Petition — Walters v. McLucas

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Supreme Cour, U. &

FILED

SEP 21 1979

IN THE MICWAGL ROBAK, JR. SLERR

SUPREME COURT OF THE see coene

October Term, 1978

no. 79-484

DONALD LEE WALTERS,

Petitioner,

vs.

JOHN L. McLUCAS, Administrator,

Federal Aviation Administration,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARVIN ZINMAN

Suite 1017.

315 West Ninth Street

Los Angeles, CA 90015

‘ (213) 622-0701

Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1978

No.

DONALD LEE WALTERS,

Petitioner,

vs.

JOHN L. McLUCAS, Administrator,

Federal Aviation Administration,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARVIN ZINMAN

Suite 1017

315 West Ninth Street

Los Angeles, CA 90015

(213) 622-0701

Attorney for Petitioner

eee

TOPICAL INDEX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

OPINION BELOW

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

R 1 .

THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGU-

LATION UNDER WHICH PETI-

TIONER'S LICENSE WAS

REVOKED IS INVALID BECAUSE

IT IS IN EXCESS OF THE

ADMINISTRATOR'S RULE

MAKING POWER

THE REGULATION IS SUBJECT

TO “VOID FOR VAGUENESS"

INFIRMITY

THE REGULATION DEPRIVES

PETITIONER OF HIS CONSTI-

TUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS BY THE FIFTH

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTI-

TUTION OF THE UNITED

» STATES

14

17

ae

24

27

Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

' Page

4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-

CEEDINGS WHICH RESULTED Cases

IN REVOCATION OF PETI-

TIONER'S LICENSE WERE

INVALID BECAUSE THE AD-

MINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

APPLIED THERETO AN IN-

APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF

Examining Board of Engineers,

Architects and Sureveyors

v. De Otero (1976)

426 U.S. 572, 49 LED.2d 65,

96 S.Ct. 2264 28

PROOF . 29

Jordan v. De George (1951)

CONCLUSION 31 241 U.S. 223, 71 S.Ct. 703 27

Lawton v. Steele

APPENDIX A - OPINION, COURT OF 152 U.S. 133, 14 S.Ct. 499 22

APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT United States Civil Services

FILED MAY 29, 1979 Commission v. National

_# Association of Letter

ORDER EXTENDING TIME Carriers (1973)

TO FILE PETITION FOR 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880 27

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

APPENDIX B

Washington v. Davis (1976)

APPENDIX C - OPINION AND ORDER 426 U.S. 229, 48 LED.2d 597,

Adopted by the NTSB | 96 S.Ct. 2040 27

on the llth day of

February 1977

Statutes

APPENDIX D - UNPUBLISHED MEMORAN-

DUM OF OPINION FILED § u.8.C. § 556 (d) 8, 29, 30

OCTOBER 6, 1975

5 v.8.C. § 706 6

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) 2

* 49 U.S.C. § 1421 9, 17-19

49 U.S.C. § 1429(a) (1)-(5) 19

49 U.S.C. § 1429(a) (6) 19

ii. iii.

—_

Page

Regulations

49 C.F.R. § 61.15 ee) ee

49 C.F.R. § 91.12 (a) 25

Rules

Revised Rules of the Supreme Court

Rule 23(h) (i) | 3

' Constitution

United States Constitution

Fifth Amendment De 265 at

iv.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1978

No.

DONALD LEE WALTERS,

Petitioner,

vs.

JOHN L. McLUCAS, Administrator,

Federal Aviation Administration,

Respondent.

&

My é eo

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TO THE HONORABLE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND

ASSOCAITE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES:

Donald Lee Walters, the petitioner

herein (petitioner), prays that a writ

of certiorari issue to review a judgment

of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit entered in the above ©

case on May 29, 1979.

l.

OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

is reported at 597 F.2d 1230 (1979) and

is printed in Appendix A hereto, infra,

pages A-l through A-6.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

sought to be reviewed by this petition

was entered on May 29, 1979. There was

no petition for rehearing of such judg-

ment in the Court of Appeals. The

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to

review the judgment of the Court of

Appeals is by certiorari as provided in

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). This petition is

timely made, prior to September 28, 1979,

pursuant to an Order Extending Time to

File Petition for Writ of Certiorari

made on August 20, 1979, by the Honor-

able William H. Rehnquist, Associate

Justice of the Supreme Court of the

United*States, as printed in Appendix

B hereto, infra, page B-l.

2.

(In an effort to comply with Rule 23(h)

(i) of the Revised Rules of this Court

which provides, in substance, that a

petition for certiorari shall show the

"time of entry" of the judgment or

decree sought to be reviewed as well as

the date of entry, counsel for peti-

tioner telephoned the office of the

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to as-

certain whether the time of the entry of

the judgment was recorded in the Office

of the Clerk and learned it was not.

Accordingly, of course, petitioner is

unable to supply such information in

this Petition.)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. A regulation adopted by the

Administrator of the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) provides that no

person who is convicted of violating any

federal or state statute relating to the

growing, sale, disposition, possession

or sale of narcotic drugs, marihuana or

depressant or stimulant drugs shall be

eligible to have issued to him within

3.

one year of the date of conviction an

aircraft pilot's license; and also

provides that any such conviction shall

be grounds for suspension or revocation

of any license previously issued. Peti-

tioner, the holder of a pilot's license,

suffered a conviction in a state court

of the kind described in the regulation,

and the FAA ordered his license revoked,

in part, because of the conviction.

Such action presents a question as to

the validity of the regulation and as

to whether as applied to petitioner by

the FAA it represents an appropriate

exercise by the federal executive branch

of its police power.

