Respondents Brief — Forsham v. Harris

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f FLLED

AUG 81 1979

L RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE ;

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1118

PETER H. FORSHAM, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

PATRICIA R. HARRIS, SECRETARY OF

HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON Writ OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CourRT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

: BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

DR. CHRISTIAN R. KLIMT

STEPHEN H. SAcus,

Attorney General

of Maryland,

Davip H. FELDMAN,

Assistant Attorney General,

Chief of Litigation, >

THOMAS E. PLANK,

Assistant Attorney General,

1400 One South Calvert Building,

Baltimore, Maryland 21202,

(301) 383-3737

> Attorneys for Respondent

Dr. Christian R. Klimt.

Wo. ae aN ;

yd 2a UA ADY SHON 79

FS 16 1g ony The Daily Record Co., Baltimore, Md. 21202 eS

4d 21a

foi HNO euexing — |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS ERLOW "sihsccccscccresephecrececetnsedeveedeotys

SUI CTIIIN . seiiitscneaivg. naecrrnadnaninbinictabaeililigs

SATU TES THORN ID 6.6 Svesiseasechecatlan tenetedoss

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ..........:::cccceessseseeeeeeees

STATEMENT OF THE CASE oeecccscsccsessseesseenees

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .......cccccccceseseseeeeeees

ARGUMENT:

The Freedom Of Information Act Applies

Only To Records In The Possession Or

Direct Control Of Federal Executive

A OANE 5, 5 siicablsnchzseatrcckitadadicseaaeleiteae

I.

Il.

III.

The Receipt Of Federal Funds Does

Not Make The University Group An

Agency Or The Raw Data Agency

PROCOES oiL ccosicnnpntiseatbagbaateubioneoten

The Freedom Of Information Act

Does Not Impose Any Affirmative

Obligation Upon Federal Agencies

To Obtain Data From Private Or

State’ Emtities .......0:.ccccsccdsscsccsccssessssete

Reliance By The Federal Govern-

ment Upon The University Group

Study Does Not Transform The

Raw Data Of The Study Into

Federal Agency Records. -................

CONCLAIBION: \ssiisdiciie eis eee

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases

Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp.

BBB’ DIG. Fs: LETT). sisssccectcvcnssorcceackosssies

Columbia Packing Co. v. United States

Department of Agriculture, 563 F.2d

495 (Lat Cir. 1977) ....hcccvcccccccecccscssccsisoess

PAGE

12

15

19

39

19, 22

ii

PAGE

Disabled Officers’ Association v. Rumsfeld,

428 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1977) ........... 31

Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink,

GRD: FO FET hsicdccrickivcncestseicdan iseck 38

Greenya v. George Washington University,

512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1975) .............. 24

Kerr v. United States District Court for the

District of California,’ 511 F.2d 192,

aff'd, 426 U.S. 394 (1976) ou... 22

Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for

Freedom of the Press, No. 78-1088

(U.S., cert. granted Apr. 16, 1979) ...... 15n.4, 17n.5

Linker v. Hills, 453 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y.

APPID Sis tise osleshaclebccndehs th edad canto seedbnahes 31

Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792

(D.D.C. 1975), aff'd mem., 546 F.2d

1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431

Cry WD CREED poesinbeckstncdocstbcoleettleotieatpanee 22, 23

Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S. 41

bs 1) eels SRN ORE ete Rre gen ly wy RED 24

Nolen v. Rumsfeld, 535 F.2d 890 (5th Cir.

1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977) 31

NLRB v. Robbins Tire and Rubber Co., 437

Rr ER RAPT IEE uavehtecoanseinieindebStpudcniecouas 18

NLRB v. Sears, Reebuck & Co., 421 U.S.

TISm ARO TON casiasadstasobbndinccssdcnoudiaicasnecepbeanee 10, 31, 38

Nichols v. United States, 460 F.2d 671 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied., 409 U.S. 966 (1972) 18

Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130

(D. Kan. 1971), aff’d, 460 F.2d 671 (10th ©

Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972) 18

Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Cloth-

ing’ Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974) woe eeeseees 38

Reporters Committee for Freedom of the

Press v. Kissinger, No. 78-1217 (U.S.,

cert. granted Apr. 16, 1979) .........0.0..... 15n.4, 17n.5

Bs; PAGE

Robles v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973) 38

Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir.

DE ea aac daicaebeonicatecherriabiaersjies 21

Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir.

eb BEE DLS OPTRA SNE AES ee aa 20

Spark v. Catholic University of Averica,

510 F.2d 1977 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ............ 24

United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807

CRIT Se biise saidabs ct iacciancdnteeacaiensarecdopeensee 10, 23

Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d

OO EI Ce TOs cicndnnesey nisasactasedeavinntnsssoe 24

Washington Research Project, Inc. v.

Department of Health, Education and

Welfare, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 20

Statutes and Regulations

I.R.C. § 7602, 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1976) ........ 32n.7

6: UB. BOGE CLOT) accensorsccsasticspecesssnesooye 20

B: USC, SBR (1G TG) + viv iccecscesecsscorepssccssvccsnansen passim

B UBC, S: 2008: (TOGA) canes scecrcitniesssposavetesnoesesss 36n.10

12. US.C2§ 1006 (ROTO): Sisscesisisiipssccccigesecesiass 32n.7

15 U.S.C. §§ 78q, 78u, 78x (1976) ..........048 18n.6, 32n.7

20 U.S.C. §§ 584, 1022 (1976) oo... eee eeeeees 32n.7

21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 357 (1976)... eeecseeseeees 32n.7

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1976) ..........scssecssesseeees 2

BD UT BE Sa ete Aa peneanases sa daaaeainnenee 32n.7

33 U.S.C. §§ 1318, 1861 (1976) ..........ceeeee 32n.7

42 U.S.C. §§ 295h-5, 2000d, 2835 (1976) .... 28

§S§ 7414, 7616 (1977) ............cccccossseees 32n.7

44 U.S.Cr§ 866 (1964) oo... ccc ccccesetseeteeeneee 16-17

ER CE TID sopinpssceseduvcennhencecenphuoavees 17

iv

41 C.F.R. § 101-11.901-3(d) (1978) .............. 17n 5

45 C.F.R. § 74.24 (1978) ......cccccccssesesceese aah 33

Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, §3 (1978)............ 27

Legislative Materials

S. Conf. No. 93-1200, 98d Cong., 24 Sess.

LP RSRRRRCEA Set ARE GROCER “ee 23

H.R. Rep.—

No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) 24, 25, 30, 36

No. 93-876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) 21

S. Rep.—

No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965) 24, 36, 38

No. 94-75, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) 18n.6

112 Cong. Rec. 13641 (1966) 0.2.00... eee 25

Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Govern-

ment, Freedom of Informatign, Hear-

ings Before the Subcomm. one!ntergov-

ernmental Relations of the Senate

Comm. on Governmental Operations

and the Subcomm. on Separation of

Powers and Administrative Pracuiice

and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on

the Judiciary, 93d Cong., lst Sess.

EUAN SCE Bera ae ee eR 25, 30

Federal Public, Records Law, Hearings

Before a Subcomm. of the House

Comm. on Government Operations,

89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965) ................. 25, 30

Freedom of Information, Hearings on S. —

1666 and S. 1663 (in part) before the

Subcomm. on Administrative Practice

and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on

»the Judiciary, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.

NR tea Se Tit STAN RRR DAE cA 25, 30

Vv

U.S. Government Information Policies and

Practices, Hearings Before the Sub-

comm. on Foreign Operations and

Government Information of the House

Comm. on Government Operations,

92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Part 9) (1972) ....

‘Administrative Materials

40 Fed. Reg. 28,587 (1975) .......csecerereeeeee

42 Fed. Reg. 40,959 (1977) .......ccscscerceeerees

43 Fed. Reg. 52,732 (1978) ..........sssssssesseeees

44 Fed. Reg. 20,966 (1972) ........cssssreeeeerees

Order of the Secretary Suspending Appro-

val of New Drug Applications for

Phenformin, NDA 11-624, 12-752, 17-

126, 17-127 (DHEW July 25, 1977) .....

Proposal to Withdraw Approval of New

Drug Applications for Phenformin

Hydrochloride, Docket No. 77N-0150,

(FDA initial decision Feb. 8, 1978) ....

Proposal to Withdraw Approval of New

Drug Applications for Phenformin

Hydrochloride (FDA final aecision

PAGE

28, 30

7,35

37n.11

33, 34

38n.11

37n.11

38n.11

PI,” Ree Ree inthis inlaptaov cep prabthstnecdbnboensnna 35n.9, 38n.11

Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 19666 ...........

Miscellaneous

Attorney General’s Memorandum on the

Public Information Section of the

Administrative Procedure Act (1967) .

Brief for Federal Parties in Kissinger v.

Reporters Committee for Freedom of

the Press, No. 78-1088, and Reporters

Committee for Freedom of the Press v.

