Appendix — PALUMUMBO EXCAVATING CO., et al. v. UNITED STATES (No. 79-111)

BIT omeo oS =

APPENDIX A

3n the

nited States Court of Appeals

F or the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 77-2295, 2296, 2297, and 2299

Unitep States or AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Vv.

Bricuton Buripinc & Maintenance Co., Krua Excavatine

Company, Western AspHALT Pavine Co., Union Con-

TRAcTING & Matertats Co., THomas J. Bow er, GEORGE

B. Kruse, Sr., J. M. Corsetr Co., Tos. M. Mappen Co.

Anp Patumso Excavatine Co.,

Defendants-A ppellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Dllinois, Eastern Division.

No. 77-CR-192—Joel M. Flaum, Judge.

ArcuEp June 13, 1978—Dercimep May 18, 1979

Before Fatrcuitp, Chief Judge, and SprecHer and

Bauer, Circuit Judges.

Farrcuitp, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from judg-

ments upon conviction of defendants, Brighton Building

& Maintenance Co., Krug Excavating Co., Western As-

phalt Paving Co., Union Contracting & Materials Co.,

Thomas J. Bowler, George B. Krug, Sr., J. M. Corbett

Co., Thos. M. Madden Co., and Palumbo Excavating Co.

App. 2

of one count of conspiracy and combination in unreason-

able restraint of interstate trade in violation of Section 1

of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (15 U.S.C. § 1) and thirty-

seven counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341). Two ad-

ditional defendants, Arcole Midwest Corp. and Crown-

Trygg Co. were also indicted. Arcole Midwest pleaded

guilty and did not participate in trial. The remaining de-

fendants pleaded not guilty. On November 2, 1977, the

jury found Crown-Trygg not guilty on all counts and the

remaining defendants guilty on all counts. The individual

defendants, Bowler and Krug, were sentenced to prison

terms. They and the corporate defendants were fined.

I

The indictment alleged that the State of Ilinois let

contracts on July 29, 1975 for the construction of Federal-

Aid Interstate Route No, 55; that this was to be done by

competitive bidding as required by law; that defendants

and others engaged in a combination and conspiracy to

suppress and eliminate competition in unreasonable re-

straint of trade by agreeing among themselves to allocate

two projects to defendants Brighton, Krug Excavating,

and Western (B-K), one project to a joint venture com-

posed of defendants Palumbo, Madden, and Corbett

(PMC), and two projects to defendant Arcole, and to sub-

mit collusive bids on those projects.

Count I charged that the combination and conspiracy

were a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The

other counts charged the creation of a scheme to defraud

the State and the United States of money and the right

to competition in the awarding of contracts, and each count

charged a mailing for the purpose of executing the scheme,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341.

App. 3

The appellants claim that there was insufficient evi-

dence on which to make a finding of the conspiracy and

scheme; that there was error in the instructions with re-

spect to intent and theories of defense; that there were

other trial errors.

II

Five construction projects are involved in this case.

They were numbered 82, 83, 84, 85, and 88.

Ernest Bederman was president of defendant Arcole,

a highway contractor, and was the government’s key wit-

ness.

Corporate defendants Brighton and Krug Excavating

bid jointly, and are referred to as B-K. Defendant Thomas

Bowler was chief executive of Brighton and defendant

George. Krug, Sr., was president of Krug Excavating.

Corporate defendants Palumbo (of which Peter Palumbo

was president), Madden (of which Robert Madden was

president), and Corbett (of which James C. Corbett was

president) bid jointly and are referred to as PMC. Arcole

also bid.

There was evidence, very largely supplied by Bederman,

that before the bids were submitted, Bowler and Krug,

Palumbo, Madden and Corbett, and Bederman had reached

agreement that the bids would be filed in such pre-arranged

fashion that B-K would be the only or the low bidder on

jobs 82 and 83, Arcole on 85 and 88, and PMC on 84.

