Opposition — Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. United States

Supreme Court brief1979

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No. 79-19

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

PAULEY PETROLEUM INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

WADE H. McCreEr, Jr.

Solicitor General

SANFORD SAGALKIN

Acting Assistant Attorney General

MYLES E. FLINT

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

Page

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CITATIONS

Cases:

Clark Grave Vault Co. v. United States,

Se BI IU ieicteeichcethincbicahdidneswidnieninciiibies 14

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141... 10

Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d

EE Aipibinicdpilia cin Ncaleteaindicighondnianaiabisicsindies sats 10, 12, 15

Statutes and regulations:

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of

19538, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C.

ES ae aa ee 2,3

© US.C, GEB(a) (1) on enceccccccccceccccsccenees. 12

80 C.P.R. 250.48 (b) ............ccccccccccceoceo.-ce 7

80 C.F.R. 250.48 (@) ooecccecccccccccccececccecceee. 7

Miscellaneous:

6 A. Corbin on Contracts (1962) .............. 14

34 Fed. Reg. (1969) :

p. 7381 (May 7, 1969) 20...

p. 7383 (May 7, 1969) 0.00...

p. 18544 (August 22, 1969) ...........

p. 18547 (August 22, 1969) ..............

Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Tent.

Draft No. 9, 1974) ooeceececcccccccccececeeceee 14

IANA

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 79-19

PAULEY PETROLEUM INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Claims (Pet. App. A-1

to A-35) is reported at 591 F.2d 1308. The Court of

Claims’ findings of fact (Pet. App. A-37 to A-40,

A-43 to A-334) are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Claims was entered

on January 24, 1979 (Pet. App. A-1) and a timely

(1)

2

motion for rehearing was denied on April 6, 1979.

The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on

July 5, 1979. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-

voked under 28 U.S.C. 1255(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Department of the Interior

breached a lease contract with petitioners, or whether

petitioners were injured, when the Department de-

clined to rule on their application to drill an explora-

tory well in the Santa Barbara channel because peti-

tioners had failed to submit all technical data neces-

sary to enable the Department to review their appli-

cation following a serious oil spill in the channel, and

where petitioners had abandoned any intention of

drilling the well soon after they filed their application.

2. Whether this Court should consider whether

state law or federal regulations promulgated under

the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.

1331-1343, govern the liability of a lessee to third

parties for damages resulting from an oil spill on

the lessee’s tract even though the present case does

not involve an oil spill on petitioners’ leased tracts

and resolution of the choice-of-law question would

have no bearing on petitioners’ substantive claims of

breach or frustration of their lease agreement.

3

STATEMENT

Petitioners are members of a consortium of oil

corporations that acquired two oil and gas leases of

submerged lands in the Santa Barbara Channel off

the coast of California in 1968.1 The leases were

issued by the Department of the Interior pursuant

to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1958, ch.

345, 67 Stat. 462-471, 43 U.S.C. 1331-1343.

After the leases were acquired, petitioners or their

predecessors in interest conducted extensive explora-

tory drilling operations on the leased acreage. No oil

or gas was found in commercially usable quantities

in any of the eight exploratory wells drilled by peti-

tioners. The results were discouraging and caused

several members of the consortium to express reluct-

ance about further exploratory drilling, to sell their

interests or to offer to sell their interests, or to write

off a substantial part of their investment by early

1969 (Findings 66(c)-(i), 78(j) and 79, Pet. App.

A-221 to A-226, A-328 to A-329, A-330 to A-333).

1 At the time this litigation was initiated those companies

holding interests in the leases were Pauley Petroleum, Inc.,

Colorado Oil and Gas Corporation, Mesa Petroleum Company,

McCulloch Oil Corporation of California, J. M. Huber Corpo-

ration, Husky Oil Company, Midwest Oil Corporation, Ke-

wanee Oil Corporation and Forest Oil Company. Of these

only Pauley, Colorado Oil and Gas, Mesa, McCulloch, Huber

and Husky initiated the action. The remaining companies

were joined as involuntary plaintiffs and, although~ they

adopted the original petitioners’ case, did not participate at

trial. At this time only Pauley, Colorado Oil and Gas (now

Derby Refining Company), Mesa, McCulloch, Husky and

MacDonald (now Adobe Oil and Gas Corporation) have

petitioned for certiorari. ‘

4

A major environmental emergency occurred on

January 28, 1969, when a well on a nearby tract

leased by Union Oil Company of California blew out.