Kissinger, No. 78-1217 (U.S. cert.

granted Apr. 16, 1979) ............:2ccceeeeees

5n.1

17, 30-31

17n.5

vi

Bureau of the Budget, Special Analyses of

the United States Budget, 1967 ..........

Committee for the Assessment of Biometric

Aspects of Controlled, Trials of Hypo-

glycemic Agents, Report, 231 J.A.M.A.

PTD Mai anccinec cdi sbutindeatiabuadbdbasconss

Freedman, Administrative Procedure and

the Control of Foreign Direct Invest-

ment, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1970) ......

Knatterud, Meinert, Klimt, Osborne, and

artin, Effects of Hypoglycemic

Agents on Vascular Complications in

Patients with Adult-Onset Diabetes,

IV, A Preliminary Report on Phenfor-

min Results, 217 J.A.M.A. 777 (1971)

Knatterud, Klimt, Levin, Jacobson, and

Goldner, A Study of the Effects of

Hypoglycemic Agents in Patients with

Adult-Onset Diabetes, VII, Mortality

and Selected Nonfatal Events with

Insulin Treatment, 240 J.A.M.A. 37

CRIED abainaustakeaescenbovede ibd lane bli tatec dis

Machlup, On Some Misconceptions Con-

cerning Academic Freedom, 41

A.A.U.P. Bull. 753 (1956) ...........cccccccee.

Madden, Future Directions for Federal , \

Assistance Programs: Lessons from

Block Grants and Revenue Sharing, 36

Ei. gs Sete eran

Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty

Oaths, 28 L. & Contemp. Prob. 487

COE sihvsseasheuneihasasseeaierncsbied ssmuicbeiebhdorin’ ;

U.S. Dep’t Health, Education, and Welfare,

Resources for Medical Research, Report

BOs TD TREE, Satiracenicntabipaccnnssindibedpaitecgions

PAGE

26

27

vii

University Group Diabetes Program, A

Study of the Effects of Hypoglycemic

Agents on Vascular Complications in

é Patients with Adult-Onset Diabetes, I

& II, 19 Diabetes 747 (Supp. 2, 1970)

University Group Diabetes Program, A

Study of the Effects of Hypoglycemi¢

Agents on Vascular Complications in

Patients with Adult-Onset Diabetes, V,

Evaluation of Phenformin Therapy, 24

Diabetes 65 (Supp. 1, 1975) .................

Webster’s New International Dictionary

CBE) CG: BOBS): cwinsersceesccccpsrednovpessacoseseessverece

PAGE

6-7

30

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1118

PETER H. FORSHAM, ET AL., |

Petitioners,

Vv.

PATRICIA R. HARRIS, SECRETARY OF

HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CouRT OF APPEALS FOR THE

District OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

DR. CHRISTIAN R. KLIMT

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit (A. 217-37), the

concurring opinion of Judge MacKinnon (A. 238-39),

and the dissenting opinion of Judge Bazelon (A. 240-57)

are reported at 587 F.2d 1128, 1139, and 1140 (D.C. Cir.

1978). The order of the court of appeals denying

rehearing (A. 258) and Judge Bazelon’s statement

explaining his vote for rehearing (A. 259) are reported

at 587 F.2d at 1148. The order of the district court (A.

2

180-81) denying the petitioners’ motion for summary

judgment and granting the respondents’ motions to

dismiss is not reported.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on July 11,

1978. On July 25 a timely petition for rehearing and in

the alternative suggestion for rehearing in banc was

filed (A. 261-68). On October 17, 1978, the court of

appeals denied the petition for rehearing (A. 258-60) and

the suggestion for rehearing in banc (Ct. App. R. 9). The

petition for writ of certiorari was filed on January 15,

1979, and was granted on May 14, 1979. The jurisdic-

tion of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1976).

STATUTES INVOLVED

This case turns upon the interpretation of the

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552 (1976),

which is reproduced in the appendix to the petitioners’

brief at 25a.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A continuing research study conducted by private

and state medical schools and hospitals and funded by

federal grants has collected raw data upon which it has

based certain conclusions. The federal government. has

never controlled the research and has never owned,

controlled, or possessed the raw data that the petition-

ers seek pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.

Accordingly, this case presents the following juéstions

of the interpretation of the Act:

1. Does the federal government’s funding of the study

transform the private and state institutions into federal

agencies or transform the raw~data into “agency

records” under the Act? ne

2. Must the federal government, in response to a

request for records under the Act, exercise whatever

Ss

= i

3

rights of access it may have to obtain private and state

documents, such as the raw data of the medical schools

and hospitals, and thereafter make them available?

3. Does the reliance by the federal government upon

the published findings of the study and upon an audit

of some of the raw data transform all of the data into

“agency records” under the Act?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioners seek reversal of the decision of the

court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district

court, which had dismissed the petitioners’ request for

the production of the raw data generated in a study

conducted by the University Group Diabetes Program

and funded by federal grants. The court of appeals held

that the federal funding of the study, federal access to

the raw data compiled by the University Group, and

reliance upon the published findings of the study do not

convert the raw data into “agency records” under the

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).

In June 1959, a number of private physicians and

scientists conceived of the idea of a long-term prospec-

tive clinical study to determine whether the treatment

of mild adult-onset diabetes with insulin or tolbutamide

prevented, delayed, or alleviated the principal complica-

tions (retinopathy, cardiovascular disease, nephro-

pathy, and neuropathy) of this disease (A. 96; D. Ct. R.

4, ex. 2 to affidavit of G. Donald Whedon at 5, 7, and 8).

As a result of the efforts of these physicians and

scientists, a number of private and state medical

schools and hospitals formed the University Group

Diabetes Program to perform the study. The University

Group eventually grew to include twelve participating

clinics and a coordinating center at the University of

Maryland School of Medicine. Between 1959 and 1961,

the principal investigators o were to conduct the

study prepared and evaluated its design, methods, and

4

Ss

objectives. The clinical part of the study began in 1961

(A. 145-46), and 1,027 patients entered the study

between 1961 and 1965 (A. 134, 146).

In each of the participating clinics, the investigators

allocated on a random basis recently diagnosed cases of

mild adult-onset diabetes to one of four treatment

groups. These groups consisted of: (1) standard diet plus

placebo tablets; (2) standard diet plus a fixed dose of

tolbutamide; (3) standard diet plus a fixed insulin dose;

and (4) standard diet plus insulin in varying amounts

dosed to maintain normal blood sugar levels. In 1963 a

fifth group of standard diet plus a fixed dose of

phenformin was added (A. 146).

When a patient entered the study, the clinics made an

initial evaluation of his or her health. Thereafter, the

clinics performed quarterly examinations to determine

the degree of control of, the diabetes and the develop-

ment, if any, of the complications of the disease (A. 97-

98). The clinics forwarded the records of these examina-

tion results to the coordinating center. The coordinating

center collected and computerized these results and

subjected them to periodic statistical analyses. The

treatment groups were compared for the number of

deaths observed in each group and the proportion

among each group developing one or more complica-

tions. In addition, the coordinating center was responsi-

ble for maintaining uniformity in the records and in the

laboratory techniques employed. For example, whe-

never a patient died, the coordinating center would

forward the patient’s records to two or more specialists

for examination. This was done to ensure the consist-

ency and quality of the findings. These consulting

specialists were unaware of the treatment that the

patient was receiving (A. 97-99).

5

Each of the schools and hospitals in the University

Group applied for and received separate research grants

from the National Institute of Arthritis, Metab.\ism,

and Digestive Diseases! (the “NIAMDD”) of the

National Institutes of Health to fund its participation

in the study. The NIAMDD provided these funds as

part of its responsibility to support research in the field

of diabetes and without any specific regulatory objec-

tive in mind. In 1966 the NIAMDD renewed the grants

to continue the study, and in 1971 the grants again

came up for review. The National Advisory Arthritis

and Metabolic Diseases Council recommended their

approval and gave the study a rating of “high program

relevance”, which was in effect a direction to the staff

of the NIAMDD to provide financial support for the

study (A. 146-47).

The Food and Drug Administration (the “FDA’’) was

not involved in the planning, inception, design, or

conduct of the study. The raw data of the study, such as

patient charts and forms, are the property of the

participating schools and hospitals and the individual

investigators. The NIAMDD does not own these data.

Furthermore, it is not the normal practice of either the

NIAMDD or the National Institutes of Health to require

grantees to submit their data for review, and submis-

sion of raw data is extremely rare. In this case, the

University group has not submitted any of the data to

the NIAMDD (A. 146-48).

