Petition — Walters v. McLucas
Supreme Court brief1979
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Supreme Cour, U. &
FILED
SEP 21 1979
IN THE MICWAGL ROBAK, JR. SLERR
SUPREME COURT OF THE see coene
October Term, 1978
no. 79-484
DONALD LEE WALTERS,
Petitioner,
vs.
JOHN L. McLUCAS, Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARVIN ZINMAN
Suite 1017.
315 West Ninth Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
‘ (213) 622-0701
Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1978
No.
DONALD LEE WALTERS,
Petitioner,
vs.
JOHN L. McLUCAS, Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARVIN ZINMAN
Suite 1017
315 West Ninth Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
(213) 622-0701
Attorney for Petitioner
eee
TOPICAL INDEX
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
OPINION BELOW
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
R 1 .
THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGU-
LATION UNDER WHICH PETI-
TIONER'S LICENSE WAS
REVOKED IS INVALID BECAUSE
IT IS IN EXCESS OF THE
ADMINISTRATOR'S RULE
MAKING POWER
THE REGULATION IS SUBJECT
TO “VOID FOR VAGUENESS"
INFIRMITY
THE REGULATION DEPRIVES
PETITIONER OF HIS CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS BY THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED
» STATES
14
17
ae
24
27
Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
' Page
4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEEDINGS WHICH RESULTED Cases
IN REVOCATION OF PETI-
TIONER'S LICENSE WERE
INVALID BECAUSE THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
APPLIED THERETO AN IN-
APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF
Examining Board of Engineers,
Architects and Sureveyors
v. De Otero (1976)
426 U.S. 572, 49 LED.2d 65,
96 S.Ct. 2264 28
PROOF . 29
Jordan v. De George (1951)
CONCLUSION 31 241 U.S. 223, 71 S.Ct. 703 27
Lawton v. Steele
APPENDIX A - OPINION, COURT OF 152 U.S. 133, 14 S.Ct. 499 22
APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT United States Civil Services
FILED MAY 29, 1979 Commission v. National
_# Association of Letter
ORDER EXTENDING TIME Carriers (1973)
TO FILE PETITION FOR 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880 27
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
APPENDIX B
Washington v. Davis (1976)
APPENDIX C - OPINION AND ORDER 426 U.S. 229, 48 LED.2d 597,
Adopted by the NTSB | 96 S.Ct. 2040 27
on the llth day of
February 1977
Statutes
APPENDIX D - UNPUBLISHED MEMORAN-
DUM OF OPINION FILED § u.8.C. § 556 (d) 8, 29, 30
OCTOBER 6, 1975
5 v.8.C. § 706 6
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) 2
* 49 U.S.C. § 1421 9, 17-19
49 U.S.C. § 1429(a) (1)-(5) 19
49 U.S.C. § 1429(a) (6) 19
ii. iii.
—_
Page
Regulations
49 C.F.R. § 61.15 ee) ee
49 C.F.R. § 91.12 (a) 25
Rules
Revised Rules of the Supreme Court
Rule 23(h) (i) | 3
' Constitution
United States Constitution
Fifth Amendment De 265 at
iv.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1978
No.
DONALD LEE WALTERS,
Petitioner,
vs.
JOHN L. McLUCAS, Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration,
Respondent.
&
My é eo
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TO THE HONORABLE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
ASSOCAITE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES:
Donald Lee Walters, the petitioner
herein (petitioner), prays that a writ
of certiorari issue to review a judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit entered in the above ©
case on May 29, 1979.
l.
OPINION BELOW
The Opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
is reported at 597 F.2d 1230 (1979) and
is printed in Appendix A hereto, infra,
pages A-l through A-6.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
sought to be reviewed by this petition
was entered on May 29, 1979. There was
no petition for rehearing of such judg-
ment in the Court of Appeals. The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
review the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is by certiorari as provided in
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). This petition is
timely made, prior to September 28, 1979,
pursuant to an Order Extending Time to
File Petition for Writ of Certiorari
made on August 20, 1979, by the Honor-
able William H. Rehnquist, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United*States, as printed in Appendix
B hereto, infra, page B-l.
2.
(In an effort to comply with Rule 23(h)
(i) of the Revised Rules of this Court
which provides, in substance, that a
petition for certiorari shall show the
"time of entry" of the judgment or
decree sought to be reviewed as well as
the date of entry, counsel for peti-
tioner telephoned the office of the
Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to as-
certain whether the time of the entry of
the judgment was recorded in the Office
of the Clerk and learned it was not.
Accordingly, of course, petitioner is
unable to supply such information in
this Petition.)
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. A regulation adopted by the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) provides that no
person who is convicted of violating any
federal or state statute relating to the
growing, sale, disposition, possession
or sale of narcotic drugs, marihuana or
depressant or stimulant drugs shall be
eligible to have issued to him within
3.
one year of the date of conviction an
aircraft pilot's license; and also
provides that any such conviction shall
be grounds for suspension or revocation
of any license previously issued. Peti-
tioner, the holder of a pilot's license,
suffered a conviction in a state court
of the kind described in the regulation,
and the FAA ordered his license revoked,
in part, because of the conviction.
Such action presents a question as to
the validity of the regulation and as
to whether as applied to petitioner by
the FAA it represents an appropriate
exercise by the federal executive branch
of its police power.
2. In the administrative proceedings
which led to revocation of petitioner's
license a question was raised as to the
"identity" of the person whom the FAA
asserted was the pilot of an offending
aircraft. The Administrative Law Judge
before whom such proceedings were had
ruled, in effect, that the petitioner
had the burden of proving the true iden-
tity of the pilot. Such ruling presents
the question for review of whether the
4.
a OD a ne
Administrative proceedings to which peti-
tioner was subject were invalidly held
because of an improper application of the
appropriate burden of proof.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This case involves the Fifth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United
States, which reads:
"No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment of indictment of
a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War
or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property
3.
be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.";
statutes enacted by the United States
Congress, to wit: § 706 of Title 5
U.S.C. (Administrative Procedures)
which reads:
"706. Scope of review. -
To the extent necessary to deci-
sion and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, in-
terpret constitutional and statu-
tory provisions, and determine
the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action.
