Opposition — Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.

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Supreme Court, U. &,

FILED

JUL 80 1979

IN THE | MICHAEL RODAK. 18. CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1918

ADLENE HARRISON, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR,

AND DOUGLAS COSTLE, ADMINISTRATOR OF

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Petitioners,

v.

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. AND

CONOCO, INC.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENT

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.

Of Counsel: CHARLES F. LETTOW

CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & = JANET L. WELLER

HAMILTON 1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036

Washington, D.C. 20036 V. PETER WYNNE, JR.

One Gateway Center

CKWELL, SIEVERT, VICCELLIO,

hie & SHADDOCK Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222

One Lakeside Plaza OLIVER P. STOCKWELL

Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601 One Lakeside Plaza

Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601

Counsel for Respondent

July 30, 1979 PPG Industries, Inc.

ES

Washington, D.C. « CLB PUBLISHERS’ e LAW PRINTING CO. e (202) 393-0625

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TC TN he ae 6a aid bie & Ne Ae ee Oem l

EO eee ee ee ee eee ee 2

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......... 3

1. PPG’s power plant at the Lake Charles

Works consists of a single integrated unit

relying on both types of “cogeneration”

technology to make highly efficient use of

Oe ed ee ee eae 4

2. EPA advised PPG that the waste-heat boilers

would not be subject to the new source

standards when operated as designed, but

then retracted this determination and im-

posed on PPG fuel requirements not author-

er aan as Saw o &@ 08 8 10

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ........... 13

A. If EPA’s Determinations Were Made Prior To

August 7, 1977, The Date Of Enactment Of

The Clean Air Act Amendments Of 1977,

EPA’s Jurisdictional Arguments Have No

es aa eo et ol. ey ge oes 0 13

B. No Conflict Exists Among The Relevant

Decisions Of The Courts of Appeals; The

Courts Have Harmonized Their Jurisdictional

Rulings On Amended Section 307(b)(1) To

Provide A Framework For A _ Reasoned

Practical Construction Of These Portions Of

ee ee weteee eee 14

ES IG OI OO a ee ar 22

IESE SRE PERE CUE EC EERE la

(it)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Came wv. Pitts, 412 US. 156 CIDTS) 2... occ ccc eccccccncal

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401

I A ho ies eink eb a eee 21

PPG Industries, Inc. v. Costle, No. 77-1271 (W.D.

oe a a ere aera 3,12

Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator of Environ-

mental Protection Agency, 556 F.2d 1282

Se CO EN ainewsh ks sha hs Wein haw eee 8 17

Sharon Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979) ............ 18,19

United States Steel Corp. v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 595 F.2d 207 (Sth Cir.

SE aca ar SmOladt 4 aki bse i ow Sie, WEAN 68 60's. 18

Utah Power & Light Co. v. Environmental Protec-

tion Agency, 180 U.S. App. D.C. 70, 553 F.2d

iD) ss ae eae Fe eee PO ee eee 13,15

Statutes and Rules:

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §553 and

GiGi toss Kab Oe Oe ees 13,19

Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§7401 et

a ee eer ae, a ey ee ear 3

Section 111(aX(2), 42 U.S.C. §7411(aX2) ........... 8

Section 301(aX1), 42 U.S.C. §7601(aXil) ........... 16

GE Dee, GP Ws OPE cei ce ects scveevess 19

Section 307(b\(1), 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1) 2,4,13,14,15,18,19

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No.

95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (August 7, 1977) ............. 4,13

ee GS OP AA, NUON ke tice ea rwedecen 13

Regulations:

es Ee re ere rere ree 2

RE ee ee ie aa ae 16

(iti)

I re eo dla 10,16

40 C.F.R. 8§60.40-6046 ........ 0. ccc cccccecee cs 2

Miscellaneous:

BUSINESS WEEK, June 6, 1977, at 99 ............05. 6

Currie and Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal

Administrative Action: Quest For The Optimum

Forum, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 54-61 (1975). .......... 19

oe Fem, Fee 19,708 Chee 17, TOTE) . ww ccc wees 8

oe Se Be Fh rrr a

5 Fee Be Oe aee GPE Ae HOPED ois bis 5 's-0:5.9 v0.66 6a 15

Letter from James E. Wyche, III to Diane Dutton,

Director, Enforcement Division, EPA Region VI

I I a Nd en eg i tie’ och 12

Remarks of President Carter to a Joint Session of

Congress, White House Press Release, at 5 (April

a ee ig eS De CMR A we en wate ft 6

Tinker, Exxon Can’t Meet Low Sulfur Residual

Demand, The Oil Daily, February 23,1979 .......... 12

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1918

ADLENE HARRISON, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR,

AND DOUGLAS COSTLE, ADMINISTRATOR OF

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Petitioners,

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. AND

CONOCO, INC.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENT

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.

