Petition — Hoffman v. United States

Supreme Court, U. &

FILED

78-1686 MAY 7% 1979

1

| _MICHABL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1339

Paut W. Horrman,

Petitioner,

against

Unitep States or AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

GeraLp B, Lercourr

Attorney for Petitioner

148 East 78th Street ;

New York, New York 10021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ce Gh Cie o a u's vb ae ead ob dees ode aes

I 6 CEU Suk Suk NAA a BA 6 wie 0 Vp OK in 2 6s 6

Questions Presented ............... paew C eee sees

1

1

2

Statutes, Federal Rules and Regulations Involved ... 2

Rr re he 2

5

Point I—The Petitioner was denied due process of

law where the trial court, in determining sen-

tence, relied on unsubstantiated and unconfronted

hearsay, the truth of which was disputed by the

Petitioner, alleging that said Petitioner was

involved in previous uncharged criminal transac-

tions and was more culpable than the co-defend-

ts te ion at pee eg ne nn anne 4)

Point I]—The informant reliability standards enun-

ciated in this Court’s holdings in Aguilar v.

Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United

States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), apply where the in-

formant is a participant in the crime about which

i TUG TTOUUIIIO oo ikea ccc cenwecses 10

ES SEI seers pen a PSR Po SR ee 13

Appendix A, Order and Judgment of Affirmance,

United States Court of Appeals for the Second

EE Oe raga k bo0 ia 60 de 6 b¥eed bee sees 14

Appendix B, Order Denying Petition for Rehearing,

United States Court of Appeals for the Second

EE aetind cnecde bss kines © Seay a towah bees 16

Appendix C, Order Extending Time to File a Petition

for Writ of Certiorari, Supreme Court of the

LE da RS ea ar 17

ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) ...... 2, 3, 10, 11, 12

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 128 (1968) ........ 9,11

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) .......... 7

Gardner vy. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1978) ..........- 8

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ........e000. 7

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) .......00. 7

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) ....2, 3, 10,

11, 12

Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) ........... 8

United States v. Battaglia, 478 F.2d 854 (5th Cir.

REET ET NEE PE TERE Crt mD 6

United States v. Dace, 502 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1974) .. 6

United States v. Dunloy, 584 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1978) ...11, 12

United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.

PIS oe va'c SACRO DIRS ER Ee RO Ee EEL Cb aae eee 6

United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y.,

BE is Sead ehed SOREL EWeTeCPaAberes akan’ 6

United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.

|. SEEN ee rte ee ay eee eee ae 6

United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied 423 U.S. 842 (1975) ..... bed lay ates 10, 11

United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1973) 6

United States v. Rollins, 522 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1975),

cert. denied, 424'U.S. 918 (1976) .............. 10

United States v. Rueda, 549 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1977) .. 10

United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) ....... 8

United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.,

1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972) ........ 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES lil

PAGE

United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951) .... 7

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) ........ 7,8

Statutes, Rules Cited

Se Mae SE 005 shes rh ee Raawaked oes cerakn

Oe aes RES soc ghee coda ndaicke' SSS b BN eS ese

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32(c¢) (3)

Miscellaneous

Comment, Reliability and the First Time Informant,

1 Am. Jur. Crim. L. 283, 295 (1972) ............ 12

IN THE

Suprene Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1339

+

bf

Pavut W. Horrman,

Petitioner,

against

Unirep States oF AMERICA,

Respondent.

+

-_

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

Gerald B. Lefeourt, on behalf of Petitioner Paul W.

Hoffman, prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review

the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Cireuit entered in the above case on the 18th

day of January, 1979.

Opinion Below

The Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed by the Circuit

Court from the bench and without written opinion.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit was made and entered on January 18, 1979, and a

2

copy thereof is appended to this Petition as Appendix A.

An order denying Petitioner’s Petition for Rehearing was

entered on March 8, 1979, and a copy thereof is appended

to the Petition as Appendix B.

In an order dated March 27, 1979, this Court ohauiel

Petitioner’s application for extension of time to file this

Petition, and a copy thereof is appended to this Petition as

Appendix C.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

Questions Presented

I. Was the Petitioner Denied Due Process of Law

Where the Trial Court, in Determining Sentence,

Relied on Unsubstantiated and Unconfronted

Hearsay, the Truth of Which was Disputed By

the Petitioner, Alleging that Said Petitioner Was

Involved in Previous ‘Uncharged Criminal Trans-

actions and Was More Culpable Than the Co-

Defendant?