The reviewing court shall -
"(1) compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreason-
ably delayed; and
"(2) hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be -
"(A) arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law;
"(B) contrary to constitu-
tional right, power, privilege,
6.
or immunity;
"(C) ain excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statu-
tory right;
"(D) without observance of
procedure required by law;
"(E) unsupported by substan-
tial evidence in a case subject
to sections 556 and 557 of this
title or otherwise reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute; or
"(F) unwarranted by the
facts to the extent that the
facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
"In making the foregoing
determinations, the court shall
review the whole record or those
parts of it cited by a party,
and due account shall be taken
of the rule of prejudicial error.
(Sept. 6, 1966, P. L. 89-554,
$1, 80 Stat. 393.)"3
§ 556(d) of Title 5 U.S.C.
tive Procedures) which reads:
"(d) Except as otherwise
provided by statute, the propo-
nent of a rule or order has the
burden of proof. Any oral or
documentary evidence may be re-
ceived, but the agency as a
matter of policy shall provide
for the exclusion of irrelevant,
immaterial, or unduly repetitious
evidence. A sanction may not be
imposed or rule or order issued
except on consideration of the
whole record or those parts there-
of cited by a party and supported
by and in accordance with the
reliable, probative, and substan-
tial evidence. A party is enti-
tled to present his case or
defense by oral or documentary
evidence to submit rebuttal evi-
dence, and to conduct such cross-
examination as may be required for
a full and true disclosure of the
facts. In rule making or deter-
mining claims for money or benefits
8.
(Administra-
or applications for initial
licenses an agency may, when a
party will not be prejudiced
thereby, adopt procedures for
the submission of all or part
of the evidence in written form.";
and § 1421 of Title 49 U.S.C. which
reads in part:
"“(a) Minimum standards; rules and
regulations
"The Secretary of Transpor-
tation is empowered and it shall
be his duty to promote safety of
flight of civil aircraft in air
commerce by prescribing and re-
vising from time to time:
(1) Such minimum standards
governing the design, materials,
workmanship, construction, and
performance of aircraft, aircraft
engines, and propellers as may be
required in the interest of
safety;
"(2) Such minimum standards
governing appliances as may be
required in the interest of
safety;
9.
f
/
7
- §3] 1 istics rules and
regulatior
governing, 1
safety,
cing, and overhaul of aircraft},
aircraft engines, propellers/ and
appliances; (B) the equipment and
facilities for such inspection,
servicing, and overhaul; and (C)
in the discretion of the Secretary
of Transportation, the periods for,
and the manner in, which such in-
spection, servicing, and overhaul
shall be made, including provision
for examinations and reports by
properly qualified private persons
whose examinations or reports the
Secretary of Transportation may
accept in lieu of those made by
its officers and employees;
"(4) Reasonable rules and
regulations governing the reserve
supply or aircraft, aircraft
engines, propellers, appliances,
and aircraft fuel and oil, re-
quired in the interest of safety,
including the reserve supply of
aircraft fuel and oil which shall
10.
be carried in flight;
"(5) Reasonable rules and
regulations governing, in the
interest of safety, the maximum
hours or periods of service of
airmen, and other employees, of
air carriers; and
"(6) Such reasonable rules
and regulations, or minimum
standards, governing other prac-
tices, methods, and procedure,
as the Secretary of Transporta-
tion may find necessary to pro-
vide adequately for national
security and safety in air
commerce.
"(b) Consideration of needs of
service; classifications of stan-
dards, rules, regulations, and
certificates
"In prescribing standards,
rules, and regulations, and in
issuing certificates under this
sub-chapter, the Secretary of
Transportation shall give full
consideration to the duty rest-
ing upon air carriers to perform
ii.
their services with the highest
Possible degree of safety in the
public interest and to any dif-
ferences between air transporta-
tion and other air commerce; and
he shall make classifications of
such standards, rules, regula-
tions, and certificates appro-
Priate to the differences between
air transportation and other air
commerce. The Secretary of
Transportation may authorize any
aircraft, aircraft engine, pro-
peller, or appliance, for which
an aircraft certificate author-
izing use thereof in air trans-
portation has been issued, to be
used in other air commerce with-
out the issuance of a further
certificate. The Secretary of
Transportation shall exercise
and perform his powers and duties
under this chapter in such manner
as will best tend to reduce or
eliminate the Possibility of, or
reoccurrence of, accidents in air
transportation, but shall not
12.
deem himself xequired to give
preference to either air trans-
portation or other air commerce
in the administration and en
forcement of this subchapter.”;
and a regulation adopted by the Adminis-
trator of the FAA, 49 C.F.R. § 61.15,
which reads: 7
"§ 61.15 Offenses involving
narcotic drugs, marihuana, and
"(a) No person who is convicted
of violating any Federal or State
statute relating to the growing,
processing, manufacture, sale,
‘disposition, possession, transporta~-
tion, or importation of narcotic
drugs, marihuana, and ne or
stimulant drugs or substances, iS
@higible for any certificate or
rating issued under this part for
a period of 1 year after the date
of final conviction.
"(b) No person who commits an
act prohibited by § 91.12(a) of
this chapter is eligible for any
certificate or rating issued under
this part for a period of 1 year
13.
after the date of that act.