INTRODUCTION

Respondent PPG Industries, Inc. opposes the petition

for writ of certiorari.

2

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, as

amended especially by the Clean Air Act Amendments

of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1), confer original and

exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of appeals to review

final actions by the Administrator of EPA applying new

source performance standards to particular facilities?

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE!

The case and the petition turn on amendments adopted

in 1977 to the judicial review provisions of the Clean Air

Act.

The petition for a writ of certiorari seeks review in

this Court of the decision and judgment of the court of

appeals dismissing a protective petition for review on

jurisdictional grounds. PPG Industries, Inc. v. Harrison,

587 F.2d 237 (Sth Cir. 1979) (Petition App. la). The

protective petition for review related to a determination

by the Environmental Protection Agency (‘“‘EPA’’) that

the Agency’s new source performance standards for air

emissions from fossil-fuel fired steam generating units?

applied to “‘waste heat’ boilers making up part of a

power plant at a chemical manufacturing works owned

and operated by PPG Industries, Inc. (““PPG’’) at Lake

"Several abbreviations are used in this memorandum. “App.”

refers to the administrative record as reproduced in the Joint

Deferred Appendix to the Briefs filed with the court of appeals.

“Petition App.” and “Petition Appendix” refer to the appendices

to the petition for a writ of certiorari.

See 40 C.F.R. § §60.1-60.15 and 60.40-60.46 (1978).

3

Charles, Louisiana. PPG had filed the protective petition

for review in the court of appeals because of uncer-

tainty over whether the provisions for judicial review of

agency action in the Clean Air Act, as amended (“the

Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq., prescribed that initial

review be had in the courts of appeals or in district

courts. PPG concurrently filed a complaint in the U.S.

District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

alleging that EPA’s determination was invalid and

praying for a declaration to that effect along with an

injunction against the Agency’s enforcement of its

determination. PPG Industries, Inc. v. Costle, Civ.

Action No. 77-1271 (W.D. La., filed November 11,

1977).

Facts are important to this litigation. An understand-

ing of the unexpected developments that produced this

litigation is necessary to place the jurisdictional issue in

context. In particular, the facts of this case demonstrate

the ready applicability of the rationale of the court of

appeals on the jurisdictional issue. Moreover, one of the

grounds presented in this response for denial of the pet-

ition for certiorari rests upon the timing of and manner

in which EPA made its determinations.

PPG was surprised when in early 1976 EPA began to

consider whether new source standards should be

applied to part of an integrated power plant that PPG

had begun constructing in 1970. Nothing in the stan-

dards for fossil-fuel fired steam generators proposed on

August 17, 1971, and later issued in due course, gave

PPG notice that the standards might be applied to

“waste heat” boilers, where the exhaust emissions from

the boilers result in large part from the combustion of

fossil fuel not in the boilers, but in associated gas

turbines. And subsequently, when EPA did decide that

its standards for fossil-fuel fired steam generating units

4

applied to the waste-heat boilers, it did not apply (and

as a technological matter could not have applied) those

standards as promulgated. Rather it developed require-

ments on an ad hoc basis, imposing, among other

things, fuel limitations, despite the absence in the

standard of any such limitations.

These are the basic factual circumstances in light of

which EPA asserts its stance on jurisdiction. That stance

in and of itself is startling because, during Congress’s

consideration of the bills which became the Clean Air

Act Amendments of 1977, no one involved with the

legislative process gave any indication that a substantial

shift of the forum for judicial review of EPA’s actions

from district courts to courts of appeals was even under

consideration, let alone embodied in the bills.

Accordingly, this supplemental statement of the case

will endeavor to provide a comprehensible description

of the facility involved and also the manner in which

EPA set about making its administrative determination.

The following factual background for the jurisdictional

issue particularly relates to two salient sets of facts and

circumstances which were omitted in EPA’s statement

of the case and which are thus set forth in some detail.

1. PPG’s power plant at the Lake Charles Works

consists of a single integrated unit relying on

both types of “cogeneration” technology to

make highly efficient use of energy.

