Petitioners Brief — United States v. Ward

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FILED

JAN 2 1980

‘

No. 79-394 {j

| _ MICHAEL RODAK, JR. CLERR

Iu the Supreme Court of the Waited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

Vv.

L. O. WARD d/b/a L. O. WARD OIL

AND GAS OPERATIONS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

JAMES W. MOORMAN

Assistant Attorney General

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

Assistant to the Solicitor General

JACQUES B. GELIN

MICHAEL A. McCorpD

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

ME I oeeshscoicorscaenchs aces taasackemoee adeconseune

RRR rei epee Sr ee EN ee

Ar ose ccisi bndintondcp cons ecaaaee

Constitutional and statutory provisions in-

NEE cited eine hh taaeniocenes i icaeacasuteciccaeobionioubenaenncees

UIMIMRTY OF GTBUMIONE ......0<...cc.ccccsccccececseccscne

Argument:

I. Section 311 is designed to prevent and

provide for the clean-up of discharges

of oil in furtherance of the Act’s broad

remedial purpose to maintain the in-

tegrity of the Nation’s waters ..............

II. The penalty assessed under Section 311

(b) (6) is plainly civil in nature, fur-

thering the Act’s remedial purposes .......

A. Section 311(b) on its face mani-

fests a clear congressional intent

that the “civil penalty” provided in

Section 311(b) (6) is civil for Con-

stitutional purposes .......................-

B. The penalty provided in Section 311

(b) (6) is also civil under the test

set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-

ko, RETRO a ede RRR

1. Whether the sanction involves

an affirmative disability or re-

cue

12

17

26

27

34

35

II

Argument—Continued

2.

Whether the sanction has his-

torically been regarded as pun-

RE SEP ARCnet

Whether the sanction comes in-

to play only on a finding of

SE sivchaumteatani aime

Whether the sanction’s opera-

tion will promote the traditional

aims of punishment—retribu-

tion and deterrence ..................

Whether the behavior to which

the sanction applies is already

I tke

Whether an alternative purpose

other than punishment may

rationally be ascribed to the

I Ssetncececce teint:

Whether the sanction appears

excessive in relation to the al-

ternative purpose assigned ......

III. The proceedings under Section 311(b)

(6) for assessment of a civil penalty

are not “quasi-criminal” for purposes

of the Fifth Amendment privilege ........

Conclusion ....

Appendix ......

Cases:

CITATIONS

Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 5380 F.2d

1291, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 _.........

Page

37

38

39

42

45

46

49

54

la

31

Ill

Cases—Continued Page

Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety

& Health Review Comm’n, 518 F.2d

990, aff’d on other grounds, 430 U.S.

OE ree a 9, 37

Bell v. Wolfish, No. 77-1829 (May 14,

cc, Se RO See CE RNS: 26, 36, 47

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616..49, 50, 51-52

California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416

WO WE aeienicc dng ek 31

California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 26

Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. United States, 220

keen MEER AMER Ol ced ed nee 28

Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)

Ps cdnciaan eta ate is 0 ME Neh 35-36, 42

Daley, In re, 549 F.2d 469, cert. denied,

ee ee eee a 52

. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 37

E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins,

ee OP ieee res. 30

Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603....12, 36, 42, 45

Garland, Ex parte, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)

ce ET OE AE Aone RR Oe en OD 35

Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 30

Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391... 17, 26, 28,

30, 37, 48, 45, 47, 53

Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103. 28, 51

Kaiser Aetna v. United States, No. 78-

too (ies. 4, 1079) iC 18

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.

Oe ies! 9, 11, 15, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43

Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 49,51

Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 43

Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348. 38

Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39... 30

IV

Cases—Continued Page

Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Strana-

Te Bae I ses iretthineecunemiesnaniness 28, 40

One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United

States, 409 U.S. 282 .......... 9, 26, 20, 48, 44, 45,

47, 51

Perrin v. United States, No. 78-959 (Nov.

a 5 seicisetiencchlsastciesdtcsanessatiaesrbiptpicamssbioete 27

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395

iis, SNES * aids tdiicsstioiptdcasapiebadaeapnisaniiesenebeis 30

Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S.

RRS, eae ea Ee 28, 47

EV Ee Ve Bete BEd ett BOD icine, 27

EVO UV. EPUTOR, TOG CTs BG saosin 41, 42

United States v. Allied Towing Corp., 578

I le ccinaiicnibiink 31

United States v. Ashland Oil and Trans-

portation 'Co., 504 F.2d 1317 -............... 18

United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,

429 F.Supp. 830, aff’d sub nom., United

States ¥. Gulf Oil Corp., 573 F.2d 1303... 25, 31

United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S.

BI ei ine acca tas ecoieaialateeand oi deden 41, 43, 46

United States v. Eureka Pipeline Co., 401

EE SN pasa chs oeinrttnswntoonaiionaiiaasiants 25

United States v. General Motors Corp.,

I. BIER Siidicenieineeoens

United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498

SII « cteinscocusenicsouatonnnonincaaieubch pap uscveiet 26, 28

United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,

II INI secdisiscantncsisesinainlcod cachensitcaclineestlpaon 6, 21

United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S.

RIE esetsienceiia edna ilallensniad aiernladaceniic assignable 43

United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing

Co., 377 F.Supp. 558, rev’d, 537 F.2d

149, cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 -......0....

Cases—Continued Page

United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 308 ...... 35, 36

United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,

RN I citi acccebnhansgdaess ei 23

United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d

iG TORR we aire ene ee oC PN 44

United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 87 ........ 51

United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 491

Np A ns ee ree Ih at A 44

United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d

RE laces ERMA Tce Te Se 24

United States v. United States Coin &

Currency, 401 U.S. 7165 ...................... 43, 49, 51

United States v. W. B. Enterprises, 378

IR PR SG ee a 25

United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498

Pe io ase ee 39

United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317

ME ae ersccbacgcet ace 25, 28, 30, 45, 47

Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.

SSSR Ene MOLE, eee 36

Wilson, Ex parte, 114 U.S. 417 _........... 38

Constitution, Treaty, statutes

and regulations:

United States Constitution, Fifth Amend-

I ceils isc tharehince bnldies nceciigenteceeaiSdsceteccia passim

the Contiguous Zone, 15 U.S.C. 1606,

T.LA.S. No. 5639, Article 24 19

Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, Section 3,

BI tnt etd 51

Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, Section 12,

Be I I acectetsaacontnschidiseeidancttngrsKebeseicesies., 50

VI vit

Constitution, Treaty, statutes Constitution, Treaty, statutes

and regulations—Continued Page and regulations—Continued Page

Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95- Section 311(f), 33 U.S.C. 1821(f).... 20, 23,

art, Oe GR TUE Sikes 3, 22 40

Section 58(a)(7) and (8), 91 Stat. a ls

LSD on neeeeeneneeeennnnerenenenneneeeenanneeee ” Section 311(k), 33 U.S.C. 1321(k).. 10, 14,

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 20, 23, 30, 33, 45

U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1974) 1251 et segq..... 12,17 Section 311(0), 33 U.S.C. 1821(0).... 24

Section 101(a), 33 U.S.C. 1251(a).. 12, 17 Section 502(4), 33 U.S.C. 1362(4).... 18

Section 308, 33 U.S.C. 1318 -............. 7 Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Section 308(a)(A), 33 U.S.C.-1318 Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-

LS LES Se MeN Crate Hee se 6, 7 224, Section 102, 84 Stat. 91, 98:

Section 310(¢c), 33 U.S.C. 1819(c).... 7 :

Section 310(d), 33 U.S.C. 1819(d)... 7 peony Ha, 83 USC. (1970 ed.) ”

Section 311, 33 U.S.C. 1321......5, 12, 17, 18, Section 12, 33 U.S.C. 1162 17

30, 33

Section 311(b), 33 U.S.C. 1821(b)-..... 3,30

Section 311(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. 1821

POS F siciccuicencinaeaiee eens 18

Section 311(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C.

pth he 2 i. | enema 24, 25

Section 311(b) (3), 33 U.S.C. 1321

(b) (8) -.... anita NM! 3, 5, 13, 16, 18, 19,

20, 21, 22, 53

Section 311(b) (4), 338 U.S.C. 1321

CRE Sickie ee 19

Section 311(b) (5), 33 U.S.C. 1821

LSM ty ME sad ST: passim

Section 311(b) (6), 33 U.S.C. 1821

PUNE PD niricsnctavaensonsmmmaaaanaiadl passim

Section 311(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. 1321

L | eee aEID Ai voy A 20

Section 311(c) (2), 33 U.S.C. 1321

i | — snsemennsuaentiaetin 23

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-

500, 86 Stat. 862 et seq. _W.... ee. 18

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-

576, 92 Stat. 2467 et seq.:

iis cstrrnneee 25

ER 3, 19, 22

Oil Pollution Act of 1924, 38 U.S.C. (1964

Se 18

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.

401 et seq.:

Section 13, 33 U.S.C. 407 ........ 11, 16, 38, 42

Section 16, 33 U.S.C. 411 00... 11, 16, 38

VIIt

' Constitution, Treaty, statutes

and regulations—Continued Page

Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119, et seq.:

Section 2, 90 Stat. 1119 -.................. 8

section 7, 90 Stat. 1120 .................... 8

Zo U.ca. (iSTO ae.) BES ;.........0.--00:0.0 8,12

Be rei ie PANTY esieiceetscenerecencersctensnceee 18

Se Ge BUIEIND coicnttsnereanrensnecineceenens 6

oo UF .m. 166.200 (1976) .........0.......... 6

Be kL eae 6

Be A Re eT, | nee ee 6

et A 8 | ee ae 19

ee eG |S | | ee een 5, 19

Exec. Order No. 11735, 3 C.F.R. 798

(1971-1975 Compilation) :

TE ier are eR RR OReS 6, 19

a 6

44 Fed. Reg. 50766 (Aug. 29, 1979)........ 22

Miscellaneous:

Comment, Compelled Self-Disclosure and

Civil Penalties: The Limits of Corpo-

rate Immunity in Oil Spill Cases, 55

Buus Bev. ite eS) 44-45

124 Cong. Rec. (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) :

Bat SE Sp Re ae OEE 19, 24-25

I ea ae a oh 25

H.R. Rep. No. 91-127, 91st Cong., 1st

oe TCR Mette 18

S. Rep. No. 91-351, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.

I aie eiin riper maguanntetiias cocina 18, 21, 24

S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.

NI cethgubiitbcashane ceo oa ne ee ae 24

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-394

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

9.

L. O. WARD d/b/a L. O. WARD OIL

AND GAS OPERATIONS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.

la-19a) is reported at 598 F.2d 1187. The opinion

of the district court (Pet. App. 22a-35a) is reported

at 423 F. Supp. 1352.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App.

20a-21a) was entered on May 10, 1979. On August

(1)

2

2, 1979, Mr. Justice White extended the time for

filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to and in-

cluding September 7, 1979. The petition was filed

on September 7, 1979, and granted on November 5,

1979 (A. 16, 62). The jurisdiction of the Court rests

on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a proceeding under the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act for the assessment of a “civil

penalty” against the individual owner or operator of

a facility from which oil was discharged in violation

of the Act, is a “criminal case” within the meaning

of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amend-

ment to the Constitution in which the government is

barred from using any information about the dis-

charge that the individual is required by the Act to

report under pain of criminal sanctions.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-

stitution provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capi-

tal, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a

presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, ex-

cept in cases arising in the land or naval forces,

or in the militia, when in actual service in time

of war or public danger; nor shall any person

be subject for the same offence to be twice put

in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-

3

pelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law; nor

shall private property be taken for public use,

without just compensation.