The blow-out created a 50-mile square oil slick and

coated the shores of Santa Barbara Channel with oil

(Pet. App. A-4; Finding 71(a), Pet. App. A-285 to

A-286).

The Department of the Interior initiated three pro-

grams to cope with the particular disaster and to

insure against similar spills in the future. First,

engineers and scientists were directed to determine

the cause of the blow-out and to stop the flow of oil.

Second, another group of experts was assigned to

review and, where necessary, modify all relevant

regulations and orders. A third group was assigned

to review geological and geophysical information on

each lease in tie Santa Barbara Channel to ascertain

if operations could be safely conducted thereon (Find-

ing 72(d), Pet. App. A-291; Findings 75-77, Pet.

App. A-302 to A-317). While these efforts were in

process, petitioners filed an application on February

11, 1969, to drill a new well on one of their leases

(Pet. App. A-6, A-7; Finding 71(b), Pet. App.

A-286).

On February 20, 1979, a meeting was held in

Washington with oil industry representatives to dis-

cuss proposed changes in Outer Continental Shelf

(OCS) Orders pertaining to drilling procedures in

response to the Secretary’s directive that existing

regulations and orders be reviewed. Petitioners previ-

ously had received copies of the proposed changes,

and petitioners’ representative commented on the

proposed changes at the meeting (Finding 75(b),

Pet. A-303 to A-304).

On February 21, the Secretary published in the

Federal Register a regulation concerning lessees’ re-

sponsibility for oil spills occurring on their leases

(Pet. App. A-5 to A-6; Finding 75(g), Pet. App.

A-306 to A-308).’ Petitioners apparently interpreted

this regulation to impose absolute liability, not only

for the costs of cleaning up oil spills, but also for

damage caused to third parties (Pet. App. A-6; Find-

ing 78(a), Pet. App. A-317 to A-318).

In furtherance of his directive that technical data

pertaining to the Santa Barbara channel be reviewed

on a lease-by-lease basis, the Secretary sent a tele-

gram on March 1, 1969, to all lessees of tracts in the

channel requesting them to furnish all available

geological, geophysical and structural information to

the regional supervisor in Los Angeles. The telegram

noted that this information was in addition to that

required under existing regulations with respect to

wells, platforms, and other matters (Finding 77(c),

Pet. App. A-312 to A-313).

At a March 12, 1969, meeting of the operating

committee responsible for petitioners’ operations,

most of the members present stated that they would

* The regulation (Pet. App. G) provided that if the high

seas are polluted by the drilling or production operations

of a lessee in a manner that threatens damage to wildlife

or public or private property, “control and removal of the

pollutant and the reparation of any damage, to whomsoever

occuring, proximately resulting therefrom shall be at the

expense of the lessee.”

6

not participate in the drilling of another well as long

as the regulation promulgated by the Secretary on

February 21 remained in effect. The members also

discussed the possibility of filing a lawsuit against

the United States. Finally, the members decided that

the question of furnishing additional information to

the regional supervisor as requested in the March 1

telegram would be held in abeyance pending a de-

cision regarding the proposed lawsuit (Finding

78(a), Pet. App. A-317 to A-319). On March 17, a

representative of petitioners wrote the regional super-

visor asking him to confirm petitioners’ understand-

ing that the additional information requested had to

be furnished only if and when they requested another

drilling permit on one of their leases. On March 20,

the regional supervisor notified petitioners of the

nature of the information required under the Secre-

tary’s March 1 telegram and confirmed that this addi-

tional information would be required only before

applications to drill additional wells could be ap-

proved (Findings 78(c) and (d), Pet. App. A-320

to A-323).

On March 28, 1969, the Secretary issued OCS

Order No. 10 establishing more stringent require-

ments for casing, cementing, mud drilling, and blow-

out procedures (Pet. App. A-7; Finding 75(e), Pet.