*See the discussion by the court of appeals at 587 F.2d at

243, Petition App. 12a-13a, of the revisions made to Sec )n

307(b\(1) of the Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1), by

the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91

Stat. 685 (August 7, 1977).

EPA’s petition recites that PPG’s power plant at the

Lake Charles Works uses “a coordinated system of two

gas turbine generators combined with two ‘waste heat’

boilers.” (Petition, at 4 (footnote omitted).) This

characterization omits any reference to the fact that the

power plant also contains a steam turbogenerator as

part of the integrated unit. As the court of appeals

recognized, the steam turbogenerator allows the power

plant to use both the “topping cycle” method of

cogeneration and a variant of the “bettoming cycle”

mode:‘

To meet its energy requirements, PPG recently

constructed a power plant designed to take

advantage of fuel-efficient ‘‘cogeneration”’ tech-

nology. The power plant is comprised of two

similar units. In each unit fossil fuel is burned in a

General Electric gas turbine generator to produce

electricity. Energy, or ‘“‘waste heat” thrown off by

the turbine’s exhaust, which would normally be

discharged into the atmosphere, is funnelled as a

heat source into a “waste heat” boiler which also

burns fuel oil. This exhaust from the turbines

contributes nearly 40% (approximately 371 million

British thermal units per hour) of the total input

to the waste heat boiler, while the remaining heat

(approximately 598 million British thermal units

per hour) is provided by combustion of fuel oil or

natural gas, known as fossil fuels. The highly

pressurized steam produced by the waste heat

boiler is first used to turn a “backpressure”

turbogenerator, thereby creating more electricity,

and is then channelled into PPG’s main plant for

use in the manufacturing process. (587 F.2d at

238-239, Petition App. 2a-3a.)

“As EPA’s petition recognizes, the term “cogeneration” is

used to denote energy-efficient production both of electricity

and of process steam at one power plant. (Petition, at 4 n.1.)

This dual use has an important bearing on the factual

underpinnings of EPA’s decision to apply its new source

standards for fossil-fuel fired steam generating units to

the waste-heat boilers in the system.

Cogeneration systems are not, unfortunately, in

common use in this country.’ When they are used,

reliance is ordinarily placed on only one or the other of

the two modes, not both together. In layman’s terms,

the two cogeneration modes have been described as

follows:

In...[the ‘topping-cycle’] approach to cogenera-

tion, turbogenerators create electricity from the

steam before it is used for drying and other

low-temperature industrial processes. In ‘bottoming

cycle’ operations, generators produce electricity

from exhaust heat after the heat is first used for

some higher-temperature processing job, such as

smelting or kiln baking.

' (BUSINESS WEEK, June 6, 1977, at 99: Attachment

A to Petitioner’s Reply Brief in the court of

appeals.)

Considered on a flow-chart basis (a diagram of the

system is shown below) PPGs cogeneration system

initially relies on a reverse “bottoming cycle” mode.

That is, the gas turbines produce electricity from

combustion of natural gas°Then the waste-heat boilers use

the heat in the exhaust gases from the turbines, plus heat

from firing supplemental fuel, to generate high-temper-

*Remarks of President Carter to a Joint Session of Congress,

White House Press Release, at 5 (April 20, 1977). (App. 81.)

°The General Electric gas turbines are also capable of using oil

of certain specifications as fuel.

~]

ature, high-pressure steam.” The high-temperature, high-

pressure steam produced by the waste-heat boilers is

supplied to the steam turbogenerator to make elec-

tricity (the “topping cycle” approach), and the re-

sultant low-temperature, reduced-pressure steam is used

in chemical processing operations at the Lake Charles

Works.®

FUEL 7 “9

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‘Omar ae STACK STACK ‘oma

WF—e) DAMPERS DAMPERS wees

=—_ svace} Pome =s ease]

wEaT |

(_——_——___ | -—_—_—_______}

Fuel BOILER BOILER Fuel

L

2

STEAM

TURBO - GENERATOR

STEAM SsTeEam

7The waste-heat boilers have been designed and constructed to

use as supplemental fuel either natural gas, fuel oil, or hydrogen.

The electricity produced by the system is used at the facility

for, among other things, the production of chlorine and caustic

from brine.

As the description of the power plant in the opinion of the

court of appeals (quoted supra, at 5) suggests, the integrated unit

is sizeable. It is rated at a total capacity of 180 megawatts of elec-

tricity and 1.35 billion BTU/hour of steam. (App. 15.) The General

Electric Gas turbines are the largest model then manufactured by

the company.

