Petition — Cuyler v. Sullivan
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4 \rl \L {i Supreme Cot t, U
[IH THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
0, 98-1832
JULIUS T, CUYLER, SuperintenDenT
AND
DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF PHILADELPHIA,
PETITIONER
V,
JOHN SULLIVAN, ResponpEeNT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
MICHAEL F. HENRY
HUES 4 COlSBLAtT .
a RISTRICT, ATTORNEY FOR LAW
ISTRICT ATTORNEY
gin CENTRE Square West n
HILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19192
OPINIONS BELOW
JURISDICTION
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
CONSTITUTIONAL Provisions INVOLVED
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
STATEMENT OF THE CaSE
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. THe SrxtH AMENDMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
TILIZED BY THE LOURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
IRCUIT IN DETERMINING CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS
FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN STATE CRIMINAL TRIALS
IS INCONSISTENT WITH STANDARDS ENUNCIATED BY
EVERY OTHER LOURT OF APPEALS AND FINDS NO
SUPPORT IN THE PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS CouRT,
I], EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
APPLIED BELOW IS CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED WHEN
COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL REPRESENTS TWO OR MORE
DEFENDANTS AT THE SAME TRIAL, THE CIRCUMSTANCES
PRESENTED HEREIN, NAMELY THE REPRESENTATION OF
RESPONDENT AND HIS SEPARATELY TRIED CO-DEFENDANTS
BY TWO PRIVATELY RETAINED ATTORNEYS, COMPELS THE
SE OF A DIFFERENT STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT,
III. THe Court BELOW VIOLATED SETTLED PRINCIPLES
F HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW, AS DETERMINED BY THIS
OURT AND LONGRESS, BY IGNORING THE FACTUAL DETER-
MINATIONS OF THE STATE COURTS, AND SUBSTITUTING
ITS OWN FINDINGS FOR THOSE OF THE STATE COURTS
AND THE J)rstrict Court,
CONCLUSION
13-19
20-28
29-33
34
APPENDICES TO THE BRIEF
Appenpix_A: Orper oF THE CourT oF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING IN BANC, WITH DISSENTING OPINION
APPENDIX 8: OPINION OF THE CouRT oF APPEALS
GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Appendix C: Opinion oF THE District Court,
INCORPORATING IN PART AND REJECTING IN PART
THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED
TATES MAGISTRATE
AppenpiIx.D: OPINION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
SUPREME COURT DENYING POST CONVICTION RELIEF
Appenpix_E: OPINION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
SUPREME COURT AFFIRMING JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE
PPENDIX F: OPINION OF THE CouRT oF ComMON
LEAS DENYING POST CONVICTION RELIEF
[]
TABLE OF CITATIONS
a (CONTINUED)
FEDERAL CASES PAGE e Pia
ARGERS INGER. Yi, HAMLIN, aa7’U.S.-25, $2 $.- Er, 93 FEDERAL CASES
Austin v, Erickson, 477 F.2p 620 (8TH Cir. 1973) 18 MaLLORS Geant, KI S.S. WS, HES. Oa oe
e AVERY Vs STATE BiiggtAbama, 308 U.S. 4M4, 60S. * House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 65S, Cr, S17 (1945) 23
BERAN Xs YNITED STATES, 580 F.9D. 324 (8TH CUR. KAPLAN V. BomBARD, 573 F,2p 708 (2p Cir, 1978) 16
ch oi ean Lanny BUFEAGO SHIETaY. STATE QE SOUTH DaKorA,
CRAIG U S > aa Fe 5 ;
° a et ee ey ae ee ew i. LAVALLEE.V» Daub Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 938. Cr,
Davipson v. Cupp, 446 F,2p 642 (StH Cir, 1971) 17 LOLLAR Ys Unrtep States, 376 F.2p 243 (D.C. Cir,
FITZGERALD V, ESTELLE 505 Fae 1334 (STH Cir.), 1967) 18,27
CERT. DENteD, 422 U.S, i011 (1975) 24 MARZU b92\ MARYLAND, bl F.2D 540 Cary Cir,
FoxwoRTH_v, W sHT, 516 F, ; IS » CERT ,_DEN Max HARYLAND V.
a RY.V» WAINWRIGHT 2p 1072 (StH Cir » ‘i Hazytco, hac FNaE toll, Gomer CORYERNR .
Fryar_y, Unrtep States, 404 F,2p 107] (1 CIR,
1868) GENT RENTED, 495 fps OG by AGaH CIR 7 McMany,y, BigyaRpson, 397 U.S, 759, 90S, Cr.
GARTON Vv, SweNsON, 497 F,2p 1137 (8TH Crr. 1974) 26 ET CERT pened, 435 Ure, 981, 8g
* GLASSER V, GNI TED States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S, Cr. ® T. 104 (97 21
7 (1982) 14,15 PowELL v. STATE OF ALABAMA, 287 U.S, 45 (1932) 23
sine’, 6). shpiahlnad dew ln ole aan Scumipt v. Hewitt, 573 F.2p 794 (3p Cir. 1978) 30
SOODWI NY CaRDWELL, 432 F,2p 521 (6TH Cir, 96 SCOTT YaoAhLINOIS, ean UeSe ane SOS. Cr. LSS 33
ad ” THACKER BORDENKIRCHER, 590 F,2p 640 (6TH Cir,
HAGGARD V, STATE OF ALA 50 £,2n 1019, ,
REHEARING DENIED, Balla 32 ube (Sta ete, 1873) V
1377) 16 Tourer Vv, HENRERSON, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S, Cr,
HAWK V, OLSEN, 326 U.S, 271, 66S. Cr. 116 J2 (2 24
(1945) 23 Townseupy, SAIN, 372 U.S, 293, 83S, Cr. 745,
a © 10. yp
IT] IV
TABLE OF CITATIONS
(CONTINUED)
FENERAL CASES
UNITE : ATES V. AvBerti, 4 2D 878 ( IR,
Is? jesFe Rg 7BENTED. 4 i) ie 88 §3 ¢!
Unt TED STATES. v. Acvarez, 580 F,2p 1251 (StH
IR,
a STA 55) Vv, ATKINSON, 565 F.2D 185 (4TH
gre 17), RY opgreD» US.
UNITED STATES v. Bosch, 584 F,2p 1113 (lst Cir,
Curve STATES. CARRIGAN, 543 F,2p 1053 (2p
UNITED, SJATES v. Foster, 469 F,2p 1 (lst Cir,
U 7
MrTegeSas seers Moana, 23 L:@° fbdo\7ae &°"
Uni TED Stayes.. v. MarRSHALL, 488 F,2p 1169 (9TH
U ; ,
ae Mee aoe Tine CoML
UNITED S bog" ep x gra ign Darcy v. Hanpy, 203 F,2
a0 Oe
mrTeyenaeys SAD Pb DOF ds ETAT SpA
ante, S3AT gs EX REL a RREEN v. Runpte, 434 F,2p
euey STATES x R L. HagTy: DAVENPORT, 478
EN? a8) en: 3
25,26,27
16
26
16
16,26
TABLE OF CITATIONS
(CONTINUED)
FEDERAL CASES
UNITED STA i & ic REL HAYWARD V, JOHNSON, 508
D
ith, CSIR spe CRT, DENIED, 422° U.S,
Doren STATES eb: SeGhwonyy. Meme dy
INTER STATES 6% BEL. HGHoIB.¥. (STATE OOF New
oNiTeD sr ATES FX REL. 0 BB AEN v, Maroney, 423
UNITED, BTATES 5X gPGh+ Rosi nson_y, HOUSEWRIGHT,
UNITED. STATES By REL SYRLAVAN Vv. CuyLer, 593
UNITE Fr Sues R rhe BANTER,
ea tae
it 198 3) a GERT: aeEN TE ED,
HALKIYG. Xs a 408 F,2p 351 (9TH Cir,
WHITE ath Basen, 324 U.S. 760, 65 S. Cr, 978
PENNSYLVANIA CASES
COMMONNEAL THOYs SULLIVAN, 472 Pa, 129, 371 A.2p
COMMONWEALTH OY SULLIVAN, 446 Pa, 419, 286 A.2pd
VI
26
8,13,21,27
23
17
23
2,/,11,12,
2,/
TABLE OF CITATIONS
(CONTINUED)
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UNITED States ConsTITUTION, AMENDMENT V]
lINITED States ConstTiTUTION, AMENDMENT XIV, §]
28 U.S.C, §1254(1)
28 U.S.C, §2254(D)
A J 25, 6 (196 ) 1580,
Fe “Hoadde ES shed & 1 et ees UPPLEMENT
OTHER AUTHORITIES
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINJSTRATION OF
CRAMSNAL wus ICE, AGANDER AND SEVERENCE,
2 (2p Cir, 1
COMME}TS CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN N WLTIPLE
PRESENTATION OF CRIMINAL Co-DEFENDAN
Rf ‘FF thine L. AND CRIMINOLOGY, Dee (1554)
GEER, REPRESENTATION OF TULTIPLE CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS: ONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND
eet Rsoanes, ESTRGGPTL'AY hol
HYMAN, JOINT REPRESENTATION OF ! 7HULTIPLE
NEFENDANTS IN A RIMINAL TRIAL: THE
1ouRs S HEADACHE, 5 HorsTrRa L. Rev, 315
NoTE, ENSURING EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 95 CouNSEL
oR TH AGRI IM ANal Co-DEFENDANT, rt &
WANAT, CONFLIETS OF INTEREST IN CRIMINAL CASES
AND THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE SSIS TANCE OF
CANES eH ER5RS me
VII
4,29,30
7, 31
20
14
14
14
15
15
1
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
TERM, 197_
NO,
JULIUS T, CUYLER, SuPeRINTENDENT
AND
DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF PHILADELPHIA,
ETITIONER
V,
JOHN SULLIVAN, RESPONDENT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
THE PETITIONER, District ATTORNEY OF PHILADELPHIA,
RESPECTFULLY PRAYS THAT A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ISSUE TO REVIEW
THE JUDGMENT AND OPINION OF THE UNITED States Court oF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ENTERED IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE ON
FEBRUARY 14, 1979,
OPINIONS BELOW
THE ORDER OF THE CouRT OF APPEALS DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING IN BANC, JUDGES GARTH, ADAMS AND ROSENN DISSENTING,
OFFICIALLY REPORTED AT 593 F,2p 512, 524 (3p Cir. 1979), Is set
OUT AS APPENDIX A, THE OPINION OF THE CouRT OF APPEALS,
OFFICIALLY REPORTED AT 593 F,2p 512 (3p Cir. 1979), 18 set
2 3
OUT AS APPENDIX B, THE UNREPORTED OPINION OF THE District CourT e I]. ASSUMING THAT THE ABOVE STANDARD IS COMPELLED UNDER
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, ADOPTING AND INCORPOR- THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN CASES OF JOINT REPRESENTATION AND COURT-
ATING IN PART THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE, IS SET OUT AS APPENDIX C, THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA DENYING POST CONVICTION RELIEF, REPORTED
AS COMMONWEALTH V, SuLLivaN, 472 Pa, 129, 371 A.2p 468 (1977),
IS SET OUT AS APPENDIX I), THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME CouRT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE, REPORTED AS
COMMONWEALTH V, SuLLIVAN, 446 Pa, 419, 286 A.2p 898 (1971), 1s
SET OUT AS APPENDIX E. THE UNREPORTED OPINION OF THE
PHILADELPHIA CourT OF ComMMON PLEAS DENYING POST CONVICTION
RELIEF IS SET OUT AS APPENDIX F,
JURISDICTION
THE ORDER OF THE CouRT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
WAS ENTERED ON FeBRuaRY 14, 1979, A PETITION FOR REHEARING IN
BANC WAS TIMELY FILED AND DENIED ON MarRCcH 12, 1979, Tuis
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WAS FILED WITHIN NINETY DAYS OF THE
FINAL ORDER OF THE CouRT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT,
THs CouRT’S JURISDICTION IS INVOKED UNDER 28 U.S.C. $1254(1)
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I, Is THE SrxTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL VIOLATED MERELY BY A DETERMINATION THAT
A POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST, HOWEVER REMOTE, MAY EXIST?