App. A-305 to A-306). This order was issued as

part of the review of OCS Orders the Secretary had

directed in response to the January 28 oil spill.

On April 9, 1969, petitioners filed the complaint in

this action, noting that the Secretary’s promulgation

7

of the February 21 regulation (which they inter-

preted to impose absolute liability for oil spills) had

“rendered it economically and practically impossible”

for petitioners to continue further drilling or produc-

tion operations under their leases (Finding 78(h),

Pet. App. A-326 to A-327). However, as the Court

of Claims noted (Pet. App. A-17), the February

regulation appears to have been under continuous

review in the Department of the Interior. In early

May, the Department announced a set of proposed

amendments to the OCS regulations. These included

a proposed new 30 C.F.R. 250.43(b) that restated

the substance of the regulation published on Febru-

ary 21. 34 Fed. Reg. 7381, 7383 (May 7, 1969).

In response to a number of comments received re-

flecting confusion about the meaning of that pro-

vision, the Department of the Interior promulgated a

new 30 C.F.R. 250.43(c) in August providing that

the “lessee’s liability to third parties, other than for

cleaning up the pollutant in accordance with para-

graph (b) of this section shall be governed by ap-

plicable law. 34 Fed. Reg. 13544, 18547 (August 22,

1969).

Petitioners never submitted all information the

regional supervisor stated in his March 20 letter was

required to be submitted and never amended their

February 11 drilling application to comply with OCS

Order No. 10 issued by the Secretary on March 28.

Based on this and other evidence, the trial judge

found that petitioners did not intend after mid-March

to conduct further drilling operations on their leases

8

because of the issuance of the February 21 regulation

“and that this is the reason why they failed to pursue

the Department of the Interior’s clearance procedures

to permit future drilling operations, and why they

failed to file an application for a permit to do further

drilling in compliance with the requirements of OCS

order No. 10” (Finding 78(k), Pet. App. A-329 to

A-330). Petitioners did not take exception to this

finding.

Petitioners’ complaint in the court below alleged

four causes of action. In their primary cause of

action, they alleged that the Secretary’s issuance of

the February 21, 1969 regulation concerning the

responsibilities of a lessee for oil spills had made it

commercially impossible for petitioners to operate un-

der the leases, thereby giving rise to a claim of frus-

tration. The second cause, premised on the same facts

as the claim of frustration, was that there had been

a mutual mistake of law as to the standard of lessee

liability to third parties and that petitioners could

rescind the contract as a result. The third cause of

action was for breach of contract based on the Febru-

ary 21 regulation, the failure of the Secretary to

approve petitioners’ February 11 drilling application,

and the clearance procedure for reviewing leases on a

case-by-case basis, which petitioners characterized as

a camouflage for an indefinite suspension of drilling.

In the final cause of action, petitioners alleged that

the United States had by its actions taken petitioners’

leasehold interests. The Court of Claims, after a

lengthy trial and receipt of extensive briefs and find-

\

9

ings of the Trial Judge, found against petitioners on

each count and dismissed their petition. Petitioners

do not press their mutual mistake and taking con-

tentions in this Court (Pet. 25 n.* * *).

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioners contend (Pet. 37-46) that the gov-

ernment breached the lease agreement by failing to

approve their application for additional drilling filed

February 11, 1969, improperly relying on petitioners’

failure to comply with the lease-by-lease clearance

procedure established by the Secretary in the wake of

the January 28 oil spill. This argument, however, is

foreclosed by the uncontested finding of fact, quoted

above, that petitioners did not intend after mid-

March to conduct further drilling operations on their

tracts and for this reason failed to pursue the In-

terior Department’s clearance procedures or to file an

amended drilling application to comply with the new

drilling standards in OCS Order No. 10, issued on

March 28, 1969. This finding is fully supported by

the record (Pet. App. A-22). Accordingly, petition-

ers cannot now assert that they were injured by the

Department’s clearance procedure or by the failure

of the Department to approve their drilling appli-

cation.

Moreover, as the Court of Claims noted (Pet. App.

A-25), the serious blow-out at the Union Oil well on

January 28 fully warranted a reasonable suspension

of drilling in the Santa Barbara Channel pending the

gathering and evaluation of additional technical data

10

about leases in the channel. See also Sun Oil Co. v.