The savings in energy attributable to the cogeneration aspects

of the system are equal to | million barrels of oil per year, or 42

million gallons of oil per year.

8

In short, the system has been carefully designed to

make highly efficient use of the fuel energy supplied to

it. Each component of the system serves an essential

purpose. PPG first made this point to EPA when it

provided EPA with information bearing on the date

construction of the system would be considered to have

commenced. This date has particular significance under

the regulatory structure for new sources established by

the Clean Air Act.

In effect, a “new source” under the definitional

provisions of the Clean Air Act is a source the

construction of which is commenced after the date of

proposal by EPA of pertinent standards of performance.

See Section 111(a)(2) of the Act, 42 USC.

§7411(a)(2). EPA published proposed standards for

fossil-fuel fired steam generating units on August 17,

1971. See 36 Fed. Reg. 15,704. PPG established the

design and carried out the engineering work on the

system in 1970. (App. 59.). It entered into contracts for

the two gas turbines and the turbogenerator in November

1970. (App. 60.) The specification book for the entire

power plant was completed in February 1971.(Jd.) PPG

cleared and prepared the site for the system in 1970 and

early 1971. The final purchase order for the waste-heat

boilers was, however, dated October 14, 1974 (App. 34),

after the effective date of the new source standards.

EPA’s standards for fossil-fuel fired steam generating

units do not refer to cogeneration systems in which

waste-heat boilers obtain a substantial part of their heat

input from the exhaust of a coordinated turbine, to

take the place of heat derived from combustion of fuel.

The Agency developed the standards without consider-

ing such cogeneration systems, and thus it did not

address any of the technological air-emission control

problems arising in connection with the systems.’ PPG

consequently and understandably did not consider or

even suspect that the new source standards applied to

its facility. When in early 1976, EPA raised the issue of

the applicability of the new source standards to the

waste-heat boiler components of the system, PPG

among other things again pointed out that no one part

of the system could be considered independently from

the other parts. When construction had begun in 1970

on the gas turbines and the turbogenerator, PPG had

then committed itself to construct the mid-component

waste-heat boilers on the basis of the integral design

and engineering plan also established in 1970. This design

and engineering plan was reflected in the orders for the

gas turbines and steam turbogenerator in 1970, and it is

reflected in the completed system. EPA refused on legal

grounds to consider the fact that the waste-heat boilers

by design could not practicably function except as part

of the total unit. In a letter dated December 22, 1976,

an official of EPA’s Region VI responded that:

[e]ven though you [PPG] may have ordered

equipment before the date of the proposed ~

regulations that would be completely useless

°Only now is the Agency doing so. At 44 Fed. Reg. 37,632

(June 28, 1979), EPA published an Advance Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking stating its intent to develop proposed new source

standards of performance for air pollutants from fossil-fuel fired

industrial (non-utility) steam generators. To further its work on

developing proposed new source standards for industrial boilers,

the Agency requested comments and information on six separate

issues, one of which bears specifically on cogeneration systems:

d. Will enforcement of standards at cogeneration facilities

present special problems which should be considered?

(/d.)

10

without the steam generators, that action is

irrelevant to determine the applicability of the

regulations to the two steam generators. (App. 51.)

The “useless” equipment would have been the entire

steam turbogenerator.'®

Thereafter, on April 13, 1977, PPG filed a formal

request under 40 C.F.R. §60.5'' for a determination

by E2A respecting the applicability of the new source

standards to its facility.

2. EPA advised PPG that the waste-heat boilers

would not be subject to the new source

standards when operated as designed, but then

retracted this determination and imposed on

PPG fuel requirements not authorized by the

standards.

EPA’s Region VI responded on June 8, 1977, to

PPG’s request for a formal determination, after having

received guidance from the Division of Stationary

Source Enforcement at EPA’s headquarters in Washing-

ton. The Agency determined that the waste-heat boilers

were subject to the standards because they were capable

of operating without waste heat input at the necessary

This unit is a large 44,000 KVA-rated generator. (App. 28.)

As PPG reported to EPA in 1976:

The purchase of the gas turbines and turbogenerators in

1970 represents a commitment of $9.4 million, covering

two-thirds of the equipment purchased in the combined-

cycle power plant. (App. 46.)

"This regulation provides that an owner or operator may

request such a determination, and it provides that EPA will

respond within 30 days. (See Petition at 4; 587 F.2d at 241 n.3,

Petition App. 8a n.3.)