As ‘‘security’’ for performance of the agreement, B-K

wanted Bederman to take possession of the PMC bidding

books (the documents needed to make a bid) on 82 and

83. PMC wanted Bederman to take possession of the

B-K bidding book on 84. Bederman testified that he did

take possession of all these books, but that B-K must

App. 4

surreptitiously have taken back its bidding book on 84.

B-K submitted a bid on 84 as weil, lower than the PMC

bid, and B-K was awarded the contract. Krug told

Bederman they had ‘‘dumped’’ 84, but had not ‘‘bothered’’

Arcole’s jobs.

There is no question but that Bederman’s testimony

traced the making of an agreement. He met first with

Bowler and Krug and later with Palumbo, Madden, and

Corbett. He testified that he reported back to Bowler

and Krug, and on the morning of July 29, Bederman,

Palumbo and Madden were together with Bowler and Krug

in the hotel quarters of the latter. He testified that all

agreed to the plan of collusive bids.

Defendants question Bederman’s testimony that after

meeting with PMC he reported back to B-K so as to ac-

complish an agreement, and they further question his

testimony that he had on the table in front of him at the

hotel quarters the B-K bidding book on 84 as well as the

PMC bidding books on 82, 83, 85, and 88, and that by

distracting him in some way B-K ‘‘got their proposal

book out of the stack of proposals in front of me.’’ We

are unable to say that the testimony is inherently in-

credible. The jury could decide, as they apparently did,

that it was true.

Counts II through XXXVIII were the mail fraud counts.

Each count charged defendants with causing a mailing

by a third party, usually the State of Illinois. The mailings

all occurred after July 29, 1975 and contained returns of

bidding documents, awards of contracts, and payments for

work performed.

The PMC defendants argue that they cannot be con-

victed of these uses of the mails because the mailings oc-

curred after the PMC defendants were no longer members

App. 5

of any conspiracy to carry out the scheme. These mail-

ings by the State were, however, virtually inevitable re-

sults of activity on and before July 29. The PMC defen-

dants could properly be found to be jointly responsible

with others for setting the scheme in motion up to that

time, and thus causing the mailings by third parties. Thus

defendants could be found criminally liable for the mail-

ings which necessarily resulted from earlier activity which

these defendants conspired to bring about.

Defendants have not challenged the proposition that

these mailings advanced the execution of the scheme.

ITI

Defendants contend that the jury was not sufficiently

and properly instructed on the element of intent. Ex-

eerpts from the instructions, bearing on that point, were

as follows:

‘‘Under Section 1 [of the Sherman Act], it is a crime

for any person or corporation to make any contract,

or engage in any combination or conspiracy in un-

reasonable restraint of interstate commerce. To con-

vict a defendant under this section of the law the

Government must establish beyond reasonable doubt

that a defendant made a contract, or that a defendant

was knowingly and intentionally a member of a com-

bination or conspiracy; that the purpose of the con-

tract, or of the conspiracy was to achieve an objec-

tive that would create an unreasonable restraint of in-

terstate commerce.

‘*Tt is not necessary to find a specific intent to violate

the law, for the parties are deemed to have intended

the necessary and direct consequences of their acts.

App. 6

“« . To convict a defendant of this crime the Gov-

ernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

he was a member of a conspiracy whose purpose was to

effect an unreasonable restraint on interstate or for-

eign commerce.

««| |. A conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman

Act is an agreement—is an agreement by two or

more persons or corporations to accomplish a com-

mon objective which would result in an unreasonable

restraint of interstate commerce.

‘‘To be a member of the conspiracy a party must know

of it, and intentionally assist in its-furtherance. ...

‘‘Certain types of conduct are regarded as unrea-

onable per se. This means that the mere doing of the

act itself constitutes an unreasonable restraint in

interstate commerce, and it is not necessary to con-

sider why the acts were committed, or their effect on

the industry, or any other explanatory matter. Con-

duct regarded as unreasonable per se includes price

fixing, division of markets and bid rigging.

‘*Where conduct unreasonable per se is shown, it can-

not be justified or excused by the elimination of com-

petitive evils, or the good motives of the conspirators,

or the fact that prices were not unreasonably high or

arbitrary.’’

