Petition — Air Freight Haulage Co. v. Ryd-Air, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1979

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

a ‘Su “wa f'n * us rea

os 5 DD

i}

In cries JUL 5 1979

Supreme Court of the TWnited | Me oon se. cue

OCTOBER THERM, 1978

W9-2%

+

Ain Fretaur Taunacn Co., INne.,

Petitioner,

against

Ryp-Air, Inc., Am Carao, Inc., Ryper System, Ino., AMeri-

CAN Ainuines, Inc., Mastenn Aimnines, Inc., Norrarasr

Ainuines, Inc., Arm Canapa, AnLeacueny Atruines, INc.,

Snanive Armways, Ine., Brarrisu Overseas Arnways Conrpe.,

Decra Arruines, Inec., Fnying Tiger Lines, [nc., MonawKk

Ainuinns, Inc., Nartonan Ainways, Inc., New Yorn Arr-

ways, Inc.,, Norrawest Amunes, Ine., Ozark Arkiines,

Inc., Pan American Wortpo Aiways, Ine., Prepmont

Aviation, Inc., Atruier PNrernationaL, [NC., SEABOARD

Wortp Atiuines, Inc., Sournern Airways, INe,

, TRANS

Wornp Ai Lines, Inc., Unrren Ain Lines, Ine.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Guy L. Hrtnemann

Attorney for Petitioner

866 United Nations Plaza

New York, New York 10017

(212) 753.1400

Kpowarp M. Cuikorsky,

Miron Horowrrz,

of Counsel

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions of the Courts Below ..........-......45.

GER CERCA SAV EGD AAV ord watecesdecins

Er a ee ee eee

Le ey are ne

RO SU MN aviv acaba nsdsterreccecss

CN CSW has 92 60h VedNd Ord Kowa ed 55sec

Statement of FMissential Facts .....................

Reasons For Grantine tHe Writ:

Port One—The combination of all the airlines, in

forming their own exelusive trucking enterprise

constituted a per se violation of Seetion One of

ee I CGO ay sabia e Cea bres esanes

Ne te eabeaee

A. Respondents’ Conduet Constituted A Collee-

SOU MU OO MR ss isha des acecertyecss

B. The Airlines Through the Ryd-Air Venture

Mngaged in Industry-Wide Price-Fixing of

Pick-Up and Delivery Rates ...............

Point Two—The relevant market is the service of

pick-up and delivery for all the Airlines in New

ETE ES = Ga

III ict a oi

I na re ore

APPENDIX!

Opinion, United States Court of Appeals for the See-

IS a SO

Opinion, United States Distriet Court for the South-

ern Distriet of New York ......;... ides vas

RENE A TE Se

.)

9

24

il TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: PAGE

Air Freight Haulage Co., Inc. v. Ryd-Atr, Inc., 408

F Upp. G60 TDN. 2c TPC) oie venciccawenscces 6, 7

Big Bear Cartage, Inc. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 419 F.Supp.

DOR CMAN CMs BRON Vac ccsunekeusSeakeeuckets 10

Breen Air Freight, Ltd. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 470 F.2d

767 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932

EeWee Chis 4 ue Kent bnrens Catan eiee eens 4, 6,9, 10, 15

Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S, 294 (1962) .... 21

Cass Student Advertising, Inc. v. National Educa-

tional Advertising Service, Inc., 516 F.2d 1092

(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986

(ROVE Bh be sich mati ad este cetae lin keaaenen 20, 21, 22

Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164

SE METS Sw cawend eas abun Ceee akan s 12

E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour

Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972),

cert. dened, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) ...........005 14

Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airtines, Inc., 409

Sees Ne CRD” ws. ba 00 dd and wk 0k 30s HEA OS 10

International Boxing Club, Inc, v. United States, 358

Sh VEO 5 kdic cdc wecnake ced Vans ceewken 22

Jim Cain v. Air Cargo, Inc., —— F.2d —— (9th Cir.,

June 26, 1979, Dkt. No. 77-1461) ............5. 10, 15

Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagrams & Sons, 340 US, 211

bh Pee ee ee or Te ere tee 11

Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Ilale Stores, 359 U.S. 207

CRUE: vides Gakks cam kke eons hau tes wees 11, 13

Nat. Society of Professional Engineers v. United

States, 4385 U.S. 679 (1978) .......ccceccecnee 17,18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ill

PAGE

Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.

1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 340 (1978) ......... 12

Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.,

243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.

Se BAUS vviaw's bonnes bores Ve CETROE eee 12

Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282

Se te CEDOD 50s Aes wha Pea cae eee eae kc hes 13

Scroggins v. Air Cargo, Inc., 534 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.

cg) BRA a one cane a EMSA Ee” Mere bara dey fhe 10

St. Pau Fire & Marme Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S.

RRP vic ds a VRS GN Lh FERS ER TE ere the 13

United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919) ...... 13

United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S.

Ne RTD bis via Ricans ks Cae eae bad we Mees 18, 22

United States v. Crowell, Collier & McMillan, 361 F.

Supp: 560 (B.D. 2s TRO) ads cn tecy swe eaiany 23

United States v. FE. 1, duPont de Nemours & Co., 351

Rae, Oe Ls ok Keke wes ree eae ai 21

United States v. First National Pictures, Inc., 282

ae | Ore ec ORE OE Een ere 13

United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S, 127

PE res fe eee ee So ceug ier es ea vemae 14

United States v. Grimnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) 22

United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 478

PM EE. , SUMP reors tedieet re Nereen Lg he? pan 23

United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967) ........ 17

United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S, 596

CATR. armen PEAS Rec AAS Ha RRR EAN Re ENR AS 13

iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Agency Decisions:

Local Cartage Agreement Case, 15 C.A.B. 850 (1952) i)

Air Freight Forwarder Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 536

(20GR) «02 ciiclsciaviee nobis Cesar eka One er ees 9)

Statutes:

1b U.S.C. § 1 (Section One of the Sherman Act) .. passim

15 U.S.C. § 2 (Seetion Two of the Sherman Act) . .3, 6,8,

18, 23

15 U.S.C. $18 (Section Seven of the Clayton

AMR) oni ccd beens ee eee 3, 6, 18, 23

49 U.S.C. § 1882 (Section 412 of the Federal Aviation

Abt) .. .itnaskaia ecient ene 4,9

49 U.S.C. § 1884 (Former Section 414 of the Federal

Aviation B@Q) i.:.00 <i seek es *: heey ead 4)

49 U.S.C. § 13884, as amended, Pub. L. 95-504 § 30

(B) accicecccanakt ee ee R nent kale eae 10, 11

Other Authorities:

Comment, Vertieal Agreements to Terminate Com-

peting Distributors, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1160 (1979) 13

Note, 39 J. Air Law & Commerce 453 (1973) ....... 10

L. Sullivan, Acstitrust (1077) oi. cic ca cddccctevdscen 13, 14

IN THE

Supreme Cort of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No.

ey Ce

Ai Freiaut Haunage Co., Ine.,

Petitioner,

against

Ryp-Air, Inc., Arr Carao, Inc., Ryper System, Inc., AMeEnt-

cAN Atruines, Inc., Eastern Arruines, Inc., Norrurast

Ainuines, Inc., Air Canapa, AtLeaueny Airings, INc.,

Branier Airways, Ine., Brrrisa Overseas Airways Corp.,

De.ra Arutwes, Inc., Fuyina Tiaer Lines, Inc., Monawk

Arrunes, Inc., Nationan Arrways, Inc., New Yorn Atr-

ways, Inc., Norruwest Airings, Inc., Ozark AtRLines,

Inc., Pan Amertcan Worup Airways, Inc., Prepmontr

Aviation, Inc., Arrnuirt Inrernationan, Inc., SEaBoarp

Wornp Arrumes, Inc., Sournern Arrways, Inc., Trans

Worn Air Lines, Inc., Unrren Air Lines, Ixvc.,

Respondents.

arn mepestendmenpenstinen i sicreasepaecantaatianestsaeaai

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioner Air Freight Haulage Co., Ine. respectfully

prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment

entered in this antitrust case by the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Cireuit, summarily affirming the

judgment of the United States District Court for the South-

ern District of New York.

Opinions of the Courts Below

The order and judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seeond Cirenit (noe opinion war isaned) in

reproduced in the Appendix at in and is not yet ofieially

reported, The opinion and order of the United States Dis

triet Court for the Southern Diatriet of New York (Lasker,

J.) (not offeially reported) is also reproduced in the Ap.

pendix at Sa oand ia reported at 19782 COT Trade Cas,

YOu set,

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Ciremt wae entered on April é, L972 The juria

dietion of thie Court ia invoked pursuant to 28 TLS.C,

S endt),

Questions Presented

1, Wasa per se violation of Seetion One of the Sherman

Act committed when all domestic airlines entered into an

induatry wide combination (without authorization by the

Civil Aeronautics Board) to ereate a new trucking eom-

pany, for the sole purpose of giving it the exeluaive eon-

tract to perform air freight pickup and delivery for all

domestic airlines serving New York City, to the exelusion

of Petitioner and all other truckers

A. Did Reapondente’ conduct constitute achorizontal

group boyeott and concerted refusal to deal that is

per se illegal under thia Court's prior decisions in

Klor’s, Ine, vy. Broadway-Hale Stores, Ino,, 359 US, 207

(1950) and United States v. General Motors Corp., 384

U.S, 127 (1906)7

BB. Did Reapondenta’ industry-wide fixing of uniform

pick-up and delivery rates for all domestic airlines

3

serving New York City constitute price-fixing, previ-

ously condemned by this Court. Kig., National Society

of Professional Engmeers vy. United States, 435 US,

G70 (1978)?

