Appendix — Davis v. Passman

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Text

} FILED

NOV 87 1975

APPENDIX

CLERK |

Suprenw Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-5072

SHIRLEY DAVIS,

Petitioner,

——l',—-

OTTO E. PASSMAN,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED JULY 17, 1978

CERTIORARI GRANTED OCTOBER 30, 1978

a eee

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-5072

SHIRLEY DAVIS,

.. Petitioner,

i

OTTo E. PASSMAN,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

INDEX

Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries ........................

Coe ee ne.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Filed October 9, 1974 ...........

Opinion and Judgment of District Court, Filed February 26,

a ssn epnccnensneeets

Opinion of Panel of Court of Ap , Filed January 3, 1977..

Petition of Defendant/Appellasas for Rehearing and Rehear-

ing En Banc, Filed February 16, 1977 ...............0.0.000ccceece.

Order Granting Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En

RB OE BN

Opinion of Court of Appeals En Banc, Filed April 18, 1978...

Judgment of Court of Appeals on Rehearing En Banc, Filed

pC Beat OY oe EE

Order of the Supreme Court of the United States Granting

Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis and Petition for Cer-

EIRENE Ee

96

98

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF RELEVANT

DOCKET ENTRIES

A. District Court

B.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

Civil Action No. 74-745

SHIRLEY DAVIS, PLAINTIFF

Vv.

OTTO E. PASSMAN, DEFENDANT

DATE PROCEEDINGS

Aug. 7,1974 Complaint filed.

Oct. 9,1974 Motion to dismiss filed.

Feb. 26,1975 Opinion and judgment filed.

Mar. 7,1975 Plaintiff’s notice of appeal filed.

Court of Appeals

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-1691

DATE PROCEEDINGS

Apr. 9, 1975 Record certified to Court of Appeals.

Apr. 12, 1976 Oral argument before Chief Judge

Brown and Judges Goldberg and Jones.

(1)

2

DATE PROCEEDINGS

Jan. 3, 1977 Opinion of Court of Appeals by Judge

Goldberg; dissenting opinion by Judge a.

Feb. 16, 1977 Petition of defendant/appellast for

rehearing and rehearing en banc filed.

May 17, 1977 Order granting rehearing and rehear-

ing en banc filed.

Sept. 26, 1977 Oral argument before Court of Ap-

peals en banc.

Apr. 18, 1978 Opinion of Court of Appeals en banc

by Judge Clark; special concurrences by Judges

Jones and Roney; dissenting opinion by Judge

Goldberg, joined by Chief Judge Brown.

Apr. 18,1978 Judgment filed.

Lee edie A inhee SE nee

“~ pers eet pe

3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

Civil Action Number 74-745

SHIRLEY DAVIS, PLAINTIFF

versus

OTTO E. PASSMAN, Congressman of the United States,

DEFENDANT

COMPLANT—Filed August 7, 1974

- I. JURISDICTION

1. This is a civil action seeking declaratory, injunctive

and other legal and equitable relief to redress violations

of plaintiff’s rights under the United States Constitu-

tion and more particularly Fifth Amendment thereto.

This Court has jurisdiction over the action pursuant to

28 U.S.C. Sections 1343, 1331, and 2201. The matter

in controversy exceeds the value of $10,000.00.

Il. PARTIES

2. Plaintiff, Shirley Davis, is an adult female citizen of

the United States and a resident of the City of Monroe,

Parish of Quachita, State of Louisiana. Plaintiff was

employed by defendant as his deputy administrative as-

sistant from February 1, 1974, through July 31, 1974.

3. Defendant Otto E. Passman is a citizen of the

United States with his domicile in the City of Monroe,

Parish of Ouachita, State of Louisiana. He is the duly

elected representative to the Congress of the United

States from the Fifth District of Louisiana.

Ill. STATEMENT

4. Plaintiff was an employee of defendant in the ca-

pacity of deputy administrative assistant from Febru-

A

ary 1, 1974, through July 31, 1974, on which date her

employment was terminated by defendant.

5. Plaintiff’s salary was $18,000.00 per year with the

expectation of a promotion to defendant’s administrative

assistant at a salary of $32,000.00 per year upon the

imminent retirement of defendant’s current administra-

tive assistant.

6. On June 21, 1974, defendant mailed plaintiff a

letter stating he would terminate her employment effec-

tive July 31, 1974, solely because she was a female and

despite the fact that she was “able, energetic, and a very

hard worker.” A copy of said letter of June 21, 1974, is

attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit “A.”

7. The conduct of defendant as described herein and

as will be more fully shown on trial of this cause dis-

criminated against plaintiff and continues to discriminate

plaintiff on the basis of sex in violation of the United

States Constitution and the Fifth Amendment thereto.

8. Plaintiff suffered and is suffering irreparable in-

jury from defendant’s practices, policies, and customs as

set forth herein, and will continue to so suffer unless

this Court grants the relief requested.

9. There is a real controversy between the parties

and plaintiff has no completely adequate remedy at law;

unless plaintiff’s request for declaratory and injunctive

relief is granted, she will suffer irreparable injury.

10. Plaintiff’s dismissal has seriously injured her

standing and reputation in the community in which she

lives and works and plaintiff has been refused any op-

portunity to refute the ground of dismissal.

11. Plaintiff affirmatively states she is well capable

of carrying on the position of administrative assistant

and that her dismissal was predicated solely upon sex

discrimination.

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Pt ogo plaintiff respectfully prays that this

urt:

1. Declare the actions of defendant, Otto E. Passman,

described in the paragraphs hereinabove to be unlawful

rer gy TT TT

5

sex discrimination in violation of the United States Con-

stitution and the Fifth Amendment thereto;

2. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions en-

joining defendant, Otto E. Passman, his agents, em-

ployees, and those acting in concert or cooperation with

him, from engaging in policies and practices contrary to

the rights of plaintiff which are sexually discriminating

in violation of the United States Constitution and the

Fifth Amendment thereto;

3. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions re-

quiring defendant, Otto E. Passman, to rehire plaintiff

in the position she would currently hold were it not for

the unlawful sexual discrimination.

4. Issue such other and further relief as may be

proper and necessary, including, but not limited to, pro-

motion, salary increase, and back pay to plaintiff;

5. Award plaintiff the costs of the action, together

with reasonable attorney fees for the prosecution of this

action.

Respectfully submitted,

Kidd & Katz

709 Jackson Avenue

Monroe, Louisiana

Attorneys for Plaintiff

By: /s/ Stephen J. Katz

STEPHEN J. KATZ

TS fee ors Ee oan OR ORES Ue Nee ey eee Sa TS ISR

6

EXHIBIT “A”

OTTO E. PASSMAN

Congressman

5th District, Louisiana

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

June 21, 1974

Mrs. Shirley Davis

611 Eason Place

Monroe, Louisiana 71201

Dear Mrs. Davis:

My Washington staff joins me in saying that we miss

you very much. But, in all probability, inwardly they all

agree that I was doing you an injustice by asking you to

assume a responsibility that was so trying and so hard

that it would have taken all of the pleasure out of your

work. I must be completely fair with you, so please note

the following: .

You are able, energetic and a very hard worker. Cer-

tainly you command the respect of those with whom you

work; however, on account of the unusually heavy work

load in my Washington Office, and the diversity of the

job, I concluded that it was essential that the understudy

to my Administrative Assistant be a man.I believe you

will agree with this conclusion.

It would be unfair to you for me to ask you to waste

your talent and experience in my Monroe office because

of the low salary that is available because of a junior

position. Therefore, and so that your experience and

talent may be used to advantage in some organization in

need of an extremely capable secretary, I desire that you

be continued on the payroll at your present salary

through July 31, 1974. This arrangement gives you your

full year’s vacation of one month, plus one additional

7

month. May I further say that the work load in the

Monroe office is very limited, and since you would come

in as a junior member of the staff at such a low salary,

it would actually be an offense to you.

I know that secretaries with your ability are very

much in demand in Monroe. If an additional letter of

recommendation from me would be advantageous to you,

do not hesitate to let me know. Again, assuring you that

my Washington staff and your humble Congressman feel

that the contribution you made to our Washington office

has helped all of us.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ Otto E. Passman

OTTO E. PASSMAN

Member of Congress

8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

| Title omitted in printing]

MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12 (b)—

Filed October 9, 1974

NOW INTO COURT, through his undersigned counsel,

comes defendant OTTO E. PASSMAN, who respectfully

moves the Court as follows:

‘. dismiss the action because the complaint fails

to state a claim against defendant upon which relief can

be granted, for the reason that the alleged conduct of de-

fendant is not violative of the Fifth Amendment to the

Constitution.

2. To dismiss the action because the complaint fails

a state Padi cng gna defendant upon which relief can

e gran or the reason that the law afford i

right of action to plaintiff. ener

3. To dismiss the action because the complaint fails to

“ a hei against defendant upon which relief can

gran y reason of the sovereign immunit i

and the official immunity doctrine. i —e"

ro - en with the Court’s rules, defendant at-

ches hereto a memorandum of authorities j

prs Rasen ly orities in support

Hupson, Potts & BERNSTEIN

10th Floor

Ouachita National Bank

Building

Monroe, Louisiana 71201

By: /s/ Jesse D. McDonald

vESSE D. McDONALD

Attorneys for Defendant

ret ete AT ane A chan OI

9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

Civil Action No. 74-745

SHIRLEY DAVIS, PLAINTIFF

versus

OTTO E. PASSMAN, CONGRESSMAN OF THE

UNITED STATES, DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT—February 26, 1975

THIS CAUSE CAME ON FOR HEARING before this

Court on February 24, 1975, on the Motion to Dismiss

under Rule 12(b) filed by defendant contending the plain-

tiff’s complaint fails to state a claim against defendant

upon which relief can be granted on three grounds, viz. :

(1) that the alleged conduct of defendant is not violative

of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution; (2) that the

law affords no private right of action to plaintiff; and

(3) by reason of the doctrines of sovereign and official

immunity; and, the Court having considered the briefs

of counsel for both sides, and having heard the oral

arguments of counsel for both sides.

IT IS THE OPINION OF THIS COURT, that the

complaint filed by plaintiff Shirley Davis herein does

fail to state a claim against defendant Otto E. Passman,

upon which relief can be granted, for the reason that the

discharge of plaintiff on alleged grounds of sex discrimi-

nation by defendant is nov violative of the Fifth Amend-

ment to the Constitution and for the reason that the law

affords no private right of action to plaintiff therefor.

The Court is of the opinion that the doctrines of sover-

eign and official immunity urged by defendant as grounds

(3) for said motion are not well founded. Having found

that defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is well founded as to

defendant’s grounds (1) and (2).

10

JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED in favor of

defendant Otto E. Passman, and against plaintiff Shirley

a — the pom cowrres of plaintiff for failure to

te a claim against defendant Otto E.

which relief can be granted. Te

THIS JUDGMENT entered and signed in Sh

Louisiana, on this 26th day of Feaaey, 1975. sti

/s/ Tom Stagg

Ls STAGG

nited States Distri

Approved as to form: istrict Judge

‘s/ Stephen J. Katz

STEPHEN J. KATz

KIDD AND KATZ

Attorneys

709 Jackson Street

Monroe, Louisiana 71201

Attorneys for Plaintiff

oT

ll

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-1691

SHIRLEY DAVIS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

a

OTTu 4. PASSMAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

OPINION—January 3, 1977

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and JONES and GOLD-

BERG, Circuit Judges.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:

In this case a member of the United States Congress

unflinchingly asserts that the Constitution allows him

openly to discriminate against women. He asserts fur-

ther that he need not so much as suggest a single basis

for the discrimination. The issue is not to be trivialized.

We have here a conflict of transcendental importance be-

tween the rights of the individual and the rights of a

representative qua representative. Although representa-

tives admittedly have some insulation not wrapped around

ordinary mortals, the conflicting interests must be har-

monized, not dichotomized. Finding that our Constitution

protects individual rights even against the mighty, we

remand this case for trial.

In the early part of 1974 Shirley Davis was Deputy

Administrative Assistant to Representative Otto E. Pass-

12

man of the Louisiana fifth Congressional District. The

Representative terminated Davis’s employment effective

July 31, 1974. In his letter to her explaining the termi-

nation decision the Representative wrote, “You are able,

energetic and a very hard worker. . . . [H]owever, on

account of the unusually heavy workload in my Washing-

ton office, and the diversity of the job, I concluded that

it was essential that the understudy to my administra-

tive assistant be a man.” The full text of this rather

remarkable letter is set out in the margin.’

1 Dear Mrs. Davis:

My Washington staff joins me in saying that we thiss you very

much. But, in all probability, inwardly they all agree that I was

doing you an injustice by asking you to assume a responsibility that

was so trying and so hard that it would have taken all of the

pleasure out of your work. I must be completely fair with you, so

please note the following:

You are able, energetic and a very hard worker. Certainly you

command the respect of those with whom you work; however, on

account of the unusually heavy work load in my Washington Office,

and the diversity of the job, I concluded that it was essential that

the understudy to my Administrative Assistant be a man. I believe

you will agree with this conclusion.

It would be unfair to you for me to ask you to waste your talent

and experience in my Monroe office because of the low salary that

is available because of a junior position. Therefore, and so that your

experience and talent may be used to advantage in some organiza-

tion in need of an extremely capable secretary, I desire that you be

continued on the payroll at your present salary through July 31,

1974. This arrangement gives you your full year’s vacation of one

month, plus one additional month. May | further say that the work

load in the Monroe office is very limited, and since you would come

in as a junior member of the staff at such a low salary, it would

actually be an offense to you.

I know that secretaries with your ability are very much in demand

in Monroe. If an additional letter of recommendation from me

would be advantageous to you, do not hesitate to let me know. Again,

assuring you that my Washington staff and your humble Congress-

man feel that the contribution you made to our Washington office

has helped all of us.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ Otto E. Passman

Member of Congress

De eile

A el a RRO 5

13

Davis then filed this action against the Representative,

claiming he had violated the equal protection component

of the fifth amendment’s due process clause. She invoked

the court’s “arising under” jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1331(a), and she sought specific relief, dam-

es and declaratory relief.

*eThe = Reswonirew moved to dismiss the complaint on

three grounds: that his conduct was not unconstitutional,

that the law afforded Davis no private right of action,

and that the doctrines of sovereign and official immunity

barred the action. The district court rejected the im-

munity argument but dismissed the action on the first

two points. We reverse, finding that Davis s allegations,

if proved, will establish a constitutional violation for

which she has a private right of action. We agree with

the district court that the immunity doctrines do not

bar the suit.

I. Constitutionality

1,2] Although the fourteenth amendment’s equal

Poin fiat applies only to the states, the fifth

amendment’s due process clause contains an equal pro-

tection component applicable to the federal government.

See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct.

693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954); N. L. R. B. v. Sumpter Ply-

wood Corp., 585 F.2d 917, 930 n.22 | 5th Cir. 1976).

Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions establish be-

yond dispute that, just as sex discrimination by the states

violates the fourteenth amendment unless supported by

sufficient justifications, Reed v. Reed, 404 US. 71, 92

S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); Stanton v. Stanton,

421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1873, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975), sex

discrimination by the federal government violates the

fifth amendment. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,

93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); Weinberger Vv.

Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514

(1975). We must therefore address two questions:

whether the alleged conduct constituted sex discrimina-

tion, and if so whether sufficient governmental interests

validate the discrimination.

14

A. Discrimination

[3] In the case at bar the first question is easily

answered. Davis’s allegations, which must of course be

taken as true in evaluating the Representative’s motion

to dismiss, see, e.g., Radovich v. National Football

League, 352 U.S. 445, 448, 77 S.Ct. 390, 1 L.Ed.2d 456

(1956) ; Reeves v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 582 F.2d

491, 493 (5th Cir. 1976), clearly make out a case of sex

discrimination. The Representative’s termination letter

offered but a single reason for Davis’s dismissal: she was

a woman; the job called for a man.