United States, 572 F.2d 786, 802 (Ct. Cl. 1978);

Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morion, 493 F.2d 141, 146 (9th

Cir. 1973).

The Secretary moved expeditiously to establish the

mechanism for the review. By March 1, the Secretary

had sent telegrams to all lessees in the channel re-

questing additional information, and by March 28,

1969, the Secretary had issued OCS Order No. 10

establishing more stringent standards for drilling

new wells. The lease-by-lease clearance procedure was

designed to precede and provide necessary background

information for the review of subsequent applications

for permits to drill on each lease. The clearance of a

particular lease and the approval of an application

to drill under that lease could therefore not proceed

until the lessee had furnished the information re-

quested in the March 1 telegram (Finding 77 (h), Pet.

App. A-316 to A-317).

Petitioners did not submit any of the requested

data to the regional supervisor until April 4, more

n a month after the telegram requesting the data

was sent to all lessees, and they never zubmitted all

necessary information to the Interior Department or

amended their application to conform to OCS Order

No. 10. The record establishes that these failures by

petitioners were the reason their February 11 drilling

application was not approved (Finding 77(i), Pet.

App. A-317).

11

Petitioners’ correspondence with the regional su-

pervisor during this period made no mention of the

February 11 application, and instead created the im-

pression that petitioners were only concerned about

the need to submit the newly requested information

should they choose to submit an application at a later

date (Findings 78(c)-(h), Pet. App. A-320 to A-

327). And after the present lawsuit was abruptly

begun on April 9, 1969—when petitioners alleged

that further drilling on their lease was impossible—

the Department of the Interior “could rightly assume

(particularly since [petitioners] did not indicate

otherwise) that the February 11th drilling applica-

tion was no longer being pressed” (Pet. App. A-26).

Because of the court’s finding that petitioners did

not, and did not intend to, press their February 11

drilling application, they cannot complain of the De-

partment’s clearance procedure that was made ap-

plicable to lessees who did submit new applications or

seek to resume operations at existing wells.

In any event, there is no basis for petitioners’ con-

tention that the clearance procedure was a bureau-

cratic facade to conceal a departmental decision to

shut down drilling operations altogether. A task force

was promptly created to analyze technical data on

each leased tract to determine whether production

operations shut down by order of the Secretary on

February 7 could be resumed and whether explora-

tory drilling could be conducted safely on other tracts

should applications for such drilling be filed (Find-

ing 77(b), Pet. App. A-312). Clearance was granted

12

by April 1, 1969, to four of the five tracts of other

lessees whose production operations had been suspend-

ed immediately after the oil spill, and clearance for

the fifth lessee was subsequently granted (Pet. App.

A-26 to A-27; Sun Oil Co. v. United States, supra,

572 F.2d at 797-800).

Although petitioners now contend (Pet. 41-46)

that the Department failed to inform them of what

was required to comply with this clearance procedure

and that they were injured as a result, the court

below expressly found that petitioners did promptly

learn of the lease clearance requirements and proce-

dures and were informed by the regional supervisor

that submission of the additional technical informa-

tion requested in the Secretary’s March 1 telegram

was a prerequisite to consideration of drilling appli-

cations (Findings 78(b) and (c), Pet. App. A-319

to A-320). Because they had actual notice of these

essentials of the lease-by-lease review and drilling

application procedures, they have no basis to complain

that the Secretary should have published this infor-

mation. 5 U.S.C. 552(a) (1).

Moreover, the court below further found that In-

terior officials were prepared to and did contact and

meet with other lessees of tracts in the Santa Barbara

Channel to explain the clearance procedure in greater

detail, to request additional information, and to re-

view information furnished (Finding 77(f), Pet.

App. A-314 to A-315). But petitioners did not pur-

sue the clearance procedure or comply with the thresh-

old requirement of submitting complete geological

13

data, of which they were aware (Pet. App. A-27 to

A-28). The reason for this, no doubt, may be found

in the Court of Claims’ well-supported evidentiary

finding that petitioners never intended after mid-

March to pursue drilling in the channel.