2. Was a relevant market of trucking for all domestic

airlines in New York City (previously served by inde-

pendent truckers under contracts administered by Air

Cargo, Ine. (ACI), the CAB authorized agent for all the

airlines) —vie., the AC L-nirline contract trucking pick-up

and delivery market——unlawfully monopolized, in violation

of Sherman Act 42 and Clayton Aet 47, when Respondent

nirlines firat, granted an exclusive trueking contract to a

new trucking company owned by all Respondents and,

aecond, Inter directly took over such services through

ACT, the Se ESoOny owned instrumentality?

Statutes and Regulations Involved

16 U.S.C. 661, 2 and 18 (Seetions One and Two of the

Sherman Aet and Section Seven of the Clayton Act).

49 UUS.C. 99 1382 and 1384 (Sections 412 and 414 of the

Mederal Aviation Act).

Mach of the above ia set forth in’ the Appendix

(1Ga-18a).

Statement of the Case

Introduction

In an unprecedented industry-wide horizontal eombina-

tion, all domestic airlines serving New York City, through

their wholly-owned subsidiary—Air Cargo, Ine,—joined

in 1970 with a major trucking company to form a new en-

terprise to which the airlines jointly gave one exclusive

.

4

contract to perform all pick-up and delivery of their air

freight, excluding all independently owned truckers, such

as Petitioner, who previously competed separately for such

contracts with each airline. The airlines undertook such

action on the premise that their conduct was immune from

the operation of the antitrust laws by virtue of their regu-

lation by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). However,

the airlines failed to disclose this combination to the CAB,

as required by 49 U.S.C. § 1382 and were subsequently held

not immune from antitrust lisbility. Breen Air Freight,

Ltd. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 470 F. 2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.

denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).

In the face of this industry-wide collective action and re-

sultant price-fixing, the Second Cireuit’s summary aflirm-

ance of the District Court’s judgment dismissing the com-

plaint constitutes a serious erosion of well-established

guidelines enunciated by this Court condemning such in-

dustry-wide collective activity as per se violations of Sec-

tion One of the Sherman Act.

Statement of Essential Facts

The facts adduced at trial were undisputed. From 1947

until 1970, the airlines used Air Cargo, Ine. (“ACI”) as

their wholly-owned, nationwide “agent” in supervising and

entering into contracts between each airline and various

independent truckers to perform pick-up and delivery

services for each airline. ACI’s role, in this regard, was

strictly limited by a CAB order, authorizing the creation

of ACI, which limited ACL's role to that of agent for the

airlines and strictly prohibited ACI’s controlling rates.

As of 1970, there were several independent ACI truck-

ers, including Petitioner, each serving several airlines in

New York City. Each airline had an independent voice in

the selection of its trucker, and, in fact, airlines oceasion-

5

ally switched truckers. An independent trucker, to per-

form trucking for an airline, had to obtain a contract from

ACI, and would be known as an “ACI trucker.” Whenever

a shipper contacted an airline to ship air freight, that air-

line’s ACI trucker would perform the pick-up and delivery

work and would be paid, not by the shipper, but by the air-

line through ACI, which deducted an administrative serv-

ice charge. The ACI trucker, thus, performed the trucking

aspect of the airlines’ air freight service.

In 1970, the airlines and ACI radically changed this

practice. The airlines and ACI entered into an agreement

to use one trucker exclusively for all the airlines serving

the New York area. Petitioner and the other independent

truckers were foreclosed from servicing any airline in the

New York area.

The airlines through ACI agreed to join with Ryder

Systems, Inc. (“Ryder”)* to form a new corporation—

called Ryd-Air—giving this ACI subsidiary an exclusive

contract to perform all pick-up and delivery for all the air-

lines serving New York City. The exclusive contract was

for a five-year term. The airlines guaranteed to give all

their cartage work to Ryd-Air on a “cost-plus profit”

basis.**® At all times, ACI, the airlines’ wholly-owned sub-

sidiary, acted “as agent for and on behalf of the Air Car-

riers,” as the Ryd-Air contract stated.

The result of this airline combination was that, after

October 1970, no domestic airline serving New York City

could choose as its trucker any company other than Ryd-

Air. Price and service competition at the pick-up and de-

livery level were thus totally eliminated among all the air-

lines. Moreover, this collective action by all the airlines

* Ryder was not previously involved in the air freight trucking

business.

** The cost of this guarantee was passed on to the shipping

publie.

6

was coercively enforced, as evidenced by American Air-

lines’ breach of a long-standing contract with Petitioner

because of its ‘‘commitment’’ to, and obvious ownership

interest in Ryd-Air. Petitioner, since 1970, has been un-

able to obtain any airline trucking business, as have all

other truckers in the New York City area.

In 1973, ACI terminated Ryd-Air’s contract and formed

its own “New York Trucking Division” which continues, to

this day, to operate as the exclusive trucker for all the

airlines serving New York City.

Petitioner Air Freight Haulage Co., Inc. brought this

action in 1971, claiming that the conduct of the Respondent

airlines—together with ACI, Ryder and Ryd-Air—violated

Sections One and Two of the Sherman Act and Section

Seven of the Clayton Act.

During the course of proceedings below, Respondents

moved for summary judgment on the ground that their

CAB-regulated status immunized them from the operation

of the antitrust laws. The District Court denied the mo-

tion, specifically holding, on the authority of Breen Air

Freight, Ltd. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 470 F. 2d 767 (2d Cir.

1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973)* that since spe-

cific authorization by the CAB had not been granted (or

sought), the CAB had not immunized Respondents’ ac-

tivities. Air Freight Haulage Co., Inc. v. Ryd-Air, Inc., 408

F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).

Trial was had to the District Court which, by opinion

entered October 11, 1978, dismissed the complaint in its en-

tirety.

Specifically, Petitioner claimed that the combination of

all domestic airlines serving New York violated Section

* Breen considered the identical controversy (involving other

plaintiffs) concerning the formation of Ryd-Air by the airlines,

ACI and Ryder. After this Court denied certiorari, the plaintiffs

in the Breen litigation settled with these Respondents.

7

One of the Sherman Act by creating a horizontal group

boycott, whereby all the airlines collectively refused to deal

with any outside trucker as their trucking agent except

Ryd;Air—owned in part by ACI, which itself was the air-

lines’ wholly-owned subsidiary.

Petitioner’s claim of collective action was based on the

indisputable fact that the airlines themselves made the

agreement with Ryd-Air (using ACI as their “agent”*),

that the CAB itself had limited ACI to act only as the

wholly-owned agent of the airlines, and that, as ACI’s Gen-

eral Counsel testified, ACI’s action in forming Ryd-Air was

taken at the airlines’ direction. Respondents did not deny

such collective action at trial. Rather, they admitted it.

Indeed, on the eve of trial, the airlines (and ACI) made

this statement:

It was the airlines who demanded that the local

motor carriers with whom ACI had contracted to pro-

' vide pick up and delivery services in New York be re-

placed . . . and it was the airlines who ratified ACI’s

actions in contracting with Ryd-Air to provide pick-up

and delivery services for the airlines at the New York

City airports. Clearly, AUi acted as agent for the

airlines in effecting the contract arrangements with

Ryder and Ryd-Air.

(Pre-Trial Memorandum of Respondents Airlines and

ACI, pp. 8-9; emphasis added).

The airlines further stated:

The airline defendants and ACI will show at the

trial of this case that ACI negotiated with Ryder as

an agent of the airlines and at the direction of the

airlmes. Furthermore the defendant airlines and ACI

* It is beyond dispute that the actual trucking contract between

ACI and Ryd-Air deseribed ACI “as agent for and on behalf of

pe ae Carriers.’’ See, Id., 408 F.Supp. 446, 448 n.3 (emphasis

>.

8

will show at the trial that the airlines in fact knew

the material facts involved in the formation of Ryd-

Air and ratified its formation.

It must be remembered that the airlines own 100%

of the stock of ACI and control the actions of ACT’s

management through a board of directors comprised

of airline vice presidents.

Id., p. 14 (Emphasis in original).

