Petition — Leavitt v. Florida

F

JUN 14 4079 |

'

ae JR., CLERK

ee eS

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

No.

48-1860

BRANDON H. LEAVITT,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

SELIG I. GOLDIN

Goldin & Cates

Post Office Box 1251

Gainesville, Florida 32602

(904) 378-1673

Attorneys for Petitioner

LS ENN TTT

Washington, D.C. e CLB PUBLISHERS e LAW PRINTING CO. e (202) 393-0625

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED ...........3

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ee IN THE

Cine Page | Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374 2.1... cee ee eee 7

United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (1973) .......... 79

United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (1974) .......... 6 No.

United States v. Freeland, 562 F.2d 383 (1977) .......... 8

United States v. Homburg, 546 F.2d 1350 (C.C.A. |

Carne <2 ct oe Wiehe Saree te bbe eek) 0b ae Ol 8 | BRANDON H. LEAVITT,

United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Piette

i a Se Seid a tae a cin dig: ein h b.b-O¥ 7 ;

v.

United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (1973) ......... 6

United States v. Williams, 516 F.2d 11 (1975) ........... 6

agen STATE OF FLORIDA,

4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution .............6.. 3 ‘ i

14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ............-. 3 espondent.

See: Deere PO a, Ss kas Casas wee cen ob 2

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, BRANDON H. LEAVITT, prays that a

Writ of Certiorari be issued to review the Judgment of

| the District Court of Appeal, First District of Florida,

entered on 17 April 1979, Rehearing denied 15 May

1979. (Said Judgment and Order is incorporated as

Appendix “A’’).

The Circuit Court, Eighth Judicial Circuit, in and for

Alachua County, Florida, entered a Judgment on the

7th day of August 1978, sentencing Petitioner to 5

| years probation with an adjudication of guilt withheld

for possession of cocaine. As a special condition of

probation, Petitioner was required to serve | year in

custody. Petitioner was also placed upon a concurrent

probation with an adjudication of guilt withheld for a

period of 3 years for possession of more than 5 grams

of cannabis. (Said Judgment is incorporated as

Appendix “B”).

The District Court of Appeal, First District, rendered

its decision and opinion wherein it affirmed the

Judgment as to the cocaine offense; however, the

Judgment as to the cannabis offense was reversed and

the cause remanded for further disposition on the lesser

included misdemeanor offense of possession of less than

5 grams of cannabis. This decision is not yet reported

in the Southern Reporter System. (This opinion is

incorporated as Appendix ‘‘A’’).

Under the Florida appellate system, this decision is a

Judgment of last resort in the State of Florida.

The stage of the proceedings in which the Federal

question sought to be reviewed was first raised were:

(1) in the Trial Court by pre-trial Motion to Suppress

Evidence; and (2) at the Appellate level, First District

Court of Appeal, by Point One of Petitioner’s Brief.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed his request for a Stay

pending disposition of this Petition for Writ of

Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

Section 1257(3), Title 28, U.S.C.

ee eee

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Federal Question raised in this Petition is:

WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL WHO SUBMITS

HIMSELF FOR PREBOARDING INSPECTION

PURSUANT TO FEDERAL ANTI-HIJACKING

PROCEDURES AT AN AIRPORT CAN WITH-

DRAW AND WITHDRAW CONSENT TO A

SEARCH OF CARRY ON PERSONALTY.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

This case presents questions concerning the construc-

tion and interpretation of the 4th and 14th Amend-

ments to the United States Constitution, which provide:

4th: “The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, * * * effects, against unreasonable searches

and seizures, shall not be violated * * * *.”

14th: “***nor shall any state deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law. * * * *”

STATEMENT

Petitioner was arrested and charged with a number of

offenses on 8 December 1977. After various Informa-

tions were filed, a pre-trial Motion to Suppress Evidence

was filed alleging that the search of Petitioner at the

Gainesville, Florida Airport during a_ preboarding

screening procedure was illegal. This Motion was denied

and the trial of this cause began before a jury on 25

May 1978. The jury found Peutioner guilty of

4

possession of cocaine and possession of more than 5

grams of cannabis.