APPOINTED COUNSEL, IS THE SAME STANDARD OF REVIEW REQUIRED
HEREIN, WHERE RESPONDENT AND HIS CO-DEFENDANTS WERE SEPARATELY
TRIED AND REPRESENTED BY TWO PRIVATELY RETAINED ATTORNEYS?
IT], Dip THE CourT BELOW VIOLATE SETTLED PRINCIPLES OF HABEAS
CORPUS REVIEW, AS ENUNCIATED BY THIS COURT AND CONGRESS, BY
IGNORING THE FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS OF THE STATE COURTS AND SUB-
STITUTING ITS FINDINGS FOR THOSE OF THE STATE AND DISTRICT COURTS?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT Srx,
IN ALL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, THE ACCUSED SHALL ENJOY THE
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL, BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY OF THE
STATE AND DISTRICT WHEREIN THE CRIME SHALL HAVE BEEN COMMITTED,
WHICH DISTRICT SHALL HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY ASCERTAINED BY LAW,
AND TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION;
TO BE CONFRONTED WITH THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM; TO HAVE
COMPULSORY PROCESS FOR OBTAINING WITNESSES IN HIS FAVOR, AND
TO HAVE THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR HIS DEFENSE.
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT FourTEEN, SECTION l,
ALL PERSONS BORN OR NATURALIZED IN THE UNITED STATES, AND
SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION THEREOF, ARE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND OF THE STATE WHEREIN THEY RESIDE, No STATE SHALL
MAKE OR ENFORCE ANY LAW WHICH SHALL ABRIDGE THE PRIVILEGES
OR IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES; NOR SHALL ANY
STATE DEPRIVE ANY PERSON OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY,
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; NOR DENY TO ANY PERSON WITHIN
ITS JURISDICTION THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS,
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
THe UnrteD States Cope, Act oF June 25, 1948, c 646,
62 stat. 967; As AmenDeD Nov, 2, 1966, Pus, L. 89-711,
§2, 80 stat, 1105, 28 U.S.C. $2254(p),
(D) IN ANY PROCEEDING INSTITUTED IN A FEDERAL COURT
BY AN APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BY A PERSON IN
CUSTODY PURSUANT TO THE JUDGMENT OF A STATE COURT, A DETERMINA-
TION AFTER A HEARING ON THE MERITS OF A FACTUAL ISSUE, MADE BY
A STATE COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN A PROCEEDING TO
WHICH THE APPLICANT FOR THE WRIT AND THE STATE OR AN OFFICER
OR AGENT THEREOF WERE PARTIES, EVIDENCED BY A WRITTEN FINDING,
WRITTEN OPINION, OR OTHER RELIABLE AND ADEQUATE WRITTEN
INDICIA, SHALL BE PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT, UNLESS THE APPLICANT
SHALL ESTABLISH OR IT SHALL OTHERWISE APPEAR, OR THE RESPONDENT
SHALL ADMIT -
(1) THAT THE MERITS OF THE FACTUAL DISPUTE WERE NOT
RESOLVED IN THE STATE COURT HEARING; ..,
(8) OR UNLESS THAT PART OF THE RECORD OF THE STATE COURT
PROCEEDING IN WHICH THE DETERMINATION OF SUCH FACTUAL ISSUE WAS
MADE, PERTINENT TO A DETERMINATION OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH FACTUAL DETERMINATION, IS PRODUCED
AS PROVIDED FOR HEREINAFTER, AND THE FEDERAL COURT ON A
CONSIDERATION OF SUCH PART OF THE RECORD AS A WHOLE CONCLUDES
THAT SUCH FACTUAL DETERMINATION IS NOT FAIRLY SUPPORTED BY
THE RECORD:
AND IN AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IN THE FEDERAL COURT, WHEN DUE
PROOF OF SUCH FACTUAL DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE, UNLESS THE
EXISTENCE OF ONE OR MORE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES RESPECTIVELY
SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPHS NUMBERED (1) To (7), INCLUSIVE, IS
SHOWN BY THE APPLICANT, OTHERWISE APPEARS, OR IS ADMITTED BY
THE RESPONDENT, OR UNLESS THE COURT CONCLUDES PURSUANT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH NUMBERED (8) THAT THE RECORD IN THE
STATE COURT PROCEEDING, CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE, DOES NOT FAIRLY
SUPPORT SUCH FACTUAL DETERMINATION, THE BURDEN SHALL REST UPON
THE APPLICANT TO ESTABLISH BY CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE
FACTUAL DETERMINATION BY THE STATE COURT WAS ERRONEOUS,
6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
RESPONDENT, JOHN SULLIVAN, WAS INDICTED BY THE PHILADELPHIA
County GRAND JuRY ON NovemBER 14, 1966, as oF NovemBER SESSIONS,
1966, Nos, 190 anp 193, EACH CHARGING MURDER, RESPONDENT'S
CO-DEFENDANTS, GREGORY CARCHIDI AND ANTHONY DIPASQUALE, WERE
ALSO INDICTED AFTER A MEDICAL EXAMINER'S INQUEST, THESE
CHARGES AROSE AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ASSASSINATION-LIKE
KILLINGS OF JOHN GOREY AND RITA JANDA OCCURRING ON JUNE 1/7,
1966, AT THE TEAMSTER’S LOCAL UNION HALL, TRIAL WAS HELD
BEFORE THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER F, BARBIERI AND A JURY BETWEEN
June 7, AND June 19, 1967, ON THE LATTER DATE, RESPONDENT WAS
CONVICTED OF TWO COUNTS OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER AND SENTENCED TO
LIFE IMPRISONMENT, RESPONDENT WAS REPRESENTED BY PRIVATELY
RETAINED COUNSEL, %, FRED D1Bona, Esquire, NOW A PHILADELPHIA
Court oF Common PLEAS JuDGE, AND A. CHARLES PeruTo, ESQuIRE.