1 The NIAMDD is one of a number of a research institutes

that collectively form the National Institutes of Health, all of

which are part of the Public Health Service. The Public

Health Service is the operating agency within the Depart-

ment of Health, Education, and Welfare principally engaged

in providing health services, conducting and supporting

health research, and providing state and local aid. The Food

and Drug Administration is a separate agency within the

department primarily responsible for regulating the manuv-

facture, labeling, and distribution of drugs. See generally

Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1966, reprinted in 5 U'S.C. app., at 391-

95 (1976) and in 80 Stat. 1610 (1966).

¢

6

The participating clinics are responsible for manag-

ing the day-today operations of the study. Representa-

tives of the NIAMDD reviewed the design, methods,

and objectives of the study before it began the clinical

phase, but it had no involvement in the clinical phase

except to review the periodic reports submitted to it.

Finally, no officer or employee of the NIAMDD or of the

National Institutes of Health has ever seen or possessed

any of the raw data. It is estimated that the raw data

consists of millions of separate documents, possibly as

many as 55,000,000 documents, and many contain

information that identifies patients (A. 146-48).

At the annual meeting of the American Diabetes

Association on June 14, 1970, the University Group

presented some of the results of its continuing study.

These results indicated that, among other things, the

use of tolbutamide to control mild adult-onset diabetes

was no more effective than diet alone in prolonging life

and that it led to a greater death rate from cardiovascu-

lar disease than was found in the groups treated with

diet alone, a fixed dosage of insulin, or a variable

dosage of insulin. Later that year, the University Group

published these results in the Journal of the American

Diabetes Association. The University Group Diabetes

Program, A Study of the Effects of Hypoglycemic

Agents on Vascular Complications in Patients with

Adult-Onset Diabetes, I & II, 19 Diabetes 747 (Supp. 2,

1970) (A. 72). Both the American Diabetes Association

and the American Medical Association’s Council on

Drugs supported the validity of the study (A. 72).

Subsequently, the University Group published its

findings that phenformin also generated a higher

incidence of cardiovascular disease. Knatterud, Mei-

nert, Klimt, Osborne, and Martin, Effects of Hypogly-

cemic Agents on Vascular Complications in Patients

with Adult-Onset Diabetes, IV, A Preliminary Report

on Phenformin Results, 217 J.A.M.A. 777 (1971); The

7

University Group Diabetes Program, A Study of the

Effects of Hypoglycemic Agents on Vascular Complica-

tions in Patients with Adult-Onset Diabetes, V, Evalua-

tion of Phenformin Therapy, 24 Diabetes 65 (Supp. 1,

1975). From time to time, additional findings have been

r ublished. See, e.g., Knatterud, Klimt, Levin, Jacobson,

and Goldner, A Study of the Effects of Hypoglycemic

Agents on Vascular Complications in Patients with

Adult-Onset Diabetes, VII, Mortality and Selected

Nonfatal Events with Insulin Treatment, 240 J.A.M.A.

37 (1978).

The University Group study has been criticized (A.

12-13). Accordingly, to assess the scientific quality of

the study, the Director of the National Institutes of

Health, in 1972, invited the President of the Biometric

Society, a private organization of scientists, to appoint

a committee to consider the statistical aspects of the

study (A. 144). This committee evaluated the methods

used in the clinical study, reviewed the published

criticisms of the study, interviewed both critics and

supporters of the study, and made new analys.s from

some of the original data. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,587, 28,590

(1975). None of the data that the University Group

made available to the committee was ever submitted to

the NIAMDD or any other agency of the federal

government, nor were they required to be submitted (A.

148). The committee commented on the major criticisms

of the study and concluded that the study’s evidence of

harmfulness was moderately strong. 40 Fed. Reg. at

28,590. See also Committee for the Assessment of

Biometric Aspects of Controlled Trials of Hypoglycemic

Agents, Report, 231 J.A.M.A. 583, 599 (1975).

Before the report of the committee of the Biomatric

Society was’ published, counsel for the petitioners

requested from the NIAMDD, the FDA, and the

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare a copy

of a draft of this report and also “access to the raw data

cot

8

which was accorded to the biometric study” (A. 40, 42-

43, 49). On January 27, 1975, G. Donald Whedon,

Director of the NIAMDD, supplied to counsel for the

petitioners the galley proof of the final version of the

committee’s report. In addition, Dr. Whedon explained

that no one in the Department of Health, Education,

and Welfare had ever possessed any of the raw data of

the study (A. 54). On May 6, 1975, counsel for the

petitioners renewed his request for access to the raw

data (A. 55). Counsel also requested the research design

and protocol for the study submitted to the NIAMDD

and a statement detailing all budget appropriations,

allocations, and expenditures for the study (A. 56). He

subsequently made a detailed request for records in the

NIAMDD’s files relating to the grants to the University

Group (A. 63-65).

In a series of subsequent correspondence, Theodore

Cooper, Acting Assistant Secretary for Health, re-

sponded that the Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare had never possessed any of the raw data on

which the study was based (A. 57); that all of the

grantees’ working documents remained in their posses-

sion and were not considered in any way to be part of

the grant files maintained at the National Institutes of

Health; that the National Institutes of Health had no

duty to request that a grantee submit data not required

as part of the grant; that, because the raw data did not

belong to the Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare, the Freedom of Information Act did not apply

to the material requested (D. Ct. R. 4, app. to ex. 1); that

neither the grants to the University Group nor the

contract with the Biometric Society required the

submission of the raw data to the National Institutes of

Health; that the raw data was at that time in the form

of microfilm and was being stored in a Maryland bank

vault; and that Dr. Cooper was informed that Dr. Klimt,

the director of the coordinating center, believed that the

9

data are protected from disclosure under Maryland law

(A. 68-69). Nevertheless, all records in the NIAMDD’s

files on the University Group’s grants and study were

released to counsel for the petitioners, with two

deletions that they have not challenged (A. 66-67).

On September 30, 1975, the petitioners filed suit

against the respondents, the Secretary of the Depart-

ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Assistant

Secretary for Health, the Commissioner of Food and

Drugs, the Director of the NIAMDD, and Dr. Christian

R. Klimt, Director of the Division of Clinical Investiga-

tion at the University of Maryland School of Medicine

and director? of the coordinating center for the

University Group (A. 1, 3-11). The petitioners sought an

order directing the respondents to produce the raw data

of the University Group study which respondents may

have possessed or to which any of the respondents may

have had a right of access. The petitioners also

requested that the court issue a declaratory judgment

that they were entitled to these records and perman-

ently enjoin the respondents from refusing to produce

them (A. 10). On October 31, Dr. Klimt filed a motion to

dismiss and a motion to quash service of process, and

on November 21, the federal respondents filed a motion

to dismiss and in the alternative a motion for summary

judgment. The petitioners responded on December 5

with a motion for summary judgment.

On February 5, 1976, the district court entered an

order denying the petitioners’ motion for summary

judgment and granting the respondents’ motions to

dismiss. Considering the various motions and the entire

2 In July 1978, Dr. Genell L. Knatterud, Deputy Director of

the Division of Clinical Investigation, became the principal

investigator for the coordinating center. Dr. Klimt, however,

is a co-investigator, and he remains the Director of the

Division of Clinical Investigation, Department of Epidemiol-

ogy and Preventive Medicine of the University of Maryland

School of Medicine.

o~ >

10

record in the case, the court found that no official or

employee of the Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare, the National Institutes of Health, the NI-

AMDD, or the FDA was then.or had ever been in

possession of the raw data of the University Group

study, that the raw data were the property of the

individual investigators and the coordinating center

and remained in the possession, custody, and control of

the coordinating center, chat neither the individual

investigators nor the coordinating center was an

agency within the purview of the Freedom of Informa-

tion Act, and that, consequently, the raw data were not

agency records subject to disclosure under the Act (A.

180-81).

The petitioners appealed this order to the court of

appeals on February 27, 1976. On July 11, 1978, the

court issued its opinion and judgment affirming the

district court’s order. Relying on United States v.

Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976), the court held that persons

or institutions that receive grants from the federal

government do not on that account become government

agencies. Further, citing NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 421 U.S. 132 ‘1975), the court concluded that the

Freedom of Information Act did not impose upon

federal agencies the obligation to exercise whatever

rights of access they may have to the raw data to

obtain the raw data to which they have access and to

supply them to the general public. The court held that

the general public may only demand a record that a

federal agency has created or has obtained in the course

of doing its work. 587 F.2d at 1136. The court also

concluded that the policy considerations presented by

the petitioners did not authorize it to extend the

Freedom of Information Act beyond the federal agen-

cies and agency records to which it applies. Moreover,

the court discussed the policy considerations for not

applying the Act to the records of federal grantees, e.g.,

11

the importance of preserving the autonomy of private

and state entities conducting research.

Judge MacKinnon authored a short concurring

opinion. In this opinion, he stated: “The plain implica-

tion derived from the language of the statute is that it

does apply to records which belong to the agency or are

in its possession—that is, records which the agency has

created or obtained.” 587 F.2d at 1139. Judge MacKin-

non rejected the approach of the dissent because under

it the interpretation of the statute would turn upon

what a federal judge considered a significant degree of

federal involvement. 587 F.2d at 1140.

