Respondents Brief — Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation
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In the Supreme Court”
OF THE
United States
Ocroser Term, 1978
No. 78-1472
Doveuas M. CostLe, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Petitioner,
vs.
Paciric Lecau Founpation, Joun B. Kixroy, Sr.,
Tue City or Torrance, AND THE Crty or Los ANGELEs,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS PACIFIC LEGAL
FOUNDATION AND JOHN B. KILROY, SR.
Ronaup A. ZuMBRUN
Rosert K. Brest
Tuomas I}. HooKANo
Pacific Legal Foundation
455 Capitol Mall, Suite 465
Sacramento, California 95814
Telephone: (916) 444-0154
Attorneys for Respondents
Pacific Legal Foundation
and John B. Kilroy, Sr.
BOWNE-PERNAU WALSH ¢ 1045 SANSOME ST. © S.F.,CA 94111 © (415) 981-7882
SUBJECT INDEX
Page
rsa, cans atts ae ee 1
Ne ee a, |) ee Sn re 1
Question presented ......06 0... cee eens 1
Statutes and regulations involved .....................,04.. 2
Statement of the case... 2.0.60. ccc cc cece veces 5
Summary of argument ..........0 00... 12
PE RR A ER eS OP teh a a 15
I
The writ should be dismissed as improvidently granted .... 15
II
The validity of EPA’s permit regulations has not been ques-
I a ig be tL geo ey ee spit bate en bees 17
Il
The Court of Appeals properly determined that EPA had
failed to demonstrate that an adequate opportunity for a
hearing had been given ..................00 cece eeeee «1B
iv
EPA did not provide due notice of its decision to terminate
consideration of revised discharge requirements ......... 26
V
The request for adjudicatory hearing adequately raised fac-
tual issues relating to the sludge processing requirements
in the Hyperion permit .......................00. 0040. 29
The requirements imposed by the Court of Appeals do not
agree a serious hindrance to effective administration of
SS iad teh hii wee See wee PRR. oP Bh ON 4. 32
ease oak ab waaldcudb a eiduweea vs La, es 40
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Page
Califano v. Yamasaki, .... U.S. ...., 99 S. Ct. 2545 (1979) .. 36
Independent Bank Ass’n of Georgia v. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 516 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 11
Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183 (1977) ................... “16
‘Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977) . .11, 32, 34
Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Kraft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) 26
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) ... 26
National ee Coal Operators’ Association v. Kleppe,
423 US. I oid To REA Ss Wak wage erie beak sod 12, 15
PLF v. Quarles, 440 F. Supp. 316 (C.D. Cal. 1977), appeal
pending, No. 77-3844 (9th Cir.)
Save our Sound Fisheries Association v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp.
PE is or nind sa dvabeacotudisacanan 31
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) ......... 26
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (lst
I NE aS Noi Se wp ae Rd Roe Fei SARE a ee Wes 32
State of Alabama ex rel. Baxley v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 557 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1977) ................... 22
wa) v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 i
United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 410 U.S. 224
CU i a oe, PT igre rea ee HOLS 33
ib) a a em SOLES Ree © SS 2S eo Rue W658 6.8 618 e Oe OLE Oe 6 Oe ee Oe 67S 8 Be
United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. ¢
Regulations
Title 40; Code of Federal Regulations:
Gomes WO ake cece ce ee MUN, geil ead 13, 17
I cae sel ead Sy wn hg ele ee baR ES 39
ES aed Sirs Ok Ma CR Sha ab aa ale 2 We OS teks 2
REE SER aa Sa ae ap ke ree ee 2
Ns i a a 2, 23, 24
Section 105.7 ( Y BEL ye Ubs chuka tina dey ben tie: on dale 23, 25, 31
Section 125 vi BE hi ac seal nae. Mea. Ul ak ey SRE ER ae 31
2 ° SS Snes Coearrcnnimeeey’, | Tt) 31
LS day 0 Wi sso KR ew sd Bde dk ae RR 4
ES oi ee eae cats Ve elas mmeecans 13, 26, 27
Section 125.32(a t3} Fee sp CVE MEMS tS EEE oe AE a 27
IE oh es ce Sk aes eae y ike 27
ct Ss a hu dde a ted veda cakes ebuvenes 4
DOE INEE Ds oni eck wed ceteccscvenvcwden 31
gn oth." gg't tac ae tic@h Gad ava weoe s coe 16
GON COPED oon i iv cues ceeveueiecceeuls 30
iii
TABLE oF AUTHORITIES CrTED
Statutes
Page
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.):
RCRD, KLEGAUCEL Raab bas bec cab bese scccces 31
> og dlnbesideh ak ice ik od ohne 04s CA 33
ir io:, x chsh noni V8dee nbs ote 11, 16, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37
Section Seats Sa NepenpeE hes re Fre ns Sa ae
a aes eas ne oy ance Gap 37
ces x's POR Y LEONI Ps 6 conv deck via vlscencr 33, 35
is 30 2 alae oh oo ee ees 33, 35
SN as Bs denies gn Ra wngh KEbie sas Gy CHS WE oo 0 17, 34
SS UBAs Got Baeetd) oa. ees iin. Accu... 1
Federal Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.):
PI MOONS on cece ccs bavidtieccnsssessdis 5
ee 2, 5, 13,19, 22, 23, 31, 39
rR oct. o's lad: « Gus Wha yaa alle 4 tins sie ace o ¢ 20
Section 1342 “, ee he 13, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 32, 33, 34, 36, 39, 40
OGD nn. aso c/blepe Womans yea oabedoees 1,11,15
EE Wag cel shana ke baa chm sh aeeie oe wet 9
To) a ae 36
Other Authorities
A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1973) ......
. RRIAE.KBe LASRORVRNAS. PR 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 35, 40
Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the
United States, Problems and ess in Regulating Ocean
“a of Sewage Sludge and Industrial Wastes, January
et ENG a gs wee OG TRO CRS SHA «39 ba Owe duane 66 0
ap
In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States
Ocroser TERM, 1978
No. 78-1472
Dovueuas M. CostLeE, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
E\NVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Petitioner,
Vs.
Paciric Lega Founpation, Joun B. Kinroy, Sr.,
THE City oF ToRRANCE, AND THE City or Los ANGELEs,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS PACIFIC LEGAL
FOUNDATION AND JOHN B. KILROY, SR.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 586
F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1978).
JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Section 402(a)(1) of the Federal Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(1), in requiring the Environ-
mental Protection Agency to provide “opportunity for
2
public hearing” prior to any issuance, denial, or modifica-
tion of a discharge permit, requires EPA to conduct
adjudicatory hearings before taking action on such permits
where, after due notice of the proposed action, no one
requests a hearing before the action is taken and a request
made subsequently raises no material issue of fact.’
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The following citations are to statutes and regulations
involved in this action which were not included in the
Brief for the Petitioner.
1. Section 101(e) of the Federal Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251(e), provides:
“Public participation in the development, revision,
and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent
limitation, plan, or program established by the Admin-
istrator or any State under this chapter shall be
provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Ad-
ministrator and the States. The Administrator, in
cooperation with the States shall develop and publish
regulations specifying minimum guidelines for public
participation in such processes.”
2. Sections 105.1, 105.2, and 105.7 of Title 40, Code of
Federal Regulations, as promulgated by EPA on August
1The Court should note that the question as stated above is that
upon which the writ of certiorari is granted. It includes incorrect
mromemeriguer won pronplonrenl gloat yey tg ~ whpcie lg no
request raised no material issue of fact. The question present
a Re ee ee ee ee
from what was presented by petitioner in its Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
3
23, 1973, state in part as follows (38 Fed. Reg. 22,756
(1973) ) :?