BOTH COUNSEL WERE ALSO RETAINED BY RESPONDENT'S CO-DEFENDANTS,
WHO WERE EACH TRIED SEPARATELY AND ACQUITTED SUBSEQUENT TO
RESPONDENT'S TRIAL. JUDGE DIBONA ACTED AS RESPONDENT'S CHIEF
COUNSEL, WHEREAS THE ROLES WERE REVERSED IN THE TRIALS OF THE
CO-DEFENDANTS, POST TRIAL MOTIONS WERE DENIED BY A COURT
EN BANC ON JuLy 15, 1968. On Aucust 9, 1968, RESPONDENT was
SENTENCED TO TWO CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT,
7
A DIRECT APPEAL WAS TAKEN TO THE SUPREME CouRT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, WHICH AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION BY AN EQUALLY
DIVIDED COURT, COMMONWEALTH V, SULLIVAN, 4HF Pa, 419, 286
A,2p 898 (1971) (Appenpix £, LweRA, AT 1E). In 1973,
RESPONDENT FILED A PETITION UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA PosT
Conviction HEARING AcT,/ CHALLENGING, INTER ALIA, HIS REPRESEN-
TATION BY COUNSEL, WHO IT WAS ALLEGED, NEGLECTED TO PRESENT ANY
DEFENSE ON HIS BEHALF BECAUSE OF THEIR DUAL REPRESENTATION OF
HIS CO-DEFENDANTS. AFTER SEVERAL EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS BEFORE
THE HONORABLE ETHAN ALLEN Doty, OF THE PHILADELPHIA CouRT OF
Common PLEAS, RESPONDENT WAS GRANTED THE RIGHT TO APPEAL TO
THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT NUNC PRO IUNC. RELIEF WAS
OTHERWISE DENIED (APPENDIX F, LNERA, AT 1F),
On FeBruary 28, 1977, THE PENNSYLVANIA SuPREME CouRT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DENYING POST. CONVICTION
RELIEF, COMMONWEALTH V, SuLiivaAn, 472 Pa, 129, 371 A.2p 468
(1977) (Appenpix D, LNERA, AT 1D). THe CourT HELD, INTER
ALLA, THAT RESPONDENT WAS NOT DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL SINCE (1) THERE WAS NO DUAL REPRESENTATION IN
THE TRADITIONAL SENSE, AND (2) THE DECISION WHETHER TO
PRESENT A DEFENSE WAS A TACTICAL DECISION, NOT BASED UPON ANY
CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN COUNSEL’S REPRESENTATION OF THE
CO-DEFENDANTS,
]
Act oF January 25, 1968, P
ET SEQ, (SuPPLEMENT 1978-1
(1965) 1589, sl, 19 P.S, $1180-1
On Jucy 18, 1977, RespoNDENT FILED HIS FOURTH PETITION®
FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE UNITED STATES District Court
FOR THE EASTERN District OF PENNSYLVANIA, DOCKETED AS CIVIL
Action tlo, 77-2527, On Fepruary 2, 1978, Unrtep States
District JupGe JoHN MorGAN DAVIS DENIED THE PETITION, ADOPTING
IN PART TE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED States
MAGISTRATE Epwin E, NaytHons (Appenpiy C, INERA, aT 10).
THE MAGISTRATE HAD RECOMMENDED THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT ON
SIXTH AMENDMENT GROUNDS,
RESPONDENT APPEALED ON VARIOUS GROUNDS, AND THE CASE WAS
ARGUED BEFORE A PANEL OF THE UNITED STATES Court oF APPEALS
FoR THE THIRD Circuit. On Fepruary 14, 197°, tHe Court oF
APPEALS, ON THE BASIS OF THE STATE COURT RECORD, REVERSED THE
ORDER OF THE UNITED States District Court AND GRANTED HABEAS
CORPUS RELIEF.” UNITED States EX REL, SULLIVAN Vv, CuYLER,
593 F.2p 512 (3x Cir. 1979) (Appennix B, LWeRA, at 1).
THE COMMONWEALTH'S PETITION FOR REHEARING IN BANC WAS
DENIED BY THAT Court, JupGes GarTH, Apams AND RoSENN
DISSENTING, ON MaRcH 12, 1979 (AppENDIx A, INERA, AT 1A).
THREE PRIOR FEDERAL HAREAS CORPUS PETITIONS WERE DISMISSED FOR
FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE REMEDIES, ‘
, Mo, F9-20U; Unrren
SULLIVAN Vv, A, T, Runpre, to, FO-457; Uniten STATES Ex RE
Nh SULLIVAN V, ROPEPT |. Jounson, CA ‘lo, 73-1694,
z
THE Court oF APPEALS GRANTED RELIEF on SIxTH AMENDMENT GROUNDS
AND THEREFORE FAILED TO CONSIDER THE OTHER ISSUES RAISED PY
NDENT,
FACTUAL History
THE EVIDENCE SURROUNDING RESPONDENT'S CONVICTION WAS AMPLY
SUMMARIZED BY THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT AS FOLLOWS:
THE CHIEF PROSECUTION WITNESS, ONE FRANCIS MCGRATH,
WAS EMPLOYED AS A JANITOR AT THE UNION HALL WHER
THE BODIES WERE EVENTUALLY DISCOVERED, ON Jyy :,
6, HE ARRIVED AT WORK AT APPROXIMATELY 6:00 P.M,
AND PARKED HIS AUTOMOBILE IN THE LOT ADJACENT TO THE
BUILDING, AT THAT TIME, HE SPECIFICALLY OBSERVED
TWO OTHER VEHICLES ON THE PREMISES, ONE WAS OWNED
BY APPELLANT AND THE OFHER WAS BEING USED AT THE
TIME BY ONE ANTHONY DiPasauaLe. AFTER ALIGHTING FROM
HIS CAR, MCGRATH NOTICED APPELLANT LOOKING OUT ONTO
THE PARKING LOT FROM THE WINDOW OF A SECOND FLOOR
OFFICE NORMALLY USED BY OTHER UNION OFFICIALS, IHE
WITNESS THEN ENTERED THE BUILDING AND PROCEEDED TO
THE SECOND FLOOR TO COMMENCE HIS DUTIES, APPELLANT
WAS STILL SEATED BY THE WINDOW WHEN MCGRATH ENTERED
THAT OFFICE, SULLIVAN INQUIRED ABOUT THE JANITOR’S
PRESENCE AND INSTRUCTED MCGRATH TO WAIT UNTIL SUNDAY
NIGHT TO CLEAN, SINCE A UNION MEETING WAS SCHEDULED
FOR THAT DATE AND THE BUILDING WOULD REQUIRE CLEANING
AFTER THE GATHERING. MCGRATH IGNORED THE SUGGESTION
ND CONTINUED COLLECTING THE TRASH FROM THE OFFICES,
HE WITNESS THEN TOOK THE REFUSE OUTSIDE THE BUILDING,
WHEN HE RETURNED, APPELLANT WAS STILL SEATED AT THE
WINDOW,
AT THIS TIME, BOTH SULLIVAN AND McGRATH OBSERVED youn
GOREY AND RITA JANDA ARRIVE AT THE UNION HALL IN GorEY’s
CAR AND ENTER THE BUILDING, MCGRATH THEN BEGAN CLEANING
THE CONFERENCE ROOM, LOCATED APPROXIMATELY FEET
FROM GOREY'S OFFICE, SHORTLY THEREAFTER, GOREY APPEARED
AND HAD A BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH MCGRATH, IMMEDIATELY
AFTER SOREY LEFT THE CONFERENCE ROOM, APPELLANT APPEARED
IN THE DOORWAY, THROUGH WHICH GOREY HAD JUST PASSED,
AND AGAIN QUESTIONED MCGRATH ABOUT THE CLEANING AND
SUGGESTED HE DEFER HIS ACTIVITIES UNTIL SUNDAY AFTER-
NOON, JJURING THIS BRIEF CONVERSATION, GREGORY CARCHIDI,
ANOTHER JANITOR, ENTERED THE CONFERENCE ROOM, NO
CONVERSATION ENSUED BETWEEN CARCHID! AND SULLIVAN
BUT LARCHIDI REPEATED APPELLANT'S URGINGS TO LEAVE
THE WORK UNTIL SUNDAY, SULLIVAN THEN LEFT THE ROOM
THROUGH THE SAME DOOR WHICH GOREY HAD EXITED BUT
ARCHIDI REMAINED AND SEATED HIMSELF BEHIND THE DESK,
10
WITHIN SEVERAL MINUTES, THE WITNESS. TESTIFIED HE
HEARD SOUNDS LIKE FIRECRACKERS GOING OFF_IN RAPID
SUCCESSION, MCGRATH STARTED TO QUESTION CARCHID]
ABO\T THE DISTURBANCE BUT WAS ABRUPTLY INSTRUCTED |
TO “GET gui OF THE BUILDING AND DON T SAY NOTHING
(sic), MCGRATH LEFT THE UNION HALL AND NOTICED FOUR
CARS OTHER THAN HIS OWN PARKED IN pHE LOT, |HESE
WERE RECOGNIZED AS aia TO DIPASQUALE, GOREY,
CARCHIDI AND APPELLANT, Mc RATH PROVE OFF sa
RETURNED TO THE PREMISES WITHIN 15 MINUTES, ONLY
GOREY’S CAR REMAINED IN THE LOT, UPON RE-ENTERING
THE BUILDING, HE FOUND THE OFFICES CLOSED, THE
CONFERENCE ROOM LOCKED AND THE LIGHTS OUT,
THE Hla BODIES WERE DISCOVERED THE FOLLOWING
MORNING, OREY HAD BEEN SHOT FOUR TIMES AND JANDA
re TIMES, THE SHOTS BEING FIRED FROM CLOSE RANGE,
HE BALLISTICS STUDIES ESTABLISHED TWO SEPARATE GUNS
WERE EMPLOYED IN THE HOMICIDES BUT THE WEAPONS WERE
NEVER RECOVERED,
ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY DISCLOSED THAT THE TELEPHONE
LINES HAD BEEN ARRANGED SO THAT REGULAR INCOMING CALLS
WOULD RING IN THE ROOM IN WHICH APPELLANT WAS SEATED,
A SECOND LINE WITH A DIFFERENT CALL NUMBER HAD BEEN
PREARRANGED BY GOREY TO RING IN HIS OFFICE SO THAT
HE COULD REGELYE AN ANTICIPATED GALL FROM JOSEPH
ERNICK AT /:0 P.M, ONE IRENE GLENN TESTIFIED For
THE COMMONWEALTH THAT SHE DIALED THE REGULAR UNION
PHONE NUMBER ABOUT 6:15 P.M, THAT EVENING AND A MAN
ANSWERED IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS GoREY, A SCRAP PAPER
FOUND IN THE WASTEBASKET ALONGSIDE THE DESK WHERE
APPELLANT HAD BEEN SEATED PRIOR TO THE VICTIM'S (SIC)
ARRIVAL CONTAINED Ms, GLENN'S NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER,
IT WAS UNCONTESTED THAT THe HANDWRITING WAS THAT OF
APPELLANT, MOREOVER, ONE JOSEPH VERNICK TESTIFIED
THAT HE CALLED GOREY’S OFFICE AT A SPECIALLY ARRANGED
TIME BUT REGEIVED Ng ANSWER DESPITE HIS REPEATED ATTEMPTS
BETWEEN 7:15 AND 8:15 P.M, THIS EVIDENCE, COUPLED
WITH THE MEDICAL EXAMINER S$ TESTIMONY, INDICATED THAT
BH TIME QF DEATH COULD HAVE BEEN APPROXIMATELY 7:1]
sly 44, ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF GUILT MAY ALSO BE
NFERRED FROM APPELLANT S STATEMENTS TO POLICE,
Purine QUESTIONING SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE MURDERS,
ULLIVAN DENIED BEING PRESENT AT THE BUILDING
DURING JHE TIME OF THE SHOOTINGS. THIS CONTRADICTED
MCGRATH’S STATEMENT WHICH PLACED SULLIVAN IN DIRECT
1l
PROXIMITY TO THE CRIME ONLY MOMENTS BEFORE ITS
OCCURRENCE, IOREOVER, MCGRATH STATED THAT WHEN
HE LEFT THE BUILDING SULLIVAN'S CAR WAS STILL
PARKED IN THE LOT,
COMMONWEALTH V, SULLIVAN, SUPRA, 472 Pa, at 147-49, 151, 37]
A,2p at 477-479,
RESPONDENT DID NOT TESTIFY AND NO EVIDENCE WAS INTRO-
DUCED ON HIS BEHALF,
IN SUPPORT OF ITS DECISION GRANTING THE WRIT, THE CouRT
BELOW RELIED SOLELY UPON CERTAIN CONTRADICTED AND INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONY OF ONE OF RESPONDENT. § TRIAL ATTORNEYS GIVEN AT THE
STATE POST CONVICTION HEARING. THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON WERE
STATEMENTS OF ATTORNEY PERUTO, WHO TWICE INDICATED THAT ONE
REASON, AMONG OTHERS, FOR HIS RECOMMENDATION THAT RESPONDENT
NOT TESTIFY OR PRESENT OTHER WITNESSES WAS A DESIRE NOT TO
REVEAL DEFENSE WITNESSES BEFORE THE TRIAL OF THE TWO CO-
DEFENDANTS (N.T. P.C.H.4, 4/24/74, 101-102, 107), Peruto atso
TESTIFIED TO OTHER STRATEGIC REASONS WHY HE RECOMMENDED THAT
RESPONDENT NOT TESTIFY (N,T, P.C.H.A, 4/24/74, 192) or cate
OTHER DEFENSE WITNESSES (N.T. P.C.H.A, 4/24/74, 20, 99-100, 105-
197, 118, 122),
PERUTO’S TESTIMONY ABOUT HIS DESIRE TO PROTECT THE co-
DEFENDANTS WAS CONTRADICTED, HOWEVER, BY JUDGE D1Bona, WHO, AS
CHIEF COUNSEL, TESTIFIED THAT THE DECISION NOT TO PRESENT A
DEFENSE, EITHER THROUGH RESPONDENT OR THROUGH OTHER WITNESSES,
_enme ELICITED AT SAID HEARING WHICH SPANNED FIVE DAYS,
WILL BE HEREINAFTER CITED AS N, 1, P.C.H.A,. WITH ADDITIONAL
REFERENCE TO THE PARTICULAR DATE SUCH TESTIMONY WAS TAKEN,
12
WAS MADE BY RESPONDENT AFTER DISCUSSION WITH COUNSEL (N,T,
P.C.4,A, 5/15/74, 5-7, 16), AND WAS IN NO WAY INFLUENCED BY THE
REPRESENTATION OF THE CO-DEFENDANTS (NT, P.C.H.A, 5/15/74, 6),
Jupce DiBoNA TESTIFIED FURTHER THAT HE WAS FULLY PREPARED TO
TRY RESPONDENT'S CASE; THAT HE HAD FULL CONSULTATION WITH
RESPONDENT EVERY STEP OF THE WAY; AND THAT HE SAW NO CONFLICT
WHATSOEVER IN HIS LIMITED REPRESENTATION OF THE CO-DEFENDANTS
(H.T, P.C.H.A, 4/24/74, 56), HE ALSO TESTIFIED THAT RESPONDENT
DID NOT WANT TO TESTIFY FROM THE BEGINNING AND THAT AFTER A
LENGTHY DISCUSSION BETWEEN COUNSEL AND RESPONDENT, AS WELL AS
HIS FAMILY, RESPONDENT MADE THE DECISION NOT TO TESTIFY (N,T,
P.C.H.A, 4/24/74, 10-11, 36; 5/15/74, 5-6),
THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS, IN DENYING RESPONDENT RELIEF
ON HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM, IMPLICITLY REJECTED
ATTORNEY PERUTO’S TESTIMONY AND CREDITED THAT OF JuDGE D1Bona,
THE PENNSYLVANIA SupREeME CouRT FOUND THAT JuDGE D1BoNna WAS
RESPONDENT'S CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL, AND AS SUCH HE MADE ALL
DECISIONS RELEVANT TO SULLIVAN'S DEFENSE. COMMONWEALTH V,
SULLIVAN, 472 Pa, aT 161, PERUTO SERVED IN THE CAPACITY OF
AN ASSISTANT COUNSEL, ALTHOUGH THE ROLES WERE REVERSED IN
THE TRIALS OF THE CO-DEFENDANTS. IN LIGHT OF THIS, THE
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT DETERMINED THAT NO DUAL REPRESENTA-
TION, IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE, EXISTED AND THAT NO EVIDENCE
OF A CONFLICT WAS SHOWN, Ip, aT 161-162,
13
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I, THE S1xTH AMENDMENT STANDARD OF Review UTILIzep BY THE
Court oF APPEALS For THE THIRD CrrcurT IN DETERMINING
ConFLicts OF Interests For Derense Attorneys In STATE
CRIMINAL TRIALS IS INCONSISTENT \!ITH STANDARDS ENUNCIATED
By Every OTHER Court oF Appeacs Ann Finps fo Support In
THE Prior Decisions OF TH1s Court,
It} REVERSING RESPONDENT'S MULTIPLE MURDER CONVICTIONS
ON SIXTH AMENDMENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST GROUNDS, THE COURT
BELOW POSITED ITS STANDARD OF REVIEW AS FOLLOWS:
THERE MUST BE SOME SHOWING OF A POSSIBLE
» HOWEVER
REMOTE, BEFORE A REVIEWING COURT WILL FIND
THE DUAL REPRESENTATION CONSTITUTIONALLY
DEFECTIVE ... ACTUAL PREJUDICE OR CONFLICT
OF INTEREST NEED NOT BE SHOWN, THE MERE 5
POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER REMOTE, IS SUFFICIENT,
THE Court BELOW, IN THE PARTICULAR CONTEXT OF THIS CASE, ALSO
NOTED:
11. RESPONDENTS ARE ASKING US TO DECIDE
THAT THERE WAS IN FACT NO PREJUDICE, THIS
MISSES THE POINT. THE STANDARD REQUIRES
US TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS A POSSI-
BILITY OF PREJUDICE, i en
INTEREST, HOWEVER REMOTE. O HOLD, IN
THE FACE OF THIS RECORD, THAT THERE WAS
NOT SUCH A POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO, IN
EFFECT, OVERRULE A LONG LINE OF CASES
IN THIS CIRCUIT AND REQUIRE A SHOWING OF
ACTUAL PREJUDICE. THIS WE CANNOT DO,
(EMPHASIS ADDED) Ip. at 522,
5
er STATES EX REL, SULLIVAN Vv, CuyteR, 593 F,2p at 519-
20 (APPENDIX B, LNERA, AT PP. 12-13B),
14
IT 18 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE STANDARD UTILIZED
BY THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY INTERPRETS THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
REQUIREMENT THAT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS BE AFFORDED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND HAS NO SUPPORT IN THIS CouRT’s
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST DECISIONS. SEE, £.G., GLASSER Vv, UNITED
States, 315 U.S, 60 (1942), anp HoLLowAy v, Arkansas, 435 U,S,
475 (1978), FURTHERMORE, THIS STANDARD IS TOTALLY INCONSISTENT
WITH THAT USED IN EVERY OTHER CiRcuIT Court oF APPEALS, For