“(c) Any conviction speci-
fied in paragraph (a) of this
section or the commission of the
act referenced in paragraph (b)
of this section, is grounds for
suspending or revoking any
certificate or rating issued
under this part.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the night of December 17, 1975,
State of Arizona law enforcement officers
were on lookout for drug smuggling acti-
vities at a remote desert airstrip. They
saw a light aircraft being operated with-
out lights moments before it landed.
After the aircraft landed and after its
engines were shut down, the officers
approached it and questioned the pilot.
He said his name was "Don Walters". They
examined four documents which the pilot
produced: a pilot's airman's certificate,
a California automobile driver's license,
a medical certificate and a radio tele-
phone operator's certificate. Each of
14.
these was in the name of and bore the
signature "Donald Lee Walters".
The officers then inspected the
aircraft and found its registration
marks were concealed by a patch which
showed false marks. Inside the cabin
they found all but one of the aircraft's
four seats had been removed and that
twelve five-gallon cans of gasoline were
in the cabin area.
On the following day an officer
again inspected the aircraft and found
its "tachometer cables", a device used
to measure revolutions per minute of the
aircraft's engines, had been discon-
nected.
No contraband substances were found
in the aircraft, on the pilot's person
or anywhere else in connection with the
case.
The officers arrested petitioner for
conspiracy to smuggle marihuana, a cri-
minal offense under Arizona state law.
Petitioner was not prosecuted for any
criminal offense arising out of the
incident.
15.
Petitioner had earlier suffered a
California state conviction for posses-
sion of marihuana for sale on February
13, 1974.
The FAA commenced proceedings to
revoke petitioner's airman's certificate,
or pilot's license, because of the
California possession for sale convic-
tion and because of violation of air
safety regulations involved in the
December 17, 1975, flight, i.e., the
patch over markings, operation of the
aircraft without lights and while the
tachometer cables were disconnected. A
hearing was had on the FAA's accusation,
as provided by law, before an Adminis-
trative Law Judge. The Law Judge issued
his initial decision to revoke peti-
tioner's license. Petitioner appealed
that decision directly to the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) which
affirmed the Law Judge's decision. A
true copy of the NTSB's Decision is an-
nexed hereto as Appendix C, pages C-l
through C-13.
Petitioner then petitioned the
United States Court of Appeals for
16.
review of the NTSB's affirmance order.
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction
to review the NTSB's order hy virtue
of 49 U.S.C. § 1903(d).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Petitioner believes there are special
and important reasons for granting the
petition because the Court of Appeals in
this case has decided an important ques-
tion of federal law which has not been
but should be settled by this Court and
because the Court of Appeals has in this
case decided a federal question in a way
which conflicts with applicable decisions
of this Court as hereinafter appears.
1. THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
UNDER WHICH PETITIONER'S
LICENSE WAS REVOKED IS IN-
VALID BECAUSE IT IS IN EXCESS
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR'S RULE
MAKING POWER
In 49 U.S.C. § 1421, supra, a part
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the
Congress empowered the Administrator to
promulgate regulations for safety in air
17.
commerce. The scope of the Administra-
tor's authority is as specified in 49
u.S.C. § 1421, surpa. The preamble to
the section provides the Administrator
is empowered to and has the duty to
"promote safety of flight". In order
to accomplish this the Congress speci-
fically empowered and required the
Administrator to proscribe rules, in
effect,
(1) establishing minimum
standards as to the design,
construction and performance
of aircraft;
(2) establishing minimum
standards as to aircraft
appliances;
(3) governing the inspec~
tion, servicing and repair of
aircraft;
(4) governing the reserve
supply of aircraft;
(5) governing the maximum
hours or periods of service
of air crew members; and
(6) to establish such
"reasonable rules and
18.
regulations, or minimum standards
and procedures" as he might find
necessary to "provide adequately
for national security and safety
in air commerce" (underlining by
counsel).
The FAA caused petitioner's license
to be revoked, in part, because of peti-
tioner's 1974 California marihuana con-
viction pursuant to a regulation the
Administrator adopted, 61.15, supra, to
that effect. Such regulation, however,
as it was applied to petitioner exceeded
the Administrator's authority from the
Congress because such authority was ex-
pressly limited by the enabling legis-
lation, 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a), supra, which
went no further than to empower the
Administrator to adopt regulations as to
matters specified by 49 U.S.C. § 1429 (a)
(1) through (5) which are patently in-
applicable to petitioner, and as to 49
U.S.C. § 1429(a) (6) which limits such
authority to situations involving
"national security", also clearly not
involved, and "safety in air commerce"
19.
(underlining by counsel) which petitioner
contends is also not involved in this
case insofar as the regulation is
concerned.
There is no conceivable, reasonable,
or other relationship between a convic-
tion for possession of marihuana for
sale standing alone and safety in air
commerce.
There is no intelligible, rational
basis for reasoning that one convicted
of possessing marihuana for sale pre-
sents, when later piloting an aircraft,
simply because of such conviction, a
hazard or an adverse factor as to safety
in air commerce.
Because the regulation makes no
effort to relate to air safety, it is
in excess of the Administrator's autho-
rity and as such it was an illegal and
inadequate basis upon which to premise
the revocation of petitioner's pilot's
license.
The Court of Appeals did not, in
counsel's opinion, adequately and fairly
consider this argument. That Court said
20.
simply in its Opinion, page A-5 (Appendix A)
"We hold that there is a rational
‘relation between a conviction for
the possession of drugs for sale
and the unsafe use of aircraft
for drugs smuggling, and that
61.15 is constitutionally valid.”
One must. fairly ask what that
"rational relationship" is. Petitioner
cannot discern the existence of any such
relationship by any intelligent measure.
Moreover, petitioner observes that the
Court of Appeals' premise is improper
since there was no evidence presented to
the Law Judge that the aircraft was in-
volved in drug smuggling.