11

level (250 million British thermal units per hour) for

coverage. (Petition, Appendix F, at 3la-33a.) The

Agency’s response stated that the waste-heat boilers

were subject to performance tests while being operated

with 100 percent fossil-fuel input; it did not resolve the

question of what was to happen when the boilers were

operated as designed with waste heat. PPG requested a

clarification. (App. 91.)

On August 3, 1977, the Director of the Division of

Stationary Source Enforcement at EPA’s headquarters

by letter stated that the standards would apply only

during a performance test or other periods when a

boiler was operating entirely using fossil fuel.

(Appendix A infra, at la.)

This favorable ruling was soon rescinded, however.

On August 18, 1977, the Director by letter retracted

the prior ruling and stated that the waste-heat boilers

would be subject to certain selected provisions of the

standards at all times. (Petition, Appendix G, at

34a-36a.) He also determined that PPG’s waste-heat

boilers would be required at all times to burn fuel

which contained a sulfur content equal to or less than a

sulfur level to be specified as a result of performance

tests conducted in compliance with the standards. He

stated that PPG was not required to install equipment

for and to conduct the continuous monitoring for SO,,

NO, , or CO mandated by the standards. However, PPG

would be required to install and operate continuous

Qpacity monitors in the stacks of the waste-heat boilers,

and PPG may also be required to monitor and report

on the sulfur content of supplemental fossil fuel burned

in the boilers.

In effect, EPA had established a new ad hoc standard

12

for application to PPG’s unique waste-heat boilers.

Notably, the standards themselves do not prescribe fuel

requirements, nor do they authorize EPA officials to

establish such requirements in particular cases.

PPG sought judicial review. It was especially

concerned that reliable and economic fuel sources be

available for use with the cogeneration system. !?

'2PPG’s concerns were not unfounded. See Tinker, Exxon

Can't Meet Low Sulfur Residual Demand, The Oil Daily,

February 23, 1979, at 1, col. 1 (blaming the problem of

insufficient supplies of low sulfur fuel oil “on a shortfall of

sweet, low sulfur crude oil’ such as that previously obtained

from Iran).

The task of obtaining suitable supplies of environmentally

acceptable fuel rests with Conoco Inc., a co-respondent here and

the intervenor in the case in the court of appeals. By contract

amendment between Conoco and PPG, dated July 9, 1974,

Conoco obligated itself to supply fuel for use in PPG’s Lake

Charles Works. EPA’s determinations to apply the standards has

resulted in the notification by PPG to Conoco that PPG claims

Conoco is contractually obligated to deliver to PPG fuels having

a sulfur content of seven-tenths percent (0.7%) or less. See

Complaint, 48, in PPG Industries, Inc. v. Costle, Civ. Action No.

77-1271 (W.D. La., filed November 11, 1977).

During the pendency of this litigation, PPG has complied with

the standards largely by using natural gas as the supplemental

fuel for the waste-heat boilers. As prescribed by the standards,

performance tests with natural gas were carried out on the first

waste-heat boiler on August 24, 1977 (App. 97), and on the

second waste-heat boiler on May 3, 1979. Letter from James E.

Wyche, III to Diane Dutton, Director, Enforcement Division,

EPA Region VI (June 21, 1979).(The second performance test

was delayed because of a disagreement between EPA and PPG

arising out of the litigation.) In each such test, the boilers met

the requirements established by the standards and EPA’s ruling

of August 18, 1977.

13

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

A.If EPA’s Determinations Were Made Prior To

August 7, 1977, The Date Of Enactment Of

The Clean Air Act Amendments Of 1977,

EPA’s Jurisdictional Arguments Have No Basis

In Fact

Throughout this litigation, PPG has taken the

position that EPA’s determinations regarding the

waste-heat boilers were found in three letters: the letter

of June 8, 1977 from an official of EPA’s Region VI

office (Petition, Appendix F, at 3la), the letter of

August 3, 1977 from the Director of the Division of

Stationary Source Enforcement at EPA’s headquarters

(Appendix A infra, at 1a), and the letter of August 18,

1977 also from the Director (Petition, Appendix G, at

34a.). For example, the fuel restrictions first appear

(they are not set out in the standards) in the letter of

August 18, 1977.

The Clean Air Act Amendments were enacted on

August 7, 1977. See Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685

(August 7, 1977). These 1977 Amendments revised

Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

§7607(b)(1), to add the statutory language upon which

EPA relies for its jurisdictional arguments. Prior to the

1977 Amendments, it was beyond dispute that a final

action by EPA such as the one in the present case was

subject to review in an action brought in a United

States District Court under 28 U.S.C. §1331 (the

federal question statute) and 5 U.S.C. §§701-706 (the

Administrative Procedure Act). See Utah Power & Light

Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 180 U.S. App.

