Respondents Brief — Brown v. Glines

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“as Supreme Court, U.S.

i FILED }

JUL 20 1979 |

}

IN THE [MICHAEL RODAK,IR., CLERK

Supreme Court of the United aa

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1006

HAROLD R. BROWN,

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

ALBERT EDWARD GLINES,

Respondent.

On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court

of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

DAVID M. COBIN

Hamline University

- School of

1536 Hewitt Avenue

St. Paul, Minnesota 55104

(612) 641-2143

(Court appointed Counsel

for Respondent)

Of Counsel:

Melvin K. Dayley

Dayley and Blumin

6330 Telegraph Avenue

Oakland, California 94609

(415) 653-8800,

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.

Page

EE ES) 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............05. 3

ARGUMENT:

I. The Court of Appeals was correct in

Il.

finding that the challenged regulations

violated 10 U.S.C. $1034 .............

A. The Court of Appeals was correct in

finding that the protections afforded

armed forces personnel by 10 U.S.C.

$1034 include communication by peti-

B. The Court of Appeals was correct in

finding that regulations placing a

prior restraint on all petitioning on

military bases were not necessary to

the security of the United States....

If this Court finds that the challenged

regulations violated 10 U.S.C. 1034, the

lower courts’ rulings in favor of respon-

dent should be affirmed ..............

A. The action taken against respondent

was based upon petitions directed to

members of Congress as well as a peti-

tion to the Secretary of Defense. ... .

B. Protections afforded armed forces

personnel for communication to

members of Congress should be held

to include communication directed

21

22

22

Page

additionally to the Secretary of

SR Ssh ha Rw eho yevieev ales

III. The Court of Appeals was correct in

finding that regulations requiring com-

mand approval prior to circulation of

petitions on a military base violate the

First Amendment...................

A. The Court’s decision in Greer v.

Spock is not dispositive of the

issues in this case ................

B. Taking the important governmental

interests served by the challenged

regulations into account, the Court of

Appeals was correct in finding that

the application of a prior restraint on

all petitioning on military bases was

substantially overboard...........

1. The significance of the prior

approval requirement as a prior

restraint..... eae ed oak ae ee

a) Dissemination delayed may

prove tantamount to dissem-

ination denied..............

b) Censors uncontrolled by courts

tend to deny publication to

material protected by the First

Amendment ...............

2. Applying the analysis employed in

Nebraska Press Association v.

27

29

29

35

35

36

iii

Page

b) The availability of other mea-

sures to mitigate the harm

Ee 47

c) The effectiveness of the prior

command approval require-

ment in protecting the military

DU Sauaiys bas 66 enedas 55

rj ae ig age Bb Wee 57

Se RS cc Sis oak be Awake UAC SOAS OO 60

: CITATIONS

CASES:

Abbott Labs v. Portland Retail Druggists, 425

Se RR ek eee Lee Wie oa acecn ne ook 9, 29

Allen v. Monger, 404 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Cal.

1975), 583 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1978), petition

for cert. pending sub. nom. Brown v. Allen,

ee Te Pee ree passim

Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1970)... 49

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413, U.S. 601 (1973) .... 50

Carlson v. Schlesinger, 364 F. Supp. 626 (D.D.C.

1973), rev'd on other grounds, 511 F.2d 1327

EA Ri RU EMN A ake 6 aioe es OS Ve Wee a as 39

Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir.

EME EN a padiaie Delve spas ee kers 21, 39, 45, 57

Chenoweth v. Van Arsdall, Mis. No. 73-1

(USCMA Mar. 13, 1973), 1 Mil. L. Rptr. 2098

Ey TSRMESNAL SAS Bap ih Peek NOSE eI yee 57

Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569(1941)..... 47

iv

Page

Eastern Air Lines v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir.

TOGRD . bc ss osc d.o0b 56S ee ate eeee ies 27

Easton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974)..... 23

Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229

(ROG: 5). kn eves Coa Orie eeaares 52

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)........ 23

Fleischmann Construction Co. v. United States,

270 U.S. 840 (199G). . cc ic vieclccctccscievs 28

Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)......... passim

Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 413 F. Supp. 863

(D.D.C. 1976) 575 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1978),

cert. granted sub. nom. Brown v. Huff, No.

i EE Pe ey es PT err i passim

Montana Pow:.- Co. v. Federal Power Com-

mission, 445 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1971) cert.

den. 400 U.S. 1013 (1971). ................ 27

Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S.

GOR ROT: i's wee vias Rice caeeesueeaees passim

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.

TES (IGT 8 ice Vee sea ea ee ees 21

Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).... 35,50, 51, 53

Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975)...... 28

Steck v. Connally, 199 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C.

BOGE a ick Na cee eon eee 34

Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) .... 3,22, 23

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)....... 17,18

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) ....... 51

Tygrett v. Washington, 543 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir.

976: oan Fe Sdekee van gs SRR ee 2 23

Page

United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar

Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967)........... 18

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 545

a a Sita giaie ai, a aaa ve eam wb u'achle'e Ae 17,18

United States Donner, 497 F.2d 184 (7th Cir.

1974) cert. den., 419 U.S. 1047 (1974) ....... 23

United States v. Gray, 20 USCMA 63, 42 CMR

ID hide! Gd 6. athe 00-070 64 AO LD oles 33

United States v. Schmidt, 16 USCMA 57, 36

UE RMEEINE ov k'b band dceeeketvcebs 33, 47

Waters v. Peterson, 495 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.

ee re eh a ee ce al ie ace es 4 bb bcp 23

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) ...... 43

Yancy v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 207, 122 S.W.

NES bs SUN wkd, bee heal weak Cae aes 19

Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1959) . 3, 22, 26

CONSTITUTION, TREATY, STATUTES AND

REGULATIONS:

United States Constitution, First Amend-

Sahih td wile d ip a vik Neo 8 0 B08 8 8 passim

IN 6 54°55. \0'oco-o°0 a awe ove vivrache o's © 28

hid a Ss Gra hvala Hale Kb ole > oeee 8s pe 48

10 UBC. $016 mse cei cece cen ncenn 47

IEE iia. oon ok evn wo abba wa wriee paints 48

Se a5 a oy 3.0.00 5-60.80 ER 4,0 OAs 48

PP NE ns os be bes ec dba bh ouleee's passim

DTM Mieco k So) kee Cavaeeees 28

Page

Department of Defense Directive 1325.6 III G

PR ee Odie Sed we ke Awd Sob wks WE 10

Navy Regulation Article 1248................ 7,9

TREATISES AND ARTICLES:

Blackstone, Commentaries (Oxford, 1765) (Phil-

| i c < | aS ara ae are eee eno A 11

Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process (1921)... 27

Kalven, The Concept aj t'1e Public Forum: Cox v.