The Representative argues, however, that unconstitu-

tional sex discrimination occurs only when the sex-based

classification is embodied in a statute and only when the

actor is someone other than a member of Congress. With

respect to the first point he correctly notes that the stat-

ute upon which his dismissal of Davis was predicated,

2 U.S.C. § 92, is nondiscriminatory on its face; it allows

dismissal of both male and female staff members with or

without cause. The Representative also correctly notes

that neither Frontiero nor Wiesenfeld compel rejection

of his position; both of those cased invalidated statutory

classifications.”

? Frontiero confronted a statutory scheme dealing with benefits

afforded members of the uniformed services for their “dependent”

spouses, A serviceman could claim his wife as a dependent without

regard to actual dependency, whereas a servicewoman could claim

her husband only if he was shown to be dependent upon her for

over one-half of his support. The court invalidated the scheme.

Similarly, Wiesenfeld struck down a provision of the Social Security

Act that granted a widow, but not a widower, benefits based on the

deceased spouse’s earnings.

Supreme Court decisions invalidating state sex discriminations

have also involved statutes. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251,

30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971) held unconstitutional an Idaho statute under

which male candidates to administer an estate were preferred over

equally-qualified female candidates. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U-S.

7, 95 S.Ct. 1378, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975) struck down a Utah statute

a established a greater age of majority for males than for fe-

males.

Bark hg ir tat u

15

[4] The Representative’s argument that equal pro-

tection principles apply only to statutory discrimination,

however, contravenes a long and unbroken chain of de-

cisions. The Supreme Court clearly rejected the argu-

ment as long ago as 1886. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118

U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) the Court

held that the discriminatory application against Chinese

Americans of facially neutral building regulations vio-

lated the equal protection clause. The passage of time

has enhanced, not diminished, the position of Yick Wo

as a pillar of our jurisprudence. Numerous more recent

decisions have struck down nonstatutory discriminations,

usually without even pausing to note explicitly that equal

protection principles are not limited to statutes. See,

e.g., Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201,

93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) ; Foster v. Sparks,

506 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1975) ; Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d

1291 (5th Cir. 1974); United Farmworkers of Florida

Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d

799 (5th Cir. 1974).

Equal protection scrutiny of inconsistencies in the ap-

plication of facially nondiscriminatory statutes is not,

of course, without limits. In Snowden v. Hughes, 321

U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed.2d 497 (1944) a state

elections official refused to follow a state law requiring

that a successful primary candidate be certified for in-

clusion on the general election ballot. The Court re-

jected the candidate’s argument that this isolated failure

to apply the state law to everyone equally constituted a

denial of “equal protection of the laws.” The Court laid

down the governing standard:

The unlawful administration by state officers of

a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its un-

equal application to those who [were] entitled to be

treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection un-

less there is shown to be present in it an element

of intentional or purposeful discrimination.

Snowden v. Hughes, supra, 321 U.S. at 8, 64 S.Ct. at 401.

Davis’s complaint clearly meets the Snowden require-

ments. The only digressions from neutral statutory pro-

16

visions that Snowden exempts from equal protection scru-

tiny are those isolated incidents not based on a classifi-

cation.» Here. Representative Passman established a

classification; he divided potential deputy administrative

assistants into one group of men and another of women.

The termination letter, at least on its face, is an open

declaration of “intentional” and “purposeful” sex dis-

crimination.

Therefore, Representative Passman will be free at

trial to demonstrate that the firing was not in fact based

upon Davis’s gender, but he can derive no support from

the nonstatutory nature of the discrimination. The con-

stitutional guarantee of freedom from invidious discrimi-

nation would ring hollow indeed if it could be bypassed

by the simple expedient of implementing the discrimina-

tion under a facially neutral statute. That the alleged

discrimination was not embodied in a statute is of no

moment.*

3 Washington V. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597

(1976) supports this analysis. There the Supreme Court upheld

the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department’s use of

Test 21 to screen applicants. The test allegedly excluded a dispro-

portionate number of black applicants and would therefore have

been invalid under Title VII and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401

U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). But the action had

been brought before Title VII was made applicable to the federal

government in 1972, and the Constitution itself provided the govern-

ing standard. See 426 U.S. at 238, n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 2040.

Unlike the situation in Snowden, the challenged action in Wash-

ington did reflect a classification; applicants were separated into

one groun that passed the test and another that did not. Equal

protection scrutiny was therefore appropriate. Because the Court

found no racially discriminating purpose, an issue as to which

racially disproportionate impact was relevant but not dispositive,

it did not invoke the stringent equal protection scrutiny that at-

tends racial classifications. The Court upheld the challenged classi-

fication, finding it sufficiently related to the legitimate goal of

modestly upgrading the communicative abilities of government

employees. 426 U.S. at 245-246, 96 S.Ct. at 2050, 48 L.Ed.2d at 610.

* Although Yick Wo and the other cited decisions were decided

under the fourteenth amendment, the equal protection component of

fifth amendment due process contains the same principle. There is

no reason to exempt the federal government from the principle that

Pe Ne ee ee eS oy ie Ce

17

[5,6] Representative Passman’s contention that the

constitutional ban on unjustified sex discrimination does

not restrict the actions of members of Congress is equally

untenable. He argues, in effect, that his congressional

status endows him with an open-ended right to discrimi-

nate irrespective of the time, place and condition of the

discrimination.’ A representative, however, is as subject

to constitutional standards when hiring employees as

when acting in concert with other members of Congress

to enact legislation. A representative is not an imperator

and is never above and beyond the law; any other view

could not be squared with the whole predicate upon which

our constitutional life depends. The need for wide dis-

cretion in staff employment decisions cannot be ignored,

but the constitutional proscription of blatant sex dis-

crimination does not impair Representative Passman’s

legitimate control over his staff to any extent at all.

The Constitution does not force him to hire by the slide

rule, but at the same time it does not permit him to

slide into unbridled discrimination. The geometry of

congressional discretion in hiring and firing is neither

apogean nor perigean. We must equilibrate. Representa-

tive Passman can certainly assemble a capable and com-

petent staff without engaging in the sex discrimination

alleged here. The applicable constitutional standards may

give a representative greater leeway in employment de-

cisions than other government entities possess, and at

trial Representative Passman may be able to show that

he has not transgressed the constitutional requirements.

All we need decide for purposes of this appeal, however,

is that at some point invidious discrimination_by a rep-

discriminatory applications of nondiscriminatory statutes must meet

equal protection guidelines, as Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,

96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) implicitly recognized. See

note 3 supra.

* Whether the courts can redress a representative’s transgressions

of the constitutional standards presents a separate issue. Repre-

sentative Passman asserts not only that he is immune from suit, but

also that even apart from the possibility of redress, the Constitution

does not prohibit him from discriminating on the basis of gender.

18

resentative in his or her employment decisions is uncon-

stitutional. Davis’s allegations are certainly sufficient to

entitle her to go to trial in an effort to show that this is

such a case.°

B. Justification

The next issue is whether the alleged discrimination is

constitutional because supported by sufficient governmen-

tal interests. Whether the interests supporting a sex dis-

crimination must be “compelling” is unsettled. In Fron-

tiero four justices said sex was a “suspect classification”

calling for strict judicial scrutiny. See 411 U.S. at 682-

88, 93 S.Ct. 1764 (plurality opinion by Brennan, J.).

Under that approach the government must show a com-

pelling interest. Three justices, however, reserved the

“strict scrutiny” issue saying the classification there was

unconstitutional in any event. 411 U.S. at 691-92, 93

S.Ct. 1764 (Powell, J., concurring). The earlier case of

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225

(1971), and the subsequent cases of Weinberger Vv.

Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514

(1975) and Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct.

1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975), invalidated sex discrimi-

nations without addressing the strict scrutiny issue.’ In

6To eliminate any confusion we note that appellant need not

demonstrate the denial of any “property” interest. Although the

due process clause extends only to deprivations of “life, liberty, or

property”, a violation of the clause’s equal protection component is

necessarily a deprivation of “liberty”. Therefore, decisions under

the due process clause’s equal protection component, like substantive

due process decisions, make no reference to the “life, liberty, or

property” requirement. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.

677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); Weinberger v. Wiesen-

feld, 420 U.S. 636, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975).

7 The holdings of Reed, Wiesenfeld and Stanton are outlined in

note 2 supra. See also Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 94 S.Ct. 1734,

40 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974) (Florida statute giving widows but not

widowers a $500 property tax exemption upheld as substantially

related to the legitimate object of cushioning the disproportionate

financial difficulties confronting a lone woman); Schlesinger Vv.

19

these decisions the Court clearly applied more than the

minimal rationality test that characterizes equal protec-

tion decisions in some other areas, however, and sex-based

classifications must withstand at least middle-level equal

protection scrutiny.*

In the case at bar we can follow the Supreme Court’s

lead and refrain from specifying the applicable standard.

Indeed, we need not even apply the substantial scrutiny

that has characterized the Court’s decisions. For here

Representative Passman offers no governmental interest

at all in support of the sex-based classification, and we

can imagine none.’ The qualifications for the post of

deputy administrative assistant simply have nothing to

do with gender. The Representative’s suggestion in his

letter that the job requires a man because of the “un-

usually heavy work load” and the “diversity of the job”

is patently ridiculous. Understandably, the Representa-

tive has abandoned that rationale on this appeal. The

Representative will be free at trial to pursue his con-

tention that gender was not the basis of Davis’s dismis-

sal, but if he is unsuccessful the firing cannot escape

constitutional condemnation.

Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 95 S.Ct. 572, 42 L.Ed.2d 610 (1975) (different

tenure provisions for military men and women sustained because,

under unchallenged scheme restricting the military role of women,

service men and women are not similarly situated).

8 For discussion of intermediate equal protection standards, see

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1,

98-110, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-

ing); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.

2d 63 (1973) (White, J., concurring) ; Gunther, The Supreme Court.

1971 Term—Forword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-

7 Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L.Rev.

1 (1972).

* We therefore need not decide whether we would consider justi-

fications occurring to us but not asserted by the Representative.

The extent to which equal protection courts will consider supporting

interests not put forward by the government is unsettled and may

vary with the governing equal protection standard.

20

II. Availability of Relief

Having determined that Davis has alleged a constitu-

tional violation, we must now determine whether the

claim is one upon which relief can be granted. In sub-

stance, Davis seeks three forms of relief: specific relief,

damages, and a declaration. We deal with each in turn.

A. Specific Relief

The specific relief Davis seeks includes reinstatement,

promotion and an injunction against unlawful discrimi-

nation directed toward her. The injunction claim might

raise a sovereign immunity issue under our decisions in

Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1971) and Beale

v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1973), even though

the Supreme Court has said in Larson v. Domestic and

Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457,

93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949) and Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609,

83 S.Ct. 999, 10 L.Ed.2d 15 (1963) that sovereign im-

munity does not bar suits against federal officials alleg-

ing that they acted unconstitutionally. See Penn Vv.

Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 703-04 (5th Cir. 1973), rev’d

on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en

banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 2646, 49 L.Ed.

2d 385 (1976). In addition, the reinstatement and pro-

motion prayers, while impervious to sovereign immunity

attack because in the nature of mandamus, see Penn v.

Schlesinger, supra; Beale v. Blount, supra, would raise

difficult issues concerning the proper exercise of equita-

ble remedial discretion. In Abbott v. Thetford, 534 F.2d

1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) we refused to order a

judge to reinstate his chief probation officer because the

probation officer’s personal criticisms of the judge made

the necessary cooperative and confidential relationship

impossible.’ Although Davis has not, so far as this rec-

ord shows, done anything to antagonize the Representa-

tive other than bring this lawsuit to vindicate her consti-

tutional rights, we would remain very hesitant to order

1°In Abbott the en banc court adopted Judge Gewin’s dissent

from the panel opinion, see 529 F.2d 695, 701-08 (5th Cir. 1976).

——-— 7 we

nei ais Sateen ds bh

Se RE ee ee 7

Pili ot hse ren owe

21

reinstatement of a representative’s personal assistant.

Cf. Lumley v. Wagner, 1 DeG., M. & G. 604, 42 Eng.

Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).

Intervening events, however, have blunted the import-

ance of these issues. We take notice that Representative

Passman was defeated in the 1976 primary election.

His tenure in Congress will therefore apparently come

to an end on January 3, 1977. That the term is not yet

completely over saves the specific-relief claims from tech-

nical mootness, but they have certainly lost their signifi-

cance. We assume Davis will not press her reinstate-

ment or injunction prayers, and we pass on to other

remedies.

B. Damages

Davis’s damages claim takes us through a five-stage

analysis. First, damages are available under the Su-

preme Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,

91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Second, the Su-

preme Court’s more recent decision in Brown v. General

Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48

L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) does not affect the Bivens remedy

under the circumstances here. Third, sovereign immunity

does not bar Davis’s claim for damages against Repre-

sentative Passman individually. Fourth, the speech or

debate clause does not shield the Representative. Fifth,

although the Representative can assert qualified official

immunity at trial, that doctrine is insufficient to support

a motion to dismiss. In sum, Davis’s damages claim must

be remanded for trial.

1. Bivens

[7] Davis’s claim for damages is predicated upon

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, supra. There the Supreme Court

held that a damages remedy for an unconstitutional

search and seizure could be implied directly from the

Constitution itself. The Court rejected the government’s

argument that the complainant should have been relegated

22

to a state law tort action and that the Constitution’s sole

function was to limit the scope of the officers’ privilege

defense, holding that the constitutional damages action

was independent of state tort law. The Court explicitly

rejected the government’s argument that damages should

be available only if “necessary to enforce the Fourth

Amendment.” 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005. Among

other things, the Constitution is a compendium of rights,

and their enforcement does not depend upon statutory

enrollment. As Bivens establishes, legislative inaction

does not vitiate constitutional rights. Statutory actions

may give breath to constitutional rights, but congres-

sional inaction cannot suffocate them.

[8] Although Davis’s claim arises under the fifth

amendment, not the fourth, we find no basis in Bivens’

language or rationale for according any significance to

this distinction. The rights protected by the fifth amend-

ment due process clause are every bit as fundamental as

fourth amendment rights. Here, as in Bivens, damages

simply constitute “a particular remedial mechanism nor-

mally available in the federal courts,” 403 U.S. at 397,

91 S.Ct. at 2005.

Indeed, here the case for implying a damages remedy is

even stronger than in Bivens. In the Bivens situation

state tort law is available to remedy some constitutional

violations, and the exclusionary rule also sometimes pro-

vides a remedy. The case for implying a constitutional

damages remedy becomes more compelling when, as here,

there is no meaningful alternative remedy. Mr. Chief

Justice Marshall’s time-honored call for justice provides

a guiding principle not lightly to be ignored: “The very

essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of

every individual to claim the protection of the laws, when-

ever he receives an injury.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.

(1 Cranch) 187, 168, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), quoted in

Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. at 397, 91-S.Ct. [1999] at 2005.

Our conclusion that Bivens is not limited to fourth

amendment claims draws support from various court of

appeals decisions. We have ourselves upheld an arrested

person’s complaint seeking damages directly under the

7

sl MOODLE he, NED, wl IK! apa.

23

Constitution for the denial of proper medical care. We

said that the conduct might have violated the fourteenth

amendment’s due process clause or the eighth amend-

ment, and that the complaint stated a damages claim.

See Reeves v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 532 F.2d 491,

495 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Roane v. Callisburg Inde-

pendent School District, 511 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1975)

(Fourteenth amendment due process). Other circuits

that have decided the issue are in accord. See Brault

v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 734 (2nd Cir.), rev’d

en banc on other grounds, 527 F.2d 736 (2nd Cir. 1975)

(damages action for fourteenth amendment due process

violation “comes within Bivens’ sweeping approbation of

constitutionally-based causes of action”) ;" United States

ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3rd Cir. 1972)

(fifth amendment due process) ;* States Marine Lines,

Inc. Vv. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974), (fifth

amendment due process).** In extending Bivens to fifth

amendment due process claims, States Marine used lan-

guage squarely applicable in our case:

11 Brault addressed the complicating issue, not present in our case,

of whether the exclusion of cities from the definition of “person” in

42 U.S.C. § 1983 affected the existence of the Bivens cause of action.

See generally Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for

Constitutional Violations, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 922 (1976). Brault upheld

the constitutional action despite § 1983. We reached the same result

in Roane V. Callisburg Independent School Di rict, supra and Reeves

v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, supra. See also Cox v. Stanton, 529

F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975); Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70,

77 (2d Cir. 1975) (Smith, J., concurring and dissenting). Cf.

Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3rd Cir. 1976):

Amen V. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976).

12 Moore extended Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3rd Cir. 1971),

cert. denied 404 U.S. 1061, 92 S.Ct. 747, 30 L.Ed.2d 749 (1972)

(fourth and fifth amendments).

13 In addition to the Second, Third and Fourth Circuit holdings

cited in text, the Tenth Circuit has intimated that Bivens extends

beyond the fourth amendment. See Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United

States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975). The issue is open in the

D.C. Circuit. See Lewis v. D.C. Dep’t. of Corrections, 174 U.S.App.

D.C. 483, 533 F.2d 710 (1976). Although the district courts have

split, the best reasoned opinions have reached our result. See, e.g.,

Penzarella v. Boyle, 496 F.Supp. 787 (D.R.I. 1975).

24

The necessity and appropriateness of judicial relief

is no less compelling in this case than it was in

Bivens. As in Bivens: A common law or state tort

remedy may or may not afford a means of redress-

ing this wrong, but in any case, will not be tailored

specifically to cases of lawlessness pursuant to fed-

eral authority; the claim presented is obviously ap-

propriate for money damages; and other remedies

such as injunctive or relief in the nature of man-

damus are no longer viable alternatives.

498 F.2d at 1157.

[9] Finally, we note that measuring damages pre-

sents no insuperable problem. Representative Passman

was free, within constitutional limits, to dismiss Davis

at any time. But if the actual dismissal is found at

trial to have been unconstitutional, then lost salary

should be taken into account in assessing damages. The

situation is analogous to a substantively justified dis-

missal accomplished in a procedurally unconstitutional

way. That a defendant could have dismissed an employee

without violating the Constitution has never been thought

to preclude the award of damages for a dismissal that

was in actuality unconstitutional. Cf. Silver v. New York

Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 365 n.18, 83 S.Ct. 1246,

10 L.Ed.2d 389 (1963).

2. Brown

{10} Our conclusion, then, is that Bivens gives Davis

a damages remedy for Representative Passman’s depriva-

tion of her due process rights. We pause briefly, how-

ever, to reject the notion that sweeping language in a

recent Supreme Court decision dictates a contrary result.

In Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S.

820, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) the Court

held that the 30-day limitation on bringing Title VII

employment discrimination suits against the federal gov-

ernment could not be avoided by the simple expedient of

bringing the action directly under the Constitution. The

Brown holding is inapplicable here because Davis never

25

had a Title VII action. Title VII excludes members of

congressional staffs from its protection."*

The inapplicability of the Brown holding does not,

however, answer the contention that some of its language

seems on casual examination to preclude Davis’s con-

stitutionally based claim. The issue arises from Mr. Jus-

tice Stewart’s framing of the Brown issue:

The principal question presented by this case is

whether § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-

vides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of

discrimination in federal employment.

425 U.S. at 821, 96 S.Ct. at 1968, 48 L.Ed.2d at 405.

Taken for all it might be worth, this language would

deny Davis not only a damages remedy but any remedy

whatesoever.

We refuse to accord the language such broad scope.

In the first place, a moment’s reflection indicates the

incongruity of importing Mr. Justice Stewart’s language

into our case. It simply makes no sense to speak of an

“exclusive judicial remedy” when there is no remedy

at all. Brown establishes that Title VII is the exclusive

judicial remedy for federal employment discrimination

to which Title VII extends, but in areas not touched by

Title VII other remedies are not affected.

This is conclusively established by Hampton v. Mow

Sun, Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 96 S.Ct. 1895, 48 L.Ed.2d 495

(1976), decided the very same day as Brown. In Mow

Sun Wong the Court invalidated the Civil Service Com-

mission’s rule excluding aliens from most federal em-

ployment.'® Title VII does not prohibit discrimination

14 42 U.S.C. §$ 2000e-16(a) makes the federal government employ-

ment discrimination provisions inapplicable to legislative branch

positions not in the competitive service, and. congressional staffs

are not in the competitive service.

15 The Mow Sun Wong plaintiffs challenged the commission’s rule

under the fifth amendment’s equal protection principle. The Court

noted that overriding national interests might conceivably provide

a justification for a citizenship requirement in the federal service.

Without resolving that issue, the Court held that due process re-

quired that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule

26

against aliens, see Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing

Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 S.Ct. 334, 38 L.Ed.2d 287 (1973),

just as Title VII does not prohibit sex discrimination

against congressional staff members. In Mow Sun Wong

the Supreme Court thus accorded a non-Title VII judicial

remedy for a claim of federal employment discrimination.

By its action on the very same day Brown was decided,

the Court made clear that the “exc’sive remedy” lan-

guage applies only to employment discrimination covered

by Title VII.

[11] We need not, however, rely solely on Mow Sun

Wong. The whole structure of the Court’s argument in

Brown has no relevance to discriminations not within

Title VII’s domain. The Court first argued that when

Congress extended Title VII to federal employment in

1972 it believed, rightly or wrongly, that no other remedy

existed. From this the Court deducted that Congress

fashioned a remedy believed adequate standing alone to

cure the discriminatory ills being brought within the

ambit of Title VII. But Congress’s belief that no remedy

existed, coupled with its failure to enact any remedy,

scarcely demonstrates a belief that no remedy was needed

for discrimination left outside Title VII. For, as is well

established, Congress need not address all facets of a

problem in a single piece of legislation; it is free to enact

remedial legislation element by element at a pace most

acceptable to the legislative mind. See, e.g., Railway

Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110, 69 S.Ct.

463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949).

was actually intended to serve the asserted national interest. Because

the rule had been adopted by the Civil Service Commission, whose

only concern was the promotion of an efficient federal service, the

Court found no basis for assuming that it was in fact intended to

further any overriding national interests. Accordingly, the Court

invalidated the rule, at least pending presidential or congressional

approval of its policy.

1* Mow Sun Wong was not a damages case and does not preclude

Brown from being read to make Title VII the exclusive damages

remedy for claims of federal employment discrimination. Mow Sun

Wong does conclusively establish, however, that the Court’s broad

language in Brown is subject to qualifications, and for the reasons

developed herein we see no reason to strain to make Brown’s lan-

guage applicable to our case.

27

The Brown Court’s second line of argument is equally

inapplicable to discriminations outside Title VII. It rea-

soned that

[t]he balance, completeness and structural integrity

of § 717 are inconsistent with the petitioner’s con-

tention that the judicial remedy afforded by § 717(c)

was designed merely to supplement other putative

judicial relief.

425 U.S. at 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1968, 48 L.Ed.2d at 411.

The Court was certainly correct that the “balance,

completeness and structural integrity” of the statute

would be undermined if its 30-day limitations period

could be rendered meaningless by bringing an action on

some other basis. The “structural integrity” of the

statutory prerequisites to invoking Title VII cannot be

undermined, however, by the provision of a remedy for

conduct not governed by Title VII. Our decision leaves

Title VII fully operative within its sphere.

In addition, we note another obstacle preventing Brown

from affecting our case. The Bivens remedy is based on

the Constitution itself. We remain ever willing to defer

to congressional views, but we cannot do so at the ex-

pense of constitutional principles. Nothing in Bivens

suggests Congress could repeal the damiages remedy with-

out enacting a suitable alternative. The Court did say,

in rejecting defendants’ argument that the issue was

whether the damages remedy was “necessary” to enforce

the fourth amendment, that “we have here no explicit

congressional declaration that persons injured by a fed-

eral officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may

not recover money damages from the agents, but must

instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective

in the view of Congress.” 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at

2005. The case at bar is no different in this respect than

Bivens. The 1972 additions to Title VII cannot be said

to constitute an “explicit” congressional disapproval of

the damages remedy, and more fundamentally there is

not “another remedy, equally effective in the view of Con-

gress,” to which Davis has been remitted. Moreover,

even if we somehow ignored these plain truths, the Bivens

28

passage would simply mean that the relevant inquiry

would be whether a damages remedy is “necessary” to

enforce the fifth amendment due process clause. Under

this framing of the issue, at least until an alternative

remedy were made available, Davis would still prevail.

Congress is free to enact an adequate substitute remedy;

to that extent the Bivens remedy therefore constitutes

constitutional common law. See Monaghan, The Supreme

Court, 1974 Term—Forword: Constitutional Common

Law, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 23-24 (1975). Congress has not

done so, however, and the constitutionally-based Bivens

damages remedy is available to Davis here.

When we deal, as we do here, with centrifugal and

centripetal forces in operation, we, as judges, must come

to a stasis, but in arriving there we do not draw the life-

blood from the legislative process nor skeletonize the con-

stitutional rights with which every citizen is endowed

even when dealing with Congress. The exemption of Con-

gress from Title VII does not have a cosmic cover. Title

VII among other things implements constitutional rights,

but here an open declaration of non-implementation be-

cause of the exemption accorded Congress does not im-

port into our case the exclusivity of Title VII actions.

When the statute affords relief from a constitutional in-

vasion, the statutory methodology should be followed, but

when the statute does not attempt to implement the con-

stitutional rights sought to be vindicaed, we cannot then

use the statute as the sword to demean or to eliminate

the constitutional right. The constitutional right stands

on its own words without the necessity of Title VII’s

supporting procedures. Title VII’s exemptions cannot

build a haven for constitutional transgressors.

[12] One last issue regarding Brown’s effect on the

Bivens cause of action remains to be canvassed. Con-

gress could attempt to remove the federal courts’ juris-

diction to hear such claims. Jurisdiction here is predi-

cated upon 28 U.S.C. § 13381(a), as it was in Bivens.

The amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. Any argu-

ment that in expanding Title VII in 1972 Congress ex-

cepted constitutionally-based federal employment discrimi-

nation claims from § 1331 must be rejected out of hand.

SG NED.

SNe es

—

= oe E

ee Se ees @:

SE LE IS EE PCR wae

29

Congress did not speak in jurisdictional terms, nor did

the Court in Brown v. General Services Administration,

supra, when it employed the “exclusive judicidal remedy”

language. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, supra, the

Court exercised § 1331 jurisdiction over a constitutional

challenge to federal employment discrimination, indicat-

ing that the Court did not read Title VII’s provisions as

taking such claims out of § 1331." We hold that the dis-

trict court has jurisdiction to adjudicate Davis’s Bivens

action on its merits. The damages remedy is available."

3. Sovereign Immunity

After carefully reviewing a variety of sovereign im-

munity decisions we are perhaps to be excused for con-

17 Moreover, any denial of jurisdiction to hear Davis’s claim would

itself raise grave constitutional issues. Congress can limit the fed-

eral courts’ jurisdiction to afford one remedy when minimally ade-

quate alternative remedies are available, see, e.g., Yakus v. United

States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944); Lockerty v.

Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 63 S.Ct. 1019, 87 L.Ed. 1339 (1943), but our

entire constitutional structure and the great esteem we accord

individual rights dictate the conclusion that Congress cannot fore-

close the last avenue of redress for a constitutional deprivation. See

generally, P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro and H. Wechsler, Hart

and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and The Federal System 330

60 (2nd Ed. 1973) (the “Dialogue’”). In the usual situation Con-

gress may have plenary authority to remove the federal courts’

jurisdiction because the state courts, having general jurisdiction,

remain open to redress constitutional wrongs. The authority of

state courts to render relief against a United States Representative

under the circumstances here, however, is subject to doubt. Cf.

Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 20 L.Ed. 597 (1872). In the

absence of any indication that Congress intended the Title VII

amendments to cut back on § 1331, we will not attribute to them a

meaning of such doubtful constitutionality. Cf. Johnson v. Robison,

415 U.S. 361, 366-67, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974); Wein-

berger Vv. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 761, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d

522 (1975); Gallo v. Mathews, 538 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1976).

18 Indeed, at oral argument the Representative’s attorney appar-

ently conceded that Bivens controls:

Your honor, I acknowledge to the court that if this court should

find that there is a federally constituted right then Bivens

versus the seven narcotics folks does imply a right of action.

30

cluding that the doctrine’s primary effect has been to in-

ject confusion into lawsuits involving the government

and its agents. In the case at bar, however, the district

court was not misled. It properly rejected the sovereign

immunity plea.

[13] At this point we address the applicability of

sovereign immunity only to damages actions. When, as

here, an action seeks to impose liability upon a govern-

ment official in an individual capacity, sovereign im-

munity poses no bar. Although sovereign immunity

sometimes shields the United States Treasury from a

plaintiff’s claims, it does not protect the personal check-

book of an individual government official to any extent

at all.

Representative Passman does not contest these prin-

ciples, nor could he in light of the myriad cases incon-

sistent with any other view of sovereign immunity. For

example, Bivens itself would have been barred if actions

against government officials individually came within the

sovereign immunity doctrine.

[14,15] The contention Representative Passman does

make is that this action is really an attempt to recover

against the United States Treasury. Admittedly, Davis’s

complaint is not free of ambiguity. She did use the phrase

“back pay” in her relief prayer, and we could conceiv-

ably construe “back pay” as limited to salary from the

government rather than damages from Representative

Passman individually. Her claim would then contravene

Penn Vv. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd

on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en

banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 2646, 49

L.Ed.2d 385 (1976) where we held sovereign immunity

a bar to two forms of money relief “both of which would

impinge upon the Treasury.” 490 F.2d at 705. We re-

fuse, however, to give the complaint such a niggardly,

technical construction. Davis’s position in this court

makes clear that she seeks damages from the Represen-

tative individually, not merely government-paid salary.

Moreover, a reading of the complaint as a whole accords

with this ~ She alleged other items of damages

Od CA a ME hn

;

1

i

|

4

31

besides lost salary, including injury to reputation,”® and

in addition to “back pay” her relief prayer sought “such

other and further relief as may be proper.” The named

defendant was, of course, Representative Passman, not

the United States of America. To read Davis’s com-

plaint as not seeking damages against Representative

Passman individually would require a return to the

technicalities of the common law writ system. The Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure countenance no such result.

Sovereign immunity does not bar Davis’s claim.”°

4. Speech or Debate

[16,17] We turn now to whether the doctrine of

legislative immunity, which in the federal context as-

sumes constitutional stature under the speech or debate

clause,” absolutely shields Representative Passman from

1° Davis can of course recover lost salary in addition to these

other items of damages; we advert to the other items to illustrate

that Davis did not use “back pay” in any restricted sense meaning

government-paid salary only.

20 A somewhat related line of cases in this circuit deals with

whether a city employee can recover money when unconstitutionally

discharged. Because a city is not a “person” within 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

that statute does not authorize a “back pay” award that would run

against the city, even if the nominal defendants are city officials.

Thurston V. Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264, 1269 (5th Cir. 1976). But a re-

covery of money from individuals rather than the city is available.

See Muzquiz Vv. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499, 500 n. 5 (5th Cir.

1976) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3727 (U.S.

May 27, 1976). Although the issue of who is a “person” within

§ 1983 obviously is not the same as the issue of the scope of federal

sovereign immunity, the Muzquiz distinction between money awards

against governments and those against individual officers has the

same effect in both situations. Whatever relief Davis’s complaint

would be construed as seeking if this were a § 1983 action involving

a city, however, we construe it under the circumstances here as

seeking damages against Representative Passman individually.

21 The Constitution provides:

The Senators and Representatives ... shall in all Cases,

except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged

from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of the

respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the

32

any suit challenging a decision to dismiss an employee.”

The Supreme Court has decided a series of speech or

debate cases but has not confronted the precise situation

before us. The Court has held that members of Con-

gress are immune from judicial inquiry into their votes,

Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 26 L.Ed. 377

(1881); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 93 S.Ct. 2018,

36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973), their speeches on the floor of

Congress, United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 86

S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966), their decisions to

circulate information to other members of Congress, Doe

v. McMillan, supra, their participation in committee

investigations and proceedings, Doe v. McMillan, supra;

Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33

L.Ed.2d 583 (1972); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S.

82, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967); cf. Tenney

v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019

(1951), and their issuance of subpoenas pursuant to a

legitimate committee investigation, Eastland v. United

States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 95 S.Ct. 1818,

44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975). Members of Congress are not

immune, on the other hand, from judicial inquiry into

their public distribution of materials gathered by com-

mittees, Doe v. McMillan, supra; Gravel v. United States,

supra, or their acceptance of bribes in return for votes

on pending legislative business, United States v. Brews-

ter, 408 U.S. 501, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972).

same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall

not be questioned in any other place.

U.S. Const. art. 1 § 6.

The freedom from arrest does not prohibit service of process, see

Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 614-15, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33

L.Ed.2d 583 (1972), and is inapplicable here.

22 We view “legislative immunity,” sometimes referred to as “con-

gressional immunity,” as coextensive in the federal context with

speech or debate protection. The terms all refer to the absolute im-

munity that members of Congress (and sometimes their function-

aries) possess for certain legislative acts. We use the phrase “official

immunity” to describe more generally the varying levels of “good

faith,” “privilege” or “immunity” defenses that numerous govern-

ment officials can assert.

33

While none of these cases involved the dismissal of a

staff member, we think their language and rationale com-

pel a rejection of Representative Passman’s immunity de-

fense. We begin with a statement of the defense’s

purpose:

The purpose of the protection afforded legislators

is not to forestall judicial review of legislative ac-

tion but to insure that legislators are not distracted

from or hindered in the performance of their legis-

lative tasks by being called into court to defend

their actions.

Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486, 505, 89 S.Ct. 1944,

1955, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).

One could argue on Representative Passman’s behalf

that calling him into court to defend any action, whether

related to congressional business or to his personal con-

tracts or torts, risks distracting him from “legislative

tasks.” Supreme Court decisions, however, make clear

that the speech or debate clause does not prohibit all

such distractions. Calling Senator Gravel into court to

testify concerning his arrangements with Beacon Press

to publish the “Pentagon Papers,’’ which he had earlier

read into the Congressional Record, might have distracted

him from legislative business, but the Court said Gravel

was nonetheless not exempt from the inquiry. Gravel v.

United States, supra, 408 U.S. at 622, 92 S.Ct. 2614.

Gravel and other opinions finding the legislative im-

munity cloak wanting in particular settings, see United

States v. Brewster, supra; Doe v. McMillan, supra, 412

U.S. at 314-15, 93 S.Ct. 2018, conclusively establish that

subjecting Representative Passman to a damages action

does not, without more, contravene the speech or debate

clause.

[18,19] Rather than blanket immunity from burden-

some litigation, the clause provides protection only against

inquiries into legislative policy-formulation processes. En-

acting legislation is the province of Congress and Con-

gress alone. The speech or debate clause assures mem-

bers of Congress that their actions in formulating and

enacting legislation, from the committee stage through

34

voting, will not be subjected to judicial (or executive )

inquiry. But the immunized act must be intimately cog-

nate to the legislative process. The reason for an absolute

rather than qualified immunity is that the prospect of an

unsuccessful but burdensome lawsuit might affect a legis-

lator’s performance of his or her legislative duties, thus

distorting the democratic process. Because of our devo-

tion to an unfettered representative government, we

foreclose even well-founded lawsuits challenging the per-

formance by members of Congress of their legislative

roles.

The language of the Supreme Court’s speech or debate

decisions supports this view. Tenney v. Brandhove, supra,

announced that legislators are protected when “acting in

the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” 841 USS.

at 376, 71 S.Ct. at 788 (emphasis added) .* More re-

cent cases have elaborated on Tenney’s oft-cited formula.

In Gravel v. United States, swpra, the Court said:

The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to as-

sure a co-equal branch of the government wide

freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without

intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch.

It thus protects Members against prosecutions that

directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative

process.

408 U.S. at 616, 92 S.Ct. at 2622 (emphasis added).™

The Court said the clause’s purpose was “freeing the

legislator from executive and judicial oversight that

realistically threatens to control his conduct as a legis-

lator,” 408 U.S. at 618, 92 S.Ct. at 2623 (emphasis

23 We adopted the Tenney formula in City of Safety Harbor vy.

Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1976).

2*This passage from Gravel was emphasized again in EZastiand

v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, supra, 421 U.S. at 503, 95

S.Ct. at 1821-22, 44 L.Ed.2d at 336. The issuance of subpoenas as

part of a legitimate committee investigation was found to be an

integral part of the process by which members participate in House

proceedings with respect to the formulation and consideration of

legislation; accordingly, speech or debate protection attached.

59

added), adding that the three earlier speech or debate

cases, Kilbourn, Dombrowski and Powell,

reflect a decidedly jaundiced view towards ex-

tending the Clause so as to privilege illegal or un-

constitutional conduct beyond that essential to fore-

close executive control of legislative speech or de-

bate and associated matters such as voting and com-

mittee reports and proceedings.

408 U.S. at 620, 92 S.Ct. at 2625. The Court reiterated

that “the Clause has not been extended beyond the legis-

lative sphere”, and, of particular relevance here, the

Court emphasized that the fact that “Senators generally

perform certain acts in their official capacity as Senators

does not necessarily make all such acts legislative in

nature.” 408 U.S. at 624-25, 92 S.Ct. at 2627. The

Gravel Court continued:

Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The

heart of the Clause is speech or debate in either

House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach

other matters, they must be an integral part of the

deliberative and communicative processes by which

Members participate in committee and House pro-

ceedings with respect to the consideration and pas-

Sage or rejection of proposed legislation or with re-

spect to other matters which the Constitution places

within the jurisdiction of either House. As the

Court of Appeals put it, the courts have extended

the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or de-

bate in either House, but “only when necessary to

prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations.”

United States v. Doe, tst Cir., 455 F.2d at 760.

408 U.S. at 625, 92 S.Ct. at 2627. The Court then stated

its holding:

“Here, private publication by Senator Gravel

through the cooperation of Beacon Press was in

no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate;

nor does questioning as to private publication

threaten the integrity or independence of the Senate

36

by impermissibly exposing its deliberations to execu-

tive influence.

408 U.S. at 625, 92 S.Ct. at 2627.

A year later in Doe v. McMillan, supra, the Supreme

Court reiterated the limited scope of the clause. In re-

jecting the argument that publication and distribution

of a committee report was essential to the legislative

process and therefore within the speech or debate clause,

the Court said, “Our cases make perfectly apparent .. .

that everything a Member of Congress may regularly

do is not a legislative act within the protection of the

Speech or Debate Clause.” 412 U.S. at 318, 93 S.Ct.

at 2025. The Court added, “‘[t]his Court has not hesi-

tated to sustain the rights of private individuals when

it found Congress was acting outside its legislative

3 ae

role.” 412 U.S. at 320, 93 S.Ct. at 2028, quoting Tenney /

v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S. at 377, 71 S.Ct. 783 \

(brackets in original). Finally, the Court said,

The business of Congress is to legislate; Congress-

men and aids are absolutely immune when they are

legislating. But when they act outside the ‘sphere

of legitimate legislative activity,’ Tenney v. Brand-

hove, 341 U.S., at 376, 71 S.Ct. 783, they enjoy no

special immunity from local laws....

412 US. at 324, 93 S.Ct. at 2030.

These statements compel the conclusion that representa-

tives are not immune from inquiry into their decisions

to dismiss staff members. Such dismissal decisions cer-

tainly are not “an integral part of the deliberative and

communicative processes by which Members participate

in committee and House proceedings with respect to the

consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legis-

lation or with respect to other matters which the Con-

stitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.”

Gravel v. United States, supra, 408 U.S. at 625, 92 S.Ct.

at 2627. Peripheral or tangential activities of a rep-

resentative must not be confused with the legislative

core. A representative’s transgressions are not given ab-

solute absolution. The Constitution establishes an im-

r

~

BIKES ss

nb ie AD tenet BAe LBRO ERE FP OPT

a

37

munity for aberrations in a representative’s legislative

activities, but members of Congress become mere mortals

when they operate in more mundane fields. When mem-

bers of Congress dismiss employees they are neither

legislating nor formulating legislation. The fear of ju-

dicial inquiry into dismissal decisions cannot possibly

affect a legislator’s decisions on matters pending before

Congress. The democratic process remains unfettered.’

Our decision today does no more than give effect to the

Supreme Court’s mandate in Gravel: “Legislators ought

not to stand above the law they create but ought gen-

erally to be bound by it as are ordinary persons.” 408

U.S. at 615, 92 S.Ct. at 2622. If legislators are bound

by the law they create, they are even more clearly bound

by the United States Constitution. The very premise

*° One could argue on Representative Passman’s behalf that, be-

cause high-ranking staff members may sometimes affect a legis-

lator’s performance of his or her deliberative role, dismissal de-

cisions should be protected by the speech or debate clause. The justi-

fication for establishing absolute immunity would be that the fear

of an unfounded but burdensome lawsuit might influence a decision

whether to fire an assistant, thereby impermissibly affecting the

legislative process.

We find, however, that such an argument cannot help Representa-

tive Passman. Our decision leaves members of Congress free to dis-

miss staff members for any reason or for no reason, so long as broad

limits established by the Constitution are not exceeded. Represent-

atives will be afforded a broad good faith defense, see page 881,

infra, and will be subject to liability in only the most egregious

cases. The very low likelihood of recovery in unfounded cases will

make the number of filings low. Moreover, summary judgment

procedures, if applied judiciously, will minimize any burden. The

chance that a legislator’s dismissal decision will be affected by the

prospect of a burdensome but meritless suit is therefore remote.

The prospect that a dismissal decision will in turn affect the legis-

lative process is also extremely remote. These layered causation

gaps defeat the argument for absolute immunity. By limiting repre-

sentatives to qualified immunity we achieve the immunity doctrine’s

goals without needlessly sacrificing the availability of redress for

clear constitutional violations.

Moreover, on this record we have no way of knowing whether

Davis’s position gave Ler a meaningful input into the Represent-

ative’s legislative decisionmaking. Even if speech or debate pro-

tection extended to decisions to dismiss high-ranking assistants, the

clause would not sustain the Representative’s 12(b)(6) motion here.

38

upon which the Constitution stands is the equality of all

persons before the law. Exceptions to that premise must

be limited, guarded, and sparingly employed. Davis is

entitled to have her claim heard on the merits.

5. Qualified Immunity

The inapplicability of speech or debate protection does

not foreclose Representative Passman from asserting the

same qualified immunity available to other government

officials. See generally Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,

95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) ; Scheuer v. Rhodes,

416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1688, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).*

Although Wood and Scheuer were § 1983 actions, their

reasoning is equally applicable to this action founded

directly on the constitution. Cf. Bevins v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456

F.2d 1339, 1848 (2d Cir. 1972) (on remand) (Lum-

bard, J., concurring).

[20,21] The inapplicability of speech or debate pro-

tection does, however, foreclose Representative Passman

from asserting an absolute official immunity such as that

recognized in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct.

984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Speech or debate protection

is coextensive with the need to afford members of Con-

gress absolute immunity. Absolute immunity extends

only to certain key governmental officials, and then only

when they are governing. It extends to prosecutors when

they are prosecuting, Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, to

judges when they are judging, see Pierson v. Ray, 386

U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), and to

legislators when they are legislating, e.g., Kilburn Vv.

Thompson, supra. As indicated, however, legislators are

not legislating when they dismiss staff members. For the

same reasons that the speech or debate clause does not

extend to staff dismissals, Representative Passman can-

not invoke absolute immunity.

Qualified immunity is available “in varying scope,”

“the variation being dependent upon the scope of dis-

cretion and responsibilities of the office and all the cir-

26 We use “qualified immunity” as synonymous with “good faith

defense.” See note 22 supra.

39

cumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of

the action on which lidpility is sought to be based.”

Scheuer v. Rhodes, suprd, 416 U.S. at 247-48, 94 S.Ct.

at 1692. The legitimate interest in assuring members

of Congress broad discretion in their staffing decisions

and the importance of staffing decisions to a legislator’s

performance dictate that the scope of the Representative’s

qualified immunity is broad. In limiting the immunity

to “good faith, non-malicious action,” however, the Court

in Wood v. Strickland made clear that a violation of

constitutional rights could not be justified by “ignorance

or disregard of settled, indisputable law”. 420 U.S. at

321, 95 S.Ct. at 999-1000, 43 L.Ed.2d at 225.*7 In light

of the settled, indisputable principle that federal govern-

ment sex discriminations not supported by rational (or

perhaps compelling) legitimate justifications are uncon-

stitutional, see, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.

677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973), the like-

lihood that Representative Passman will be able suc-

cessfully to maintain a good faith defense even under

the liberal standard governing congressional staffing de-

cisions appears very remote.** Because this case must

be remanded for a trial at which Representative Passman

will be free to press his claim that the dismissal was not

based on Davis’s gender, however, we need do no more

at this stage than point out that any qualified immunity

plea will be governed by the principles to which we have

adverted. The determniation that Representative Pass-

man cannot claim absolute immunity is sufficient to re-

“7 Wood involved school officials, but we have applied its principles

more broadly. See Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Serv-

ice, 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Morris v. Travisono, 528

F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1976); Mukmuk v. Commissioner of Dep’t of

Correctional Services, 529 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1976); Hanneman v.

Breier, 528 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976).

28 The good faith defense must of course be distinguished from a

defense denying that the firing was discriminatory. The former

asserts that the firing was unconstitutiunal but that the Represent-

ative acted in good faith and therefore should not be held liable.

The latter asserts that gender was not the basis of the dismissal

and that the dismissal therefore was not unconstitutional. Wood

makes a successful assertion of the former defense unlikely, Wood

does not affect the latter defense.

40

quire reversal of the dismissal given in his favor. See,

e.g., Scheuer V. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 282, 239, 94 S.Ct. 1683,

40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829

(5th Cir. 1976).

C. Declaratory Relief

The final form of relief that Davis seeks is declaratory.

Although a claim for declaratory relief could be pursued

independently of any right to other types of relief, see

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518, 89 S.Ct. 1944,

23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), the absence of any forward-

looking scope of operation for any declaration of Davis’s

rights as against Representative Passman, whose con-

gressional tenure is virtually at its end, would make the

propriety of such a declaration questionable.” This issue

loses its significance, however, in view of our holding

that a damages remedy is available. We therefore de-

cline to pass on the propriety of declaratory relief.

III. Conclusion

In summary, taking the complaint’s allegations as

true, Representative Passman’s dismissal of a staff mem-

ber on the basis of gender violated the equal protection

component of the fifth amendment due process clause.

Under Bivens the Constitution itself affords the dis-

missed staff member a damages remedy. Sovereign im-

munity does not bar a damages award against the Rep-

resentative individually. The speech or debate clause

does not extend to staff dismissals because they are not

“legislative tasks” within the Supreme Court holdings.

Finally, the existence of qualified immunity cannot sup-

port the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

JONES, Circuit Judge (dissenting) :

It seems to me that the judges should refrain from

wearing their robes in the halls of the Congress. The

doctrine of separation of powers should, I believe, require

the affirmance of the dismissal of the action.

2° Davis has not alleged a desire to work for other representatives

whose employment decisions might be affected by the resolution of

her constitutional claims.

a

oe

RE ON - DO

A: AP BOR LYE Ih A 5

41

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

(Title omitted in printing)

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC—

Filed February 16, 1977

NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel,

comes Defendant-Appellee, OTTO E. PASSMAN, who

respectfully petitions this Court for a rehearing en banc

for the following reasons:

A.

I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied

professional judgment, that the panel decision is con-

trary to the following decisions of the Supreme Court of

the United States and that consideration by the full

court is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of

decisions: Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund,

421 US 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 US 306

(1973); and Gravel v. United States, 408 US 606, reh

den 409 US 902 (1972).

2.