**$105.1 Scope.
“This part sets forth minimum guidelines for public
participation in the processes of development, revision
and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent
limitation, plan or program under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, as amended (Public Law 92-500;
86 Stat. 816; 33 U.S.C. 1251), in accordance with sec-
tion 101(e) of the Act. This part is applicable to all
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) components
concerned with the Federal Water Pollution Control
Ath a nine
**§$105.2 Policy and Objectives.
“Participation of the public is to be provided for,
encouraged, and assisted to the fullest extent prac-
ticable consistent with other requirements of the Act
in Federal and State government water pollution con-
trol activities. The major objectives of such participa-
tion include greater responsiveness of governmental
actions to public concerns and priorities, and improved
popular understanding of official programs and actions.
Although the primary responsibility for water quality
decision-making is vested by law in public agencies at
the various levels of government, active public involve-
ment in and scutiny of the intergovernmental decision-
making process is desirable to accomplish these objec-
tives. Conferring with the public after a final agency
decision has been made will not meet the requirements
of this part. The intent of these regulations is to foster
These regulations are presented as they were in effect at the
time the challenged action was taken. They have since been sub-
stantially revised to include the public participation requirements
of other acts in addition to the requirements of the Federal Clean
Water Act. See 44 Fed. Reg. 10,292 (1979).
4
a spirit of openness and a sense of mutual trust be-
tween the public and the State and Federal agencies in
efforts to restore and maintain the integrity of the
Nation’s water.”
‘$105.7 Guidelines for Public Hearings.
“Any public hearing, whether mandatory or discre-
tionary, to be held under the Act shall be in conformity
with this section. If conflict exists between the mini-
mum guidelines of this section and requirements of
State or Federal law or other regulations pertaining to
a particular hearing, the more stringent requirements
shall be observed.
“(a) Purpose.—Generally, a public hearing gives
persons and organizations a formal opportunity to be
heard on a matter prior to decision-making. Although
public hearing testimony may focus on the prospective
action to be taken in the form of a tentative plan or
decision, the final actions shall benefit from and reflect
consideration of the public hearing content.
“(c) Opportunity for Hearings.—Where the oppor-
tunity for public hearing is called for in the Act, and
in other appropriate instances, a publie hearing shall
be held if the hearing official finds significant public
interest (including the filing of requests or petitions
for such hearing) or pertinent information to be
gained. Instances of doubt should be resolved in favor
of holding the hearing, or if necessary, of providing
alternative opportunity for public participation.”
3. Sections 125.5 and 125.35 of Title 40, Code of Federal
Regulations, as promulgated by EPA on July 24, 1974,
state in part as follows (39 Fed. Reg. 27,079 (1974)) :*
*These regulations have since been revised. See 44 Fed. Reg.
32,854 (1979).
4)
**§ 125.5 Delegation of authority.
“(a) ... the following authorities are hereby dele-
gated to each of the Regional Administrators for the
area which he administers.
“(1) The authority to issue and condition permits
or to deny applications for permits for discharge cov-
ered by the NPDES and by section 405 of the act.
“(c) These authorities may be redelegated to the
Director, Enforcement Division, of each region.”
**§ 125.35 Issuance and Effective Date of Permit.
“(b)(1) Where the determinations of the Regional
Administrator pursuant to paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion with respect to any permit are substantially un-
changed from the tentative determinations and draft
permit prepared pursuant to § 125.31 of this subpart,
the Regional Administrator shall forward a copy of
the determinations to any person who has submitted
written comments regarding the permit.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Federal Clean Water Act (Act), 91 Stat. 1566, 35
U.S.C. §§ 1251, et seqg., sets forth a comprehensive scheme
to insure public participation in all phases of the adminis-
tration of the Act. The specific duties placed on the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
require not only that he “provide for” public participa-
tion, but also that he take affirmative action to insure
that such participation is “encouraged” and “assisted.”
33 U.S.C. §1251(e). This case involves an attempt by a
public interest organization, Pacific Legal Foundation
6
(PLF), and an individual citizen, John B. Kilroy, Sr., to
obtain an opportunity for a hearing on the issuance
of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit for the City of Los Angeles Hyperion
Wastewater Treatment Plant (Hyperion). The purpose of
the hearing is to present to EPA, on a public record, in-
formation and arguments relating to the adverse impacts
on people, fish, and wildlife which are certain to result
from the implementation of EPA requirements for modify-
ing the processing of wastewater at Hyperion.
Wastewater discharge requirements for Hyperion were
set in an NPDES permit issued to the City of Los Angeles
in August, 1975. A at 21. The permit required the City to
cease its twenty-year-long practice of discharging digested
sewage sludge‘ through a seven-mile-long outfall to a point
over 290 feet below the surface of the Pacific Ocean at
the mouth of a substantially deeper submarine canyon.
This permit expired by its terms on February 1, 1977. A at
19. During 1976, a substantial public controversy arose
when EPA announced for the first time that the alternt-
tive sludge disposal method would involve transporting
millions of tons of sludge through the streets of Los An-
geles in huge trucks for disposal in landfills near residen-
tial neighborhoods. During the same period, information
‘Sewage sludge is defined as
“A nonhomogenous ses resulting from chemical and phys-
ical treatment of waste water.” Report to the Congress by the
Comptroller General of the United States, Problems and
“ Sate Regulating Ocean Demene of Sewage Sludge and
Wenn Jae January 21, 1977
At * raw sludge is processed in anaerobic Poe wd which,
with addition of steam, convert the substance to
carbon dioxide, water vapor, and a residual dtthanse = ae
digested sludge.
t
was released from ongoing, intensive studies of the coastal
waters of Southern California which showed no significant
environmental impacts from the twenty years of sludge
discharges. A at 76. The studies also indicated that the
sludge discharge puts great amounts of nutrients into the
marine waters and supports much of the marine life in
Santa Monica Bay, including the best sport fishing areas.
The alternative of trucking and dumping the sludge on land
has many significant adverse environmental and social
effects, even though many millions of dollars will be ex-
pended to implement this requirement. A at 64-65, 76-78,
200-04.
In the midst of this controversy, EPA initiated proceed-
ings to issue a new permit for Hyperion. The notice ex-
pressly stated that a proposal was under consideration “‘to
revise waste discharge requirements including effluent limi-
tations and special conditions” for Hyperion. A at 206.
During these proceedings, PLF objected to the appropri-
ateness of the existing permit requirements and stated:
“No similar requirement should be included in a
future permit until a full environmental analysis, in-
cluding economic and social factors of the ocean dis-
charge of effluent and sludge, has been completed. As
soon as possible, a new NPDES permit should be is-
sued to the City of Los Angeles including only those
conditions necessary to provide adequate protection
to the marine environment directly affected by the
discharge from the Hyperion Plant.” A at 88.
The basis for this request was the need to consider “sub-
stantial scientific and technical information” which indi-
cated that the modifications to Hyperion required in the
8
existing permit “would be environmentally, economically
and socially undesirable.” A at 87. To fully address the
issues necessary to develop new permit requirements, PLF
requested that EPA establish “a comprehensive environ-
mental review ... which would conform to the full require-
ments for study, analysis, public participation, open dis-
closure and open decision making of [the Act and other
applicable laws].” Jd. By filing these comments, PLF had
become a participant in the permit proceedings and had
requested a full hearing on the permit requirements.
On January 24, 1977, EPA announced that it did not
have “[a]dequate review time” to consider “tentative waste
discharge requirements” and issued an interim order delay-
ing action on the City of Los Angeles’ application for a
new permit and extending the expiration date of the old
permit to June 30, 1977. A at 93-95.