Louisiana, 1965 Supreme Court Reviewl... 51

Moyer, Justice and the Military (1972)......... 33

Rehnquist, Civility and Freedom of Speech, 49

I RAO Gris dee e eb W iene eb cs 60

Schwartz, The Bill of Rights (1978)......... passim

Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places,

1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 238......ccccceccesecs 35

» Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978)... 36, 37,

38, 39, 42, 44

Tucker, Constitution of the United States

RR Se dinG es hiew dns es eas ae aoe esas

Wills, Inventing America (1978) ............6: 11

MISCELLANEOUS:

97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951)............ 22 e ee eee 7

97 Cong. Rec. A4977 (1951) .............. 9, 20, 28

97 Cong. Rec. A4977-78 (1951)............004. 28

Federal Register Vol. 33 No. 16, p.841......... 28

Vii

Page

Executive Order No. 11390, 47, January 24,

PEI 5p eulld kale eed ap Rd a as Sa

28

55

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1006

HAROLD R. BROWN,

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

ALBERT EDWARD GLINES,

Respondent.

On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court

of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

~~ BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

STATEMENT

Respondent was a Captain in the Air Force Re-

serves. He had been evaluated as dedicated, energetic,

zealous officer, clearly the most competent navigator

within his flight and probably the most competent

within his entire group (A.9, Appendix A to this brief),

and had accumulated more than 15 years of service in

2

the Air Force Reserves. (A. 31). Although he was a

member of the Reserves, respondent had been on near-

ly full-time active duty for the two years prior to

initiation of this lawsuit. (A. 8).

Respondent was concerned about the negative im-

pact Air Force grooming standards were having on

the morale and retention of servicemen in the Air

Force; he prepared a petition to members of Congress

and the Secretary of Defense to show the widespread

dissatisfaction of servicemen with the grooming

standards.' The substantive portion of the petition

stated the following:

We, the undersigned, all American citizens serv-

ing in the armed services of our nation, req:vst

your assistance in changing the grooming stand-

ards of the United States Air Force.

We feel that -.:e present regulations on grooming

have caused more racial tension, decrease in mor-

ale and retention, and loss of respect for author-

ities than any other official Air Force policy.

(A. 18-22) At the time of the events herein, respondent

was serving active duty was involved in a navigator

instructor upgrade training program. (A. 34).

' The record does not include an explanation of how grooming

standards caused the problems indicated. Counsel’s understand-

ing is that the standards had a disparate effect on Blacks and

Whites in the Reserves. Reservists had to satisfy the grooming

standards for the weekend-a-month they were on active duty.

Persons with tightly-curled hair, often Blacks, could mat their

hair while on active duty and comb it out as a civilian to conform

with current civilian hair styles. Persons with straight hair, often

Whites, had to keep their hair short at all times, remaining out

of style with civilian hair styles. This disparate effect caused

racial tension.

3

In April, 1974, during a training flight to Japan,

respondent had an overnight stopover at Anderson

Air Force Base, Guam. After his plane landed in

Guam, respondent handed a ground crew member a

copy of the petition. The ground crew member took

the petition back to his barracks and, in time, a total

of eight servicemen signed the petition. (A. 25-27). For

initiating the circulation of his petition in this manner,

respondent was removed from active duty and trans-

ferred out of the Active Reserves to the Standby Re-

serves.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I,

The statutory protection afforded members of mil-

itary service “communicating with a member of Con-

gress” in 10 U.S.C. $1034 includes communication by

petitions. Noi only are petitions generally understood

as a proper means of communicating with Congress,

the right to petition the government has been under-

stood as a fundamental right since colonial times.

Furthermore, the legislative history of 10 U.S.C.

$1034 demonstrates that it was enacted to open chan-

nels of communication between members of the armed

services and members of Congress which explicitly

included joint petitions.

II.

Respondent should not lose statutory protection

even though his petition to members of Congress was

directed additionally to the Secretary of Defense. Un-

der Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) and Yates

v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1959), the government

4

must prove to a certainty that the action taken

against respondent was not based in the least degree

on his petitions to members of Congress for respond-

ent to lose statutory protection. The government can-

not meet this burden.

Furthermore, since the addition of a copy of re-

spondent’s petition to the Secretary of Defense serves

the congressional goals that underlie 10 U.S.C. §1034,

it would be unjust, if not absurd, for respondent to

lose statutory protection as a result of directing an

additional copy to the Secretary of Defense.

Ill.

The Court’s decision in Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.

828 (1976), relied on by the government, is not dis-

positive of the issues in this case because the nature

of the speech interests and the policies involved in the

two cases are entirely different. The inability of a

civilian national political candidate to make political

speeches on a military base has very little impact on

the candidate’s ability to reach his national audience.

However, the inability of a serviceman to circulate a

petition to be signed by other servicemen on a military

base has a substantial impact on the serviceman’s

ability to reach his limited audience. Furthermore, the

decision to prohibit civilian campaign speeches on

base comports with the American constitutional tra-

dition of a politically neutral military establishment

under civilian control. However, the decision to pro-

hibit the circulation of petitions to the civilians con-

stitutionally charged with control over the military

establishment conflicts with the same constitutional

tradition.

5

Prior restraints on speech are ‘‘the most serious

and the least tolerable infringement on First Amen¢d-

ment Rights,’’ Nebracka Press Association v. Stuart,

427 U.S. 539, 559 (1975), and the prior approval re-

quirement is as serious an infringement on the first

amendment rights of servicemen as is prior restraints

on speech generally. Prior restraints on petitioning

on-base can prove tantamount to a prohibition of all

petitioning. For servicemen assigned to foreign bases

and ships, it has that effect so long as servicemen are

assigned to the base or so long as the ship is at sea.

If timeliness has importance, a prior restraint

amounts to total infringement. In every case, denial

of permission to circulate a petition on-base substan-

tially interferes with petitioner’s ability to accomplish

the desired communication. Furthermore, the prior

approval requirement has the same procedural signif-

icance as other prior restraints.