There could conceivably be a rela-
tionship between a drug related criminal
conviction or any criminal conviction
and air safety if and only if the convic-
tion in some way had something to do with
operation or prospective operation of an
aircraft. The regulation involved here
contains no specification that could
relate it to safety in air commerce.
21.
A plain reading of the regulation
makes it clear that it was enacted
for punitive purposes, without any
real consideration having been given
to air safety factors. The Congress
gave the Administrator no power or
authority to adopt regulations for
punishment purposes. The authority
delegated the Administrator was to
promulgate air safety and this, as
applied to petitioner by 61.15, the
Administrator did not do.
Besides being beyond the authority
- and power of the Administrator, the
regulation is invalid for yet another
reason; namely, it is an improper exer-
cise of the police power of the execu-
tive. There is no “litmus test" by
which the limit of restraint on govern-
ment police power by judicial action
may be measured. This Court's earlier
classic statement of the rule, announced
in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14
S.Ct. 499, seems still valid today:
"To justify the state in inter-
posing its authority in behalf
of the public, it must appear -
22.
First, the interests of the
public require such interference
and, second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals."
Petitioner does not dispute the power
of the Administrator to adopt regulations
to enhance air safety. He does, however,
dispute the assertion of power to punish
him without any demonstrated relationship
to air safety by revocation of his
license because of his earlier conviction
of a crime which had no relationship to
air commerce. Such action is beyond pro-
per exercise of the executive's police
power.
The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia considered this question in
James D. Rahm, petitioner, v. NTSB, res-
pondent, case No. 74-1959 (Unpublished
Memorandum of Opinion filed October 6,
1975, copy attached as Appendix D).
That court held the regulation to be
within the Administrator's power
23.
because, said the Court:
"In general, the commission
of drug-related crimes indicates
that the ‘applicant would not be
compliance-minded regarding the
many requirements necessary for
safety in air commerce ... .'
More specifically, a rational
connection exists between past
drug trafficking and future un-
safe aircraft operations. A
known drug trafficker is sub-
stantially more likely than the
average person to engage in such
traffic in the future."
Petitioner urges this reasoning be
rejected. It cannot suffice to create
in the Administrator a power not given
him by the Congress.
2. THE REGULATION IS SUBJECT TO
"VOID FOR VAGUENESS" INFIRMITY
The regulation is in three parts,
subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c). Sub-
paragraph (a) provides that one who has
been convicted of any state or federal
24.
law relating to growing, processing,
manufacture, selling, disposing, pos-
session, transporting or importation
of drugs shall not be eligible to have
a license issued to him "for a period
of 1 year after the date of final
conviction". Subparagraph (b) sets
forth a like prohibition for a like
effective period for those who operate
an aircraft with knowledge that it
carries drugs, referring to Federal
Aviation Regulation 91.12(a) which
reads:
"Except as provided in para-
graph (b) of this section, no
person may operate a civil air-
craft within the United States
with knowledge that narcotic
drugs, marihuana, and depressant
or stimulant drugs or substances
as defined in Federal or State
statutes are carried in the
aircraft."
‘
Read as a whole one who has suffered
a described conviction can't have a
license issued to him until 1 year after
25.
the conviction is final but presumably
would not be under disability if 1 year
has elapsed; anyone actually found in
the act of knowingly operating an air-
craft which is carrying contraband can't
have a license issued to him until l
year after such illegal operation; and,
as to someone who already holds a
license, his license may be revoked or
suspended irrespective of when the con-
viction occurred, and without limit as
to duration, i.e., the conviction could
have taken place at any time.
In this case the Administrator,
relying on his regulation, reached back
from the December 17, 1975 incident to
an earlier conviction as a ground for
revocation.
The test announced by this Court for
application of the "void for vagueness"
doctrine as applied to the federal
government by the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States is
whether the language of a statute or
rule conveys a sufficiently definite
warning so as to proscribe conduct when
measured by common understanding and
26.
practices, Jordan v. De George (1951)
261 8.8. 223-: 72 8:Ct. 763s United
States Civil Service Commission v.
National Association of Letter Carriers
(1973) 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880.
Petitioner believes the regulation
read as a whole by this measure is sub-
ject to the "void for vagueness
infirmity" because a common reading of
it would not give the reader fair warn-
ing of the effect of a conviction upon
his license giving the lack of any time
frame in subparagraph (c) and the in-
clusion of precise time frames in
subparagraphs (a) and (b).
3. THE REGULATION DEPRIVES
PETITIONER OF HIS CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES
"Due process". as a guaranty against
conduct of the federal executive branch
forbids invidious, unjustified classifi-
cations among and between citizens,
Washington v. Davis (1976) 426 U.S. 229,
48 LED.2d 597, 96 S.Ct. 2040;
27.
Examining Board of Engineers, Architects 4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
and Surveyors v. De Otero (1976) 426 WHICH RESULTED IN REVOCATION
OF PETITIONER'S LICENSE WERE
U.S. 572, 49 LED.2d 65, 96 S.Ct. 2264. INVALID BECAUSE THE ADMINIS-
; TRATIVE LAW JUDGE APPLIED
The regulation to which petitioner THERETO AN INAPPROPRIATE
was subjected creates such discrimina- STANDARD OF PROOF
tory invidious classification on the
one hand, between those who might be At the hearing before the Adminis-
convicted of a drug offense while un- trative Law Judge a question arose, on
the Administrator's proof, as to the
licensed who may then wait 1 year and
| identity of the pilot of the aircraft
during the December 17, 1975 incident.
