Opposition — Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.
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Supreme Court, U. &,
FILED
JUL 80 1979
IN THE | MICHAEL RODAK. 18. CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 78-1918
ADLENE HARRISON, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR,
AND DOUGLAS COSTLE, ADMINISTRATOR OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Petitioners,
v.
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. AND
CONOCO, INC.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENT
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.
Of Counsel: CHARLES F. LETTOW
CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & = JANET L. WELLER
HAMILTON 1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036
Washington, D.C. 20036 V. PETER WYNNE, JR.
One Gateway Center
CKWELL, SIEVERT, VICCELLIO,
hie & SHADDOCK Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222
One Lakeside Plaza OLIVER P. STOCKWELL
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601 One Lakeside Plaza
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
Counsel for Respondent
July 30, 1979 PPG Industries, Inc.
ES
Washington, D.C. « CLB PUBLISHERS’ e LAW PRINTING CO. e (202) 393-0625
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TC TN he ae 6a aid bie & Ne Ae ee Oem l
EO eee ee ee ee eee ee 2
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......... 3
1. PPG’s power plant at the Lake Charles
Works consists of a single integrated unit
relying on both types of “cogeneration”
technology to make highly efficient use of
Oe ed ee ee eae 4
2. EPA advised PPG that the waste-heat boilers
would not be subject to the new source
standards when operated as designed, but
then retracted this determination and im-
posed on PPG fuel requirements not author-
er aan as Saw o &@ 08 8 10
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ........... 13
A. If EPA’s Determinations Were Made Prior To
August 7, 1977, The Date Of Enactment Of
The Clean Air Act Amendments Of 1977,
EPA’s Jurisdictional Arguments Have No
es aa eo et ol. ey ge oes 0 13
B. No Conflict Exists Among The Relevant
Decisions Of The Courts of Appeals; The
Courts Have Harmonized Their Jurisdictional
Rulings On Amended Section 307(b)(1) To
Provide A Framework For A _ Reasoned
Practical Construction Of These Portions Of
ee ee weteee eee 14
ES IG OI OO a ee ar 22
IESE SRE PERE CUE EC EERE la
(it)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Came wv. Pitts, 412 US. 156 CIDTS) 2... occ ccc eccccccncal
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
I A ho ies eink eb a eee 21
PPG Industries, Inc. v. Costle, No. 77-1271 (W.D.
oe a a ere aera 3,12
Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator of Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 556 F.2d 1282
Se CO EN ainewsh ks sha hs Wein haw eee 8 17
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979) ............ 18,19
United States Steel Corp. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 595 F.2d 207 (Sth Cir.
SE aca ar SmOladt 4 aki bse i ow Sie, WEAN 68 60's. 18
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 180 U.S. App. D.C. 70, 553 F.2d
iD) ss ae eae Fe eee PO ee eee 13,15
Statutes and Rules:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §553 and
GiGi toss Kab Oe Oe ees 13,19
Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§7401 et
a ee eer ae, a ey ee ear 3
Section 111(aX(2), 42 U.S.C. §7411(aX2) ........... 8
Section 301(aX1), 42 U.S.C. §7601(aXil) ........... 16
GE Dee, GP Ws OPE cei ce ects scveevess 19
Section 307(b\(1), 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1) 2,4,13,14,15,18,19
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (August 7, 1977) ............. 4,13
ee GS OP AA, NUON ke tice ea rwedecen 13
Regulations:
es Ee re ere rere ree 2
RE ee ee ie aa ae 16
(iti)
I re eo dla 10,16
40 C.F.R. 8§60.40-6046 ........ 0. ccc cccccecee cs 2
Miscellaneous:
BUSINESS WEEK, June 6, 1977, at 99 ............05. 6
Currie and Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal
Administrative Action: Quest For The Optimum
Forum, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 54-61 (1975). .......... 19
oe Fem, Fee 19,708 Chee 17, TOTE) . ww ccc wees 8
oe Se Be Fh rrr a
5 Fee Be Oe aee GPE Ae HOPED ois bis 5 's-0:5.9 v0.66 6a 15
Letter from James E. Wyche, III to Diane Dutton,
Director, Enforcement Division, EPA Region VI
I I a Nd en eg i tie’ och 12
Remarks of President Carter to a Joint Session of
Congress, White House Press Release, at 5 (April
a ee ig eS De CMR A we en wate ft 6
Tinker, Exxon Can’t Meet Low Sulfur Residual
Demand, The Oil Daily, February 23,1979 .......... 12
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 78-1918
ADLENE HARRISON, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR,
AND DOUGLAS COSTLE, ADMINISTRATOR OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Petitioners,
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. AND
CONOCO, INC.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENT
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.