We think it is a fair summary of these instructions that

in order to convict defendants, it must be proved that they

intentionally agreed or formed a combination or conspiracy

for the purpose of rigging the bids and thus allocating the

contracts among themselves; that because an agreement,

App. 7

combination, or conspiracy to rig the bids and allocate the

contracts is per se an unreasonable restraint of trade,

it is not necessary that the government prove that such

conduct is an unreasonable restraint of trade; that it is

unnecessary for the government to prove that the defen-

dants knew that the agreement, combination, or conspiracy

to rig the bids and allocate the contracts was a violation of

the law.

Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the instructions

with respect to the element of intent. The B-K defendants

expressly concede that the instructions on this subject were

in accord with the interpretation of the ‘‘pre-1974 case

law.’’ All defendants argue that the law must necessarily

have changed at the time Congress increased the maximum

penalties for § 1 violation from one year imprisonment

and a $50,000 fine to three years imprisonment and a

$1,000,000 fine, and raised the offense from a misdemeanor

to a felony. Pub. L. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708, Dec. 21, 1974,

amending 15 U.S.C. § 1.

Defendants relied in part on United States v. United

States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977). After

oral argument in the case before us, we had the benefit

of the decision of the Supreme Court in Gypsum, 46 L.W.

4937.

Defendants’ briefs on appeal have not set out, nor

pointed out in the record, the text of any instruction they

requested. We do find in the record Instruction No. O-21,

upparently requested by the PMC defendants, but refused

by the court. C-21 asserts that proof of ‘‘specific intent’’

1 Although knowledge that intended conduct was unlawful need

not be proved, the government points out that each bid was ac-

companied by an affidavit that the bidder and its agents have not

directly or indirectly entered into any agreement, participated in any

collusion, or otherwise taken any action in restraint of free com-

petitive bidding in connection with the bid.

App. 8

is required, and that ‘‘To establish specific intent the Gov-

ernment must prove that the defendant knowingly did an

act which the law forbids, purposely intending to violate

the law.’’ Defendants were not entitled to an instruction

which included the last phrase. ‘‘A requirement of proof

not only of this knowledge of likely effects, but also of a

conscious desire to bring them to fruition or to violate the

law would seem, particularly in such a context, both un-

necessarily cumulative and unduly burdensome.’’ Gypsum,

46 L.W. at 4944.

The alleged offense in Gypsum occurred before the 1974

amendment. The Supreme Court noted the 1974 increase

in penalties and reasoned that ‘‘The severity of these

sanctions provide further support for our conclusion that

the Sherman Act should not be construed as creating strict

liability crimes.’’ 46 L.W. at 4943, footnote 18. Although

the Court obesrved at that point that the increased penalties

were not applicable to the charges before it, there is no

suggestion that the intent requirement would be different

in offenses committed after the amendment.

Defendants all argue that the jury must be instructed

that in order to convict, the jury must find that defendants

acted with intent to restrain trade or commerce.’

Of course Gypsum does support the general proposition,

contended for by defendants, that intent is an element of

the offense. ‘‘For these reasons, we conclude that the

criminal offenses defined by the Sherman Act should be

construed as including intent as an element.’’ 46 L.W. at

4943,

2 We do not find any requested instruction to this effect. The

government does not claim failure to preserve the issue. We have

not attempted to trace this subject through the conference on in-

structions and objections noted, but address the issue as properly

before us.

App. 9

There is a difference, however, between the case before

the Supreme Court in Gypsum and the case before us. We

consider the difference significant.

In Gypsum, the government proved defendants’ prac-

tice of telephoning a competing producer to determine

the price at which gypsum board was currently being of-

fered to a specific customer. That practice was not, by

itself, an unreasonable restraint, unlawful per se. The

government contended that these price exchanges were

part of an agreement and had the effect of stabilizing

prices and policing agreed upon price increases. The

offending instruction was that the defendants’ purpose

in the price verification practice was essentially irrele-

vant if the jury found that the effect of verification was

to rdtse, fix, maintain, or stabilize prices,

An agreement for price maintenance is an unreason-

able restraint, unlawful per se under the Sherman Act.