Despite Respondents’ own position that ACI acted spe-

cifically at the direction of the airlines, the Distriet Court,

without any factual basis, found that ACI acted independ-

ently in making the crucial decision to replace all existing

independent truckers with Ryd-Air. Accordingly, the Dis-

trict Court rejected Petitioner’s contentions that Respond-

ents’ actions were collective in nature and constituted a

per se violation of Section One. Without explanation, the

District Court made no finding on Petitioner’s price-fixing

claim, despite undisputed evidence of uniform price-fixing

resulting from the Ryd-Air venture.*

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seeond Cireuit, a panel consisting of Cireuit Judges

Mulligan, Timbers and Van Graafeiland heard oral argu-

ment on April 2, 1979. On April 6, 1979, the Court of

Appeals entered judgment affirming the District Court

without opinion.**

* Similarly, without explanation, the Distriet Court made no

findings at all with respect to Petitioner’s claim of conspiracy to

monopolize (15 U.S.C. § 2).

** Counsel for Petitioner is constrained to suggest that the is-

sues raised by this antitrust case were not meaningfully reviewed

by the panel of Judges of the Seeond Cirenit that heard the

appeal. The panel affirmed the judgment on the opinion of the

District Judge. Sinee the District Judge did not even decide two

of Plaintiff's claims (price-fixing and conspiracy to monopolize),

the abruptness of this appellate determination, in light of the

seriousness of the issues—dealing with an industry-wide combina-

tion—was indeed puzzling.

.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT |

POINT ONE

The combination of all the airlines, in forming

their own exclusive trucking enterprise constituted a

per se violation of Section One of the Sherman Act.

Introduction

The immunity from antitrust liability hitherto enjoy ed

by the airline industry has been described as the brosuest

ever granted any segment of American industry. As a

general rule, the airlines, often agreeing among them-

selves to perform certain tasks in common or to create

industry-wide standardization, submitted such agreements

to the CAB for approval, and often for continued sur-

veillance by the Board.* As a result of such regula-

tion, the antitrust implications of the airline-ACT relation-

ship to the air freight trucking market has, in the past,

normally been shielded from judicial serutiny by the

Federal Aviation Act to the extent that CAB orders ap-

proved specific activities.**

* Indeed, the 1947 CAB order approving the airlines’ creation

of ACI noted the Board’s belief that “the future development of

Air Cargo, Ine. is uncertain and . . . its activities may require

future reconsideration of the approval granted herein.’’ Breen,

supra, 470 F, 2d at 774 n. 7 (emphasis added). Notably, on two

oceasions when the airlines sought CAB approval to expand ACI’s

activities, the CAB refused on antitrust grounds. See, eg., Local

Cartage Agreement Case, 15 C.A.B. 850, 854 (1952); Air Freight

Forwarder Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 536, 625-26 (1955).

** Where agreements affecting air transportation were approved

by the CAB, any person affected by such an order was automati-

cally exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws (49 U.S.C.

former § 1384), since the CAB, in approving such an agreement,

is required to consider “the promotion of adequate . . . service

by air carriers . . . without unjust diserimination . . . or un-

fair . . . competitive practices . . .” (49 U.S.C. § 1802). The

(footnote continued on following page)

10

Because of this immunity, predicated upon the regulated

nature of the industry, there are few judicial decisions

analyzing the antic. npetitive effect of industry-wide agree-

ments among airlines, such as the one in this case dealing

with air freight trucking.* Thus, despite anticompetitive

practices in their trucking activities, the airlines (and ACI)

have sometimes been held immune from antitrust liabil-

ity.** However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-

cently held that the airlines’ trucking agent, ACI, was not

immune from antitrust liability when, acting beyond the

scope of its original authority, it involved itself in the

actual organization of the trucking industry. Jim Cain v.

Air Cargo, Ine. F.2d —— (9th Cir., June 26, 1979,

Dkt. No. 77-1461).

In this case the airlines in New York departed dramat-

icaly from their past practice of having ACI merely super-

vise contracts be'ween the airlines and independent truck-

ers. Instead, the airlines themselves, using ACT as “agent”,

combined to form a new trucking company, Ryd-Air,

taking a substantial ownership interest, and agreed to use

this new enterprise as their exclusive trucker in New York

City, excluding all independent truckers. This agreement,

unlike previous airline trucking agreements, was never

disclosed to the CAB, prompting the Court of Appeals to

deny it exemption from the antitrust laws. Breen Air

Freight Ltd., swpra.***

(footnote continued from preceding page)

standards governing such authority “are taken from the antitrust

laws themselves. Hughes Tool Company v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 385 (1973). See new § 1384, effective October

24, 1978, and text, infra at p. 11.

*The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has ex-

pressed the view that control over airline activities which are only

incidental to air transportation is not a proper area for CAB

regulation and immunity. Note, 39 J. Air Lew & Commerce 453,

457n. (1973).

** See, e.g., Scroggins v. Air Cargo, Inc., 534 F. 2d 1124 (5th

Cir. 1976); Big Bear Cartage, Inc. vy. Air Cargo, Inc., 419 F.Supp.

982 (N.D. Ill. 1976).

*** Perhaps sensing vulnerability on the merits, the Respondents

attempted on appeal below to reassert immunity from the anti-

trust laws, an argument plainly foreclosed by Breen.

. RS

11

In light of the nationwide importance of the airline-ACI

trucking arrangement, this Court is respectfully urged to

grant the writ to consider the application of traditional

antitrust benchmarks of liability to evaluate the industry-

wide conduct of the airlines. Such an evaluation will well

serve the CAB and the airline industry since the Airline

Deregulation Act of 1978 makes the granting of immunity

discretionary with the CAB. Pub. L. 95-504, § 30(a); 49

U.S.C. § 1384 (reproduced in the Appendix at 18a).

A. Respondents’ Conduct Constituted A Collective

Refusal to Deal

This Court has long held that “the Sherman Act makes

it an offense for [businessmen] to agree among them-

selves to stop selling to particular customers.” Kiefer

Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).

Yet, the Ryd-Air venture accomplished precisely that,

since all domestic airlines serving New York City agreed

to refuse a trucking contract to any trucker other than

Ryd-Air—their own creation. Petitioner and _ others

whose “trade” was performing trucking for individual

airlines were henceforth precluded from performing these

services because of the airlines’ agreement to use Ryd-Air

on an industry-wide exclusive basis.

The Ryd-Air venture was far more pernicious than the

restraint of trade condemned by this Court in Klor’s, Inc.

v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), in

which “a wide combination consisting of manufacturers,

distributors and a [single] retailer’? by mutual agree-

ment, refused to sell to Klor’s, another retailer. Even

though the boycott of Klor’s was engaged in by only one

other retailer at Klor’s level, this Court unanimous:

condemned such activity as a boycott and as per se illegal.*

* This analysis under Klor’s leaves aside, for the moment, the

vertical integration resulting from all the airlines’ wholly owning

(footnote continued on following page)

12

Notably, in this case, the District Court did not dispute

that joint conduct by the airlines in terminating their ACI

truckers (including Petitioner) would have constituted a

per se restraint of trade under Sherman Act Section One.

Rather, the Court unexplainably and without justification

totally ignored the relationship between the airlines and

ACI and decided the matter solely as a simple unilateral

refusal to deal with the truckers by ACI, as though it were

a separate entity—even though ACI’s sole existence was

as the airlines’ agent and the Ryd-Air contract thus defined

it. This finding, however, was clearly erroneous since Re-

spondents below admitted their conduct was joint. Thus,

Respondents’ ACI and Ryder agreed to form Ryd-Air

(Appellees’ Brief p. 9), which action was authorized by

ACI’s Board (Id., pp. 9-10), which, in turn represented its

airline owners (Id., p. 19 n.). Finally, the ACI-Ryd-Air

contract itself, as well as Appellee’s own Brief (p. 10),

described ACI as “agent for . . . the Air Carriers”.

The District Court apparently read the Second Circuit’s

recent decision in Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579

F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 340

(1978) (Justices Brennan, White and Blackmun dissenting),

as controlling this case.* Oreck, Sissies was a single

(footnote continued from preceding p page)

ACI, which itself controlled Ryd-Air. Sueh horizontal industry-

wide ownership of a vertically integrated entity but contributes to

the trade-restraining nature of the Ryd-Air venture.

* While Petitioner does not regard Oreck as controlling, we

note that the Circuits have split on the question of whether a

per se violation is made out when a manufacturer (or a supplier)

and a customer arrange together for the manufacturer or supplier

to eliminate another customer in favor of the first. Compare,

Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir.

1979) with Oreck, supra and Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster

Motor Car Co., 248 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dented, 355 U.S.

822 (1957). If the analogy to Oreck is controlling, then the split

in Cireuits should be resolved.

13

manufacturer-distributor termination case. See Comment,

Vertical Agreements to Terminate Competing Distributors,

92 Harv. L. Rev. 1160 (1979). Petitioner does not dispute

that each individual airline, acting independently, could

legally have terminated any ACI trucker and substituted

another. United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919).