Moreover, the broad delegation of authority to mil-

itary commanders to restrain petitioning on the basis

of such amorphous interests as “‘loyalty,’’ ‘‘disci-

pline’’ and ‘‘morale,”’ invites censorship. In every case

where permission to circulate on-base has been re-

quested it has been denied, even when the government

now admits that denial was wrongful. In the present

case, respondent was taken off active duty and re-

moved from the reserves even though his conduct was

innocuous.

Applying the analysis employed in Nebraska Press

Association v. Stuart, supra, demonstrates that the

prior approval requirement is unnecessary, ineffective

and unconstitutional. The danger to military interests

6

from petitioning is minimal, especially when com-

pared with other forms of protest which may be ex-

ercised when the right to petition is denied. Further-

more, there are less restrictive alternatives available

to the government to mitigate the dangers that peti-

tioning might present. These alternatives include ap-

propriate time, place and manner restrictions and the

broad power of military authorities to punish disrup-

tive petitioning.

ARGUMENT

I

The Court Of Appeals Was Correct In Finding That

The Challenged Regulations Violate 10 U.S.C. §1034.

A. The Court of Appeals was correct in find-

ing that the protections afforded armed

forces personnel by 10 U.S.C. $1034 in-

clude communication by petition.

10 U.S.C. §1034 states:

No person may restrict any member of an armed

force in communicating with a member of Con-

gress, unless the communication is unlawful or

violates a regulation necessary to the security of

the United States.

In the district court, the Court of Appeals and in

this Court, the Government has argued that the pro-

tections afforded armed forces personnel by this stat-

ute do not extend to communication by petition be-

cause (1) the language of the statute is written in the

singular and (2) the original incident which prompted

7

the statute involved a letter. Brief for the petitioners

at 37-42. The lower courts in this case and in two

other cases found this argument unpersuasive. Glines

v. Wade, 401 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Cal. 1975), 586 F.2d

675 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, sub. nom., Brown

v. Glines, No. 78-1006 (Mar. 19, 1979); See, Huff v.

Secretary of the Navy, 413 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C.

1976), 575 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. granted,

No. 78-599 (Mar. 19, 1979); Allen v. Monger, 404 F.

Supp. 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1975), 583 F.2d 438 (9th Cir.

1978), petition for cert. pending, sub. nom., Brown v.

Allen, No. 78-1005. This Court should find the argu-

ment unpersuasive as well.

In its brief the Government asserts that the lan-

guage “‘communicating with a member of Congress”’

in $1034 by its nature omits any reference to petition-

ing. Brief for the petitioner at 37. But petitioning is

certainly generally understood as a proper means of

communicating with Congress.

To support an interpretation limiting the meaning

of ‘‘communicating”’ to communication by individual

letters, the Government’s brief refers to portions of

the Congressional Record purporting to quote from

the Navy Regulations in effect in 1951 which regulat-

ed communication with Congress:

At that time, Articles 1248 and 1249 of Navy

Regulations (1948) provided ‘‘any letter from a

member of the naval service to Congress or to a

Congressman which affects the Naval Establish-

ment should be sent through official Channels. “

97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951).

Brief for the petitioners at 38.

In fact, the above quotation is not from the text of

Navy Regulations, but from a letter of the Secretary

8

of the Navy, which in turn quoted an opinion of the

Judge Advocate General of the Navy.’

* The letter was from Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the

Navy and addressed to Congressman Byrnes of Wisconsin. The

letter in its entirety ie as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Washington, March 13, 1951.

Hon. John W. Byrnes,

House of Representatives,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BYRNES: This is in reply to your letter of Feb-

ruary 26, 1951, requesting and interpretation of articles 1248

and 1249, Navy Regulations (1948).

In an opinion dated April 7, 1950, the Judge Advocate General

of the Navy, with reference to articles 1248 and 1249, Navy

Regulations (1948) stated in conclusion:

“The provisions of the above-quoted articles 1248 and 1249

would seem to be sufficiently broad to cover any communication

intended or designed to influence Congress or a Member of Con-

gress to favor or oppose any legislation or appropriations affect-

ing the Naval Establishment, whether pending, proposed, or sug-

gested. Hence, in every case where a person in the naval service

desires to send a communication to Congress, or a Member of

Congress, the question to be answered by such person is whether

his communication concerns legislation or appropriations relat-

ing to the Naval Establishment. Such a determination is made

by the member of the naval forces at his own risk. If he has any

doubt as to whether his proposed letter relates to the Naval

Establishment, he should send it via the Secretary of the Navy.

“Accordingly, in the light of the above-quoted articles 1248

and 1249, it appears that any letter from a member of the naval

service, to Congress or to a Congressman which affects the Naval

Establishment, should be sent through official channels.”’

I consider this to be the correct interpretation of these articles.

You will agree, I am sure to the basic administrative policy on

which these articles are based: That the Department of the Navy

should at all times be advised as to all matters relating to the

Naval Establishment. These articles are not intended to prohibit

9

Article 1248 of Navy Regulations (1948), which was

entitled ‘‘Communications to the Congress,” actually

read as follows:

All petitions, remonstrances, memorials and

communications from any person or persons in

the naval service, whether on the active or retired

list, addressed to Congress, or to either House

thereof, on any subject of legislations relating to

the Naval Establishment, whether pending, pro-

posed, or suggested, shall be forwarded through,

or as authorized by, the Secretary of the Navy.

97 Cong. Rec. A4977 (1951) (emphasis added).

Contrary to the Government’s assertions, this leg-

islative history indicates that the meaning of ‘“‘com-

municating”’ in §1034 does include communicating by

petitions since §1034 was enacted to open channels of

communication which explicitly included petitions.

Application of other rules of statutory construction

suggests the same result. As stated by this Court,

‘‘fbjecause the Act is remedial, it is to be construed

broadly to effectuate its purposes.”’ Abbott Labs. v.

Portland Retail Druggists, 425 U.S. 1, 12, (1976).

The Courts of Appeals in Brown v. Glines, supra

(78-1006), Brown v. Allen, supra (78-1005), and Sec-

retary of the Navy v. Huff, supra (78-599), extensively

correspondence between naval personnel and their Congressmen.

Whenever correspondence addressed to a Congressman is sent

via the Secretary of the Navy, it is, as a matter of policy, for-

warded promptly.

Your inquiry in this regard is appreciated and your letter is

being further referred to the Chief of Naval Mperations for study

of your suggestion that the articles might be clarified.

Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS

10

analyzed the language and legislative history of the

statute. The majority of the Court of Appeals in Huff

concluded,

[T}he legislative history indeed leaves no doubt

that the right to present a solitary, individual

grievance to a member of Congress is encom-

passed by §1034. But there is no indication that

this is the outer limit of the communication

which Congress sought to protect. ... We would

suppose that quite often a soldier’s intended com-

munication with Congress could not effectively

be accomplished through solitary letters, as, for

instance, when the objective is to communicate

widespread dissatisfaction concerning a particu-

lar aulersaa rather than merely the grievance

itself.

* * *

Particularly in view of the long and cherished

tradition in this country, embodied in the first

amendment ... of collective presentation of

grievances to those in authority in the form of

petitions, we think it most unlikely that in pro-

tecting the right to communicate grievances to

Congress, Congress did not intend to protect the

right to solicit others to sign such communica-

tions.

Huff (78-599 Pet. App. 12a-13a)

The Court of Appeals in Huff also noted that

D.O.D. Directive No. 1325.6, §III G (1969) refers to

§1034 as protecting the right of a member of the

armed forces to “‘petition or present any grievance to

any member of Congress.”’ Huff (78-599 Pet. App.

12a).

11

The Court of Appeals in Allen and Glines reached

similar conclusions.

Congress clearly intended to protect communi-

cation with several members of Congress at a

time, even though it is used in the singular; while

the record is not so clear, it is unlikely that Con-

gress intended to restrict protected communica-

tion by more than one member of the armed

forces at a time.

We therefore hold that $1034 protects petition-

ing. The importance petitioning Congress has

"8 in our history, combined with a legislative

istory that shows Congress concerned to kee

communications open despite threats to disci-

pline and a history of verbal changes in the stat-

ute that encourages a broad interpretation of its

protections, all lead to this conclusion. The right

to petition, of course, includes a reasonable op-

portunity to solicit signatures for the petition.

Allen (78-1005 Pet. App. 10a).

The Courts of Appeals’ appreciation for the impor-

tance petitioning has played in our history is entirely

justified. Not only is the right to petition protec.ed

by the First Amendment, but it is a right that was

fundamental to the origins of the United States. “It

is too often forgotten that the entire raison d’etre of

the [First] Congress, assembled in Philadelphia, was

to petition for redress.’’ G. Wills, Inventing America,

57 (1978).

The right to petition was by 1774 a well-established

principle of British law,’ and in the colonies had been

* See, 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 138-39, ch. I §4 (Oxford,

1765), id. at 143 (American Edition, Philadelphia, 1771):

4. If there should happen any uncommon injury, or infringe-

ment of the rights beforementioned, which the ordinary

12

designated as a fundamental right as early as 1641.‘

The First Congress relied on assembly and petition as

“the recognized way of addressing and defining what

the seventeenth and eighteenth century Englishmen

called ‘fundamental law’.” G. Wills, supra, 54 (1978).

course of law is too defective to reach, there still remains a

fourth subordinate right appertaining to every individual,

namely, the rights of petitioning the king, or either house of

parliament, for the redress of grievances.

(Typeset modernized). See also, The English Bill of Rights (1689),

reprinted in, 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 43 (1971):

[Tyhe said lords . . . being now assembled in a full and free

representative of this nation, taking into their most serious

consideration the best means for attaining the ends afore-

said, do in the first place (as their ancestors in like case have

naturally done) for the vindicating and asserting their an-

cient rights and liberties, declare ... that it is the right of

the subjects to petition the king, and all commitments and

prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal. . . .

* MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES, 1641

A Coppie of the Liberties of the

Massachusetts Colonie in New England

12. Every man, whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not

free shall have libertie to come to any publique Court, Coun-

cel, or Towne meeting, and either by speech or writeing to

move any lawfull, seasonable, and materiall question, or to

present any necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill or

information, whereof that meeting hath proper cognizance,

so it be done in convenient time, due order, and respective

manner.

Reprinted in, 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 73 (1971).

Schwartz states, id. at 69, “‘[o]f the documents discussed thus far

[English: Magna Carta (1215), Petition of Right (1628), Agree-

ment of the People (1649), A Healing Question (1656), Bill of

Rights (1689); American: First Charter of Virginia (1606), Fun-

damental Orders of Connecticut (1639), Maryland Act for the

Liberties of the People (1639)], there is no doubt that the 1641

Massachusetts Act was the most important as a forerunner of

the federal Bill of Rights.”

13

The colonies had used group petitions to the King as

a means of seeking redress of grievances as early as

1765,° and unanimously asserted the right to do so at

the First Continental Congress.°

* After the Stamp Act in 1765, the colonists convened a Con-

gress to assert their right to be treated as were English citizens.

Included in their Declaration was an assertion of the right to

petition.

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES, 1765

The members of this Congress, ... with minds deeply

impressed by a sense of the present and impending misfor-

tunes of the British colonies on this continent; having con-

sidered as maturely as time will permit the circumstances

of the said colonies, esteem it our indispensible duty to make

the following declarations of our humble opinion respecting

the most essential rights and liberaties of the colonists, and

of the grievances under which they labor, by reason of sev-

eral late Acts of Parliment.

XIII. That it is the right of the British subjects in these

colonies to petition the King or either House of Parliment.

1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 196-98 (1971). :

* DECLARATION AND RESOLVES OF THE FIRST

CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774

And whereas, Assemblies have been frequently dissolved,

contrary to the rights of the people, when they attempt to

deliberate on grievances; and their dutiful, humble, loyal,

& reasonable petitions to the crown for redress, have been

repeatedly treated with contempt, by his majesty’s minis-

ters of state:

The good people of the several Colonies . . . justly alarmed

at these arbitrary proceedings of parliment and administra-

tion, have severally elected, constituted, and appointed de-

puties to meet and sit in general congress, in the city of

Philadelphia, in order to obtain such establishment, as that

their religion, laws, and liberties may not be subverted:

Whereupon the deputies so appointed being now assem-

bled, in a full and free representation of these Colonies,

taking into their most serious consideration, the best means

14

As the states of the new country began erecting

their own Constitutions, many included expressions

of the rights of their citizens. The first to expressly

protect petitioning was Pennsylvania, in 1776.’ That

of attaining the ends aforesaid, do, in the first place, as

Englishmen, their ancestors in like cases have usually done,

for asserting and vindicating their rights and liberties, de-

clare,

That the inhabitants of the English Colonies in North

America, by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of

the English Constitution, and the several charters of com-

pacts, have the following Rights:

Resolved, N.C.D. 8. That they have a right peaceably to

assemble, consider their grievances, and petition the King;

and that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations, and

commitments for the same, are illegal.