At some point after January 24, 1977, and before April
27, 1977, when EPA issued its notice of the action which
resulted in this lawsuit, EPA decided to alter drastically
the nature of the permit proceedings. The review of the
sludge processing requirements, which had been requested
not only by PLF but also by the City of Los Angeles (A at
65) and the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce (A at
73), was abruptly and without explanation terminated.’
A decision was made to extend the expiration date of the
old permit to December 17, 1979. A at 117. Although PLF
‘EPA appears to suggest that the Apel 27, 1977, notice an-
nounced a separate proceeding. Brief for the Petitioner at 12.
However, the application for NPDES permit contained in the
certified record is the one upon which the proceeding was initiated
in December, 1976, and for which no final order had been
entered, Certified Record at 81-118. The record also contains a sug-
— by the California Regional Water Quality Control Board
at EPA defer final action on the permit application until a date
after the February 1, 1977, expiration date. Certified Record at 119.
9
was active as an interested person in the sludge contro-
versy and had filed as a participant in the permit proceed-
ings, requesting EPA to go through “the full requirements
for ... public participation, open disclosure and open de-
cision making” (A at 87), PLF was given no notice of the
intent to terminate the proceeding (Brief for the Petitioner
at 12 n.9).
The basis for the decision by EPA to terminate the de-
velopment of revised permit requirements has not been
explained either in the record of the administrative pro-
ceedings or in the many documents outside the record
submitted to the Court of Appeals. The only apparent, in-
tervening, related event was the filing of a lawsuit on Feb-
ruary 14, 1977, in which PLF, John B. Kilroy, Sr., as a
member of PLF, four Los Angeles City Councilmen, and
the City of Torrance, California, sought to obtain a court
order to require EPA to conduct the desired review of the
scientific data and environmental impacts related to the
implementation of the sludge processing requirement.® One
of the purposes of this lawsuit was to determine which
sludge processing requirements were outside the scope of
the NPDES permit and, therefore, subject to consideration
pursuant to the requirements of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act,’ and to determine which requirements
were within the scope of the permit and, therefore, subject
to consideration in the permit proceeding. A at 134, 143-44.
°‘PLF v. Quarles, 440 F. Supp. 316 (C.D. Cal. 1977), appeal
pending, No. 77-3844 (9th Cir.).
"Section 511(c) of the Federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1371(c), exempts the issuance of an NPDES permit from the
requirements for the preparation of an environmental impact
statement.
10
It was during oral argument in the District Court on May
23, 1977, that PLF was first notified that the effort to
modify the permit requirements in which it was involved
was being terminated. A at 145.
Attempts subsequent to that hearing to obtain informa-
tion from the EPA Regional Office on what action had been
taken and when it had occurred were rebuffed. A at 157.
On June 10, 1977, PLF in desperation sent a Freedom of
Information Aet request to attempt to find out the date of
the action and obtain a copy of the decision and the sup-
porting documents. 7d. On June 13, 1977, the day the Free-
dom of Information Act request was received by EPA,
PLF was notified by telephone that EPA’s action had been
taken on June 2, 1977, and that a request for an adjudica-
tory hearing would be- accepted only if filed that day. A
protective request for hearing was rushed to EPA by mail-
gram. A at 159. This request was prepared in a vacuum.
EPA had released no information to PLF other than the
date of the action, and continued to withhold all informa-
tion about the action taken until June 23, 1977. A at 171.
This same day, EPA denied the request for adjudicatory
hearing on the basis that the request had not identified
any of the factual issues relevant to the action taken. A at
166. EPA then certified three “issues of law” which related
to whether public participation should have been allowed
in the permit issuance. These issues had no relationship
to the impact on people, fish, and wildlife which would re-
sult from the Hyperion modification, A separate process
was initiated by EPA to resolve EPA’s selected issues.
A at 168.
il
This petition for review of the Administrator’s action
was then filed to obtain a court order to reopen the admin-
istrative proceeding for consideration of the terms, condi-
tions, and requirements contained in the permit for the
Hyperion plant.
The Court of Appeals determined that on “the special
circumstances of this case” (586 F.2d at 659), no oppor-
tunity for hearing was provided. The Court of Appeals
indicated that “[t]he analysis supporting this conclusion
must commence with Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d
1253, 1262 (9th Cir. 1977).” 586 F.2d at 658. In Marathon
Oil the court had previously determined that the type of
hearing required by Section 402(a)(1) of the Act was gov-
erned by 5 U.S.C. § 554. However, since neither Marathon
Ou nor 5 U.S.C-4 554 governs whether a hearing must be
held, the court made no further reference to Marathon Oil
or to 5 U.S.C. § 554 except to emphasize “the strong policy
in favor of holding public hearings before an adjudicative
decision is made.” 586 F.2d at 659. Instead, the court fol-
lowed “the observations of the court in Independent Bank
Ass’n of Georgia v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 516 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1975), concern-
ing the ‘opportunity for hearing’ provision.” 586 F.2d
at 658. In that case, the District of Columbia Circuit stated
that, where Congress has plainly given interested parties
the right to a full hearing, the agency has a burden to jus-
tify a refusal to provide a hearing. 516 F.2d at 1220.
In addition, the Court of Appeals determined that there
were several factual issues which should have been deter-
mined on an administrative record but “with respect to
which the record in this case is silent.” 586 F.2d at 659.
12
The existence of these issues convinced the court that a
hearing should be held, especially in light of the special
circumstances of this case, including the overlapping of
federal and state regulatory authorities, the request by Kil-
roy for a hearing, and the failure of EPA to provide any
explanation of its action. 586 F.2d at 659-60.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The primary basis for the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
was an asserted conflict between the decision of the Court
of Appeals and the decision of this Court in National Inde-
pendent Coal Operators’ Association v. Kleppe, 423 U.S.
388 (1976). The question presented in the Brief for the
Petitioner, however, has been substantially modified so as
to remove that issue and inject a new issue not previously
raised regarding the type of hearing which must be held
for the issuance of an NPDES permit. For this reason, it
is suggested that the writ should be dismissed as improvi-
dently granted. _
The Brief for the Petitioner also seeks an opinion as to
the validity of certain EPA regulations imposing “thresh-
old requirements” on interested persons seeking a hear-
ing. Review of this question is unnecessary and would not
change the results of the decision below. PLF and Kilroy
did not challenge the facial validity of EPA’s regulations.
The issues presented and decided in the Court of Appeals
claimed EPA had violated or erroneously applied the perti-
nent regulations. The decision below did not hold any regu-
lation to be invalid.
On the facts of the case, the principal issue is the holding
of the Court of Appeals that EPA was obligated to hold a
13
hearing prior to issuing the Hyperion permit or to dem-
onstrate to the court that a public hearing was unneces-
sary. This holding is supported by the Legislative History
of the Act which shows that the hearing requirement of
Section 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a), of the Act was estab-
lished as part of a comprehensive public participation pro-
gram. The requirements of Section 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251
(e), of the Act that the Administrator encourage and assist
public participation apply to the NPDES hearings. EPA’s
own public participation regulations (40 C.F.R. Part 105)
are also expressly made to apply to the NPDES hearings.
Since the facts of this case meet the requirement in those
regulations that hearings shall always be held if there is
“significant public interest” or “pertinent information to be
gained,” the Administrator clearly erred in not providing
a hearing and the court could reach no other conclusion on
a record “barren of any explanation.” 586 F.2d at 660.
The possibility of effective public participation in the
permit action was frustrated by EPA’s failure to give no-
tice of its proposed action to PLI’, Kilroy, or other inter-
ested persons. EPA’s regulations adopt the general princi-
ple that notice must be “circulated in a manner designed to
inform interested and potentially interested persons.” 40
C.F.R. § 125.32(a). EPA had the addresses for both PLI°
and Kilroy, who were well established as persons interested
in the Hyperion permit. However, EPA’s only notice for
public participants was a fine print announcement in the
legal notices section of the Los Angeles Times, a form of
notice well established to be inadequate when addresses
are available.
