Reply Brief — AMF, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.

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RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-259

AMF INcorRPoRATED,

Petitioner

Vv.

GENERAL Motors CorporaTIon, et al.

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Of Counsel:

BERGSON, BoRKLAND, Howarp ADLER, JR.

Maroouis & ADLER DonaLp L. Harpison

11 Dupont Circle, N.W. Marc S. PaLay

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 462-5930

Rogers Hoce & His GrReEGorR F’. GREGORICH

90 Park Avenue

New York, New York

10016

(212) 953-9200 Attorneys for Petitioner

September 28, 1979

Press or Byron 8S. Anpams Parintine, Inc., WASHINGTON, D. C.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-259

AMF INcoRPORATED,

Petitioner

V.

GENERAL Motors CorporaTION, et al.

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondents, in their Brief in Opposition, admit the

existence of ‘‘several incidents occurring after Janu-

ary 10, 1965’’ (Br. in Opp. 16), the critical statute of

limitations date, which AMF alleges are examples of

continuing conspiratorial conduct aimed at excluding

it from the market for exhaust control devices. These

overt acts include an acknowledged refusal to deal by

Ford in April 1965, respondents’ pricing of the air

injection system at below cost so that it could meet

the price of AMF'’s Smog Burner and achieve certifica-

tion, and the ‘“‘joint development of an air pump in

1965.’’ (Br. in Opp. 21-22) Consistent with the errone-

ous holding of the court of appeals, however, respond-

ents contend that a cause of action cannot be based on

2

these acts because they caused AMF ‘‘no new injury”’

not caused by respondents’ conspiratorially-announced

refusal to deal in 1964 (Br. in Opp. 16).

Respondents’ argument only serves to emphasize the

conflict between the decision below and those of other

courts of appeals. For example, respondents’ assertion

that the admitted refusal to deal by Ford in 1965

‘hardly constitutes an additional rejection of the Smog

Burner for a period different from that covered by

the 1964 rejection ...’’ (Br. in Opp. 22) is squarely at

odds with the law of the Fifth and other Circuits. (See

Pet. 12 n.8.) Contrary to respondents’ arguments and

the Ninth Circuit’s holding in this case, the Fifth Cir-

cuit has specifically held that ‘‘reiteration of defend-

ants’ refusal to deal would have constituted an ‘act’

within the meaning of Zenith and . . . [thus given]

‘rise to an antitrust cause of action.’ ’’ Imperial Point

Collonades Condominium v. Mangurian, 549 F.2d

1029, 1035 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859

(1978).' This is because AMF’s exclusion from the

‘Not surprisingly, respondents cite Garelick v. Goerlich’s Inc.,

323 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1963) in support of their position that their

1964 refusals can, as a matter of law, be considered final and irre-

vocable and that any reiteration of these refusals is not an act for

which damages lie under the antitrust laws (Br. in Opp. 20).

Garelick was also cited by respondents in the court of appeals,

and the Ninth Cireuit’s opinion in this case is in accord with that

decision. In Garelick, plaintiff (distributor of defendant’s prod-

ucts) was notified more than four years prior to bringing suit,

allegedly in violation of the antitrust laws, that defendant would

cease doing business with it. Plaintiff, however, had at two separate

occasions within the four years preceding suit requested to defend-

ant and defendant’s salesmen to be reinstated. In an analysis

similar to that of the court of appeals in this case, the Sixth Circuit

held that plaintiffs ‘‘were not in any way injured or damaged’’

by these subsequent overt acts since they ‘‘were simply acts that

3

market as a result of respondents’ 1964 refusals ‘‘ while

perhaps unequivocal, was not of necessity permanent

.... Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service

Corp., 517 F.2d 117, 127 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,

423 U.S. 1054 (1976). Respondents need not have con-

tinued to adhere to the conspiracy in 1965, which re-

sulted in AMF’s continued injury. Rather, ‘‘defend-

ants could have quit causing the injury at any time by

agreeing to deal with plaintiff... .’’ Mangurian, 549

F.2d at 1035. Ford was given this choice in April of

1965, at a time when it was having severe problems with

its own air injection system. Nevertheless, Ford ad-

hered to the conspiracy.

Moreover, in the instant case, the ‘‘several incidents’”’

which occurred in 1965 consisted of more than mere

reiterations of respondents’ 1964 refusals. Respondents’

conspiratorial ‘‘episodes’’ in 1965 injured AMF by

perpetuating its exclusion from the market and by

creating added barriers to market entry. Furthermore,

this continued conspiratorial conduct was essential for

the conspiracy’s success. For example, respondents

consistently justified their lack of interest in outside

devices by representing to the MVPCB that ‘‘the price

to the consumer’’ of their own air injection system,

reflected that defendant-appellee continued in refusing to sell its

products to plaintiffs-appellants’’ (323 F.2d at 856).

Garelick was specifically cited and rejected by the Fifth Circuit

in Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., 517

F.2d 117, 125 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).