Petitioner’s Motion for New Trial was denied and the

District Court of Appeal, First District of Florida, heard

the appeal as stated herein.

The events, sufficient for an understanding of the

facts leading to Petitioner’s conviction, are as follows:

On 8 December 1977 at the Gainesville, Florida

Airport, Petitioner began to go through the pre-

boarding screening process as he prepared to board a

flight. When a carry-on bag went through the X-Ray

machine, the attendant noticed that there was an object

she could not identify. The attendant testified that

Petitioner pushed the bag toward her for inspection and

while the inspection was in progress, he changed his

mind. Another attendant confirmed that Petitioner did

not want to complete the inspection process and that

the first attendant gave Petitioner an option to leave

the inspection area. Petitioner testified that he did not

consent to a search of his bag. As he left the inspection

area, he left a toilet kit which the first attendant

handed to a nearby police officer. She stated that she

did not see any controlled substance in the toilet kit.

The police officer testified that the toilet kit was open

and he saw cannabis and a white powder inside of it.

The police officer chased Petitioner and, after

shooting him in the foot, Petitioner was placed under

arrest and this prosecution ensued.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

If an individual has the right to withdraw from a

pre-boarding screening area of an airport, he also has

the right to object to a search of his personal property.

The attendant continued her search after the consent

was withdrawn and it is therefore Petitioner’s position

that the search and subsequent seizure was violative of

constitutional limitations.

ARGUMENT

In recent years, this Country, as well as the rest of

the world, has been plagued by a new criminal element

comprised of individuals who hijack commercial air-

craft. Because of the great danger to the innocent

passengers and airline personnel from armed wackos, it

has become necessary to search all passengers for

weapons. As a result, the passenger boarding an airliner

has now been asked to submit to a search and, as

would be expected, these searches have uncovered

numerous folks carrying all types of illegal substances

which are not weapons. Thus, a whole new body of law

is evolving concerning airport searches. It is not

Petitioner’s purpose to contest the validity or rationale

of these procedures; rather, Petitioner will attempt to

demonstrate to this Court that within the parameters of

the applicable law, the search of Petitioner was an

illegal act.

In the context of this case, the Petitioner was not

considered as a risk because of any actions on his part

before he began the screening process and the X-Ray

machine, sometimes called a magnetometer, could not

be utilized to identify an object in his carry-on bag.

Under similar factual situations, two results have

emerged from the Federal Court -ystem. On one side is

the rule of the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth

Circuit, which is personified by the decision in United

States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (1973). In this case,

the Defendant presented himself for boarding and the

ticket agent detained him since he fit an anti-skyjack

profile. He was searched and a controlled substance was

found. The “ourt first noted that:

‘**... Rather, Skipwith came to the specific part of

the airport where he knew or should have known

all citizens were subject to being searched.”

The Court then stated the rule as:

‘“..we hold that those who actually present

themselves for boarding on an air carrier, like

those seeking entrance into the country, are

subject to a search based on mere or unsupported

suspicion,”

This is in line with the holdings of the United States

Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in United States v.

Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (1974), and United States v.

Williams, 516 F.2d 11 (1975) that:

“... we hold that there was implied consent to

search the carry-on baggage by virtue of the fact

that baggage which one does not want to have

searched may be consigned to the baggage

compartment.”

The effect of this line of cases is that once this

implied consent is given by the act of entering a

boarding area, any suspicious act, whether in person or

an unidentified object while baggage is going through a

magnetometer, justifies a search and consent can not be

withdrawn at that point.

The other rule that emerged first was enunciated in

United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D.

Cal., 1972), in which the search of a passenger’s

suitcase was held invalid because the passenger was not

given the option to decline a search upon the condition

that he not board the aircraft.

In United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (1973), the

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, had an

opportunity to review this issue. As Davis approached

the loading gate, he was told that a routine security

check was necessary and the agent reached for Davis’

briefcase, opened it, found a gun and he was taken into

custody. In reviewing the applicable law, the Court

stated:

“.,. Searches conducted as a part of a general

regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administra-

tive purpose, rather than as part of a criminal

investigation to secure evidence of crime, may be

permissible under the Fourth Amendment though

not supported by a showing of probable cause

directed to a particular place or person to be

searched.”