14
The last chance for any public participation was lost
when EPA refused to disclose any information about what
it was doing in the days immediately before and after the
challenged action was taken. PLF had inadvertently
learned during a court hearing that EPA was taking some
form of action on the Hyperion permit. EPA, however,
would not release any information about the action and
required that a request for adjudicatory hearing be pre-
pared and filed on a few hours notice with no knowledge of
the actual substance of the action or the procedures em-
ployed. These actions by EPA, which vio'sted provisions
of law and regulation as well as any con :: of fair proce-
dure, excused the lack of specificity in the hearing request.
EPA nevertheless denied the hearing request on the techni-
cal basis that it failed to specify material issues of fact.
This claimed basis for refusing the requested hearing is
utterly without merit, since EPA admitted to the Court of
Appeals that the request for hearing raised factual issues
relating to the controversial sludge processing require-
ments in the permit.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals gives full effect to
the strong policy expressed by Congress that there would
be full public participation in the NPDES program. More-
over, since ‘the hearing requirement which the court en-
forced is consistent with the existing requirements of
EPA’s regulations, the decision achieved a desired result
without imposing significant new burdens on EPA. By fore-
ing the Administrator to recognize the mandates of Con-
gress for public participation, the Court of Appeals has
corrected a serious shortcoming in EPA’s administration
of the Act.
15
ARGUMENT
I
THE WRIT SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS IMPROVI-
DENTLY GRANTED
The writ of certiorari was granted to review the ques-
tion :
“Whether Section 402(a)(1) of the Federal Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(1), in requiring the
Environmental Protection Agency to provide ‘opportu-
nity for public hearing’ prior to any issuance, denial,
or modification of a discharge permit, requires EPA to
conduct adjudicatory hearings before taking action on
such permits where, after due notice of the proposed
action, no one requests a hearing before the action is
taken and a request made subsequently raises no mate-
rial issue of fact.”
In presenting the case on the merits, petitioner Admin-
istrator of the Environmental Protection Agency has made
two significant changes to the question presented. All refer-
ence to the failure to request an adjudicatory hearing
before the action was taken has been deleted in face of the
uncontroverted fact that a request for an adjudicatory
hearing was filed in the manner required by EPA regula-
tions. A at 159. This modification in the question presented
removes from the case the primary basis for the petition
for writ of certiorari—the asserted conflict between the
decision of the Court of Appeals in this case and the deci-
sion of this Court in National Independent Coal Operators’
Association v. Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388 (1976). Petition at
13-16.
In his second change, the Administrator inserts the
descriptive phrase “AP A-type” before “adjudicatory hear-
ings” to raise the new issue of whether Section 402(a) (1)
16
of the Federal Clean Water Act requires that adjudications
under that section comply with 5 U.S.C. § 554. The Brief for
the Petitioner focuses primarily on this question and on a
related question of whether EPA’s NPDES permit regula-
tions as they existed prior to their recent comprehensive re-
vision were valid.* Under the facts of this case, however, no
hearing was allowed. Thus, the only question raised was
whether a hearing should have been conducted at all, not
the nature of the hearing required. If the proceedings are
reopened for any type of hearing, PLF and Kilroy can
obtain an adjudicatory hearing simply by submitting a
request pursuant to EPA’s regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 125.36.
The ultimate conclusion of the Court of Appeals that EPA
had unlawfully refused to provide an opportunity for a
public hearing was not dependent upon the question of
whether the hearing, if held, would be subject to 5 U.S.C.
§ 554. Nor was the holding of the court based on a deter-
mination that any portion of the now revised regulations
was invalid.
Since the Administrator has significantly modified the
question presented and seeks now to use this case merely
as a vehicle to obtain an advisory opinion on questions not
in issue between the parties in the court below and only
casually referred to in the opinion of that court, respond-
ents respectfully suggest that the writ of certiorari should
be dismissed as improvidently granted.’ Jones v. Hilde-
brant, 432 U.S. 183 (1977).
®See note 2, supra.
*The Court should also be aware that the permit expires De-
cember 17, 1979. A at 149. However, EPA has not initiated pro-
cedures to issue a new permit. Thus, it appears that EPA intends
17
II .
THE VALIDITY OF EPA’S PERMIT REGULATIONS
HAS NOT BEEN QUESTIONED IN THIS CASE
The Administrator insists that “[t]he issue presented in
this case is whether EPA’s regulations (40 C.F.R. Part
125) provide a sufficient ‘opportunity for public hearing’
within the meaning of Section 402(a)(1) of the Act.” Brief
for the Petitioner at 17. The Administrator apparently
reaches this issue by assuming that he had fully complied
with all requirements of law and regulation relating to
public participation in the issuance of an NPDES permit.
This assumption is false. The procedural challenges which
PLF and Kilroy took to the Court of Appeals were based
on the failure of EPA to fulfill its obligation under the Act
and its own regulations which require public participation
and the involvement of interested and potentially interested
persons. The real issues are whether EPA violated its
public participation regulations (40 C.F.R. Part 105) by
failing to give notice to PLF and Kilroy or to provide for,
encourage, and assist their participation in a hearing on
the action taken; and whether EPA violated or erroneously
applied the NPDES permit regulations when it failed to
give direct notice of the proposed action to PLF and Kil-
roy, refused to release information on the action when
taken, and denied a written request for an adjudicatory
hearing.
Nowhere in the opinion below does the court state that
any part of EPA’s regulations is invalid. The Court of
to allow the controversial permit to extend beyond that date by
Npeeey of 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) and thereby avoid the mooting of
case.
18
Appeals concluded that on the facts of this case the Admin-
istrator had not demonstrated that he had met his public
participation obligations in this particular permit action.
The arguments which follow demonstrate that this conclu-
sion is fully supported by the requirements of the Act and
EPA’s regulations when applied to EPA’s questionable
conduct in this case.
Ill
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY DETERMINED
THAT EPA HAD FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT
AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING
HAD BEEN GIVEN
The focal point of the concerns of EPA is the conclusion
by the Court of Appeals that a showing “must be made
to demonstrate that adequate opportunity for a hearing
has been given. The necessity of a hearing turns not only
on the vigor with which the parties clamor for one but
also on whether a showing has been made demonstrating
that a hearing is unnecessary.” 586 F.2d at 658. The rea-
sonableness of this conclusion must be examined in light
of the law and regulations which apply to the procedures
in question.
This case arises in the context of requirements of law
much more comprehensive than a bare mandate that an
opportunity for hearing be provided. The hearing provi-
sions of the Act were intended to accomplish far more than
simply to provide for adjudication of pertinent factual
questions. It was the intention of Congress that all aspects
of the Act would be “administered and enforced in a fish-
bowl-like atmosphere.” A Legislative History of the Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 249 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Leg. Hist.). This
19
purpose was to be accomplished through a comprehensive
public participation program which would include the pub-
lic hearing requirements as one element. Although Section
402(a) establishes the requirement for a hearing, the pro-
vision of law governing the manner in which the hearing
is to be provided is Section 101(e) of the Act:
“Public participation in the development, revision,
and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent
limitation, plan, or program established by the Admin-
istrator or any State under this chapter shall be pro-
vided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Administra-
tor and the States.”
The interlocking of the requirements of Sections 101(e)
and 402(a) of the Act was emphasized by RepreSentative
Dingell during the House debate on overriding the Presi-
dent’s veto:
“T reiterate my comments on the importance of section
101(e) of this bill which encourages public participa-
tion in the development, revision and enforcement of
various actions taken under this statute. I sincerely
hope that the Administrator understands that this
applies across the board, including the establishment
of the permit program under section 402 of the bill.”