2. In the administrative proceedings

which led to revocation of petitioner's

license a question was raised as to the

"identity" of the person whom the FAA

asserted was the pilot of an offending

aircraft. The Administrative Law Judge

before whom such proceedings were had

ruled, in effect, that the petitioner

had the burden of proving the true iden-

tity of the pilot. Such ruling presents

the question for review of whether the

4.

a OD a ne

Administrative proceedings to which peti-

tioner was subject were invalidly held

because of an improper application of the

appropriate burden of proof.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the Fifth Amend-

ment of the Constitution of the United

States, which reads:

"No person shall be held to

answer for a capital, or other-

wise infamous crime, unless on

a presentment of indictment of

a Grand Jury, except in cases

arising in the land or naval

forces, or in the Militia, when

in actual service in time of War

or public danger; nor shall any

person be subject for the same

offense to be twice put in jeop-

ardy of life or limb; nor shall

be compelled in any criminal case

to be a witness against himself,

nor be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process

of law; nor shall private property

3.

be taken for public use, with-

out just compensation.";

statutes enacted by the United States

Congress, to wit: § 706 of Title 5

U.S.C. (Administrative Procedures)

which reads:

"706. Scope of review. -

To the extent necessary to deci-

sion and when presented, the

reviewing court shall decide all

relevant questions of law, in-

terpret constitutional and statu-

tory provisions, and determine

the meaning or applicability of

the terms of an agency action.

The reviewing court shall -

"(1) compel agency action

unlawfully withheld or unreason-

ably delayed; and

"(2) hold unlawful and set

aside agency action, findings,

and conclusions found to be -

"(A) arbitrary, capricious,

an abuse of discretion, or other-

wise not in accordance with law;

"(B) contrary to constitu-

tional right, power, privilege,

6.

or immunity;

"(C) ain excess of statutory

jurisdiction, authority, or

limitations, or short of statu-

tory right;

"(D) without observance of

procedure required by law;

"(E) unsupported by substan-

tial evidence in a case subject

to sections 556 and 557 of this

title or otherwise reviewed on

the record of an agency hearing

provided by statute; or

"(F) unwarranted by the

facts to the extent that the

facts are subject to trial de

novo by the reviewing court.

"In making the foregoing

determinations, the court shall

review the whole record or those

parts of it cited by a party,

and due account shall be taken

of the rule of prejudicial error.

(Sept. 6, 1966, P. L. 89-554,

$1, 80 Stat. 393.)"3

§ 556(d) of Title 5 U.S.C.

tive Procedures) which reads:

"(d) Except as otherwise

provided by statute, the propo-

nent of a rule or order has the

burden of proof. Any oral or

documentary evidence may be re-

ceived, but the agency as a

matter of policy shall provide

for the exclusion of irrelevant,

immaterial, or unduly repetitious

evidence. A sanction may not be

imposed or rule or order issued

except on consideration of the

whole record or those parts there-

of cited by a party and supported

by and in accordance with the

reliable, probative, and substan-

tial evidence. A party is enti-

tled to present his case or

defense by oral or documentary

evidence to submit rebuttal evi-

dence, and to conduct such cross-

examination as may be required for

a full and true disclosure of the

facts. In rule making or deter-

mining claims for money or benefits

8.

(Administra-

or applications for initial

licenses an agency may, when a

party will not be prejudiced

thereby, adopt procedures for

the submission of all or part

of the evidence in written form.";

and § 1421 of Title 49 U.S.C. which

reads in part:

"“(a) Minimum standards; rules and

regulations

"The Secretary of Transpor-

tation is empowered and it shall

be his duty to promote safety of

flight of civil aircraft in air

commerce by prescribing and re-

vising from time to time:

(1) Such minimum standards

governing the design, materials,

workmanship, construction, and

performance of aircraft, aircraft

engines, and propellers as may be

required in the interest of

safety;

"(2) Such minimum standards

governing appliances as may be

required in the interest of

safety;

9.

f

/

7

- §3] 1 istics rules and

regulatior

governing, 1

safety,

cing, and overhaul of aircraft},

aircraft engines, propellers/ and

appliances; (B) the equipment and

facilities for such inspection,

servicing, and overhaul; and (C)

in the discretion of the Secretary

of Transportation, the periods for,

and the manner in, which such in-

spection, servicing, and overhaul

shall be made, including provision

for examinations and reports by

properly qualified private persons

whose examinations or reports the

Secretary of Transportation may

accept in lieu of those made by

its officers and employees;

"(4) Reasonable rules and

regulations governing the reserve

supply or aircraft, aircraft

engines, propellers, appliances,

and aircraft fuel and oil, re-

quired in the interest of safety,

including the reserve supply of

aircraft fuel and oil which shall

10.

be carried in flight;

"(5) Reasonable rules and

regulations governing, in the

interest of safety, the maximum

hours or periods of service of

airmen, and other employees, of

air carriers; and

"(6) Such reasonable rules

and regulations, or minimum

standards, governing other prac-

tices, methods, and procedure,

as the Secretary of Transporta-

tion may find necessary to pro-

vide adequately for national

security and safety in air

commerce.

"(b) Consideration of needs of

service; classifications of stan-

dards, rules, regulations, and

certificates

"In prescribing standards,

rules, and regulations, and in

issuing certificates under this

sub-chapter, the Secretary of

Transportation shall give full

consideration to the duty rest-

ing upon air carriers to perform

ii.

their services with the highest

Possible degree of safety in the

public interest and to any dif-

ferences between air transporta-

tion and other air commerce; and

he shall make classifications of

such standards, rules, regula-

tions, and certificates appro-

Priate to the differences between

air transportation and other air

commerce. The Secretary of

Transportation may authorize any

aircraft, aircraft engine, pro-

peller, or appliance, for which

an aircraft certificate author-

izing use thereof in air trans-

portation has been issued, to be

used in other air commerce with-

out the issuance of a further

certificate. The Secretary of

Transportation shall exercise

and perform his powers and duties

under this chapter in such manner

as will best tend to reduce or

eliminate the Possibility of, or

reoccurrence of, accidents in air

transportation, but shall not

12.

deem himself xequired to give

preference to either air trans-

portation or other air commerce

in the administration and en

forcement of this subchapter.”;

and a regulation adopted by the Adminis-

trator of the FAA, 49 C.F.R. § 61.15,

which reads: 7

"§ 61.15 Offenses involving

narcotic drugs, marihuana, and

"(a) No person who is convicted

of violating any Federal or State

statute relating to the growing,

processing, manufacture, sale,

‘disposition, possession, transporta~-

tion, or importation of narcotic

drugs, marihuana, and ne or

stimulant drugs or substances, iS

@higible for any certificate or

rating issued under this part for

a period of 1 year after the date

of final conviction.