The Court then held:

“In sum, airport screening searches of the persons

and immediate possessions of potential passengers

for weapons and explosives are reasonable under

the Fourth Amendment provided each prospective

boarder retains the right to leave rather than

submit to the search.”’ (Emphasis Added).

The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, in

1974, approved this rule in United States v. Dalpiaz,

494 F.2d 374, although this was not necessary for the

8

determination of that case. However, in United States v.

Freeland, 562 F.2d 383 (1977), the Ninth Circuit

expressly approved the rule when it held such a search

valid so long as the passenger had a right to withdraw

luggage and not board the airplane.

From a purely factual standpoint, the closest decision

to the case at bar is United States v. Homburg, 546

F.2d 1350 (C.C.A. 9th, 1977). The facts were

summarized by the Court as:

“On September 16, 1975, appellant passed through

security inspection at Western Airlines Gate One at

San Diego International Airport. His carry-on

suitcase was subjected to x-ray inspection and he

went through the magnetometer. Just prior to his

arrival at the inspection point, security officers

there were notified that an anonymous bomb

threat had been received at the airport.

As appellant passed through the inspection point,

security officers observed a rectangular bulge in

the front portion of his trousers, which he

awkwardly attempted to conceal with his suitcase.

Appellant asked for directions to the men’s room

and an officer was instructed to follow him there.

In the restroom, appellant went inside a toilet stall

and the officer heard a ‘cracking or rustling sound,

like a plastic bag or something of that nature’

(R.T. at 64), coming from inside the toilet stall.

Appellant remained inside the stall for about

fifteen minutes. When he exited, the bulge in his

trousers was gone and he was carrying his suitcase

normally. Appellant then took his place in the

boarding line, nervously watching security officers.

A security officer approached appellant and told

him he would have to be reinspected before

boarding the plane. Appellant complied and

returned to the inspection area, but upon arrival

9

indicated to the officer that he wanted to leave

the boarding area. Testimony varies as to the

precise words appellant used, but there is no

dispute that appellant indicated that he wished to

leave the boarding area and that he took a step or

two in that direction before being ‘forcibly

detained. The suitcase was then opened, contra-

band discovered and appellant was placed under

arrest.”

Although the search was upheld on other grounds, the

Court held as to the question involved herein that:

“While there is authority from this circuit to

support the government’s view of airports general-

ly, we cannot accept the government’s argument

that a passenger in'a secured boarding area may

not, as a general proposition, leave the area rather

than submit to additional searches. Such a view

runs contrary to the rationale of United States v.

Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). In that case,

we held that the justification for warrantless

screening searches is the implied consent of the

passenger. “(A)s a matter of constitutional law, we

stated in Davis, ‘a prospective passenger has a

choi : he may submit to a search of his person

and immediate possessions as a condition to

boarding; or he may turn around and leave.’ 482

F.2d at 913. Davis does not state specifically that

the consent to additional searches after a pre-

liminary screening may be revoked if a passenger

agrees not to board the plane. The above-quoted

portion of Davis strongly indicates, however, that a

party may revoke his consent to be searched any

time prior to boarding the plane, even when he has

passed beyond the initial screening point, if he

agrees to leave the boarding area. Other decisions

of this court have also recognized that a passenger

always maintains the option of leaving. See, e.g.,

10

United States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir.

1973); United States v. Moore, 483 F.2d 1361

(9th Cir. 1973). We must therefore reject the

government’s view of its power to search within

the boarding area as too sweeping. Since the

undisputed evidence indicates that appellant

wished to leave the boarding area, the trial judge

erred in finding the search reasonable under the

general doctrine of implied consent.”

The search was, however, upheld because of suspicious

conduct, a bulge in the pants (gone after a trip to the

restroom) and a bomb threat that had been received.

In this case, none of these additional factors are

involved. The attendant began to search without telling

or affording Petitioner an opportunity to leave.