INTRODUCTION
Respondent PPG Industries, Inc. opposes the petition
for writ of certiorari.
2
QUESTION PRESENTED
Does Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, as
amended especially by the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1), confer original and
exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of appeals to review
final actions by the Administrator of EPA applying new
source performance standards to particular facilities?
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE!
The case and the petition turn on amendments adopted
in 1977 to the judicial review provisions of the Clean Air
Act.
The petition for a writ of certiorari seeks review in
this Court of the decision and judgment of the court of
appeals dismissing a protective petition for review on
jurisdictional grounds. PPG Industries, Inc. v. Harrison,
587 F.2d 237 (Sth Cir. 1979) (Petition App. la). The
protective petition for review related to a determination
by the Environmental Protection Agency (‘“‘EPA’’) that
the Agency’s new source performance standards for air
emissions from fossil-fuel fired steam generating units?
applied to “‘waste heat’ boilers making up part of a
power plant at a chemical manufacturing works owned
and operated by PPG Industries, Inc. (““PPG’’) at Lake
"Several abbreviations are used in this memorandum. “App.”
refers to the administrative record as reproduced in the Joint
Deferred Appendix to the Briefs filed with the court of appeals.
“Petition App.” and “Petition Appendix” refer to the appendices
to the petition for a writ of certiorari.
See 40 C.F.R. § §60.1-60.15 and 60.40-60.46 (1978).
3
Charles, Louisiana. PPG had filed the protective petition
for review in the court of appeals because of uncer-
tainty over whether the provisions for judicial review of
agency action in the Clean Air Act, as amended (“the
Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq., prescribed that initial
review be had in the courts of appeals or in district
courts. PPG concurrently filed a complaint in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
alleging that EPA’s determination was invalid and
praying for a declaration to that effect along with an
injunction against the Agency’s enforcement of its
determination. PPG Industries, Inc. v. Costle, Civ.
Action No. 77-1271 (W.D. La., filed November 11,
1977).
Facts are important to this litigation. An understand-
ing of the unexpected developments that produced this
litigation is necessary to place the jurisdictional issue in
context. In particular, the facts of this case demonstrate
the ready applicability of the rationale of the court of
appeals on the jurisdictional issue. Moreover, one of the
grounds presented in this response for denial of the pet-
ition for certiorari rests upon the timing of and manner
in which EPA made its determinations.
PPG was surprised when in early 1976 EPA began to
consider whether new source standards should be
applied to part of an integrated power plant that PPG
had begun constructing in 1970. Nothing in the stan-
dards for fossil-fuel fired steam generators proposed on
August 17, 1971, and later issued in due course, gave
PPG notice that the standards might be applied to
“waste heat” boilers, where the exhaust emissions from
the boilers result in large part from the combustion of
fossil fuel not in the boilers, but in associated gas
turbines. And subsequently, when EPA did decide that
its standards for fossil-fuel fired steam generating units
4
applied to the waste-heat boilers, it did not apply (and
as a technological matter could not have applied) those
standards as promulgated. Rather it developed require-
ments on an ad hoc basis, imposing, among other
things, fuel limitations, despite the absence in the
standard of any such limitations.
These are the basic factual circumstances in light of
which EPA asserts its stance on jurisdiction. That stance
in and of itself is startling because, during Congress’s
consideration of the bills which became the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977, no one involved with the
legislative process gave any indication that a substantial
shift of the forum for judicial review of EPA’s actions
from district courts to courts of appeals was even under
consideration, let alone embodied in the bills.
Accordingly, this supplemental statement of the case
will endeavor to provide a comprehensible description
of the facility involved and also the manner in which
EPA set about making its administrative determination.
The following factual background for the jurisdictional
issue particularly relates to two salient sets of facts and
circumstances which were omitted in EPA’s statement
of the case and which are thus set forth in some detail.
1. PPG’s power plant at the Lake Charles Works
consists of a single integrated unit relying on
both types of “cogeneration” technology to
make highly efficient use of energy.
*See the discussion by the court of appeals at 587 F.2d at
243, Petition App. 12a-13a, of the revisions made to Sec )n
307(b\(1) of the Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1), by
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91
Stat. 685 (August 7, 1977).