The Poster Exchange court read this Court’s decision in Zenith

Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971) as

‘*lay[ing] to rest the theory that .. . suit upon a continued anti-

trust violation must be prosecuted within four years from the

first act of illegality .. .’’ as well as ‘‘eschewing the requirement

of acts different in kind to set up a later accruing cause of action.’’

(517 F.2d at 126-27)

4

once developed, would be less than that of the certified

devices. (R.5259) These representations forced re-

spondents to beat the price to the consumer of the AMF

Smog Burner, which respondents recognized, in July

of 1965, was ‘‘the lowest priced device already certi-

fied’? (R.5394). Failure in this regard would have re-

sulted in respondents ‘‘not receiv[ing] certification in

July [1965]’’ because ‘‘the Board cannot certify our

system until a maximum selling price has been estab-

lished.’’ (Id.)* Therefore, in July of 1965 respondents,

pursuant to the conspiracy, priced air injection with-

out regard to cost, encountering staggering losses in

the process. Respondents do not deny this critical

factor.

Thus, the record clearly and indisputably demon-

strates that rather than being ‘‘the least of their worries

at that time’’ (Br. in Opp. 22), the potential competi-

tion of the economically priced and ‘‘certified ... AMF

afterburner” (R.5394) was, in 1965, the last major

barrier to the success of the conspiracy. Nevertheless,

the court of appeals has immunized unlawful acts,

which occurred within the statutory period, by reason-

ing that these conceded post-limitations ‘‘episodes”

were the ‘‘unabated inertial consequences’’ of respon-

dents’ ‘‘permanent’’ 1964 refusals to deal (App. lla

quoting Poster Exchange, 517 F.2d at 128). This analy-

sis, which not even respondents seriously attempt to

defend, is incorrect. The law pertaining to the applica-

tion of the statute of limitations in cases of continuing

2 Board regulations prohibited any ‘‘undue cost burden to the

motorist’? (MVPCB Regulations, Part 5, § A). Thus, had the

announced price of air injection reflected its true cost, it is doubtful

the device would have been approved and the market would have

been opened to AMF.

5

antitrust conspiracies carried a degree of ambiguity

before the decision below was rendered. Now, as a re-

sult of that decision, one district court already has re-

lied upon the Ninth Cireuit’s erroneous ruling and

stated that post-limitations acts which are essentially

the same as pre-limitations conduct cannot provide the

basis for an antitrust cause of action. Woodbridge

Plastics, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., No. 78-5709 (S.D.N.Y.

July 2, 1979) .° This Court should grant the petition and

reverse lest the opinion below introduce further uncer-

tainty and conflict on this important subject.

On the issue of whether AMF’s damages were ascer-

tainable in 1964 so that a cause of action accrued to

AMF at that time, the Brief in Opposition serves to

highlight the misapplication by the court of appeals in

this case of the rule in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine

Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971). Respondents are

forced to recognize at least that under eases in the Sec-

ond and Third Circuits, fundamental market contin-

gencies resulting ‘“‘from uncertainty as to the *uture

actions of others’’ render damages speculative and un-

provable, and thus prevent a cause of action from ac-

cruing. (Br. in Opp. 28) They argue, however, that

’The district court in Woodbridge Plastics characterized the

holding in the present ease as follows:

Each of the defendants had announced their intention to

refrain from ... purchase [of the AMF Smog Burner] at a

meeting in 1964, more than four years prior to the commence-

ment of suit. Their only actions within the four-year period

were to adhere to this position and reject renewed requests

by plaintiff to sell its product. The Court of Appeals a firmed

the dismissal of the complaint as time-barred, finding any

injury to plaintiff to have been attributable to the final denials

in 1964. The Court characterized the later, reiterated rejec-

tions as nothing more than the ‘‘ ‘unabated inertial conse-

quences of some prelimitations action.’’’ (Slip op. at 6; cita-

tions omitted.)

6

the facts in this case incontrovertibly demonstrate that

respondents themselves had full control over whether

AMF could market its device in California. (Jd. at

28-29)

Nothing could be further from the truth. Whether

AMF would ultimately suffer complete, partial, or no

exclusion from the state-mandated market for exhaust

control devices as a result of respondents’ 1964 an-

nouncements was, in 1964, completely beyond the par-

ties’ control.‘ Prior to January 10, 1965, respondents’

own systems were at a rudimentary stage of develop-

ment, and certification testing of air injection had not

even begun. Respondents proceeded to have serious diffi-

culties with air injection throughout the first half of

1965. Whether certification would be obtained, and if

so, on what models, was uncertain until the very end

(e.g., R.5749-72; R.5776-77) and rested in the judg-

ment, not of respondents, but of the State of California.

Indeed, respondents themselves recognized this as evi-

denced by their concern that the Board might withdraw

certification if ‘‘the device in the hands of the public

was not functioning properly.” (R.5797).