However, the airlines—themselves competitors with each

other for air freight business—could not legally agree to

eliminate competition at the pick-up and delivery level by

agreeing to do business with only one trucker of their

_ mutual choice (and creation). This is because:

“[T Jhe illegality consists, not in the separate action of

each, but in the conspiracy and combination of all to

prevent any of them from dealing with the [targets].”

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531,

545 (1978).

The airline combination was horizontal at two levels.

First, at the airline level, each airline could not compete

with all the others in the pick-up and delivery of air freight

(both as to price and service). Such a result was illegal.

United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611

(1972). Second, at the trucker level, although “the boy-

cotters and the ultimate target need not be in a competitive

relationship with each other,” St. Paul Fire and Marie Ins.

Co., supra, at 543 (collecting cases), the airi.nes and Ryder

entered the truckers’ market by creating a new trucking

company, and through the exclusive ACI-Ryd-Air con-

tract, prevented any other company from working as an

airline trucker. The boycott of independent truckers was

thus carried out by a combination of three levels of

separate business entities—the airlines, ACI, and Ryd-Air.

See Klor’s supra, 359 U.S. at 213; L. Sullivan, Antitrust,

231 n. 1 (1977). However, unlike Klor’s, this was more

than a group boyeott of several traders; it was effectively

a cartel of the whole industry. See Paramount Famous

Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930); United

14

States v. First National Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930) ;

Sullivan, Antitrust at 257 (1977).

The industry-wide collective action by the Respondents

is not saved by its purported lack of an illegal motive.*®

Even though the District Court found that there was no

“sinister anti-competitive intent,’ this Court has held in

a group boycott case:

“Where businessmen concert their actions in order

to deprive others of access to merchandise which the

latter wish to sell to the public, we need not inquire

into the economic motivation underlying their conduct.”

United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146

(1966).

The airline combination in the Ryd-Air venture thus

was a group boycott, or refusal to deal, because it con-

stituted an organized industry-wide combination which de-

prived all other truckers from doing pick-up and delivery

work for any domestic airline.

This Court is respectfully requested to examine this

powerful combination of ACI and its airline owners, es-

pecially since the ACI-airline combination has continued

to interfere with the trucking industry throughout the

nation.

Indeed, in 1975, the airlines, through ACI, actively in-

stigated the acquisition of one local trucking company by

* The lack of anti-competitive motive on the part of the manu-

facturers and distributors in Klor’s was irrelevant. As noted by

the Fifth Cireuit in F.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated

Air Tour Manual Committee, 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973).

“Since the effect of the agreement was to drive Klor’s out of

competition with Broadway [another retailer], the Court found

the three-cornered agreement illegal per se notwithstanding

the fact that the manufacturers and wholesalers, not in eom-

petition with Klor’s probably had no such anticompetitive

motive.” (Id., 467 F.2d at 187) (Emphasis added).

15

another, for the alleged purpose of insuring that ACI’s

revenues be maintained and enhanced. Jim Cain vy, Air

Cargo, Inc., swpra. The Ninth Circuit in that case re-

versed the District Court’s granting of summary judg-

ment in favor of ACI, and held that such conduct was

not within the scope of the authority given by the CAB

to ACI and the airlines. The Court stated:

‘‘In Breen, prior to awarding the contract, ACI

involved itself in the horizontal organization of the

freight-hauling industry by affiliating with Plaintiffs’

competitor to establish its own trucking firm.’’ Jim

Cain, supra (typescript copy, p. 6).

ACI’s expansions beyond mere supervision of contracts

into actual involvement in the air freight trucking business

in New York City (via the Ryd-Air venture) and in Los

Angeles (by instigating acquisitions) are not isolated. As

already noted, ACI itself took over the pick-up and de-

livery service in New York in 1973, by forming the ‘‘New

York Trucking Division’’ of ACI—again without notifying

the CAB. In 1978, the ‘‘New York Trucking Division’’—

an organ of all the airlines, designated itself as the trucker

for all of the domestic airlines for Long Island, in the face

of competitive “bids” for this contract by truly inde-

pendent truckers. Likewise, throughout the nation ACI

acts virtually dictatorially in cities where it can designate

itself as the exclusive cartage agent for all airlines to the

exclusion of all independent truckers. Once ACT does the

pick-up and delivery for all the airlines in an area, it can-

not help but eliminate rate and service competition among

the airlines in the pick-up and delivery of air freight.

B. The Airlines Through the Ryd-Air Venture

Engaged in Industry-Wide Price-Fixing of

Pick-Up and Delivery Rates

By the formation of Ryd-Air, which became the exclu-

sive trucking agent for all domestic airlines in New York

City, Respondents directly fixed uniform industry-wide

16

prices to their shipping customers for the service of air

freight trucking.

Prior to Ryd-Air’s creation, the airlines could and did

vary the prices charged to their customers for pick-up

and delivery of air freight, since the cost to them was

determined by the competitive interplay of free market

forces resulting from the varying rates charged to them

by independent truckers such as Petitioner.

Effective October 1, 1970—when Ryd-Air began its op-

erations—price competition among the airlines was elimi-

nated. Rates rose dramatically from $3.85 to $5.00 for

minimum shipments and soon were raised yet another

20%—to $6.00, effective January 1, 1971. By December 1,

1971, the minimum again was raised to $6.60, once again

with industry-wide price uniformity. And, since all the

airlines were parties to the same ‘‘contract” with Ryd-Air,

each airline was assured that none of its competitors

could undereut it, either as to the rates charged or the

services provided.

ACI’s automatic power to raise rates for pick-up and

delivery service during the Ryd-Air period® for all the

airlines—a power hitherto forbidden by the CAB—was

thus exercised to insure that the airline-stockholders of

ACI did not lose money on Ryd-Air, which was guaranteed

a profit.**

* This power was enhanced in 1973 when ACT itself directly

took over the New York City pick-up and delivery operation as

“the New York Trucking Division.” By 1976, the minimum rates

had almost tripled.

** Incredibly, although ACI (which was required to file rate

increases with the CAB) reported to the CAB at length the eco-

nomic difficulties of its New York trucker—Ryd-Air—it studiously

concealed the fact that it was was an owner of Ryd-Air. Rather,

ACI deseribed itself as dealing with “independent motor carriers.”

Furthermore, it conveniently omitted telling the CAB that Ryd-Air

was guaranteed a 5% profit by the airlines.

17

As this Court only recently repeated:

“Price is the ‘central nervous system of the

economy,’ United States v. Socony-Vacuum Ou Ce.,

310 U.S. 150, 226 n. 59, 60 S. Ct. 811, 845, 84 L. Ed.

1129, and an agreement that, ‘interefere[s] with the

setting of price by free market forces’ is illegal on

its face. United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S.

333, 337, 89 S. Ct. 510, 512, 21 L. Ed. 2d 526.’’

National Society of Professional Engimeers, 435 U.S. 679,

692 (1978).

The Ryd-Air venture’s effect on price competition

among the airlines was quite similar to, but far more

egregious than that in United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S.

350 (1967), where the Sealy Company, owned by approxi-

mately thirty Sealy “licensees,’’ manufactured and sold

Sealy-named mattresses at pre-set prices. As the Court

stated, “this flagrant and pervasive price-fixing . . . was

. . the activity of the ‘stockholder representatives’ act-

ing through and in collaboration with Sealy mechanisms.

This underlines the horizontal nature of the enterprise, and

the use of Sealy, not as a separate entity, but as an

instrumentality of the individual manufacturers.” Jd., 388

U.S. at 355-56 (emphasis added). ACI (and Ryd-Air)

similarly were nothing but instrumentalities of their airline

owners.

Unfortunately, the District Court did not rule on Peti-

tioner’s price-fixing claim and the Second Circuit’s sum-

mary affirmance leaves the Court (and the industry)

without any insight into its reasoning. Nevertheless, as-

suming that the District Court viewed the price-fixing

conduct of Respondents as permissible under the Rule of

Reason, such a holding is manifestly in error. Only last

term, this Court made clear that even in the face of a

purportedly noble reason for a restriction on price com-

petition, any attempt at justification under the Rule of

Reason is still restricted solely to a consideration of its

18

impact on competitive conditions. National Society of

Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).

Clearly, the instant case has the industry-wide control

of prices by anticompetitive activities of the participants

—ostensible competitors—that this Court enjoined in

National Society.

POINT TWO

The relevant market is the service of pick-up and

delivery for all the Airlines in New York City.

The District Court, in dismissing AFH’s monopoliza-

tion claim under Section Two of the Sherman Act* and

its claim under Section Seven of the Clayton Act, based its

decision upon a finding that the relevant service market

consisted of ‘‘the ground transportation of air freight to

and from the Metropolitan New York airports.” (6a).

The Court also found that ‘‘this service is provided, with-

out significant differences, by air freight forwarders, in-

dependent contractors, house truckers, as well as ACI”

Id.