EPA’s petition recites that PPG’s power plant at the
Lake Charles Works uses “a coordinated system of two
gas turbine generators combined with two ‘waste heat’
boilers.” (Petition, at 4 (footnote omitted).) This
characterization omits any reference to the fact that the
power plant also contains a steam turbogenerator as
part of the integrated unit. As the court of appeals
recognized, the steam turbogenerator allows the power
plant to use both the “topping cycle” method of
cogeneration and a variant of the “bettoming cycle”
mode:‘
To meet its energy requirements, PPG recently
constructed a power plant designed to take
advantage of fuel-efficient ‘‘cogeneration”’ tech-
nology. The power plant is comprised of two
similar units. In each unit fossil fuel is burned in a
General Electric gas turbine generator to produce
electricity. Energy, or ‘“‘waste heat” thrown off by
the turbine’s exhaust, which would normally be
discharged into the atmosphere, is funnelled as a
heat source into a “waste heat” boiler which also
burns fuel oil. This exhaust from the turbines
contributes nearly 40% (approximately 371 million
British thermal units per hour) of the total input
to the waste heat boiler, while the remaining heat
(approximately 598 million British thermal units
per hour) is provided by combustion of fuel oil or
natural gas, known as fossil fuels. The highly
pressurized steam produced by the waste heat
boiler is first used to turn a “backpressure”
turbogenerator, thereby creating more electricity,
and is then channelled into PPG’s main plant for
use in the manufacturing process. (587 F.2d at
238-239, Petition App. 2a-3a.)
“As EPA’s petition recognizes, the term “cogeneration” is
used to denote energy-efficient production both of electricity
and of process steam at one power plant. (Petition, at 4 n.1.)
This dual use has an important bearing on the factual
underpinnings of EPA’s decision to apply its new source
standards for fossil-fuel fired steam generating units to
the waste-heat boilers in the system.
Cogeneration systems are not, unfortunately, in
common use in this country.’ When they are used,
reliance is ordinarily placed on only one or the other of
the two modes, not both together. In layman’s terms,
the two cogeneration modes have been described as
follows:
In...[the ‘topping-cycle’] approach to cogenera-
tion, turbogenerators create electricity from the
steam before it is used for drying and other
low-temperature industrial processes. In ‘bottoming
cycle’ operations, generators produce electricity
from exhaust heat after the heat is first used for
some higher-temperature processing job, such as
smelting or kiln baking.
' (BUSINESS WEEK, June 6, 1977, at 99: Attachment
A to Petitioner’s Reply Brief in the court of
appeals.)
Considered on a flow-chart basis (a diagram of the
system is shown below) PPGs cogeneration system
initially relies on a reverse “bottoming cycle” mode.
That is, the gas turbines produce electricity from
combustion of natural gas°Then the waste-heat boilers use
the heat in the exhaust gases from the turbines, plus heat
from firing supplemental fuel, to generate high-temper-
*Remarks of President Carter to a Joint Session of Congress,
White House Press Release, at 5 (April 20, 1977). (App. 81.)
°The General Electric gas turbines are also capable of using oil
of certain specifications as fuel.
~]
ature, high-pressure steam.” The high-temperature, high-
pressure steam produced by the waste-heat boilers is
supplied to the steam turbogenerator to make elec-
tricity (the “topping cycle” approach), and the re-
sultant low-temperature, reduced-pressure steam is used
in chemical processing operations at the Lake Charles
Works.®
FUEL 7 “9
-- =
ee Ce | efncaatn [Oat
‘Omar ae STACK STACK ‘oma
WF—e) DAMPERS DAMPERS wees
=—_ svace} Pome =s ease]
wEaT |
(_——_——___ | -—_—_—_______}
Fuel BOILER BOILER Fuel
L
2
STEAM
TURBO - GENERATOR
STEAM SsTeEam
7The waste-heat boilers have been designed and constructed to
use as supplemental fuel either natural gas, fuel oil, or hydrogen.
The electricity produced by the system is used at the facility
for, among other things, the production of chlorine and caustic
from brine.
As the description of the power plant in the opinion of the
court of appeals (quoted supra, at 5) suggests, the integrated unit
is sizeable. It is rated at a total capacity of 180 megawatts of elec-
tricity and 1.35 billion BTU/hour of steam. (App. 15.) The General
Electric Gas turbines are the largest model then manufactured by
the company.
The savings in energy attributable to the cogeneration aspects
of the system are equal to | million barrels of oil per year, or 42
million gallons of oil per year.