Section 311(b) of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act,’ 33 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1974) 1821(b),

as in effect when this case arose,’ provided in per-

tinent part:

* * * * *

(3) The discharge of oil or hazardous sub-

stances into or upon the navigable waters of

the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into

or upon the waters of the contiguous zone in

harmful quantities as determined by the Presi-

dent * * * is prohibited, * * *.

* * * * *

(5) Any person in charge of a vessel or of an

onshore facility or an offshore facility shall, as

soon as he has knowledge of any discharge of

oil or a hazardous substance from such vessel or

1 Since enactment of the Clean Water Act of 1977, the

amended Federal Water Pollution Act has cemmonly been

referred to as “the Clean Water Aci.” However, because

this case only directly concerns the pre-1977 version of the

statute, we will refer to it as “the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act,” “the Act,” or “the FWPCA.”

* Section 311 was amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977,

Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, and the Federal Water

Poliution Control Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-

576, 92 Stat. 2468 (see notes 10, 13, 15, 16 and 18, infra), but

these amendments have no direct bearing on the present case.

4

facility in violation of paragraph (3) of this

subsection, immediately notify the appropriate

agency of the United States Government of such

discharge. Any such person who fails to notify

immediately such agency of such discharge shall,

upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000,

or imprisoned for not more than one year, or

both. Notification received pursuant to this para-

graph or information obtained by the exploita-

tion of such notification shall not be used against

any such person in any criminal case, except a

prosecution for perjury or for giving a false

statement.

(6) Any owner or operator of any vessel, on-

shore facility, or offshore facility from which oil

or a hazardous substance is discharged in viola-

tion of paragraph (3) of this subsection shall be

assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of the

department in which the Coast Guard is operat-

ing of not more than $5,000 for each offense.

No penalty shall be assessed unless the owner or -

operator charged shall have been given notice

and opportunity for a hearing on such charge.

Each violation is a separate offense. Any such

civil penalty may be compromised by such Secre-

tary. In determining the amount of the penalty,

or the amount agreed upon in compromise, the

appropriateness of such penalty to the size of

the business of the owner or operator charged,

the effect on the owner or operator’s ability to

continue in business, and the gravity of the vio-

lation, shall be considered by such Secretary. * * *

+ * * * .

5

Section 311, as in effect when this case arose, is re-

produced in its entirety in Appendix D to the petition

for a writ of certiorari (Pet. App. 36a-57a).

STATEMENT

1. On or about March 23, 1975, oil escaped from

an oil retention pit at a drilling facility on premises

leased by respondent L. O. Ward, d/b/a L. O. Ward

Oil and Gas Operations, near the City of Enid, Okla-

homa (Pet. App. 2a, 23a; Tr. 47-48; A. 19, 29, 44-

45). On March 25, a sanitarian with the Oklahoma

State Department of Health, conducting a routine in-

spection of a landfill near respondent’s property, ob-

served that oil had seeped from the retention pit,

down a gully, and into Boggie Creek (Tr. 47-51; A.

44-47), a tributary of the Arkansas River system

(Pet. App. 2a). On the same day, one of respondent’s

employees received a telephone call from the Okla-

homa State Department of Health, notifying him of

the discharge (Tr. 77; A. 51).

As required by Section 311(b) (5) of the FWPCA,?

8’ Section 311(b) (5) provides that the person in charge

of a facility shall immediately notify the “appropriate agency”

of the federal government as soon as he has knowledge of a

discharge of oil or a hazardous substance from the facility

in violation of Section 311(b)(3) of the Act. The latter

section prohibits the discharge of oil or hazardous substances

into navigable waters or adjoining shorelines in quantities

determined in regulations issued by the President to be “harm-

ful.” Because the oil discharged in the present case was

visible on the surface of Boggie Creek (Tr. 50; A. 46-47),

it was in a “harmful” quantity under the applicable regula-

tions, 40 C.F.R. 110.3 (1974), issued by the Administrator of

EPA pursuant to authority delegated by the President in

6

respondent notified the regional office of the Environ-

mental Protection Agency (EPA) by telephone on

April 2 that a discharge of oil had taken place.‘

Respondent submitted a more complete written report

of the discharge to EPA on June 25 (Plaintiff’s Exh.

1; A. 21-23, 31), as required by Section 308(a) (A)

of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. 1818(a) (A).°

Section 1 of Exec. Order No. 11735, 3 C.F.R. 793 (1971-

1975 Compilation).

In Section 7 of the same Executive Order, the President

designated the Coast Guard as the “appropriate agency” for

purposes of receiving the notice of a discharge required by

Section 311(b) (5). Current Coast Guard regulations pro-

vide that such notification may be given, inter alia, to the

government official predesignated as the On-Scene Coordinator

for the geographic region in which the discharge occurs. 33

C.F.R. 153.203(a) (2). The Administrator of EPA is re

sponsible for furnish ng the On-Scene Coordinator for inland

waters, 33 C.F.R. 153.103(p), and EPA is therefore an ap-

propriate agency to receive notification under Section 311

(b) (5). Notice to EPA apparently was also appropriate

at the time of the discharge in this case. 33 C.F.R. 153.203 (a) P

33 C.F.R. 153.105 (1975). Cf. United States v. Kennecott

Copper Corp., 523 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1975).

* A memorandum of the conversation prepared by the EPA

employee who received the telephone call was included as

part of the administrative record but not introduced at the

trial de novo in the district court. Because this memorandum

is relevant to the constitutional issue presented, it was in-

cluded as an appendix to the government’s brief in the court

of appeals and is reproduced in the Appendix in this Court

(A. 17-18).

* Section 308(a)(A) of the FWPCA authorizes the Ad-

ministrator of EPA to require the owner or operator of any

point source of effluents to make such reports, maintain such

records, and provide such other information as the Adminis-

trator may require in order to enable the Administrator to de-

7

By letter dated August 15, 1975 (A. 24-25),

EPA forwarded respondent’s June 25 report of

the discharge to the Coast Guard (Pet. App. 3a),

which is responsible for assessing civil penalties

under Section 311(b)(6) of the Act against those

responsible for the discharge of “harmful” quantities

of oil or hazardous substances into or upon navigable

waters or adjoining shorelines. On December 19, 1975,

following notice and opportunity to be heard, the

Coast Guard assessed a civil penalty against respond-

ent in the amount of $500 (Pet. App. 3a). There is

no indication in the record that this assessment was

based on information other than that forwarded to

the Coast Guard by EPA, which had in turn received

the information from respondent pursuant to Sec-

tions 311(b)(5) and 308(a)(A) of the Act. Re-

velop effluent or other limitations, to determine whether a

person has violated existing limitations or standards, or to

carry out other provisions of the FWPCA. There are civil and

criminal penalties for the failure to comply with these re-

quirements. 33 U.S.C. 1819(c) and (d).

By letter apparently sent in late May of 1975, EPA re-

quested respondent to submit a written report of the discharge

and advised him that failure to do so could result in im-

position of civil or criminal sanctions. (This letter was not

included in the record in the district court, but because it is

part of the administrative record and relates tw the consti-

tutional issue presented, it is reproduced in the Appendix

(A. 19-20)). Because respondent was therefore compelled

to submit this report to EPA under Section 308, use of that

report in the collection of a civil fine from respondent raises

the same constitutional question as does the use of informa-

tion furnished by respondent on April 2 to the “appropriate

agency” (again, in this instance, EPA; see note 3, supra) as

required by Section 311(b) (5) of the Act.

8

spondent filed an administrative appeal from this

ruling, contending that the reporting and enforce-

ment scheme violated his Fifth Amendment privilege

against compulsory self-incrimination, but this ad-

ministrative appeal was denied (Pet. App. 3a, 23a;

A. 26-28).

2. On April 138, 1976, respondent filed suit in the

United States District Court for the Western District

of Oklahoma against the Secretary of Transportation,

the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Admin-

istrator of EPA to enjoin enforcement of Sections

311(b)(5) and (6) and collection of the adminis-

tratively assessed penalty (Pet. App. 8a). Respondent

moved to convene a three-judge court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 2282.° On June 4, 1976, the United

States filed a separate action in the district court to

collect the unpaid penalty (Pet. App. 3a). The court

denied respondent’s motion to convene a three-judge

court on the ground that no substantial challenge to

the constitutionality of the statute was presented (Pet.

App. 23a n.2) and ordered the two cases consolidated

(id. at 24a).

The court denied respondent’s motion for summary

judgment, in which he again argued that the civil

penalty described in Section 311(b) (6) is criminal

or “quasi-criminal” in nature and that use of infor-

mation furnished under the self-reporting scheme

therefore violated his Fifth Amendment privilege

* Section 2282 of Title 28, United States Code, was repealed

by Section 2 of Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (August 12,

1976), but, under Section 7 of that Act, 90 Stat. 1120, it re-

mained in effect with respect to cases previously filed.

9

against compulsory self-incrimination (Pet. App. 24a-

dla, 35a).

The court reasoned that whether a given sanction

is civil or criminal is a question of statutory construc-

tion (Pet. App. 24a, citing One Lot Emerald Cut

Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 287 (1972) ).

The court found (Pet. App. 26a) that Section 311(b)

(6) is “unambiguous” in this regard and that “con-

gressional intent to impose a civil penalty can be dis-

cerned from its face.” The court concluded (ibid.)

that the penalty is expressly labelled “civil,” provision

for administrative assessment of the penalty is in-

dicative of congressional intent to impose a civil sanc-

tion, and the civil nature of the penalty is underscored

by its juxtaposition with a provision for criminal pen-

alties in the immediately preceding Section 311(b) (5)

for those who fail to report a discharge immediately

to the appropriate agency of the federal government.

The court also found (Pet. App. 27a-3la) the civil

nature of the penalty to be supported by reference to

the factors set forth in this Court’s decision in Ken-

nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169

(1963), quoted at pages 34-35, infra.

The case was then tried to a jury,’ which found

that oil from respondent’s facility did spill into Boggie

Creek (Tr. 1385; A. 58). The court reduced the

penalty to $250 in view of the amount of oil that

escaped and its conclusion that respondent had been

7 A jury trial was not required by the Seventh Amendment.

Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review

Comm’n, 480 U.S. 442 (1977).

10

diligent in his clean-up efforts after the discharge was

discovered (Tr. 138-139; A. 60-61).

3. The court of appeals reversed (Pet. App. 1la-

19a), holding that the civil penalty proceeding in Sec-

tion 311(b) (6) is criminal in nature, at least for pur-

poses of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth

Amendment, and that notification given to the appro-

priate agency as required by Section 311(b) (5) could

not be used in determining either liability for or the

amount of the civil penalty assessed under Section

311(b) (6).