One of the state officers testified he
apply for a license free of disability,
or those who might be found operating
an aircraft with knowledge that contra-
was unable to positively identify the
would be licensed) who can then wait 1 pilot as one and the same person as
year until they would be eligible for | depicted on petitioner's automobile
driver's license. In announcing his
|
{
band is on board (and these presumably |
i
license free of disability; and on the
other hand, between those, like peti- | decision the Judge said, "In the face
tioner, already licensed, who can find of all this, it is necessary for the
their licenses revoked or suspended | pilot to come forth and say who he was
for any transaction committed at any | if he was not Don Lee Walters (peti-
time without limitation and without the | tioner) ."
ability to find themselves free of | : Petitioner's quarrel with this is
disability on account of the passage of that, in effect, it placed the burden
time. of proof in the proceedings as to
identity on the petitioner, doing vio-
lence to § 556(d) of Title 5 which
| expressly recites, in part:
28. | 29.
"the proponent of a rule or order
has the burden of proof"
The burden this ruling placed upon
petitioner was intolerable. In effect,
it required him to generate proof which
should legally have been part of his
"accuser's" case against him.
The Court of Appeals seemingly chose
to simply pass over this clear and
simple mandate of the statute, saying
simply at page A-6 (Appendix A).
of the Opinion:
"Proof by a preponderance of
reliable, probative, and sub-
stantial evidence is the
standard."
citing 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), but not comment-
ing upon or discussing that part of the
section which expressly provides the
burden of proof to be upon the proponent
of an order, i.e., the Administrator.
30.
4 ae 2
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons petitioner
prays the Writ of Certiorari be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
MARVIN ZINMAN
Attorney for Petitioner
31.
APPENDIX A
tO EIT SE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DONALD LEE WALTERS, )
)
Petitioner, ) No.
Vv. ) 77-1837
)
JOHN L. McLUCAS, Administrator, )
Federal Aviation Administration,) OPINION
)
Respondent. )
PIULeE D
MAY 29, 1979
EMIL E. MELFI, JR.
CLERK, U.S. COURT
OF APPEALS
Petition to Review a Decision of the
National Transportation Safety Board
Before: KENNEDY and HUG, Circuit Judges,
and SOLOMON,* District Judge
Per Curiam:
Walters petitions this court to
review an order of the National Trans-
portation Safety Board (Board which up-
held the revocation of his private pilot
licensed by the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration. The basis for the revocation
* The Honorable Gus J. Solomon, Senior
United States District Judge for the
District of Oregon sitting by designation.
A-l.
were that he violated Federal Aviation
Regulations and had been convicted of
possessing marijuana for sale.
On the night of December 17, 1975,
Deputies Chapin and Mergell of the Mojave
County, Arizona Sheriff's Office kept
watch for drug smuggling activities at an
isolated and deserted airstrip. A few
hours after the Deputies arrived, they
heard a plane flying low over the air-
strip. The Deputies did not see the
plane until moments before it landed;
until then the plane was being operated
. without lights.
When the engines were shut down,
Chapin approached the plane and ques-
tioned the pilot. The pilot identified
himself as "Don Walters.“ Chapin then
examined four documents which the pilot
produced: a pilot certificate, Califor-
nia driver's license, a medical certi-
ficate, and a radio telephone operator's
certificate. Each document was in the
name of and signed "Donald Lee Walters."
The Deputies inpected the plane and
found that its registration marks were
A-2.
concealed by a patch which showed false
marks. Inside the cabin, where all but
one of the four seats had been removed,
the Deputies found 12 five-gallon cans
of gasoline.
The pilot was arrested for conspir-
acy to smuggle marijuana.
On the following day, a third Deputy
inspected the plane and found that the
tachometer cables had been disconnected.
Later, the Deputies found that the plane
was owned and registered in California
by the Petitioner's business partner.
In May 1976, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) revoked Petitioner's
pilot license because of his 1974 mari-
juana conviction, 14 C.F.R. § 61.15,2/
1/ 14 C.F.R. § 61.15 provides that "(a)
No person who is convicted of vio-
lating any Federal or State statute re-
lating to the growing, processing, manu-
facture, sale, disposition, possession,
transportation, or importation of ...
marihuana . .. is eligible for any
certificate or rating issued under this
part for a period of 1 year after the
date of final conviction.
"...(c¢c) Any conviction specified in
paragraph (a) of this section...is
(continued)
A-3.
and because of six violations of Federal
Aviation Regulations committed during
the flight on December 17, 1975.
Petitioner appealed asserting that
14 C.F.R. § 61.15 was invalid because it
exceeded the FAA's statutory authority
and because the FAA lacked "unequivocal"
proof that he was the arrested pilot.
At a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge in September 1976, Deputy
Chapin testified that the photograph on
the driver's license was of the pilot he
arrested.
Petitioner did not testify or call
witnesses. The Judge found that the FAA
proved, by a preponderance of "credible,
reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence," that Petitioner was the ar-
rested pilot and that he violated Federal
Aviation Regulations.
1/ (continuted)
De grounds for suspending or revoking
any certificate or rating issued under
this part."
The Judge upheld the FAA order of
revocation after rejecting Petitioner's
contentions that section 61.15 exceeded
the FAA's statutory authority and was
constitutionally invalid.
Petitioner again appealed, this time
to the National Transportation Safety
Board. The Board held that section 61.15
is reasonably related to the safety pur-
poses of the Federal Aviation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1421 et seg. and that there is
a rational connection between drug traf-
ficking in the past and unsafe aircraft
operations in the future. The Board
also decided that the Judge applied the
standard of proof on the issue of iden-
tity. It found no grounds for disturbing
the Judge's findings of fact on that is-
sue and affirmed.
In this court, Petitioner renews
both challenges to the revocation order.
We hold that there is a rational
relation between a conviction for the
possession of drugs for sale and the un-
safe use of aircraft for drugs smuggling,
and that section 61.15 is constitution-
ally valid.
A-5.
We also reject Walters' contention
that the Judge applied the wrong stand-
ard of proof on the issue of identity.
