Reply Brief — AMF, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.
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RODAK, JR., CLERK
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1979
No. 79-259
AMF INcorRPoRATED,
Petitioner
Vv.
GENERAL Motors CorporaTIon, et al.
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Of Counsel:
BERGSON, BoRKLAND, Howarp ADLER, JR.
Maroouis & ADLER DonaLp L. Harpison
11 Dupont Circle, N.W. Marc S. PaLay
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 462-5930
Rogers Hoce & His GrReEGorR F’. GREGORICH
90 Park Avenue
New York, New York
10016
(212) 953-9200 Attorneys for Petitioner
September 28, 1979
Press or Byron 8S. Anpams Parintine, Inc., WASHINGTON, D. C.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1979
No. 79-259
AMF INcoRPORATED,
Petitioner
V.
GENERAL Motors CorporaTION, et al.
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Respondents, in their Brief in Opposition, admit the
existence of ‘‘several incidents occurring after Janu-
ary 10, 1965’’ (Br. in Opp. 16), the critical statute of
limitations date, which AMF alleges are examples of
continuing conspiratorial conduct aimed at excluding
it from the market for exhaust control devices. These
overt acts include an acknowledged refusal to deal by
Ford in April 1965, respondents’ pricing of the air
injection system at below cost so that it could meet
the price of AMF'’s Smog Burner and achieve certifica-
tion, and the ‘“‘joint development of an air pump in
1965.’’ (Br. in Opp. 21-22) Consistent with the errone-
ous holding of the court of appeals, however, respond-
ents contend that a cause of action cannot be based on
2
these acts because they caused AMF ‘‘no new injury”’
not caused by respondents’ conspiratorially-announced
refusal to deal in 1964 (Br. in Opp. 16).
Respondents’ argument only serves to emphasize the
conflict between the decision below and those of other
courts of appeals. For example, respondents’ assertion
that the admitted refusal to deal by Ford in 1965
‘hardly constitutes an additional rejection of the Smog
Burner for a period different from that covered by
the 1964 rejection ...’’ (Br. in Opp. 22) is squarely at
odds with the law of the Fifth and other Circuits. (See
Pet. 12 n.8.) Contrary to respondents’ arguments and
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in this case, the Fifth Cir-
cuit has specifically held that ‘‘reiteration of defend-
ants’ refusal to deal would have constituted an ‘act’
within the meaning of Zenith and . . . [thus given]
‘rise to an antitrust cause of action.’ ’’ Imperial Point
Collonades Condominium v. Mangurian, 549 F.2d
1029, 1035 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859
(1978).' This is because AMF’s exclusion from the
‘Not surprisingly, respondents cite Garelick v. Goerlich’s Inc.,
323 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1963) in support of their position that their
1964 refusals can, as a matter of law, be considered final and irre-
vocable and that any reiteration of these refusals is not an act for
which damages lie under the antitrust laws (Br. in Opp. 20).
Garelick was also cited by respondents in the court of appeals,
and the Ninth Cireuit’s opinion in this case is in accord with that
decision. In Garelick, plaintiff (distributor of defendant’s prod-
ucts) was notified more than four years prior to bringing suit,
allegedly in violation of the antitrust laws, that defendant would
cease doing business with it. Plaintiff, however, had at two separate
occasions within the four years preceding suit requested to defend-
ant and defendant’s salesmen to be reinstated. In an analysis
similar to that of the court of appeals in this case, the Sixth Circuit
held that plaintiffs ‘‘were not in any way injured or damaged’’
by these subsequent overt acts since they ‘‘were simply acts that
3
market as a result of respondents’ 1964 refusals ‘‘ while
perhaps unequivocal, was not of necessity permanent
.... Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service
Corp., 517 F.2d 117, 127 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054 (1976). Respondents need not have con-
tinued to adhere to the conspiracy in 1965, which re-
sulted in AMF’s continued injury. Rather, ‘‘defend-
ants could have quit causing the injury at any time by
agreeing to deal with plaintiff... .’’ Mangurian, 549
F.2d at 1035. Ford was given this choice in April of
1965, at a time when it was having severe problems with
its own air injection system. Nevertheless, Ford ad-
hered to the conspiracy.
Moreover, in the instant case, the ‘‘several incidents’”’
which occurred in 1965 consisted of more than mere
reiterations of respondents’ 1964 refusals. Respondents’
conspiratorial ‘‘episodes’’ in 1965 injured AMF by
perpetuating its exclusion from the market and by
creating added barriers to market entry. Furthermore,
this continued conspiratorial conduct was essential for
the conspiracy’s success. For example, respondents
consistently justified their lack of interest in outside
devices by representing to the MVPCB that ‘‘the price
to the consumer’’ of their own air injection system,
reflected that defendant-appellee continued in refusing to sell its
products to plaintiffs-appellants’’ (323 F.2d at 856).