8
In short, the system has been carefully designed to
make highly efficient use of the fuel energy supplied to
it. Each component of the system serves an essential
purpose. PPG first made this point to EPA when it
provided EPA with information bearing on the date
construction of the system would be considered to have
commenced. This date has particular significance under
the regulatory structure for new sources established by
the Clean Air Act.
In effect, a “new source” under the definitional
provisions of the Clean Air Act is a source the
construction of which is commenced after the date of
proposal by EPA of pertinent standards of performance.
See Section 111(a)(2) of the Act, 42 USC.
§7411(a)(2). EPA published proposed standards for
fossil-fuel fired steam generating units on August 17,
1971. See 36 Fed. Reg. 15,704. PPG established the
design and carried out the engineering work on the
system in 1970. (App. 59.). It entered into contracts for
the two gas turbines and the turbogenerator in November
1970. (App. 60.) The specification book for the entire
power plant was completed in February 1971.(Jd.) PPG
cleared and prepared the site for the system in 1970 and
early 1971. The final purchase order for the waste-heat
boilers was, however, dated October 14, 1974 (App. 34),
after the effective date of the new source standards.
EPA’s standards for fossil-fuel fired steam generating
units do not refer to cogeneration systems in which
waste-heat boilers obtain a substantial part of their heat
input from the exhaust of a coordinated turbine, to
take the place of heat derived from combustion of fuel.
The Agency developed the standards without consider-
ing such cogeneration systems, and thus it did not
address any of the technological air-emission control
problems arising in connection with the systems.’ PPG
consequently and understandably did not consider or
even suspect that the new source standards applied to
its facility. When in early 1976, EPA raised the issue of
the applicability of the new source standards to the
waste-heat boiler components of the system, PPG
among other things again pointed out that no one part
of the system could be considered independently from
the other parts. When construction had begun in 1970
on the gas turbines and the turbogenerator, PPG had
then committed itself to construct the mid-component
waste-heat boilers on the basis of the integral design
and engineering plan also established in 1970. This design
and engineering plan was reflected in the orders for the
gas turbines and steam turbogenerator in 1970, and it is
reflected in the completed system. EPA refused on legal
grounds to consider the fact that the waste-heat boilers
by design could not practicably function except as part
of the total unit. In a letter dated December 22, 1976,
an official of EPA’s Region VI responded that:
[e]ven though you [PPG] may have ordered
equipment before the date of the proposed ~
regulations that would be completely useless
°Only now is the Agency doing so. At 44 Fed. Reg. 37,632
(June 28, 1979), EPA published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking stating its intent to develop proposed new source
standards of performance for air pollutants from fossil-fuel fired
industrial (non-utility) steam generators. To further its work on
developing proposed new source standards for industrial boilers,
the Agency requested comments and information on six separate
issues, one of which bears specifically on cogeneration systems:
d. Will enforcement of standards at cogeneration facilities
present special problems which should be considered?
(/d.)
10
without the steam generators, that action is
irrelevant to determine the applicability of the
regulations to the two steam generators. (App. 51.)
The “useless” equipment would have been the entire
steam turbogenerator.'®
Thereafter, on April 13, 1977, PPG filed a formal
request under 40 C.F.R. §60.5'' for a determination
by E2A respecting the applicability of the new source
standards to its facility.
2. EPA advised PPG that the waste-heat boilers
would not be subject to the new source
standards when operated as designed, but then
retracted this determination and imposed on
PPG fuel requirements not authorized by the
standards.
EPA’s Region VI responded on June 8, 1977, to
PPG’s request for a formal determination, after having
received guidance from the Division of Stationary
Source Enforcement at EPA’s headquarters in Washing-
ton. The Agency determined that the waste-heat boilers
were subject to the standards because they were capable
of operating without waste heat input at the necessary
This unit is a large 44,000 KVA-rated generator. (App. 28.)
As PPG reported to EPA in 1976:
The purchase of the gas turbines and turbogenerators in
1970 represents a commitment of $9.4 million, covering
two-thirds of the equipment purchased in the combined-
cycle power plant. (App. 46.)
"This regulation provides that an owner or operator may
request such a determination, and it provides that EPA will
respond within 30 days. (See Petition at 4; 587 F.2d at 241 n.3,
Petition App. 8a n.3.)