1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 216-17 (1971). The letters

“‘N.C.D.”’ before the resolution indicate that the resolution was

adopted nemine contradicente: i.e., without dissent. Schwartz,

supra, at 214. Cf., the Declaration of Independence, { 29 (1776):

In every state of these oppressions we have petitioned for

redress in the most humble terms. Our repeated petitions

have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince,

whose character is thus marked by every act which may

define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.

Reprinted in, 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 254 (1971).

’ A DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE

INHABITANTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, OR STATE

OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1776.

XVI. That the people have a right to assemble together,

to consult for their common good, to instruct their repre-

sentatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of

grievances, by address, petition, or remonstrance.

1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 276-77 (1971).

oa oe

15

state was followed by similar provisions in Delaware

(1776),° North Carolina (1776), Massachusetts

(1780),'° New Hampshire (1783),'' and the territory of

* DELAWARE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1776

A Declaration of the Rights and Fundamental Rules of

the Delaware State, formerly stiled, The Government of the

counties of New-Castle, Kent and Sussex, upon Delaware.

Sect. 9. That every man hath a right to petition the leg-

islature for the redress of grievances in a peaceable and

orderly manner.

1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 276-77 (1971). °

* NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1776

XVIII. That the people have a right to assemble together,

to consult for their common goods, to instruct their Repre-

sentatives, and to apply to the Legislature, for redress of

grievances.

1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 286-87 (1971).

‘© Massachusetts’ Constitution was not adopted until 1780. A

1778 version had been overwhelmingly rejected by the people for

lack of a Bill of Rights, among other reasons. 1 B. Schwartz, The

Bill of Rights 337 (1971). The Constitution finally passed con-

tained this provision:

XX. The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable

manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good; give

instructions to their representatives; and to request of the

legislative body, by the way of addresses, petitions, or re-

monstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and the

grievances they suffer.

Id., 372-73.

7. NEW HAMPSHIRE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1783

XXXII. The penple have a right in an orderly and peace-

able manner, to assemble and consult upon the common

good, give instructio..s to their representatives; and to re-

quest of the legislative body, by way of petition or re-

monstrance, redress of wrongs done them, and of the griev-

ances they suffer.

1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 378-79 (1971).

16

Vermont (1777) (Vermont was not recognized as a

state until 1791).'* See also, the Georgie Constitution

(1777).'*

Even though most states had adopted their own

Bills of Rights, the 1787 federal Constitution con-

tained no such provisions. 2 B. Schwartz, The Bill of

Rights 435 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Schwartzj. The

lack of a Bill of Rights created serious reservations

among Antifederalists about ratification. Seven of

eleven states proposed amendments to the Constitu-

tion,'‘ and one state, North Carolina, refused to ratify

the Constitution until a Bill of Rights was included."*

2 VERMONT DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1777

XVIII. That the people have a right to assemble together,

to consult for their common good—to instruct their repre-

sentatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of

grievances by address, petition or remonstrance.

Reprinted in, 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 324 (1971).

¥ GEORGIA CONSTITUTION, 1777

Art. LXIII. No alteration shall be made in this consti-

tution without petitions from a majority of the counties,

and the petitions from each county to be signed by a ma-

jority of voters in each county within this State; at which

time the assembly shall order a convention to be called for

that purpose, specifying the alterations to be made, accord-

ing to the petitions preferred to the assembly by the major-

ity of the counties as aforesaid.

Reprinted in 1, B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 300 (1971).

'‘* The seven states were Massachusetts, Maryland, South Car-

olina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina. See,

2 Schwartz, 627-933. Pennsylvania approved the constitution

without amendments, but a minority of the convention circulated

a document after the convention that influenced later public

opinion as to why a Bill of Rights should be adopted. Schwartz,

628.

‘6 2 Schwartz 932-33.

Ph, Wor. at

17

\

Four of the seven states that expressed a desire for

amendments included in their recommendations a pro-

tection for the right to petition.'®

In 1789, when James Madison assumed the lead-

ership in meeting the widespread demand for a federal

Bill of Rights, a consensus had developed among

Americans regarding the fundamental rights that the

Bill of Rights should protect.'’ Madison recommended

to Congress fourteen of the twenty-two state propos-

als. It is significant that more states recommended

the right to petition than recommended free speech,

grand jury indictment, double jeopardy, self-incrimi-

nation, just compensation, right to counsel, right to

confront witnesses, right to know nature of accusa-

tion, and that powers not delegated are reserved to

the people.'* There was no challenge to the right to

petition during the Congressional debates on the

amendments,’* and it was, of course, included in the

First Amendment.

After adoption in the Bill of Rights, the right to

petition, intertwined with the right of assembly, has

repeatedly been found woven into the very fabric of

the United States. See e.g., United States v. Cruik-

shank, 92 U.S. 545, 552 (1875); Thomas v. Collins,

‘©The four states were Virginia, Maryland, New York, and

North Carolina. See, 2 Schwartz 729-933. Two days after drawing

up its own list of amendments, a motion was made in the Mas-

sachusetts convention to add a provision which, in part, protect-

ed petitioning. The amendment was denied. 2 Schwartz 680-81.

‘7 2 Schwartz 983.

'8 See, 2 Schwartz 1167.

'® See, 2 Schwartz 1054-1167.

18

323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); United Mine Workers v.

Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 222

(1967).2° It has always been recognized as the appro-

priate mechanism for citizens to inform their elected

representatives.”' It has always included the right to

*” From United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552:

The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of

petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing

else connected with the powers or duties of the national govern-

ment, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under

the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The

very idea of government, republican in from, implies a right on

the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in

respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of griev-

ances.

From Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 530:

It was not by accident. or coincidence that the rights to freedom

in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the

rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for

redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inse-

parable. They are cognate rights. Cf. DeJogne v. Oregon, 299

U.S. 353, 364, and therefore are united in the First Article’s

assurance. Cf. 1 Annals of Congress 759-760.