D.C. 70, 553 F.2d 215 (1977).

14

In its petition, EPA avers that its determinations

were made in the letter dated June 8, 1977 from an

official of the Agency’s Region VI office. (See Petition,

at 4.) The letter of August 18, 1977, from a Division

Director at EPA’s Washington headquarters is character-

ized as a “‘clarifi{cation].” (/d. at 5.) Perhaps

understandably, the petition disregards the substantively

contrary letter dated August 3, 1977 from the Division

Director.

If the characterizations in the petition for the

Agency are proper, then EPA’s determinations were in

fact made prior to enactment of the 1977 Amend-

ments. In these circumstances, the revisions made by

the 1977 Amendments to the judicial review provisions

arguably would not apply in this case even if

EPA’s arguments on jurisdiction were correct and the

decision of the court of appeals were wrong.

B.No Conflict Exists Among The Relevant

Decisions Of The Courts Of Appeals; The

Courts Have Harmonized Their Jurisdictional

Rulings On Amended Section 307(b)(1) To

Provide A Framework For A_ Reasoned,

Practical Construction Of These New Portions

Of The Clean Air Act

In the petition, EPA avers that approximately 90

currently pending actions depend on the jurisdictional

question decided by the court of appeals in this case.

(Petition, at 13 n.8.) EPA claims that “serious

problems” with the administration of the Clean Air Act

are created because of the decision by the court of

15

appeals. (/d. at 13.)'? Thus far at least, the courts of

appeals have not had so much difficulty as EPA claims.

Indeed, the three decisions by courts of appeals

reported to date bearing on the jurisdictional issue are

in harmony with each other and provide a workable

starting point for a reasoned, practical construction of

the recently amended judicial-review portions of the

Clean Air Act.

Under the judicial-review provision of the Clean Air

Act, Section 307(b)(1), as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§7607(b)(1), a court of appeals has _ exclusive

jurisdiction to review any order issued by _ the

Administrator of EPA under several specifically enu-

merated sections, or ‘“‘any other final action of the

'SNo trouble even arguably arose under the Act as it stood

prior to the 1977 Amendments. Then, under Utah Power &

Light Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 180 U.S. App.

D.C. 70, 553 F.2d 215 (1977), the district courts clearly had

jurisdiction to review action by EPA applying regulations to

particular facilities. See supra, at 13. EPA, however, argues that

the 1977 Amendments changed the jurisdictional import of the

judicial review provisions in the Act. It is thus EPA’s jurisdic-

tional argument, not the “position of PPG or Conoco, which

creates any difficulty.

In fact, EPA has ensured that regulated parties will be

presented with a difficult jurisdictional decision regarding the

forum for review. In notices recently published by EPA in the

Federal Register reporting that the Agency had granted or denied

a permit to construct a particular new facility, EPA has included

an explicit statement that review of its action to grant or deny

the requested permit must be had in the appropriate court of

appeals. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 41,531 (July 17, 1979) (giving

notice that EPA had granted a “PSD” permit to FlexCon

Company for construction of a new “pressure-sensitive adhesive

coater with a gas-fired incinerator’’).

16

Administrator” under the Act which is locally or

regionally applicable. Because the action in this case

involved the interpretation and application of a

regulation, it did not fall within any of the specifically

enumerated sections of the statute.'* Therefore, in

order for the court of appeals to have jurisdiction,

EPA’s action had to come within the “any other final

action’’ clause of the statute.

The court of appeals attempted to determine what

type of action was within the ‘“‘any other final action”

language of the statute by reference to the legislative

history of the 1977 Amendments. However, the

legislative history spoke only of venue for review, not

jurisdiction. See 587 F.2d at 243 n.6, Petition App.

1Sa-l6a n.6. As the court of appeals observed, the

legislative history ‘“‘complete[ly] fail[s] to mention

what EPA asserts was a massive shift in jurisdiction to

the courts of appeals.” Jd. at 243, Petition App. 15a.

'4Notably also, the action was not taken by the Administrator

of EPA which the statutory provisions require as a predicate for

review actions to be brought jurisdictionally in the courts of

appeals. EPA’s actions were taken by an official of EPA’s Region

VI office and by the Director of the Division of Stationary

Source Enforcement at EPA’s headquarters.