"(b) No person who commits an

act prohibited by § 91.12(a) of

this chapter is eligible for any

certificate or rating issued under

this part for a period of 1 year

13.

after the date of that act.

“(c) Any conviction speci-

fied in paragraph (a) of this

section or the commission of the

act referenced in paragraph (b)

of this section, is grounds for

suspending or revoking any

certificate or rating issued

under this part.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On the night of December 17, 1975,

State of Arizona law enforcement officers

were on lookout for drug smuggling acti-

vities at a remote desert airstrip. They

saw a light aircraft being operated with-

out lights moments before it landed.

After the aircraft landed and after its

engines were shut down, the officers

approached it and questioned the pilot.

He said his name was "Don Walters". They

examined four documents which the pilot

produced: a pilot's airman's certificate,

a California automobile driver's license,

a medical certificate and a radio tele-

phone operator's certificate. Each of

14.

these was in the name of and bore the

signature "Donald Lee Walters".

The officers then inspected the

aircraft and found its registration

marks were concealed by a patch which

showed false marks. Inside the cabin

they found all but one of the aircraft's

four seats had been removed and that

twelve five-gallon cans of gasoline were

in the cabin area.

On the following day an officer

again inspected the aircraft and found

its "tachometer cables", a device used

to measure revolutions per minute of the

aircraft's engines, had been discon-

nected.

No contraband substances were found

in the aircraft, on the pilot's person

or anywhere else in connection with the

case.

The officers arrested petitioner for

conspiracy to smuggle marihuana, a cri-

minal offense under Arizona state law.

Petitioner was not prosecuted for any

criminal offense arising out of the

incident.

15.

Petitioner had earlier suffered a

California state conviction for posses-

sion of marihuana for sale on February

13, 1974.

The FAA commenced proceedings to

revoke petitioner's airman's certificate,

or pilot's license, because of the

California possession for sale convic-

tion and because of violation of air

safety regulations involved in the

December 17, 1975, flight, i.e., the

patch over markings, operation of the

aircraft without lights and while the

tachometer cables were disconnected. A

hearing was had on the FAA's accusation,

as provided by law, before an Adminis-

trative Law Judge. The Law Judge issued

his initial decision to revoke peti-

tioner's license. Petitioner appealed

that decision directly to the National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) which

affirmed the Law Judge's decision. A

true copy of the NTSB's Decision is an-

nexed hereto as Appendix C, pages C-l

through C-13.

Petitioner then petitioned the

United States Court of Appeals for

16.

review of the NTSB's affirmance order.

The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction

to review the NTSB's order hy virtue

of 49 U.S.C. § 1903(d).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Petitioner believes there are special

and important reasons for granting the

petition because the Court of Appeals in

this case has decided an important ques-

tion of federal law which has not been

but should be settled by this Court and

because the Court of Appeals has in this

case decided a federal question in a way

which conflicts with applicable decisions

of this Court as hereinafter appears.

1. THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION

UNDER WHICH PETITIONER'S

LICENSE WAS REVOKED IS IN-

VALID BECAUSE IT IS IN EXCESS

OF THE ADMINISTRATOR'S RULE

MAKING POWER

In 49 U.S.C. § 1421, supra, a part

of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the

Congress empowered the Administrator to

promulgate regulations for safety in air

17.

commerce. The scope of the Administra-

tor's authority is as specified in 49

u.S.C. § 1421, surpa. The preamble to

the section provides the Administrator

is empowered to and has the duty to

"promote safety of flight". In order

to accomplish this the Congress speci-

fically empowered and required the

Administrator to proscribe rules, in

effect,

(1) establishing minimum

standards as to the design,

construction and performance

of aircraft;

(2) establishing minimum

standards as to aircraft

appliances;

(3) governing the inspec~

tion, servicing and repair of

aircraft;

(4) governing the reserve

supply of aircraft;

(5) governing the maximum

hours or periods of service

of air crew members; and

(6) to establish such

"reasonable rules and

18.

regulations, or minimum standards

and procedures" as he might find

necessary to "provide adequately

for national security and safety

in air commerce" (underlining by

counsel).

The FAA caused petitioner's license

to be revoked, in part, because of peti-

tioner's 1974 California marihuana con-

viction pursuant to a regulation the

Administrator adopted, 61.15, supra, to

that effect. Such regulation, however,

as it was applied to petitioner exceeded

the Administrator's authority from the

Congress because such authority was ex-

pressly limited by the enabling legis-

lation, 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a), supra, which

went no further than to empower the

Administrator to adopt regulations as to

matters specified by 49 U.S.C. § 1429 (a)

(1) through (5) which are patently in-

applicable to petitioner, and as to 49

U.S.C. § 1429(a) (6) which limits such

authority to situations involving

"national security", also clearly not

involved, and "safety in air commerce"

19.

(underlining by counsel) which petitioner

contends is also not involved in this

case insofar as the regulation is

concerned.

There is no conceivable, reasonable,

or other relationship between a convic-

tion for possession of marihuana for

sale standing alone and safety in air

commerce.

There is no intelligible, rational

basis for reasoning that one convicted

of possessing marihuana for sale pre-

sents, when later piloting an aircraft,

simply because of such conviction, a

hazard or an adverse factor as to safety

in air commerce.

Because the regulation makes no

effort to relate to air safety, it is

in excess of the Administrator's autho-

rity and as such it was an illegal and

inadequate basis upon which to premise

the revocation of petitioner's pilot's

license.