The Sheriff's Deputies’ testimony made
out a prima facie case that Petitioner
was the pilot they arrested. The burden
shifted to Petitioner to present evi-
dence that he was not the pilot. Newman
v. Shaffer, 494 F.2d 1219 (2nd Cir.
1974).
Walters presented no eivdence.
@..0: by a preponderance of reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence is
the proper standard. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
2/
Here the agency met that standard.—
The petition for review of the revo-
cation order is therefore
DENIED.
2/ Even if the Petitioner were correct
in contending that the identity issue
must be proved by "clear, convincing, and
unequivocal evidence," the evidence here
Satisfied that standard.
APPENDIX B
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. A-149
DONALD LEE WALTERS,
Petitioner,
Ve
JOHN L. McLUCAS, Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
UPON CONSIDERATION of the application
of counsel for petitioner(s),
IT IS ORDERED that the time for
filing a petition for writ of certiorari
in the above-entitled cause be, and-the
same is hereby, extended to and including
September 28 , 1979
/sf/ William H. Rehnquist
Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the
United States
Dated this 20th
day of August , 1979
B-l.
APPENDIX C
SERVED: February 16, 1977
NTSB Order No. EA-963
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Adopted by the NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
SAFETY BOARD at its office in
Washington, D. C. on the llth
day of February 1977.
JOHN L. McLUCAS, Administrator, )
Federal Aviation Administration,
Complaint,
Docket
S
E-3294
)
)
Vv. )
DONALD LEE WALTERS,
)
)
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Respondent has appealed from the
initial decision of Administrative Law
Judge Robert R. Boyd, issued orally at
the conclusion of the hearing held in
this proceeding on September 23, 1976 .2/
1/ An excerpt from the hearing trans-
cript containing the initial decision
is attached.
C-l.
The law judge therein found that the
Administrator had proven, by a prepon-
derance of the credible, reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence, the
charges set forth in the complaint, as
follows:
1. Respondent's airman certificate
was subject to suspension or
revocation, under the terns of
section 61.15(c) of ve Federal
Aviation Regulations— (FAR),
2/ Section 61.15(a) and (c) provides, in
~ pertinent part, as follows:
"§61.15 Offenses involving narcotic
drugs, marihuana, and depres-
sant or stimulant drugs or
substances.
(a) No person who is convicted of
violating any Federal or state statute
relating to the growing, processing,
manufacture, sale, disposition, posses-
sion, transportation, or importation of
narcotic drugs, marihuana, and depressant
or stimulant drugs or substances, is
eligible for any certificate or rating
issued under this part for a period of l
year after the date of final conviction.
* * * * * * *
(c) Any conviction specified in
paragraph (a) of this section or the com-
mission of the act referenced in paragraph
(b) of this section, is grounds for sus-
pending or revoking any certificate or
rating issued under this part."
C-2.
by virtue of respondent's having
been convicted, on February 13,
1974, in the Superior Court of
the State of California, County
of Riverside, of a violation of
section 11359 of the California
Health and Safety Code, to wit:
possession of marihuana for sale2/
2. With respect to a nighttime VFR
(visual flight rules) flight con-
ducted by respondent on December
17, 1975, in Piper PA-23-250,
N4895) (property of another), in
the vicinity of McCraken Airstrip
(approximately 40 miles southeast
of Yucca, Arizona), respondent
was in violation of the following
provisions of the FAR:
3/ Respondent was sentenced to serve 6
months in the custody of the Sheriff
of Riverside County. The conviction was
affirmed by the California Court of Appeal
and, on April 14, 1975, the Superior Court
ordered execution of the sentence.
C-3.
a. Section 91.33(a) and 91.33(c) (1),
(2), and (3) 4/ in that respondent
operated an aircraft in VFR flig
light at night when it was with-
out (1) an operating tachometer
for each engine, (2), an approved
anticollision light system, and
(3) approved position lights.
4/ Section 91.33(a),(b) (4), and (c)(1),-
(2), and (3) provides, in pertinent
Part, as follows:
"Seba ae Powered civil aircraft with
Standard category U.S. air-
worthiness certificates;
instrument and equipment
requirements.
(a) General. Except as provided in
Paragraphs (c)(3) and (e) of this section,
no person may operate a powered civil
aircraft with a standard category U.S.
airworthiness certificate in any opera-
tion described in Paragraphs (b) through
(f) of this section unless that aircraft
contains the instruments and equipment
specified in those paragraphs (or FAA-
approved equivalents) for that type of
Operation, and those instruments and
items of equipment are in operable
condition.
(b) Visual flight rules (day). For
VFR flight during the day the following
instruments and equipment are required.
* * * * * * *
(4) Tachometer for each engine.
(continued)
C=-4,
b. Section 45.21(a),>/ in that res-
pondent operated aU.S. registered
aircraft without the required
nationality and registration marks.
4/ (continued)
* * * * * * *
(c) Visual flight rules (night).
For VFR flight at night the following
instruments and equipment are required.
(1) Instruments and equipment spe-
cified in paragraph (b) of this section.
(2) Approved position lights.
(3) An approved aviation red or
aviation white anticollision light sys-
tem on all large aircraft, on all small
aircraft when required by the aircraft's
airworthiness certificate, and on all
other small aircraft when required by the
aircraft's airworthiness certificate, and
on all other small aircraft after August
11, 1972. Anticollision light systems
initially installed after August 11l, 1971,
on aircraft for which a type certificate
was issued or applied for before August
ll, 1971, must at least meet the anti-
collision light standards of Parts 23,
25, 27, or 29, as applicable, that were
in effect on August 10, 1971, except that
the color may be either aviation red or
aviation white. In the event of failure
of any light of the anticollision light
system, operations with the aircraft may
be continued to a stop where repairs or
replacement can be made."