ALL OF THESE REASONS, THIS COURT SHOULD ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW,
THIs CourT HAS, IN THE PAST, COMMENTED ON THE DIFFERENT
APPROACHES BY VARIOUS COURTS IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST. HOLLOWAY v, Aransas, 98S, Ct, at 1178,
VARIOUS COMMENTATORS HAVE ALSO INDICATED THAT THE COURTS OF
APPEAL ARE IN DISARRAY IN THEIR RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM,
SEE, E.G., GEER, REPRESENTATION OF MULTIPLE CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS:
ConFLicts OF INTEREST AND THE ProFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
DEFENSE AtToRNey, 62 Minn. L, Rev, 119 (1977); Hyman, JoINT
REPRESENTATION OF MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL:
THE Court’s HEADACHE, 5 Hofstra L, Rev, 315 (1977); COMMENTS:
ConFLicT OF INTERESTS IN MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION OF CRIMINAL
Co-DEFENDANTS, 68 JouRNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, 226
(1977); Note, Ensurine EFFective Assistance OF CounseL For THE
15
CRIMINAL Co-DeEFENDANT, 37 La, L. Rev, 1289 (1977); Wanat,
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CRIMINAL CASES AND THE RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - THE NEED FOR CHANGE, 10 RuT,
= CaM, & Rev, 57 (1978),
In GLASSER Vv, UNITED STATES, SUPRA, THIS COURT HELD THAT
BY REQUIRING AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT TWO CO-DEFENDANTS WHOSE
INTERESTS WERE IN CONFLICT, WHICH CONFLICT WAS BOTH READILY
APPARENT AND POINTED OUT TO THE COURT, ONE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED
HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL. IN HOLLOWAY V, ARKANSAS, THIS COURT REAFFIRMED
GLASSER BY HOLDING THAT ONCE AN IMPERMISSIBLE CONFLICT OF
INTEREST IS SHOWN, AND THE TRIAL COURT REFUSES TO APPOINT
SEPARATE COUNSEL OVER OBJECTION, NO INQUIRY INTO THE DEGREE OF
PREJUDICE IS NECESSARY, 98S, Ct. at 1181. However, THIS CouRT
IMPLICITLY INDICATED THAT A CONFLICT OF INTEREST MUST BE SHOWN:
FINALLY, A RULE REQUIRING A DEFENDANT TO SHOW
THAT A CONFLICT OF INTERESTS ~ WHICH HE AND
HIS COUNSEL TRIED TO AVOID BY TIMELY OBJECTIONS
TO THE JOINT REPRESENTATION - PREJUDICED HIM IN
SOME SPECIFIC FASHION WOULD NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE
TO INTELLIGENT, EVENHANDED APPLICATION ,,, AND
TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF A
ON THE ATTORNEY'S OPTIONS, TACTICS AND DECISIONS
IN PLEA NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE,
98 S, Ct, at 1182 (EMPHASIS ADDED),
PETITIONER HEREIN DOES NOT CHALLENGE THE CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE THAT ONCE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IS
ESTABLISHED, NO INQUIRY INTO THE DEGREE OF PREJUDICE 1S
NECESSARY. THE THIRD CircurT Court oF APPEALS, HOWEVER, HAS
16
GONE FURTHER IN ITS APPROACH AND EXPRESSLY HELD THAT ALL A
HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONER NEED SHOW TO OBTAIN RELIEF IS A
POSSIBILITY THAT A CONFLICT OF INTEREST MAY HAVE EXISTED,
THUS, IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT, A HABEAS PETITIONER NOT ONLY IS
NOT REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH ACTUAL PREJUDICE, HE ALSO HAS NO
BURDEN TO EVEN ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACTUAL CONFLICT,
THE MINIMAL STANDARD EMPLOYED BY THE COURT BELOW PUTS IT
AT ODDS WITH EVERY OTHER CourT OF APPEALS, SAVE ARGUABLY THE
District oF CoLumpiaA Court OF APPEALS, THE OVERWHELMING
MAJORITY OF CrRCUIT CouRTS OF APPEAL REQUIRE THAT AN ACTUAL
CONFLICT OF INTEREST OR ACTUAL PREJUDICE BE ESTABLISHED,
SEE, £.G., UNITED States v, Foster, 469 F,2p 1 (1st Cir. 1972)
(DEFENDANT DID NOT SHOW ANY PREJUDICE FROM JOINT REPRESENTATION) ;
Kaplan v, Bomparp, 573 F,.2p 708 (2np Crr, 1978) (DEFENDANT MUST
SHOW SOME SPECIFIC INSTANCE OF PREJUDICE, SOME REAL CONFLICT
OF INTEREST); UNITED STATES v, CARRIGAN, 543 F,2p 1053 (2np
Cir, 1976) (REAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND PREJUDICE PRESENT
SINCE EACH DEFENDANT GAVE DIFFERENT VERSION OF INCIDENT TO POLICE
AND DEFENDANT'S TRIAL TESTIMONY WAS 'N CONFLICT WITH THE CO-
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT, WHICH WAS ALSO ADMITTED AT TRIAL);
UNITED STATES v, Atkinson, 565 F.2p 1283 (4TH Cir. 1977), cert,
DENIED, 98 S, Ct, 2845 (1978) (DEFENDANT MUST SHOW SOME SPECIFIC
INSTANCE OF PREJUDICE AND SOME REAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST);
HAGGARD V, STATE OF ALABAMA, 550 F.2p 1019, REHEARING DENIED,
554 F.2p 475 (StH C1x, 1977) (DEFENDANT MUST SHOW ACTUAL
1/7
PREJUDICE); FoxwoRTH V, WAINWRIGHT, 516 F.2p 1072 (5TH Cir,
1975) (ACTUAL PREJUDICE EXISTS AS TO MINIMALLY INVOLVED
DEFENDANT SINCE PLAUSIBLE DEFENSE OF SHIFTING BLAME TO CO-
DEFENDANTS FORECLOSED BY JOINT REPRESENTATION); [HACKER V,
RORDENKIRCHER, 590 F.2p 649 (6TH Cir, 1979) (DEFENDANT MUST SHOW
THAT THERE WAS A CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND THAT HE WAS PREJUDICED
THEREBY; THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MERE POTENTIAL CONFLICT ARISING
FROM JOINT REPRESENTATION IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE DENIAL
OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT); UNITED States v, Woops, 544 F,2p 242
(6TH Cir, 1976), CERT. DENIED, 429 U.S, 1062 (1977) (DEFENDANT
MUST SHOW ACTUAL PREJUDICE); UNITED STATES EX REL, MCCLINDON
Vv, WARDEN, Jit, St, PEN, 575 F,2p 108 (7TH Cir, 1978) (DEFENDANT
MUST SHOW THAT A CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTED IN FACT);
UNITED STATES Vv, MANDELL, 525 F,2p 671 (7TH Cir. 1975), cert,
DENIED, 423 U.S, 1049 (1976) (DEFENDANT MUST SHOW WITH A REASONABLE
DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY THAT A CONFLICT OF INTEREST ACTUALLY EXISTED
AT TRIAL; SOMETHING MORE THAN “A POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST,
HOWEVER REMOTE” NEEDED); Davipson v, Cupp, 446 F,2p 642 (StH Cir,
1971) (DEFENDANT MUST SHOW SPECIFIC PREJUDICE IN ORDER TO PREVAIL);
WATKINS V, Yitson, 498 F,2p 351 (9TH Cir, 1969) (DEFENDANT MUST
DEMONSTRATE THAT SOME SPECIFIC PREJUDICE RESULTED FROM THE JOINT
REPRESENTATION); FRYAR V, UNITED STATES, 404 F,2p 1071 (10TH
Cir, 1968), cert, DENIED, 395 U.S, 964 (1969) (DEFENDANT muUST
SHOW THAT PREJUDICE RESULTED FROM THE JOINT REPRESENTATION),
18 13
« N UNWARRANTED BURDEN ON STATE PROSECUTORS IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
THE ErGHTH Circuit Court oF APPEALS REQUIRES A SHOWING 2 en ae ,
OF ACTUAL PREJUDICE OR A SUBSTANTIAL POSSIBILITY OF A CONFLICT ; A
CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE CouRT OF APPEALS FOR
OF INTEREST. AusTIN v, ErRicxson, 477 F.2p 620 (8TH Cir, 1973);
BERAN v, UNITED Stares, 580 F.2p 324 (81H Cir. 1978), cert, THE THIRD CiRcuIT.