The Court of Appeals did not, in

counsel's opinion, adequately and fairly

consider this argument. That Court said

20.

simply in its Opinion, page A-5 (Appendix A)

"We hold that there is a rational

‘relation between a conviction for

the possession of drugs for sale

and the unsafe use of aircraft

for drugs smuggling, and that

61.15 is constitutionally valid.”

One must. fairly ask what that

"rational relationship" is. Petitioner

cannot discern the existence of any such

relationship by any intelligent measure.

Moreover, petitioner observes that the

Court of Appeals' premise is improper

since there was no evidence presented to

the Law Judge that the aircraft was in-

volved in drug smuggling.

There could conceivably be a rela-

tionship between a drug related criminal

conviction or any criminal conviction

and air safety if and only if the convic-

tion in some way had something to do with

operation or prospective operation of an

aircraft. The regulation involved here

contains no specification that could

relate it to safety in air commerce.

21.

A plain reading of the regulation

makes it clear that it was enacted

for punitive purposes, without any

real consideration having been given

to air safety factors. The Congress

gave the Administrator no power or

authority to adopt regulations for

punishment purposes. The authority

delegated the Administrator was to

promulgate air safety and this, as

applied to petitioner by 61.15, the

Administrator did not do.

Besides being beyond the authority

- and power of the Administrator, the

regulation is invalid for yet another

reason; namely, it is an improper exer-

cise of the police power of the execu-

tive. There is no “litmus test" by

which the limit of restraint on govern-

ment police power by judicial action

may be measured. This Court's earlier

classic statement of the rule, announced

in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14

S.Ct. 499, seems still valid today:

"To justify the state in inter-

posing its authority in behalf

of the public, it must appear -

22.

First, the interests of the

public require such interference

and, second, that the means are

reasonably necessary for the

accomplishment of the purpose,

and not unduly oppressive upon

individuals."

Petitioner does not dispute the power

of the Administrator to adopt regulations

to enhance air safety. He does, however,

dispute the assertion of power to punish

him without any demonstrated relationship

to air safety by revocation of his

license because of his earlier conviction

of a crime which had no relationship to

air commerce. Such action is beyond pro-

per exercise of the executive's police

power.

The Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia considered this question in

James D. Rahm, petitioner, v. NTSB, res-

pondent, case No. 74-1959 (Unpublished

Memorandum of Opinion filed October 6,

1975, copy attached as Appendix D).

That court held the regulation to be

within the Administrator's power

23.

because, said the Court:

"In general, the commission

of drug-related crimes indicates

that the ‘applicant would not be

compliance-minded regarding the

many requirements necessary for

safety in air commerce ... .'

More specifically, a rational

connection exists between past

drug trafficking and future un-

safe aircraft operations. A

known drug trafficker is sub-

stantially more likely than the

average person to engage in such

traffic in the future."

Petitioner urges this reasoning be

rejected. It cannot suffice to create

in the Administrator a power not given

him by the Congress.

2. THE REGULATION IS SUBJECT TO

"VOID FOR VAGUENESS" INFIRMITY

The regulation is in three parts,

subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c). Sub-

paragraph (a) provides that one who has

been convicted of any state or federal

24.

law relating to growing, processing,

manufacture, selling, disposing, pos-

session, transporting or importation

of drugs shall not be eligible to have

a license issued to him "for a period

of 1 year after the date of final

conviction". Subparagraph (b) sets

forth a like prohibition for a like

effective period for those who operate

an aircraft with knowledge that it

carries drugs, referring to Federal

Aviation Regulation 91.12(a) which

reads:

"Except as provided in para-

graph (b) of this section, no

person may operate a civil air-

craft within the United States

with knowledge that narcotic

drugs, marihuana, and depressant

or stimulant drugs or substances

as defined in Federal or State

statutes are carried in the

aircraft."

‘

Read as a whole one who has suffered

a described conviction can't have a

license issued to him until 1 year after

25.

the conviction is final but presumably

would not be under disability if 1 year

has elapsed; anyone actually found in

the act of knowingly operating an air-

craft which is carrying contraband can't

have a license issued to him until l

year after such illegal operation; and,

as to someone who already holds a

license, his license may be revoked or

suspended irrespective of when the con-

viction occurred, and without limit as

to duration, i.e., the conviction could

have taken place at any time.

In this case the Administrator,

relying on his regulation, reached back

from the December 17, 1975 incident to

an earlier conviction as a ground for

revocation.

The test announced by this Court for

application of the "void for vagueness"

doctrine as applied to the federal

government by the Fifth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States is

whether the language of a statute or

rule conveys a sufficiently definite

warning so as to proscribe conduct when

measured by common understanding and

26.

practices, Jordan v. De George (1951)

261 8.8. 223-: 72 8:Ct. 763s United

States Civil Service Commission v.

National Association of Letter Carriers

(1973) 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880.

Petitioner believes the regulation

read as a whole by this measure is sub-

ject to the "void for vagueness

infirmity" because a common reading of

it would not give the reader fair warn-

ing of the effect of a conviction upon

his license giving the lack of any time

frame in subparagraph (c) and the in-

clusion of precise time frames in

subparagraphs (a) and (b).

3. THE REGULATION DEPRIVES

PETITIONER OF HIS CONSTITU-

TIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES

"Due process". as a guaranty against

conduct of the federal executive branch

forbids invidious, unjustified classifi-

cations among and between citizens,

Washington v. Davis (1976) 426 U.S. 229,

48 LED.2d 597, 96 S.Ct. 2040;

27.

Examining Board of Engineers, Architects 4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

and Surveyors v. De Otero (1976) 426 WHICH RESULTED IN REVOCATION

OF PETITIONER'S LICENSE WERE

U.S. 572, 49 LED.2d 65, 96 S.Ct. 2264. INVALID BECAUSE THE ADMINIS-

; TRATIVE LAW JUDGE APPLIED

The regulation to which petitioner THERETO AN INAPPROPRIATE

was subjected creates such discrimina- STANDARD OF PROOF

tory invidious classification on the

one hand, between those who might be At the hearing before the Adminis-

convicted of a drug offense while un- trative Law Judge a question arose, on

the Administrator's proof, as to the

licensed who may then wait 1 year and

| identity of the pilot of the aircraft

during the December 17, 1975 incident.