5/ Section 45.21(a) provides, in perti-
nent part, as follows:
(continued)
C-5.
c. Section 45.21(b) ,2/ in that res-
pondent placed on an aircraft a
design mark, or symbol that modi-
fied or confused the nationality
and registration marks.
dad. Section 91.9,2/ in that respon-
dent's operation of the aircraft
under the above circumstances, and
by virtue of carrying on board 12
plastic containers filled with
aviation fuel, was careless so as
S/ (continued)
"§45.21 General.
(a) Except as provided in §45.22,
no person may operate a U.S. registered
aircraft unless that aircraft displays
nationality and registration marks in
accordance with the requirements of this
section and §§ 45.33."
6/ Section 45.21 (b) provides, in perti-
nent part, as follows:
"§45.21(b) General.
* * * * * * *
(b) Unless otherwise authorized by
the Administrator, no person may place
On any aircraft a design, mark, or
symbol that modifies or confuses the
nationality and registration marks."
7/ Section 91.9 reads as follows: "No
person may operate an aircraft in a
careless or reckless manner so as to
endanger the life or property of another."
C-6.
to endanger the life or property
of another.
The law judge thereupon affirmed the
Administrator's order revoking respon-
dent's private pilot certificate.
In support of his appeal, respondent,
through counsel, has filed a brief where-
in he argues that, with respect to the
marihuana conviction, the regulations
under which this conviction forms the
basis of certificate action are constitu-
tionally invalid and exceed the scope of
authority delegated to the Administrator.
Respondent further contends that, in re-
gard to the incident of December 17,
1975, the Administrator has not proved by
clear, convincing, and unequivocal evi-
dence that respondent was the person who
was the pilot of the aircraft involved in
the alleged safety violations.
Upon consideration of the briefs of
the parties, and the entire record, the
Board has determined that safety in air
commerce or air transportation and the
public interest require affirmation of
the Administrator's order of revocation.
C-7.
Co
We adopt as our own the findings of the
law judge.
In regard to respondent's first argu-
ment on appeal, it has been our consis-
tent position that the Board lacks juris-
diction, and thus is not the proper
forum, to consider attacks on the vali-
dity or wisdom of the Federal Aviation
Regulations. We note, in any event, that
a similar attack was made on section
61.15 of the FAR as part of an appeal
from a previous Board decision®/ to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. The Court, in rejecting that
attack, ruled that section 61.15 "is
reasonably related to the statute's
safety purpose" and that "a rational
connection exists between past drug traf-
ficking and future unsafe aircraft
8/ Administrator v. Rahm, Order EA-600,
August 14, 1974. The Rahm case was
alike the instant one in the significant
respect that the marijuana conviction did
not involve the utilization by the res-
pondent of the priviliges of his airman
certificate.
n9/
dity of section 61.15 has been judicially
operations. Consequently, the vali-
affirmed.
Respondent's second argument is like-
wise without merit. He argues that the
standard of proof which should have been
applied to the pilot identity issue is
clear, convincing, and unequivocal evi-
dence. The only judicial decision cited
in support of this stnadard is restricted
by its terms to deportation cases .29/
Safety enforcement proceedings adjudicated
by the Board are governed by the Adminis-
trative procedure Act, which provides that
sanctions may be imposed and orders is-
sued only if "supported by and in accor-
dance with the reliable, probative and
ii/ The Board has
therefore applied the aforesaid standard
substantial evidence."
of proof in enforcement cases, and the
various courts of appeals, in reviewing
9/ Rahm v. N.T.S.B. Case No. 74-1959,
(C.A.D.C. Oct. 6, 1975).
16/ Woodby v. Immigration and Naturali-
Zation Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
11/ 5 U.S.C. 556(d).
Cc-9.
numerous Board decisions, have never
indicated that any other standard should
be applied.
In the instant case, the Administra-
tor has clearly proven, by a preponder-
ance of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence, that respondent
was the pilot of the aircraft involved
in the inei@ent of December 17, 1975.22/
A narcotics enforcement team agent from
the Mojave County Sheriff's Office,
Kingman, Arizona, testified that, when
the pilot embarked from the aircraft,
he (the agent) asked the pilot for id-
entification and was given a private
pilot certificate, medical certificate,
radio telephone operator permit, and
state driver's license, all of which
contained respondent's name and
12/ Respondent's attorney, in his clos-
ing argument to the law judge,
stated that "Under the circumstances
in this case, I would admit that there
is probative and substantial evidence
with respect to the identity of the
person who was flying the plane."
(fe. 56).
C-10.
signature.13/ In addition, when the
pilot was asked who he was, he responded
"Don Walters." Finally, another witness
testified that he was informed that the
registered owner of the aircraft in-
volved in the incident was a partner of
respondent .24/
From the evidence summarized above,
it is apparent that the Administrator
presented a prima facie case identifying
respondent as the pilot of the plane in
question. Respondnet presented no evi-
dence whatsoever in rebuttal .22/ and thus
13/ The agent also testified that, while
he was not absolutely positive the
pilot matched the picture on the driver's
license, he believed it "with the same
authority . . . as if I looked at your
driver's license and saw your picture
and compared it to your face." (Tr. 33)
14/ The above testimony, although hear-
say, is admissible as evidence in
administrative proceedings.
15/ Respondent's rebuttal does not neces-
sarily require him to establish that
someone other than himself was the pilot
as the law judge apparently indicated in
his decision (Tr. 68). However, once the
Administrator has established a prima
facie case, the burden of going forward
(continued)
C-ll.
the Administrator must be found to have
borne the burden of proof on this issue.