The court acknowledged the “remedial” purpose of

the provision (Pet. App. 9a), reflected in the statutory

direction to pay the civil penalties assessed under

Section 311(b) (6) into a revolving fund to defray the

costs of administration and enforcement of Section

311 and of cleaning up oil spills where those costs are

not otherwise recoverable (see Section 311(k), 33

U.S.C. 13821(k); Pet. App. 58a). But, in concluding

that the civil penalty provision is nevertheless penal

or criminal for purposes of the Self-Incrimination

Clause, the court relied (Pet. App. 9a-12a) upon the

requirement that a civil penalty be assessed in every

case without regard either to fault for the discharge

or the subsequent mitigation of damage through clean-

up efforts; this automatic assessment, the court con-

cluded, is indicative of a punitive or retributive pur-

pose. The court found (Pet. App. 1la-12a, 14a, 17a)

the punitive or retributive purpose of the penalty to

be reenforced by implementing instructions issued

11

by the Commandant of the Coast Guard (A. 38-40).°

These instructions stated that the Coast Guard would

assess some penalty in every case, that a penalty at or

near the maximum of $5000 would be assessed unless

one of the factors listed in Section 311(b) (6) justified

a lesser penalty, that the degree of culpability and prior

record of the person responsible for the discharge would

be taken into account, and that the penalty would not be

based on the responsible party’s clean-up effort or ex-

pense. The court also attached importance to the fact

that the conduct involved—a discharge into navigable

waters—may already be a crime under Sections 13 and

16 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.

407 and 411 (Pet. App. 13a, 15a-16a, citing Kennedy v.

Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963) ),

and what it viewed as the possibly excessive amount of

the penalty in relation to the remedial purposes ascribed

8 Commandant Instruction 5922.11A (Feb. 23, 1973) relied

upon by the court of appeals, was reprinted in an appendix

to the opinion in United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co.,

377 F. Supp. 558, 568-570 (E.D. La. 1974), rev’d, 537 F.2d

149 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977).

Neither petitioner nor respondent cited or relied upon this

Instruction in the briefs in the court of appeals, and that

Instruction had been superseded by Instruction 5922.11B

(Oct. 10, 1974) by the time of the occurrences and decisions

in this case. Instruction 5922.11A is reprinted in the Appen-

dix (A. 38-40), and pertinent portions of Instruction 5922.11B

are reprinted as an Appendix to this brief (App., infra, la-

7a). The Coast Guard is in the final stages of preparing a

revision of the Instruction, which will then be incorporated as

a new chapter in the Coast Guard Merchant Marine Safety

Manual. The revision, undertaken in part to reflect the 1977

and 1978 amendments to Section 311, is not expected to depart

materially from the existing Instruction 5922.11B in areas

relevant to this case.

12

to it where the penalty is assessed without regard to

fault (id. at 16a-17a).

The court did not strike down either the self-

reporting requirement in Section 311(b)(5) or the

civil penalty provision in Section 311(b) (6); in-

stead, it fashioned a use and derivative use im-

munity and remanded the United States’ collection

suit to the district court for further proceedings con-

sistent with its opinion.°

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.

(Supp. IV 1974) 1251 et segq., sets forth a comprehen-

sive statutory framework “to restore and maintain the

chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Na-

tion’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). In furtherance of

this goal, Section 311 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1321,

regulates the discharge of oil and hazardous sub-

stances into the Nation’s waters.

® The court of appeals also concluded (Pet. App. 4a-6a) that

the district court had properly declined to convene a three-

judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 2282 in the action

brought byepetitioner. The court of appeals noted that a

judgment for respondent in the district court would not have

restrained enforcement or operation of the FWPCA because

the self-reporting system would have remained intact, and

civil penalties could still have been assessed if the govern-

ment proved its case on the basis of information other than

that derived from the notification required by Section 311

(b) (5). See also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 607

(1960). The court therefore remanded respondent injunctive

action to the district court with instructions to dismiss (Pet.

App. 19a, 21a). Neither petitioner nor respondent has sought

review of the court of appeals’ remand of that action, and

there is, as a result, no issue before the Court regarding the

convening of a three-judge court.

13

Section 311(b)(3) prohibits the discharge of

“harmful” quantities of oil and hazardous substances

into the waters. Section 311(b) (5) requires the per-

son in charge of any facility from which oil or a haz-

ardous substance is discharged in violation of Sec-

tion 311(b)(3) to immediately notify the federal

government so that prompt clean-up and mitigation

measures may be taken. Section 311(b) (5) express-

ly provides, however, that this notification and infor-

mation derived from it may not be used against

the reporting person “in any criminal case.” Sec-

tion 311(b) (6) provides that a “civil penalty” shall

be assessed against the owner or operator of the

vessel or facility where the discharge occurred, the

amount of the penalty to be determined accord-

ing to the gravity of the violation, the size of the busi-

ness operation, and the effect of the penalty on the

ability of the owner or operator to remain in business.

The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination

applies only in a “criminal case.” The court of ap-

peals held that the “civil penalty” prescribed in Sec-

tion 311(b) (6) is criminal in nature and that infor-

mation about a discharge the person in charge of a_

facility or vessel is required by Section 311(b) (5)

to furnish the federal government cannot, under the

Fifth Amendment privilege, be used in the proceed-

ing to assess and collect the penalty. This conclusion

was plainly in error.

A. The question whether a given penalty is crimi-

nal or civil is one of legislative intent. Here, Con-

gress could not have been clearer in expressing in

the very language of the Act its intent that the

penalty is civil, not criminal in nature. It is denomi-

14

nated a “civil penalty,” and the administrative pro-

cedure for its assessment demonstrates that it was

not intended to be criminal. Moreover, in the

immediately preceding Section 311(b) (5), Congress

provided what are plainly criminal sanctions for

the failure to notify the federal government of a

discharge, thereby demonstrating that it knew how

to provide for criminal sanctions when it so desired.

Congress was sensitive to the Fifth Amendment im-

plications of the self-reporting scheme, and expressly

provided in Section 311(b)(5) that the compelled

notification could not be used against the reporting

individual “in any criminal case.” The quoted lan-

guage is drawn directly from the Fifth Amendment.

Thus, when Congres used the term “civil penalty”

in Section 311(b) (6), it must be presumed that it

did so advisedly, with full knowledge of the tradi-

tional distinction between criminal and civil sanc-

tions, and its judgment that the civil penalty proceed-

ing was not a “criminal case” to which the statutory

—and therefore the constitutional—immunity at-

taches is entitled to great weight.

B. There is, moreover, no indication that this plain

language of the Act masks a contrary congressional

intent to impose what amounts to a criminal sanction.

The penalty is remedial, not punitive, under this

Court’s cases.

The penalties are paid into a special contingency

fund established in the Treasury under Section 311

(k), from which the government’s costs of cleaning

up discharges of oil and hazardous substances are

paid. Although the government’s clean-up costs may

15

in many cases be recovered from the owner or op-

erator of the facility or vessel where the discharge

occurred (see Section 311(f)(1)), the civil penalties

assessed in all cases serve to underwrite the govern-

ment’s costs of removing those discharges for which

the costs cannot be recovered—because the owner or

operator has a statutory defense to liability for clean-

up costs, is insolvent, or cannot be identified. Thus,

the civil penalty section imposes a type of absolute,

enterprise liability for these costs on those who en-

gage in the activity of handling oil and hazardous

substances and, as a result, create the risk of causing

the discharges into the Nation’s waters that Section

311 was intended to prevent.

The civil penalty provision was also intended to

deter discharges of oil and hazardous substances by

causing those who handle them to take the economic

consequences of the penalty into account and to

heighten the degree of care they exercise. Finally,

the civil penalty may be viewed as compensation to

the United States, acting parens patriae, for the eco-

logical harm that may be presumed to follow a dis-

charge of oil or a hazardous substance, even where

that discharge is cleaned up promptly.

C. The penalty is also plainly not criminal in na-

ture under the analysis suggested in this Court’s

opinion in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.

144, 168-169 (1963). A monetary penalty imposes

no affirmative disability or restraint on personal lib-

erty, such as the exile involved in Mendoza-Martinez

itself or disqualification from the practice of a pro-

fession involved in the cases cited in that opinion.

16

Monetary penalties have long been accepted as a

legitimate civil remedy, and, accordingly, have not,

unlike banishment or professional disqualification,

been historically regarded as punishment.

A penalty is imposed under Section 311(b) (6) for

all discharges, without regard to fault, and therefore

does not come into play only upon a finding of scien-

ter—another factor identified in Kennedy v. Mendoza-

Martinez, supra. The penalty is not retributive in its

purpose; and while it has the broad, prospective de-

terrent function of encouraging a higher standard of

care by interjecting an additional economic considera-

tion into the handling of oil and hazardous substances,

the penalty does not deter in the manner of a criminal

sanction by an in terrorem effect or by a monetary

sanction that is wholly disproportionate to the harm

that may be caused.

Although discharges of oil and hazardous sub-

stances may in some cases be a crime under the Rivers

and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 407 and 411, the

civil penalty in Section 311(b) (6) was not designed as

additional punishment for violation of those provi-

sions; it imposes a penalty for violation of a different

provision, Section 311(b) (3) of the FWPCA, which

contains no criminal sanctions. Finally, the civil

penalty has remedial purposes not tied to any intent

to punish, so that the penalty in this case ($250) and

generally (up to a maximum of $5000) cannot be

regarded as excessive in relation to those remedial

purposes.

D. Nor can the penalty be regarded as “quasi-

criminal,” implicating the Fifth Amendment privi-

17

lege against compulsory self-incrimination, even if it

is not criminal for purposes of all constitutional pro-

tections normally attaching in a criminal proceeding.

The Court has made clear that a nominally civil pro-

ceeding for the forfeiture of goods or recovery of a

monetary penalty can be regarded as criminal only

where a finding of liability depends on the commis-

sion of an underlying criminal offense. The Fifth

Amendment privilege therefore does not apply where

the civil penalty is remedial in nature, and is not

intended to result in the equivalent of criminal pun-

ishment. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 404 n.

12 (1938).

ARGUMENT

I,

SECTION 311 IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT AND

PROVIDE FOR THE CLEAN-UP OF DISCHARGES

OF OIL IN FURTHERANCE OF THE ACT’S BROAD

REMEDIAL PURPOSE TO MAINTAIN THE INTEG-

RITY OF THE NATION’S WATERS

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.

(Supp. IV 1974) 1251 et seq., sets forth a comprehen-

sive statutory framework designed “to restore and

maintain the chemical, physical, and biological in-

tegrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a).

As a part of this overall plan, Section 311 of the Act,

33 U.S.C. 1321,” regulates the discharge of oil and

10 The substance of Section 311 was first added as Sections

11 and 12 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 1161 and 1162, in

1970. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, Section 102, 84 Stat. 91, 98. These

sections were added to replace the Oil Pollution Act of 1924,

18

hazardous substances into navigable waters in fulfill-

ment of the congressional policy that “there should be

no discharges of oil or hazardous substances into or

upon the navigable waters of the United States * * *.”

Section 311(b) (1).

Congress employed a number of different measures

to accomplish this “no discharge” objective. Section

311(b) (3), as in effect when this case arose, pro-

hibited the discharge into the navigable waters of

the United States'* or upon adjoining shorelines *

33 U.S.C. (1964 ed.) 431 et seg., which had proven to be in-

effective because it applied only to discharges that were grossly

negligent or willful, because it applied only to vessels and

therefore did not cover discharges from stationary sources, and

because it did not extend beyond oil to other hazardous sub-

stances. The addition of these new sections in 1970 was spur-

red by the breakup of the tanker Torrey Canyon, “with its in-

calculable damage to the coast of England and its nearly $8

million cleanup cost,” and by the Santa Barbara Channel oil

spill, which caused “vast” and “appalling” damage to marine

life and recreation in the area. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-127, 91st

Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969); see also S. Rep. No. 91-351, 91st

Cong., Ist Sess. 8, 6 (1969). The provisions were combined

in Section 311 of the Act (33 U.S.C. 1821) in the compre-

hensive Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 862 et seq., and with modifi-

cations not directly relevant to this case, have been carried

forward to the present time.