EPA’s regulations (40 C.F.R. §60.5) provide that determina-

tions regarding applicability of new source standards are to be

made by the Administrator. This is so even though the

regulations also specify that “[a]ll... applications, submittals,

and other communications to the Administrator pursuant to this

part shall be... addressed to the appropriate Regional Office of

the Environmental Protection Agency, to the attention of the

Director, Enforcement Division [of the Region].” (40 C.F.R.

§60.4.)

Section 301 (a1) of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 42

U.S.C. §7601(a)(1), permits the Administrator to delegate his

“powers and duties” other than rulemaking authority.

17

The court accordingly turned to other aids to statutory

construction. It concluded that the amended statutory

provisions must be read in light of the limitations in the

ability of a court of appeals to develop facts. In the

court’s view the determination regarding jurisdiction

should reflect the capability provided a district court to

call into play discovery procedures to prove out a more

comprehensible administrative record.

As previously noted, EPA’s interpretation and

application of its regulation in the present case

produced a record that consisted of a collection of

correspondence between the Agency and the petitioner.

The court of appeals found that this record was

“sparse” and might leave the reviewing court in a

position where it would be unable to verify, or even

identify, the EPA’s grounds for its decision. 587 F.2d at

244-245, Petition App. 19a. Because the appellate

courts lack the fact finding mechanisms available to

district courts, they are ill-suited to conduct a meaning-

ful review of administrative action resting on records

that are either sparse or non-existent.'* Therefore, the

'SThe court of appeals also feared that courts of appeals

would not be able to provide prompt review, and suggested that

delayed review would be costly and prejudicial to the parties:

At this level [the court of appeals], only after hearing,

which may be long delayed because of other calendar

commitments, can it be known whether the record is

sufficient for review purposes. An insufficient record may

necessitate a removal for fact-finding and record comple-

tion and a second court appearance, often before other

judges, long delayed. 587 F.2d at 245; Petition App. 20a.

Moreover, as the court of appeals had stated in a prior decision,

“[r] emand to the agency for a statement of reasons for its

decision would risk after the fact rationalization, which the

evidence gathering powers of a trial court can more easily

penetrate.” Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator of Environmental

Protection Agency, 556 F.2d 1282, 1292 (Sth Cir. 1977).

18

court of appeals held that the ‘“‘any other final action”

clause in the statute would not include any final action

taken on such an informal basis that it produced an

administrative record insufficient for a court of appeals .

to review. Such informal actions should be reviewed at

the district court level to permit the record to be

proven by way of discovery and other means. /d.,

Petition App. 20a-2 1a.

Other courts of appeals have accepted this ruling. In

United States Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 595 F.2d 207 (Sth Cir. 1979), the petitioners

filed for review of EPA’s action in promulgating

regulations designating areas in Alabama as nonattain-

ment areas for suspended particulates. The court found

that it had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1) to

review the agency action. /d. at 212. It distinguished

this decision from its prior decision in the PPG case on

the basis of the type of agency action taken and the

resulting administrative records involved in each case.

The court noted that the record in the PPG case

consisted solely of exchanges of correspondence.

Since there was a substantial record in the U.S. Steel

case, derived from a rulemaking proceeding, the court

found that the considerations that gave rise to the

result in the PPG case were absent. The court explicitly

acknowledged the difference in the nature of the two

actions. In the PPG case EPA had determined that a

certain regulation was applicable to a specific plant,

while in the U.S. Steel case EPA had promulgated

regulations having a general effect in the specified areas.

Similarly, in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979),

steel-company petitioners sought review of a final rule

issued by EPA embodying the determination that four

19

areas of Pennsylvania were nonattainment areas for

suspended particulates.

The court briefly discussed the jurisdictional issue,

and in doing so, distinguished the case before it from

the Fifth Circuit’s prior decision in the PPG case on

grounds similar to those set out in the Fifth Circuit’s

U.S. Steel decision. See 597 F.2d at 379 n.3. The court

took the position that the PPG case was not applicable

in the case before it because EPA had in its case taken

rulemaking action under 5 U.S.C. §553. The court

opined that the PPG case stood for the proposition that

42 U.S.C. §7607 did not give jurisdiction to courts of

appeals to review the interpretation and application of

regulations, where the Agency was acting on an

informal basis. /d.