Leg. Hist. at 108.
Far from understanding this relationship, the Admin-
istrator rejects it. He argues that his entire obligation
under the Act was met by the publication of nine inches of
single-column fine print in the legal notice section of the
Los Angeles Times. A at 128. He supports his action
by claiming that the burden rests entirely on the would-be
public participants :
20
“That the public fails to make a satisfactory request
does not mean that it was not provided with an oppor-
tunity to.do so. To the contrary, the opportunity was
provided, but not accepted.” Brief for the Petitioner
at 27.
The Act requires more. “The public must have a genuine
opportunity to speak ... .” Leg. Hist. at 1490 (emphasis
added). Even if it is assumed that the minimal action of
the Administrator fulfilled the obligation to provide for a
hearing, there was not even a minimal effort to either en-
courage or assist public participation in the permitting
process.
The Legislative History repeatedly emphasizes the im-
portance of public participation in the NPDES control
program under Section 402 of the Act:
“An essential element in any control program in-
volving the nation’s waters is public participation, The
public must have a genuine opportunity to speak on
the issue of protection of its waters, The Committee
has therefore established requirements to provide op-
portunity for public hearing .... 7'he scrutiny of the
public and the exercise of authority under [Section
402] is extremely important in insuring expeditious
implementation of the authority and a high level of
performance by all levels of government and discharge
_ sources.” Leg. Hist. at 1490 (emphasis added),
In very strong language, the Legislative History states
that the purpose of the hearing requirement is to foree a
reluctant EPA to accept input on a “public record” on
matters it might prefer to decide without public serutiny:
21
“(T]he Committee is also concerned that this move-
ment to the courts may have been brought about by
inadequate recognition on the part of the administra-
tive agencies as to the proper role of the public, Time
and time again during the hearings evidence was sub-
mitted as to decisions made by Federal agencies with-
out appropriate consultation with the State and local
goveruments or the general public. And what is true
about the Federal agencies is also true of the State
and local government agencies, It is with the under-
standing that steps are necessary to restore the pub-
lic’s confidence and to open wide the opportunities for
the public to participate in a meaningful way in the
decisions of government, that the Committee has in-
cluded in the proposed legislation various steps to
arrive at this goal. First, the Committee has included
provision for public participation in the development,
revision and enforcement of any regulation, standard
or effluent limitation established by the Administrator
or any State under this Act. Not only is this specifi-
cally required in section 101(a) [sic] but the Admin-
istration is directed to encourage this participation.
Second, the Committee has included provision in most
instances where a determination is to be made by the
administrator or the State, that such determination
shall be made as part of a public record,” Leg, Hist.
at 819 (emphasis added),
The hearing required by Section 402(a) serves the dual
purpose of adjudicating pertinent facts and developing
required advice and consultation from the public, The hear-
ing requirement in Section 402(a) was inserted as part of
a program woven through the Act intended “to open wide
the opportunities for the public to participate in a mean-
ingful way” in order “to restore the public’s confidence”
22
in the decisions of EPA so as to lessen the tendency toward
“having the forum for decision-making be in the court-
room.” Leg. Hist, at 819. See also State of Alabama ez rel.
Baaley v. Environmental Protection Agency, 557 F.2d
1101, 1110 (5th Cir, 1977).
The Administrator acknowledges that Section 101(e) of
the Act applies to the NPDES permit program and re-
quires him to use the Section 402(a) hearings not only to
adjudicate facts but also to obtain public participation.
Brief for the Petitioner at 32, Yet, in practice, he utterly
ignores this obligation to use the hearing process as a wide
open means of communicating with the public at large. In
this case he took a major permitting action for a contro-
versial permit for one of the largest urban areas in the
country with absolutely no public participation at all. It
is undisputed that EPA did nothing to encourage and
assist public participation in this major action, Even worse,
the record clearly shows that EPA officials engaged in a
practice of withholding information, issuing an obscure
and confusing notice, and taking the exceptional actions
of terminating cooperative consideration of permit require-
ments and unilaterally extending the expiration date of
the controversial permit, These actions made effective pub-
lic participation impossible, Moreover, when PLF and Kil-
roy discovered what was going on and attempted to raise
a challenge, EPA withheld all information, demanded that
the challenge be filed on a few hours notice without benefit
of any information or explanation of what had occurred,
and then asserted “threshold barriers” to block any form
of public participation,
23
These improper actions not only violated the clear in-
tent of Congress, but also directly contravened the require-
ments of EPA’s regulations implementing Section 101(¢)
of the Act which were in effect at the time the hearing was
refused, These regulations explicitly applied the public
participation requirements of Section 101(e) of the Act
to the hearing requirement of Section 402(a) of the Act.
“Any public hearing, whether mandatory or discre-
tionary, to be held under this Act shall be in conform-
ity with this section. If conflict exists between the
minimum guidelines of this section and . . . other
regulations pertaining to a particular hearing, the
more stringent requirements shall be observed.” 40
C.F.R. § 105.7.
The requirements of this section of the regulations make
it clear that the Administrator had an obligation under the
circumstances of this case to provide a public hearing re-
gardless of whether one was expressly requested:
“Where the opportunity for a public hearing is
called for in the Aet, and in other appropriate in-
stances, a public hearing shall be held if the hearing
official finds significant public interest (including the
filing of requests or petitions for such hearing) or
pertinent information to be gained, Instances of doubt
should be resolved im favor of holding the hearing, or |
if necessary, of providing alternative opportunities for
public participation,” 40 C.F.R, §105.7(¢) (emphasis
added).
The more stringent requirements for the provision of
hearings which are placed on EPA's staff by this section
supercede any “threshold requirements” on would be
participants found elsewhere in the regulationw. 40 C.F.R.
24
§ 105.7. Therefore, without regard to any individual request
for a hearing, EPA was obligated to conduct a hearing if
(1) there was significant public interest in the permit, or
(2) there was pertinent information to be gained. More-
over, such hearings were required unless the Agency estab-
lished beyond “doubt” that there was no significant public
interest or pertinent information to be gained. In the event
no “hearing” was to be allowed, the Regional Administrator
was under an additional obligation to provide an alterna-
tive opportunity for public participation. No such alterna-
tive opportunity was provided.
The record before the Court of Appeals clearly estab-
lished that “significant public interest” existed in this
particular permitting action. A at 63-88, 129-47, 200-04,
Among the concerns raised by public expression was “(t]he
need for this additional notice and the required holding of
hearings” concerning the manner in which sludge disposal
was to be handled at Hyperion. A at 79. The Regional
Administrator had even signed a sworn affidavit in which
he acknowledged the existence of the “controversy” over
the question of the sludge processing requirements at
Hyperion. A at 111..
On the question of “pertinent information to be gained,”
the prior communications to EPA had emphasized the
importance of EPA considering the “substantial scientific
and technical information” which would require a modifica-
tion of the permit requirements. A at 87. EPA was even
informed of the primary source of this information. A at
76. Nonetheless, no opportunity to submit the pertinent
information was allowed.
The Court of Appeals also identified the need under the
facts of this case for an opportunity to present pertinent
29
information relating to “the division of jurisdiction over
discharges in the ocean between the federal and state
authorities which significantly complicates compliance by
an affected agency.” 586 F.2d at 659. EPA was clearly
aware of the fact that a conflict existed between the com-
pliance dates established in the permit by EPA and those
established by the co-permitting authority, the California
Regional Water Quality Control Board. A at 18, 54-62.
Some form of hearing or alternative procedure was ob-
viously required to resolve this conflict, particularly since
the modifications to Hyperion controlled by these incon-
sistent compliance dates were the center of the public
controversy. The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the
“reasonableness of the EPA’s compliance schedule depends
upon facts that may be disputed and with respect to which
the record in this case is silent” (586 F.2d at 659) is fully
supported by the record.