Because the District Court analyzed the relevant market

question from the viewpoint of all potential air freight

shippers, rather than the viewpoint of the airlines who

contract, through ACI, with truckers to offer a total

door-to-door air freight service, Petitioner submits the

District Court erred in dismissing Petitioner’s monopoli-

zation claim.**

* The District Court never decided Petitioner’s claim of con-

spiracy to monopolize under Section Two.

** It is not necessary to assert that the District Court’s specific

findings of fact, or all of them, were “clearly erroneous” on the

issue of relevant market. Rather, on an uncontroverted record,

Petitioner submits that the District Court misapplied the appro-

priate legal standards, thereby compelling reversal. See United

States v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 666 (1974).

19

The factual difficulty apparently encountered by the Dis-

trict Court was that shippers of air freight have other

means, besides the ACI truckers, of getting their freight

to the airline cargo terminals at the airports. Thus, air

freight forwarders, independent (non-ACI) truckers and

house truckers (working for a given shipper), deal di-

rectly with shippers. The ACI trucking service, on the

other hand, is a trucking service provided under contract

to the airlines, who included this service in their door-to-

door air freight service to shippers.

The actual carriage of goods by air is, in all instances,

performed by CAB-certified airlines. However, very dis-

tinct (and separately regulated) boundaries divide the

different trucking services which cart goods to the airport.

Air freight forwarders, which handle the majority of air

freight and are denominated by the law as ‘‘indirect air

earriers,’’ consolidate shipments of their various shippers

to achieve bulk rates, and arrange for consolidated ship-

ments to be flown by a direct air carrier—an airline. An

air freight forwarder also assumes total responsibility to

the shipper to whom it issues its own air waybill for the

shipment door-to-door, providing its own pick-up and de-

livery service.

When an airline makes a “door-to-door” contract with a

shipper, the airline issues its own air waybill and delegates

the pick-up and delivery task to its ACI trucker, which has

no direct relationship with the shipping public, acting in-

stead solely as the airline’s agent.

While air freight forwarders and truckers might have

individual contracts with shippers, the ACI truckers’ cus-

tomers are, in fact, the airlines not the shippers. Indeed,

the ACI truckers are paid by the airlines, through ACI.

The ACI trucker’s geographic jurisdiction and schedules

are set by the airlines and ACI pick-up and delivery rates

are filed with the CAB by the airlines.

20

Finally, the ACI trucking service alone provides for

door-to-door liability by the airline for the shipment. The

ACI trucker picking up the shipment, as agent for airlines,

executes an air waybill for the airline—an authority not

given other truckers or forwarders. This airline liability

for shipments carried by the ACI trucker is regulated

by the CAB.

The ACI trucker, as the airline’s agent, is in essence,

providing a dual service primarily to its airline, which

requires a trucker to pick-up and deliver shipments it con-

tracted for directly with shippers—but also to the shipper

itself, which needs a method of transporting freight to

the airport, but which deals with the airline alone in obtain-

ing such service.

Petitioner asserted that the ACI trucking market was

monopolized by the airlines and Ryd-Air. Indeed, the

District Court noted that, on Petitioner’s theory of relevant

market, it is “inescapable that ACI has a monopoly”.*

Nevertheless, the District Court ignored the dual nature of

the service provided by airline truckers and chose a

relevant market viewpoint of all potential shippers. This

was clearly incorrect. Cass Student Advertising, Inc., 516

F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1976).

Cass dealt with a service industry consisting of the sale

of advertising space in college newspapers to national

*The District Court apparently viewed the relevant market

question as dispositive of all Petitioner’s claims (including Section

One of the Sherman Act), since it stated:

“T believe that the ease should be approached—the decider

of the case should approach it first from the point of view

of determining what the relevant market is.

“We don’t need to get to the question of immunity, for

example, if the relevant market is not what the plaintiff con-

tends it is. If I decide that the plaintiff is correct in that

regard, then we certainly have to get to the immunity question

because by definition it seems almost inescapable that ACT has

a monopoly of the market which is the relevant market.”’

—-

21

advertisers. Plaintiff Cass charged that defendant Na-

tional, which represented over eighty percent of the college

newspaper business largely through exclusive contracts,

had monopolized this market. National was the exclusive

representative of the newspapers it served in soliciting

advertising from national advertisers. The District Court

in Cass noted that the service of the defendant National

was only one method by which national advertisers could

reach college students—since college newspapers are

theoretically in competition with other types of newspapers,

television, and &ll other media. The District Court thus

concluded that national advertisers had significant alterna-

tives to college newspapers for reaching the college student

market and concluded that the relevarit market was “all

modes of communication used to present national advertis-

ing to college students” rather than the narrower market

suggested by plaintiff: (“the market for representing col-

lege newspapers in the placement of national advertising’’).

The Seventh Circuit reversed,* relying on the principles

of United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours € Co., 351

U.S. 377 (1956), and the submarket principles of Brown

Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 394 (1962). The Seventh

Cireuit noted that the District Court had misunderstood

- the ‘‘dual nature’’ of the services offered by Cass and

National. By viewing only the national advertisers as

“buyers” of the service—and ignoring the fact that the

college newspapers were also “buyers’’ of the service—

the District Court incorrectly chose an overly large rele-

vant market.

The Court of Appeals observed that, in the context of

the factual situation in Cass, “it may not be easy for a

Court to choose one of the ‘end’ parties as the sole

purchaser of the middleman’s services” (/d., 516 F.2d

at 1098) but concluded that:

‘*It is conceivable that both end parties in a middle-

* The late Mr. Justice Clark sat on the panel.

22

man market could be purchasers of the middleman’s

services. In such cases, two relevant market deter-

minations might be necessary. For example, if this

case were viewed as a dual purchaser case, the district

court’s opinion would represent a finding that [Na-

tional] has no market power with respect to its national

advertiser customers. The question would remain open

whether [National] has market power among the other

purchasers of its services, college newspapers seeking

national advertising. It would therefore be possible

for a middleman to lack the requisite market power

in one direction while achieving a complete strangle-

hold in the other direction.

Id., 516 F.2d at 1098-99 (Emphasis added).

The Court then went on to note that National’s primary

relationship began, and continued, with the college news-

papers, with which it made ‘‘exclusive arrangements’? and

by which it was paid. Applying the submarket indicia

of Brown Shoe, the Court of Appeals found that the busi-

ness of providing representation was a ‘‘specialized ven-

dor,’’ that the college newspapers were ‘‘distinct

customers,’’ that there was ‘‘industry recognition of the

submarket,’’ and ‘‘distinet prices.’’ Jd., 516 F.2d at 1099-

1100.*

In the instant ease, the District Court failed to make

just such an analysis. First, since ACI truckers work

under contract for the airlines, the airlines themselves are

the ‘‘distinct customers’’ of the ACI truckers, who are

prohibited from soliciting air freight trucking for them-

* The Court also relied on United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384

U.S. 563 (1966); International Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States,

358 U.S. 242 (1956); and United States v. Connecticut National

Bank, supra—all of which rejected assertions of a large market

paso? on the supposed interchangeability of products or services

offered.

23

selves.* Second, distinct prices” are charged by the ACI

truckers, to ACI, which then billed the airlines. ‘‘Public

recognition of the submarket’’ is present, since ACI

truckers, required to paint their trucks with the ACI logo

become ‘‘agents’’ of the airlines, and are not permitted

to solicit business on their own.

The District Court, viewing the ‘‘relevant market’’ from

the shippers’ viewpoint, thus ignored the real customer

of ACI trucking—the airlines themselves.

In surveying the difficulty of choices in the relevant

market analysis, a court

“would be remiss in selecting between two otherwise

appropriate product markets that one which, on anal-

ysis, will not reflect the full brunt of any and all anti-

competitive effects...”

United States v. Crowell, Collier & McMillan, 361 F.Supp.

983, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Tyler, J.).

Such an admonition is appropriate in this case, where

Sherman Section Two and Clayton Section Seven claims

are clearly applicable to this unprecedented industry-wide

combination and monopoly by all domestic airlines serv-

ing New York.

In analyzing the markets present here, two principal

modes of door-to-door air freight service under an air

waybill are available: either under that of a direct air

carrier (the airline) or that of an indirect air carrier

(the air freight forwarder), each separately defined and

licensed under statute and regulations by the CAB. The

airlines’ door-to-door service required a trucking com-

* Notably ACI, the airlines’ contracting agent, was the subject

of specific CAB regulation. As this Court has noted, an antitrust

market should ‘normally be defined by reference to the existing

regulatory framework.” United States v. Marine Bancorporation,

Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 642 (1974).

24

ponent, which, in New York City, was totally pre-empted

by the airlines’ own exclusive trucker, airline-owned,

profit-guaranteed and interlockingly directed. It follows

that, however denominated, the exclusive handling of air

freight in New York for all of the domestic airlines, by a

single airline-owned and controlled trucker, giving no ac-

cess to other truckers, is an illegal monopoly of a discrete

submarket. Legitimizing the airlines’ conduct in New

- York can only have serious implications for the rest of

the nation.