' Boggie Creek is part of the navigable waters of the

United States for purposes of Section 31 1, which is not limited

in coverage by technical notions of navigability. See Pet.

App. 2a n.1; United States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation

Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); 33 C.F R. 2.05-25 (b) ;

33 U.S.C. 1862(7); cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, No.

78-738 (Dec. 4, 1979), slip op. 9-10.

12 Section 311(b) (8) also prohibits the discharge of oil and

hazardous substances into the “contiguous zone” of waters

adjacent to territory of the United States, as established

19

of oil or hazardous substances in quantities deter-

mined by the President under Section 311(b) (4) to

be “harmful to the public health or welfare of the

United States.” The President delegated the function

of determining what constitutes “harmful” quantities

under this provision to the Administrator of EPA.

Exec. Order No. 11735, Section 1, 3 C.F.R. 793

(1971-1975 Compilation). Under EPA regulations

in effect now and in 1974, discharges of oil are de-

fined as “harmful” if they violate applicable water

quality standards or cause a film or sheen upon or

discoloration of the surface of the water or adjoining

shorelines or cause a sludge or emulsion to be de-

posited in or upon either. 40 C.F.R. 110.3. Because

the discharge in this case caused a sheen on the sur-

face of Boggie Creek (Tr. 50; A. 46-47), it was of

a harmful quantity under the regulation.”

or to be established by the United States under Article 24

of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous

Zone, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 40 C.F.R. 110.1(g).

13 Jn his motion for summary judgment, respondent chal-

lenged the validity of the “sheen test” of harmfulness, but

this challenge was rejected by the district court (Pet. App.

32a-35a), and respondent did not pursue this issue in the

court of appeals. Sections 311(b) (3) and (4) were amended

by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments

of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-576, 92 Stat. 2468, to prohibit the

discharge of oil and hazardous substances “in such quantities

as may be harmful” (emphasis added), as determined by

the President. This change was intended to make clear that

the Act “does not require an assessment of actual harm in

the variety of circumstances in which such substances might

be discharged.” 124 Cong. Rec. S18995, H13599 (daily ed.

Oct. 14, 1978).

20

Section 311(c)(1) authorizes the President to re-

move or to arrange for the removal of any oil or

hazardous substance discharged into or upon the

navigable waters of the United States or adjoining

shorelines, unless he determines that the owner or

operator of the vessel or facility from which the sub-

stance was discharged will properly do so. The gov-

ernment’s clean-up costs are paid out of a special

revolving fund established in the Treasury by Section

311(k).

The owner or operator of the vessel or facility from

which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in

violation of Section 311(b) (3) is liable to the United

States for the actual costs incurred by the government

in clean-up operations except where the discharge was

caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, negli-

gence on the part of the United States, or an act or

omission of a third party. Section 311(f). Funds

recovered pursuant to this provision are deposited in ~

the revolving fund established under Section 311(k).

Although Congress has from time to time appro-

priated money for the fund, it is in general intended

to be replenished by recoveries from those responsible

for prohibited discharges.

Section 311(b) (5) of the FWPCA requires “Taljny

persor in charge” of a vessel or facility from which

oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in violation

of Section 311(b) (3) to “immediately notify the ap-

propriate agency of the United States Government of

such discharge.” This notification enables the federal

government to ensure that clean-up and other reme-

21

dial measures are taken promptly in order to mini-

mize the ensuing damage. See S. Rep. No. 91-351,

supra, at 16. Failure to notify the appropriate

agency immediately is a criminal offense punish-

able by a fine of up to $10,000 and imprison-

ment for one year. In recognition of the Fifth

Amendment privilege, however, Section 311(b) (5)

provides that the “[n]otification réceived pursuant

to this paragraph or information obtained by the

exploitation of such notification shall not be used

against any such person in any criminal case, except

a prosecution for perjury or for giving a false state-

ment.” “*

Section 311(b) (6), as it read at the time of the

discharge involved in this case, provided that the

“owner or operator” of a facility from which oil.or

a hazardous substance is discharged in violation of

Section 311(b)(3) shall be assessed a civil penalty

by the Secretary of the department in which the Coast

Guard is operating in an amount not to exceed $5,000

14 Respondent notified EPA eight days after one of his em-

ployees was informed of the discharge (A. 17-18). This notifi-

cation would not appear to have been “immediate,” as Section

311(b) (5) requires. See United States v. Kennecott Copper

Corp., 523 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1975) ; United States v. Ashland

Oil and Transportation Co., supra. The government argued in

the court of appeals that because respondent did not notify

the appropriate agency immediately, he could not take advan-

tage of the statutory grant of use and derivative use im-

munity in Section 311(b) (5), which was intended to imple-

ment the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-

tion. We did not present this question in the petition for a

writ of certiorari. See Pet. 2, 8.

22

for each offense.* In determining the amount of the

penalty or any settlement thereof, the Secretary is to

take into account “the appropriateness of such penalty

to the size of the business of the owner or operator

charged, the effect on the owner or operator’s ability

to continue in business, and the gravity of the vio-

lation.” *°

Civil penalties recovered in proceedings brought

under Section 311(b) (6) are paid into the revolving

fund established by Section 311(k), along with re-

*® Section 311(b) (6) was amended by Sections 58 (a) (7)

and (8) of the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,

91 Stat. 1566, 1594, to provide that the “person in charge”

of a facility is liable for a civil penalty in addition to the

owner or operator of the facility.

‘6 Section 311(b) (6) was further amended by the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.

No. 95-576, 92 Stat. 2468, to permit the Administrator of

EPA to bring an action directly in the district court to recover

a civil penalty of up to $50,000 against the owner, operator,

or person in charge of a vessel or facility from which a sub-

stance is dicharged in violation of Section 311(b) (3). The

amount of the penalty is to be determined by the same three

factors utilized by the Coast Guard in assessing a penalty

administratively, as well as the “standard of care manifested”

and efforts to “minimize or mitigate the effects of such dis-

charge.” The penalty may be in an amount of up to $250,000

if the Administrator can show willful negligence or mis-

conduct on the part of the\defendant. This provision for the

Administrator of EPA to recover a much larger civil penalty

in an action in the district court is designed for more serious

discharges, and it cannot, by its terms, be utilized if the

Coast Guard has already assessed a penalty administratively.

EPA recently issued regulations and entered into a memo-

randum of understanding with the Coast Guard governing

the assessment of civil penalties in the district court. 44 Fed.

Reg. 50766 (Aug. 29, 1979).

23

coveries under Section 311(f) from owners or opera-

tors of the costs incurred by the United States in

cleaning up discharges. Thus, as the court of appeals

acknowledged (Pet. App. 9a), the collection of civil

penalties in all cases helps defray the cost of cleaning

up those oil spills for which the government’s clean-

up costs are not otherwise recoverable—e.g., where

the discharge cannot be traced to a particular source;

where the discharge is caused by an act of God, an

act of war, or negligence on the part of the United

States; where the owner of a facility at which the

discharge occurred is insolvent; or where the clean-up

costs exceed the limitations on liability established in

Section 311(f). Moneys from the revolving fund are

also used for implementation of the National Con-

tingency Plan for removal of oil and hazardous sub-

stances. See Sections 311(c) (2) and 311(k).

By the operation of these sections, the civil penalty

provision furthers the FWPCA’s goal of pollution-

free weer by imposing a type of absolute or enter-

prise liability on those who engage in activities creat-

ing a risk of the discharges the FWPCA was intended

to prevent—and by imposing that liability only where

the risk has manifested itself in an actual discharge

—in order to assist in the funding of clean-up efforts

generally. See United States v. Marathon Pipe Line

Co., 589 F.2d 1305, 1309 (7th Cir. 1978). This re-

flects a congressional judgment that the industry con-

cerned, rather than the public, should bear the direct

costs of the water pollution caused by discharges.

Ibid.; see also United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589

F.2d 1310, 1314-1315 (7th Cir. 1978).

24

The civil penalty was also expected to have an in-

cremental impact in deterring discharges. S. Rep.

No. 91-351, supra, at 16. In many cases, the amount

of the penalty will be considerably less than the clean-

up costs. The clean-up costs (and potential liability

to third parties for damages under state or federal

law for injury to property)'’ would operate as a

significant deterrent to such discharges. But Con-

gress anticipated that there would be other discharges

that, although not lending themselves to effective

clean-up, would nevertheless “present a hazard to the

water environment” (zbid.). The civil penalty was

expected to discourage these discharges for which

clean-up costs were not likely to be recovered (ibid.) .’®

In those cases in particular, but to an extent in all

1 Section 311(0) provides that nothing in Section 311

shall be construed to affect the liability under federal or state

law of an owner or operator of a vessel or facility to the

owner of property that is damaged by an oil spill.

18 At the time of the discharge in this case, Section 311

(b) (2)(B) provided for the recovery of a civil penalty—

in effect, liquidated damages—from the owner or operator

of a facility or vessel from which a hazardous substance

was discharged if the Administrator of EPA determined at

the time he designated the substance as hazardous that it was

not actually removable from water. This provision, enacted

in 1972, was expected to discourage discharges of hazardous

substances because each carrier or handler would evaluate the

risk of discharge and determine whether the potential penalty

made engaging in the risk-prone activity worthwhile or

whether a higher standard of care was in order. S. Rep. No.

92-414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 66 (1971) ; see also 124 Cong. Rec.

S18995 (daliy ed. Oct. 14, 1978). There was, contrary to the

court of appeals’ apparent belief (Pet. App. 8a-9a), no simi-

larly distinct provision for liquidated damages in the case of

oil discharges that could not readily be cleaned up in a particu-

was

25

cases, the civil penalty helps to prevent harmful

spills “by making care more economical than care-

lessness” (Pet. App. 29a n.9, quoting United States v.

General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151, 1162 (D.

Conn. 1975)). See also United States v. Atlantic

Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830, 841 (E.D. Pa. 1977),

aff’d sub nom. United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 573

F.2d 13803 (3d Cir. 1978). And, as the court of ap-

peals conceded (Pet. App. 16a), the penalty may also

be viewed as compensation to the United States (act-

ing parens patriae, to preserve the integrity of the

Nation’s waters for the benefit of the general citi-

zenry) for the presumed ecological harm to the waters

resulting from the discharge, even though it may be

cleaned up promptly. See United States v. W. B.

Enterprises, 378 F. Supp. 420, 422-423 (S.D. N.Y.

1974) ; see also United States v. Eureka Pipeline Co.,

401 F. Supp. 934, 940 (N.D. W. Va. 1975). “[T]he

Congress obviously believed: (a) that no clean up ef-

fort could be complete because, after discharge, it is

impossible to guarantee against residual harm from

quantities of oil too small or too well dispersed to be

detectable; and (b) that even the transitory pollu-

tion of waters was deleterious to the environment.”

United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 429 F.

Supp. at 837.

lar case. The “liquidated damages” provision in Section 311 (b)

“(2) (B) effectively repealed by Subsection (b) (3) of the Fed-

eral Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.