The Court of Appeals had before it uncontroverted
evidence that EPA was aware that interested persons were
anxious to participate in a review of the permit conditions
and that, as provided in 40 C.F.R. § 105.7(c), there was
“significant public interest” and “pertinent information to
be gained.” See 586 F.2d at 659 n.3. Since the principal
purpose of the Section 402(a) hearing requirement was to
force EPA to obtain such input before making decisions on
permits and since Section 105.7(c) of EPA’s regulations
required that a hearing “shall” be held under such cireum-
stances, EPA was clearly obligated to have conducted a
hearing. Yet, the record “is barren of any explanation of
the extension of June 2, 1977,” 586 F.2d at 660. Under
EPA suggests that the reasons for the action taken were ex-
lained in its published notice. Brief for the Petitioner at 33 n.22.
n the four-page notice (A at 117-20), however, only two
sentences describe the action being taken (A at 118, last para-
graph). No reasons are stated.
26
these facts, the Court of Appeals was justified in conclud-
ing that EPA was obligated to explain why a hearing was
unnecessary and that in the absence of an adequate ex-
planation EPA had failed to demonstrate that it had
provided an adequate opportunity for a hearing as in-
tended by Congress.
IV
EPA DID NOT PROVIDE DUE NOTICE OF ITS DE-
CISION TO TERMINATE CONSIDERATION OF
REVISED DISCHARGE REQUIREMENTS
A fundamental requirement of due notice is that it be
communicated in a manner “ ‘reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.’ ” Memphis Light, Gas and Water
Div v. Kraft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978), quoting from Mullane
v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
EPA’s regulations adopted this standard as a basic require-
ment governing notice of NPDES permit actions:
“Public Notice of the proposed issuance, denial or
modification of every permit or denial shall be cir-
culated in a manner designed to inform interested and
potentially interested persons of the discharge and of
the proposed determination to issue, deny or modify a
permit for the discharge.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.32(a).
In cases since Mullane, this Court has consistently
rejected claims that a fine print newspaper notice will sat-
isfy a requirement that a notice be reasonably calculated to
apprise interested parties when the government agency
involved could obtain names and addresses for direct
notice. See, e.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S.
208, 211-13 (1962). EPA had addresses for both PLF and
27
Kilroy who were well established prior to April 27, 1977,
as persons interested in the Hyperion permit. Not only had
PLF filed written comments in the permit proceeding then
underway (A at 84), but also PLF and Kilroy had been
engaged in active litigation with EPA for over two months
attempting to determine which of the alternative sludge
processing requirements for Hyperion were conditions in
the permit and which were merely grant conditions (A at
129). In spite of this activity and the public controversy
which had forced EPA to agree to prepare an environ-
mental impact statement on the sludge processing require-
ments (A at 111), the notice was sent only to the City of
Los Angeles, the California Regional Water Quality Con-
trol Board, and four federal offices (A at 115-16). No effort
was made to contact PLI, Kilroy, or any other public
participants.
EPA has not suggested that it designed its manner of
communicating notice so as to reach either PLF at its
Sacramento, California, office or Kilroy in Los Angeles.
Instead, EPA claims a technical defense that the regula-
tions require no more than what was done. Brief for the
Petitioner at 36 n.5. This claim relies on the minimum pro-
visions of 40 C.F.R. §§ 125.32(a)(1) and (2) and ignores
the principal notice requirement contained in 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.32(a) that notice procedures in each case must be
“designed to inform interested and potentially interested
persons.” As recognized by the Court of Appeals, publica-
tion of a small notice in the back pages of a major metro-
politan newspaper is hardly designed to inform an inter-
ested organization located over 350 miles away or even a
specific interested person among the millions of inhabitants
of the general Los Angeles area. 586 F.2d at 659 n.3.
EPA also suggests that “[t]he Court of Appeals did
not question that EPA had complied with its notice-and-
hearing regulations.” Brief for the Petitioner at 16. To
support this assertion, citation is made to 586 F.2d at 653-
54, the “Background” section of the opinion where the
court merely recites the events which oceurred. Contrary
to EPA’s suggestion, the Court of Appeals did address
the issue of adequacy of notice and decided it adversely to
EPA. The court took up PLF’s and Kilroy’s challenge to
the adequacy of the notice” within the context of the ques-
tion of whether under the facts of this case the right to a
hearing had been waived. 586 F.2d at 658-59 n.3. The court
distinguished between the direct notice given the City of
Los Angeles (petitioner in the consolidated action before
the Court of Appeals) and the newspaper notice given PLF
and Kilroy. The court concluded that the newspaper notice
was inadequate to establish that PLF and Kilroy had been
given an adequate opportunity for a hearing. This conclu-
sion necessarily entails a finding either that EPA failed
to circulate the notice in a manner designed to inform PLF
and Kilroy as required by the regulations or that EPA’s
regulations failed to fulfill the public participation re-
quirements in the Act. Since ‘the court would have clearly
stated any intention to invalidate the regulations (which
“The challenge to the adeq of the notice, in addition to
ising the issue of the manner of communication, also set forth
that the permit referred to in the notice was the 1974 permit which
had been rescinded, not the 1975 permit which was actually ex-
tended. In addition, the notice failed to identify which of the
- various conflicting sludge compliance schedules was to be required.
29
apply to every other NPDES permit action), it is apparent
that the court concluded that it was EPA’s actions in this
case which were invalid, not EPA’s regulations.
V
THE REQUEST FOR ADJUDICATORY HEARING
ADEQUATELY RAISED FACTUAL ISSUES RE-
LATING TO THE SLUDGE PROCESSING REQUIRE-
MENTS DD THE HYPERION PERMIT
The Administrator in his brief emphasizes his right to
impose “reasonable threshold requirements” on persons
seeking to obtain an opportunity for a public hearing under
the Act. Brief for the Petitioner at 21-29. In so doing, he
attempts to place at issue before this Court the validity of
his regulation which required persons who desired an ad-
judicatory hearing to state issues of fact. The question of
the validity of this regulation was not raised before the
Court of Appeals. This Court will find no mention of this
issue or of the particular regulation in the decision for the
reason that EPA admitted that the request for adjudica-
tory hearing raised issues of fact relating to sludge dis-
posal requirements :
“Given a second chance to request a hearing under 40
C.F.R. § 125.36, only one Petitioner (Kilroy) took ad-
vantage of it, and his request raised only procedural
legal issues and issues concerning the land-based
sludge disposal method used to implement the sludge
phase-out conditions of the permit.” Brief for Re-
spondents (before the Court of Appeals) at 38 (foot-
note omitted).
"For the convenience of the Court, this brief has been lodged
with the clerk.
30
This admission was repeated :
- “Even petitioner Kilroy’s request for an adjudicatery
hearing refers to the interim sludge project.” Brief for
Respondents (before the Court of Appeals) at 39-40.
EPA’s, explanation for not allowing a hearing on these
issues was siinply that it considered them to be irrelevant
to the permit provisions. Brief for Respondents ‘(before
the Court of Appeals) at 36-37. Since the Court of Appeals
decided that the issues admittedly raised by the request
were relevant and should have been adjudicated before the
permit was extended (586 F.2d at 659), the validity of the
regulation was not placed in issue. 7
Before this Court, the Administrator does not seek re-
view of the determination by the Court of Appeals that the
factual-issues concerning the sludge processing require-
ments are matters which should be addressed in a proper
hearing. Instead, he attempts to take back his admission as
to the facts and litigate for the first time in this Court a
challenge to the-validity.of his own regulation—a challenge
which only he has raised.