Judge Bazelon, dissenting, would have applied the

Act to the University Group’s raw data. In his view, the

federal funding for the University Group, the govern-

ment’s right of access to the data, and the government’s

reliance upon the University Group’s study established

a significant degree of federal involvement with the raw

data, and that therefore this federal involvement

converted the data into agency records. 587 F.2d at

1140.8 ,

3 The petitioners have presented to this Court numerous

allegations of fact unsupported by any evidence in the record.

The petitioners have done this in three ways. They have

made bare assertions without citing any sources for these

assertions. See, e.g., petitioners’ brief at 4 (the amount of

grants to the University Group); 12 (concerning petitioners’

knowledge about an earlier draft of the report of the

Biometric Society); 32 n.39 (concerning liaison officers to the

University Group); 32-33 (concerning a policy advisory

board); and 39 (details of the conduct of the FDA audit). The

petitioners also cite documents and sources not in the record

and not provided by the petitioners. See, e.g., petitioners’

brief at 16 & n.i7 (letter dated January 5, 1977 from Neil L.

Chayet to J. Richard Crout, M.D. ); 22 & n.30 (telegram from

American Medical Association Executive Vice President

James H. Sammons, M.D., February 2, 1979); 41 n,48 (letter

from Dr. Christian R. Klimt to Dr. Crout, March 1, 1976); 53-

54 (two memoranda of telephone coversations concerning the

FDA audit and a letter from Dr. Crout to Dr. Klimt). Further,

the petitioners have included in an appendix to their brief

12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552

(1976), first enacted by Public Law No. 89-554, 80 Stat.

383 (1966), provides that all federal executive agencies

are to make available to any person agency records

unless those records fall within one of nine exceptions.

§ 552(a)(3). The Act also provides a judicial remedy for

an‘ person who believes that the agency is improperly

withholding “agency records”. § 552(a)(4)(B). “Agency

records” are those records made or received by any

federal agency, that is, any documents and other

similar material within the possession or day-to-day

control of a federal agency.

The raw data that the petitioners seek are not the

records of any federal agency. They are the property of

the participating private and state medical schools and

documents which are not in the record and have cited these

documents at 16, 17 & n.18 and at 36 n.42).

Many of these putative facts concern events that preceded

the petitioners’ complaint or the district court’s hearing on

the parties’ motions, and the petitioners could have intro-

duced into the district court proceedings evidence supporting

these allegations. The respondents then would have had an

opportunity to review and question any of these allegations

or to place them in their proper context. The respondent

believes that the petitioners’ attempt to bring these allega-

tions before this Court now is improper. However, the

respondent also believes that all of these allegations, as well

as the allegations of facts not found in the record but recited

in secondary sources cited by the petitioners, are essentially

irrelevant, and they do not contradict the undisputed facts

upon which the district court’s order was based. Accordingly,

the respondent will not attempt to refute these allegations.

The respondent does not mean to suggest by his silence on

these matters that he accepts the accuracy of the allegations

or the implications that can be derived from them. In fact, he

rejects these allegations and the implications that the

petitioners attempt to draw, and he urges that this Court do

the same. Nevertheless, even if all of these allegations were

true, the respondent believes that they would not change the

outcome in this case.

13

hospitals that comprise the University Group. The

University Group, and not any agency of the federal

government, possesses the raw data and has day-to-day:

control over them. Because neither the University

Group nor its participating institutions are federal

executive agencies, the data are not agency records.

Furthermore, federal funding of the University Group’s

study, federal access to the University Group’s records,

and federal reliance upon both the University Group’s

published findings and a limited audit of some of the

data do not make the University Group or its participat-

ing schools and hospitals federal agencies, and they do

not change the raw data into the records of any federal

agency.

The application of the Act to “agency records” and

the definitions of “agency” demonstrate that Congress

did not intend the Act to apply to a private or state

recipient of federal funds or to its records. Indeed, the

legislative history of the 1974 amendments states that

the definition of agency does not include entities that

receive federal appropriations but that are not con-

trolled by the federal government. The language of the

Act and its legislative history is consistent with federal

court decisions holding that the federal government

does not control a private or state institution because it

provides it with federal funds and that such institutions

are not federal agencies. Consequently, federal funding

does not make the records of such entities “agency

records’.

Congress’ choice of words requiring an agency to

“make available” the records in its possession or

subject to its control and the crafting of a judicial

remedy for the improper “withholding” of such records

expresses its intent that agencies need not use whatever

rights of access that they may have to the documents of

private and state entities in order to comply with a

request under the Act. This intent has been recognized

14

by the Attorney General’s contemporaneous construc-

tion of the Act and by many courts, including this

Court. Such right of access or even the exercise of the

right does not amount to possession of records still in

the hands of private or state entities or control over

those entities or their records. Thus, this access does not

transform the raw data into agency records.

Finally, that a federal agency may have relied upon

both the published findings of the University Group’s

study and an audit of some of the raw data does not

make the raw data “agency records”. The University

Group and its participating institutions have retained

day-to-day control of their raw data. In relying upon

published findings, the federal government did not

obtain possession of the raw data, and in conducting a

limited audit of some of the raw data, the federal

government did not exercise control over the raw data

or take such control away from the University Group.

Congress deliberately chose to apply the Aet only to

records in the possession or direct control of federal

agencies. Those individuals and organizations that

must deal with the federal government know that their

records are not subject to the Act unless the federal

government obtains possession of their records or

exercises such control over them or their records as’to

make them, in effect, federal agencies. Petitioners’

argument, however, would obliterate these expectations.

If the petitioners were to prevail, then every individual

and every private and state entity that receives federal

funds or that is subject to federal audit, or every non-

federal individual or body whose work product may be

relied upon by the federal government would in effect

become federal agencies, and their records would be

15

subject to access by any person. It is clear that

Congress intended no such result.‘

ARGUMENT

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT APPLIES ONLY TO

RECORDS IN THE POSSESSION OR DIRECT CONTROL

OF FEDEF AL EXECUTIVE AGENCIES.

«he petitioners present to this Court a strained

interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act. They

argue that the federal “involvement” with the Univer-

sity Group makes the data of the University Group’s

private and state medical schools and hospitals

“agency records” under the Act. This “involvement”

consists: of the funding by the NIAMDD of the

University Group’s research study, the NIAMDD’s

alleged right of access to all of the University Group’s

data, and the unquantified reliance by the FDA on the

published findings of the study, the Biometric Society

committee report, and the FDA’s limited audit of the

raw data. The respondent suggests, however, that the

specific language of the Act, in the context of commonly

understood conventions of language and principles of

law, expresses the specific as well as the general intent

4 The issues in this case are distinct from those in

Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,

No. 78-1088, and Reporters Committee for Freedom of the

Press v. Kissinger, No. 78-1217 (U.S., cert. granted Apr. 16,

1979). Those cases involve the issues of whether transcripts

of telephone conversations of former Secretary of State

Henry A. Kissinger are personal notes not subject to the

Freedom of Information Act or are agency records under the

Act, and whether the district court has jurisdiction to compel

an agency to obtain records not in its possession because it

had physical possession of them at one time. In this case, the

NIAMDD and the FDA never had physical possession of the

raw data that the petitioners seek. Moreover, the raw data

were created by nongovernmental scientists and physicians

working at state and private institutions, unlike the trans-

cripts in the Kissinger cases, which were created by a

government official on government time a ar use of

government facilities. /

16

that, notwithstanding any putative federal “involve-

ment” with the University Group, the Act does not

apply to the raw data that the petitioners seek.

The Act requires “each agency, upon any request for

records,” to “make the records” available. 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(3) (1976). If the agency does not comply with

the request, a court may enjoin the agency from

withholding “agency records” and may order the

production of “agency records improperly withheld’. 5

U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(B) (1976). Thus, the Act applies only

to “agency records”.

Although the Act does not contain a definition of

“agency records”, standard usage and commonly

understood principles of the English language provide

the meaning. “Agency records” means records of an

agency. The records of an agency are the records that

an agency creates, possesses, or directly controls.

This definition directly follows the earlier congres-

sional definition of records in the Records Disposal Act

of 1943, 57 Stat. 380 (1943). When Congress adopted the

Freedom of Information Act, the Records Disposal Act

contained the following definition of “records”:

{T]he word “records” includes all books, papers,

maps, photographs, or other documentary mate-

rials regardless of physical form or characteristics,

made or received by an agency of the United States

Government in pursuance of federal law or in

connection with the transaction of public business

and preserved or appropriate for preservation by

that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence

of the organization, functions, policies, decisions,

17

procedures, operations or other activities of the

Government or because of the informational value

of data contained therein.

44 U.S.C. § 366 (1964) (emphasis added). This definition

has been recodified with only insignificant changes in

44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976).