Summary

The Second Circuit’s countenancing cf the industry-wide

collective refusal to deal embodied in the Ryd-Air venture

together with the total fixing of uniform rates, is a serious

departure from the per se standards of liability established

by this Court in the above-cited cases. Certiorari should

be granted to ensure that the continuing industry-wide

illegal actions of the Respondents in New York and nation-

wide are dealt with by the Courts.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the petition for a

writ of certiorari should be granted.

Dated: New York, New York

July 5, 1979

Respectfully submitted,

Guy L. HermyemMann

866 United Nations Plaza

New York, New York 10017

(212) 753-1400

Attorney for Petitioner

Epwarp M. CurkorFsky,

Miiron Horowitz

Of Counsel

la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

Seconp Circuit

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Court-

house in the City of New York, on the 6th day of April,

one thousand nine hundred and seventy-nine.

Present: Hon. William H. Mulligan

Hon. William H. Timbers

Hon. Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland

Circuit Judges.

78-7557

Arr Freicut Havuuace Co., Inc.,

. Plaintiff-Appellant,

against

Ryp-Air, Ivc., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

a

sd

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of

record from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.

2a

On ConsmperaTION WHeEREOF, it is now hereby ordered,

adjudged, and decreed that the order and judgment of said

District Court be and it hereby is affirmed on the opinion

below of the Hon. Morris E. Lasker, 1978-2 CCH Trade

Cas. {] 62,321 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1978).

s/ Wim H. Mutuican

William H. Mulligan

s/ Wru1am H. Timsers

William H. Timbers

s/ ExvuswortH A. Van GRAAFEILAND

Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland

Filed: April 6, 1979

United States Court of Appeals

A. Daniel Fusaro, Clerk

3a

Opinion of District Court

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SourHern District or New York

’

71 Civ. 3428

+

7

Am Freicht Hautace Co., Lye.,

Plaintiff,

against

Ryp-Ar, Ivc., Am Carco, Inc., Ryper System, Inc., AMER-

ICAN AtRLINES, INc., EASTERN AIRLINES, Inc., NORTHEAST

Arrurnes, Inc., Arr Canapa, ALLEGHENY AIRLINE:, Inc.,

BranirF Airways, Inc., British Overseas Airways Corp.,

Detra Ar Lives, Inc., Fiyrne Ticer Lrvzs, Inc., Monawk

AruineEs, Inc., Nationau Arrways, Inc., New York ArrR-

ways, Inc., NorrHwest Arrives, Inc., OzarK Arr LINES,

Inc., Pan Amertcan Wortp Arrways, Ino., PIEDMONT

Aviation, Inc., Arrtirt INTERNATIONAL, Inc., SEABOARD

Worip Arrunes, Inc., SourHern Armways, Inc., Trans

Worwtp Arruines, Inc., Unrrep Ar Lings, Inc.,

Defendants.

y%

+

Lasker, D. J. Since 1947, Air Cargo, Ine. (ACT), has

provided terminal and cartage services on behalf of a

large number of airlines operating in the United States.

From 1957 until 1970, it employed Air Freight Haulage

as one of its cartage agents in the New York City area.

In 1970, ACI terminated its contracts with Air Freight

and its two other agents in New York City, Breen Air

Freight, Ltd., and Mereury Air Freight, Inc., and, to-

gether with Ryder Systems, Inc., formed a new entity,

Ryd-Air, to take over the pickup and delivery of air

4a

Opinion of District Court.

freight in this area. This arrangement lasted until Octo-

ber of 1973, when ACI terminated its contract with Ryd-

Air and began to conduct its own direct pickup and de-

livery service in New York City.

In or about 1971, Breen and Air Freight Haulage

brought separate suits against the defendants charging

them with violations of the antitrust laws. In the Breen

case, the defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that

the Civil Aeronautics Board had primary jurisdiction

over the dispute and that the operations of ACI were

immunized from the antitrust laws under the exception

contained in § 414 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S. C.

§ 1384. The motion was denied and the denial was af-

firmed on appeal. 470 F. 2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972). In

the case at hand the parties made cross-motions for

summary judgment, both of which were earlier denied.

Defendants’ motion was denied on the authority of Breen;

plaintiff’s because of residual factual disputes. Although

in their pretrial memoranda and at trial both parties laid

considerable emphasis on factual matters relating to the

immunity of the defendants from the antitrust laws, we

do not. determine that question because we find that the

plaintiff has not established by a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendants have violated Sections 1 or

2 of the Sherman Act or Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

Air Freight charges the defendants with conspiring to

monopolize and unreasonably restraining trade in the

trucking of air freight to and from New York City’s

major metropolitan airports in violation of Sections 1

and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §$1 & 2, and

Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. $18. Trial was

had to the court, and we now make the following findings

of fact and conclusions of law.*

* The findings of fact stipulated to by the parties are contained

in the Appendix to this opinion.

da

Opinion of District Court.

ACI concluded its contractual relationship with Air

Freight Haulage, Breen and Mercury because, by the

spring of 1969, it was experiencing severe problems with

its pickup and delivery service in New York’s Area A.

A large number of hijackings and truck heists had taken

place, (Bernhard, 262; Champley, 664; Miller, 817) ; claims

ratios almost doubled in a brief period and ACI in-

curred serious deficits (Bernhard, 262; Miller, 817). Offi-

cials at several of the airlines were “fed up” with the

service (Miller, 817), and found it “far, far below stand-

ard’’ (Milton, 737). ACI felt that the service lacked “the

proper image” and was not “according to [its] contractual

service requirement’? (Champley, 584). ACI therefore

decided to replace its current contractors with the legiti-

mate business purpose of improving the quality of its

pickup and delivery service.

ACI solicited proposals from ‘‘about every trucker in

the telephone directory in New York” (Bernhard, 349)

to replace its existing service but found none of the pro-

posals satisfactory (Bernhard, 349-50; Champley, 593-94).

At a meeting on March 12, 1970, the ACI Board of Di-

rectors decided to ask Ryder Systems, Inc., to submit a

proposal to take over the pickup and delivery service in

Area A. (Miller, 819) Later that spring, after ACI’s

management concluded that it was not feasible for ACI

itself to take over the pickup and delivery service (Ex-

hibit 7), the ACI Board of Directors decided to accept a

proposal by Ryder to form a subsidiary, Ryd-Air, to

perform the service (Miller, 819; Exhibit 7). On June 30,

1970, ACI entered into an agreement with Ryd-Air under

which Ryd-Air agreed, commencing October 1, 1970, to

provide pickup and delivery service for the airlines in

New York’s Area A on a cost plus 5% basis. (Exhibit 30)

Under an agreement with Ryder, ACI received a 20%

stock interest in Rvyd-Air and the right to elect two di-

6a

Opinion of District Court.

rectors to the Board of Directors of Ryd-Air. (Miller, 820;

Exhibit 88).

The contract between ACI and Ryd-Air provided that

ACI and the air carriers reserved the right “to employ

additional parties to compete with Contractor [Ryd-Air]

in providing pickup, delivery and transfer services for all

or any part of the air freight traffic moving between the

points covered by this Contract . . .” (Exhibit 30).

Ryd-Air consistently lost money while it acted as ACI’s

contractor (Bernhard, 448-50; Pelletier, 1105) and ex-

perienced a lower volume than the ACI contractors it re-

placed (Champley, 643). Because ACT found the service

provided by Ryd-Air costly and unsatisfactory, ACT

terminated its contract with Rvd-Air on October 1, 1973,

and since then has conducted, through its New York City

Trucking Division, its own pickup and delivery service to

the metropolitan New York airports from Area A.

The court makes the following findings of fact on the

issue of relevant market:

The parties agree that the relevant geographic market

is Area A of New York, which consists of the boroughs of

the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan and Queens.

The relevant product market in this case is the ground

transportation of air freight to and from the metropolitan

New York airports. The testimony establishes that this

service is provided, without significant differences, by

air freight forwarders, independent contractors, house

truckers, as well as ACI. A comparison of the alternatives

indicates that the following substantial similarities exist

between the services provided by the various carriers:

a. A shipper in Area A can ship to the airport by house

trucker, independent trucker (Hood, 860), freight for-

warder or by ACI (Groves, 996-997).

7a

Opinion of District Court.

b. A shipper in Area A can procure door-to-door service

whether he uses an air freight forwarder, an independent

trucker, his own house trucker, or an ACI contractor

(Cirami, 193; Groves, 1051, 1074; Hood, 840, 861).

e. An air freight shipment is likely to arrive at its

destination at approximately the same time, regardless of

whether the shipment is made through an air freight

forwarder, an independent trucker, a house trucker, or

ACI (Groves, 1002-04).