Turning finally to the matter of
sanction, it is our conclusion, consi-
dering the marihuana conviction in con-
juction with the numerous violations
associated with the incident of December
17, 1975, that revocation of respondent's
airman certificate is fully warranted.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Respondent's appeal be and it
hereby is denied:
2. The Administrator's order and the
initial decision be and they
hereby are affirmed; and
3. The revocation of respondent's
private pilot certificate shall
commence 30 days after service
of this order .2°/
15/ (continued) with the evidence shifts
to the respondent. Respondent must
then present some evidence tending to
disprove that he was the pilot, or run
the risk of a finding favorable to the
Administrator.
16/ For purposes of this order, the res-
pondent must physically surrender his
(continued)
C-12.
TODD, Chairman, BAILEY, Vice Chairman,
McADAMS, HOGUE, and HALEY, Members of the
Board, concurred in the above opinion and
order.
16/ (continued) certificate to an appro-
priate representative of the Federal
Aviation Administration purusant to
section 61.19(f) FAR.
C-13.
APPENDIX D
wi
> y
DJ#88-215 APPELLATE Mutterperl:LS
NOTE TO BE PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the District of Columbia Circuit
No. 74-1959 September Term, 1975
James D. Rahm, Petitioner
Vv.
National Transportation Safety Board,
Respondent
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Before: LEVENTHAL AND WILKEY, Circuit
Judges and SOLOMON, * United
States Senior District Judge
for the District of Oregon
JUDGMENT
This cause ‘came on for consideration
on a petition for review of an order of
the National Transportation Safety Board
and briefs were filed by the parties.
On consideration of the foregoing, it is
* Sitting by designation pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 294(d)
D-l.
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by this Court
that the order of the National Trans-
portation Safety Board on review herein
is hereby affirmed, for the reasons set
forth in the attached memorandum.
Per Curiam
For the Court
/s/ Hugh E. Kline
Hugh E. Kline
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the District of Columbia Circuit
FILED OCT 6, 1975
HUGH E. KLINE
Clerk
No. 74-1959 - James D. Rahm v. National
Transportation Safety Board
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner appeals from the Opinion
and Order of the National Transportation
Safety Board ,2/ which upheld the Initial
Decision of the Administrative Law
Judge2/
3/
Order— revoking Petitioner's private
modifying the F.A.A. Emergency
pilot license. The modified order under
review suspends Petitioner's license for
eight months, pursuant to section 61.15
of the Federal Aviation Regulations. 4/
That section provides that any convic-
tion under a Federal or State statute
relating to manufacture, sale, possession
or transportation of drugs or marijuana
is grounds for suspending or revoking
any certificate or rating. Petitioner
1l/ N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-600, Docket No.
SE-2283 (August 14, 1977)
2/ Opinion of Administrative Law Judge
Charles A. Smith, March 27, 1974.
Appendix, at 98.
3/ Emergency Order of Revocation, Case
No. WE-73-0G-533 (July 24, 1973).
4/ 14 C.F.R. § 61.15
D-3.
was convicted, upon a pleas of guilty,
of conspiring to import marihuana in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 963
(1970) .2/
Petitioner attacks the Board's
order on two grounds. First, he asserts
that section 61.15 of the Federal Avia-
tion Regulations is invalid on its face
as exceeding the authority delegated to
the Administrator under 49 U.S.C. § 1421
(a) (6). Second, he argues that even if
the regulation is itself valid, its
application to petitioner is not sup-
ported by substantial evidence, and
therefore must be reversed.
I
Section 61.15 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations provides, inter alia, that
any conviction on a Federal or State drug
offense is grounds for suspension or revo-
6
cation of any pilot certificate or rating.—
5/ United States v. James Douglas Rahm,
Case No. WE-73-OG-533 (July 24, 1973).
6/ 14 C.F.R. § 61.15
The issue raised is whether the regula-
tion is within the delegation to the
F.A.A. Administrator, under 49 U.S.C.
§ 1421(a) (6), authorizing reasonable
rules as "necessary to provide ade-
quately for national security and safety
in air commerce." For the reasons set
out in the Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing,’ we conclude that the rule is
reasonably related to the statute's
safety purpose. In general, the commis-
sion of drug-related crimes indicates
that "the applicant would not be com-
pliance-minded regarding the many
requirements necessary for safety in
air commerce ...." More specifically,
a rational connection exists between
past drug trafficking and future unsafe
aircraft operations. A known drug
trafficker is substantially more likely
than the average person to engage in
such traffic in the future. Anda
smuggler with access to a plane is likely
to use it in a hazardous manner, flying
low to escape detection by border sur-
veillance. Although agencies do not
7/ 34 Fed. Reg. 12713 (1969).
D-5.
a
additional penalties for criminal of-
fenses, the nexus between the Board's
obligation to protect air safety and
illicit smuggling justifies the instant
regulation. It is no bar to the Regula-
tion that it also advances a broader
public policy of impairing illegal drug
traffic.
II
The suspension is also challenged on
the grounds that section 61.15 was im-
properly applied in this case, since
nothing in Petitioner's conduct indicated
a disposition to fly in an unsafe manner.
Petitioner freely admits, however, his
willful violation of the drug laws, which
manifests at least a temporary lapse from
the obedience to regulations which is the
sine gua non of air safety in our crowded
skies.
Petitioner did not actually use his
airplane in the smuggling operation, and
there is no evidence that he has flown
it in an unsafe manner. However, Peti-
tioner testified that on three separate
occasions he used his aircraft to fly a
D-6.
friend involved in the smuggling opera-
tion roundtrip across the country, for
which he was paid $2,000.00. At the
time of apprehension, Petitioner carried
a briefcase filled with money and con-
taining one marijuana cigarette. More-
over, Petitioner continues to have
access to an airplane. All of these
factors negate any conclusion that the
order of suspension was an unreasonable
and unnecessary application of section
61.15, in light of both the particular
facts of Petitioner's individual case
and the safety purpose which the regu-
lation is designed to serve.
D=-7.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.