Garelick was specifically cited and rejected by the Fifth Circuit
in Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., 517
F.2d 117, 125 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
The Poster Exchange court read this Court’s decision in Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971) as
‘*lay[ing] to rest the theory that .. . suit upon a continued anti-
trust violation must be prosecuted within four years from the
first act of illegality .. .’’ as well as ‘‘eschewing the requirement
of acts different in kind to set up a later accruing cause of action.’’
(517 F.2d at 126-27)
4
once developed, would be less than that of the certified
devices. (R.5259) These representations forced re-
spondents to beat the price to the consumer of the AMF
Smog Burner, which respondents recognized, in July
of 1965, was ‘‘the lowest priced device already certi-
fied’? (R.5394). Failure in this regard would have re-
sulted in respondents ‘‘not receiv[ing] certification in
July [1965]’’ because ‘‘the Board cannot certify our
system until a maximum selling price has been estab-
lished.’’ (Id.)* Therefore, in July of 1965 respondents,
pursuant to the conspiracy, priced air injection with-
out regard to cost, encountering staggering losses in
the process. Respondents do not deny this critical
factor.
Thus, the record clearly and indisputably demon-
strates that rather than being ‘‘the least of their worries
at that time’’ (Br. in Opp. 22), the potential competi-
tion of the economically priced and ‘‘certified ... AMF
afterburner” (R.5394) was, in 1965, the last major
barrier to the success of the conspiracy. Nevertheless,
the court of appeals has immunized unlawful acts,
which occurred within the statutory period, by reason-
ing that these conceded post-limitations ‘‘episodes”
were the ‘‘unabated inertial consequences’’ of respon-
dents’ ‘‘permanent’’ 1964 refusals to deal (App. lla
quoting Poster Exchange, 517 F.2d at 128). This analy-
sis, which not even respondents seriously attempt to
defend, is incorrect. The law pertaining to the applica-
tion of the statute of limitations in cases of continuing
2 Board regulations prohibited any ‘‘undue cost burden to the
motorist’? (MVPCB Regulations, Part 5, § A). Thus, had the
announced price of air injection reflected its true cost, it is doubtful
the device would have been approved and the market would have
been opened to AMF.
5
antitrust conspiracies carried a degree of ambiguity
before the decision below was rendered. Now, as a re-
sult of that decision, one district court already has re-
lied upon the Ninth Cireuit’s erroneous ruling and
stated that post-limitations acts which are essentially
the same as pre-limitations conduct cannot provide the
basis for an antitrust cause of action. Woodbridge
Plastics, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., No. 78-5709 (S.D.N.Y.
July 2, 1979) .° This Court should grant the petition and
reverse lest the opinion below introduce further uncer-
tainty and conflict on this important subject.
On the issue of whether AMF’s damages were ascer-
tainable in 1964 so that a cause of action accrued to
AMF at that time, the Brief in Opposition serves to
highlight the misapplication by the court of appeals in
this case of the rule in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971). Respondents are
forced to recognize at least that under eases in the Sec-
ond and Third Circuits, fundamental market contin-
gencies resulting ‘“‘from uncertainty as to the *uture
actions of others’’ render damages speculative and un-
provable, and thus prevent a cause of action from ac-
cruing. (Br. in Opp. 28) They argue, however, that
’The district court in Woodbridge Plastics characterized the
holding in the present ease as follows:
Each of the defendants had announced their intention to
refrain from ... purchase [of the AMF Smog Burner] at a
meeting in 1964, more than four years prior to the commence-
ment of suit. Their only actions within the four-year period
were to adhere to this position and reject renewed requests
by plaintiff to sell its product. The Court of Appeals a firmed
the dismissal of the complaint as time-barred, finding any
injury to plaintiff to have been attributable to the final denials
in 1964. The Court characterized the later, reiterated rejec-
tions as nothing more than the ‘‘ ‘unabated inertial conse-
quences of some prelimitations action.’’’ (Slip op. at 6; cita-
tions omitted.)
6
the facts in this case incontrovertibly demonstrate that
respondents themselves had full control over whether
AMF could market its device in California. (Jd. at
28-29)
Nothing could be further from the truth. Whether
AMF would ultimately suffer complete, partial, or no
exclusion from the state-mandated market for exhaust
control devices as a result of respondents’ 1964 an-
nouncements was, in 1964, completely beyond the par-
ties’ control.‘ Prior to January 10, 1965, respondents’
own systems were at a rudimentary stage of develop-
ment, and certification testing of air injection had not
even begun. Respondents proceeded to have serious diffi-
culties with air injection throughout the first half of
1965. Whether certification would be obtained, and if
so, on what models, was uncertain until the very end
(e.g., R.5749-72; R.5776-77) and rested in the judg-
ment, not of respondents, but of the State of California.
Indeed, respondents themselves recognized this as evi-
denced by their concern that the Board might withdraw
certification if ‘‘the device in the hands of the public
was not functioning properly.” (R.5797).