From United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association,

389 U.S. at 222:

We start with the premise that the rights to assemble peaceably

and to petition for a redress of grievances are among the most

precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. These

rights, moreover, are intimately connected both in crigin and in

purpose, with the other First Amendment rights of free speech

and free press.

" During the House Debates on the Bill of Rights, a motion

was made to add the right of the people “‘to instruct their rep-

resentatives."" 2 Schwartz 1091. The motion was defeated by

Madison's argument that the right to instruct representatives is

included in the rights of free speech and petition—particularly in

the right of petition. 2 Schwartz 1096. Representative Jackson

(Georgia), speaking in favor of the amendment, discussed the

LT ae

PgR tilt IO TD a, a tU a E PL a BS

ae ee ee ee lees Rae Filet hk

19

circulate a petition as well as to present an individual

grievance.” In connection with 10 U.S.C. $1034, it is

also linked to maintenance of civilian control over the

military establishment.”

importance of encouraging the people to communicate with their

representatives.

The people will be encouraged to come forward with their

instructions, which will form a fund of useful information

for the Legislature. We cannot, I apprehend, be too well

informed of the true state, condition, and sentiment of our

constituents, and perhaps this is the best mode in our power

of obtaining information. I hope we shall never shut our

ears against that information which is to be derived from

the petitions and instructions of our constituents. I hope we

shall never presume to think that all wisdom of this country

is concentred [sic] within the walls of this House. Men,

unambitious of distinctions from their fellow-citizens, re-

main within their own domestic walk, unheard and unseen,

possessing all the advantages resulting from a watchful

observance of public men and public measures, whose voice,

if we would descend to listen to it, would give us knowledge

superior to what could be acquired amidst the cares and

bustles of a public life... .

2 Schwartz 1095-96.

* It [the First Amendment] simply protects the petitioners in

their right to get up the petition, circulate it for signatures,

and have it presented.

II Tucker, Constitution of the United States 671 (1899). See also,

Yancy v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 207, ___., 122 S.W. 123, 124

(1909), construing the right to petition under a state constitution:

[The Bill of Rights confers upon any citizen, or number of

citizens, the right to petition the Legislature of the state for

any necessary and proper purpose, and if one may lawfully

sign his name to a petition to be presented to the Legislature

for a proper purpose, he may likewise lawfully circulate the

petition and procure others to sign it.

** See, Remarks of the Honorable Jacob K. Javits, then Con-

gressman from New York, speaking in 1951:

Mr. Speaker, with millions of Americans serving in the

Armed Forces and with the new emphasis upon a civilian

20

As the Courts of Appeals recognized, the signifi-

cance of petitioning in this country’s history mintend-

ed to exclude it from protected communication in

§1034 ‘most unlikely.’’ Huff (78-599 Pet. App. 13a).

The Government finally asserts that interpreting

$1034 to exclude communication by petition “‘is sup-

ported by good sense”’ because ‘‘circulating a petition

on base ... [produces] an inevitable potential that

factions will be created, morale lowered and discon-

tent spread—with the result that the discipline and

fighting capacity of the military is injured.’’ Brief for

the petitoners at 41-42.

The nature and extent of the harm threatened by

on-base petitioning is discussed in section III, B, 2 of

this brief, infra. At this point, it is sufficient to note

chat, whatever potential circulating petitions on base

has for producing the evil attributed to it, nothing in

the language or legislative history of $1034 reflects

Congressional concern for such potential. Rather, the

value of petitions to communicate widespread dissat-

isfaction, the clear intention of Congress t> open the

channels of communication between members of the

armed services and members of Congress, and the

historical importance of petitioning all suggest that

Congress would not have chosen to exclude petitions

from the communication protected in $1034.

army—America’s traditional weapon against dictatorship

and oppression—the right of Armed Forces personnel to

communicate freely with members of Congress is of the

utmost importance. It will be recalled that the Congress

endeavored to preserve this right inviolate by a new provi-

sion ... [referring to what is now 10 U.S.C. §1034).

97 Cong. Rec. A4977 (1951).

a. ——<_.

a yl tlds

21

B. The Court of Appeals was correct in find-

ing that regulations placing a prior re-

straint on all petitioning on military bas-

es were not necessary to the security of

the United States. .

Regulations which interfere with communications -

protected by 10 U.S.C. §1034 are improper unless the

regulations are necessary to the security of the United

States.

The prior approval requirements imposed by the

challenged regulations place a prior restraint on all

petitioning on military bases. In each of the reported

cases where permission was sought to circulate peti-

tions on military bases, such permission was denied.

See, Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir.

1975); Allen v. Monger and Moses v. Foley, 583 F.2d

438 (9th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. pending, sub.

nom., Brown v. Allen, No. 78-1005; Brown v. Huff,

No.: 78-599. {n Huff, armed forces officials conceded

that the denials were wrongful. Huff (78-599 Pet. App.

3a).

In reference to these regulations, the Court of Ap-

peals for the Ninth Circuit stated:

Prior restraints are suspect in the constitutional

context. Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.

S. 539, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L. Ed.2d 683 (1976);

New York Times Coxv. United States, 403 U.S.

713, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971). They

stand no better in a statutory setting. Well pub-

licized petitioners may inconvenience the mili-

tary. Some petitions may even produce division

and morale problems, but we cannot say that

there is no less restrictive method than total

rior restraint to protect the national security.

Shans the regulations are overbroad and exceed

22

the needs of the national security, we affirm the

district court.

Allen (78-1005 Pet. App. 12a). See also, Glines (78-

1006 Pet. App. 9a) and Huff (78-599 Pet. App. 16a-

17a).

This conclusion is justified because of the limited

nature and extent of the harm threatened by on-base

petitioning; the availability of other measures to mit-

igate the harm threatened (including reasonable time,

place and matter restrictions and punishment for dis-

ruptive petitions); and the ineffectiveness of the prior

command approval requirement in protecting the mil-

itary interests. A discussion of these considerations

appears in section III, B, below.

II.

IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE

CHALLENGED REGULATIONS VIOLATE 10

U.S.C. §1034, THE LOWER COURTS’ RULINGS

IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT SHOULD BE

AFFIRMED.

A. The action taken against respondent was

based upon petitions directed to members

of Congress as well as a yetition to the

Secretary of Defense.