DENIED, __ U.S, __, 99 S. Cr, 1422 (1979) (DEFENDANT must
SHOW THAT THERE WAS AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST OR A SUB-
IT IS RESPECTFULLY REQUESTED THAT THIS CouRT ISSUE A WRIT OF
STANTIAL POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A CONFLICT),
THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST STANDARD IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT REQUIRES THE COURT TO DETERMINE IF THE RECORD
SHOWS THE ABSENCE OF PREJUDICE OR A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. LOLLAR v, UNITED States, 376 F.2p
243 (D.C. Cir, 1967), EveEN THAT STANDARD, HOWEVER, REQUIRES
THE COURT TO EXAMINE THE RECORD AS A WHOLE TO DETERMINE THE
POSSIBILITY OF PREJUDICE,
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE COURT BELOW IS UNWARRANTED
AND, IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, GOES FAR BEYOND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS ESTABLISHED IN ALL OTHER CIRCUITS, ®
CERTAINLY THIS COURT HAS NEVER INDICATED THAT THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION IS VIOLATED BY THE EXISTENCE OF A POSSIBLE CONFLICT
OF INTEREST OR PREJUDICE, HOWEVER REMOTE,
IN LIGHT OF THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY REFERRED TO ABCVE AND ©
THE FACT THAT THE INSTANT CLAIM WAS REJECTED BY PENNSYLVANIA’S
HIGHEST COURT, AS WELL AS THE UNITED States District Court
BELOW, AND BECAUSE THE DECISION OF THE CouRT BELOW WILL PLACE
20
1, Even AssuminG THAT THE STANDARD OF Review APPLIED BELow
IE CONSTITUTIONALLY [ANDATED WHEN CourT APPOINTED Cou SEL
EPRESENTS Two OR MoRE 5 FENDANTS AT THe SAHE RIAL, THE
esoonoens bio Ais Scpunenect faith Conberensates Bi Tach
PRIVATELY RETAINED Error YS, ComPELs THe Use OF A DIFFERENT
STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT,
EVEN IF THIS COURT WERE TO DETERMINE THAT THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW UTILIZED BELOW IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
REQUIRED AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION, THE CIRCUMSTANCES HEREIN
MANDATE A STRICTER STANDARD OF REVIEW, SUCH REVIEW MUST REQUIRE
A SHOWING, IN FACT, OF AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST OR
PREJUDICE, IN ORDER TO REVERSE STATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS. By
ITS FAILURE TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN JOINT AND SEPARATE TRIALS,
AS WELL AS PRIVATELY RETAINED VERSUS COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL,
THE COURT BELOW MISCONSTRUED THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
OF THE CONSTITUTION,
INITIALLY, THE INSTANT RECORD REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT WAS
TRIED APART FROM HIS TWO CO-DEFENDANTS, BOTH OF WHOM WERE
SUBSEQUENTLY AND SEPARATELY TRIED, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT
THE MANY UNFAVORABLE ASPECTS OF A JOINT CRIMINAL TRIAL CAN
WEIGH HEAVILY AGAINST A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT, CONSIDERATIONS SUCH
AS VARYING DEGREES OF CULPABILITY; DIFFERENCES IN DEFENSE
STRATEGIES; THE POSSIBILITY OF GUILT BY ASSOCIATION; AND THE
DECISION WHETHER TO TESTIEY OR NOT, ARE ALL ACCENTUATED IN THE
CONTEXT OF A JOINT TRIAL, IN THE CONTEXT OF SEPARATE TRIALS,
E.G., ABA Stanparps RELATING TO THE INISTRATION OF
fee, eas JUSTICE, JOINDER AND SEVERANCE. QRYINIS POND ED, 1978),
21
HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY INHERENT UNFAIRNESS IS NONEXISTENT,
THUS, IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT A GREATER SHOWING OF PREJUDICE IN
CONFLICTS CLAIMS MUST BE MADE IN CASES OF DUAL REPRESENTATION
AS OPPOSED TO JOINT REPRESENTATION, SEE, E,G,, MILLER Vv.
UNiTeD States, 564 F,2p 103, 106 (lst Cir. 1977), CERT, DENIED,
435 U.S, 931 (1978),
THE INSTANT RECORD REVEALS, AT MOST, DUAL REPRESENTATION BY
TWO PRIVATELY RETAINED ATTORNEYS, IN FACT, BOTH THE PENNSYLVANIA
SUPREME CouRT AND THE UNITED States District COURT DETERMINED
THAT THE CONCEPT OF DUAL REPRESENTATION, IN ITS TRADITIONAL
SENSE, WAS INAPPLICABLE INSTANTLY, BOTH COURTS FOUND THAT THE
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN
RESPONDENT'S TWO PRIVATELY RETAINED COUNSEL PRECLUDED A FINDING
OF DUAL REPRESENTATION,
NHETHER OR NOT THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY BY RESPONDENT'S
ATTORNEYS PRECLUDES A FINDING OF DUAL REPRESENTATION, THE FACT
THAT RESPONDENT WAS SEPARATELY TRIED SURELY WARRANTS A STRICTER
fevainieven, THE PHRASE DUAL REPRESENTATION REFERS TO THE CONCEPT
OF AN ATTORNEY REPRESENTING CO-DEFENDANTS WHO ARE SEPARATELY TRIED,
» APPENDIX D, INFRA, AT 33-34;
LIED STATES §X REL. SULLIVAN V, CUYLER, APPENDIX C, INFRA, AT SC.
June DiBon mas nesrppenr’s cuier ria. comes, Arromey Penuro
BHSSOOHAT s_tepresewrarion HT, Beech Adz oRrs BH, Wy
CO-DEFENDANTS ey B BENERS By sH ay
22
STANDARD OF REVIEW THAN THAT APPLIED BY THE CouRT BELOW. IN
THE FACTUAL CONTEXT PRESENTLY INVOLVED, IT IS RESPECTFULLY
SUBMITTED THAT AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST OR PREJUDICE
MUST BE DEMONSTRATED. NO SUCH CONFLICT OR PREJUDICE EXISTS
HEREIN,
ADDITIONALLY, THE COURT BELOW FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE
FACT THAT A DIFFERENT STANDARD OF REVIEW WAS REQUIRED SINCE
RESPONDENT'S REPRESENTATION WAS OF HIS OWN CHOOSING, AND NOT
THAT OF THE STATE'S, RESPONDENT, ALONG WITH HIS CO-DEFENDANTS,
PRIVATELY RETAINED TWO EXCEEDINGLY EXPERIENCED CRIMINAL TRIAL
ATTORNEYS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF
WOULD ONLY BE WARRANTED IF (1) RESPONDENT'S REPRESENTATION WAS
SO LACKING IN EFFECTIVENESS, BECAUSE OF THE DUAL REPRESENTATION,
AS TO HAVE DEPRIVED HIM OF A FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR TRIAL: OR
(2) THE TRIAL JUDGE OR PROSECUTOR KNEW THAT RESPONDENT PECEIVED
INCOMPETENT REPRESENTATION AND TOOK NO REMEDIAL ACTION, OR THAT
THE INCOMPETENCY OF RESPONDENT'S REPRESENTATION WAS SO APPARENT
THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF IT AND COULD HAVE CORRECTED
IT. ONLY THEN CAN RESPONDENT'S RETAINED ATTORNEYS’ ACTIONS BE
ATTRIBUTED TO THE COMMONWEALTH FOR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT REVIEW
PURPOSES,
THE CourT BELOW FOUND A SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION IN THE
DUAL REPRESENTATION OF RESPONDENT AND TWO SEPARATELY TRIED
CO-DEFENDANTS BY TWO RETAINED ATTORNEYS BECAUSE, IN ITS VIEW,
A POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS OR PREJUDICE, HOWEVER
REMOTE, EXISTED. SUCH A DETERMINATION MISCONSTRUES THE
23
Unrtep States CONSTITUTION AND FINDS NO SUPPORT IN ANY OF THE
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT OR ANY OTHER FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT.
By MECHANICALLY APPLYING ITS OWN CONFLICT OF INTEREST STANDARD,
AS WEL AS IGNORING CERTAIN CONTRARY THIRD CIRCUIT DECISIONAL
LAW, THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY EXTENDED SIXTH AMENDMENT REVIEW,
WITH RESPECT TO INDIGENT STATE CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS, THIS
CouRT HAS DETERMINED THAT THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES THE APPOINTMENT OF EFFECTIVE
COUNSEL, POWELL v, ALABAMA, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932),
ADDITIONALLY, IF COUNSEL’S REPRESENTATION AMOUNTS TO A MERE
FORMALITY OR SHAM, DUE PROCESS ALONE VITIATES THE PROCEEDINGS,
Avery_v, ALABAMA, 308 U.S. 444 (1940); Hawk v. Ousen, 326 U.S,
971 (1945): Wute v. Racen, 324 U.S, 760 (1945); House v, Mayo,
324 U.S, 42 (1945), SIMILARLY, UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT,
‘AN INDIGENT MUST BE PROVIDED WITH APPOINTED COUNSEL IN ALL
STATE CRIMINAL TRIALS INVOLVING IMPRISONMENT, GIDEON Vy
WAINWRIGHT, 372 U.S. 335,- 344-345 (1963); ARGERSINGER V, HAMLIN,
47 U.S, 25 (1972); Scott vs Iupinors, __ U.S, __, 99 S. Ct,
2086 ¢ (ss 07. 426-427 (3rd
oT
=}
“4 Sy CERT. BO 3
tir ¢ 2 34 NITED STATES EX REL, OREEN V, 8 Fo,
Be i 5 AER of Gyiiy Sings a Ae Tass
24
1158 (1979) 4 IN SUCH CASES THE STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT
OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT REVIEW IS OBVIOUS SINCE THE STATE IS
DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE IN SELECTING COUNSEL,
HOWEVER, SINCE RESPONDENT EXERCISED HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
TO COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE, THE COURT BELOW UTILIZED AN ERRONEOUS
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN FINDING A SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION
ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
IN ORDER FOR A SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION TO HAVE OCCURRED
IT MUST BE SHOWN THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE OR PROSECUTOR KNEW THAT
RESPONDENT RECEIVED INCOMPETENT REPRESENTATION AND TOOK NO
REMEDIAL ACTION, OR THAT THE INCOMPETENCY OF RESPONDENT’ S
REPRESENTATION WAS SO APPARENT THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE
OF IT AND COULD HAVE CORRECTED IT. ELTZGERALD Vv, ESTELLE, 505