Even if this Court decides to disregard the admission of
facts before the court below, the issue of the facial validity
of 40 C.F.R. § 125.36(c)(1) still is not raised by this case.
The claim of PLF and Kilroy is that they had substantially
complied with the requirement in the regulation to raise
factual issues and that EPA misused the regulation in a
manner which violated other provisions of the Aet and the
regulations.
The requirement that a request for an adjudicatory
hearing raise factual issues must be applied in a manner
consistent with the public participation requirements of
31
Section 101(e) of the Act. As EPA’s own regulations pro-
vide, any question of doubt should be resolved in favor of
holding the requested hearing. 40 C.F.R. § 105.7(c). Within
the context of (1) the controversy over the sludge process-
ing requirements, (2) EPA’s agreement to study the en-
vironmental claims which had been raised relating to the
sludge processing requirements, and (3) the confusion and
lack of information over what EPA had in fact done on
June 2, 1977, the mailgram communicates as much infor-
mation as can reasonably be expected on the request to
adjudicate on an adequate record the environmental im-
pacts of the permit requirements for sludge processing.
Any lack of specificity in the mailgram request was
caused by EPA’s own misconduct in refusing to release in-
formation on what had occurred* and withholding notifica-
tion of the date the action was taken until the day the
hearing request was demanded. Under these circumstances,
a deliberate narrow reading of the request for hearing by
EPA cannot be sanctioned. Cf. Save our Sound Fisheries
Association v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136, 1144 (D.R.I.
1977) (EPA’s violations of the Act prevented plaintiffs’
filing a timely notice of citizen’s suit.)
In failing to provide PLF with a copy of the decision, EPA
ee eee oe tions that “the Regional
Administrator forward a copy of the determination to any
who has submitted written comments the permit.
person
40 C.F.R. § 125.35(b)(1). PLF had such written com-
ments when the proceeding was first initiated. A at 84. The refusal
to provide PLF with a copy of the final decision was also a vio-
. § 552(9)(2). It should be noted that. to this
day EPA has not produced decision itself. The only document
, had been made. A at 149-50. decision itself had to
be made by either the Regional Administrator her, DeFalco, Jr.)
or the Director, Enforcement Division (R. O'Connell). 40
C.F.R. §§ 125(a)(1) and (c).
32
VI
THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THE COURT
OF APPEALS DO NOT PRESENT A SERIOUS HIN-
DRANCE TO EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE ACT
The Administrator devotes a substantial portion of his
argument to the holdings in several other cases in three
Courts of Appeals that the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 554, applies to the issuance of NPDES
permits.* The question of the applicability of the APA,
however, does not determine the result in this case. The
issue presented herein is whether a hearing of any type
should have been held, and the Court of Appeals did not
rely upon the prior holdings to conclude that PLF and
Kilroy had not been given an opportunity for a hearing.
However, the question of the applicability of the require-
ments of the APA is of significant public importance and
must not go by default should this Court decide to address
it.
To start his argument, the Administrator points to the
lack of the words “on the record” in Section 402(a) of the
Act. He relies on two leading cases dealing with rule mak-
ing procedures which hold that, in the absence of these
words, a question is raised as to whether Congress intended
the formal hearing requirements of the APA to apply.
Each case, however, emphasizes that the words “on the
“This issue was not raised in the petition for certiorari, but has
been added to the question presented in the Brief for the Peti-
tioner. The three cases which reached this holding are United
States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977); Mara-
thon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977); and Seacoast
Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978).
33
record” are not required in the statute and that the hold-
ings of the cases do not apply to adjudication.
“We do not suggest that only the precise words ‘on the
record’ in the applicable statute will suffice to make
§§ 556 and 557 applicable to rulemaking proceedings.”
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406
U.S. 742, 757 (1972). See also United States v. Florida
East Coast Railway Co., 410 U.S. 224, 238 (1973).
“[T hese decisions represent a recognized distinction
in administrative law between proceedings for the pur-
pose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards,
on the one hand, and proceedings designed to adjudi-
cate disputed facts in particular cases on the other.”
Florida East Coast Railway Co., 410 U.S. at 245. See
also Allegheny-Ludlum, 406 U.S. at 757.
The question presented is significantly different when the
agency action is an adjudication rather than rule making.
Unlike rule making, adjudications have a direct effect on
individuals and are oriented to the facts of the particular
case. Moreover, rule making actions not subject to
Sections 556 and 557 of the APA are governed by the
alternative “notice and comment” procedures in Section
553. However, if Section 554 of the APA does not apply,
there is no alternative procedure for adjudication in the
APA. The courts, therefore, are obligated, as each of the
circuits to address this issue has done, to go beyond the
words in a statute such as Section 402(a) of the Act to
discern the intent of Congress as to the procedural protec-
tions to be provided.
Although the analyses of the requirements of Section
402(a) of the Act by the three circuits differ, each is well
34
reasoned and speaks for. itself in identifying those factors
which convineingly indicate that 5 U.S.C. § 554 applies.
In Marathon Oil, the Ninth Circuit identified that the na-
ture of Section 402(a) proceedings is to focus on an in-
dividual discharger in an action which is likely to be based
on disputed factual matters. (The Administrator admits
that “[a]ll NPDES permits involve at least the potential
for factual dispute.” Brief for the Petitioner at 35 (empha-
sis in original).) The court concluded that such actions
were within the category of proceedings Congress sought
to address in the APA. Since the Legislative History of
the Federal Clean Water Act did not indicate that the
APA would not apply, and since the Act provided for
judicial review which could only be effective on an ad-
ministrative record, the court concluded that Congress in-
tended that Section 554 of the APA should apply. Marathon
Oil, 564 F.2d at 1262-64.° The Administrator, however,
argues that the Legislative History “specifically disclaims
any intent to apply the strict hearing requirements of 5
U.S.C. 554.” Brief for the Petitioner at 27-28. To support
this claim, he cites a comment from the Legislative History
that “EPA should adopt ‘procedures which are expedi-
tious.’” The full statement at this point in the Legislative
History, however, expressly contradicts the Administra-
tor’s claim and supports the opposite conclusion reached
by the Court of Appeals:
8]t should be noted that the Seventh Circuit found a require-
ment in 5 U.S.C. §558(c) that EPA hold adjudica hearings
in addition to the requirement of 5 U.S.C, § 554, United States
Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 833-34 (7th Cir. 1977). The
Administrator does not challenge that independent requirement for
adjudicatory hearings.
39
“The language ‘notice and opportunity for a hear-
ing’ of Section 311(b)(6) is not intended to impose in
every instance the complex procedural requirements
associated with formal adjudicatory hearings on the
record before a hearing examiner such as are used for
ratemaking and similar federal rule issuance. The com-
mittee believes that effective administrative enforce-
ment will be enhanced by assessment procedures which
are expeditious. Provisions of Title 5 of the United
States Code commonly referred to as the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, as amended, will nevertheless ap-
ply to assure due process and protection of a respond-
ent’s rights.” Leg. Hist. at 804 (emphasis added).”
Thus, the Legislative History removes any doubt that
Congress intended that the procedural protections afforded
by 5 U.S.C. §554 would apply when the Act provides an
“opportunity for hearing.”
The Administrator also challenges the reference by the
Court of Appeals to the “strong policy in favor of holding
public hearings before an adjudicative decision is made.”
586 F.2d at 659. This Court, however, has recently affirmed
the existence of such a policy and established that the type
of proceedings required for adjudicative decisions must be
determined from an analysis of the nature and effect of the
decision Congress intended to be made:
tradictory because prior to stating that the APA shall apply
it indicates that “complex ural requirements” are not ed
to be “in every instance.” Brief for the Petitioner at “se
36
“(T }his court has been willing to assume a Congres-
sional solicitude for fair procedure, absent explicit”
statutory language to the contrary, See Greene v. Me-
Klroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507-508 (1959).” Califano v.