11
level (250 million British thermal units per hour) for
coverage. (Petition, Appendix F, at 3la-33a.) The
Agency’s response stated that the waste-heat boilers
were subject to performance tests while being operated
with 100 percent fossil-fuel input; it did not resolve the
question of what was to happen when the boilers were
operated as designed with waste heat. PPG requested a
clarification. (App. 91.)
On August 3, 1977, the Director of the Division of
Stationary Source Enforcement at EPA’s headquarters
by letter stated that the standards would apply only
during a performance test or other periods when a
boiler was operating entirely using fossil fuel.
(Appendix A infra, at la.)
This favorable ruling was soon rescinded, however.
On August 18, 1977, the Director by letter retracted
the prior ruling and stated that the waste-heat boilers
would be subject to certain selected provisions of the
standards at all times. (Petition, Appendix G, at
34a-36a.) He also determined that PPG’s waste-heat
boilers would be required at all times to burn fuel
which contained a sulfur content equal to or less than a
sulfur level to be specified as a result of performance
tests conducted in compliance with the standards. He
stated that PPG was not required to install equipment
for and to conduct the continuous monitoring for SO,,
NO, , or CO mandated by the standards. However, PPG
would be required to install and operate continuous
Qpacity monitors in the stacks of the waste-heat boilers,
and PPG may also be required to monitor and report
on the sulfur content of supplemental fossil fuel burned
in the boilers.
In effect, EPA had established a new ad hoc standard
12
for application to PPG’s unique waste-heat boilers.
Notably, the standards themselves do not prescribe fuel
requirements, nor do they authorize EPA officials to
establish such requirements in particular cases.
PPG sought judicial review. It was especially
concerned that reliable and economic fuel sources be
available for use with the cogeneration system. !?
'2PPG’s concerns were not unfounded. See Tinker, Exxon
Can't Meet Low Sulfur Residual Demand, The Oil Daily,
February 23, 1979, at 1, col. 1 (blaming the problem of
insufficient supplies of low sulfur fuel oil “on a shortfall of
sweet, low sulfur crude oil’ such as that previously obtained
from Iran).
The task of obtaining suitable supplies of environmentally
acceptable fuel rests with Conoco Inc., a co-respondent here and
the intervenor in the case in the court of appeals. By contract
amendment between Conoco and PPG, dated July 9, 1974,
Conoco obligated itself to supply fuel for use in PPG’s Lake
Charles Works. EPA’s determinations to apply the standards has
resulted in the notification by PPG to Conoco that PPG claims
Conoco is contractually obligated to deliver to PPG fuels having
a sulfur content of seven-tenths percent (0.7%) or less. See
Complaint, 48, in PPG Industries, Inc. v. Costle, Civ. Action No.
77-1271 (W.D. La., filed November 11, 1977).
During the pendency of this litigation, PPG has complied with
the standards largely by using natural gas as the supplemental
fuel for the waste-heat boilers. As prescribed by the standards,
performance tests with natural gas were carried out on the first
waste-heat boiler on August 24, 1977 (App. 97), and on the
second waste-heat boiler on May 3, 1979. Letter from James E.
Wyche, III to Diane Dutton, Director, Enforcement Division,
EPA Region VI (June 21, 1979).(The second performance test
was delayed because of a disagreement between EPA and PPG
arising out of the litigation.) In each such test, the boilers met
the requirements established by the standards and EPA’s ruling
of August 18, 1977.
13
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
A.If EPA’s Determinations Were Made Prior To
August 7, 1977, The Date Of Enactment Of
The Clean Air Act Amendments Of 1977,
EPA’s Jurisdictional Arguments Have No Basis
In Fact
Throughout this litigation, PPG has taken the
position that EPA’s determinations regarding the
waste-heat boilers were found in three letters: the letter
of June 8, 1977 from an official of EPA’s Region VI
office (Petition, Appendix F, at 3la), the letter of
August 3, 1977 from the Director of the Division of
Stationary Source Enforcement at EPA’s headquarters
(Appendix A infra, at 1a), and the letter of August 18,
1977 also from the Director (Petition, Appendix G, at
34a.). For example, the fuel restrictions first appear
(they are not set out in the standards) in the letter of
August 18, 1977.
The Clean Air Act Amendments were enacted on
August 7, 1977. See Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685
(August 7, 1977). These 1977 Amendments revised
Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§7607(b)(1), to add the statutory language upon which
EPA relies for its jurisdictional arguments. Prior to the
1977 Amendments, it was beyond dispute that a final
action by EPA such as the one in the present case was
subject to review in an action brought in a United
States District Court under 28 U.S.C. §1331 (the
federal question statute) and 5 U.S.C. §§701-706 (the
Administrative Procedure Act). See Utah Power & Light
Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 180 U.S. App.