I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied

professional judgment, that this appeal involves one or

more questions of exceptional importance: 1. Whether

the hiring and firing of staff members by Congressmen

is protected from judicial inquiry by Article 1, Section

6 of the United States Constitution. 2. Whether the

hiring and firing of staff members by Congressmen is a

42

political question, thus rendering the controversy non-

justiciable. i

HupDsoNn, Potts & BERNSTEIN

Post Office Drawer 3008

Monroe, Louisiana 71201

By /s/ Jesse D. McDonald

JESSE D. MCDONALD

Attorney of record for

Otto E. Passman,

Defendant-Appellant

rhe MOE” LLL ES, te ibis 4 bl

Ce el OL CEE 57,

SB Ft HO ITE 1

SRLS Aaa

48

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-1691

SHIRLEY DAVIS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

versus

OTTO E, PASSMAN, CONGRESSMAN OF THE UNITED STATES,

DEFENDANT-APPFLLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Louisiana

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND

PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion January 3, 1977, 5 Cir. 197—, ——- F2d ——-)

ORDER—May 17, 1977

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, THORNBERRY, COLEMAN,

GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, MORGAN,

CLARK, RONEY, GEE, TJOFLAT, HILL and FAy,

Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

A member of the Court in active service having re-

quested a poil on the application for rehearing en banc

and a majority of the judges in attive service having

voted in favor of granting a rehearing en banc,

IT IS ORDERED that the cause shall be reheard by

the Court en banc with oral argument on a date here-

after to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a briefing sched-

ule for the filing of supplemental briefs.

44

HE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

sage FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-1691

SHIRLEY DAVIS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

v.

OTTO E. PASSMAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT CouURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

OPINION—April 18, 1978

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, JONES, THORNBERRY,

COLEMAN, GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, MORGAN,

CLARK, RONEY, GEE, TJOFLAT, HILL and Fay, Circuit

Judges.

CHARLES CLARK, Circuit Judge:

In today’s decision the court en bane reverses a panel

opinion which implied a cause of action for money dam-

ages from the Due Process Clause of the fifth amend-

ment to the Constitution.’ ‘

1 The opinion of the panel, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977), had, in

turn, reversed the district court’s dismissal of a complaint filed by

a discharged female congressional employee.

45

In her complaint, Ms. Shirley Davis alleged that former

Louisiana Congressman Otto Passman dismissed her as

his Deputy Administrative Assistant solely because she

was a woman and he wanted a man in the position. Davis

claimed Passman’s actions violated the equal protection

component of the fifth amendment Due Process Clause.

Invoking the court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331

(a), she sought specific relief, damages, and declaratory

relief. Because Passman’s service in Congress ended after

the suit was brought, the claim has narrowed to one for

recovery of money damages. The district court based its

dismissal of the complaint on alternative grounds: (1)

that the law affords Davis no private right of action and

(2) that the conduct of which she complained did not

violate the Constitution. Addressing only the surviving

claim for money damages, we affirm the district court’s

dismissal on the first ground.

The roster of constitutional rights which have been

held to support implied damage actions began its growth

with the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Bivens v.

Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619

(1971). In Bivens, the Court noted that historically dam-

ages have been regarded as the “ordinary remedy for an

invasion of personal interests in liberty,” and implied a

cause of action for money damages for the invasion of the

plaintiff’s liberty which abridged his fourth amendrient

rights. 403 U.S. at 395, 91 S.Ct. at 2004, 29 L.Ed.2d at

626.

Although the Supreme Court has neither extended nor

further explained its initial position, many inferior fed-

eral courts have cited Bivens as authorizing implied ac-

tions for money damages based on constitutional rights

other than the fourth amendment.? Generally, these deci-

* Apart from the Due Process Clauses, lower federal courts have

looked favorably upon Bivens actions based upon the first, sixth,

eighth, ninth, and thirteenth amendments. See, e.g., Cox v. Stanton,

529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975) (thirteenth and fourteenth amend-

ments); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 870 (3d Cir. 1975) (first

amendment) ; Jihaad v. Carlson, 410 F.Supp. 1132 (E.D.Mich. 1976)

(first and eighth amendments); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rums-

46

sions have recognized implicitly that Bivens has some yet

unreached limits. Only isolated district court decisions

have asserted that Bivens created damage actions for

violation of constitutional rights as broadly as if it had

decreed that 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 applied to the federal

government. This appeal requires either that we join

other circuits in projecting the scope of Bivens to the Due

Process Clauses of the fourteenth and fifth amendments,*

feld, 410 F.Supp. 144, 160-62 (D.D.C. 1976) (first and sixth amend-

ments); Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F.Supp. 737 (E.D.Ill. 1975) (fifth

and eighth amendments). See also M. Lehmann, Bivens and Its

Progency, 4 Hastings Const. L.Q. 531, 566-72 (1977).

3E.g., Saffron v. Wilson, 70 F.R.D. 51, 53 n.1 (D.D.C. 1975)

(“This holding [Bivens] has been interpreted almost unanimously

as recognizing a cause of action for damages for violation of any

constitutionally protected interest.”); Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F.

Supp. 1389, 1398 (N.D. Ill. 1974). (“Bivens recognizes a cause of

action for damages for violation of any constitutionally protected

interest.” )

4 Several circuits have allowed plaintiffs to base Bivens implied

actions solely upon the concept of due process: the Second Circuit,

Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1977) (fourteenth

amendment); the Third Circuit, United States ex rel. Moore V.

Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1972) (fifth amendment) ; but

see Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977) (declining to

allow cause of action on fourteenth amendment alone) ; the Fourth

Circuit, States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1156-57

(4th Cir. 1974) (fifth amendment) ; the Seventh Circuit, Fitzgerald

v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 523 F.2d 716, 718-19 & n.7 (7th Cir.

1975) (denying relief, but holding action could be brought solely

under fourteenth amendment) ; the Eighth Circuit, Owen v. City of

Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 932 (8th Cir. 1977) (fourteenth amend-

ment in suit seeking back pay); the Ninth Circuit, Jacobson V.

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 928, 936-37, 941-43

(9th Cir. 1977) (one cause of action available on fifth amendment

just compensation clause and another on fifth amendment due

process clause).

Other circuits have commented favorably upon extension of

Bivens to actions implied from the concept of due process: the

Tenth Circuit, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d

926, 982 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1975) (apparently referring to the fifth

amendment) ; the D.C. Circuit, e.g., Lewis v. D.C. Dep’s of Correc-

tions, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 483, 484, 533 F.2d 710, 711 (1976).

[Footnote continued on page 47 |

a

as alk AAR appeal ie

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a

47

or decline to follow their precedents. A choice is not

foreclosed. In more than one decision the Supreme Court

specifically has pointed out that this issue remains open.‘

Our own decisions appear equivocal on this point. We

have ruled district courts erred in finding no jurisdiction

to consider damage claims based upon implied causes of

action under the Due Process Clauses of both the fifth

amendment, Weir v. Muller, 527 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1976)

and the fourteenth amendment, Reeves v. City of Jack-

son, 582 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Roane v.

Callisburg I ndependent School District, 511 F.2d 683, 635

n.l (5th Cir. 1975) ; United Farmworkers of Florida

Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d

799, 801-02 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1974); Traylor v. City of

Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156, 1157 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974). How-

ever, in Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th

Cir. 1977) (en bane), we expressly declined to speak as

an en banc court on the appropriateness of extending

Bivens beyond the fourth amendment. Now we find our-

ny face-to-face with the necessity to take a firm posi-

ion.

To decide whether to imply a cause of action fo

damages from the fifth amendment Due Wiaites Slenns,

we must examine Bivens itself. While Bivens is not with-

out ambiguity, the analysis employed by the Court shows

that the cause of action created is not wholly of constitu-

* [Continued]

The First Circuit has declined to im j i

ie First ply a cause of action against

municipalities from the fourteenth amendment Due Process -, 0

to grant damages for wrongful death. Kostka v

37, 44 (1st Cir. 1977). a Vv. Hogg, 560 F.2d

°In several cases since Bivens, the Supreme Court

left open the question whether an alin for renin ren img

implied from the Due Process Clauses. Mt. Healthy School Dist. v

Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277, 97 S.Ct. 568, 571, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 477

(1977) ; Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 3 n.3, 96 S.Ct. 2413 2415

16 n.3, 49 L.Ed.2d 276, 280 n.3 (1976); City of Charlotte v. Local

660, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283, 284 n.1, 96 S.Ct. 2036

2038 n.1, 48 L.Ed.2d 636, 639 n.1 (1976) ; District of Columbia v.

Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432-33, 93 S.Ct. 602, 610, 34 L.Ed.2d 618. 624

(1973). See also City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507. 514. 93

S.Ct. 2222, 2227, 37 L.Ed.2d 109, 116 (1973). aes

48

tional dimensions. The opinion of the Court expressly

states:

we cannot accept respondents’ formulation of the

question as whether the availability of money dam-

ages is necessary to enforce the Fourth Amendment.

For we have here no explicit congressional declara-

tion that persons injured by a federal officer’s viola-

tion of the Fourth Amendment may not recover

money damages from the agents, but must instead be

remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the

view of Congress.

403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005, 29 L.Ed.2d at 627. The

cases relied upon for guidance by the Court in Bivens

dealt with implying a cause of action from federal stat-

utes that created rights but provided no federal remedy.‘

Moreover, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45

L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), the Supreme Court’s most compre-

hensive treatment of implied statutory causes of action,

the Court relied upon Bivens to support two points of its

four-part statutory analysis.’

If the fourth amendment had mandated a cause of

action for monetary damages, Bivens would have had no

oceasion to consult or discuss the action or inaction of

Congress. Since the Court explicitly reasoned its prece-

6 See 403 U.S. at 396-97, 91 S.Ct. at 2005, 29 L.Ed.2d at 626-27,

citing J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 1560,

12 L.Ed.2d 423, 428 (1964) (federal securities laws); Wheeldin v.

Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 83 S.Ct. 1441, 10 L.Ed.2d 605 (1963) (action

for abuse of process through misuse of statute governing Congress’

subpoena power); United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 74 S.Ct.

695, 98 L.Ed. 898 (1954) (indemnity action by government under

Federal Tort Claims Act) ; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332

U.S. 301, 311, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609-10, 91 L.Ed. 2067, 2073 (1947)

(government sought implied remedy, based upon established com-

mon law action).

7 Bivens is cited in Cort to support the proposition that causes of

action for damages should not be implied to govern matters ‘‘tradi-

tionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of

the States,” 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d at 36, and

the proposition that where such actions have been implied, “there

has generally been a clearly articulated federal right in the plain-

tiff,” id. at 82, 95 S.Ct. at 2090, 45 L.Ed.2d at 39.

Sia SRR PILING 2 1 ee La

ee ee Te ere

~

49

dent on the latter ground, we take the Bivens remedy to

be one implied as a matter of federal common law®* and

therefore subject, like all such law, to the power of Con-

gress to alter or withdraw. Therefore, we employ a two-

step analysis. First, we look to the jurisprudence of

statutory implication to determine whether to imply a

damage action of non-constitutional dimensions. Second,

if this initial inquiry does not suggest that such an ac-

tion should be implied, we must determine whether the

Constitution nevertheless compels the existence of a rem-

edy in damages to vindicate the rights asserted. See

Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1977). Apply-

ing this analysis to Davis’ claim, we find that the district

court properly concluded that no cause of action existed.

1] Courts have considered several factors in deter-

mining whether to imply a cause of action from a statu-

tory right: (1) whether the provision asserted creates

an especial right in the plaintiff, (2) whether the action

of Congress in the field indicates an intent to allow such

a remedy or at least an intent not to deny the remedy

(3) whether implication of the remedy would be con-

sistent with the purpose of the right asserted, and (4)

whether the cause of action implied would be one appro-

8 See Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 44 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1977). See

also Rodriguez Vv. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1198-94 (5th Cir. 1977)

(en banc). See generally Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning

Agency, 558 F.2d 928, 937 & n.14 (9th Cir. 1977) ; C. Wright, Fed-

eral Courts §60 (3d ed. 1976), citing D’Oench, Duhme & Co. V.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 465-75, 62 S.Ct. 676, 683-

88, 86 L.Ed. 956, 966, 971 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) :

Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and

statutes, and is conditionel by them. Within these limits, federal

courts are free to apply the traditional common-law technique

. decision and to draw upon all the sources of the common

Et oases

315 U.S. at 472, 62 S.Ct. at 686, 86 L.Ed. at 969; Monaghan, Fore-

pire Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 10-13, 22-26

( y.

Where a remedy is of constitutional dimensions and particular

elements are not subject to revisions by Congressional legislation,

the Court has clearly so indicated. See, e.g., Jacobs v. United States,

290 U.S. 54 S.Ct. 26, 78 L.Ed. 142 (1933); Seaboard Air Line Ry.

Co. Vv. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 43 S.Ct. 354, 67 L.Ed. 664 (1928).

50

priate for federal law. Cort Vv. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78, 95

S.Ct. at 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d at 36 (1975). Of course, the

factors examined in questions of implied statutory causes

of action, as set forth in Cort and preceding cases, cannot

be applied in precisely the same way where implying a

Bivens-type action is at issue. However, this circuit has

held that the Cort factors do not set forth a rigid pattern

of analysis that a court must follow precisely. Rather,

“the Court simply said that several factors were relevant

and worthy of consideration.” Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 561

F.2d 1178, 1188 (5th Cir. 1977).

Where federal courts have inferred a federal private

cause of action not expressly provided, there generally has

been a clearly articulated federal right in the plaintiff.

Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2090, 45

L.Ed.2d 26, 38 (1975), citing Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394-95, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2003-

04, 29 L.Ed.2d 619, 625-26 (1971). While the fifth amend-

ment right to due process certainly confers a right upon

Davis, the injury alleged here does not infringe this right

as directly as the injury inflicted in the unreasonable

search of Webster Bivens offended the fourth amendment.

The concept of due process encompasses virtually all of

the civil liberties derived from the Constitution. While

the fifth amendment Due Process Clause surely exists for

the “especial benefit” of Davis, as Cort required, it does

not exist with equal certainty to protect her tenure in a

noncompetitive personal aide position statutorily denomi-

nated as service at will. 2 U.S.C.A. § 92.

Cort looked to “legislative intent, explicit or implicit,

either to create such a remedy or to deny one.” 422 U.S.

at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d at 36. Bivens recog-

nized that congressional intent to create a remedy must

guide a court in determining whether to imply a remedy

from provisions of the Constitution. 403 U.S. at 396-97,

91 S.Ct. at 2004-05, 29 L.Ed.2d at 626-27. Congressional

remedial legislation for employment discrimination has

carefully avoided creating a cause of action for money

damages for one in Davis’ position. In Section 701, Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress excluded

the federal government from the general definition of

nee Deri mint DIOR le ae eT a i

51

“employer,” thus denying federal employees a statutory

damage actior under Title VII. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b).

In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to add Section 717,

which provided a separate administrative remedy for dis-

crimination in federal employment, but did not extend

the remedy to employees of Congress not in the competi-

tive service. Under Section 717, other federal employees

may have review in the federal courts of final action by

their employing agencies or the Civil Service Board of

Review, 42 US.C.A. § 2000e-16(a) (1974). Congres-

sional action in designing Title VII remedies shows Con-

gress adhered te the legislative judgment expressed in

the statute under which Davis was hired: Members of

a congressman’s personal staff are removable by him “at

any time .. . with or without cause.” 2 U.S.C.A. § 92.

Implying the cause of action asserted by Davis would

Lave the anomalous result of granting federal employees

in non-competitive positions, whom Congress did not in-

tend to protect, a remedy far more extensive than Con-

gress adopted for federal employees in the competitive

service, whom it did intend to protect. When Congress

enacted Section 717, it believed that no other effective

remedy existed for federal employees treated discrimina-

torily. See Brown v. General Services Admin., 425 U.S

820, 826-28, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1965-66, 48 L.Ed.2d 402, 407-

08 (1976); H.R.Rep.No. 92-238, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.

[1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News. pp. 2137, 2160.

However, in amending Title VII to make it the “exclu-

Sive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for

the redress of federal employment discrimination” for

those federal employees it covered,’ Congress did not

grant federal employees in the competitive service an

action for damages against their superiors in their in-

dividual capacities.» The Supreme Court has upheld the

exclusivity of Title VI Ias a remedy for federal employ-

ment discrimination against employees in the competitive

service whom it covers. In Brown, the Court held that

Congress could require federal employees alleging dis-

crimination to seek relief solely within the confines of

Title VII, a limitation which plaintiffs could not sur-

mount by the simple expedient of putting a different label

52

on the pleadings. 425 U.S. at 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1968, 48

L.Ed.2d at 411. Congress cannot have intended to deal

more generously with those in Davis’ position, from

whom it deliberately withheld protection.