95-576, 92 Stat. 2467. The civil penalty assessed under Section

311(b) (6) can, however, serve the same function by forcing

the handler or carrier of oil or hazardous substances to take

the monetary cost of a civil penalty into account and to

exercise a higher standard of care as a result.

| :

’ ; ;

:

26

II.

THE PENALTY ASSESSED UNDER SECTION 311

(b)(6) IS PLAINLY CIVIL IN NATURE, FURTHER-

ING THE ACT’S REMEDIAL PURPOSES

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person

shall be compciied “in any criminal case” to be a

witness against himself. The court of appeals held

that a penalty provided for in Section 311(b) (6),

although denominated “civil” is, in reality, “crimi-

nal in nature” and that the Fifth Amendment there-

fore precluded the use in proceedings to assess and

collect the penalty of the notice of the discharge re-

spondent was required by Section 311(b) (5) to give

to the “appropriate agency” of the federal govern-

ment. The conclusion may follow if the premise is

correct (but see California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424

(1971) ). But, in our view, the court below wrongly

characterized the proceeding in suit as a “criminal

case” for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause.

“The question of whether a given sanction is civil or

criminal is one of statutory construction.” One Lot

Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,

237 (1972); accord, Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S.

391, 399 (1938); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, No. 77-1829

(May 14, 1979), slip op. 16-17. This is not to say, of

course, that Congress could effectively dispense with

applicable constitutional protections merely by at-

taching the “civil” label to what is otherwise un-

questionably a criminal sanction. United States v.

J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974);

cf. Beil v. Wolfish, supra, slip op. 17 n.20. The proper

judicial inquiry in any given case is whether Congress

intended the finding of liability under the statutory

27

provision and the adverse effect on the person in-

volved—here, a monetary penalty—to carry with them

the usual implications or consequences of an adjudi-

cation of guilt under the criminal law. Among these

are the stigma that is intended to attach following a

conviction, the legitimacy of characterizing the ad-

verse consequences as punishment, the satisfaction of

whatever retributive impulses may underlie the crimi-

nal law, and, in appropriate cases, the imposition of

disabilities or restraints, such as imprisonment or

other custody, expulsion from the jurisdiction, or

disqualification from the practice of a profession.

Where Congress intends a finding of liability un-

der a particular statutory provision to carry these

consequences normally associated with conviction for

commission of a criminal offense, the determination

of liability cannot occur, and the penalty provided

cannot be imposed, without the protection afforded

by the Constitution in criminal cases or prosecutions.

But evidence of such congressional intent is wholly

lacking with respect to Section 311(b) (6).

A. Section 311(b) On Its Face Manifests A Clear Con-

gressional Intent That the “Civil Penalty” Provided

in Section 311(b)(6) Is Civil for Constitutional

Purposes

The very language of the Act here, which must be

the starting point in statutory interpretation, Perrin

v. United States, No. 78-959 (Nov. 27, 1979), slip

op. 4; TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978), amply

demonstrates that the penalty is not criminal. Con-

gress used the term “civil penalty” in describing the

assessment under Section 311(b)(6). It must be

assumed, absent compelling evidence of congressional

28

intent to the contrary, that this term was used ad-

visedly. Congress must be presumed to be aware of

the traditional distinction between civil and criminal

sanctions, not merely with respect to the procedural

protections that must be afforded, but also in the

vastly different legal and societal consequences that

follow when one is adjudged guilty of a crime on the

one hand and, on the other, has paid a mere monetary

penalty under a regulatory statute.

For this reason, as Judge Friendly stated, “[w]hen

Congress has characterized the remedy as civil and

the only consequence of a judgment for the Govern-

ment is a money penalty, the courts have taken Con-

gress at its word.” United States v. J. B. Williams

Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974). This Court

has, as a result, repeatedly upheld monetary penal-

ties designated by Congress as civil penalties against

contentions that they were actually criminal in nature.

See ¢.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S.

148, 151-154 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus v.

Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-552 (1943); Helvering v.

Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S. at 400, 402-403; Chicago,

B. & Q. Ry. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 577-579

(1911) ; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,

214 U.S. 320, 338-339 (1909); Hepner v. United

States, 213 U.S. 103, 108-111 (1909).

The administrative procedure for assessment of

the penalty under Section 311(b) (6) is also indica-

tive of a congressional intent that the penalty be civil.

In Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), for

example, in which the question presented was whether

29

a 50% penalty on a federal income tax defici-

ency was a criminal penalty and therefore barred

under the circumstances by the Fifth Amendment

protection against double jeopardy, the Court stated:

That Congress provided a distinctly civil pro-

cedure for the collection of the additional 50

percentum indicates clearly that it intended a

civil, not a criminal, sanction. Civil procedure

is incompatible with the accepted rules and con-

stitutional guaranties governing the trial of

criminal prosecutions, and where civil procedure

is prescribed for the enforcement of remedial

sanctions, those rules and guaranties do not

appply.

303 U.S. at 402.

But it is not necessary to rely on the language of

Section 311(b) (6) alone to determine from the face

of the Act that the penalty is civil. In Section

311(b) (5), the immediately preceding section, Con-

gress provided for what are clearly criminal sanc-

tions for those who fail to notify the appropriate

agency of the federal government of a prohibited

discharge:

Any such person who fails to notify immediately

such agency of such discharge shall, upon con-

viction, be fined not more than $10,000, or im-

prisoned for not more than one year, or both.

Thus, when Congress wished to impose a criminal

sanction in the Act, it knew how to do so.

Even more significantly for present purposes, how-

ever, is Congress’ treatment of the Fifth Amendment

implications of the self-reporting requirement in

Section 311(b) (5). To safeguard the Fifth Amend-

30

ment privilege, Congress expressly provided in that

section that the compelled notification, or information

obtained by the exploitation of that notification, shall

not be used against the reporting person “in any

criminal case.” The quoted phrase is, of course,

drawn verbatim from the Self-Incrimination Clause.

Thus, when Congress termed the monetary assess-

ment in Section 311(b) (6), the very next section, a

“civil penalty,” it must have been of the view that a

proceeding under Section 311(b) (6) is not a “crimi-

nal case” for purposes of the immunity granted by

Section 311(b) (5) or, therefore, for purposes of the

Fifth Amendment. When Congress has shown such

a sensitivity to Fifth Amendment concerns by in-

cluding an express grant of immunity (compare

Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), and

Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968)), and

characterized a sanction provided in the same statu-

tory scheme as a “civil penalty” that was intended to -

be outside of the protection afforded by the statutory

and Fifth Amendment immunity, the statutory char-

acterization of the penalty as civil is especially com-

pelling.”

20 Commandant’s Instruction 5922.11B, issued in 1974, pro-

vides that there is no statutory immunity from the use of the

notification in a civil penalty proceeding (App. 2a, infra).

The administrative construction that a “civil penalty” pro-

ceeding is not a “criminal case” for purposes of the statutory

(and, therefore, the constitutional) immunity “should be fol-

lowed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.”

E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 482 U.S. 46, 54-55

(1977), quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.

267, 381 (1969).

31

Finally, the provision for payment of penalties

assessed under Section 311(b) (6) into the revolving

fund established by Section 311(k) to defray costs of

administering Section 311 further demonstrates a

remedial, not punitive purpose. One Lot Emerald Cut

Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) ;

United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,

549-550 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, 303

U.S. at 401.

Thus, in a number of different ways, Section

311(b) unmistakably reveals a congressional intent

that the civil penalty in Section 311(b) (6) is indeed

civil. This conclusion is reinforced by the decisions

of a number of courts that a proceeding under Sec-

tion 311(b) (6) is not a “criminal case” for purposes

of the statutory grant of immunity in Section 311(b)

(5), which, as noted above, implements the Fifth

Amendment privilege. See United States v. Allied

Towing Corp., 578 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1978) ;

United States v. LeBeouff Bros. Towing Co., 537 F.2d

149 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987

(1977); Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d

1291, 1293 n.7 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827

(1976) ; United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 429

F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d sub. nom. United

States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 573 F.2d 1303 (3d Cir.

1978) .”

*1 None of these cases involved the possible application of

the Fifth Amendment privilege because the defendants were

corporations, which do not enjoy the privilege. California

Bankers Ass’n Vv. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 71 (1974). However,

because Section 311(b) (5) uses the phrase “in any criminal

case” drawn from the Fifth Amendment and was presumably

32

The court of appeals determined (Pet. App. 9a,

12a), however, in looking to the face of the statute,

that a punitive intent—and therefore an intent to

impose a criminal sanction—was indicated by the

statutory language that a civil penalty “shall be

assessed” for a violation. To be sure, the Coast

Guard Instructions relied upon by the court of ap-

peals—as well as those actually in effect at the time

—support the view that Congress intended that some

penalty be assessed in all cases. See A. 38-40; App.,

infra, la. But it does not follow that the provision

is criminal in nature. The approach may simply be to

impose a type of enterprise liability on the basis of the

activity engaged in by the person generally—the stor-

age, transportation, processing, or other handling of

oil or hazardous substances—which creates an inherent

risk of ecological harm, rather than to focus on the

degree of fault underlying the specific act or omission

at the time of the discharge actually occurred.

The court of appeals also found a punitive tone

in the Commandant’s Instructions, which give con-

tent, inter alia, to the phrase “gravity of the offense,”’

one of the factors to be taken into account under the

statute in determining the amount of the penalty to

be assessed. As implemented in the Instructions, this

factor embraces such considerations as the amount

of oil discharged, whether the discharge was inten-

tional or negligent, and the prior record of the person

intended thereby to have the same scope (both for individuals

and corporations) as the constitutional privilege, these cases

reflect a judicial consensus of the underlying nature of the

civil penalty in Section 211(b) (6) that is relevant here.

33

involved.” But, the amount of the oil discharged is

clearly relevant if the penalty is viewed as compen-

sation to the government for the ecological harm that

is presumed to follow an oil spill, even one that is

cleaned up promptly. See page 25, supra. So, also,

the size of the spill is relevant in allocating the

costs of government clean-up and stand-by prepared-

ness measures funded by Section 311(k) to those

who, as demonstrated by the magnitude of the par-

ticular spill, present the greater risk of the ecological

harm Section 311 is designed to prevent.

Similarly, the prior record of the person involved

is directly pertinent to the remedial purpose of pre-

venting discharges. A long history of discharges con-

firms that the person’s activities present a greater

risk of ecological harm than do the activities of others

and that a larger portion of the government’s costs

associated with administering Section 311 should

therefore be allocated to that person. By the same

token, if the discharge was intentional or negligent

(a factor the Coast Guard instructions also take into

account), this activity demonstrates a sufficient dis-

regard for the purposes of the Act, and therefore a

sufficient possibility of future harm, such that a

proportionately greater penalty is warranted to fur-

ther the purpose of preventing spills.”

22 Although the Instructions on which the court relied and

those actually in effect at the time are differently worded,

these considerations are generally contained in both. See

A. 38-40; App., infra, 2a-3a.

23 The court of appeals’ conclusion that taking the degree

of culpability into account in determining the amount of a

penalty to be assessed demonstrates an intent to impose

34

Thus, nothing on the face of Section 311 or the

Coast Guard’s enforcement of it indicates an intent

in the least inconsistent with Congress’ characteriza-

tion of the penalty as civil or with the section’s

remedial purposes.