U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).

We do not read Gypsum as indicating that once defen-

dants are proved to have intentionally made an agree-

ment which is unlawful per se, there must be an instruc-

tion that the defendants cannot be convicted unless they

are found to have intended to restrain trade or commerce.

The conduct directly proved in Gypsum, the practice

of price verification, was not per se unlawful. The Su-

preme Court held that in terms of criminal liability it

was not enough to find price stabilization as a consequence

of the practice, without also finding that these consequences

were intended, at least at the level of knowledge of the

probability of those consequences.

In the case before us the jury was instructed that in

order to convict it must find that defendants were know-

ing members of a conspiracy whose purpose was to effect

App. 10

an unreasonable restraint on interstate or foreign com-

merce and that bid-rigging is regarded as unreasonable

per se.

A conspiracy to submit collusive, non-competitive,

rigged bids is a per se violation of the statute. Umnited

States v. Flom, 558 F.2d 1179, 1183 (5th Cir. 1977) ; United

States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir.

1975), cert. demed 423 U.S. 874 and 893; United States

v. Champion Intern, Corp., 557 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1977),

cert. denied 434 U.S. 938.

As the government put it in its brief, ‘‘Since the per se

rules define types of restraints that are illegal without fur-

ther inquiry into their competitive reasonableness, they

are substantive rules of law, not evidentiary presump-

tions. It is as if the Sherman Act read: ‘An agreement

among competitors to rig bids is illegal.’ ”’

Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evi-

dence of the interstate character of trade or commerce

affected, nor do they claim instructions on that issue were

erroneous.

We conclude that the issue of intent was adequately

submitted here where the court instructed that, in order to

convict it must be proved that defendants knowingly agreed

or formed a combination or conspiracy for the purpose of

rigging the bids, and intentionally assisted in its further-

ance.

IV

A.

The district court instructed in part:

‘‘Defendants . . . have presented a theory of defense —

that none of them entered into any agreement to sub-

App. 11

mit collusive, non-competitive, highway construction bids,

as charged against them in the indictment.’’

This indeed was their attempted defense. They en-

deavored to support it by showing circumstances de-

signed to demonstrate that the bids were more probably

the result of economic factors, independently considered,

than of agreement among defendants. B-K considers that

it was entitled to have the court alert the jury to this theory

of the relevancy of such circumstances.

B-K successively requested two instructions far longer

than the portion given, and above quoted, and longer

than would have been required to alert the jury to the

supporting proposition just referred to. The requested

instructions listed a number of categories of ‘‘economic

factors and operating costs’’ explanatory of the bids and

also instructed that the jury may consider several par-

ticular items or categories of evidence.

Judge Flaum had invited revision of the first request

and apparently, and understandably, did not consider

the second an improvement. We think the requests went

considerably beyond a statement of the theory of defense.

We find no abuse of discretion in rejecting all but the por-

tion given. See Umted States v. Bessesen, 445 F.2d 463,

467 (7th Cir. 1971).

B.

Defendants express concern that the jury may have

based the guilty verdict on the undisputed fact that de-

fendants met and talked about the highway construction

jobs without: being convinced that they reached an agree-

ment to rig the bids. They wanted an instruction that a

conversation between competitors which does not give

rise to an agreement is not, taken alone, a violation of

App. 12

the antitrust laws. Two of the three requested and re-

fused instructions on that subject came fairly close to the

mark,

The district court did, however, make it abundantly clear

that there was an offense only if defendants knowingly

made a contract or agreement. As we view the case, and

in the light of this emphasis, we see no possibility that the

jury was misled into believing that the meeting and dis-

cussion, without agreement, was an offense.

C.

The district court gave an instruction on the subject of

withdrawal from a conspiracy by one who has previously

been a member. The instruction was requested by the

government because of the circumstances of B-K’s decision,

after the alleged formation of the conspiracy to bid Job

84. Objections were somewhat equivocal, PMC offered

its own version of a withdrawal instruction.