However, Petitioner did protest (which was verified

by the other attendant) and object but the first

attendant kept on searching.

As has been noted in the various federal cases cited

herein, two factors are obvious. The first is that

hijackings are way down and, secondly, most items

found at airport searches are not bombs or guns but

controlled substances. As hijacking has become less of a

frequent problem, we must ever keep in mind that

Courts must be ever zealous in guarding against further

invasions of personal liberties and rights merely because

we are all in agreement that the consequences of a

skyjacking can mean death to a large number of

innocent people.

Accordingly, Petitioner submits that on balance the

better view is to allow airport routine screening upon

the basis of consent so long as a passenger also retains

the right to give up his flight by revoking the consent

and leaving. There is just no evidence that this rule

»

ar’ @

—_-

encourages efforts to skyjack or that it increases

weapons at the airport. Based on this rule, the facts of

this case indicate that there was no consent and that

the search of Petitioner’s carry-on bag was illegal which

vitiates his arrest and any subsequent statements or

searches incident to arrest.

Accordingly, Petitioner submits that the better view

is that an individual may revoke consent and withdraw

and, therefore, the State of Florida has violated his

rights under the 4th and 14th Amendments to the

Constitution of the United States.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, probable jurisdiction should be noted in

this case.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Selig I. Goldin

Selig I. Goldin

GOLDIN & CATES

Post Office Box 1251

Gainesville, Florida 32602

(904) 378-1673

Attorneys for Petitioner

12

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY

I, SELIG I. GOLDIN, hereby certify that I am a

member of the Bar of the United. States Supreme Court

in good standing and was admitted to practice by the

Court on 17 September 1973.

/s/ Selig I. Goldin

Selig I. Goldin, Attorney At Law

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

| HEREBY CERTIFY that the original copy hereof

has been furnished this 14th day of June 1979 to:

THE HONORABLE MICHAEL RODAK, JR., Clerk,

United States Supreme Court, Washington, D.C., and

copies to: THE HONORABLE RAYMOND EE.

RHODES, Clerk, District Court of Appeal, First District

of Florida, Post Office Box 487, Tallahassee, Florida

32304; THE HONORABLE JIM SMITH, Attorney

General for the State of Florida, The Capitol,

Tallahassee, Florida 32304; and to THE HONORABLE

A. CURTIS POWERS, Clerk of the Circuit Court,

Eighth Judicial Circuit, Alachua County Courthouse,

Gainesville, Florida 32601.

/s/ Selig 1. Goldin

Attorney At Law

la

APPENDIX “A”

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE

REHEARING PETITION AND DISPOSITION THERE-

OF IF FILED.

CASE NO. LL-25

BRANDON H. LEAVITT,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

Opinion filed April 17, 1979.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

John J. Crews, Judge.

Selig I. Goldin, of Goldin & Cates, for Appellant.

Jim Smith, Attorney General; and Lee Mandell,

Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court in and for

Alachua County. The appellant appeals a final order

withholding adjudication of guilt a placing him on

probation with a special condition of one year in jail

and payment of $2,500 costs on a cocaine possession

count based upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of

2a

possession of cocaine under Count Two of one

information, and guilty of possession of more than five

grams of cannabis under a second information. The two

cases had been consolidated and were tried together.

Prior to trial motions to suppress were filed by

appellant in each case and were denied. A motion for

judgment of acquittal under Count Two of the second

information which charged unlawful possession of drug

paraphernalia was granted by the court.

At the trial the following facts developed: In 1977

the appellant attempted to board an airplane in the

Gainesville airport. Before being allowed to board,

appellant was required to submit himself and _ his

carry-on baggage through a predeparture screener. The

agent handling the machine could not identify an object

in his carry-on bag so she asked appellant for

permission to examine his bag in his presence. The

agent testified that defendant consented and pushed his

bag toward her and then both proceeded to search

going toward the unindentified object. However

defendant testified he did not consent to the search.

Elsa Powers, a prescreening inspector testified on

deposition that defendant did not want to be checked.