Under these circumstances, no jury could have specu-

lated in 1964 whether respondents would eventually be

certified.’ If respondents had failed to achieve certifica-

* Respondents’ citation of counsel for AMF’’s remarks concerning

AMF’’s damages in this case, made at the January 19, 1976 hearing

in the district court, is both irrelevant and misleading. (Br. in

Opp. 26) These comments concerned AMF'’s provable damages at

this time, and have nothing to do with the ascertainability of

AMF'’s damages prior to January 10, 1965.

5 Despite respondents’ continued arguments to the contrary,

there is no comparison between the arduous procedures for initial

certification that AMF had passed prior to June of 1964, which

involved testing on a fleet of 30 used cars representative of the

7

tion, it is almost certain that AMF, with the most ef-

fective and most economical device,* would have made

at least some sales, either to the respondents them-

selves or, by force of state law, to others for in-state

installation. (See Pet. 18)." Thus, the present case falls

squarely within the rule in Zenith, and no cause of ac-

tion accrued until respondents’ certification in mid-

1965. The misreading of the decision in Zenith by the

Ninth Circuit, which conflicts with what respondents

concede is the way the rule has been applied in the

Second and Third Circuits, requires review by this

Court.

entire vehicle population of the state (R.4150-52), and final certi- ©

fication for production, which merely involved a derivative, not

de novo, staff determination ‘‘that the [modified device] . . . falls

within the scope of the original certification.’’ (MVPCB Regula-

tion Part 7 at 2).

Moreover, Board Regulations did not contemplate certification

of the Smog Burner for production until after AMF established

commercial relationships for its sale and the identity of the models

on which it would be installed. (Jd. at 2-3) Due to the compara-

bility, in design and performance, of the certification prototype

and production model (e.g., R.6040, R.6042, R.6044, R.6050, R.6051,

R.6141, R.6144, R.6148, R.6184, R.6194-95), final Board approval

of the AMF production unit, if defendants purchased it, was

assured. Indeed, even the district court acknowledged that ‘‘no-

body questions the ability of AMF to do the hardware’’ (Tr. of

Proceedings, 1/19/76 at 58).

*See e.g., R.6050; R.6076; R.6077-78; R.6130-31; R.4145-46;

R.6145-46 ; R.6147,

" Defendants’ repeated reference to the ‘‘decertification’’ of

AMF'’s device in September of 1965 is irrelevant to the issues

before this Court and was not a basis for the decision in the court

of appeals. Certification was suspended on September 15, 1965 for

devices ‘‘not now in production’? (MVPCB Resolution 65-26, R.

5845) and would not have applied to the Smog Burner if any

defendant had previously elected to use it. Additionally, certifica-

tion for all systems was ‘‘for the 1966 model year only’’ and

recertification for 1967 was considered ‘‘only a technicality’’ (R.

5846-48).

8

Finally, the bulk of respondents’ 30-page Brief in

Opposition does nothing more than discuss contested

factual disputes between the parties, such as AMF'’s

intention, preparedness, and ability to market its cer-

tified pollution-control device in 1965, and respondents’

motives when they engaged in the various ‘‘episodes”

aimed at excluding AMF from the market after the

critical statute of limitations date. Indeed, the Brief in

Opposition resembles more a brief in support of a

jury verdict than one defending summary judgment.

As such, it confirms the serious abuse of discretion

committed by the court below, and accordingly, the

need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power

to correct this error. :

Assuming a conspiracy in 1964 to exclude AMF from

the market for exhaust-control devices, respondents’

one-sided and self-serving interpretations of the events

of 1965 can be given no weight on summary judgment.

The record contains abundant evidence from which a

jury could find that AMF was not only capable of en-

tering the market in 1965, but was actively attempting

to market its device, by among other things, calling on

Ford and International Harvester and quoting a firm

production price. (See Pet. 8.) Further, the record also

contains abundant evidence from which a jury could

find that the AMF Smog Burner was the most effective

and economical device available in 1965. Finally, the

fact that many of respondents’ actions, such as their

predatory below-cost pricing in July of 1965, were spe-

cifically aimed at the AMF Smog Burner speaks

strongly of the fact that the Smog Burner project was

very much alive and that further action was needed to

assure AMF’s market exclusion and the success of the

conspiracy.

9

In short, the Brief in Opposition stands as strong

emphasis of the serious errors committed below and the

need for review by this Court. This Court should grant

the petition and make it clear that the statute of limita-

tions cannot be employed, as here, to immunize repeti-

tion or continuation of antitrust violations. The rul-

ing below extends the statute far beyond its purpose

and stands as a barrier to enforcement of private rights

through private actions under the antitrust laws.

Poster Exchange, Inc., 517 F.2d at 127-28.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Petition for a Writ

of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Of Counsel:

BeErGson, BorKLAND, Howarp ADLER, JR.

Marcouis & ADLER DonaLp L. Harpison

11 Dupont Circle, N.W. Marc 8S. Panay

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 462-5930

Rocers Hoce & Hits

90 Park Avenue

New York, New York

10016

(212) 953-9200

September 28, 1979

GREGOR F’. GREGORICH

Attorneys for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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