B-K now points out that a withdrawal defense is mean-

ingless in the context of a charge of conspiracy arising

under the Sherman Act, unless, as is not true here, a

defendant claimed that the statute of limitations had run

since his withdrawal.

B-K now argues that the instruction was not only inap-

propriate, but prejudicial because it misled the jury ‘‘into

believing that the defendants were relying on a weak and

legally insufficient defense.’’

The jury noticed this portion of the instructions, for

they sent a note during deliberations quoting a sentence

from it and asking for a definition of a phrase. The court

denied the request for elaboration. It seems probable that

the jury was considering whether either B-K or PMC

App. 13

had withdrawn before the bids were filed, and their con-

sideration of that question was surely not prejudicial to

B-K.

We cannot conclude that the giving of the withdrawal in-

struction was prejudicial.

V.

The district court sent a copy of his instructions to the

jury room, Defendants contend this was an abuse of

discretion because the government and most of the defen-

dants objected.

Sending a copy of the instructions to the jury room is

approved in this circuit. United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d

879, 883 (7th Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Donner, 497 F.2d

184, 194 (7th Cir. 1974).

We find no abuse of discretion here, We do not agree,

moreover, that the two notes of inquiry sent by the jury

demonstrate that the practice generated confusion.

VI.

Robert J. Madden, James C. Corbett, Peter Palumbo,

and George B. Krug, Jr. were not defendants, but were

officers of corporate defendants. They had been granted

use immunity under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 and had testi-

fied before the grand jury. They were called as witnesses

at trial, and where they gave testimony favorable to de-

fendants and inconsistent with their grand jury testi-

mony, the grand jury testimony was admitted in evi-

dence. Under Rule 607, Federal Rules of Evidence, the

government was permitted to impeach the witness it had

cailed by introducing the inconsistent grand jury testi-

mony. Such testimony was also substantive evidence. Un-

der Rule 801(d)(1)(A) the prior statements were not hear-

App. 14

say at a trial where the declarants were subject to cross-

examination.

There were numerous and significant instances where

the grand jury testimony tended to convict and the trial

testimony did not.

Defendants say they do not attack the validity of Rule

801(d)(1)(A), nor claim the grand jury testimony was

irrelevant or outside the literal scope of the Rule. Rather,

they call for exclusion under Rule 403, permitting the

court to exclude relevant evidence ‘‘if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-

dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury... .’’

Defendants observe that when persons in the situation

of these witnesses are called before the grand jury ‘‘their

statements may be influenced by the subtle and not-so-

subtle pressures which the prosecutor may apply in the

isolation of the Grand Jury room.’’ The suggested un-

fairness seems to rest on an inherent probability that

witnesses in this situation would come closer to the truth

in the trial setting than before the grand jury, and that

the government should therefore be denied the procedure

it followed here. We are not persuaded.

Vil

PMC argues that the use immunity provided Robert J.

Madden, James C. Corbett, and Peter Palumbo was vio-

lated when their testimony was used in a criminal case

against their corporations. The corporations were closely

held. These men were the managing officers and owned

large percentages of stock.

Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that a

criminal case against a closely held corporation is a crimi-

App. 15

nal case against its principal stockholder. Doubtless con-

viction of the corporation impairs the financial interests of

the stockholder, but we conclude that the use of the stock-

holder’s testimony in a criminal case against the cor-

poration is not use in a criminal case against the stock-

holder.

VIII

The government asked Bederman:

‘‘Mr. Bederman, prior to engaging in the conversa-

tions which you have related, what was your knowl-

edge of grand jury investigations and prosecutions in

the highway industry in Illinois?’’

The court sustained a defense objection, struck the

question, and instructed the jury then and, generally, later,

to disregard stricken material.

Defendants argue that a mistrial was necessary be-

cause the question, though unanswered, had already left

with the jury the prejudicial inference ‘‘that the road

building industry in Illinois was honeycombed with cor-

ruption and price-fixing, and that these defendants were

an integral part of it.’’