It is unnecessary for the Court to separately con-

sider respondent’s right to circulate a petition to

someone other than a member of Congress. The fact

that among the group of petitions respondent circu-

lated one was addressed to the Secretary of Defense

is important only if the record ‘‘negates the possibil-

ity’’ that the sanction respondent suffered was not

j

?

a

;

23

based in the least degree on his petitions to members

of Congress. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 588

(1969); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 311-312

(1957). See also, Easton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S.

697, n. at 699.(1974); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.

438 (1972) (White, J., concurring); United States v.

Donner, 497 F.2d 184 (7 Cir. 1974), cert. den., 419 U.S.

1047 (1974).

Street dictates that a sanction cannot stand where

the record fails to prove that the sanction was founded

exclusively on nonprotected speech activity.** Apply-

ing the rationale behind Street indicates that where,

as here, a sanction is imposed for a general violation

without a specific designation of the particular of-

fense, there is an “unacceptable danger that the trier

of fact will have regarded the [petitions to Congress

and the Secretary] as ‘intertwined’ and have rested

the [sanction] on both together.’’ Street, 394 U.S. 576,

588 (1969).

The trier of fact for the purposes of respondent’s

dismissal and transfer is the Air Force. The danger

specified in Street is eliminated only if the Air Force

can sustain its strong burden of proof to enable this

Court to say “with certainty’’ that respondent’s pe-

titions to members of Congress were not even a con-

——— ~

* Street involved a criminal sanction, but has been extended

to include the situation at bar—civil sanctions against a federal

employee. See, Tygrett v. Washing'ton, 543, F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir

1974) (Street applied to sanction against a D.C. police officer);

Waters v. Peterson, 495 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Street applied

to sanction against a Federal Bureau of Census employee). There-

fore, assuming arguendo that peptitions to the Secretary of De-

fense are not protected speech, petitioners must nevertheless

meet the heavy burden of Street before respondent’s dismissal

and transfer can be accepted.

24

tributing cause to respondent’s dismissal and transfer

from the Active Reserves. Street, 394 U.S. 576, 589

(1969). If the Court cannot find from the record this

degree of certainty, affirming the lower courts’ rulings

in favor of respondent on the basis of his petitions to

mbers of Congress will satisfy the entire case. The

record demonstrates that the Air Force cannot meet

this burden.

1. Nowhere in the record is there any indication

that petitions to Congress were deemed protected

while those to the Secretary of Defense were not. On

the contrary, all indications are that any petitioning

done by the respondent was considered improper.

2. The District Court treated the petitions as a

unit, making no distinction based on the person to

whom the petition was to be sent. In its unpublished

Opinion and Order of December 12, 1975, the District

Court stated:

In April, 1974, while on Active Duty Status at

Travis Air Force Base, [respondent] circulated a

_ petition aimed at relaxing Air Force hair-length

regulations ....

The letter notifying Captain Glines of his dis-

missal from the Active Reserves and his transfer

to the standby Reserves stated that his actions

in circulating the petition ... demonstrated that

he had failed ‘‘to meet the professional standards

expected of an officer in the Air Force.”’. . : [T]he

[petitioners] have admitted that had it not been

for the distribution. of the petition, the decision

to remove Captain Glines from Active Duty

would not have been made at this time.

In this case the evidence established that but

for his peticiconing activities, Captain Glines

would have .. . remained on Active Duty. ....

(A. 31-32, 34) (emphases added).

25

These conclusions by the District Court further

demonstrate that the government treated Captain

Glines’ petitioning as a single act, and that no dis-

tinction was ever made based on the addressees.

3. Colonel Wade’s letter of Reassignment and

Transfer, dated April 26, 1974 (A. 24) refers to advice

Colonel Wade had given respondent not to circulate

the petition. Jd., 42. Since each copy of the petition

contains as its final paragraph a statement of the

other designated recipients (see, A. 18-22), Colonel

Wade could easily have informed respondent that pe-

titions to Congressmen were permitted but those to

the Secretary of Defense were not. Moreover, the pe-

tition originally,,reviewed by Colonel Wade was a

handwritten copy addressed to Senator Cranston.

(Clerk’s Record, 4, 21).

4. Signatories to the Guam petition testified in af-

fidavits that the petition with which they were in-

volved was Exhibit F-1 to the plaintiff's complaint

(A. 18), the petition addressed to Senator Cranston.

IO: I show you Exhibit F-1 attached to Com-

plaint filed by Captain Glines, and request

that you read it and determine whether

this is the petition that you came into

contact with on that date?

A: Yes, to my knowledge that is the petition,

the exact petition.

[R. at 166, Affidavit of Sergeant Nilles (emphasis

added).] ;

Q: Sergeant Wolf, you have seen Exhibit F-

1 attached to the Complaint in this mat-

ter. Is that exhibit the haircut petition

with which you involved [sic] at Anderson

Air Force ody Guam, on or about 15

April, 1974?

26

A: yes.

(R. at 160, Affidavit of Sergeant Wolf.)

IO: I show you Exhibit F-1, attached to the

Complaint filed by Captain Glines. Does

that exhibit generally reflect what you

read or what you saw and read on or about

15 April, 1974?

A: sium ¥ €S.

(R. at 274, Affidavit of Sergeant Elizey.)

5. Prior practice of the military with respect to

petitions gives no reason to believe the designated

receipient of the petition was of any significance. In

Brown v. Huff, No. 78-599; Brown v. Allen, No. 78-

1005; and Brown v. Moses, id., prior restraints were

applied to petitions addressed solely to members of

Congress. See, Brief for Petitioners, No. 78-599 at 7

(Huff); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, No. 78-1005 at

4 (Allen, Moses). If the government did not hesitate

to apply prior restraints to petitions to Congress in

“these instances, it cannot now be inferred that no

action would have been taken against respondent had

he only addressed his petitions to members of Con-

gress.

The record does not, as required by Street, negate

with certainty the possibility that respondent’s dis-

missal and transfer was at least in part due to his

petitioning members of Congress. The most reasona-

ble inference is that his Congressional petitions were

indeed a reason for the action taken against him.

Therefore, the copy of the petition to the Secretary

need not be considered by this Court. If the action

taken against respondent is not supportable as to the

petitions to Congress, it is supportable as to none.

See, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957).

Y %

27

B. Protections afforded to armed forces per-

sonnel for petitions to members of Con-

gress should be held to include a petition

directed additionally to the Secretary of

’ Defense.