Yamasaki, ...... US. ......, 99 8. Ct. 2545, 2553 (1979).
In Yamasaki, this Court, relying on the “duty to make
an accurate determination,” the importance of “an assess-
ment of the recipient’s credibility” and “the statutory goal
that ‘there shall be no’ recoupment when waiver is appro-
priate,” decided that Congress intended an adjudicatory
hearing would be held when a recipient requests a waiver
of recoupment of overpayments under the Social Security
Act. Id. at 2555-56. The Court reached this conclusion even
though in the statutory provision in question (42 U.S.C.
§ 404(b)), Congress did not even mention a hearing."
It is, therefore, clear that when an administrative agency
makes decisions which are adjudicatory in nature, the form
of procedure required is not to be determined solely from
the words (or lack thereof) in the statute. The courts must
look to the nature of the decision to be made and the pur-
poses the decision is to serve. This analysis of congressional
intent is appropriately conducted within the context of an
assumption that Congress intended fair procedures, The
Courts of Appeals were correct in applying this analytical
approach to Section 402(a) of the Act.
The Administrator also uses the well worn complaint
about administrative burdens to suggest that Congress
142 U.S.C, § 404(b) provides:
“In any case in which more
payment has been made, there 5
payments to, or recovery 5 the! Mated Miihen Coen poey
person who was without fa en enn Seeeveny
would defeat the purpose of this subchapter or would be
against equity and good conscience,”
37
could not have intended that 5 U.S.C. § 554 would apply
to NPDES permit issuances. His case is far from con-
vincing. It is not at all apparent that 5 U.S.C. § 554 and
the decision of the Court of Appeals read together require
anything significantly different from that which is already
required by EPA’s regulations governing both public par-
ticipation and NPDES permit procedure,”
Both 5 U.S.C. §554 and EPA’s regulations contemplate
a two-step procedure. Initially, there is “the submission
and consideration of facts, arguments, offers of settlement,
or proposals of adjustment.” 5 U.S.C. §554(¢)(1). This
requirement appears to fit well within EPA’s provision
for a “public hearing of the ‘legislative’ type.” Brief for
the Petitioner at 8. Next, there is the requirement that
“to the extent that the parties are unable so to determine a
controversy by consent, hearing and decision on notice and
in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title” must
be held. 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(2). EPA’s regulations likewise
provide for an adjudicatory hearing for persons dissatis-
fied with the initial decision. Brief for the Petitioner at 9.
Therefore, EPA’s regulations could be applied in a manner
fully consistent with the APA.
The requirement of the Court of Appeals that an ad-
judicatory hearing must be conducted in this case was not
based on a conclusion that, contrary to EPA’s regulations,
an adjudicatory hearing must be conducted in all NPDES
permit actions. The court found under “the special cir-
cumstances of this case” (586 F.2d at 659) that there were
2 expec with yore in tte cls wh
“It
several years’ with its programs in three circuits which
oy teens. hearings. Apparently the program continues
to function
38
interested parties who wished to adjudicate material facts
upon which EPA’s decision rests. The Administrator does
not dispute these findings nor has he ever claimed that
he was unaware of the interested parties or the issues
which concerned them. His only claim has been that the
parties did not present themselves and their issues to him
in the precise manner he desired. Only this transparent
defense was set aside by the Court of Appeals as not
being acceptable in light of the requirements of law and
regulation and the circumstances of this case. |
The real complaint of the Administrator appears to be
limited to the requirement by the Court of Appeals that
EPA establish some form of record supporting its decision
not to provide for any manner of public participation. EPA
argues that it could not make this showing without conduct-
ing an “AP A-type adjudicatory hearing” for every permit.
Brief for the Petitioner at 35. Clearly, this claim is no more
than a “cry of wolf.”** Without question, the legislative
type hearing can establish the necessary record showing no
material issues of fact, no significant public interest, no
additional information to be gained, and no doubt as to
the propriety of proceeding without a formal hearing. The
Court of Appeals expressly stated that with such a showing
it would be required to “reconsider our holding that no
‘opportunity for a hearing’ was provided.” 586 F.2d at 659.
What is more, in the obviously routine and noncontrover-
sial setting in which most NPDES permits are issued
*The Seventh Circuit found that conducting adjudicatory hear-
oa oregon ng burdensome on EPA. United States Steel,
F.2d at 834. The court also noted that if EPA’s claims of
down of whether the adjudicatory provisions of the
APA apply. Id at 834 note 14. "
ee eee
oo
(40,000 out of 42,000—Brief for the Petitioner at 34), the
likelihood of a challenge is remote and speculative. There-
fore, the showing that a hearing was unnecessary could
undoubtedly be made by an analysis of the circumstances
documented in some informal manner. The Administrator
does not explain how, without some showing by EPA, a
reviewing court can determine whether EPA met its obliga-
tions under the Act, particularly in circumstances such as
this case where the regulations require a hearing even if
no request is submitted. See 40 C.F.R. § 105(c).
The strong emphasis in the Legislative History that
Congress intended the NPDES process to be one of full
participation, not only by the permittees but also by the
interested public, demonstrates that the Act contemplates
a burden on EPA to show that it has reasonably sought out
the factual information bearing on the permitting action.
EPA is not free to act without considering available, per-
tinent factual information on the excuse that others did not
overcome administrative obstacles to urge that information
on the Agency in the precise form it desires. EPA is re-
quired by the express terms of Section 101(e) of the Act
not only to provide for the opportunity for a hearing but
also to seek out appropriate input from the public and to
encourage and assist those who can make a contribution.
Therefore, the real concern raised by EPA’s statistics
relating to NPDES permit hearings (Brief for the Peti-
tioner at 34) is that under its past practices EPA has
granted hearings to fewer than five percent of those who
requested them and for less than three-tenths of one per-
cent of the total permits. These statistics as well as the
facts of this case show that EPA is making little if any
40
effort to utilize the Section 402(a) hearing “to make avail-
able to the public all relevant information surrounding a
discharge source and the control requirements placed upon
it” or to provide public participants with “a genuine
opportunity to speak on the issue of the protection of its
waters.” Leg. Hist. at 1490.
The highly inflated and speculative claims of administra-
tive burden by the Administrator lack any credibility.
Congress intended that hearings would generally be held to
insure that EPA obtained and considered public input—a
requirement the Administrator appears to have been ignor-
ing. Since the requirements set forth by the Court of
Appeals are consistent with the requirements of the Act,
the fault, if any, for the burden of conducting hearings lies
with Congress, not with the Court of Appeals.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the Court of Appeals properly concluded that under
the facts of this case EPA did not provide PLF and Kil-
roy with the opportunity for public hearing required by
Section 402(a) of the Act. The relief ordered by the Court
of Appeals is necessary and proper to correct the Admin-
istrator’s established pattern of ignoring interested and
potentially interested public participants and to insure
that he will recognize his obligations under the Act to
provide for, encourage, and assist genuine public partici-
pation in the NPDES permit process. Moreover, the Court
of Appeals properly sensed the need not to allow the ques-
tionable EPA conduct which precluded any possibility of
public participation in this case to occur without a calling
41
to account. Therefore, Pacific Legal Foundation and John
B. Kilroy, Sr., respectfully request that the decision below
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Ronaup A. ZumBrun
Robert K. Best
Tuomas KE. Hooxano
Pacific Legal Foundation
455 Capitol Mall, Suite 465
Sacramento, California 95814
Telephone: (916) 444-0154
Attorneys for Respondents
Pacific Legal Foundation
and John B. Kilroy, Sr.
October, 1979
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.