One of the state officers testified he

apply for a license free of disability,

or those who might be found operating

an aircraft with knowledge that contra-

was unable to positively identify the

would be licensed) who can then wait 1 pilot as one and the same person as

year until they would be eligible for | depicted on petitioner's automobile

driver's license. In announcing his

|

{

band is on board (and these presumably |

i

license free of disability; and on the

other hand, between those, like peti- | decision the Judge said, "In the face

tioner, already licensed, who can find of all this, it is necessary for the

their licenses revoked or suspended | pilot to come forth and say who he was

for any transaction committed at any | if he was not Don Lee Walters (peti-

time without limitation and without the | tioner) ."

ability to find themselves free of | : Petitioner's quarrel with this is

disability on account of the passage of that, in effect, it placed the burden

time. of proof in the proceedings as to

identity on the petitioner, doing vio-

lence to § 556(d) of Title 5 which

| expressly recites, in part:

28. | 29.

"the proponent of a rule or order

has the burden of proof"

The burden this ruling placed upon

petitioner was intolerable. In effect,

it required him to generate proof which

should legally have been part of his

"accuser's" case against him.

The Court of Appeals seemingly chose

to simply pass over this clear and

simple mandate of the statute, saying

simply at page A-6 (Appendix A).

of the Opinion:

"Proof by a preponderance of

reliable, probative, and sub-

stantial evidence is the

standard."

citing 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), but not comment-

ing upon or discussing that part of the

section which expressly provides the

burden of proof to be upon the proponent

of an order, i.e., the Administrator.

30.

4 ae 2

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons petitioner

prays the Writ of Certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

MARVIN ZINMAN

Attorney for Petitioner

31.

APPENDIX A

tO EIT SE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DONALD LEE WALTERS, )

)

Petitioner, ) No.

Vv. ) 77-1837

)

JOHN L. McLUCAS, Administrator, )

Federal Aviation Administration,) OPINION

)

Respondent. )

PIULeE D

MAY 29, 1979

EMIL E. MELFI, JR.

CLERK, U.S. COURT

OF APPEALS

Petition to Review a Decision of the

National Transportation Safety Board

Before: KENNEDY and HUG, Circuit Judges,

and SOLOMON,* District Judge

Per Curiam:

Walters petitions this court to

review an order of the National Trans-

portation Safety Board (Board which up-

held the revocation of his private pilot

licensed by the Federal Aviation Admin-

istration. The basis for the revocation

* The Honorable Gus J. Solomon, Senior

United States District Judge for the

District of Oregon sitting by designation.

A-l.

were that he violated Federal Aviation

Regulations and had been convicted of

possessing marijuana for sale.

On the night of December 17, 1975,

Deputies Chapin and Mergell of the Mojave

County, Arizona Sheriff's Office kept

watch for drug smuggling activities at an

isolated and deserted airstrip. A few

hours after the Deputies arrived, they

heard a plane flying low over the air-

strip. The Deputies did not see the

plane until moments before it landed;

until then the plane was being operated

. without lights.

When the engines were shut down,

Chapin approached the plane and ques-

tioned the pilot. The pilot identified

himself as "Don Walters.“ Chapin then

examined four documents which the pilot

produced: a pilot certificate, Califor-

nia driver's license, a medical certi-

ficate, and a radio telephone operator's

certificate. Each document was in the

name of and signed "Donald Lee Walters."

The Deputies inpected the plane and

found that its registration marks were

A-2.

concealed by a patch which showed false

marks. Inside the cabin, where all but

one of the four seats had been removed,

the Deputies found 12 five-gallon cans

of gasoline.

The pilot was arrested for conspir-

acy to smuggle marijuana.

On the following day, a third Deputy

inspected the plane and found that the

tachometer cables had been disconnected.

Later, the Deputies found that the plane

was owned and registered in California

by the Petitioner's business partner.

In May 1976, the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) revoked Petitioner's

pilot license because of his 1974 mari-

juana conviction, 14 C.F.R. § 61.15,2/

1/ 14 C.F.R. § 61.15 provides that "(a)

No person who is convicted of vio-

lating any Federal or State statute re-

lating to the growing, processing, manu-

facture, sale, disposition, possession,

transportation, or importation of ...

marihuana . .. is eligible for any

certificate or rating issued under this

part for a period of 1 year after the

date of final conviction.

"...(c¢c) Any conviction specified in

paragraph (a) of this section...is

(continued)

A-3.

and because of six violations of Federal

Aviation Regulations committed during

the flight on December 17, 1975.

Petitioner appealed asserting that

14 C.F.R. § 61.15 was invalid because it

exceeded the FAA's statutory authority

and because the FAA lacked "unequivocal"

proof that he was the arrested pilot.

At a hearing before an Administrative

Law Judge in September 1976, Deputy

Chapin testified that the photograph on

the driver's license was of the pilot he

arrested.

Petitioner did not testify or call

witnesses. The Judge found that the FAA

proved, by a preponderance of "credible,

reliable, probative, and substantial

evidence," that Petitioner was the ar-

rested pilot and that he violated Federal

Aviation Regulations.

1/ (continuted)

De grounds for suspending or revoking

any certificate or rating issued under

this part."

The Judge upheld the FAA order of

revocation after rejecting Petitioner's

contentions that section 61.15 exceeded

the FAA's statutory authority and was

constitutionally invalid.

Petitioner again appealed, this time

to the National Transportation Safety

Board. The Board held that section 61.15

is reasonably related to the safety pur-

poses of the Federal Aviation Act, 49

U.S.C. § 1421 et seg. and that there is

a rational connection between drug traf-

ficking in the past and unsafe aircraft

operations in the future. The Board

also decided that the Judge applied the

standard of proof on the issue of iden-

tity. It found no grounds for disturbing

the Judge's findings of fact on that is-

sue and affirmed.