Consequently, in the three cases reported to date

interpreting the “other final action clause”? of Section

307(b)(1), the courts have reached decisions which are

not in conflict and which provide a reasoned and

practical conceptual basis for deciding which of the

many types of “other actions” are properly to: be

reviewed in courts of appeals and which are to be

reviewed in district courts. If an action taken by EPA

was based upon the record provided by a formal

adjudicatory proceeding or by a rulemaking proceeding,

then the action must be reviewed in the courts of

appeals. If the action reflects informal adjudicatory

proceedings, then district courts must undertake the

task of review. This is precisely the result advocated as

a general matter by two distinguished commentators.

See Currie and Goodman, Judicial Review Of Federal

Administrative Action: Quest For The Optimum

Forum, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 54-61 (1975).

20

EPA’s petition offers several reasons for reaching a

result contrary to that of the court of appeals. Among

other things, it asserts that this is a case of “undisputed

facts.”” (Petition, at 8.) This assertion is not correct.

The facts regarding the cogeneration system were not

fully developed in the exchanges of correspondence, in

large part because EPA rejected the legal relevance of

much information. For example, EPA did not concern

itself with the integrated design of the cogeneration

system or with the orders for and construction of the

gas turbines and the steam turbogenerator. The Agency

explicitly took the position it would not consider these

matters even if equipment such as the steam turbo-

generator would be “useless” in the absence of the

waste-heat boilers. See supra, at 9-10.

Yet the Agency recognized the special characteristics

of the cogeneration system in rewriting on an ad hoc

basis the new source standards. It imposed fuel

requirements not found in the standards and otherwise

selectively chose among the requirements of the

standards, as evidenced by the letter of August 18,

1977. No. basis or rationale for these ad hoc

determinations appears in the 97 pages of correspond-

ence making up the administrative record certified to

the court of appeals by the Agency in this case.

Document discovery and interrogatories would force

disclosure by the Agency of whether it indeed had any

basis for its ad hoc action, and if it had such a basis,

whether the basis was sustainable on the record.

EPA’s petition focuses particularly on discovery

procedures. (See Petition, at 11-12.) Contrary to EPA’s

claims, the court of appeals did not direct or invite the

district court “to go far beyond the administrative

21

record and to create a judicial record much broader

than the administrative proceedings.” (/d. at 11 (foot-

note omitted).) The discovery proceedings which have

taken place in the district court since the decision by

the court of appeals have been clearly and sharply

addressed to proving out the full administrative record

before the Agency at the time the determinations were

made. That is, the discovery has sought disclosure of

materials and information before EPA at that time,

along with the bases upon which those who made the

decisions acted. It is on these grounds that the district

_ court on May 22, 1979, denied EPA’s Motion for A

Protective Order barring all further discovery. The

district court on June 6, 1979, directed EPA to answer

certain interrogatories previously served on the Agency

by intervenor Conoco, Inc. EPA has since responded to

those interrogatories. This course of events is consistent

with this Court’s opinions in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S.

138, 143 (1973), and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park

v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).

22

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES F. LETTOW

JANET L. WELLER

1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

V. PETER WYNNE, JR.

One Gateway Center

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222

OLIVER P. STOCKWELL

One Lakeside Plaza

Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601

Counsel For Respondent

PPG Industries, Inc.

Of Counsel:

CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN &

HAMILTON

1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

STOCKWELL, SIEVERT, VICCELLIO,

CLEMENTS & SHADDOCK

One Lakeside Plaza

Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601

July 30, 1979

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20450

August 3, 1977

Office of Enforcement

Charles F. Lettow, Esq.

Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and Hamilton

1250 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Lettow:

Your letter of July 18, 1977, requests confirmation

of your understanding of EPA’s requirements regarding

the applicability of new source performance standards

for fossil-fuel fired boilers (40 CFR §60.40 ef. seq.) to

the operation of PPG’s Lake Charles, Louisiana

waste-heat boilers.

This letter is to confirm your understanding: (1) that

except for the time of the performance test or other

periods when a boiler is operating on 100 percent fossil

fuel, the standards for fossil-fuel fired boilers would not

apply to the operation of PPG’s waste-heat boilers in

their planned mode of operation (significant heat input

from turbine exhaust gas); and (2) that any new source

performance standard for waste-heat boilers which

would be proposed and promulgated in the future

would not apply to PPGs Lake Charles, Louisiana

2a

waste-heat boilers which commenced construction prior

to the proposal date of the new standard.

If you have any questions on this matter, please

contact Doug Farnsworth of my staff at (202)

755-2570.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Edward E. Reich,

Edward E. Reich, Director

Division of Stationary Source

Enforcement (EN-341)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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