D.C. 70, 553 F.2d 215 (1977).
14
In its petition, EPA avers that its determinations
were made in the letter dated June 8, 1977 from an
official of the Agency’s Region VI office. (See Petition,
at 4.) The letter of August 18, 1977, from a Division
Director at EPA’s Washington headquarters is character-
ized as a “‘clarifi{cation].” (/d. at 5.) Perhaps
understandably, the petition disregards the substantively
contrary letter dated August 3, 1977 from the Division
Director.
If the characterizations in the petition for the
Agency are proper, then EPA’s determinations were in
fact made prior to enactment of the 1977 Amend-
ments. In these circumstances, the revisions made by
the 1977 Amendments to the judicial review provisions
arguably would not apply in this case even if
EPA’s arguments on jurisdiction were correct and the
decision of the court of appeals were wrong.
B.No Conflict Exists Among The Relevant
Decisions Of The Courts Of Appeals; The
Courts Have Harmonized Their Jurisdictional
Rulings On Amended Section 307(b)(1) To
Provide A Framework For A_ Reasoned,
Practical Construction Of These New Portions
Of The Clean Air Act
In the petition, EPA avers that approximately 90
currently pending actions depend on the jurisdictional
question decided by the court of appeals in this case.
(Petition, at 13 n.8.) EPA claims that “serious
problems” with the administration of the Clean Air Act
are created because of the decision by the court of
15
appeals. (/d. at 13.)'? Thus far at least, the courts of
appeals have not had so much difficulty as EPA claims.
Indeed, the three decisions by courts of appeals
reported to date bearing on the jurisdictional issue are
in harmony with each other and provide a workable
starting point for a reasoned, practical construction of
the recently amended judicial-review portions of the
Clean Air Act.
Under the judicial-review provision of the Clean Air
Act, Section 307(b)(1), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§7607(b)(1), a court of appeals has _ exclusive
jurisdiction to review any order issued by _ the
Administrator of EPA under several specifically enu-
merated sections, or ‘“‘any other final action of the
'SNo trouble even arguably arose under the Act as it stood
prior to the 1977 Amendments. Then, under Utah Power &
Light Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 180 U.S. App.
D.C. 70, 553 F.2d 215 (1977), the district courts clearly had
jurisdiction to review action by EPA applying regulations to
particular facilities. See supra, at 13. EPA, however, argues that
the 1977 Amendments changed the jurisdictional import of the
judicial review provisions in the Act. It is thus EPA’s jurisdic-
tional argument, not the “position of PPG or Conoco, which
creates any difficulty.
In fact, EPA has ensured that regulated parties will be
presented with a difficult jurisdictional decision regarding the
forum for review. In notices recently published by EPA in the
Federal Register reporting that the Agency had granted or denied
a permit to construct a particular new facility, EPA has included
an explicit statement that review of its action to grant or deny
the requested permit must be had in the appropriate court of
appeals. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 41,531 (July 17, 1979) (giving
notice that EPA had granted a “PSD” permit to FlexCon
Company for construction of a new “pressure-sensitive adhesive
coater with a gas-fired incinerator’’).
16
Administrator” under the Act which is locally or
regionally applicable. Because the action in this case
involved the interpretation and application of a
regulation, it did not fall within any of the specifically
enumerated sections of the statute.'* Therefore, in
order for the court of appeals to have jurisdiction,
EPA’s action had to come within the “any other final
action’’ clause of the statute.
The court of appeals attempted to determine what
type of action was within the ‘“‘any other final action”
language of the statute by reference to the legislative
history of the 1977 Amendments. However, the
legislative history spoke only of venue for review, not
jurisdiction. See 587 F.2d at 243 n.6, Petition App.
1Sa-l6a n.6. As the court of appeals observed, the
legislative history ‘“‘complete[ly] fail[s] to mention
what EPA asserts was a massive shift in jurisdiction to
the courts of appeals.” Jd. at 243, Petition App. 15a.
'4Notably also, the action was not taken by the Administrator
of EPA which the statutory provisions require as a predicate for
review actions to be brought jurisdictionally in the courts of
appeals. EPA’s actions were taken by an official of EPA’s Region
VI office and by the Director of the Division of Stationary
Source Enforcement at EPA’s headquarters.