In this court, Petitioner renews

both challenges to the revocation order.

We hold that there is a rational

relation between a conviction for the

possession of drugs for sale and the un-

safe use of aircraft for drugs smuggling,

and that section 61.15 is constitution-

ally valid.

A-5.

We also reject Walters' contention

that the Judge applied the wrong stand-

ard of proof on the issue of identity.

The Sheriff's Deputies’ testimony made

out a prima facie case that Petitioner

was the pilot they arrested. The burden

shifted to Petitioner to present evi-

dence that he was not the pilot. Newman

v. Shaffer, 494 F.2d 1219 (2nd Cir.

1974).

Walters presented no eivdence.

@..0: by a preponderance of reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence is

the proper standard. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).

2/

Here the agency met that standard.—

The petition for review of the revo-

cation order is therefore

DENIED.

2/ Even if the Petitioner were correct

in contending that the identity issue

must be proved by "clear, convincing, and

unequivocal evidence," the evidence here

Satisfied that standard.

APPENDIX B

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. A-149

DONALD LEE WALTERS,

Petitioner,

Ve

JOHN L. McLUCAS, Administrator

Federal Aviation Administration

ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

UPON CONSIDERATION of the application

of counsel for petitioner(s),

IT IS ORDERED that the time for

filing a petition for writ of certiorari

in the above-entitled cause be, and-the

same is hereby, extended to and including

September 28 , 1979

/sf/ William H. Rehnquist

Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court of the

United States

Dated this 20th

day of August , 1979

B-l.

APPENDIX C

SERVED: February 16, 1977

NTSB Order No. EA-963

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Adopted by the NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD at its office in

Washington, D. C. on the llth

day of February 1977.

JOHN L. McLUCAS, Administrator, )

Federal Aviation Administration,

Complaint,

Docket

S

E-3294

)

)

Vv. )

DONALD LEE WALTERS,

)

)

Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

Respondent has appealed from the

initial decision of Administrative Law

Judge Robert R. Boyd, issued orally at

the conclusion of the hearing held in

this proceeding on September 23, 1976 .2/

1/ An excerpt from the hearing trans-

cript containing the initial decision

is attached.

C-l.

The law judge therein found that the

Administrator had proven, by a prepon-

derance of the credible, reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence, the

charges set forth in the complaint, as

follows:

1. Respondent's airman certificate

was subject to suspension or

revocation, under the terns of

section 61.15(c) of ve Federal

Aviation Regulations— (FAR),

2/ Section 61.15(a) and (c) provides, in

~ pertinent part, as follows:

"§61.15 Offenses involving narcotic

drugs, marihuana, and depres-

sant or stimulant drugs or

substances.

(a) No person who is convicted of

violating any Federal or state statute

relating to the growing, processing,

manufacture, sale, disposition, posses-

sion, transportation, or importation of

narcotic drugs, marihuana, and depressant

or stimulant drugs or substances, is

eligible for any certificate or rating

issued under this part for a period of l

year after the date of final conviction.

* * * * * * *

(c) Any conviction specified in

paragraph (a) of this section or the com-

mission of the act referenced in paragraph

(b) of this section, is grounds for sus-

pending or revoking any certificate or

rating issued under this part."

C-2.

by virtue of respondent's having

been convicted, on February 13,

1974, in the Superior Court of

the State of California, County

of Riverside, of a violation of

section 11359 of the California

Health and Safety Code, to wit:

possession of marihuana for sale2/

2. With respect to a nighttime VFR

(visual flight rules) flight con-

ducted by respondent on December

17, 1975, in Piper PA-23-250,

N4895) (property of another), in

the vicinity of McCraken Airstrip

(approximately 40 miles southeast

of Yucca, Arizona), respondent

was in violation of the following

provisions of the FAR:

3/ Respondent was sentenced to serve 6

months in the custody of the Sheriff

of Riverside County. The conviction was

affirmed by the California Court of Appeal

and, on April 14, 1975, the Superior Court

ordered execution of the sentence.

C-3.

a. Section 91.33(a) and 91.33(c) (1),

(2), and (3) 4/ in that respondent

operated an aircraft in VFR flig

light at night when it was with-

out (1) an operating tachometer

for each engine, (2), an approved

anticollision light system, and

(3) approved position lights.

4/ Section 91.33(a),(b) (4), and (c)(1),-

(2), and (3) provides, in pertinent

Part, as follows:

"Seba ae Powered civil aircraft with

Standard category U.S. air-

worthiness certificates;

instrument and equipment

requirements.

(a) General. Except as provided in

Paragraphs (c)(3) and (e) of this section,

no person may operate a powered civil

aircraft with a standard category U.S.

airworthiness certificate in any opera-

tion described in Paragraphs (b) through

(f) of this section unless that aircraft

contains the instruments and equipment

specified in those paragraphs (or FAA-

approved equivalents) for that type of

Operation, and those instruments and

items of equipment are in operable

condition.

(b) Visual flight rules (day). For

VFR flight during the day the following

instruments and equipment are required.

* * * * * * *

(4) Tachometer for each engine.

(continued)

C=-4,

b. Section 45.21(a),>/ in that res-

pondent operated aU.S. registered

aircraft without the required

nationality and registration marks.

4/ (continued)

* * * * * * *

(c) Visual flight rules (night).

For VFR flight at night the following

instruments and equipment are required.

(1) Instruments and equipment spe-

cified in paragraph (b) of this section.

(2) Approved position lights.

(3) An approved aviation red or

aviation white anticollision light sys-

tem on all large aircraft, on all small

aircraft when required by the aircraft's

airworthiness certificate, and on all

other small aircraft when required by the

aircraft's airworthiness certificate, and

on all other small aircraft after August

11, 1972. Anticollision light systems

initially installed after August 11l, 1971,

on aircraft for which a type certificate

was issued or applied for before August

ll, 1971, must at least meet the anti-

collision light standards of Parts 23,

25, 27, or 29, as applicable, that were

in effect on August 10, 1971, except that

the color may be either aviation red or

aviation white. In the event of failure

of any light of the anticollision light

system, operations with the aircraft may

be continued to a stop where repairs or

replacement can be made."