B. The Penalty Provided in Section 311(b)(6) Is Also

Civil Under the Test Set Forth In Kennedy v.

Mendoza-Martinez

In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144

(1963), the Court held punitive a section of the

Nationality Act of 1940 which “automatically

strip[ped] an American of his citizenship * * *

whenever [he] depart[ed] from or remain[ed] out-

side the jurisdiction of this country for the purpose

of evading his military obligations.” Jd. at 166.

Accordingly, the Court held that this punishment

could not be imposed “without affording the pro-

cedural safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and

Sixth Amendments.” Jbid. That result is hardly

relevant here. Nor is the primary basis on which

it was reached—the Court having concluded that

the legislative history of the provision afforded

“conclusive evidence of congressional intent” to treat

the sanction of de-nationalization as punishment. Jd.

at 169. But the Court went on to identify seven

factors useful in determining whether an Act of

Congress is penal or regulatory in character (7d. at

168-169 ; footnotes omitted).

criminal sanctions is, of course, inconsistent with the court’s

earlier conclusion (see page 10, supra) that assessment of

some penalty in every case without regard to fault (cul-

pability) reflects a punitive intent.

BF niet meee mn ewvess <n ¥

35

Whether the sanction involves an affirmative

disability or restraint, whether it has historically

been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes

into play only on a finding of scienter, whether

its operation will promote the traditional aims of

punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether

the behavior to which it applies is already a

crime, whether an alternative purpose to which

it may rationally be connected is assignable for

it, and whether it appears excessive in relation

to the alternative purpose assigned are all rele-

vant to the inquiry, and may often point in

differing directions. Absent conclusive evidence

of congressional intent as to the penal nature of

a statute, these factors must be considered in

relation to the statute on its face.

In the present case, the court below invoked this

passage to support its conclusion that the Section

311(b)(6) penalty is criminal in nature, and we

accordingly consider the several factors here.

1, Whether the sanction involves an affirmative

disability or restraint

This factor clearly points to the remedial nature of

the Section 311(b) (6) penalty. The type of “affirma-

tive disability or restraint” to which the Court re-

ferred was one imposed on personal liberty, not the

adverse consequences of a monetary assessment. This

is evidenced by the Court’s citation (372 U.S. at 168

n.22) to Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333

(1866), and United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303

(1946). The former case held that a statute barring

from the practice of law in federal courts any person

who did not subscribe to an oath that he had not

been an active supporter of the Confederacy consti-

36

tuted punishment for past conduct that was or may

have been criminal and was therefore a prohibited

ex post facto law. Similarly, Lovett held that a

statute barring the payment of certain named govern-

ment employees constituted punishment for their sup-

posed subversive activities “without the safeguards

of a judicial trial,” 328 U.S. at 316, and was there-

fore a prohibited bill of attainder. Jd. at 316-318.

Cf. Bell v. Woljish, supra, slip op. 17 n.20 (suggest-

ing that certain restrictions on the liberty of pretrial

detainees “may on [their] face appear to be punish-

ment,” but that they may in fact be incidents of a

lawful ‘nonpunitive governmental objective).

Monetary penalties, on the other hand, do not 'm-

pose affirmative disabilities or restraints under «he

Mendoza-Martinez analysis. This is indicated by the

Court’s citation (372 U.S. at 168 n.22) to Flemming

v. Nestor, supra, by way of contrast to Ex parte

Garland, supra, and United States v. Lovett, supra.

In Flemming v. Nestor, supra, the Court upheld the

statutory termination of social security benefits of a

person who had been deported because of past member-

ship in the Communist Party. Finding an absence of

compelling evidence of punitive intent, the Court re-

jected contentions that the provision was an ex post

facto law or bill of attainder and that it resulted in

punishment without benefit of a judicial trial. 363 U.S.

at 612-621. Significantly, the phrase “affirmative

disability or restraint” used in Mendoza-Martinez is

drawn from a passage in Flemming v. Nestor (372

U.S. at 617) in which the Court cites Wong Wing v.

Umted States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) and Cummings v.

me ae.

37

Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), both of

which involved restrains on liberty,* and notes that

Flemming v. Nestor itself involved no such “affirma-

tive disability or restraint.”

Thus, the court of appeals erred in concluding that

because a monetary penalty may inflict a ““pocket-

book deterrence or restraint on the recipient” (Pet.

App. 18a-14a, quoting Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occu-

pational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 518 F.2d

990, 1001 (5th Cir. 1975), aff’d on other grounds,

430 U.S. 442 (1977)), the first of the Mendoza-

Martinez factors offers “little indication as to Con-

gress’ intent” (Pet. App. 14a). A “pocket-book” im-

pact distinctly points to a remedial rather than puni-

tive intent.

2. Whether the sanction has historically been re-

garded as punishment

This factor, too, clearly supports the remedial, non-

criminal nature of the penalty provision. As the

Court stated in Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S.

at 400:

Forfeiture of goods or their value and the pay-

ment of fixed or variable sums of money are

other sanctions which have been recognized as

** Wong Wing invalidated a statute providing for imprison-

ment at hard labor, without a criminal trial to establish guilt,

of a person unlawfully in the United States, and Cummings

V. Missouri invalidated as an ex post facto law a state con-

stitutional provision barring from the clergy any person who

failed to subscribe to an oath that he had never supported

the Confederacy. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889),

also cited in Flemming v. Nestor at the pertinent page, in-

volved a defendant who had been indicted and convicted and

is relevant only for its discussion of Cummings v. Missouri.

38

enforcible by civil procedings since the original

revenue law of 1789. * * * In spite of their

comparative severity, such sanctions have been

upheld against the contention that they are es-

sentially criminal and subject to the procedural

rules governing criminal prosecutions.

Unlike the historically punitive sanction of exile in-

volved in Mendoza-Martinez itself (see 372 U.S. at

168 n.23), and the similarly criminal sanctions in-

volved in the other cases cited in Mendoza-Martinez

on this point—imprisonment at hard labor, Wong

Wing v. United States, supra; Ex parte Wilson, 114

U.S. 417, 426-429 (1885); Mackin v. United States,

117 U.S. 348, 350-351 (1886) (discussing Ex parte

Wilson), and exclusion from a profession, Cummings

v. Missouri, swpra—monetary penalties have tradi-

tionally been recognized as appropriate civil remedies.

3. Whether the sanction comes inte play only on a_

finding of scienter

This factor furnishes no support whatever for the

argument that the penalty in Section 311(b) (6) is

criminal in nature, because there is no scienter re-

quirement for the imposition of a civil penalty under

that section. The court of appeals agreed, “at first

blush” (Pet. App. 14a), but then resorted to the

somewhat inverted logic that Section 311(b)(6) is

punitive in this regard because Sections 13 and 16 of

the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which may im-

pose criminal sanctions for the discharge of oil and

hazardous substances, likewise do not contain a scienter

ihc NID

39

requirement (Pet. App. 14a, citing United States v.

White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1974) ).

We, of course, recognize that a statute may be crimi-

nal although it contains no scienter requirement. Yet,

the absence of such a requirement in Section 311

(b) (6) tends to establish that the measure is reme-

dial, not criminal.

The court of appeals was also influenced (Pet. App.

14a) by the fact the Commandant’s Instructions ap-

peared to contain a scienter element in determining

the amount of the penalty to be assessed in a given

case. See A. 38-40; App., infra, 2a-3a. But the only

pertinent statutory factor is the “gravity of the of-

fense.” This is not the equivalent of a scienter require-

ment. As the implementing instructions make clear,

this factor can embrace such considerations as the

amount of oil discharged, the degree of care exercised

by the discharger, and whether the discharge was in-

tentional. The inquiry under Mendoza-Martinez, on

the other hand, is whether the penalty “comes into

play only on a finding of scienter.” 372 U.S. at 168

(emphasis added). This question must be answered

in the negative, both as it pertains to the assessment

of at least some penalty and the determination of its

amount.

4. Whether the sanction’s operation will promote the

traditional aims of punishment—retribution and

deterrence

The court of appeals concluded (Pet. App. 15a)

that the deterrence factor does not come into play

under Section 311(b) (6) to a significant degree be-

40

cause the deterrence of spills under the section as

a whole results from the provision in Section 311(f)

for the recovery of clean-up costs from the owner or

operator. We agree that the potential for assessment

of a civil penalty will have a relatively small deter-

rent effect where the potential clean-up liability is

substantial. But, as noted above (see pages 24-25,

supra), Congress expected Section 311(b)(6) to

serve some deterrent function, especially where the

oil could not readily be removed. This prospective

deterrent effect was expected to result because hand-

lers of oil and hazardous substances would make

an economic calculation whether the possibility of a

penalty warranted the taking of certain risks in the

handling of those materials, and it was anticipated

that those responsible would be impelled by economic

considerations to take protective measures.

Such essentially regulatory deterrence, by imposing

additional costs or responsibilities in connection with.

doing business for the purpose of accomplishing reme-

dial goals, does not render the sanction criminal. This

is clear, for example, from Oceanic Steam Navigation

Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 337-338 (1909):

[The Senate] report leaves no doubt that the

sole purpose of §9 was to impose a penalty,

* * * to secure the efficient performance by the

steamship company of the duty to examine

[aliens] in the foreign country, before em-

barkation, and thereby aid in carrying out the

policy of Congress to exclude from the United

States aliens afflicted with loathsome or dan-

gerous contagious diseases as defined in the act.

The contention that because the exaction which

ee ne

41

the statute authorizes the Secretary of Commerce

and Labor to impose is a penalty, therefore

its enforcement is necessarily governed by the

rules controlling in the prosecution of criminal

offenses, is clearly without merit, and is not open

to discussion.

The deterrent effect of which the Court spoke in

Mendoza-Martinez must therefore be more than that

which would predictably follow from the assessment

of a penalty for remedial purposes. It must, instead,

result from an in terrorem effect akin to that of being

adjudged guilty of a criminal offense or from a mone-

tary penalty far in excess of that reasonably related

to the remedial purposes of the provision, as in the

two cases cited in Mendoza-Martinez (372 U.S. at 168

n.25, citing United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S.

287 (1935), and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) ).

Although the court of appeals did not find a pro-

hibited deterrent function in the civil penalty, it did

find that Section 311(b) (6) manifested a retributive

purpose, at least as implemented by the Coast Guard

Instructions. In setting the amount of penalty, the

Instructions take into account the gravity of the vio-

lation, the degree of culpability, and the prior record

of the party and preclude consideration of good faith,

the absence of fault, or subsequent clean-up efforts.

As noted above, however (see pages 32-33, supra),

the gravity of the violation, the prior record, and the

degree of culpability are all relevant to the alloca-

tion of the special costs of administering Section 311

42

to those who engage in the activity that creates the

risk of the ecological harm the statute was designed

to prevent, whatever the nature of the conduct (or

absence thereof) at the specific moment of the dis-

charge. Similarly, subsequent cleanup efforts do not

erase the fact that the occurrence of the dis-

charge itself confirms that the particular facility

poses a risk of discharge or the possibility that

ecological harm may have resulted to the waters

notwithstanding the clean-up efforts. This is in no

sense retributive purpose.** Where, as here, the stat-

ute’s aim is to reach the conduct engaged in, rather

than the person engaging in it, it is remedial, not

punitive. See Flemming v. Nestor, supra, 363 U.S.

at 616, quoting Cummings v. Missouri, supra, 71

U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320 (there must be a persuasive

showing of a purpose “to reach the person, not

the calling” to find the provision punitive or crimi-

nal in nature).

d. Whether the behavior to which the sanction applies

is already a crime

The court below found here a clear indication that

the Section 311(b) (6) penalty is criminal for present

purposes because Section 13 of the Rivers and Har-

bors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 407, makes criminal

the discharge of refuse of any kind into the navigable

waters of the United States. But the fact that crimi-

*5 This factor must also be considered in light of the facts of

Mendoza-Martinez itself, in which the legislative history made

unmistakably clear that Congress aeted for the repeatedly

expressed purpose to punish those who left the country in

time of need. 372 U.S. at 170-184. See also Trop v. Dulles,

supra, 356 U.S. at 96 (plurality opinion).