II. Do the Informant Reliability Standards Enun-

ciated in this Court’s Holdings in Aguilar v. Texas,

378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States,

393 U.S. 410 (1969) Apply Where the Informant

is a Participant in the Crime About Which He

Provides Information?

a

Statutes, Federal Rules and Regulations Involved

No Statutes, Federal Rules or Regulations are involved.

Statement of the Case

The Petitioner, Paul Hoffman, and his co-defendant,

Brook Hart, arrived in Kennedy Airport in New York on

3

February 20, 1978, following an international flight. The

Petitioner cleared customs but Mr. Hart was found to be

in possession of cocaine. Hart immediately “cooperated”

and identified Petitioner as his accomplice. Two Special

Agents went looking for the Petitioner, who was about to

board a flight bound for San Francisco. They located

Petitioner shortly thereafter and detained him for ques-

tioning. He gave inconsistent answers to their questions

aud, upon denying he knew Brook Hart, was placed under

arrest. A warrant was subsequently issued to search

Petitioner’s baggage and cocaine was found therein.

The foregoing facts formed the basis of a motion to sup-

press on the grounds that the arrest of Petitioner was

without probable cause. The motion was denied following

a hearing at which the two agents and the defendant testi-

fied. Second Circuit law assumes the reliability of informa-

tion received from a participant-informant and therefore

does not apply the standards enunciated in Aguilar v.

Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinel v. United States,

393 U.S. 410 (1969).

The Petitioner thereafter entered a plea of guilty to im-

portation of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 952.

Prior to sentencing, Mr. Hoffman’s attorney read the

pre-sentence report prepared for the court and took issue

with several allegations contained therein. Specifically,

counsel objected to, and proffered information to rebut,

allegations that the defendant had been involved in previ-

ous drug dealings and that he was the more culpable of the

two defendants. The source of the information was the

co-defendant who had previously plead guilty.

Despite counsel’s objections, made in a letter sent to the

Court prior to sentencing and repeated at the time of

sentencing, the Court refused to permit further inquiry by

defense counsel and made no effort to substantiate the

critical allegations contained in the pre-sentence report

4

and elsewhere. Instead, the Court ruled that it had made

all the credibility determinations it need make at the previ-

ous suppression hearing. Thus, the Court ruled:

“Same credibility question on a limited issue. It is

somewhat the same credibility. The issue is somewhat

the same as that which was presented at the suppres-

sion hearing. And it seems to me that in those—if

that is your position on sentencing, that I don’t know

any reason why I should believe Mr. Hoffman’s ac-

count of the relative responsibilities at the time of

sentencing than I did at the time of the suppression

hearing. In fact, I have determined that Mr. Hoffman

is somewhat more—was somewhat more culpable at

the time of the offense than Mr. Hart. But I base

that not only on Mr.—what I have here from Mr. Hoff-

man on the stand and what I have here from the agents

and what I have seen in the probation report and

other circumstances? concerning Mr. Hoffman’s back-

ground which lead me to believe that Mr. Hoffman

is somewhat more involved in this trade than he makes

out.

That’s a determination that any judge is going to have

to make, and I’m not making it because I have reached

any conclusion concerning Mr. Hoffman’s general

character. It’s because I have had the advantage of

hearing his testimony on the issue. So I’m quite will-

? At one point, in open court, the Assistant United States At-

torney declared:

“Mr. Selafani: During the course of preparing this case

for both indictments I had occasion to debrief extensively

the co-defendant in this case, for one, Mr. Hart, and Mr. Hart

had indicated that he, of course, had a rather long-standing

prior relationship with this defendant and this defendant had

advised him that on a number of occasions he had brought into

the country from various different cities, Miami, for one, on

prior occasions, cocaine.”

5

ing to—in fact, I’m going to proceed with the

sentencing.”

The Court thereupon sentenced Petitioner to a five year

term of imprisonment to be followed by a special parole

term of five years. Brook Hart, at a separate hearing,

received a sentence of one and a half years imprisonment

which was subsequently reduced to one year imprisonment.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

POINT |

The Petitioner was denied due process of law where

the trial court, in determining sentence, relied on

unsubstantiated and unconfronted hearsay, the truth

of which was disputed by the Petitioner, alleging

that said Petitioner was involved in previous un-

charged criminal transactions and was more culpable

than the co-defendant.

The Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court to

review the trial court’s de facto ruling that it may predi-

eate sentencing upon uncorroborated and inherently un-

reliable hearsay contained in a pre-sentence report, without

affording counsel an opportunity to inquire into the ver-

acity of challenged allegations contained therein. Peti-

tioner in effect asks the Court to finally provide guidance

to trial courts regarding what is undoubtedly the most

significant yet hopelessly confused issue in criminal law

today: the extent to which Due Process standards apply

in the sentencing of non-capital cases. Currently, more

than 80 percent of all criminal defendants plead guilty.

Thus, to the overwhelming majority of defendants, the

only significant decision made by the criminal justice sys-

tem involves sentencing. Yet, despite the constant guid-

ance this Court has given regarding the procedures which

must be utilized to insure fairness for the minority of

6

defendants who go to trial, no such direction has been

given to the trial courts regarding the procedures to be

followed at sentencing. The rules of evidence are not

applicable at sentencing and the courts have been left to

chart their own course.

The vacuum created by the failure to develop minimum

Due Process standards at sentencing has resulted in utter

confusion between and within the Circuits. For example,

the Ninth Cireuit appears to have required that hearsay

allegations be corroborated;? cases within the Fifth Cir-

cuit put the burden upon the defendant to disprove alle-

g-tions with which he takes issue,’ as, apparently, does

the Eighth Circuit. The Second Circuit has taken varied

positions on the subject.© And Judge Weinstein of the

Eastern District of New York recently concluded in a

lengthy and scholarly opinion that the government must

prove the truth of critical allegations contained in a pre-

sentence report by ‘‘clear, unequivocal and convincing’’

evidence.®

The failure of this Court to previously hold that mini-

mal Due Process standards apply to all sentencing pro-

ceedings stands in stark contrast to its rulings in related

areas. Welfare recipients cannot be deprived of their

support payments without being accorded minimal Due

Process, including the right to present witnesses and cross-

2 United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.

denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972).

8 United States v. Battaglia, 478 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1972);

United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1973).

*United States v. Dace, 502 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1974).

*Compare United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.

1973) and United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1970).

“United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)

(Weinstein, J.).

7

examine the witnesses against them.’ Parolees and pro-

bationers cannot be deprived of their conditional freedom

without ‘‘minimum’’ procedural safeguards, which include

the right to present evidence, to cross examine adverse

witnesses and to receive a statement of reasons if parole

or probation is revoked.* Yet a defendant whose Liberty

has never been taken from him often faces his only sig-

nificant day in court with no more ‘‘Due Process’’ than

the trial court agrees to provide him. As Justice Douglas

said twenty eight years ago:

When discretion is absolute, man has always

suffered. At times it has been his property that has

been invaded; at times, his privacy; at times, his

liberty of movement; at times his freedom of thought;

at times, his life. Absolute discretion is a ruthless

master. It is more destructive of freedom than any of

man’s other inventions.°

That a man may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment

based upon allegations of bad deeds for which he was never

charged and which remain unsubstantiated offends our

most basic notions of fairness. Yet the practice continues

unabated in the absence of a ruling by this Court that it

will not be tolerated.

The decisions rendered thus far by the Court bearing

upon the issue at hand have been equivocal. Williams v.

New York, held that, at least in the absence of an objec-

tion to allegations contained in a pre-sentence report, Due

* Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

8 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,

411 U.S. 778 (1973).

®* United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951) (Doug-

las, J., dissenting).

1° 337 US. 241 (1949).

Process does not apply at sentencing. Yet other cases"

have held that a defendant has a right not to be sentenced

upon misinformation, and in the recent case of Gardner

v. Florida,” at least five Justices in some way utilized the

Due Proeess Clause in reversing a death sentence

predicated in part upon undisclosed information. Mr.

Justice Stevens, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr.

Justice Powell in fact concluded that “it is now clear that

the sentencing process, as well as the jtrial itself, must

satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.”

The significance which Petitioner sees in the way in

which Gardner was decided is in this Court’s deviation

from its previous practice of relying upon the Eighth

rather than the Fifth Amendment in analyzing the

propriety of imposing the death sentence. Mr. Justice

White, concurring in Gardner, recognized the importance

of this shift in approach, although he disagreed with it:

I... see no reason to address in this case the possi-

ble application to sentencing proceedings—in death or

other cases—of the Due Process Clause, other than as

the vehicle by which the strictures of the Eighth

Amendment are triggered in this case.**

The Gardner court, in distinguishing Williams v. New

York, supra, noted that Williams itself had recognized a

need to reexamine capital sentencing procedures with the

passage of time and against evolving standards of fair-

ness."* Petitioner submits that several trends enunciated

by this Court suggest that the Gardner plurality’s applica-

™ See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); United

States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).