EPA’s regulations (40 C.F.R. §60.5) provide that determina-
tions regarding applicability of new source standards are to be
made by the Administrator. This is so even though the
regulations also specify that “[a]ll... applications, submittals,
and other communications to the Administrator pursuant to this
part shall be... addressed to the appropriate Regional Office of
the Environmental Protection Agency, to the attention of the
Director, Enforcement Division [of the Region].” (40 C.F.R.
§60.4.)
Section 301 (a1) of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 42
U.S.C. §7601(a)(1), permits the Administrator to delegate his
“powers and duties” other than rulemaking authority.
17
The court accordingly turned to other aids to statutory
construction. It concluded that the amended statutory
provisions must be read in light of the limitations in the
ability of a court of appeals to develop facts. In the
court’s view the determination regarding jurisdiction
should reflect the capability provided a district court to
call into play discovery procedures to prove out a more
comprehensible administrative record.
As previously noted, EPA’s interpretation and
application of its regulation in the present case
produced a record that consisted of a collection of
correspondence between the Agency and the petitioner.
The court of appeals found that this record was
“sparse” and might leave the reviewing court in a
position where it would be unable to verify, or even
identify, the EPA’s grounds for its decision. 587 F.2d at
244-245, Petition App. 19a. Because the appellate
courts lack the fact finding mechanisms available to
district courts, they are ill-suited to conduct a meaning-
ful review of administrative action resting on records
that are either sparse or non-existent.'* Therefore, the
'SThe court of appeals also feared that courts of appeals
would not be able to provide prompt review, and suggested that
delayed review would be costly and prejudicial to the parties:
At this level [the court of appeals], only after hearing,
which may be long delayed because of other calendar
commitments, can it be known whether the record is
sufficient for review purposes. An insufficient record may
necessitate a removal for fact-finding and record comple-
tion and a second court appearance, often before other
judges, long delayed. 587 F.2d at 245; Petition App. 20a.
Moreover, as the court of appeals had stated in a prior decision,
“[r] emand to the agency for a statement of reasons for its
decision would risk after the fact rationalization, which the
evidence gathering powers of a trial court can more easily
penetrate.” Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator of Environmental
Protection Agency, 556 F.2d 1282, 1292 (Sth Cir. 1977).
18
court of appeals held that the ‘“‘any other final action”
clause in the statute would not include any final action
taken on such an informal basis that it produced an
administrative record insufficient for a court of appeals .
to review. Such informal actions should be reviewed at
the district court level to permit the record to be
proven by way of discovery and other means. /d.,
Petition App. 20a-2 1a.
Other courts of appeals have accepted this ruling. In
United States Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 595 F.2d 207 (Sth Cir. 1979), the petitioners
filed for review of EPA’s action in promulgating
regulations designating areas in Alabama as nonattain-
ment areas for suspended particulates. The court found
that it had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1) to
review the agency action. /d. at 212. It distinguished
this decision from its prior decision in the PPG case on
the basis of the type of agency action taken and the
resulting administrative records involved in each case.
The court noted that the record in the PPG case
consisted solely of exchanges of correspondence.
Since there was a substantial record in the U.S. Steel
case, derived from a rulemaking proceeding, the court
found that the considerations that gave rise to the
result in the PPG case were absent. The court explicitly
acknowledged the difference in the nature of the two
actions. In the PPG case EPA had determined that a
certain regulation was applicable to a specific plant,
while in the U.S. Steel case EPA had promulgated
regulations having a general effect in the specified areas.
Similarly, in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979),
steel-company petitioners sought review of a final rule
issued by EPA embodying the determination that four
19
areas of Pennsylvania were nonattainment areas for
suspended particulates.
The court briefly discussed the jurisdictional issue,
and in doing so, distinguished the case before it from
the Fifth Circuit’s prior decision in the PPG case on
grounds similar to those set out in the Fifth Circuit’s
U.S. Steel decision. See 597 F.2d at 379 n.3. The court
took the position that the PPG case was not applicable
in the case before it because EPA had in its case taken
rulemaking action under 5 U.S.C. §553. The court
opined that the PPG case stood for the proposition that
42 U.S.C. §7607 did not give jurisdiction to courts of
appeals to review the interpretation and application of
regulations, where the Agency was acting on an
informal basis. /d.