Implying the cause of action asserted by Davis would

have the anomalous result of granting federal employees

in non-competitive positions, whom Congress did not in-

tent to protect, a remady far more extensive than Con-

gress adopted for federal employees in the competitive

enacted Section 717, it believed that no other effective

service, whom it did intend to protect. When Congress

remedy existed for federal employees treated discrimina-

torily. See Brown v. General Services Admin., 425 U.S.

820, 826-28, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1965-66, 48 L.Ed.2d 402, 407-

08 (1976); H.R.Rep.No. 92-238, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.,

[1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 2137, 2160.

However, in amending Title VII to make it the “ex-

clusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme

for the redress of federal employment discrimination”’

for those federal employees it covered,’ Congress did not

grant federal employees in the competitive service an

action for damages against their superiors in their indi-

vidual capacities.° The Supreme Court has upheld the

exclusivity of Title VII as a remedy for federal employ-

ment discrimination against employees in the competi-

tive service whom it covers. In Brown, the Court held

that Congress could require federal employees alleging

discrimination to seek relief solely within the confines

of Title VII, a limitation which plaintiffs could not sur-

mount by the simple expedient of putting a different

label on the pleadings. 425 U.S. at 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1968,

® 425 U.S. at 828, 96 S.Ct. at 1966, 48 L.Ed.2d at 408.

10 Section 717, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e 16(c) (1974), allows an em-

ployee or applicant aggrieved by final action or a failure to take

final action on his administrative complaint to file a civil action

under Section 706, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (1974), in which “the head

of the department, agency, or unit . . . shall be the defendant.”

However, under this section, federal defendants may be sued only

in their official capacities, and not as individuals. See Keeler v.

Hills, 408 F.Supp. 386, 387 (N.D.Ga. 1975); see also Jones v. Bren-

nan, 401 F.Supp. 622, 627 (N.D.Ga. 1975).

53

48 L.Ed.2d at 411. Congress cannot have intended to

deal more generously with those in Davis’ position, from

whom it deliberately withheld protection.

Cort calls for an examination of the consistency of a

Statutory cause of action with the statutory scheme en-

acted by Congress. 422 U.S. at 78, 84, 95 S.Ct. at 2088

2090-91, 45 L.Ed.2d at 39. The Court in Bivens made

an analogous inquiry in considering the particular diffi-

culties presented in enforcing the guarantees of the

fourth amendment. The fourth amendment has presented

the Court with a series of remedial dilemmas. not en-

countered in other contexts, with which the Court has

wrestled actively for over half a century. The amend-

ment’s subject matter is such that law enforcement of-

ficials, who necessarily make the searches and seizures

it governs, are themselves the group most likely to be

hostile to its barriers. Thiiz hostility of law enforce-

ment officials to the restraint of the fourth amendment

led the Court initially to adopt the exclusionary rule

for federal causes. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S

383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), and then to

apply it te the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. 81

S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), when criminal ac.

tions and state law tort actions proffered as a substitute

remedy in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 IS. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359

93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949), showed{ themselves ineffective

However, the exclusionary rule+the remedy chosen to

secure the right—also has proved-Jess than satisfactory

See Bevins v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at

411, 91 S.Ct. at 2012, 29 L.Ed.2d 685 (1971) (Burger

C. J., dissenting). Thus the Court continues to struggle

Ca b just ag cre: the fourth amendment

one V. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, Ct.

s2 det cae 5, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.

Violations of fourth amendment rights occur i -

defined setting familiar to the ening The aims de

always one between law enforcement officials and citi-

zens suspected of possessing evidence of crime. The con-

text in which these violations may arise is sufficiently

limited to allow the court to determine that an action for

damages would be consistent with the purpose of the

54

fourth amendment in future instances in which such an

action might be invoked. The fifth amendment Due

Process Clause presents no similarly focused remedial

issue. To the contrary, the breadth of the concept of

due process indicates that the damage remedy sought

will not be judicially manageable and that there is sim-

ply no way a court can judge whether this remedy

will be appropriate for securing the right in future

situations where some plaintiff might assert it.

The final factor considered in Cort is whether “the

cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state

law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so

that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action

based solely on federal law.” 422 U.S. at 78, 84-85, 95

S.Ct. at 2088, 2091, 45 L.Ed.2d at 36, citing Bivens Vv.

Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 394-95, 91

S.Ct. at 2003-04, 29 L.Ed.2d at 625-26. Under this

factor we consider the effect that implying a remedy

would have upon both state law and the federal ju-

diciary. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,

477, 97 S.Ct. 1292, 1808, 51 L.Ed.2d 480, 494 (1977) ;

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 728,

739-741, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 1927-28, 44 L.Ed.2d 539, 551-52

(1975). While the particular circumstances of the case

at bar raise questions of federal rights in federal em-

ployment, adoption of the broad principle upon which

the granting of relief to Davis hinges would expand

federal jurisdiction into broad fields of law presently

occupied by state court systems. Therefore, we prop-

erly consider this factor.

Adoption of Davis’ interpretation of Bivens would

project the penumbra of federal court constitutional due

process jurisdiction over every legally cognizable tortious

injury inflicted by persons acting under color of federal

law because, by its nature, every tort deprives the victim

of due process through unlawful appropriation of liberty

or property or both. Indeed, logically, the expansive ef-

fect of such a holding would not end there. It also would

extend federal jurisdiction to cover all state action tort

claims, either under pendent jurisdiction, cf. Hagans v.

Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1872, 39 L.Ed.2d 577

nn. See aan Eee

55

(1974), or under a cause of action implied from the

fourteenth amendment. The latter of these state action

claims would be cognizable without regard to diversity

of citizenship, amount in controversy or other present

statutory limitations. Because of the breadth of due

process, a decision implying an action for money dam-

ages from the fifth amendment Due Process Clause alone

would extend an action for damages to any constitu-

tional guarantee. Thus, the danger of deluging federal

courts with claims otherwise redressable in state courts

or administrative proceedings looms far more ominously

than in Bivens. 403 U.S. at 391 & n.4, 91 S.Ct. at 2002

& we 29 L.Ed.2d at 623 & n.4.

_Not only does this case fail to present speci

dial difficulties analogous to those se by ag Se 8

dealing with the fourth amendment, but also Congress

avoided creating an action for money damages for Con-

gressional aides in non-competitive positions. Moreover

implying this damage action necessarily would draw into

the federal judicial system a wide range of cases whose

resolution Congress has not committed to the federal

judiciary and whose resolution is better suited to courts

of general jurisdiction. These special considerations, not

present in Bivens, eliminate any question of our creat-

ing a remedial right under our federal common law

powers. This conclusion does not end our inquiry, how-

ever, for we still must determine whether the Constitu-

tion nevertheless compels an action for money dam-

ages implied from the fifth amendment Due Process

Clause.

[2] Therefore, we next consider whether, in this case,

a damage action is indispensible to the effectuation of the

fifth amendment Due Process Clause and thus beyond

the power of Congress to preclude. Cf. Kostka v. Hogg,

560 F.2d at 44. We conclude that the proposed damage

remedy is not constitutionally compelled. Not every right

that conceivably could be wedged within the literal

breadth of due process demands federal protection

through a cause of action for monetary damages. In

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d

405 (1976), the Court considered the reach of federal

56

remedies where Congress, in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, ex-

pressly provided that violation of constitutional rights

by one acting under color of state law would give rise

to a cause of action for monetary damages. Even with

an express statutory mandate to provide a federal dam-

age action, the Court noted that “ ‘the range of interests

protected by procedural due process is not infinite.

424 U.S. at 709, 96 S.Ct. at 1164, 47 L.Ed.2d at 418

(1976), citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,

570, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 556— (1972).

Here, we do not consider, as the Court did in Paul,

what due process may encompass given an express statu-

tory mandate to extend a cause of action for money

damages to the full reach of the right. Rather, we con-

sider the extent to which the Constitution requires that

we countermand the clearly discernible will of Congress

to create a cause of action where Congress declined to

provide one. Paul thus teaches that we should restrain

our reach far more than the Court did there.

Denying an implied cause of action for money dam-

ages does not render meaningless any constitutional

rights of congressional employees. A plaintiff might still

seek equitable relief where the employer remained in

office, although congressional employees — in the non-

competitive service whose allegedly discriminating em-

ployers are not in office may be left without a remedy

for sex discrimination in employment unless Congress

reverses its present statutory stand.” Other due process

wrongs would either continue to be remedied in tradi-

tional ways through tort actions in courts of appro-

priate general jurisdiction or through special statutory

remedies provided by state legislatures or Congress.

Admittedly, some not now covered would remain inac-

tionable. pn

Another provision of the Constitution must also be con-

sidered. Our rejection of the broad principle asserted by

Davis is premised upon much more than just another

11 Davis has not challenged the distinction in Title VII between

federal employees in competitive positions and those non-competitive

positions for the purposes of Title VII remedies.

57

“floodgates” argument. The prospect here is of so crush-

ing an already precariously overloaded federal judicial

system as to render meaningless the power the Constitu-

tion vests in Congress under Article III, Section 1, of

the Constitution to establish the jurisdictional ambits

of the inferior courts it has created. We decline to hold

that by implication the fifth amendment requires such

an anomalous result.

[3] Given these consequences and our inability to

construct a plausible measure for acceptable limits on the

right of action Davis would have us imply to remedy

the wrong alleged, we refuse to take even a first step

down the slippery slope until the Supreme Court answers

the open question of whether any such right should exist.

Because no right of action may be implied from the

Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment, the district

court correctly ruled that no civil action for damages

may be maintained here. Absent such a right of civil

action, the district court cannot exercise jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a), which confers jurisdic-

tion only for “civil actions wherein the matter in contro-

versy .. . arises under the Constitution . . . of the

United States.” To the extent that Weir is inconsistent

with this position, it is overruled. Our affirmance on

the jurisdictional ground means we do not reach Davis’

second contention. Therefore, we vacate the district

court’s decision on the ground that Passman’s conduct

in firing her did not violate the Constitution.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED IN PART, AND IN PART VACATED.

JONES, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:

If there is a constitutional barrier against the exer-

cise of the judicial power to decide the controversy be-

tween Mrs. Davis and Mr. Passman then, so I believe,

that bar should be raised rather than denying relief be-

cause the Congress has failed to enact legislation provid-

ing a remedy.

58

o not believe that the constitutional provisions here

viata are to 2 confined to the Speech and Debate

clause. The broader provision by which all legislative

powers are vested in the Congress’ is relevant to this

cause. It might be said that the doctrine of inclusio

unius est exclusio alterious permits or requires a con-

struction that a Congressman may be judicially ques-

tioned for any and all else that a Congressman might

do in the exercise of the legislative power except in

speech or debate. Obviously the Constitution has no

such meaning. We may remind ourselves of Chief Jus-

tice Marshall’s reminder as to constitutional construc-

a no small measure the genius of the Founding

Fathers in framing that most wonderful work ever

struck off by man‘ is the separation of powers among

the three branches of government. Although the need

for checks and balances requires that no one of the de-

partments shall be wholly unrelated to each of the

others * the essential functions of each are, by the terms

of the instrument, separate from those of the others.°

1 The Senators and Representatives . .. for any speech or debate

in either House . . . shall not be questioned in any other place. U.S.

Const. Art. 1, § 6(1).

2U.S. Const. Art. 1, §1.

3’“We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expound-

ing.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579

(1819).

William E. Gladstone, 127 North American Review 179 (Sept.

—Cot. 1878).

5 J. Madison, The Federalist, No. XLVIII (1852 ed.).

6‘ It may be appropriate to take note of a recent comment of the

Attorney General that although the Constitution and Statutes pro-

vide that the President shall nominate and by and with the advice

and consent of the State shall appoint federal judges and US.

attorneys the reality is that “the Senate nominates and the Presi-

dent confirms persons to fill those cfficers.” Griffin B. Bell, Washing-

ton Post, February 27, 1978.

59

Notwithstanding the Gravel’ and Brewster * cases and

Senator Ervin’s critical comments upon them® the doc-

trine of separation of powers survives.

It is not necessary to say that all of the activities

of the members of a Congressman’s staff are legislative.

It will not be said that they are not so in large measure.

Their activities are as many and as varied as those of

the members served by them. It has been well stated

that “the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical

to the Members’ performance that they must be treated

as the latter’s alter egos . . .” Gravel v. United States,

supra, 408 U.S. at 616-17, 92 S.Ct. at 2623.

It seems to me the court held that judicial relief is

denied because the Congress has failed to provide a

judicial remedy. Rather I think the court should say

that the hiring and firing of his “alter ego” is a legis-

lative activity and a part of the exercise of the legis-

lative power. The question is not one of whether there

is a judicial remedy. The question, as I see it, is whether

or not the controversy is one involving the exercise of

the legislative power and within the jurisdiction of the

Congress. Let it decide whether there should be abso-

lute immunity. Let it determine whether there is a

right and if so to fashion a remedy and designate a

tribunal to declare and enforce it. I think it should

have been held that the complaint does not state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.

RONEY, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion,

but I am constrained to articulate the difference I see

between this case, in which I agree that plaintiff has no

constitutional damage remedy based on an alleged fifth

* United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 38 L.Ed.2d

583 (1972).

* United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.

2d 507 (1972).

®Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Gravel and Brewster cases: An Assault

on Congressional Independence, 59 Va.L.Rev. 175 (1973).

60

amendment violation, and the case of Rodriquez V.

Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), in

which I joined a dissent on the ground that plaintiff

there could claim damages against federal officers for an

alleged due process violation.

In his concurring opinion in Bivens, Justice Harlan

intimated that “the appropriateness of money damages

may well vary with the nature of the personal interest

asserted.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,

403 U.S. 388, 408 n.9, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2011, 29 L.Ed.2d

619, 634 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). The dis-

tinction I find between Rodriguez and the instant case

lies in the nature of the personal interest asserted in

the “due process” violations alleged. In Rodriguez the

plaintiff was indicted, arrested, and held in bail for

many months for a crime she knew nothing about and

of which she was altogether innocent, because of the al-

legedly unconstitutional acts and conduct of a federal

agent. In dissent, both Judges Coleman and Goldberg,

with whom I concurred, held that plaintiff had a Bivens-

type damage claim if the agent’s acts were so reckless

as to constitute a willful violation of the plaintiff’s “right

to remain free of unconstitutional intrusions by govern-

mental agents.” 556 F.2d at 1195.

To me, there is little distinction between the per-

sonal liberty invasion by arrest and indictment in Rod-

riguez and the personal liberty invasion by the pri-

vate apartment search, seizure, and arrest in Bivens.

Both cases involved the citizen’s right to be let alone by

Government agents, unless the agents act within the

governmental powers ordained by the Constitution. The

Constitution gave limited power to the Government it

created. Without a constitutional base, no individual has

the legal authority to act against another individual in

the name of Government. Some governmental powers

are specifically given, but to make absolutely sure that

certain powers not given would not be read into the

Constitution by overzealous Government officers, either

executive, congressional, or judicial, there is a list of

“shall nots” in the Bill of Rights. Many of the indi-

vidual rights enumerated there were neither “created”

61

nor “given” by the Constitution, but rather were recog-

nized as being inherent rights of individuals long before

the summer of 1787. The framers’ approach to those

rights in the written Constitution was to try to assure

they would remain forever free of governmental intru-

sion.

Such were the fundamental rights at stake in Bivens

and Rodriguez. Even before the drafting of our Bill

of Rights, plaintiffs Bivens and Rodriguez had an in-

herent right to be free from the type of intrusions

they suffered. The constitutiona: amendments, in Bivens,

the fourth, and in Rodriguez, the fifth—merely protected

those rights by specific prohibition against encroachment.

I saw Rodriguez as being controlled by Bevins and would

have there held that the case law provided plaintiff

Rodriguez with a damage remedy, a damage remedy

rooted in preconstitutional notions of tort law.

In this case, however, no similar right is at stake.