43

nal sanctions apply under another statute, passed at

a distant time, has little bearing on Congress’ intent

in enacting Section 311(b) (6). “ ‘Congress may im-

pose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to

the same act or omission.’” One Lot Emerald Cut

Stones v. United States, supra, 409 U.S. at 235, quot-

ing Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S. at 399.

Once again, a consideration of the facts in Mendoza-

Martinez is in order. In that case, the Court found

that Congress had enacted the expatriation provision

for the specific purpose of imposing additional punish-

ment for conduct that was already criminal under

the Selective Service laws but which could not be

prosecuted when the violator was outside the country.

372 U.S. at 170-184. There was therefore a clear

nexus between an underlying criminal offense and the

particular disability.

Such a nexus was also plain in the three cases cited

by the Court by way of explaining this factor. All

three statutes involved premised liability for a moue-

tary sanction on a finding that the person engaged in

conduct that was criminal under a statutory provision

referred to in the very section that provided for the

monetary penalty. 372 U.S. at 168 n.26, citing Lipke

v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922); United States

v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572-573 (1931); United

States v. Constantine, supra, 296 U.S. at 295. See

also United States v. United States Coin & Currency,

401 U.S. 715, 721-722 (1971); compare One Lot

Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, supra, 409 U.S.

at 236 n.6. It is apparent, then, that the Court

in Mendoza-Martinez had in mind something substan-

44

tially more than the fact that the conduct involved

might also be criminal under some other statute or

provision. There must be a basis for concluding that

Congress specifically intended the sanction in question

to be additional punishment for engaging in that crimi-

nal conduct. There is no basis for such a conclusion

here.

Moreover, the Court has held that the fact that a

concededly criminal provision falls in a different part

of the statutory scheme than the provision whose

penal or remedial character is in issue weighs in

favor of a finding that the provision in issue is not

criminal. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United

States, supra, 409 U.S. at 286. Viewed from this

perspective, the fact that the conduct here covered

by Section 311(b)(6) may also be criminal under

the Rivers and Harbors Act, enacted some 70 years

earlier, attenuates any relationship to underlying

criminal activity to the breaking point. There is no

mention of the Rivers and Harbors Act in Section

311(b) (6), nor is there any indication that Congress

intended for the civil penalty assessed under Sec-

tion 311(b) (6) to be an additional punishment for a

violation of that statute.”

*6 In fact, although the committee reports do not elaborate,

a principal motivation for the incorporation of a statutory

grant of immunity under Section 311(b) (5) against the use

“in any criminal case” of information about discharges re-

quired to be furnished under that section was no doubt to

prevent the use or derivative use of that information under

the Rivers and Harbors Act. See, e.g., United States v. Re-

public Steel Corp., 491 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1974) ; United

States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1972) ; see

45

6. Whether an alternative purpose other than punish-

ment may rationally be ascribed to the sanction

Although sanctions that have no conceivable legiti-

mate purpose other than to punish are considered

punitive in nature, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,

supra; Trop v. Dulles, supra, the sanction will not

be regarded as punitive or criminal in nature if the

statute may rationally be thought to have another

purpose. Flemming v. Nestor, supra, 363 U.S. at

615-617. In the present case, it is clear that a num-

ber of alternative purposes may rationally be ascribed

to Section 311(b) (6). The court of appeals conceded

as much (Pet. App. 16a). It specifically noted the

remedial aspects of the penalty resulting from the

payment of moneys recovered into the revolving fund

established under Section 311(k), which is utilized to

defray the costs of administering the program. See

also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,

supra, 409 U.S. at 237; United States ex rel. Marcus v.

Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550 (1943) ; Helvering v. Mitchell,

supra, 303 U.S. at 401. The court also conceded the

reasonableness of the government’s argument that the

penalty compensates the United States for tortious

generally Comment, Compelled Self-Disclosure and Civil

Penalties: The Limits of Corporate Immunity in Oil Spill

Cases, 55 B.U.L. Rev. 112, 114-118 (1975). The fact that

Congress termed the penalty in Section 311(b) (6) a “civil

penalty” demonstrates that it did not view a proceeding for

the assessment of such a penalty as the equivalent of a

“criminal case” for purposes of the statutory (and therefore

the constitutional) grant of immunity.

46

damage to the environment (Pet. App. 16a, citing

United States v. W.B. Enterprises, supra). However

the court declined to accept this rationale because the

factors involved in determining the amount of the

penalty did not, in its view, reasonably relate to the

possible damage to the environment.

But the statute by its terms states that the “gravity

of the violation” is to be taken into account in de-

termining the amount of the penalty, and this has,

quite appropriately, been interpreted by the Coast

Guard to involve a consideration of the amount of oil

discharged. Plainly the amount of oil discharged may

in general be though to be reasonably related to the

ecological damage to the waters that could result even

if the discharge was cleaned up promptly. At the

very least, Congress, in addressing the generality of

cases, could reasonably have so concluded. Finally,

as discussed above, Section 311(b)(6) has the broad

remedial purpose of encouraging compliance with

the Act’s “no discharge” policy through the imposi-

tion of a type of enterprise liability on those who

engage in risk-prone activity.

7. Whether the sanction appears excessive in relation

to the alternative purpose assigned

Where a monetary penalty is “grossly dispropor-

tionate” (United States v. Constantine, supra, 296

U.S. at 295) to the amount that could reasonably

be imposed in furtherance of the asserted remedial

purposes of the provision, the courts may construe

47

the penalty as punitive in nature. See also Bell v.

Wolfish, supra, slip op. 17 n.20. However, it is

well settled that a civil penalty need not be limited

to the amount of the government’s actual dam-

ages in order to constitute a remedial measure.

One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, supra,

409 U.S. at 237 (forfeiture of goods for custom law

violation) ; Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350

U.S. 148, 152-154 (1956) ($2000 liquidated damages

recoverable by government against fraudulent pur-

chasers of surplus property without proof of actual

damages); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,

supra, 317 U.S. at 550 (recovery of double damages

by government for filing of false claims) ; Helvering

v. Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S. at 401 (50% addition to

tax deficiency).

Whatever the outer limits of this test, it is clear

that a civil penalty of $250 in the present case is not

so grossly disproportionate as to smack of punish-

ment. In the vast majority of cases, even the

maximum penalty of $5000 could not be considered

excessive. Significantly, as well, the statute expressly

requires that the penalty be tailored in amount to

meet the “gravity of the violation” as well as the

size of the business of the owner or operator charged

and the effect of the penalty on his ability to remain

in business. Thus, far from showing the type of

cavalier disregard for the consequences of the pen-

alty that might lead a court to find a punitive in-

tent, Congress manifested a meticulous concern for

the appropriateness of the penalty under the circum-

stances of the particular case.

48

The court of appeals concluded that the penalty

nevertheless “could be excessive” in certain cases, at

least where the owner or operator attempted in good

faith to clean up and was not at fault for the discharge

(Pet. App. 17a). If the statutory factors are prop-

erly applied, however, an accidental or otherwise

innocent discharge should not result in as severe a

penalty as would an intentional or negligent one

(other things being equal), because the violation would

not be so “grave.” Moreover, even where the dis-

charge is innocent or clean-up efforts are diligently

pursued, these factors do not erase the fact of the dis-

charge itself, nor do they necessarily erase all en-

suing ecological harm (see page 42, supra). In any

event, speculation that a penalty might prove excessive

in some future case (the court of appeals did not ex-

pressly find the penalty excessive in this case) does

not support the conclusion that Congress must have

intended the sanction to be criminal in all cases. The

more prudent judicial course would be to invalidate

an excessive penalty in whatever case it may be im-

posed on the theory that it is inconsistent with the

statutory scheme.

Thus, each of the factors enumerated by the

Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, sup-

ports the conclusion that thé “civil penalty” under

Section 311(b) (6) was intended by the Congress to

be exactly that.

49

ITI.

THE PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 311(b)(6) FOR

ASSESSMENT OF A CIVIL PENALTY ARE NOT

“QUASI-CRIMINAL” FOR PURPOSES OF THE FIFTH

AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE

Respondent argued in the court of appeals (Ap-

pellant’s Br. 11-22) that even if Section 311(b) (6)

does not state a criminal offense for purposes of all

constitutional protections applicable in criminal pros-

ecutions, it should nevertheless be regarded as crimi-

nal for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privi-

lege against compulsory self-incrimination. The court

below did not specifically address this argument, al-

though it did note (Pet. App. 18a n.7) that it was not

deciding the question whether Section 311(b) (6) is

criminal for any purpose other than the Fifth Amend-

ment privilege—perhaps thereby suggesting that the

privilege does have something of the broader reach

respondent urged the court to consider.

Respondent primarily relied on Boyd v. United

States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Lees v. United States,

150 U.S. 476 (1893); and United States v. United

States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971). Those

cases, however, do not stand for the proposition that

monetary penalties that are plainly civil in char-

acter should nevertheless be regarded as criminal in

order to further the “policies” of the Fifth Amend-

ment. The Amendment by its terms applies only to a

“criminal case,” and there must therefore be a dem-

50

onstration that the procedure for imposition of the

penalty here is—or is part of—a “criminal case.”

Boyd v. United States, supra, arose under Section 12

of the Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, 18 Stat. 188,

which prohibited the fraudulent importation of mer-

chandise and provided that a person violating the sec-

tion “shall * * * be fined in any sum not exceeding

$5000 nor less than $50, or be imprisoned for any time

not exceeding two years, or both; and, in addition to

such fine, such merchandise shall be forfeited.” See

116 U.S. at 617. The government filed an informa-

tion for forfeiture of certain goods, but did not file a

criminal charge. The Court held that the Fifth

Amendment attached in the forfeiture proceeding.

But that conclusion was not based on a doctrine that

forfeitures and monetary sanctions are generally

“quasi-criminal” and that the Fifth Amendment privi-

lege may uniformly be invoked in such proceedings.

Instead, the Court premised its holding on the spe-

cific finding that the forfeiture of goods was one of

the “penalties affixed to the criminal acts” prohibited

by the statute. 116 U.S. at 634. The Court explained

(2bid.) :

If an indictment had been presented against the

claimants, upon conviction the forfeiture of the

goods could have been included in the judgment.

If the government prosecutor elects to waive an

indictment, and to file a civil information against

the claimants—that is, civil in form—can he by

this device take from the proceeding its criminal

aspect and deprive the claimants of their im-

munities as citizens, and extort from them a

51

production of their private papers, or, as an

alternative, a confession of guilt? This cannot

be.