In interpreting the Freedom of Information Act

shortly after its passage, the Attorney Genera! cited

this definition of records and concluded that the Act

refers “only to records in being and in the possession or

control of an agency.” Attorney General’s Memoran-

dum on the Public Information Section of the Adminis-

trative Procedure Act 23-24 (1967) [cited in this brief as

Attorney General’s Memorandum], reprinted in Sub-

comm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure,

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Freedom of Informa-

tion Act Source Book, S. Doc. No. 93-82, 93d Cong., 2d

Sess. 194, 222 (1974) [cited in this brief as Source Book].

Although Congress has amended the Act three times, it

has yet to question the Attorney General’s reference to

the definition of records in the Records Disposal Act of

5 Although this definition contains two elements, that is,

whether the documents are (1) made or received by an agency

and (2) preserved or appropriate for preservation by that

agency, the important element for purposes of the Freedom of

Information Act is the first. Government documents made or

received by an agency that are not appropriate for preserva-

tion are “nonrecord materials”. 41 C.F.R. §101-11.401-

3(d)(1978). See also brief for federal parties in Kissinger v.

Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, No. 78-1088,

and Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v.

Kissinger, No. 78-1217, (U.S., cert. granted Apr. 16, 1979), at

39-42. In this case, the Court need not reach the question of

whether “nonrecord materials” are “agency records” within

the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act, because the

raw data that the petitioners seek are not documents “made

or received” by a federal agency.

18

1943 or to change his interpretation of the meaning of

“agency records’”’.6

Similarly, this Court has recognized the plain mee

of “agency records”. In summarizing the salient

features of the Act in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber

Co., 437 U.S. 214, 221 (1978), the Court stated that the

Act “requires that records and material in the posses-

sion of federal agencies be made available on demand

to any member of the general public” (emphasis added).

See also Nichols v. United States, 460 F.2d 671, 673 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972) (stating that the

Act applies to “all records and information in agency

possession’), aff’g Nichols v. United States, 325 F.

Supp. 130, 137 (D. Kan. 1971) (holding that “the Court

may not require production of records not in custody or

control of an agency”).

The University Group’s raw data are not the records

of the federal government or any federal agency. The

raw data that the petitioners seek are not contained in

the records of the NIAMDD, the FDA, or any other

agency in the Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare and were not created by any agency, officer, or

employee of the department. They have never been in

possession of any officer or employee of the department

(A. 54, 57, 68, 69, 143, 147, 148). The raw data are the

property of the individual investigators and the

6 See also Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 19, 89 Stat. 158 (1975), which

amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 24, 15 U.S.C.

§ 78x (1976) (emphasis added), as follows:

(a) For purposes of section 552 of Title V, the term

“records” includes all applications, statements, reports,

contracts, correspondence, notices, and other documents

filed with or otherwise obtained by the Commission

pursuant to this chapter or otherwise.

The purpose of this amendment was to make all documents

filed with the Commission agency records for purposes of the

Act and to provide that the Act governed all requests for

these documents. S. Rep. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 136-

37 (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News

179, 313-14.

19

University Group and are not owned by any agency of

the federal government (A. 147). The University Group

has not submitted any raw data to the federal

government (A. 148). The FDA performed a limited

audit of some of the University Group data, see 43 Fed.

Reg. 52,732 (1978), and any documents or records that

the FDA collected or created in this audit have been

turned over to the petitioners (A. 202). In addition, all

other documents and records in the possession of the

federal government (with two deletions not challenged

by the petitioners) have been turned over to the

petitioners (A. 143, 202).

Faced with these facts, the petitioners have con-

structed an argument that the raw data are agency

records because various federal agencies have had some

involvement with the University Group’s study. How-

ever, this involvement—funding of the study and access

to certain records of the University Group by the

NIAMDD and reliance by the FDA upon published

findings and a limited audit—cannot transform the raw

data into agency records unless the federal government

has possessed the raw data or has caused the Univer-

sity Group’s participating medical schools and hospi-

tals to become federal agencies. As the respondent

demonstrates, the factors that the petitioners cite, either

separately or in combination, do not produce such a

transformation. See Ciba-Geigy v. Mathews, 428 F.

Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), (rejecting identical argu-

ments raised by Ciba-Geigy, a manufacturer of phenfor-

min.)

I.

THE RECEIPT OF FEDERAL FUNDS DOES NOT MAKE

THE UNIVERSITY GROUP AN AGENCY OR ITS

RAW DATA AGENCY RECORDS.

When the Freedom of Information Act was first

passed by Public Law No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966),

and codified as part of the United States Code by Public

20

Law No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967), it did not contain a

definition of “agency”. Because the Act is an amend-

ment to the original section 3 of the Administrative

Procedure Act, the definition of “agency” in the

Administrative Procedure Act applies to it. That

definition states:

“{Algency” means each authority of the Govern-

ment or the United States, whether or not it is

within or subject to review by another agency... .

5 U.S.C. §551(1) (1976).

The federal courts have interpreted this definition of

agency to mean any administrative unit of the federal

government “with substantial independent authority in

the exercise of specific functions”. Soucie v. David, 448

F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that the Office

of Science and Technology was an agency of the federal

government and hence was subject to the Freedom of

Information Act). It has also been interpreted to mean

any federal entity with authority in law to make

decisions. Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Depart-

ment of Health, Education and Welfare, 504 F.2d 238,

248 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that initial review groups

consisting of non-governmental consultants are not

agencies within the meaning of the Administrative

Procedure Act and hence are not subject to the Act). See

generally Freedman, Administrative Procedure and the

Control of Foreign Direct Investment, 119 U. Pa. L.

Rev. 1, 4-13 (1970).

Because certain federal entities, such as the United

States Postal Service, attempted to avoid complying

with the Act by claiming that they were not agencies

within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure

Act, Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act

in 1974 to include a broader definition of “agency”.

Section 552(e) now states:

21

For purposes of this section, the term “agency”

as defined in section 551(1) of this title includes

any executive department, military department,

Government corporation, Government controlled

corporation, or other establishment in the executive

branch of the Government (including the Executive

Office of the President), or any independent

regulatory agency.

As House Report No. 93-876 explained, “the definition

of ‘agency’ has been expanded to include those entities

which may not be considered agencies under § 551(1) of

title 5, U.S. Code, but which perform governmental

functions and control information of interest to the

public.” H.R. Rep. No. 93-876, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 8,

reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 6267,

6274. Thus, in addition to entities in the executive

branch of government which have authority to make

decisions, the definition of “agency” also includes

corporations which are subject to substantial federal

control over their day-to-day operations. Rocap uv.

Indiek, 539 F.2d 174, 177, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding

that the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation was

an agency within the meaning of section 552(e)).

The University Group does not fall within any of

these definitions of agency. It is not an establishment

in the executive branch or an independent regulatory

agency. It was not created by federal law or by any of

the federal agencies. It has no authority to make

decisions. It exercises no power of the federal govern-

ment. It is not a government corporation or a govern-

ment controlled corporation. It is subject to no more

control by the federal government than many other

private or state institutions.

The University Group consists of twelve private and

state medical schools and hospitals and a coordinating

center at the University of Maryland. The physicians

and scientists at the various participating institutions,

22

and not any agency of the federal government,

originated the continuing clinical study conducted by

the University Group. The only involvement of any

agency of the federal government in the study was the

NIAMDD’s reviewing the design, methods, and objec-

tives of the study, granting research funds to the

University Group, and reviewing periodic reports

submitted by the University Group (A. 146). The FDA

was not involved in its planning, inception, or design

(A. 146). The University Group, and no agency of the

federal government, had full responsibility for the

management of its day-to-day operations (A. 147).

The sole function of the University Group has been to

conduct a clinical research study. It has analyzed the

data from the clinical study and from time to time has

published its conclusions about that data. At no time

has it purported to make any governmental decisions or

to exercise any governmental authority. Nor has it ever

considered itself an agency of the federal government.

For these reasons, the University Group is not an

agency of the federal government within the meaning

of the Act. See Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792,

302 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd mem., 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir.

1276), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977) (holding that the

National Academy of Sciences and its committee on

motor vehicle emissions, private entities which con-

tracted with the government to conduct studies, are not

agencies within the meaning of the Act); Ciba-Geigy

Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp. 523, 526-28 (S.D.N.Y.

1977) (holding that the University Group is not an

agency within the meaning of the Act). See also Kerr v.

United States District Court for the Northern District of

California, 511 F.2d 192, 197 (9th Cir. 1975), aff’d, 426

U.S. 394 (1976) (holding that the California Adult

Authority is not an agency subject to the Act).