The defendant has not intruded upon a liberty interest

with preconstitutional origins. Historically, employers

had an inherent right to hire and fire whom they pleased,

for whatever reason, arbitrarily, with no need to ac-

count to anyone for their actions, except perhaps to

their conscience and their God, and for governmental

employers, to their voters. This understanding of the

employer-employee relationship prevailed when the Con-

stitution was drafted and, indeed, formed the basis for

decisions of the United States Supreme Court in this

century. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28

S.Ct. 277, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1908); Copvage v. Kansas,

236 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 441 (1915). Under

this early theory, Ms. Davis had no right to be hired

in the first place, and if hired, held her job subject to

ie whim of the individual who had the power to hire and

re.

But the Constitution has allegedly given her a right

not to be fired on the basis of her sex. This right is

not, however, a protected inherent right, but a right

“ereated” by the Constitution, a right which in fact en-

croaches upon what was historically viewed as an in-

herent right of her employer.

62

uestion is, Where does one find the roots

on rag oots remedy for a violation of this right so oe

cently discovered in the recesses of the fifth eee

The dissenting opinion of Judge Goldberg repeatedly

invokes the oft-quoted dictum that “where legal rights

have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for ;

general right to sue for any such invasion, yr

couyts may use any available remedy to make good the

wrong done.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct.

773, 777, 90 L.Ed. 939, 944 { 1946), quoted in Bivens

v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,

396, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). It is interest-

ing to note, however, that the author of that statement,

Justice Black, dissented in Bivens on the ground that

“neither Congress nor the State of New York [had]

enacted legislation creating . . . a right of action

damages].” 403 U.S. at 428, 91 S.Ct. at 2020. (Black,

issenting).

ya aren by both Constitution and statute, can and

often do create rights for which they provide either no

remedy or a restricted remedy for the violation thereof.

In analyzing such rights, the courts are not entirely

free to afford remedies which have not been provided

by the creator of the rights. Thus, to me, Judge Clark

makes a necessary analysis to determine whether a dam-

age remedy is rooted in the document which created

the violated right. Here we find the relevance of the

analysis provided in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct.

2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). To me also, this is where

I part from Judge Goldberg, with whom I joined in

riguez. .

"dee majority opinion does not “cut back on Bivens.

The underlying facts and concept of Bivens, by them-

selves, simply do not cover the rights asserted in this

case. The question, then, is not whether Bivens applies,

but whether the courts will infer from the Constitution

itself a damage remedy for the violation of the kind of

due process right here claimed. For here, a damage

remedy must be rooted in the document—the Constitu-

tion—which created the violated right, or a subsequent

statute, since there is no preconstitutional source for it.

63

This gets down to the real difference between the ma-

jority and the dissent, in my view. Bivens can easily be

grounded on the premise that courts may remedy the

unlawful violation of constitutionally “protected” indi-

vidual rights. But it will better satisfy the revered con-

cept of Government “by the people” if the rights “cre-

ated” by Constitution or statute are remedied in only

those ways that can safely be inferred from the creating

documents.

Bivens, which produced five Separate opinions, was

not an easy decision. Lower courts probably disserve

the law by carrying obviously difficult, narrow, limited

decisions of the Supreme Court far beyond their in-

tended reach. Such judicial activity subverts a major

objective of law in an organized society: to provide cer-

tainty for human action. The majority of this Court

has shown precisly the restraint required. If the people,

through their elected officials, choose to provide the

remedy sought here, so be it; but until then the courts,

through their appointed judges, should not require it.

It is impossible to completely align the cases in such

a way as to support the distinction made here between

Bivens and Rodriguez, and this case. But so is it im-

possible to line up the cases to Support any other logical

Bivens premise. There is a bit of symmetry, however,

if we look only at the facts of the cases, and the results,

and disregard the verbalization of principles in the writ-

ten opinions. In the purest sense, the facts and the

result are the precedent from which stare decisis should

flow anyway.

As the Supreme Court held in Beil y. Hood, 327 US.

678, 681-82, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) federal

question jurisdiction, as opposed to a federally recog-

nized right of relief, is created by the mere allegation of

matters in controversy arising under the Constitution

or laws of the United States. Most of the circuit court

cases dealing with Bivens-type claims in constitutional

areas other than the fourth amendment have decided

only the federal jurisdiction question. Dicta aside, these

cases have merely found allegations of constitutional vio-

lations to be sufficiently substantial to ground federal

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1831. This is altogether

64

, , ene - edy

ifferent from inferring a Btvens-type damage rem

ps the constitutional provisions asserted. re e.g

Weir v. Muller, 527 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1976) ; “7

v. District of ges ye iy Corrections, 174 U.S.

D.C. 483, 533 F.2d 71 ;

Be 8 the only cases cited by the dissent as gern

ing Bivens beyond the fourth amendment to “ ue

process rights of discharged employees were not Pia

remedy cases. In Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193 (:

Cir. 1977) the Second Circuit held that a claimed ne

of due process by a discharged elementary school teacher

stated a cause of action arising directly under the four-

teenth amendment. On the question of remedies, how-

ever, the court stated: “Whether money damages are

available under this cause of action or only equitable re-

lief . . . is a question of remedies that we need not

reach... .” Id. at 197 n.4 (citation omitted). sre

the power of federal courts to grant equitable relie

for violations of constitutional rights was recognized

prior to Bivens, the Gentile court did not really advance

the march of Bivens into the area of fifth amendment

rights. See Bivens v. Six’ Unknown Fed. Narcotics

Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 400, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d

619 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ; Bell v. Hood, 327

U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 778, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946).

Likewise, in Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d

925 (8th Cir. 1977) the Eighth Circuit held that a dis-

charged city employee was entitled to monetary relief

in the nature of backpay for violation of fourteenth

amendment due process, but was careful to emphasize that

it was discussing “only an equitable remedy... .” Id.

n.9 and 940.

z a in which circuit courts have inferred a Bivens-

type damage remedy from constitutional amendments

other than the fourth have varied widely in their facts,

but have generally involved an intrusion into a liberty

interest having preconstitutional origins. _For example,

the first amendment did not “create” the right to express

one’s views free from unlawful governmental intrusion ;

it merely protected an already present right from gov-

ernmental inference.

Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977)

(speakers and demonstrators unlawfully arrested by

65

District of Columbia police during 1971 “May Day”

demonstration have cause of action for damages aris-

ing directly under first amendment) ;

Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 863 [862] (8rd Cir.

1975) (Bivens-type damage remedy for violation of

first amendment rights available to 16-year-old school

student who was investigated by FBI after sending

off for literature from Socialist Workers Party in

connection with her social studies class); Yiamou-

yiannis V. Chemical Abstracts Service, 521 F.2d 1392

(6th Cir. 1975) (complaint alleging that because of

antifluoridation speeches made by plaintiff, Depart-

ment of Health, Education and Welfare coerced

plaintiff’s employer to fire him stated a Bivens-type

damages action for violation of first amendment

rights).

Nor did the due process clause of the fifth amend-

ment “create” a right in the individual to be free from

deprivation of liberty and property interests; it merely

provided that government encroachment would be con-

stitutional only if it followed the criteria therein provided.

Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558

F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1977) ( allegation that certain

zoning ordinances enacted by agency operating un-

der federal law effectuated a “taking” of plaintiff’s

land states a Bivens-type damage claim arising di-

rectly under the fifth amendment) :

State|s] Marine Lines, Ine. v. Schultz, [Shultz] 498

F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974) (unlawful seizure of

plaintiff’s property by Customs agents gives rise to

a Bivens-type damage action arising directly under

fifth amendment) ;

United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d

892 (8rd Cir. 1972) (allegations that FBI agents

falsified documents and testified falsely in order to

convict plaintiff state cause of action for damages

arising directly under fifth amendment).

These fundamental rights, unlike the liberty interest

asserted by Ms. Davis, are not “created” by the Con- ‘

66

ituti inherent in the individual, either, abso-

ie ae the framers from ect

by the Government, or “protected” to the extent provide

" eae oa for damages should not be foreclosed

merely because it arises out of a fifth amendment igo

tion, rather than a fourth, but should be consider :

the basis of the personal interest asserted. en gtd

sought for the personal interest asserted by 8. :

cannot be infused into the Constitution without - vid

burdening the reasoning with the hope, faith, 4 ant

sonal preference of the reasoner. Therefore, I w

affirm the district court.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge, with whom JOHN R.

BROWN, Chief Judge, joins, dissenting:

majority of the en banc court today holds that no

Bi anual action for damages may be implied —

the due process clause of the fifth amendment to e

United States Constitution. I believe that this conclu-

sion, certainly as it applies to the facts of this _ e

untenable so long as Bivens v. Six Unknown —_

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 USS. >

91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), is good law. al

ing nothing in subsequent opinions of the Supreme Cou

which undercuts the vitality of the reasoning in a,

I would hold that Shirley Davis has a private ne °

action for damages to vindicate her constitutional rig. a

While recognizing that constitutional attrition may

the benchmark of the 1970’s, I would leave it for t e

Supreme Court to place the mark of Cain on ge

heretofore unblemished brow. It is a source of —

regret that it is the Fifth Circuit, a court so 0 4

exemplary in its affirmation of constitutional rights,

which has chosen to start Bivens down the slippery slope

into desuetude and demise. I respectfully dissent.

I.

i i Deputy

In the early part of 1974 Shirley Davis was

Administrative Assistant to Congressman Otto E. Pass-

67

man of Louisiana’s Fifth Congressional District. The

Representative terminated Ms. Davis’s employment, effec-

tive July 31, 1974. In his letter to her explaining the

termination decision the Representative wrote, “You are

able, energetic and a very hard worker. ... [H Jowever,

on account of the unusually heavy workload in my Wash-

ington Office, and the diversity of the job, I concluded

that it was essential that the understudy to my adminis-

trative assistant to be a man.” The full text of this

rather remarkable letter is set out below."

1 Dear Mrs. Davis:

My Washington staff joins me in Saying that we miss you

very much. But, in all probability, inwardly they all agree that

I was doing you an injustice by asking you to assume a respon-

sibility that was so trying and so hard that it would have taken

all of the pleasure out of your work. I must be completely fair

with you, so please note the following:

You are able, energetic and a very hard worker. Certainly

you command the respect of those with whom you work; how-

ever, on account of the unusually heavy work load in my Wash-

ington Office, and the diversity of the job, I concluded that it

was essential that the understudy to my Administrative Assist-

ant be a man. I believe you will agree with this conclusion.

It would be unfair to you for me to ask you to waste your

talent and experience in my Monroe office because of the low

Salary that is available because of a junior position. Therefore,

and so that your experience and talent may be used to advan-

tage in some organization in need of an extremely capable sec-

retary, I desire that you be continued on the payroll at your

present salary through July 31, 1974. This arrangement gives

you your full year’s vacation of one month, plus one additional

month. May I further say that the work load in the Monroe

office is very limited, and since you would come in as a junior

member of the staff at such a low salary, it would actually be

an offense to you.

I know that secretaries with your ability are very much in

demand in Monroe. If an additional letter of recommendation

from me would be advantageous to you, do not hesitate to let

me know. Again, assuring you that my Washington staff and

your humble Congressman feel that the contribution you made

to our Washington office has helped all of us.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ Otto E. Passman

Member of Congress

68

is then filed this action against the Representa-

ogg Ped he had violated the equal protection —

ponent of the fifth amendment’s due process clause. ‘

invoked the court’s “arising under’ jurisdiction Sgro

to 28 U.S.C. § 1831(a) and sought relief including, inter

alia, damages from Passman in his individual gen

The district court assumed jurisdiction of the case =

proceeded to dismiss the complaint for failure to “9-9

a claim upon which relief can be granted, vinseia f

12(b) (6), holding that “the discharge of plaintiff on

alleged grounds of sex discrimination by defendant is

not violative of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-

tion” and that “the law affords no private right of “gre

to plaintiff therefor.” A panel of this court reversed : €

decision of the district court and remanded the case ree

trial. 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977). The panel conclude

that taking the complaint’s allegations as true, ga oageed

tative Passman’s dismissal of a staff member on the

basis of gender violated the equal protection component

of the fifth amendment due process clause : that “pe

Bivens the Constitution itself affords the dismissed sta

member a damages remedy ; that sovereign immunity does

not bar a damages award against the Representative

individually; that the speech or debate clause ga tat

extend to staff dismissals because they are not legisla-

tive tasks” within the Supreme Court s holdings; and that

the existence of qualified immunity cannot support the

district court’s dismissal of the complaint. See id. at 882.

Circuit Judge Jones dissented from the judgment of the

panel on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Id. Representative Passman, by then defeated in his bid

for reelection and retired from the Congress, filed a pe-

tition for rehearing en banc, alleging that congressional

hiring and firing were insulated from judicial review

under the political question doctrine and the speech or

debate clause. The court granted rehearing en bane. To-

day, not reaching the thorny constitutional issues posed

by the scope of congressional immunity under the speech

or debate clause, the en bane majority determines that

no right of action for damages may be implied from

the fifth amendment due process clause. As I dissent

69

from this holding, I necessarily must reach the other

issues, including the applicability of the speech or debate

clause, considered in the panel opinion. On those issues,

I would adhere to the analysis explicated in the panel

opinion; I confine my remarks here to the Bivens ques-

tion. On Bivens, the thrusts of Judge Clark’s opinion for

the en bane majority merit defensive parries in response.

II.

Only in one case has the Supreme Court directly con-

fronted and decided the question whether a federal cause

of action for damages may be implied directly from the

United States Constitution: Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.

388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Having

created in that case “a policy of access,” * the Court has

since chosen to refrain from possibly premature rigidifi-

cation of the contours of the Bivens action,’ in effect li-

censing the lower federal courts to develop their own

rules setting the parameters,’ consistent with the man-

date of Bivens itself, within which constitutional rights

may be vindicated by private damage actions. As noted

? Also worthy of mention is Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13,

54 S.Ct. 26, 78 L.Ed. 142 (1933) (founding right to recover just

compensation directly on the fifth amendment; statutory recognition

not necessary). Of course, it is clear “that there is an implied

injunctive remedy for threatened or continuing constitutional vio-

lations.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau

of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718, 723 (2nd Cir. 1969), rev'd on other

grounds, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), citing

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 and n. 4, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed.

939 (1946); Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337

U.S. 682, 696-97, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949); Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 128, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); United

States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 1 S.Ct. 240, 27 L.Ed. 171 (1882). See

also Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. at 400, 404, 91 S.Ct. at 2006, 2008, 29

L.Ed.2d at 628 (Harlan, J. concurring).

3’ Lehmann, “Bivens and Its Progeny,” 4 Hastings Const.L.Q.

531, 539 (1977).

* See cases cited in majority opinion, supra, at n. 5.

° See Lehmann, supra n. 3, at 540, 604.

70

by the en bane majority, few courts have held that

Bivens actions are limited to fourth amendment claims.°

6 See majority opinion, supra, at p. , slip op. at p. 3508.

Apart from decisions in several circuits declining to imply causes of

action against municipalities directly under the fourteenth amend-

ment, in view of the exemption of municipalities from liability

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977) ;

McDonald v. State of Illinois, 557 F.2d 596, 604-05 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, —— U.S. ——, 98 S.Ct. 508, 54 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977) ; ef.

Mahone V. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1022-25 (3rd Cir. 1977) (de-

clining to imply a constitutional cause of action but finding an

effective federal statutory remedy under § 1981), there appear

to be no other decisions at the Court of Appeals level rejecting

the availability of Bivens causes of actions under other constitu-

tional amendments. Circuits founding causes of action directly on

constitutional provisions other than the fourth amendment, or

finding claims sufficiently substantial to ground jurisdiction on 28

U.S.C. § 1331, include the

D.C. Circuit: Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 194-95 (D.C. Cir.

1977) (first amendment, cause of action); Payne V. Government of

District of Columbia, 559 F.2d 809, 818-19 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (fifth

amendment, jurisdiction; favorable dicta on cause of action) ; Lewis

y. District of Columbia Department of Corrections, 174 U.S.App.

D.C. 483, 533 F.2d 710 (1976) (fifth amendment, jurisdiction) ;

accord, Greenya V. George Washington University, 167 U.S.App.D.C.