There is no evidence that the cost of shipment is greater

whether the shipment is made through a forwarder, in-

dependent, house trucker or ACI. There is no evidence

that the shippers in Area A, in practice, prefer the services

of the ACI contractor to those of any other carrier. To

the contrary, the credible testimony establishes that ACI

competes for customers with air freight forwarders, house

truckers, and independent truckers (McQuade, 545; Miller,

817, 822-23; Groves, 995-96, 1071; Hood, 860, 865, 878;

Smick, 979; Exhibit 33) and that there is cross-elasticity

of demand between ACI’s services and those of the other

carriers. For example, T. M. Miller, a former director of

ACI, testified that when the ACI contractors’ service was

deteriorating in the late 1960s, ACI was “losing sub-

stantial business to forwarders and other carriers . . .”

(Miller, 817) and Mr. George L. Groves, the President of

ACI, testified that, since 1968, ACT has steadily lost busi-

ness as its prices have gone up. We credit this testimony:

indeed, there is no evidence to the contrary. Accordingly,

on the basis of the evidence described above, we conclude

that the relevant product market consists of the services

of air freight forwarders, house truckers, independent

truckers and the ACI contractor in Area A.

The credible testimony establishes that from 1968 until

1977, the ACI contractors’ share of the relevant domestic

market never rose above 10.1%, which it achieved in 1969,

8a

Opinion of District Court.

In 1977, their share of the domestic market was 5.4%. The

ACI contractors’ share of the combined domestic and in-

ternational market during the same period reached a high

of 6.4% in 1968. In 1977, ACL’s share of this market was

2.6% (Groves, 1007-09; Exhibit E).

The barriers to entry in the air freight pickup and

delivery business in the relevant market are extremely

low. All that is necessary to enter the business.is a truck

and a driver (Groves, 1022-23; Cirami, 117-18, 175).

Air Freight Haulage has not established that the defend-

ants are guilty of an illegal combination or conspiracy in

restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman

Act. The plaintiff contends that the airlines jointly

decided to terminate the three ACI contractors and to

form Ryd-Air with Ryder Systems, thereby engaging in a

horizonta! combination to restrain trade which would con-

stitute a per se violation of Section 1. Although there was

some testimony that individual airlines were dissatisfied

with the service provided by the prior ACI contractors

(Air Freight Haulage, Breen and Mercury), there is no

evidence that the airlines, collectively, decided to terminate

such contractors. Rather, the evidence establishes that

ACI, the airlines’ independent subsidiary, was responsible

both for the initial decision to replace the contractors with

Ryd-Air and the subsequent decision to provide direct pick-

up and delivery service. Indeed, Air Freight Haulage

itself attempted to prove at trial, during the examination

of Mr. Lambert (Lambert, 557) and Mr. Miller (Miller,

825), that ACI alone was responsible for replacing the

earlier service in order to refute the contention of the

defendants that the airlines supervised and ratified the

decision and thus immunized the actions from the opera-

tion of the antitrust laws. (See Breen Air Freight v. Air

Cargo, Inc., 470 F. 2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972)).

Since there is no evidence that the airlines engaged in a

horizontal restraint of trade but only that ACI decided to

Ya

Opinion of District Court.

change its pickup and delivery service with the help of

Ryder Systems, the plaintiff's argument that a per se

violation of the antitrust laws is involved fails. In this

case, as in those involving the replacement of a distributor

by a single manufacturer, the actions in dispute should be

tested in light of their anticompetitive purpose or effect.

See Oreck Corporation v. Whirlpool Corporation and

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1978-1 CCH Trape Cases, § 62,026

(2d Cir. 1978); Ace Beer Distributors, Inc. v. Kohn, Inc.

318 F. 2d 283 (6th Cir. 1963).

The testimony at trial indicates that ACI terminated its

contracts with Air Freight Haulage, Breen and Mercury

not out of any “sinister anticompetitive intent”, Bushie v.

Stenocord Corp., 460 F. 2d 116, 120 (9th Cir. 1972), but

only to improve the quality of its pickup and delivery

service. There is no evidence that competition has lessened

among suppliers of pickup and delivery service in Area A

since 1970. To the contrary, the evidence at trial! indicated

that competition in this market is healthy and that ACI’s

share has actually decreased since the formation of Ryd-

Air. Moreover, Air Freight Haulage, even though it is no

longer one of ACI’s exclusive agents, remains a competitor

in the market. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff has not

established that ACI’s termination of Air Freight Haulage,

Breen and Mercury had an anti-competitive purpose or

effect in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Air Freight Haulage has failed to establish that ACI’s

use of Ryd-Air for pickup and delivery service and ACI’s

subsequent independent operation constituted monopoliza-

tion or an attempt to monopolize in violation of Section 2

of the Sherman Act or that this conduct substantially

lessened competition or tended to create a monopoly in

violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

To establish monopolization, it must be proven that the

defendants posseassed monopoly power in the relevant

10a

Opinion of District Court.

market and that this power was “willfully acquired” rather

than a natural development as a result of ‘‘a superior

product, business acumen or historical accident.” United

States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S. 563, 570-71 (1966). The

Supreme Court defines ‘‘monopoly power’’ as the “power

to control prices or exclude competition” and the “relevant

market” to include “commodities reasonably interchange-

able by consumers for the same purposes.” United States

v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U. S. 377, 395

(1956). As stated above, the evidence establishes that

the services of air freight forwarders, independent

truckers, house truckers and ACI are ‘reasonably inter-

changeable” services available to shippers in Area A. The

type of service provided by all four types of carriers is

substantially the same; there is no evidence that one pos-

sesses a cost or service advantage over the other; and

there is substantial evidence that ACI competes for cus-

tomers with the other three carriers and has suffered from

price and service competition from them in the past.

Although Air Freight Haulage argues that ACI’s pickup

and delivery service constitutes a submarket for purposes

of the antitrust laws, there is no evidence that the

characteristics of a submarket, as set out in Brown Shoe

v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 325 (1962), are present

here. Thus the plaintiff has failed to show that ACI’s

service enjoys ‘‘industry or public recognition” as a sub-

market, “peculiar characteristics and uses, distinct cus-

tomers” or “distinct prices”.

There is no evidence that the defendants possess monop-

oly power in this market. The testimony on market share

establishes that, during the last ten years, ACI has pos-

sessed, at most, only 10.1% of the domestic market for

ground transportation of air freight in Area A and, in

1977, possessed only 5.4% of this market. These figures

do not alone support an inference that ACI has the ability

to “exclude competition” or ‘‘control prices” within the

lla

Opinion of District Court.

market, and, in the absence of any other evidence in sup-

port of this contention, we reject the claim of monopoliza-

tion.

The plaintiff has also failed to establish an attempt to

monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

To prevail on such a claim, it is necessary to prove that

the defendants have the “specific intent to destroy com-

petition or build monopoly”, Times-Picayune v. United

States, 345 U. S. 594, 626 (1953), and a “dangerous

probability of success’, Lorain Journal v. United States,

342 U. S. 143, 153 (1952); Swift & Co. v. United States,

196 U. S. 357, 396 (1905); FILM Collision Parts, Ine. v.

Ford Motor Co., 543 F. 2d 1019, 1030 (2d Cir. 1976) ; Bowen

v. New York News, Inc., 522 F. 2d 1242, 1252 n. 7 (2d Cir.

1975). The testimony establishes that ACI terminated its

contracts with Air Freight Haulage, Breen and Mercury

because it was dissatisfied with the quality of service they

were providing and not as a result of any anti-competitive

motive. Moreover, the testimony on market share in-

dicates that, even if the defendants did have the requisite

intent, they were so far from achieving a monopoly as to

preclude a finding of “dangerous probability of success”,

the second part of the test for attempt. Accordingly, this

claim is also rejected.

Finally, there is no evidence that the formation of Ryd-

Air substantially lessened competition or tended to create

a monopoly in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

Indeed, the creation of Ryd-Air can be said to have in-

creased competition in the market since it added a new

carrier to the field while the former ACI contractors, Air

Freight Haulage, Breen and Mercury, remained in. busi-

ness. The cause of action is therefore dismissed.

For the reasons stated above, the plaintiff’s complaint

is dismissed in its entirety.

12a

Opinion of District Court.

It is so ordered.

Dated: New York, New York

October 10, 1978

8/ Morris E, Lasker

U.S.D.J.

Appendix

Under the pre-trial order herein dated March 31, 1977,

the parties have stipulated that the following facts are

not in dispute:

(1) Air Cargo, Ine. (“ACI”) was incorporated in 1941

in Delaware by several airlines. In 1943, ‘the activities

of ACI were discontinued and it was preserved by its

stockholders as a mere paper corporation,

(2) On March 1, 1947, seventeen airlines entered into

an agreement entitled “Agreement Among Certain Air

Carriers Relating to Air Cargo Services,” which agree-

ment (hereinafter the “ACI Agreement”) provided for

the reactivation of ACI. ACI is wholly owned by the

domestic airlines who own varying amounts of ACT stock.