The government contends that it was intending to show

the conspirators’ knowledge of investigations and prose-

cutions in order to demonstrate actual knowledge that

their scheme was unlawful. In any event we cannot agree

that the court’s action was insufficient to avoid any pos-

sible prejudicial interpretation of the question.

IX

Defendants contend that the prosecutor improperly

asked the jury to give weight to the guilty plea of another

corporate defendant, Bederman’s Arcole Midwest.

App. 16

In answering defense attacks on Bederman’s eredi-

bility, the prosecutor observed that ‘‘Bederman admits

the guilt of his own company in this bid-rigging conspiracy.

In his own mind it was and is guilty of the offenses charged.

If one is to believe the defendants, no agreement was ever

reached. If that is true, then Bederman must literally be

off his rocker to come into this court and at this trial admit

his company’s guilt. But that is what the defendants ask

you to believe. ...’’ He went on to stress the improbability

that Bederman would say his company was party to an un-

lawful agreement and expose it to liability if there was no

agreement.

The court gave appropriate instructions at the end of

the argument that a plea of guilty by one defendant is

not evidence of the guilt of another.

The guilty plea had been made known to the jury by

the defense. In cross-examination of Bederman they had

used provisions of the plea agreement for impeachment.

Bederman’s testimony at trial was an admission of un-

lawful conduct by him and his company, and it was legiti-

mate to argue that his testimony was credible because

strongly against self-interest. The prosecutor was not

asking the jury to consider the guilty plea of an absent

defendant except as part of a demonstration that Beder-

man was speaking against self-interest and should be

deemed credible.

Under the circumstances, we do not consider the argu-

ment improper.

The judgment appealed from is ArrrrMep.

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

App. 17

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

June 26, 1979

Before

Hon. Thomas E. Fairchild, Chief Judge

Hon. Robert A. Sprecher, Circuit Judge

Hon. William J. Bauer, Circuit Judge

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Nos. 77-2295, 2296, 2297 and 2299 iv.

BRIGHTON BUILDING & MAINTENANCE CO., KRUG

EXCAVATING COMPANY, WESTERN ASPHALT

PAVING CO., UNION CONTRACTING & MATERTALS

CO., THOMAS J. BOWLER, GEORGE B. KRUG, SR.,

J. M. CORBETT CO., THOS. M. MADDEN CO. and PA-

LUMBO EXCAVATING CO.,

Defendants-A ppellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 77-CR-192 Joel M. Flaum, Judge.

ORDER

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and sug-

gestion for rehearing en banc filed in the above-entitled

cause by counsel for defendants-appellanis Palumbo Ex-

App. 18

cavating Co., Thos. M. Madden Co., and J. M. Corbett Co.,

no judge* in regular active service having requested a

vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc, and all judges

on the original panel having voted to DENY a rehearing,

IT IS ORDERED, that the aforesaid petition for rehear-

ing be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.

* Circuit Judge Philip W. Tone did not participate in the sug-

gestion for rehearing en banc.

App. 19

APPENDIX C

Opinion by Judge Fairchild

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Chicago, Illinois 60604

May 18, 1979

Before

Hon. Thomas E. Fairchild, Chief Judge

Hon. Robert A. Sprecher, Circuit Judge

Hon. William J. Bauer, Circuit Judge

Nos. 77-2295, 77-2296, 77-2297, 77-2299

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BRIGHTON BUILDING & MAINTENANCE CO., KRUG

EXCAVATING COMPANY, WESTERN ASPHALT

PAVING CO., UNION CONTRACTING & MATERIALS

cO., THOMAS J. BOWLER, GEORGE B. KRUG, SR.,

J. M. CORBETT CO., THOS. M. MADDEN CO. and PA-

LUMBO EXCAVATING CO.,

Defendants-A ppellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 77-CR-192 Joel M. Flaum, Judge

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the

record from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Tlinois, Eastern Division, and was

argued by counsel.

App. 20

On consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged by

this court that the judgment of the said District Court in

this cause appealed from be, and the same is hereby,

AFFIRMED, in accordance with the opinion of this court

filed this date.

&

:

i

’

-