Under these circumstances, no jury could have specu-
lated in 1964 whether respondents would eventually be
certified.’ If respondents had failed to achieve certifica-
* Respondents’ citation of counsel for AMF’’s remarks concerning
AMF’’s damages in this case, made at the January 19, 1976 hearing
in the district court, is both irrelevant and misleading. (Br. in
Opp. 26) These comments concerned AMF'’s provable damages at
this time, and have nothing to do with the ascertainability of
AMF'’s damages prior to January 10, 1965.
5 Despite respondents’ continued arguments to the contrary,
there is no comparison between the arduous procedures for initial
certification that AMF had passed prior to June of 1964, which
involved testing on a fleet of 30 used cars representative of the
7
tion, it is almost certain that AMF, with the most ef-
fective and most economical device,* would have made
at least some sales, either to the respondents them-
selves or, by force of state law, to others for in-state
installation. (See Pet. 18)." Thus, the present case falls
squarely within the rule in Zenith, and no cause of ac-
tion accrued until respondents’ certification in mid-
1965. The misreading of the decision in Zenith by the
Ninth Circuit, which conflicts with what respondents
concede is the way the rule has been applied in the
Second and Third Circuits, requires review by this
Court.
entire vehicle population of the state (R.4150-52), and final certi- ©
fication for production, which merely involved a derivative, not
de novo, staff determination ‘‘that the [modified device] . . . falls
within the scope of the original certification.’’ (MVPCB Regula-
tion Part 7 at 2).
Moreover, Board Regulations did not contemplate certification
of the Smog Burner for production until after AMF established
commercial relationships for its sale and the identity of the models
on which it would be installed. (Jd. at 2-3) Due to the compara-
bility, in design and performance, of the certification prototype
and production model (e.g., R.6040, R.6042, R.6044, R.6050, R.6051,
R.6141, R.6144, R.6148, R.6184, R.6194-95), final Board approval
of the AMF production unit, if defendants purchased it, was
assured. Indeed, even the district court acknowledged that ‘‘no-
body questions the ability of AMF to do the hardware’’ (Tr. of
Proceedings, 1/19/76 at 58).
*See e.g., R.6050; R.6076; R.6077-78; R.6130-31; R.4145-46;
R.6145-46 ; R.6147,
" Defendants’ repeated reference to the ‘‘decertification’’ of
AMF'’s device in September of 1965 is irrelevant to the issues
before this Court and was not a basis for the decision in the court
of appeals. Certification was suspended on September 15, 1965 for
devices ‘‘not now in production’? (MVPCB Resolution 65-26, R.
5845) and would not have applied to the Smog Burner if any
defendant had previously elected to use it. Additionally, certifica-
tion for all systems was ‘‘for the 1966 model year only’’ and
recertification for 1967 was considered ‘‘only a technicality’’ (R.
5846-48).
8
Finally, the bulk of respondents’ 30-page Brief in
Opposition does nothing more than discuss contested
factual disputes between the parties, such as AMF'’s
intention, preparedness, and ability to market its cer-
tified pollution-control device in 1965, and respondents’
motives when they engaged in the various ‘‘episodes”
aimed at excluding AMF from the market after the
critical statute of limitations date. Indeed, the Brief in
Opposition resembles more a brief in support of a
jury verdict than one defending summary judgment.
As such, it confirms the serious abuse of discretion
committed by the court below, and accordingly, the
need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power
to correct this error. :
Assuming a conspiracy in 1964 to exclude AMF from
the market for exhaust-control devices, respondents’
one-sided and self-serving interpretations of the events
of 1965 can be given no weight on summary judgment.
The record contains abundant evidence from which a
jury could find that AMF was not only capable of en-
tering the market in 1965, but was actively attempting
to market its device, by among other things, calling on
Ford and International Harvester and quoting a firm
production price. (See Pet. 8.) Further, the record also
contains abundant evidence from which a jury could
find that the AMF Smog Burner was the most effective
and economical device available in 1965. Finally, the
fact that many of respondents’ actions, such as their
predatory below-cost pricing in July of 1965, were spe-
cifically aimed at the AMF Smog Burner speaks
strongly of the fact that the Smog Burner project was
very much alive and that further action was needed to
assure AMF’s market exclusion and the success of the
conspiracy.
9
In short, the Brief in Opposition stands as strong
emphasis of the serious errors committed below and the
need for review by this Court. This Court should grant
the petition and make it clear that the statute of limita-
tions cannot be employed, as here, to immunize repeti-
tion or continuation of antitrust violations. The rul-
ing below extends the statute far beyond its purpose
and stands as a barrier to enforcement of private rights
through private actions under the antitrust laws.
Poster Exchange, Inc., 517 F.2d at 127-28.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Of Counsel:
BeErGson, BorKLAND, Howarp ADLER, JR.
Marcouis & ADLER DonaLp L. Harpison
11 Dupont Circle, N.W. Marc 8S. Panay
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 462-5930
Rocers Hoce & Hits
90 Park Avenue
New York, New York
10016
(212) 953-9200
September 28, 1979
GREGOR F’. GREGORICH
Attorneys for Petitioner
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