** 430 U.S. 349 (1977).

** 430 U.S. at 357-358.

#430 U.S. at 364.

*° 430 U.S. at 357.

9

tion of Due Process Standards to capital sentencing pro-

ceedings apply to non-capital proceedings as_ well.

Sentencing has for a long time now been keyed towards re-

habilitation and judges are no longer straight-jacketed in

the imposition of sentence. But at the same time, this new

freedom on the part of the judiciary has turned what was

once a “legal” determination into a “fact-finding” process.

If this procedure is to work it must attempt to find facts

accurately and fairly. There is no better way of doing

this than by including the defendant in the fact finding

process in a meaningful way. Congress in 1975 mandated

the disclosure of pre-sentence reports.”* This admirable

development becomes meaningless if the defendant is not

permitted to challenge its contents and demand verification

of essential disputed facts.

In the case at bar, Petitioner was sentenced in part upon

information received from the co-defendant who told the

Probation Department and the Assistant United States At-

torney that the Petitioner had been involved in previous:

drug transactions and that Petitioner was more culpable

than he. The inherent unreliability of such statements by

one who seeks to ingratiate himself with the government

and the court and to shift blame from himself to another

is too obvious to dwell on.”

Yet the trial court refused to permit Petitioner to con-

front the co-defendant and refused to verify the informa-

tion in any way before relying on it. It is submitted that

such a practice is inherently unfair and represents a

palpable denial of Due Process.

Wherefore, Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this

Court to vacate the sentence unlawfully imposed upon him.

26 Rule 32(c) (3), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

17 See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968).

10

POINT II

The informant reliability standards enunciated in

this Court’s holdings in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108

(1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410

(1969), apply where the informant is a participant

in the crime about which he provides information.

In Aguilar_,¥: Texas,"* this Court held that an applica-

tion for g-Warrant which relies upon information received

fro informant must meet two requirements. Firstly,

the affidavit must set forth ‘‘underlying cireumstances’’

from which an independent magistrate can judge the valid-

ity of the conclusions contained therein, and, secondly,

the affiant must set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate

that the informant was ‘‘credible’’ and his information

‘freliable.’’ In Spinelli v. United States,” it was held that

if the informant’s ‘‘tip’’ fails to satisfy the Aguilar re-

quirements, the magistrate should look at any independent

corroboration provided in the report to ascertain whether

the corroborative material, when added to the informant’s

information, renders the affidavit as trustworthy as if the

informant’s information was sufficient by itself.

Despite the clarity of these requirements and the failure

of this Court to limit them in any manner, several Cir-

cuits, including the Second Cireuit,”? have held that the

rules enunciated in Aguilar-Spinelli have no application

where the information upon which a warrantless arrest

is based was received from a ‘‘participant informant.’’

Thus, in the case at bar neither the trial court nor, ap-

parently, the Court of Appeals through its bench af-

** 378 U.S. 108 (1964).

*° 393 U.S. 410 (1969).

2° See United States v. Rueda, 549 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1977);

United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423

U.S. 842 (1975); United States v. Rollins, 522 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.

1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).

11

firmance tested the validity of the Petitioner’s arrest by

application of Aguilar and Spinelli.

The reasons for the Circuits having created the partici-

pant informant exception are unclear, but two rationali-

zations have been advanced. Firstly, it has been stated

that a participant in a crime is somehow ‘‘inherently”’

reliable, thereby rendering the application of Aguilar and

Spinelli unnecessary.” Secondly, it has been said that if

Aguilar and Spinelli were applied in the context of the

participant informant, no valid warrantless arrests based

upon such information would be possible, because the in-

formant had not been used in the past.”

As to the first reason cited above, it is unclear why

a recently arrested participant informant should be con-

sidered more reliable than the informants used in Aguilar

and Spinelli. If anything, they are less reliable and the

strict application of this Court’s rules become even more

necessary to insure compliance with the fundamental prob-

able cause requirement. As this Court has stated in the

context of one defendant making a statement inculpating

another, such information is ‘‘inevitably suspect .

given the recognized motivation to shift blame to others.