That the University Group was funded completely by

federal grants does no alter this conclusion. As

23

Conference Report No. 93-1200 on the 1974 amendments

indicates, Congress did “not intend to include [in the

definition of agency] corporations which receive ap-

propriated funds but are neither chartered by the

Federal Government nor controlled by it, such as the

Corporation for Public Broadcasting.” Conf. R. No. 93-

1200, 938d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted in [1974] U.S.

Code Cong. & Ad. News 6285, 6293. See also Lombardo

v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792, 802 (D.D.C. 1975), aff’d

mem., 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431

U.S. 932 (1977).

The language that Congress did use in defining an

agency and the conclusion that a federal agency does

not include a private or state recipient of federal funds

that is not controlled by the federal government are

consistent with a number of decisions of this Court and

other federal courts. For example, this Court held in

United: States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976), that a

community action agency funded under the Economic

Opportunity Act of 1964 was not a federal instrumental-

ity or agency for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims

Act. In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated that

the determinative question was not whether the

community action agency received federal money and

must comply with federal standards and regulations,

but whether its day-to-day operations were supervised

by the federal government. The Court noted that the

federal government spent billions of dollars on projects

performed by people and institutions under contracts

with the federal government and that federal funding

affected innumerable activities of local and state

government and of private institutions. The Court

stated, “It is inconceivable that Congress intended to

have waiver of sovereign immunity follow congres-

sional largesse and cover countless unidentifiable

classes of ‘beneficiaries’.” 425 U.S. at 816. Finally, the

Court observed that the federal government did not

control the “detailed physical performance” of all the

24

programs and projects that it finances by gifts, grants,

contracts, or loans. 425 U.S. at 816. See also Maryland

v. United States, 381 U.S. 41 (1965) (holding that

civilian caretakers of aircraft owned by the United

States and assigned to the Maryland Air National

Guard were state, not federal employees, even though

the caretakers were paid from federal funds and were

required to comply with federal standards); Greenya v.

George Washington University, 512 F.2d 556, 559-62

(D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that federal funding of a

university without any federal involvement

in the actual management of the funded program, and

the existence of a contract between the university

and the federal government to teach government

employees at government facilities did not make the

university a governmental agency subject to the first

and fifth amendments to the United States Constitu-

tion); Spark v. Catholic University of America, 510 F.2d

1977 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that the receipt of federal

funds did not convert a private university into an

agency of the federal government for purposes of

federal question jurisdiction); Wahba, v. New York

University, 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that

the receipt of federal funds by a university and by

the chairman of the Biochemistry Department who

was conducting a research project funded by the

National Institutes of Health did not transform the

university or the chairman into governmental actors for

purposes of the first and fourteenth amendments to the

United States Constitution).

There is nothing in the Act’s legislative history to

suggest that Congress intended the Act to apply to the

recipients of federal grants. The Act did broaden the

public’s rights to obtain records of federal agencies so

that the public may be informed about what its

government is doing. See generally S. Rep. No. 813,

89th Cong., lst Sess. 2-3, 5, 10 (1965), reprinted in

Source Book 36, 37-38, 40, 45; H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th

25

Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 12 (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S.

Code Cong. & Ad. News 2418, 2429; 112 Cong. Rec.

13,641 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Moss). Nevertheless, all

of the examples of the unwillingness of federal officials

to make available even the most innocuous records

(such as a telephone book) that led to the Act’s passage

involved records that were in the possession of a federal

agency, not in the possession of a recipient of a federal

grant. See H.R. Rep. No. 1497 at 4-5, [1966] U.S. Code

Cong. & Ad. News at 2422-23; Freedom of Information,

Hearings on S. 1666 and S. 1663 (in part) before the

Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of

the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st

Sess. passim (1963) [cited in this brief as 1963 Senate

Hearings]; Federal Public Records Law, Hearings

Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Govern-

ment Operations, 89th Cong., lst Sess. passim (1965)

[cited in this brief as 1965 House Hearings]. Even after

the Act took effect, Congress’ focus remained upon

providing access to government records and the

reluctance of federal agencies to give up documents in

their possession. See Executive Privilege, Secrecy in

Government, Freedom of Information, Hearings Before

the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the

Senate Comm. on Governmental Operations and the

Subcomms. on Separation of Powers and Administra-

tive Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the

Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. passim (1973) [cited in

this brief as 1973 Senate Hearings].

It is reasonable to expect that, had Congress intended

the Act to apply to private and state recipients of

federal grants, it would have directed some attention to

the significant implications of such an application, that

is, the effect upon private and state institutions

receiving federal grants and upon the federal govern-

ment’s program of supporting research through grants.

In the context of research grants, such an application

would conflict with one of the major principles of

26

academic freedom—that a scientist be free to investi-

gate an area, to locate data, to interpret that data, and

to decide whether and when to publish the results of his

investigations without the fear of interference or

harassment by outside agents. See generally Machlup,

On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic Free-

dom, 41 A.A.U.P. Bull. 753 (1955), reprinted in Ameri-

can Association of University Professors, Academic

Freedom and Tenure, 177, 178 (L. Joughlin ed. 1967).

See also Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths,

28 L. & Contemp. Prob. 487, 489-90 (1963). However, if

the Act applied to a research grant recipient, any

member of the public could require a private or state

researcher to open up his files before he has finished

gathering or analyzing his data or publishing his

findings. Thus, his research efforts could be subjected to

harassment, misappropriations, or premature disclo-

sures by outside interests motivated» by financial,

emotional, or philosophical considerations.

This prospect also raises serious questions about the

federal effort to support research. Prominent physicians

and scientists may not be willing to accept federal

grants for research if others with a particular financial

or ideological stake in the subject matter of the research

could have ready access to the research documents

under the Act. Thus, a decision to apply the Act to

recipients of research grants requires a careful weigh-

ing of the benefits and detriments to the conduct of

scientific research in the United States and the role of

the federal government in this research, as well as a

thorough airing of the many conflicting interests

attending these issues.

On a larger scale, the extension of the Act to

recipients of federal grants raises issues of federalism,

for the states receive a large number of grants totallpng

billions of dollars. Many states have their own acts

requiring varying degrees of disclosure of state records.

a oe

27

Maryland, for example, has determined that a custo-

dian of records, such as Dr. Klimt, may deny access to

the specific details of research projects conducted by a

state institution and shall deny access to hospital

records relating to medical care and other medical

information. Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, §§ 3(b)(iii) &

3(c)(vii) (1978). To the extent that the Maryland statute

and other state statutes conflict with the Federal

Freedom of Information Act, the application of the

Federal Act to Maryland and other state agencies

receiving federal grants would either make those

agencies ineligible for grants or would abrogate the

Maryland and other state statutes.

The proper forum for resolving these policy issues is,

of course, Congress and not a court. If Congress had

intended the Act to apply to federal grantees, then it

would have addressed the policy questions. Certainly,

Congress was aware of the tremendous amount of

money it has appropriated for grant programs. In 1966,

the year the Act was adopted, Congress appropriated

approximately $808 million to the National Institutes of

Health for medical research, which included almost

$675 million in the form of grants and contracts for

research at nonfederal institutions. U.S. Dep’t of

Hee’th, Education, and Welfare, Resources for Medical

Research, Report No. 10 at 9 (1967). For the fiscal year

July 1, 1966-June 30, 1967, the federal government

budgeted approximately one and one-half billion dollars

for basic research at universities and colleges through

grants and contracts. Bureau of the Budget, Special

Analyses of the United States Budget, 1967, at 116-17.

For that fiscal year, grants to state and local govern-

ment totaled 14.5 billion dollars. Id. at 137.

Furthermore, during the hearings in 1972 on the

operation of the Act, John F. Sherman, Deputy Director

of the National Institutes of Health, described the

mission of the National Institutes of Health in detail

28

and the mechanism by which the Institutes awarded

research grants. Dr. Sherman advised the subcommit-

tee that the National Institutes of Health planned

expenditures in fiscal year 1972 of $792 million for

research grants and $232 million for research and

development contracts. Significantly, Dr. Sherman and

the subcommittee were concerned not about informa-

tion and records in the possession of the grantees or

contractors but about the information submitted by the

grantees and contractors to the Institutes, that is,

whether that information in the possession of the

Institutes should be subject to disclosure under the Act.

U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices,

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations

and Government Information of the House Comm. on

Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Part 9)

3617, 3627,,3629 (1972) [cited in this brief as 1972 House

Hearings}. :

Congress has not been reluctant to impose obliga-

tions and conditions upon the recipients of federal

grants. It has by statute imposed requirements that

grant recipients keep books and establish accounting

systems and that they be subject to audits. See, e.g., 42

U.S.C. § 295h-5 (1976) (grants concerning allied health

professions, enacted in 1965); 42 U.S.C. § 2835 (1976)

(grants relating to the prevention and treatment of

alcohol abuse and alcoholism, enacted in 1970).