Consequently, in the three cases reported to date
interpreting the “other final action clause”? of Section
307(b)(1), the courts have reached decisions which are
not in conflict and which provide a reasoned and
practical conceptual basis for deciding which of the
many types of “other actions” are properly to: be
reviewed in courts of appeals and which are to be
reviewed in district courts. If an action taken by EPA
was based upon the record provided by a formal
adjudicatory proceeding or by a rulemaking proceeding,
then the action must be reviewed in the courts of
appeals. If the action reflects informal adjudicatory
proceedings, then district courts must undertake the
task of review. This is precisely the result advocated as
a general matter by two distinguished commentators.
See Currie and Goodman, Judicial Review Of Federal
Administrative Action: Quest For The Optimum
Forum, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 54-61 (1975).
20
EPA’s petition offers several reasons for reaching a
result contrary to that of the court of appeals. Among
other things, it asserts that this is a case of “undisputed
facts.”” (Petition, at 8.) This assertion is not correct.
The facts regarding the cogeneration system were not
fully developed in the exchanges of correspondence, in
large part because EPA rejected the legal relevance of
much information. For example, EPA did not concern
itself with the integrated design of the cogeneration
system or with the orders for and construction of the
gas turbines and the steam turbogenerator. The Agency
explicitly took the position it would not consider these
matters even if equipment such as the steam turbo-
generator would be “useless” in the absence of the
waste-heat boilers. See supra, at 9-10.
Yet the Agency recognized the special characteristics
of the cogeneration system in rewriting on an ad hoc
basis the new source standards. It imposed fuel
requirements not found in the standards and otherwise
selectively chose among the requirements of the
standards, as evidenced by the letter of August 18,
1977. No. basis or rationale for these ad hoc
determinations appears in the 97 pages of correspond-
ence making up the administrative record certified to
the court of appeals by the Agency in this case.
Document discovery and interrogatories would force
disclosure by the Agency of whether it indeed had any
basis for its ad hoc action, and if it had such a basis,
whether the basis was sustainable on the record.
EPA’s petition focuses particularly on discovery
procedures. (See Petition, at 11-12.) Contrary to EPA’s
claims, the court of appeals did not direct or invite the
district court “to go far beyond the administrative
21
record and to create a judicial record much broader
than the administrative proceedings.” (/d. at 11 (foot-
note omitted).) The discovery proceedings which have
taken place in the district court since the decision by
the court of appeals have been clearly and sharply
addressed to proving out the full administrative record
before the Agency at the time the determinations were
made. That is, the discovery has sought disclosure of
materials and information before EPA at that time,
along with the bases upon which those who made the
decisions acted. It is on these grounds that the district
_ court on May 22, 1979, denied EPA’s Motion for A
Protective Order barring all further discovery. The
district court on June 6, 1979, directed EPA to answer
certain interrogatories previously served on the Agency
by intervenor Conoco, Inc. EPA has since responded to
those interrogatories. This course of events is consistent
with this Court’s opinions in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S.
138, 143 (1973), and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
22
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES F. LETTOW
JANET L. WELLER
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
V. PETER WYNNE, JR.
One Gateway Center
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222
OLIVER P. STOCKWELL
One Lakeside Plaza
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
Counsel For Respondent
PPG Industries, Inc.
Of Counsel:
CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN &
HAMILTON
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
STOCKWELL, SIEVERT, VICCELLIO,
CLEMENTS & SHADDOCK
One Lakeside Plaza
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
July 30, 1979
la
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20450
August 3, 1977
Office of Enforcement
Charles F. Lettow, Esq.
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and Hamilton
1250 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Mr. Lettow:
Your letter of July 18, 1977, requests confirmation
of your understanding of EPA’s requirements regarding
the applicability of new source performance standards
for fossil-fuel fired boilers (40 CFR §60.40 ef. seq.) to
the operation of PPG’s Lake Charles, Louisiana
waste-heat boilers.
This letter is to confirm your understanding: (1) that
except for the time of the performance test or other
periods when a boiler is operating on 100 percent fossil
fuel, the standards for fossil-fuel fired boilers would not
apply to the operation of PPG’s waste-heat boilers in
their planned mode of operation (significant heat input
from turbine exhaust gas); and (2) that any new source
performance standard for waste-heat boilers which
would be proposed and promulgated in the future
would not apply to PPGs Lake Charles, Louisiana
2a
waste-heat boilers which commenced construction prior
to the proposal date of the new standard.
If you have any questions on this matter, please
contact Doug Farnsworth of my staff at (202)
755-2570.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Edward E. Reich,
Edward E. Reich, Director
Division of Stationary Source
Enforcement (EN-341)
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.