Yet for some reason, the Second Cireuit and other Cir-

cuits have given extra credence to the self serving finger-

pointing of one who has recently been arrested.

9923

There may be some justification in finding a participant

inherently reliable when he has voluntarily ‘‘turned him-

self in’’ prior to ineulpating another. But such is surely

not the case where the participant was involuntarily ar-

rested and seeks only to ingratiate himself with the police.

As one commentator has written:

21 United States v. Dunloy, 584 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1978).

22 See United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 423 U.S. 843 (1975).

23 Bruton v. United States, 191 U.S. 123, 136 (1968).

12

. . courts should recognize a distinetion between the

participant who walks into the police station to make

an incriminating admission and the participant whom

the police have sufficient evidence to convict before

he supplies the information relied upon. No common

sense rationale for believing the second type of par-

ticipant informant is present since he has nothing

to lose by providing the self serving admission.”

As to the second rational often forwarded in support of

ignoring the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements when a partic-

ipant informant is involved, it is simply not true that but

for the “participant informant exception” the police would

be unable to,make a warrantless arrest upon information

received from a previously unknown arrestee. Spinelli ex-

plicitly holds that information received from a “fledgling”

informant may support a finding of probable cause so long

as it is sufficiently corroborated by independent sources.”

Thus, there is no reason whatever for ignoring the clear

rules set forth by this Court merely because the informant

is a participant, and in fact, careful application of this

Court’s precedent becomes even more important.”

In the case at bar, the validity of the arrest of the Peti-

tioner was not tested against the standards so carefully

laid down by this Court due to the erroneous rule of this

Cireuit that such standards did not apply.

Wherefore, Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this

Court to review the denial of his motion to suppress.

**Comment, Reliability and the First Time Informant, 1 Am.

Jur. Crim, L, 283, 295 (1972).

25393 U.S. at 415.

_ ** Most of the applicable cases in fact require some corrobora-

tion of at least “innocent” aspects of the participant-informant’s

tip, but do so outside the constraints of Spinelli. See, e.g., United

States v. Dunloy, supra, fn. 21, 584 F.2d at 10.

13

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully sub-

mitted that this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should

be granted.

Geratp B, Lercourr

Attorney for Petitioner

148 East 78th Street

New York, New York 10021

14

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

Seconp Circuir

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Court-

house in the City of New York, on the eighteenth day of

January one thousand nine hundred and seventy-nine.

Present: Hon. J. Eowarp LumBarp

Hon. Leonarp P. Moore

How. Wititiam H. Mutuican

Cireuit Judges.

78-1339

a ¢--- C+

Unitep States or AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Pavi W. Horrman, and Broox L. Hart,

Defendants,

Paut W. Horrman,

Defendant-Appellant.

»

vr

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Kastern District of New York.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of

record from the United States District Court for the Kast-

ern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.

15

On Consiperation Wuereor, it is now hereby ordered,

adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said District

Court be and it hereby is affirmed in accordance with the

Court’s oral opinion in open court.

A. Danie Fusaro,

Clerk

By: ArtrHur HeELier,

Deputy Clerk

16

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

Seconp Crrcuir

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals,

in and-for the Second Circuit, held at the United States

Court House, in the City of New York, on the eighth

day of March, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-nine.

78-1339

+

»

Unirep States or America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Vv.

Pau. W. Horrman,

Defendant-Appellant.

+

bf

A petition for rehearing containing a suggestion that

the action be reheard en bane having been filed herein by

counsel for the appellant Paul W. Hoffman, and no active

judge or judge who was a member of the panel having

requested that a vote be taken on said suggestion,

Upon consideration thereof, it is

Ordered that said petition be and it hereby is Dentxp.

Irnvinc R. KaurMan

Irving R. Kaufman,

Chief Judge

17

APPENDIX C

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. A-838

a

é

Pau. Horrman,

Petitioner,

V.

Unitep STATES

7’

7

Orpver Extrenpine Time To Fite Petirion FOR

Writ or CERTIORARI

Upon Consiperation of the application of counsel for

petitioner(s),

Ir 1s Orperep that the time for filing a petition for writ

of certiorari in the above-entitled cause be, and the same

is hereby, extended to and including May 7, 1979.

/s/ Txuurcoop MarsHaLL

Associate Justice of the Supreme

Court of the United States

Dated this 27th

day of March, 1979.

RECEIVED

Mar 29 1979

GrraLtp B. Lercourr

Attorney-at-Law