It has also subjected grant recipients to federal

requirements on matters of social policy not related to

handing out and accounting for grant money. For

example, in 1964, Congress imposed upon all recipients

of federal grants an obligation not to discriminate

against any person on the basis of race, color, or

national origin in the utilization of federal funds. 42

U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). In addition, one author has listed |

at least eighteen additional statutes imposing condi-

tions, apart from the requirements of the statutes

ne eee Se Dee ene eee een Seen

29

creating the grant program, upon the expenditure of

federal grant moneys. Madden, Future Directions for

Federal Assistance Programs: Lessons from Block

Grants and Revenue Sharing, 36 Fed. B.J. 107, 115 n.48

(1977). If Congress had wanted to extend the reach of

the Act to records of grant recipients, it knew how to do

so.

Consequently, the language of the Act, its legislative

history, and the authorities that have interpreted and

applied it require one conclusion. Because the federal

government did not exercise day-to-day control over the

activities of the private and state organizations

comprising the University Group, the receipt of federal

research grants by those organizations does not

transform them into federal agencies subject to the Act

or their records into agency records. These same

considerations also lead to the conclusion that the

NIAMDD’s right of access to certain records or the

FDA reliance upon the University Group’s published

findings and a limited audit do not transform these

organizations into agencies or their records into agency

records.

Il.

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT DOES NOT IMPOSE

ANY AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION UPON FEDERAL AGENCIES

TO OBTAIN DATA FROM PRIVATE OR STATE ENTITIES.

The Freedom of Information Act requires each

agency, upon any request for its records, to “make the

records promptly available to any person”. 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(3) (1976). By this language, Congress did not

intend to enact an information retrieval system. Its

goal was simply to require federal agencies and federal

employees to provide the documents that they had in

their possession to any person who requests those

documents. See pages 16-17 and 24-25 above. Neither

the language of the Act nor its legislative history

suggests that a federal agency must exercise whatever

30

auditing rights it may have and must obtain documents

from private or state entities in response to a request for

records. In short, the words “to make. . . available” do

not mean “to obtain from outside of the government

and make available”.

The enforcement provisions of the Act support this

conclusion. Section 552(a)(4)(B) states:

On complaint, the district court of the United

States ... has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency

from withholding agency records and to order the

production of any agency records improperly

withheld from the complainant.

“Withhold” means “to hold back’’, “to keep back or in

one’s possession”. Webster’s New International Diction-

ary 2941 (2d ed. 1953). If Congress had intended that

federal agencies must acquire documents not in their

possession in response to a request, Congress would not

have limited the district court’s power to (1) enjoining

federal agencies from “keeping” agency records in their

possession, and (2) ordering the production of records

improperly kept in their possession.

The language that Congress chose accurately reflects

its goal to make available to the public documents in

the possession of federal agencies. None of the in-

stances of agency reluctance to give access to agency

records that motivated Congress to pass the Act

involved a refusal by an agency to exercise its auditing

powers and obtain documents not in its possession. See

generally H.R. Rep. No. 1497 at 4-5 [1966], U.S. Code

Cong. & Ad. News at 2422-23; 1963 Senate Hearings

passim; 1965 House Hearings passim; 1972 House

Hearings passim; 1973 Senate Hearings passim.

The Attorney General’s interpretation of the Act

recognizes this specific intent:

The requirement of this subsection [5 U.S.C.

§ 552(3)] imposes no obligation to compile or

procure a record in response to a request.

31

Attorney General’s Memorandum at 23-24, Source Book

at 222-23. Similarly, this Court and other federal courts

have given effect to this plain meaning of the Act. In

NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 182, 161-62

(1975), this Court stated:

The Act does not compel agencies to write

opinions in cases in which they would not

otherwise be required to do so. It only requires

disclosure of certain documents which the law

requires the agency to prepare or which the agency

has decided for its own reasons to create.

See also Nolen v. Rumsfeld, 535 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1976),

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977) (holding that the Act

does not require a federal agency to produce missing

records and that the United States Army complied with

the Act when it made available all of the requested

Army records that were extant); Linker v. Hills, 453 F.

Supp. 556, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that the

Securities Exchange Commission diligently searched

missing records and exhibited good faith in assuring

that upon locating these records it would make them

available and therefore its failure to produce the

missing records was not an improper withholding

under the Act); Disabled Officers’ Association uv.

Rumsfeld, 428 F. Supp. 454, 459 (D.D.C. 1977) (holding

that the Act obligates an agency only to produce

nonexempt records which it presently has and hence

the court should not order the Secretary of Defense to

provide in the future the names and addresses of

officers who will be retired with a disability).

Since the publication of the Attorney General’s

Memorandum, Congress has amended the Act three

times. The two most recent amendments came after this

Court’s decision in Sears. Yet, Congress has not

changed the Attorney General’s interpretation or the

holding of this Court in Sears. If Congress wished to

change the plain import of the Act and the Attorney

32

General’s and this Court’s interpretation, then Con-

gress would have done so.

Congress most likely did not extend the Act to the

records of private or state entities that are subject to

audit by the federal government because of the drastic

impact that such action would have on private and

state entities. There are few activities in today’s society

that are immune from federal auditing powers.’ In

addition, the application of the Freedom of Information

Act to private and state organizations subject to federal

audit would abrogate many state public information

policies as expressed in state statutes and would violate

the reasonable expectations of many private persons

and organizations that their records are not subject to

disclosure to the world at large, but only to one or more

particular federal agencies which will only exercise

their auditing powers when they need to do so to carry

out their functions. If Congress had intended the Act to

have so broad a reach, it would at the very least have

7 The following statutes are merely an example of the

federal government’s broad powers to require that private

and state entities keep records, to demand access to those

records, and to acquire the records of private or state entities:

I.R.C. § 7602, 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1976) (any taxpayer or

potential taxpayer); 42 U.S.C. §§7414, 7616 (1977) (any

person who owns an emission source or is subject to the

Clean Air Act or any recipient of assistance under that Act);

15 U.S.C. §§78q, 78u (1976) (any person subject to the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 12 U.S.C. § 1906 (1976) (any

person subject to the Credit Control Act); 20 U.S.C. §584

(1976) (state education agency responsible for administering

state plans under the National Defense Education Act of

1958); 20 U.S.C. § 1022 (1976) (institutions of higher education

and other public and private nonprofit library institutions

receiving grants for the acquisition of library resources); 21

U.S.C. §§ 355, 357 (1976) (persons engaged in manufacturing

drugs or introducing drugs into interstate commerce); 33

U.S.C. §§ 1318, 1361 (1976) (the owner or operator of any point

of discharge and any recipient of financial assistance under

the Clean Water Act of 1977); and 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1976) (each

visi. subject to the Occupational Safety and Health Act

of 1970).

PO ae a Ml a nO ge a re tO me tine 38

Pe a al

33

considered the interests of these private and state

entities before acting.

In the instant case, the NIAMDD has a right to audit

certain records of the University Group. 45 C.F.R.

§ 74.24 (1978). The FDA did a limited audit of the data

for 150 patients. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,732, 52,733 (1978). Any

documents that the FDA created or obtained in the

course of the audit have been turned over to the

petitioners (A. 202). The purposes of the Act have been

served well.

Because the Act imposes no obligation upon a federal

agency to acquire records in response to a request for

records and because the Act only applies to records in

the possession or day-to-day control of a federal agency,

the petitioners’ argument fails. Neither the NIAMDD’s

putative right of access or the FDA’s limited audit of

some of the data amount to sufficient possession or

control of the data to make the data ageficy records.

Similarly, the right of access and a limited audit does

not make the University Group’s participating schools

and hospitals federal agencies.* The University Group

created the data and it possesses and controls them.

The federal government does not. The University Group

controls its day-to-day activities. The federal govern-

ment does not. Here, the data are not subject to the Act.

Ill.

RELIANCE BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UPON THE

UNIVERSITY GROUP STUDY DOES NOT TRANSFORM THE RAW

DATA OF THE STUDY INTO FEDERAL AGENCY RECORDS.

The petitioners argue that the FDA and the Secretary

of Health, Education, and Welfare have brought the

raw data of tne University Group’s study under the

8 There is nothing in the record or in the petitioners

unsubstantiated allegations in their brief to suggest that the

University Group has served as a data haven to subvert the

Act.

34°

Freedom of Information Act because in taking certain

regulatory actions they have relied upon the published

findings of the study, upon the published report of the

committee of the Biometric Society, and upon the

limited FDA audit of some of the data. They assert that

this alleged reliance is tantamount to reliance upon the

raw data and hence that the raw data have been

absorbed into the regulatory process.