5/ Section 45.21(a) provides, in perti-

nent part, as follows:

(continued)

C-5.

c. Section 45.21(b) ,2/ in that res-

pondent placed on an aircraft a

design mark, or symbol that modi-

fied or confused the nationality

and registration marks.

dad. Section 91.9,2/ in that respon-

dent's operation of the aircraft

under the above circumstances, and

by virtue of carrying on board 12

plastic containers filled with

aviation fuel, was careless so as

S/ (continued)

"§45.21 General.

(a) Except as provided in §45.22,

no person may operate a U.S. registered

aircraft unless that aircraft displays

nationality and registration marks in

accordance with the requirements of this

section and §§ 45.33."

6/ Section 45.21 (b) provides, in perti-

nent part, as follows:

"§45.21(b) General.

* * * * * * *

(b) Unless otherwise authorized by

the Administrator, no person may place

On any aircraft a design, mark, or

symbol that modifies or confuses the

nationality and registration marks."

7/ Section 91.9 reads as follows: "No

person may operate an aircraft in a

careless or reckless manner so as to

endanger the life or property of another."

C-6.

to endanger the life or property

of another.

The law judge thereupon affirmed the

Administrator's order revoking respon-

dent's private pilot certificate.

In support of his appeal, respondent,

through counsel, has filed a brief where-

in he argues that, with respect to the

marihuana conviction, the regulations

under which this conviction forms the

basis of certificate action are constitu-

tionally invalid and exceed the scope of

authority delegated to the Administrator.

Respondent further contends that, in re-

gard to the incident of December 17,

1975, the Administrator has not proved by

clear, convincing, and unequivocal evi-

dence that respondent was the person who

was the pilot of the aircraft involved in

the alleged safety violations.

Upon consideration of the briefs of

the parties, and the entire record, the

Board has determined that safety in air

commerce or air transportation and the

public interest require affirmation of

the Administrator's order of revocation.

C-7.

Co

We adopt as our own the findings of the

law judge.

In regard to respondent's first argu-

ment on appeal, it has been our consis-

tent position that the Board lacks juris-

diction, and thus is not the proper

forum, to consider attacks on the vali-

dity or wisdom of the Federal Aviation

Regulations. We note, in any event, that

a similar attack was made on section

61.15 of the FAR as part of an appeal

from a previous Board decision®/ to the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.

Circuit. The Court, in rejecting that

attack, ruled that section 61.15 "is

reasonably related to the statute's

safety purpose" and that "a rational

connection exists between past drug traf-

ficking and future unsafe aircraft

8/ Administrator v. Rahm, Order EA-600,

August 14, 1974. The Rahm case was

alike the instant one in the significant

respect that the marijuana conviction did

not involve the utilization by the res-

pondent of the priviliges of his airman

certificate.

n9/

dity of section 61.15 has been judicially

operations. Consequently, the vali-

affirmed.

Respondent's second argument is like-

wise without merit. He argues that the

standard of proof which should have been

applied to the pilot identity issue is

clear, convincing, and unequivocal evi-

dence. The only judicial decision cited

in support of this stnadard is restricted

by its terms to deportation cases .29/

Safety enforcement proceedings adjudicated

by the Board are governed by the Adminis-

trative procedure Act, which provides that

sanctions may be imposed and orders is-

sued only if "supported by and in accor-

dance with the reliable, probative and

ii/ The Board has

therefore applied the aforesaid standard

substantial evidence."

of proof in enforcement cases, and the

various courts of appeals, in reviewing

9/ Rahm v. N.T.S.B. Case No. 74-1959,

(C.A.D.C. Oct. 6, 1975).

16/ Woodby v. Immigration and Naturali-

Zation Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).

11/ 5 U.S.C. 556(d).

Cc-9.

numerous Board decisions, have never

indicated that any other standard should

be applied.

In the instant case, the Administra-

tor has clearly proven, by a preponder-

ance of the reliable, probative, and

substantial evidence, that respondent

was the pilot of the aircraft involved

in the inei@ent of December 17, 1975.22/

A narcotics enforcement team agent from

the Mojave County Sheriff's Office,

Kingman, Arizona, testified that, when

the pilot embarked from the aircraft,

he (the agent) asked the pilot for id-

entification and was given a private

pilot certificate, medical certificate,

radio telephone operator permit, and

state driver's license, all of which

contained respondent's name and

12/ Respondent's attorney, in his clos-

ing argument to the law judge,

stated that "Under the circumstances

in this case, I would admit that there

is probative and substantial evidence

with respect to the identity of the

person who was flying the plane."

(fe. 56).

C-10.

signature.13/ In addition, when the

pilot was asked who he was, he responded

"Don Walters." Finally, another witness

testified that he was informed that the

registered owner of the aircraft in-

volved in the incident was a partner of

respondent .24/

From the evidence summarized above,

it is apparent that the Administrator

presented a prima facie case identifying

respondent as the pilot of the plane in

question. Respondnet presented no evi-

dence whatsoever in rebuttal .22/ and thus

13/ The agent also testified that, while

he was not absolutely positive the

pilot matched the picture on the driver's

license, he believed it "with the same

authority . . . as if I looked at your

driver's license and saw your picture

and compared it to your face." (Tr. 33)

14/ The above testimony, although hear-

say, is admissible as evidence in

administrative proceedings.

15/ Respondent's rebuttal does not neces-

sarily require him to establish that

someone other than himself was the pilot

as the law judge apparently indicated in

his decision (Tr. 68). However, once the

Administrator has established a prima

facie case, the burden of going forward

(continued)

C-ll.

the Administrator must be found to have

borne the burden of proof on this issue.