379, 385, 512 F.2d 556, 562 n. 13, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995, 96 S.Ct.

422, 46 L.Ed.2d 369 (1975); Apton v. Wilson, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 22,

35, 506 F.2d 83, 96 (1974) ; Cardinale v. Washington Technical In-

stitute, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 128, 500 F.2d 791, 796 n. 5 (1974) ;

Sullivan v. Murphy, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 28, £5, 478 F.2d 938, 965 and

n. 47, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880, 94 S.Ct. 162, 38 L.Ed.2d 125 (1973)

(fourth and fifth amendments, jurisdiction; favorable dicta on

remedy) .

Second Circuit: Gentile v. Wilson, 562 F.2d 193, 196-97 (2nd Cir.

1977) (fourteenth amendment due process, cause of action) ; accord,

Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 734-35 (2nd Cir.), rev’d

en banc on other grounds, 527 F.2d 736 (2nd Cir. 1975).

Third Circuit: Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 869-70 (3rd

Cir. 1975) (first amendment, cause of action) ; United States ex rel.

Moore V. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892, 894 (3rd Cir. 1972) (fifth amend-

ment, cause of action) ; Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 114-16 (3rd

Cir. 1977) (fourteenth amendment, jurisdiction; reserving question

of cause of action) ; id. at 117 (Gibbons, J. concurring) (cause of

action). But see Mahone v. Waddle, supra.

Fourth Circuit: States Marine Line, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d

1146, 1156-57 (4th Cir. 1974) (fifth amendment, cause of action) ;

71

cf. Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975 i

fourteenth amendments, suggesting pai Pategg neem

Fifth Circuit: Reeves Vv. City of Jackson, 582 F.2d 491 (5th Cir.

1976) (suggesting availability of cause of action under eighth

amendment and/or fourteenth amendment due process, jurisdic-

tion) ; Weir v. Muller, 527 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1976) (fifth amend-

ment, jurisdiction) ; see also Roane V. Callisburg Independent School

District 511 F.2d 633, 635 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1975) ; United Farmwork-

ers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493

F.2d 799, 801-02 and n. 2 (5th Cir. 1974); Traylor v. City of Ama-

rillo, 492 F.2d 1156, 1157 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1974). But see Rodriguez

Ve Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (de-

ear Spr on Bivens issue).

ix ircuit: Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstra tC

521 F.2d 1392, 1393 (6th Cir. 1975) (first amendment, ner ie

— ae based on fifth amendment cases).

even ircuit: Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospi

F.2d 716, 718-719 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U8 a6

96 S.Ct. 1518, 47 L.Ed.2d 768 (1976) (fourteenth amendment, sug-

gesting availability of cause of action but denying relief) ; Hostrop

Vv. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577 (7th

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963, 96 S.Ct. 1748, 48 L.Ed.2d

208 (1976) (fourteenth amendment procedural due process, jurisdic-

tion; favorable dicta); cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559

F.2d 1063, 1082 (7th Cir. 1977) (dicta on availability of relief for

violations of fundamental constitutional rights). But see McDonald

V. me hd bossa supra.

ig it ircuit: Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.

(8th Cir. 1977) (fourteenth amendment due process, cause oie

for monetary relief in the nature of backpay against a munici-

pality) ; McNally v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 532 F.2d 69, 76 (8th Cir.)

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855, 97 S.Ct. 150, 50 L.Ed.2d 131 (1976)

(finding no infringement of fair trial, privacy rights; assuming

without deciding availability of Bivens cause of action) : Wounded

aoa Gn cr a Ce Committee v. F.B.I., 507 F.2d 1281

‘ir. (sixth amen i i i ,

pr penta pred es cg dment right to effective assistunce

Ninth Circuit: Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning A

558 F.2d 928, 936, 941-42 (9th Cir. 1977) (separate caaaee of aliens

available under fifth amendment due process clause and fifth amend-

ment just compensation clause) ; Bennett v. Campbell, 564 F.2d 329

331-32 (9th Cir. 1977) (reversing denial of motion to amend com-

plaint in order to permit assertion of Bivens claims under fourth

and fifth amendments ; suggesting the availability of damage actions

for deprivations “of constitutional rights”) ; Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d

1376, 1378 and n. 1 (9th Cir. 1975) (fifth, sixth and eighth amend-

ments, jurisdiction; reserving question of remedy); cf. Gray v

Union County Intermediate Education District, 520 F.2d 803, 805

(9th Cir. 1975) (finding no denial of rights; apparently assuming

72

With respect to the due process clauses of the fifth and

fourteenth amendments, the overwhelming weight of

authority, particularly at the Court of Appeals level,

holds that constitutional rights may be vindicated through

implied causes of action for money damages.’ And as

the en bane majority is also aware, numerous panels of

this circuit have adhered to Bivens’ policy of access, find-

ing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for district courts

to entertain implied causes of action for damages under

the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-

ments.* Nevertheless, taking Ms. Davis’ allegations as

true, the en bane court today chooses to deny a right of

action to the victim of as blatant a case of gender-based

discrimination as is within my experience on this court.’

availability of cause of action for backpay and damages for viola-

tion of first amendment and due process rights).

Tenth Circuit: Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d

926 (10th Cir. 1975) (equal protection and due process, jurisdiction ;

favorable dicta on cause of action) ; Kite v. Kelley, 546 F.2d 334, 337

(10th Cir. 1976) (first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments; finding

jurisdiction but denying relief on vicarious liability claim).

District court cases are collected in Lehmann, supra n. 3. at 566-68

and nn. 226-229.

Thus, seven circuits have implied causes of action directly from

constitutional amendments other than the fourth. Of these, five cir-

cuits have implied causes of action from the due process clauses of

the fifth and fourteenth amendments. In addition to these five, at

least three circuits have found Bivens claims under the due process

clauses sufficiently substantial to ground federal jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1831 and have commented favorably upon implication

of damage actions from these clauses. Still another circuit, in im-

plying a cause of action under the first amendment, has relied on

cases implying causes of action from the fifth amendment. Today

the Fifth Circuit becomes the first circuit to reject definitively the

availability of a Bivens cause of action in any context other than a

fourteenth amendment action against a municipality.

7 See cases cited in majority opinion, supra, at n. 4, and note 6

supra.

8 See majority opinion, supra, at p.—, slip op. at p. 3509, and

cases cited therein.

® Gender-based discrimination may violate the due process clause

of the fifth amendment. “[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no

equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is ‘so un-

justifiable as to be violative of due process.’” Weinberger v. Wisen-

feld, 420 U.S. 636, 638, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 1228 n. 2, 43 L.Ed.2d 514

73

Would that the Fifth Circuit had instead chosen to add

one more jewel to its liberating diadem of pioneering

jurisprudence. Still, the en banc court is correct in not-

ing that despite the overwhelming weight of authority,

choice is not foreclosed. The Supreme Court has invited

judicial creativity, and Judge Clark, with his customary

care and acuity, has authored as persuasive a rebuttal

of this authority as might be imagined. Yet I remain un-

persuaded. The test is Bivens. I offer here a reading of

that case which I believe to be more consistent with its

holding and more harmonious with its spirit than the

reading offered by the majority.

ITI.

If I understand the majority’s treatment of Bivens,

the crux of its reasoning is that the Supreme Court was

able to imply a damages remedy for violation of the

fourth amendment by federal officers only because Con-

gress had not spoken. The Supreme Court’s indication of

a possible willingness to accord some deference to an

“explicit congressional declaration” of preference for an

alternative remedy “equally effective in the view of Con-

gress,” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005, is ap-

parently taken to mean that a cause of action for dam-

ages is not “part and parcel of the underlying constitu-

tional right,” therefore “is not wholly of constitutional

dimensions,” and thus is “subject to the will of the Con-

gress for the substitution of other remedies, so long as

the minimum demands of the Constitution are met.” (Em-

phasis added). Majority opinion, supra, at pp.

slip op. at pp. 3510-3511.

What follows from this perspective is that the impli-

cation of a cause of action from the Constitution is

initially to be governed, or at least guided, by the stand-

ards applicable to implication of remedies from statu-

’

(1975), quoting Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168, 84 S.Ct. 1187,

1190, 12 L.Ed.2d 218 (1964). See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.

497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 694, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954). “This Court’s

approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always

been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Wisenfeld, supra (citations omitted).

74

tory enactments, as elucidated by the Supreme Court in

Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d

26 (1975). Only if a cause of action for damages satis-

fies these statutory standards, or if “a damage action 1s

indispensible to the effectuation of the fifth amendmnet,”

(emphasis added), majority opinion, supra at p. ——,

slip op. at p. 3514, may a damage remedy be implied.

I believe that proper application of the Cort analysis

to a constitutional claim would justify implication of a

damages remedy directly from the fifth amendment on the

facts of this case. But my disagreement with the ma-

jority is a more fundamental one: I believe the premises

underlying the analytical structure proposed by the ma-

jority are irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s opin-

ion in Bivens.

In my view Bivens is a decision of constitutional mag-

nitude. The fundamental inquiry in Bivens was whether

the Constitution mandates some remedy for a petitioner

whose constitutional rights have been violated. Only after

finding that some remedy is constitutionally compelled

did the Supreme Court go on to consider which remedy

is appropriate—not necessary in itself—in the circum-

stances of a given case to redress the constitutional

violation :

[T]he Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation

upon the exercise of federal power regardless of

whether the State in whose jurisdiction that power

is exercised would prohibit or penalize the identical

act if engaged in by a private citizen. It guaran-

tees to citizens of the United States the absolute

right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority.

And “where federally protected rights have been

invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that

courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to

grant the necessary relief.”

403 U.S. at 392, 91 S.Ct. at 2002, citing, inter alia, Bell

v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed.

939 (1946). The Constitution creates a right in the

75

4,

plaintiff; the courts are to adjust their remedies to ac-

cord relief.

That the fourth amendment might be enforced by other

plaintiffs, in other contexts, through mechanisms other

than a damage action, was passed over by the Bivens

majority as of little moment. What was significant to

the Court was the remedial plight of the petitioner in the

case before it. As stated by Justice Harlan, concurring:

{I]t is apparent that some form of damages is the

only possible remedy for someone in Bivens’ alleged

position. . . . {A]ssuming Bivens’ innocence of the

crime charged, the “exclusionary rule” is simply ir-

relevant. For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages

or nothing.

Id. at 409-10, 91 S.Ct. at 2011-12. On the need to provide

an effective remedy, the Court was unequivocal:

{I]t is . . . well settled that where legal rights have

been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a

general right to sue for any such invasion, federal

courts may use any available remedy to make good

the wrong done.

Id. at 396, 91 S.Ct. at 2004, citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.

at 684, 66 S.Ct. at 777. In this respect, provision of a

damage remedy “should hardly seem a surprising propo-

sition. Historically, damages have been regarded as the

ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in

liberty.” Id. at 395, 91 S.Ct. at 2004 (citations omitted).

The question is merely whether petitioner, if he can

demonstrate an injury consequent upon the violation

by federal agents of his [constitutional] rights, is

entitled to redress his injury through a particular

remedial mechanism normally available in the fed-

eral courts.

Id. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005 (citations omitted). Re-

sponding to the suggestion that a more stringent test

should govern the grant of damages in constitutional

eases, Justice Harlan stated:

76

These arguments . . . seem to be adequately an-

swered by the point that the judiciary has a par-

ticulamresponsibility to assure the vindication of

constitutional interests such as those embraced by

the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 407, 91 S.Ct. at 2010 (concurring opinion) (foot-

note omitted).

The en bane majority’s apparent conclusion that the

Bivens-damage action is of non-constitutional dimensions

seems to be tied to its assumption” that a cause of

action not “part and parcel of the underlying constitu-

tional right” is merely federal common law of less than

constitutional dimensions. But to state that the Court

may accord some deference to a congressional choice of

remedy “equally effective in the view of Congress’ is

only to admit the possibility of substitutes for the dam-

age remedy, not to say that Congress may eliminate all

means of vindication of a federal constitutional right."

10 This assumption is speculative on the basis of Bivens itself. See

Harlan, J., concurring:

I express no view on the Government’s suggestion that congres-

sional authority to simply discard the remedy the Court today

authorizes might be in doubt; nor do I understand the Court’s

opinion today to express any view on that particular question.

Id. at 407 n. 7, 91 S.Ct. at 2010.

11 Professor Dellinger suggests that the passage in Bivens finding

no “explicit congressional declaration” and rejecting ‘formulation

of the question as whether the availability of money damages is

necessary to enforce the Fourth Amendment.” 403 U.S. at 397, 91

S.Ct. at 2005, might be read

“affirmatively ... to describe the conditions under which the

Court should defer to congressional judgment even though a

remedy may be substantively bound to constitutiona! provi-

sions.”

Dellinger, “Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword.”

85 Harv.L.Rev. 1532, 1548 n. 89 (1972). Thus, where these condi-

tions have not been met—where Congress has not provided an effec-

tive alternative remedy—there is no occasion for deference to con-

gressional judgment. The courts must therefore “adjust their reme-

dies so as to grant the necessary relief.” 403 U.S. at 392, 91 S.Ct.

at 2002, quoting Bell v. Hood.

77

Had Congress chosen to provide a remedy alternative to

money damages to those “in Davis’ shoes,” this court

would be correct in according that choice deference,

though even in those circumstances,

[t]he ultimate determination of whether a remefial

scheme appropriately effectuates the mandate of the

Constitution is, of course, to be made by the Court as

an exercise of constitutional judicial review.”

Perhaps the clearest statement by the Supreme Court it-

self on this subject is found in Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966):

Congress and the States are free to develop their own

safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are fully

as effective as those described above in informing

accused persons of their right of silence and in afford-

ing a continuous opportunity to exercise it. In any

event, however, the issues presented are of constitu-

tional dimensions and must be determined by the

courts. ... Where rights secured by the Constitution

are involved, there can be no rule making or legisla-

tion which would abrogate them.

Id. at 490-91, 86 S.Ct. at 1636.

The opinion of the en bane majority totally fails to

address the core inquiry commanded by Bivens. Apart

from a passing reference not applicable to the plight of

Ms. Davis that “[a]} plaintiff might still seek equitable

relief where the employer remained in office,” majority

opinion, supra, at p. , Slip op. at p. 3514, the en banc

court nowhere considers whether some remedy must be

12 Dellinger, supra n. 11. I find nothing in Professor Monaghan’s

provocative article, cited by the majority, inconsistent with this

conclusion. Monaghan, “Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,”

89 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1975): “I think that Bivens is an explicit recog-

nition that the constitutional guarantee embraces a right of action

. . . Which is enforceable by any appropriate remedy including

damages ....” Id. at 24 n. 125. See generally Cox, “The Role of

Congress in Constitutional Determinations,” 40 Cincinnati L.Rev.

199, 247, 261 (1971); Burt, “Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic

Marriage,” 1969 Sup.Ct.Rev. 81.

78

available to vindicate fifth amendment rights. Where is

the sensitivity that moved Justice Harlan to observe “For

people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing’? 403

U.S. at 410, 91 S.Ct. at 2012. The majority essentially

ignores the constitutional predicate for the Bivens deci-

sion, i.e, that there be a remedy, and reformulates the

inquiry in a far more stringent fashion: a cause of action

for damages will be implied only if damages, specifically,

are in some absolute sense necessary to effectuate the

constitutional mandate. The court then proceeds to find a

damage remedy unnecessary while simultaneously ac-

knowledging that constitutional deprivations of the sort

suffered by Ms. Davis “would remain inactionable,” and

that Ms. Davis “may be left without a remedy for sex

discrimination in employment” unless Congress chooses to

create one. Majority opinion, supra, at p. ——,, slip op. at

p. 3514.

In short, the majority opinion errs because it answers

the wrong question. If Congress had provided an alterna-

tive remedy and explicitly excluded a remedy in damages,

the appropriate inquiry would indeed be whether a dam-

age remedy as such is necessary, nevertheless, to effectuate

the constitutional guarantee, and therefore constitutionally

required. But where, as here, no alternative remedy has

been made available, that inquiry is simple irrelevant.

In leaving Ms. Davis without any remedy, the majority’

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