Upon the agent grasping a toilet kit, the appellant

grabbed his bag and proceeded to leave the area. The

agent was left holding the toilet kit, which had come

open in the process. She then handed the kit to Officer

Sanders of the Gainesville Police Department who

looked inside and saw five or six bags of marijuana.

Under these bags he also saw a white powder and he

began chasing appellant. Sanders yelled at appellant to

stop, that he was under arrest, but appellant continued

to flee, whereupon Sanders shot appellant in the foot.

3a

Appellant was arrested and taken to the hospital. The

total weight of the cannabis taken from appellant was

47.2 grams gross weight which included seeds, stems

and certain sticks.

An amended information was filed charging in Count

One possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver

and charging in Count Two simple possession of

cocaine. In a separate case, an information was filed

charging appellant with possession of more than five

grams of cannabis and with possession of drug

paraphernalia.

At trial, a state chemist testified that the substance

was cannabis and that it weighed 47.2 grams. He also

testified that based upon his tests, the white powder

was illegal cocaine. Dr. Robert Shapiro, an expert in the

field of analysis of organic compounds, testified for

appellant that there are eight isomers of cocaine and

that it would not be possible to distinguish between the

isomers based upon the tests that the state chemist

used, and that in order to prove that the cocaine

involved in a criminal case is the cocaine made illegal

by statute, additional tests must be performed. Thus a

conflict was presented to the jury on the issue of the

character of the substance in question. The jury having

resolved such conflict in favor of the State and against

the appellant, it is not the province of this court to act

as a second jury on this issue. We therefore find point

three to be without merit for the evidence

demonstrated that the illegal cocaine was a controlled

substance within the definition of that term as

proscribed by section 893.03 (2) (a)4.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in

denying motions to suppress the evidence which

4a

revealed both the cocaine and cannabis, alleging that

the search was unreasonable. We hold that the denial of

such motions was not error. In so holding we determine

that the airport screening employees conducted a

proper search pursuant to appellant’s consent and that

the evidence affirms that the search was reasonable

under the circumstances. United States v. Cyzewski,

484 F.2d 509 (Sth Cir. 1973). Therefore the judgment

of conviction of unlawful possession of cocaine under

Count Two of the information is affirmed.

We reverse the order of probation with reference to

the cannabis count of the information for the reason

that it was not proven beyond and to the exclusion of

every reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of

the possession of more than five grams of cannabis, and

we remand such order to the trial court with direction

to reduce the probation sentence commensurate with a

misdemeanor charge of possession of less than five

grams of cannabis. See Purifoy v. State, 359 So.2d 446

(Fla. 1978).

Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded

to the trial court for the purpose hereinbefore

indicated.

MILLS, Acting Chief Judge and MASON, ERNEST E.,

Associate Judge, CONCUR. ERVIN J., CONCURS IN

PART and DISSENTS IN PART.

ERVIN, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part.

I concur in all portions of the majority’s opinion

with the exception of that holding it was not proven

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of

——

oo

Sa

possession of more than five grams of cannabis. I feel

the facts here, as in Dorsey v. State, So.2d

no. KK-240 (Fla. Ist DCA, February 9, 1979), are

sufficiently distinguishable from those which existed in

Purifoy v. State, 359 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1978). I would

affirm the order of probation in its entirety.

b

6a

APPENDIX “B”’

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. LL-25

BRANDON H. LEAVITT,

Appellant,

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

ORDER

Motion For Rehearing And/Or Clarification and

Application For Stay Of Mandate thereto having been

considered,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is hereby denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Application is

denied.

By Order of the Court dated this 15th day of May,

A.D. 1979. Unless otherwise ordered, the Court’s

mandate will issue fifteen (15) days after this date.

Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 9.340; General

Order entered April 14, 1978. Acting Chief Judge E. R.

Mills, Jr., Judge Richard W. Ervin, III, and Associate

Judge Ernest E. Mason.