Turning finally to the matter of

sanction, it is our conclusion, consi-

dering the marihuana conviction in con-

juction with the numerous violations

associated with the incident of December

17, 1975, that revocation of respondent's

airman certificate is fully warranted.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Respondent's appeal be and it

hereby is denied:

2. The Administrator's order and the

initial decision be and they

hereby are affirmed; and

3. The revocation of respondent's

private pilot certificate shall

commence 30 days after service

of this order .2°/

15/ (continued) with the evidence shifts

to the respondent. Respondent must

then present some evidence tending to

disprove that he was the pilot, or run

the risk of a finding favorable to the

Administrator.

16/ For purposes of this order, the res-

pondent must physically surrender his

(continued)

C-12.

TODD, Chairman, BAILEY, Vice Chairman,

McADAMS, HOGUE, and HALEY, Members of the

Board, concurred in the above opinion and

order.

16/ (continued) certificate to an appro-

priate representative of the Federal

Aviation Administration purusant to

section 61.19(f) FAR.

C-13.

APPENDIX D

wi

> y

DJ#88-215 APPELLATE Mutterperl:LS

NOTE TO BE PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the District of Columbia Circuit

No. 74-1959 September Term, 1975

James D. Rahm, Petitioner

Vv.

National Transportation Safety Board,

Respondent

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Before: LEVENTHAL AND WILKEY, Circuit

Judges and SOLOMON, * United

States Senior District Judge

for the District of Oregon

JUDGMENT

This cause ‘came on for consideration

on a petition for review of an order of

the National Transportation Safety Board

and briefs were filed by the parties.

On consideration of the foregoing, it is

* Sitting by designation pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 294(d)

D-l.

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by this Court

that the order of the National Trans-

portation Safety Board on review herein

is hereby affirmed, for the reasons set

forth in the attached memorandum.

Per Curiam

For the Court

/s/ Hugh E. Kline

Hugh E. Kline

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

for the District of Columbia Circuit

FILED OCT 6, 1975

HUGH E. KLINE

Clerk

No. 74-1959 - James D. Rahm v. National

Transportation Safety Board

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner appeals from the Opinion

and Order of the National Transportation

Safety Board ,2/ which upheld the Initial

Decision of the Administrative Law

Judge2/

3/

Order— revoking Petitioner's private

modifying the F.A.A. Emergency

pilot license. The modified order under

review suspends Petitioner's license for

eight months, pursuant to section 61.15

of the Federal Aviation Regulations. 4/

That section provides that any convic-

tion under a Federal or State statute

relating to manufacture, sale, possession

or transportation of drugs or marijuana

is grounds for suspending or revoking

any certificate or rating. Petitioner

1l/ N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-600, Docket No.

SE-2283 (August 14, 1977)

2/ Opinion of Administrative Law Judge

Charles A. Smith, March 27, 1974.

Appendix, at 98.

3/ Emergency Order of Revocation, Case

No. WE-73-0G-533 (July 24, 1973).

4/ 14 C.F.R. § 61.15

D-3.

was convicted, upon a pleas of guilty,

of conspiring to import marihuana in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 963

(1970) .2/

Petitioner attacks the Board's

order on two grounds. First, he asserts

that section 61.15 of the Federal Avia-

tion Regulations is invalid on its face

as exceeding the authority delegated to

the Administrator under 49 U.S.C. § 1421

(a) (6). Second, he argues that even if

the regulation is itself valid, its

application to petitioner is not sup-

ported by substantial evidence, and

therefore must be reversed.

I

Section 61.15 of the Federal Aviation

Regulations provides, inter alia, that

any conviction on a Federal or State drug

offense is grounds for suspension or revo-

6

cation of any pilot certificate or rating.—

5/ United States v. James Douglas Rahm,

Case No. WE-73-OG-533 (July 24, 1973).

6/ 14 C.F.R. § 61.15

The issue raised is whether the regula-

tion is within the delegation to the

F.A.A. Administrator, under 49 U.S.C.

§ 1421(a) (6), authorizing reasonable

rules as "necessary to provide ade-

quately for national security and safety

in air commerce." For the reasons set

out in the Notice of Proposed Rulemak-

ing,’ we conclude that the rule is

reasonably related to the statute's

safety purpose. In general, the commis-

sion of drug-related crimes indicates

that "the applicant would not be com-

pliance-minded regarding the many

requirements necessary for safety in

air commerce ...." More specifically,

a rational connection exists between

past drug trafficking and future unsafe

aircraft operations. A known drug

trafficker is substantially more likely

than the average person to engage in

such traffic in the future. Anda

smuggler with access to a plane is likely

to use it in a hazardous manner, flying

low to escape detection by border sur-

veillance. Although agencies do not

7/ 34 Fed. Reg. 12713 (1969).

D-5.

a

additional penalties for criminal of-

fenses, the nexus between the Board's

obligation to protect air safety and

illicit smuggling justifies the instant

regulation. It is no bar to the Regula-

tion that it also advances a broader

public policy of impairing illegal drug

traffic.

II

The suspension is also challenged on

the grounds that section 61.15 was im-

properly applied in this case, since

nothing in Petitioner's conduct indicated

a disposition to fly in an unsafe manner.

Petitioner freely admits, however, his

willful violation of the drug laws, which

manifests at least a temporary lapse from

the obedience to regulations which is the

sine gua non of air safety in our crowded

skies.

Petitioner did not actually use his

airplane in the smuggling operation, and

there is no evidence that he has flown

it in an unsafe manner. However, Peti-

tioner testified that on three separate

occasions he used his aircraft to fly a

D-6.

friend involved in the smuggling opera-

tion roundtrip across the country, for

which he was paid $2,000.00. At the

time of apprehension, Petitioner carried

a briefcase filled with money and con-

taining one marijuana cigarette. More-

over, Petitioner continues to have

access to an airplane. All of these

factors negate any conclusion that the

order of suspension was an unreasonable

and unnecessary application of section

61.15, in light of both the particular

facts of Petitioner's individual case

and the safety purpose which the regu-

lation is designed to serve.

D=-7.

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