F.2p 1334 (StH Cir.), CERT. DENIFD, 422 U.S, 1011 (1975). Onvy
THEN CAN A PRIVATELY RETAINED ATTORNEY'S ACTIONS BE ATTRIBUTED
TO THE STATE FOR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PURPOSES,
THE THIRD Circuit CourT OF APPEALS HAS RECOGNIZED THE ABOVE
DISTINCTION, BUT NEVERTHELESS CHOSE TO IGNORE IT HEREIN,
UNITED STATES EX REL, HART v. DAvenport, 478 F.2p 203, 210-211
(3rp Cir, 1973), NOWHERE IN ITS OPINION GRANTING RELIEF DOES
In Mee, CONTEXT OF RECOMMENDING THAT A DEFENDANT PLEAD GUILTY,
THIS LOURT HAS DEFINED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE TO MEAN THAT SUCH
ADVICE BE “WITHIN THE RANGE OF COMPETENCE RS, Og ORY YS 970);
a re ec mi renege
N CRIMINAL
DEFINITION, THIS LOURT HAS NEVER EXPLICITLY DEFINED THE MINIMUM
EGREE OF EFFECTIVENESS_NECESSA OR gp!X4 AMENDMEN RPOSES,
HagvLanD v4 MaRzuLLO, 43 3 B fi es Ronis af “1335 (998) (lustices
HITE AND RHENQUIST DJSSENTING FROM THIS OURT'S DENTAL OF
CERTIORARI TO REVIEW FouRTH CIRCUIT'S ADOPTION OFA a CONSTI-
UT IONS 7 TANDARD IN MARZULLO VY, ABR ] 0 (4TH
IR,
25
THE COURT BELOW DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN RETAINED VERSUS APPOINTED
COUNSEL, AS THE THREE JUDGE DISSENT FROM THE ORDER DENYING
REHEARING IN BANC STATED:
BUT ALTHOUGH STATE ACTION WAS FOUND TO
BE PRESENT IN HART, THERE WOULD APPEAR
TO BE NO EVIDENCE IN THE PRESENT CASE
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE OR THE PROSECUTOR
WAS AWARE, OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE,
OF THE ALLEGED CONFLICT OF INTEREST,
AND CERTAINLY NOTHING JN THE RECORD
SUGGESTS THAT SULLIVAN) S REPRESENTATION
BY TWO OF PHILADELPHIA’S BEST KNOWN
TRIAL ATTORNEYS WAS SO GROSSLY DEFICIENT
AS TO RENDER THE PROCEEDINGS FUNDAMENTALLY
U
APPENDIX A, INFRA, AT
IN ES eRe aoe 580 F.2p 1251 (5tH Cir, 1978),
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT APPROPRIATELY RECONCILED ITS CONFLICT OF
INTEREST STANDARD OF REVIEW WITH THE PRIVATELY RETAINED VERSUS
APPOINTED COUNSEL DICHOTOMY, THE GOVERNMENT ARGUED THAT A MORE
STRINGENT TEST WAS REQUIRED FOR DETERMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
COUNSEL IN CONFLICTS CASES INVOLVING RETAINED COUNSEL. THE
CourT STATED (ID. at 1256);
APPLYING, AS WE_MUST, THE STANDARDS
ESTABLISHED BY FITZGERALD FOR JUDGING
EFFECTIVENESS-OF-COUNSEL CLAIMS, WE
FIND THAT CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST CASES
SUCH AS THE INSTANT ONE FALL WITHIN
HE DUE PROCESS CATEGORY OF CASES,
ONSEQUENTLY, WE HOLD THAT AN ATTORNEY,
WHETHER RETAINED OR APPOINTED LABORING
UNDER AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN HIS
REPRESENTATION OF AN ACCUSED FAILS TO ACCORD
HIM EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS
UARANTEED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
IFTH AMENDMENT, AND A FORTIORI, THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT,
26
THE COURT THEREAFTER DETERMINED THAT AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST
EXISTED, AND RELYING ON THIS CouRT'’S DECISION IN HOLLOWAY Vv,
ARKANSAS, SUPRA, CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT NO SHOWING OF PREJUDICE
IS REQUIRED ONCE AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST IS ESTABLISHED,
UNITED STATES Vv, ALVAREZ, SUPRA AT 1259 n, 14,
BY ATTRIBUTING TO THE STATE, FOR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
PURPOSES, ITS FINDING THAT A POSSIBILITY OF PREJUDICE, HOWFVER
REMOTE, IS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF IN THIS
CASE, THE COURT BELOW HAS ENTERED AN UNCHARTERED SEA, AND
CONSTITUTIONALLY MISCONSTRUES THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS,
AND THIS COURT'S PRIOR CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS DECISIONS,
PETITIONER READILY CONCEDES THAT CERTAIN COURTS HAVE
REJECTED ANY DISTINCTION BETWEEN RETAINED VERSUS APPOINTED
COUNSEL IN WEIGHING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS,
HOWEVER, IN EACH OF THESE CIRCUITS, IN ORDER TO SECURE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RELIEF ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST GROUNDS, THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL STANDARD OF REVIEW REQUIRES A SHOWING OF AN ACTUAL CONFLICT °
NITED STATES 14 ALBERTI,
FERT. NG to
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daeeeatto Bu By,
ie STATES Vv. FosTER, Ni hits Ls Naoe (1st
ALTHOUGH THE li CIRCUIT IN THE PAST MADE NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN
Laney fin AND APPOINTED Sarg IN ae 7) BD Ng. aN SS “yam
oY TH '
IT RECENTLY INDICATED THAT THER ~
By NSTITUT Bi! STANDARDS 5 Nepky / apron. susan, 18)" 5 20
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OF INTEREST OR eis As THE FIFTH CIRCUIT MAKES CLEAR,
IN ALVAREZ, SUPRA, WHENEVER AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTS,
THE TRIAL IS FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR AND IPSO FACTO FOURTEENTH AND
SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS OCCUR,
RY IGNORING THE PRIVATE VERSUS RETAINED COUNSEL DISTINCTION,
WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY APPLYING A TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE STANDARD
OF REVIEW, THE COURT BELOW MISAPPLIED THE UNITED STATES ConsTI-
TUTION, THE COURT ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO INQUIRE INTO THE ACTUAL
EXISTENCE OF A CONFLICT OF INTEREST OR PREJUDICE:
RESPONDENTS ALSO ARGUE THAT ULTIMATELY IT
WAS PETITIONER HIMSELF, AND NOT HIS ATTORNEYS,
WHO DECIDED NOT TO TAKE THE WITNESS STAND AND
THAT HIS DECISION WAS BASED ON PERSONAL CONSID-
“lm - AND NOT INFLUENCED BY DUAL REPRESENTA~
TION, URTHER, THEY SUBMIT, ONCE PETITIONER HAD
DECIDED NOT TO TESTIFY THERE WERE NO +t Aby gana
WHOSE TESTIMONY WOULD HAVE BEEN WORTHWHILE, NY
COMPLAINT ABOUT THE FAILURE TO PRODUCE DEFENSE
WITNESSES IS, IN THEIR JUDGMENT, ILLUSORY, HESE
ARGUMENTS ARE ALSO DIRECTED TO THE QUESTION
WHETHER THERE WAS ACTUAL PREJUDICE WHICH, AS
WE HAVE NOTED, WE MAY NOT CONSIDER,
UNITED STATES £X REL, SULLIVAN V, CUYLER ET AL,, APPENDIX, INFRA,
AT JOR,
IN SUM, WHETHER OR NOT THE EXCEEDINGLY LIBERAL SIXTH
AMENDMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW UTILIZED BELOW IS CONSTI TUTIONALL
REQUIRED IN JOINT REPRESENTATION COURT APPOINTMENT CASES, IT
CERTAINLY IS ERRONEOUS AS APPLIED TO RESPONDENT HEREIN,
Tae District oF CoLumB1A CourT oF APPEALS, WHILE BEJFETING THE
DISTINCTION, SUPRA AT 24 » STILL
MANDATES AN INQUIRY INTO THE EXISTENCE OF PREJUDICE IN FACT,
ALTHOUGH REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE ITS ABSENCE,
28
SINCE RESPONDENT WAS REPRESENTED BY PRIVATELY RETAINED COUNSEL,
TRIED SEPARATELY FROM HIS TWO CO-DEFENDANTS, AND AFFORDED
REPRESENTATION THAT WAS NEITHER FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR NOR SO
DEFECTIVE AS TO PUT THE TRIAL COURT OR PROSECUTOR ON NOTICE
OF ANY ALLEGED CONFLICT OF INTEREST, ONLY AN ACTUAL CONFLICT
OF INTEREST OR PREJUDICE WOULD WARRANT REVERSAL. NO SUCH
SHOWING EXISTS ON THIS RECORD,
FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE, THIS COURT IS RESPECTFULLY
REQUESTED TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CourT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT,
29
I], THE Decision OF THE Court BeLow VIOLATED RETTLED PRINCIPLES
JF HABEAS CorPus Revjew, As ENUNCIATED By THIS OURT we ONGRESS,
2Y ENCROACHING Upon THE FacTUAL ETRRMINATIONS Mape_In HE STATE
OURT System, AND SUBSTI TUTI G Its Own Finpincs OF Fact For THOSE
OF THE State Courts Anp THE District CourT,
IN TOWNSEND v, SAIN, 372 U.S, 293 (1963), THIS CouRT SET FORTH
GENERAL STANDARDS GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS IN FEDERAL
couRT, TuHis Court stated (Ip, at 314-315):
FURTHERMORE, THE COEQUAL RESPONSIBILITIES
OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES IN THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ARE SUCH
THAT WE THINK THE DISTRICT JUDGE MAY, IN THE
ORDINARY CASE IN WHICH THERE HAS BEEN NO
ARTICULATION, PROPERLY ASSUME THAT THE STATE
TRIER OF FACT APPLIED CORRECT STANDARDS OF
FEDERAL LAW TO THE FACTS, IN THE ABSENCE OF
EVIDENCE ... THAT THERE IS REASON TO SUSPECT
THAT AN es gh STANDARD WAS IN FACT
APPLIED, HUS, IF THIRD-DEGREE METHODS OF
OBTAINING A CONFESSION ARE ALLEGED AND THE
STATE COURT REFUSED TO EXCLUDE THE CONFESSION
FROM EVIDENCE, THE DISTRICT JUDGE MAY ASSUME
THAT THE STATE TRIER FOUND THE FACTS AGAINST
THE PETITIONER, THE LAW BEING, THAT THIRD-
DEGREE METHODS NECESSARILY PRODUCE A COERCED
CONFESSION,
SUBSEQUENT TO TOWNSEND, CONGRESS AMENDED 28 U.S.C, §2254(p) To
PROVIDE IN RELEVANT PART:
A DETERMINATION AFTER A HEARING ON ae
MERITS OF A FACTUAL ISSUE, MADE BY A STATE
COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION ,., EVIDENCED
BY A WRITTEN FINDING, WRITTEN OPINION, OR
OTHER RELIABLE AND ADEQUATE WRITTEN INDICIA,
SHALL BE PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT, UNLESS THE
APPLICANT SHALL Ya bie it OR IT SHALL OTHER-
WISE APPEAR, .., = HAT THE MERITS OF
es FACTUAL DISPUTE WERE NOT RESOLVED IN THE
OTATE COURT HEARING...