A TRUE COPY

ATTEST:

RAYMOND E. RHODES, CLERK

/s/ Raymond E. Rhodes

District Court of Appeal, First District

Tallahassee, Florida

OVER LITHAOCLDING ADJUDICATION OF GUILT AXO PLACING DL! CNOANT'ON

STATE OF FLORIDA F

BRANDON H. LEAVITT

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In the —_ CIRCUIT

Plaintiff 390 of

County, Florida

Cae No, 17=2508-CF

‘2 co ning on this day to be heard before me, and you, the defer! int, . BRANDON H. LEAVITT

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INLAWFUL PROSSESSION_OF..A CONTROLLED..SUBSTANCE ,TO-\JLT:_COCATNE. AS

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gto tes fifo fon of the Cart thet you ve not titcly ect to en, 2 ins erate? cruce of caistiet, snd

oof tice cad the wetfare of society do not require thet you should presently be edjucsed guilty 204 coffer the

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fore, it is ordcved end adjudged that the adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence are heveby withheld,

eh. My theed on probation for a perlod of YEARS under the supervision

nt of KE YY XX ANY XY Xond Its officers, such supervision to be subject to the provisions of the laws of

CORRECTIONS

CAA Mt yt te TD comply with the followiag conditions of probation:

Bf bee Coon tee cacth any ofc ch iscoth, you will mcke a fall and truthful report to your Probation

et oF ; EE “A “or Wit pucpece.

"a Thy y tots Tf te of bho the s.covnt of Ten Doth ss ($10) por month fowsed the coct of

gee Se ee Wet y wrived ba cot oe vith Pe cla Sintates,

“oy id wot . Sy VE Pak ce Of ploy: ent oF f:.ve the comty of your re ‘2once without F..8

uastag the “at of pour Piotbation Offece, ~2s.

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FONE STI NLP SA SUR ION GSI DSA

You will live sed rowaia ot Morty yithout violating any law. A conviction In a court of lew chell not

Lo wucetascy In order for such a vivlatioa to constitute a violation of your probation.

Me an oall not use intoxicants Jo excess] nor will you visit places where intoxicants, drugs or other

Jerous substeness ure unlawfully sold, dispensed or used unlawfully.

You vill work diligently at # lawful oceupation and support any dependents to the best of your ability

va Drected Ly your Probation Officer,

You cil pro.cptly and truthfully answer all Inquiries directed to you by the Court or the Probation

O’Ccer, end -Now the Oifleer to visit In = a at your employment site or elsewhere, ond you

Vill co noly vith ell Invtivetions he may g@

Pursuant Lo Chapter 948, Florida Statutes, serve one year in an

institution of the Department of Corrections to which said

depactment may cause you to be confined. The Court recommeuds that

you be incarcerated at the Indian River Correctional Center which has

an innovative youthful offender program.

’ay $2500 fine or costs.

Kc bexpot y, ht si a4 Ca!eBs-r a

Vea are tr eeby pl ced oa notice thit the Cou

Moa or my eete. dite

ee may at any Cina tosvind or niattif

PEt iP yon sialate

y any cf the condkions of your

i tied Of probation ag authoriccd by law, or inay discharsa you from further supervision;

y of Iho conditions of your piobst!

Shan, You nay ba enesled cud the Court Hisy revoke your

PEO IR, BE ee yok Soy atd banpose any tenivence vision i right have hapoced befcce plecing you on probstion,

PUSH om you hate nomied tot ba" Som Givicge ad ove Sica destruct d .3 to the

ow BOF ye Valen you eM be relecsed from custody if you a.r ine ody ond if you ore at Nverty on bond, the

a; me Wostid Cieharged from fist ity,

Bets fort or erdored that the Clerk of thi

Coiet, ob Gu. ith r

routs of bow,

$s Court file this over j

n his office, record the rome in the Minutes of the

vite corttiod copies of some to the Probesti

on Officer for his use in comptiance with the require

VOSE AND ORDERED IN OPEN COURT, this the oo. y

— AUGUST, 1978,

> & \ / Judge

5 KS - a “3: : SSMS SL 97% Broz. eh

touche. Oe eIpt Of a Cid copy of this order and Kat the conditions have been explained to me.

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Probationer

Instruct di by ccuantnstunthensectpeninnt:

Org vel Court sag prea

Copies Nobationer 5 a

File