It was on this basis alone that the Court stated that

“proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring

the forfeiture of a man’s property, by reason of

offences committed by him, though they may be civil

in form, are in their nature criminal.” 116 U.S. at

634 (emphasis added).

In Lees v. United States, supra, the Court likewise

indicated that the statutory penalty could have been

recovered in either a criminal or civil action. 150 U.S.

at 479. The Court also stressed that the penalty was

intended as punishment (150 U.S. at 480), and the

statute in question referred to a violation as an “of-

fence,” Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, Section 3, 23

Stat. 333, thereby underscoring the punitive nature

of the penalty. Accordingly, the Court followed Boyd

in concluding (150 U.S. at 480-481) that the action,

though civil in form in the particular instance, was

criminal in nature and therefore one in which the de-

fendant could not be compelled to be a witness against

himself. See also United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37,

47, 50 (1914); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S.

103, 111-112 (1909).

Similarly, United States v. United States Coin &

Currency, supra, held that the Fifth Amendment

privilege is applicable in a forfeiture proceeding un-

der the internal revenue laws where the forfeiture

is intended to be imposed “only upon those who are

significantly involved in a criminal enterprise.” 401

U.S. at 721-722. See also id. at 718, quoting Boyd

52

v. United States, supra, 116 U.S. at 634 (proceeding

for forfeiture of a person’s property “by reason of

offences committed by him” are in their nature crimi-

nal for Fifth Amendment purposes). This reading

of Boyd v. United States and its progeny—that ap-

plication of t’» Fifth Amendment privilege is limited

to situations in which the monetary penalty or for-

feiture is premised on commission of an underlying

criminal offense—was expressly reaffirmed by the

Court in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United

States, supra, 409 U.S. at 236 n.6.

Thus, in the cases upon which respondent relied in

the court of appeals, the monetary penalty or forfei-

ture was dependent on the occurrence of an integrally

related criminal offense and was, in actuality, but a

form of punishment for the commission of that of-

fense. See In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 474-475 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). This nexus

to a criminal offense serves to illuminate the ap-

parent rationale of these holdings: Although a civil

penalty or forfeiture proceeding is not a “criminal

prosecution” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment,

it may, in appropriate circumstances, be considered

part of a broader “criminal case” for purposes of

the Fifth Amendment privilege—a “criminal case”

that could fairly be thought to embrace not only the

prosecution itself, but certain ancillary or closely re-

lated proceedings the government may pursue to exact

additional punishment for the same underlying crimi-

nal conduct. And if the defendant is compelled to give

information that will result in a finding of liability in

sinh biadr nicrseinicscseaaas oleae

pele R ET le Son Seta ites

53

a civil penalty or forfeiture proceeding that is in-

tended to be the practical equivalent of an adjudica-

tion of guilt in a prosecution for the criminal offense,

he may, as a practical matter, effectively “incrimi-

nate” himself even if he is never formally prosecuted.

That rationale is inapplicable here. The civil

penalty provision in Section 311(b)(6) lacks such a

direct nexus to an underlying criminal offense; it is

imposed for violations of Section 311(b) (3), which

contains no criminal sanctions. There is no indication

that it was also intended to be an alternative or addi-

tional means of punishing offenses under the Rivers

and Harbors Act. Our case is like Helvering v.

Mitchell, supra, in which the Court rejected the argu-

ment that a provision for a 50% penalty on income tax

deficiencies was barred under the Double Jeopardy

Clause following an acquittal on criminal charges of

fraudulently evading income taxes, finding that the

assessment was remedial, not punitive in character.

The Court there observed that where the monetary

penalty or forfeiture is remedial, the defendant does

not have the protection of a number of procedural

rights normally associated with the criminal process,

including the Fifth Amendment privilege against com-

pulsory self-incrimination. 303 U.S. at 404. The

Court noted that it did not read Boyd v. United

States, supra, or Lees v. United States, supra, as

holding to the contrary “where the sanction involved

is remedial, not punitive.” 303 U.S. at 404n.12 Here

also (as explained in Parts I and II of the brief), the

a ttti(a lll

54

civil penalty is remedial, not punitive. It follows that

Section 311(b) (6) does not trigger the Fifth Amend-

ment privilege.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

JAMES W. MOORMAN

Assistant Attorney General

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

Assistant to the Solicitor General

JACQUES B. GELIN

MICHAEL A. McCorp

Attorneys

JANUARY 1980

la

APPENDIX

Instruction 5922.11B issued by the Commandant of

the Coast Guard on October 10, 1974, provides in

pertinent part:

GUIDELINES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF

THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CON-

TROL ACT, SECTION 311

I. It is the policy of the Coast Guard to assess a

civil penalty for every violation of Section 311(b) (3)

of the FWPCA.

* * * * *

II. Notification.

* * * * *

(2) The notification required by Section 311(b) (5)

confers a statutory immunity from exploitation of

that notification in any criminal case upon the per-

son required to notify the Coast Guard (i.e., “person

in charge” [U.S. v. Mobil Oil, 4 ERC 1405]).

(3) Any employee of any corporation, firm, part-

nership, etc., who notifies the Coast Guard of a dis-

charge in accordance with Section 311(b)(5), en-

titles his corporation to that same immunity from

exploitation of the notification in any criminal case

if (1) that employee is acting for or on behalf or as

an agent of that corporation and (2) that corpora-

tion is “tn charge” of that vessel or onshore or off-

shore facility from which oil is discharged.

2a

(4) The notification does not confer a statutory

immunity from exploitation of that notification in a

civil penalty proceeding. Assessment of a civil penalty

is not affected in any way by the fact that the owner

or operator initially notified the Coast Guard of the

discharge.

(5) Therefore, if, during any stage of the investi-

gation or civil penalty procedure, it becomes evident

that there has been a failure to notify, a litigation

report should be referred to the U.S. Attorney for

the district in which the alleged violation took place

for possible criminal action. The referral should give

notice that the Coast Guard will institute civil

penalty procedures under Section 311(b)(6). The

fact that criminal action for Section 311(b) (5) may

be pending, or prospective, should not affect the civil

penalty procedure in any way.

(6) The immunity from criminal action based on

notification extends generally to the Refuse Act, 33

U.S.C.A. § 407. There is, however, no immunity from

prosecution for perjury or giving a false statement.

* * * * *

III. Assessment of Civil Penalty.

* * * * *

C. The gravity of the violation—This factor en-

compasses multiple considerations. The following

questions should be considered by the Hearing Officer

in weighing the gravity of the violation:

(1) Was the discharge intentional?

3a

(2) Could the discharge have been prevented using

reasonable care?

(3) Was the discharge caused by an act or omis-

sion of a type previously attributable (according to

official records) to that same owner/operator so as

to place him on notice of the particular hazard?

(4) Was the cause of the discharge a violation of

the prevention regulations? Note that a separate vio- |

lation may have occurred under Section 311(j).

(5) Did the owner/operator take speciai steps to

try to avert the specific discharge?

(6) Was the discharge “unforseeable”’ by an ex-

perienced owner/owner knowing the weather, sea

conditions and equipment?

(7) Was there a minimum amount of oil dis-

charged?

Note that an affirmative answer to 1-4 increases

the gravity of the violation and an affirmative answer

in 5-7 decreases the gravity of the violation. Under

no circumstances may response action by the owner/

operator be considered as decreasing the gravity of

the violation.

D. The size of the business and the impact of the

civil penalty on the ability of the owner or operator to

remain in business

These two factors go hand in hand and should be

considered together. By requiring the Coast Guard to

consider these factors, Congress intended that com-

panies not normally be forced out of business or seri-

ously impaired in remaining in business by the size

of the civil penalty. It should be noted that there is

4a

no provision to decline to assess a penalty altogether,

but only to consider the size of the business of the

owner/operator in assessing the civil penalty. The

basic objective to be gained is to assess a civil penalty

which will not, if all other considerations warrant a

maximum penalty, place the business of the owner/

operator in jeopardy or seriously impair his ability

to continue to operate.

The “notice” letter solicits information concern-

ing the size of the business of the owner/operator and

the owner/operator’s own evaluation of the effect a

preliminarily determined civil penalty would have.

Before the notice letter is sent, the size of the busi-

ness of the owner/operator should have been. con-

sidered in making the preliminary determination.

This is normally possible because the businesses are

generally known to the Hearing Officer or his staff

or may be discovered by a call to the appropriate

Captain of the Port or district finance personnel. If

information is then received from the party charged

which differs materially from the Hearing Officer’s

preliminary consideration, the Hearing Officer should

reevaluate and adjust the preliminary determination

before making the assessment. If no information is

received, or if information is received which does

not differ materially from the Hearing Officer’s pre-

liminary consideration, no adjustment because of the

size of the business or effect on ability to continue

to operate should be made prior to assessment.

The Hearing Officer should properly consider the

overall corporate structure of the owner/operator.

5a

For example, a small, wholly owned subsidiary of a

large conglomerate or holding company should be

considered as the larger conglomerate for purposes

of considering the size and impact of a civil penalty.

Most frequently, when one-vessel corporations are

controlled by a parent operating company, the size of

the parent company shall control.

E. Minimum penalty—Neither assessing a zero

penalty nor issuing a letter of warning in lieu of a

penalty meets the requirements of the statute that a

penalty “shall be assessed.” If the facts warrant the

imposition of a minimum penalty, then the penalty

should be reasonably sufficient to motivate owners

and operators of vessels and facilities to take ade-

quate measures to prevent future unlawful dis-

charges. In a district where pollution incidents are

somewhat controlled, a figure of $150.00 per incident

might be adequate to provide the necessary motiva-

tion. In another district where violations are flagrant

and preventative measures frequently disregarded, a

somewhat higher minimum figure might be required

to provide the same motivation. However, it must

always be remembered that in any one case, the as-

sessed penalty must be based on its own set of facts.

* * * * *

I. Use of records kept in accordance with Section

308 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in

actions brought under Section 311(b)(5) and 311

(b) (6) of that Act

6a

Section 308 of the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act provides authority for the Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency to require the

owner or operator of any point source to install,

use, and maintain monitoring equipment or methods,

to sample effluents, and to maintain records and

make reports whenever required to carry out the

objectives of several sections of the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act, including Section 311. Section

308 also gives the Administrator of the Environmen-

tal Protection Agency or his authorized representa-

tive the right to have access to and to copy these

records. These records are also to be available to

the public except in certain narrowly defined situa-

tions.

Section 308 specifically cites a purpose of the record

keeping as “determining whether any person is in

violation of any .. . limitation, prohibition or efflu-

ent standard... of this Act...” It is appropriate

to use records kept in accordance with Section 308

in the assessment of a civil penalty for discharges

of oil or hazardous substances in harmful quantities

under Section 311(b) (6) against the owner or opera-

tor and to use the records to notify under Section

311(b) (5). Use of Section 308 records should only

be used where Section 308 information is forwarded

to the Coast Guard by EPA and where obtaining

such information is otherwise not practical. The

Hearing Officer may obtain Section 308 records in

cases where Coast Guard investigation is not practi-

Ta

cal, by initiating a request to the appropriate EPA

Regional Administrator.

Use of Section 308 required records will not violate

the discharger’s constitutional rights against self-

incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, because -

that provision applies only to criminal actions and

the penalty assessed under Section 311(b).(6) is

civil.

¥ + * * ¥

5 ¢ ©. 8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFicEe; 1979 30759! 169

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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