The largest stockholders are American Airlines, Ine.,

Trans World Airlines, Inc., United Air Lines, Ine., East-

ern Airlines, Inc., and Delta Air Lines, Ine.

(3) The ACL Agreement was filed by the airlines with

the Civil Aeronautics Board on April 14, 1947.

(4) The Civil Aeronautics Board officially designated

the ACI Agreement as “Agreement C. A. B. No, 1041.”

On December 31, 1947, the Civil Aeronautics Board ap-

proved the ACI Agreement by its Order Serial Number

E-1086 pursuant to the provision of Section 412(b) of the

Civil Aeronautics Act, which section required the Board

to either approve or disapprove an agreement so filed.

13a

Opinion of District Court.

(5) Five amendments to C, A. B. No. 1041 were also

filed with the Civil Aeronauties Board, and each has been

approved by the Board, Amendments 1 and 2 by Order

Serial No, E-6913, dated October 24, 1952; Amendment 3

by Order Serial No. 6-9532 on August 30, 1955; Amend-

ment 4 by Order Serial No, -22044 dated April 6, 1965;

and Amendment 5 by Order 75-6-37 dated June 6, 1975.

(6) The initial undertaking by ACT toward implementa-

tion of the duties assigned to it by the airlines under

Agreement C. A. B, No. 1041 was to prepare a standard

form “Service Contract” to be used by ACT at each air-

port city for contracting with a loeal trucking company

to perform air freight pickup and delivery service for

the airlines serving that city.

(7) Salvatore Cirami, d/b/a Air Freight Haulage Co.,

first acted as an ACI contractor serving one or more of

the domestie airlines in the metropolitan New York City

area at JK International, LaGuardia and Newark air-

ports in 1957, After the incorporation of plaintiff Air

Freight Haulage Co., Ine., a New York corporation, it

succeeded, with the approval of ACI to the company’s

contracts, and continued the pickup and delivery of air

freight for one or more domestic airlines at these airports

until October 1, 1970.

(8) A Serviee Contract, between ACI and Salvatore

Cirami, d/b/a Air Freight Haulage, Co., dated May 1,

1957, and applicable to services in the New York City

area was filed with the C. A. B. along with other Service

Contracts. The Board assigned to that Service Contract

the designation “Agreement C. A. B. No. 10981.’’ On

August 9, 1957, by its Order Serial No. E-11546, the

Board approved the Service Contracts so filed, including

Agreement C. A. B. No. 10981 between Air Cargo, Ine.

and Salvatore Cirami.

l4a

Opinion of District Court.

(9) In 1958, a short-form Service Contract between ACI

and Salvatore Cirami, d/b/a Air Freight Haulage Co.

dated December 1, 1958, and assigned ‘‘Agreement C. A. B.

No. 12708,’’ was filed. The Board approved that Service

Contract and four subsequent amendments — thereto

(C. A. B. Order Nos. F-13601, F-14052, and E-15278).

(10) In 1960, the standard-form Service Contract was

again amended. A new Service Contract between Sal-

vatore Cirami, d/b/a Air Freight Haulage Co., and ACI

applicable to New York City was filed with the Board

and assigned Agreement C. A. B. No. 14470, and was

approved by the Board on August 26, 1960 (Order No.

B-15700).

(11) The Board, effective March 8, 1962, dispensed with

the requirements that agreements between certificated

route air carriers or indirect air carriers on the one hand

and surface motor carriers on the other hand fer pickup

and delivery of property be filed under Section 412 of the

Act. CAB Economie Regulations, § 289.3 (14 C. F. R.

Part 289).

(12) In addition to the ACI contract with Air Freight

Haulage Co., Inc. for pickup and delivery services in New

York City, ACI also throughout the same period had such

standard-form Service Contracts with two other local

motor carriers for such services in New York City—

Mercury Air Freight and Breen Air Freight.

(13) The Economic Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics

Board require that all rates and charges for pickup,

delivery, and transfer services provided by the airlines

for the public be published in tariffs filed with the Board-

(14 C. F. R. Parts 221.102 and 222.2). The rates so pub-

lished consist of two elements: first, the rate paid to the

contractor under the Service Contract, and second, the

administrative service charge of ACT.

15a

Opinion of District Court.

(14) At a meeting of the Board of Directors of ACI

on April 28, 1970, the Direetors voted.to enter into an

agreement with Ryder System, Ine. in which a new sub-

sidiary corporation would be formed to conduct pickup

and delivery services of air freight in New York City

Area A. The subsidiary created, called Ryd-Air, Inc.,

was created with Ryder System owning 80% of the out-

standing stock and ACI owning the remaining 20%, and

with ACI designating 2 of the 5 directors. The agreement

also called for Ryd-Air, Inc. to be paid for the services

on a cost plus 5% basis.

(15) The new service in New York City by Ryd-Air

was to commence October 1, 1970. On or about April 29,

1970, ACI served written notices of contract termination

upon the three ACT contractors in New York City (Air

Freight Haulage, Mercury and Breen).

(16) On June 30, 1970, ACI entered into ACI’s stand-

ard-form contract with Ryd-Air for the air freight cartage

services in New York City Area A commencing October 1,

1970.

(17) Ryd-Air commenced operations on October 1, 1970.

In the summer of 1972, ACI proposed to Ryder System

that ACI take over the management of Ryd-Air on Octo-

ber 1, 1972, and eliminate the 5% management fee. This

proposal was accepted by Ryder System. On October 1,

1973, ACI terminated its pickup and delivery contract

with Ryd-Air and commenced its own direct operation on

that date, which operation by ACI has continued to the

present. ,

l6a

Statutes.

Section One of the Sherman Act (in part), 15 U.S.C. § 1.

§ 1. Trusts, ctc., in restraint of trade illegal; exception of

resale price agreements; penalty

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or

otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce

among the several States, or with foreign nations, is

declared to be illegal... .

Section Two of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (in effect

in 1970).

§ 2. Monopolizing trade a misdemeanor; penalty

Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to

monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person

or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-

merce among the several States, or with foreign nations,

shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction

thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thou-

sand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year,

or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

Section Seven of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

§ 18. Acquisition by one corporation of stock of another

No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, di-

rectly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or

other share capital and no corporation subject to the juris-

diction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire

the whole or any part of the assets of another corpora-

tion engaged also in commerce, where in any line of com-

merece in any section of the country, the effect of such

acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or

to tend to create a monopoly.

17a

No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the

whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and

no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal

Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of

the assets of one or more corporations engaged in com-

merece, where in any line of commerce in any section of

the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or

assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting

of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen

competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.

Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1382

(in effect in 1970)

§ 1382. Pooling and other agreements; filing; approval by

Board

(a) Every air carrier shall file with the Board a true

copy, or, if oral, a true and complete memorandum, of

every contract or agreement (whether enforceable by provi-

sions for liquidated damages, penalties, bonds, or other-

wise) affecting air transportation and in force on the ef:

fective date of this section or hereafter entered into, or any

modification or cancellation thereof, between such air car-

rier and any other air carrier, foreign air carrier, or

other carrier for pooling or apportioning earnings, losses,

traffic, service, or equipment, or relating to the establish-

ment of transportation rates, fares, charges, or classifica-

tions, or for preserving and improving safety, economy,

and efficiency of operation, or for controlling, regulating,

preventing, or otherwise eliminating destructive, oppres-

sive, or wasteful competition, or for regulating stops, —

schedules, and character of service, or for other cooperative

working arrangements.

(b) The Board shall by order disapprove any such con-

tract or agreement, whether or not previously approved by

it, that it finds to be adverse to the public interest, or in

18a

violation of this chapter, and shall by order approve any

such contract or agreement, or any modification or cancella-

tion thereof, that it does not find to be adverse to the public

interest, or in violation of this chapter; except that the

Board may not approve any contract or agreement between

an air carrier not directly engaged in the operation of air-

craft in air transportation and a common carrier subject to

the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, governing the

compensation to be received by such common carrier for

transportation services performed by it.

Former Section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.

§ 1384 (in effect in 1970)

§ 1384. Legal restraints

Any person affected by any order made under sections

1378, 1379, or 1382 of this title shall be, and is hereby,

relieved from the operations of the ‘‘antitrust laws’’, as

designated in section 12 of Title 15, and of all other re-

straints or prohibitions made by, or imposed under, au-

thority of law, insofar as may be necessary to enable such

person to do anything authorized, approved, or required

by such order.

Present Section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.

§ 1384 (effective October 24, 1978)

§ 1384. Antitrust exemption

In any order made under section 1378, 1379, or 1382 of

this title, the Board may, as part of such order, exempt

any person affected by such order from the operations of

the ‘‘antitrust laws’’ set forth in subsection (a) of section

12 of Title 15 to the extent necessary to enable such per-

son to proceed with the transaction specifically approved

by the Board in such order and those transactions nee-

essarily contemplated by such order, except that the Board

may not exempt such person unless it determines that

such exemption is required in the public interest.

s\

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.