30
In LAVALLEE v, De_Le Rose, 410 U.S, 690 (1973), THis CourT
FURTHER HELD THAT AN OPINION OF THE STATE TRIAL COURT MEETS
THE REQUIREMENT OF 28 U.S.C, §2254(p)(1), IF a District Court
CAN REASONABLY CONCLUDE THAT RELIEF WOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED
BY THE STATE COURT IF IT BELIEVED A DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATIONS,
HEREIN, THE CIRCUIT CoURT BELOW, W}THOUT ANY ANALYSIS OF
THE STATE COURT FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS ON THE CONFLICT OF
INTEREST QUESTION, GRANTED THE WRIT BASED ONLY ON THE STATE COURT
RECORD, BY REVERSING THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT, AS WELL
AS THE ])ISTRICT CouRT, SOLELY UPON THE INCONSISTENT AND CONTRA-
DICTED TESTIMONY OF ONE OF RESPONDENT'S TRIAL ATTORUEYE, AND
WITHOUT ORDERING AN ADDITIONAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING, THE
14
WELL-ESTABLISHED THIRD CIRCUIT DECISIONAL * REQUIRES THAT
SEE, s.. Soe BE GRANTED TO pate te ite entre Loge).
STATE COURT FACTUAL FINDINGS MUST BE ACCEPTED AS TRUE AND
BURDEN ON PETITIONER TO ESTABLISH, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
VIDENCE, THAT STATE COURT FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS ARE ERRONEOUS;
TATE SUPREME COURT HAS MORE LATITUDE IN REVIEWING TRIAL COURT
DETERMINATIONS THAN A FEDERAL COURT DOES IN RULING ON HABEAS
RPUS PETITIO di AE N
she a) > 5pD) M6 As Lye CERT, DENIED, APT 1975)
(WHERE NO INDICATION THAT THE STATE COURT UTILIZED AN IMPROPER
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD, AND THE FACTS AS RELATED BY PETITIONER
WOULD ENTITLE HIM TO RELIEF UNDER THE PREVAILING CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD, A FEDERAL COURT SHOULD ASSUME THAT THE STATE COURT
WOULD PROPERLY APPLY THE LAW IF IT BELIEVED PETITIONER'S STORY:
THEREFORE A STATE COURT DECISION DENYING RELIEF IS IN ALL
LIKELIHOOD BASED ON DISCREDITING PETITIONER S TESTIMONY AND
ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS),
{> Wyirep Spares gy ach Met ¢ bis
a6} .2D 13 RD UIR, WHEN LEGAL PROBLEMS ARE PRESENTED
WHICH ARE NOT EASILY RESOLVED EVEN ON THE BASIS OF CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED FACTS, AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS AN A EQORTJORI
PROPOSITION IF THE STATE RECORD IS DEFICIENT IN CRITICAL AREAS),
31
CouRT SERIOUSLY INTRUDED UPON THE PRINCIPLES OF COMITY AND THE
PROPER DEFERENCE WHICH MUST BE GIVEN TO STATE COURT CRIMINAL
DETERMINATIONS, —
RESPONDENT SOUGHT COLLATERAL RELIEF IN THE STATE COURT
SYSTEM UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA Post ConvICTION HEARING ACT,
IN HIS PETITION HE ALLEGED, WITHOUT PROVIDING SUPPORTING FACTS,
THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WERE INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO PRESENT ANY
DEFENSE AND THAT SUCH FAILURE WAS BASED UPON THE DUAL REPRESEN-
TATION INVOLVED, AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE CourT
HELD THAT RESPONDENT WAS NOT DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL, BASED UPON THE TESTIMONY oF JupGe D1Bona,
RESPONDENT'S CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL. IN REVIEWING THIS DETER-
MINATION, THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THERE WAS
NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST, SINCE THERE WAS NO DUAL REPRESENTATION
IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE, AND THAT RESPONDENT’S CHIEF TRIAL
COUNSEL, JuDGE DiBonA, INDICATED THAT HIS STEWARDSHIP WAS IN
NO WAY AFFECTED BY THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CO-DEFENDANTS’ CASES,
BUT WAS SOLELY A PRODUCT OF WHAT HE CONS I DERED TO BE THE BEST
COURSE IN HIS REPRESENTATION OF SULLIVAN, THE CouRT FURTHER
HELD THAT THE DECISION NOT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE WAS BASED UPON
the Act oF JANUARY 2 4266, P.L, (1965) 1580 sl, 19 P.S, s1180-1
ET SEQ, (SUPPLEMENT 1979),
7
(\PINION OF STATE TRIAL COURT DENYING COLLATERAL RELIEF, APPENDIX,
INFRA, AT 7F,
(GvMoNWEALTH v, SULLIVAN, APPENDIX D, INFRA, AT 34D,
32
Jupc6e D1Bona’ gBELIEF THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR
A CONVICTION, THE District CourT concLUDED THAT THE STATE
COURT FINDINGS WERE SUPPORTED BY THE STATE RECORD. ’
SUCCINCTLY STATED, THE CrrcurIT CouRT BELOW GRANTED THE WRIT
BY RELYING SOLELY UPON THE CONTRADICTED AND CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONY
OF ONE OF RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEYS TO THE EFFECT THAT NO DEFENSE
WAS PRESENTED BECAUSE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THERE WAS A FEAR OF
EXPOSING ALLEGED DEFENSE WITNESSES BEFORE THE CO-DEFENDANTS’
TRIALS. THE ISSUE UPON WHICH THE COURT BELOW REVERSED THE
District CouRT WAS PRESENTED TO, AND REJECTED BY, THE STATE
HEARING COURT AND THE STATE Supreme Court, OF NECESSITY, THOSE
COURTS RELIED UPON THE TESTIMONY OF JuDGE D1Bona.
SINCE THE STATE COURT DECISIONS WERE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
TESTIMONY OF JUDGE DIBONA, THE CouRT BELOW SHOULD HAVE DENIED
RELIEF. THUS, THE COURT'S DECISION DEPARTED FROM SETTLED
PRINCIPLES OF HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW WHEN IT IGNORED SUCH TEST]-
MONY AND ENGAGED IN ITS OWN FACT FINDING, UNITED STATES EX REL,
SULLIVAN Vv, CUYLER ET AL,, APPENDIx B, INFRA, AT 15-17R, If
THE COURT DETERMINED THAT THE STATE COURT FINDINGS WERE INCOMPLETE
OR INAPPROPRIATE, THE ONLY PROPER REMEDY WAS TO REMAND THE CASE
TO THE District CourT FOR INDEPENDENT FINDINGS OF FACT AFTER A
COMMONWEALTH v. SuLivan, APPENDIX D, INFRA, AT 34D,
ae STATES EX REL, SuLiivan vy, CuYLER, Appenpix C, INFRA, AT
5-8C, '
33
PLENARY EVIDENTIARY HEARING. JOWNSEND V. SAIN, 372 U.S, 293 (1963),
UNITED STATES Ex REL, McNair v, STATE oF New Jersey, 492 F.2p
1307 (3rp Cir. 1974); Unitep STATES £x REL, Foye v, STATE oF
New Jersey, 547 F,2p 217 (3rp Crr. 1977),
BECAUSE THE COURT BELOW VIOLATED SETTLED PRINCIPLES OF
HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW AS ENUNCIATED BY THIS CouRT AND CONGRESS,
IT IS RESPECTFULLY REQUESTED THAT THIS CouRT ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE CouRT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT IN ORDER TO RESTORE COMITY TO ITS PROPER
PLACE IN THE CIRCUIT,
34
CONCLUS LON
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS THAT A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ISSUE TO REVIEW
THE DECISION BELOW,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
MICHAEL F, HENR
i [Pape
ss Psi Tomer rm Um
ISTRICT ATTORNEY
2490 CENTRE SAYARE WEST
PHILADELPHIA,
ENNSYLVANIA 19102
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