This argument founders for a number of reasons. In

the first place, reliance upon published findings of a

study is not reliance upon the unpublished raw data

generated by that study. The published findings result

from the efforts of the University Group’s private and

state investigators to analyze the data, to organize

them in patterns that the investigators deem approp-

riate, and to draw conclusions from them. These

findings cannot be equated with the raw data any more

than a legal brief can be equated with all of the facts

and legal authorities that a lawyer may gather in

preparing the brief.° Similarly, a limited audit of some

of the data (see 43 Fed. Reg. 52,732, 52,733 (1978)) and

reliance upon that data or upon the audit does not

“absorb” all of the data into the FDA regulatory

process. Accordingly, neither reliance upon published

findings nor the FDA’s limited audit of some of the data

and its reliance upon that audit can reasonably be

deemed to create possession of or control over all of the

data. In short, neither the FDA nor any other agency of

the federal government has ever obtained possession of

the raw data or ever exercised day-to-day control over

the data or the University Group. Therefore, they are

not agency records.

® The distinction between published findings and the data

underlying those findings was specifically recognized by the

Commissioner of Food and Drugs in the administrative

proceedings for the withdrawal of approval of new drug

POs ety en

a at ees a ete

ee ee ee

35

Moreover, even if reliance upon published findings

and a limited audit were the same as reliance upon the

raw data—or, even if the FDA were to inspect every one

of the millions of documents in the University Group’s

possession and were to attempt to rely upon those

documents for any regulatory action without acquiring

them—the Act would still not apply to the raw data.

Such inspection and reliance are not possession of the

data and are not sufficient control over the data to

make them agency records. FDA’s attempt to rely upon

the raw data as a basis for regulatory action may not be

valid. That, however, is of no concern here.

It follows that the petitioners’ reliance argument is in

reality an argument that the federal government should

have obtained all of the raw data. This of course raises

the issue of whether the materials relied upon are

substantial evidence upon which regulatory decisions

may be based. For example, whether the published

findings of the University Group’s study and the other

material relied upon by the Commissioner of Food and

Drugs in proposing the relabeling for all oral hypogly-

cemic drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,587 (1975), are sufficient to

support the proposed relabeling is an issue which must

be considered first by the Commissioner and second by

any court to which the final decision of the Commis-

sioner may be appealed. It is not an issue before this

applications for phenformin hydrochloride. Proposal to

Withdraw Approval of New Drug Applications for Phenfor-

min Hydrochloride (FDA final decision Nov. 15, 1978)

reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 20,967, 20,969 (1979). In his final

order withdrawing such approval the Commissioner noted

that the record in the withdrawal proceedings contained

nearly 400 articles published in the medical literature, none

of which were accompanied by the raw data upon which they

were based. The Commissioner also observed that the

University Group’s study was relied upon in those proceed-

ings in the same way as the other articles. Accordingly, the

Commissioner did not accept the petitioners’ assertions that

the administrative law judge erred in admitting the Univer-

sity Group’s study into evidence.

36

Court and it has never been an issue in this case.

Indeed, in considering this issue, the court of appeals

stated that its holding that the raw data are not agency

records raised no implications about the petitioners’

ability to obtain the data in the proceedings before the

FDA. 587 F.2d at 1134.

The petitioners’ argument that reliance makes private

and state records federal agency records under the Act,

aside from having no basis in the language of the Act,

fails for another reason. This argument contradicts one

of Congress’ main goals in passing theAct: to establish

clear and simple guidelines for determining what

records are to be made available and to whom.

Congress provided that “agency records” should be

made available to “any person”. These words replaced

the elastic and uncertain standards in the original

section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act.!° That

section contained such vague phrases as “matters of

official record”, “persons properly and directly con-

cerned”, and “confidential for good cause”, which were

difficult to apply and which federal agencies used as

grounds for withholding federal documents. See S. Rep.

No. 813 at 5, Source Book at 40; H.R. Rep. No. 1497 at 4-

5, [1966] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2422-23. The

test put forth by the petitioners would inject into the

interpretation of the Act an equally elastic and

uncertain standard. There is no way to determine how

much reliance would be necessary before this metamor-

phosis of private and state records into federal agency

records happened. Moreover, this standard would

10 This section stated:

(c) Public Records. — Save as otherwise required by

statute, matters of official record shall in accordance

with published rule be made available to persons

properly and directly concerned except information held

confidential for good cause found.

Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), formerly codified in 5 U.S.C.

§ 1002 (1964).

a a Dn tN re Rint mses a SAO ee Ld bnew —

Re ee

37

inextricably entangle the interpretation of the Act with

the collateral administrative proceedings in which the

federal agency’s reliance occurred.!!

Finally, the reliance test is inappropriate because it

attempts to incorporate into the Act consideration of

the need for records as a criterion for determining

whether those records are “agency records”. The

petitioners allege a tremendous need for acquiring the

raw data. Petitioners’ brief at 28, 52. This putative need

derives solely from the reliance by the FDA and the

Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare upon the

published findings of the University Group study. The

petitioners in effect argue that, when the government

relies upon the published findings of a study, or a

portion of the raw data generated in the study—that is,

when the government creates a perceived need in

certain persons fqy,all of the data—then all of the data

become “agency records” under the Act, even though

those data are the records of private and state entities.

On the other hand, under the petitioners’ argument, if

there is no reliance and hence no need, then those

private or state records do not become agency records.

11 The difficulty in applying such a test is illustrated by the

administrative proceedings for the suspension and withdraw-

al of approval of new drug applications for phenformin. On

July 25, 1975, the Secretary of Health, Education, and

Welfare suspended the approval of new drug applications for

phenformin because the drug posed an imminent health

hazard. The Secretary based this decision upon reports to the

FDA of deaths due to lactic acidosis, data submitted by drug

companies and hospitals, reports from other countries, and

the published findings of the University Group study. Order

of the Secretary Suspending Approval of New Drug Applica-

tions for Phenformin, NDA 11-624, 12-752, 17-126, 17-127,

(DHEW July 25, 1977).

At the same time, the FDA began the hearings on the

permanent withdrawal of approval of the new drug applica-

tions. 42 Fed. Reg. 40,959 (1977). After the hearings, the

administrative law judge issued an initia! decision, in which

he ruled that the University Group’s study could not be

substantial evidence in the proceedings but could form the

38

It is clear that Congress did not intend this result.

The Act eliminated the requirement that the person

requesting documents demonstrate a need for those

documents. See S. Rep. No. 813 at 5, Source Book at 40;

NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10

(1975); Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410

U.S. 73, 86 (1973); Columbia Packing Co. v. United

States Department of Argiculture, 563 F.2d 495, 499 (1st

Cir. 1977); Robles v. Environmental Protection Agency,

484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973). The need for

documents arising out of regulatory proceedings is

similarly irrelevant. The Act was intended to be a

disclosure statute, not a discovery statute. NLRB uv.

Sears, 421 U.S. at 143 n.10; e.g.; Renegotiation Board v.

Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974);

Columbia Packing Co. v. United States Department of

Agriculture, 563 F.2d at 499, 500.

Consequently, whether and to what extent the federal

government has relied upon the published findings of

the University Group does not alter the plain import of

the language of the Act. A person may obtain “agency

records”. “Agency records” are the records that an

agency has created or acquired or that it possesses. Just

as federal funding of the study that generated the

basis for expert testimony and for consideration of the safety

of phenformin. Proposal to Withdraw Approval of the New

Drug Applications for Phenformin Hydrochloride, Docket No.

77N-0150, (FDA initial decision Feb. 8, 1978), reprinted in 44

Fed. Reg. 20,977, 20,979 (1979). The Commissioner of Food

and Drugs adopted this decision with some modifications.

Proposal to Withdraw Approval of New Drug Applications

for Phenformin Hydrochloride (FDA final decision Nov. 15,

1978), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 20,967 (1979). In doing so, the

Commissioner stated that he did not consider the University

Group’s study in reaching his final decision and that he was

not adopting the references to the study in the substantive

portions of the initial decision. 44 Fed. Reg. at 20,979. See

also 44 Fed. Reg. 20,966, 20,966-67 (1979) (denial of petition of

reconsideration of final order). Thus, the FDA’s reliance upon

the published findings of the University Group has varied

from some reliance to no reliance.

39

records or federal access to the records is not equivalent

to possession of the records or control over the

University Group sufficient to make it a federal agency,

federal reliance—by itself or in conjunction with federal

funding and federal access—is not possession of the

data or control over the University Group. The raw data

that petitioners seek are not agency records.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the respondent requests that this

Court affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and

hold that the raw data generated by private and state

institutions that conduct a research project funded by

federal grants are not agency records within the

meaning of the Act and that the Act does not impose an

obligation upon federal agencies to acquire these

private or state records simply because the federal

government may have access to them or may have

relied upon published reports based on them.

Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN H. SAcus,

Attorney General

of Maryland,

Davip H. FELDMAN,

Assistant Attorney General,

Chief of Litigation,

{ THOMAS E. PLANK,

Assistant Attorney General,

1400 One South Calvert Building,

Baltimore, Maryland 21202,

(301) 383-3737

Attorneys for Respondent

' Dr. Christian R. Klimt.

August 31, 1979

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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