2. Petitioners also ask the Court to consider

whether a lessee’s liability for injury to third parties

caused by an oil spill on the lessee’s tract is governed

by state law or federal regulations issued under the

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (Pet. 3-4, 46-

50). However, petitioners present this issue in the

abstract, suggesting only that it would be useful for

the Court to address it in view of the substantial

number of oil and gas leases on the outer continental

shelf, without indicating why the issue is of any

importance in this particular case. They do not as-

sert, for example, that any spill has resulted from

drilling on their leased tracts. Petitioners’ failure to

elaborate on the reasons why the Court should con-

sider this choice-of-law question is understandable

because, as explained below, that question had no

bearing on the outcome of this case.

Petitioners raised the choice-of-law question below

in connection with their contention that the Secre-

tary’s February 21 regulation governing a lessee’s

responsibility for oil spills was a marked departure

from prior law and thereby frustrated petitioners’

ability to perform under the lease. The government

argued that prior to issuance of the regulations, state

law, not pre-existing federal regulations, governed the

standard of liability for damages to third parties

14

and that California law already imposed a strict

standard of liability on oil drilling as an ultrahazard-

ous activity. Thus, under the government’s theory,

even if the February 21 regulation established a

standard of strict liability, it did not depart from

prior law. Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that

federal law previously governed liability for oil spills

and that negligence, not strict liability, was the stand-

ard under prior federal regulations. Alternatively,

petitioners argued that only oil drilling in inhabited

areas was necessarily ultrahazardous under Califor-

nia law (Pet. App. A-14 n.12). Based on these

premises, petitioners argued that the February 21

regulation changed the standard of liability (Pet.

App. A-16). See generally Pet. 28, 30-33.

But whatever the law governing lessees’ liability,

petitioners’ claim of frustration failed, as the Court

of Claims properly held (Pet. App. A-18 to A-19),

because petitioners had failed to prove that perform-

ance of the contract was rendered impossible by the

standard of liability prevailing (or believed by peti-

tioners to be prevailing) at the time they elected to

file this action. Impossibility sufficient to enable a

party to be released from his contract must be deter-

mined by an objective standard. The contract must

be found unreasonable to all, not to a particular party

only. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 281,

Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974); Clark Grave

Vault Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 459, 461 (Ct.

Cl. 1967) ; 6 A. Corbin on Contracts § 1332 (1962).

The record here reveals that other companies are and

15

have been since 1969 operating under existing reg-

ulations in the Santa Barbara Channel (Pet. App.

A-26 to A-27; Finding 77(g), Pet. App. A-316). See

also Sun Oil Co. v. United States, supra, 572 F.2d

at 797-800.

In addition, the Court of Claims properly held

(Pet. App. A-15 to A-18) that petitioners had failed

to establish another essential element of the doctrine

of frustration: the occurrence of an unexpected con-

tingency not accounted for in negotiations between

the parties. The court concluded that the state of the

law on lessees’ liability was plainly unsettled prior

to February, 1969, whether one looked to California

law, as the government urged, or to federal regu-

lations, as petitioners suggested (id. A-15 to A-17).

The state of the law remained unsettled even after

the February 21 regulation was issued (id. A-17 to

A-20). The Department of the Interior amended its

regulations in August, 1969, less than five months

after this case was filed, expressly to provide that

although the lessee was responsible for cleaning up

any pollutant, liability to third parties for damages

caused by an oil spill was to continue to be governed

by “applicable law” (Finding 76, Pet. App. A-309

to A-310). Thus, the effect of the February and

August regulations, read together, was to leave the

law on liability to third parties for damages exactly

where it was at the time petitioners entered into

their lease. Such repose can hardly be termed an

“unexpected contingency” giving rise to impossibility

of performance.

16

In sum, because petitioners failed to establish either

an unexpected contingency or impossibility of per-

formance, they would not be entitled to recovery,

irrespective of the manner in which the Court might

resolve petitioners’ choice-of-law issue. Accordingly,

there is no occasion for the Court to consider the

choice-of-law issue.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted.

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

SANFORD SAGALKIN

Acting Assistant Attorney General

MYLES E. FLINT

Attorney

SEPTEMBER 1979

W ov. S. Goveanment printing orrice; 1979 300443 68

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