Even if the actions taken against respondent had

been based solely on his petition to the Secretary of

Defense, respondent should not be held to lose sta-

tutory protection because he sent an additional copy

to the Secretary of Defense.

Respondent’s petition to the Secretary of Defense

was one of five petitions, each with exactly the same

substantive provisions, reworded only so that each

would speak directly to its recipient. (A. 18-22). The

other four recipients were all members of Congress.

The final paragraph of each petition indicated that

the signers were similarly petitioning each of the other

four recipients ‘‘in the hope that one of our elected or

appointed officials will help correct this problem.”’ Jd.

Petitions to Congress that include a petition to the

Secretary of Defense was undoubtedly not within the

specific contemplation of the Congress that enacted

10 U.S.C. $1034. However, ‘‘it is no bar to interpreting

a statute as applicable that ‘the question which is

raised on the statute never occurred to the legisla-

ture.’ ’’ Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507,

510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1965). To construe the statute in this

instance, the Court must therefore “‘[start] from the

areas where the legislative intent is readily discerni-

ble, and [project] to fair and reasonable corollaries of

that intent for the specific issue’ at hand. Montana

Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 445 F.2d

739, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. den. 400 U.S. 1013,

(1971). See, Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process

15 (1921).

28

This Court has stated the guidelines for this meth-

od of statutory construction:

The strict letter of an act must, however, yield

to its evident spirit and purpose, when this is

necessary to give effect to the intent of Congress.

[citations omitted]. And unjust or absurd conse-

quences are, if possible, to be avoided.

Fleischmann Construction Co. v. United States, 270

U.S. 349, 360 (1926). Cf, Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421

U.S. 707, 713-714 (1975).

The legislative history of 10 U.S.C. $1034 indicates

congressional concern with maintaining civilian con-

trol over the military establishment. See, Extension

of Remarks of Hon. Jacob K. Javits, 97 Cong. Rec.

A4977 (1951), supra-p. 15, n.22. In order to maintain

civilian control, the Congress must communicate free-

ly with members of the armed forces and with indi-

viduals who determine military policies—the Secre-

tary of Defense and the secretaries of the various

military branches. See, supra p.6, n.1; see, also 10

U.S.C. §1034; Cong. Rec. 3776-77, A4977-78 (1951).

For purposes of reforming Air Force grooming reg-

ulations, the Secretary of Defense is a logical recipient

both of respondent’s petition and Congressional in-

quiries. The Secretary of Defense is the head of the

Department of Defense and, as such, has authority,

direction, and control over the Department of the Air

Force. 10 U.S.C. §133(a); 10 U.S.C. §8010. The Secre-

tary of Defense had been delegated dential au-

thority regarding Air Force uniform standards, which

includes grooming standards. Exec. Ord. #11390, 4 7

(January 24, 1968); 33 Fed. Reg. No. 16 at 841 (1968).

Furthermore, no danger to any governmental interest

a ae a

~~,

29

results from directing a copy of a Congressional pe-

tition to the Secretary of Defense.

Respondent’s petition to the Secretary of Defense

is therefore consistent with the congressional goals

that underlie 10 U.S.C. §1034. It would be unjust if

not absurd to afford the protection of the statute to

one member of the armed forces who petitions Con-

gress while withholding such protection from another

member of the armed forces who petitions Congress

and demonstrates the courtesy and respect of simul-

taneously petitioning the Secretary of Defense. Such

a result would be especially inappropriate since 10

U.S.C. §1034 is remedial legislation, to be construed

broadly. Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggists,

425 U.S. 1, (1976).

iil.

THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN

FINDING THAT REGULATIONS REQUIRING

COMMAND APPROVAL PRIOR TO

CIRCULATION OF PETITIONS ON A

MILITARY BASE VIOLATE THE FIRST

AMENDMENT.

A. The Court’s decision in Greer v. Spock is

not dispositive of the issues in this case.

It should be obvious that the Court’s decision in

Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) is not dispositive

of the issues in this case. Greer involved the right of

civilian political campaigners to enter Fort Dix, New

Jersey, a ‘“‘closed’’ military base, to make political

speeches and distribute campaign literature. This case

involves the right of military personnel, properly on

30

a military base, to circulate to other military person-

nel, properly on a military base, a petition to the

government for redress of grievances. While both cas-

es involve prior command approval requirements

grounded on the military interest in maintaining loy-

alty, discipline and morale, the nature of the compet-

ing speech interests and the policies involved are en-

tirely different.”

The essential dissimilarity between the two speech

interests is demonstrated by looking at the impact a

denial of permission would have on the individual’s

ability to accomplish the desired communication. In

Greer, the respondents were candidates for national

political office who were seeking to communicate their

ideas and gain political support among voters. The

personnel at Fort Dix, and the sum of all personnel

on all military bases, were a small percentage of the

** Twice in its brief, the Government has quoted the following

statement from this Court’s opinion in Greer v. Spock :

[t]here is nothing in the Constitution that disables a military

commander from acting to avert what he perceives to be a

clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops

on the base under his command.

This statement was certainly not intended by this Court as a

constitutional standard which would obviate the need for con-

stitutional analysis. For example, a military commander could

not employ the use of the rack or another torture against an

unpopular serviceman under his command—no matter how sin-

cere his belief that such action was necessary to avert a clear

danger to loyalty, discipline or morale to troops on the base

under his command—without his actions being subject to scru-

tiny under the eighth amendment’s protection against cruel and

unusual punishment. Nor could he discriminate in advancement

on the basis of race, even if equal treatment on the basis of race

would negatively impair the loyalty and morale of a majority of

his troops.

31

prospective voters. Though barred from engaging in

speech activities on base, the respondents in Greer

were not impaired in reaching the vast majority of

their audience. Furthermore, the respondents in Greer

could still have reached the on-base audience through

paid political advertisements on radio, television and

newspaper. Members of national, though minor, polit-

ical parties, the candidates had their party financial

resources available to reach their audience, both ci-

vilian and inservice, through the use of expensive

means of communication.

In this case, respondent was a Captain in the Air

Force Reserves. He was seeking to communicate to,

members of Congress and the Secretary of Defense

widespread dissatisfaction among armed service per-

sonnel, demonstrating the signers’ belief that ‘‘the

present regulations on grooming have caused more

racial tension, decrease in morale and retention, and

loss of respect for authorities than any other official

Air Force policy.’ (A. 18-22). Respondent’s audience

consisted of government officials and members of the

armed services and his resources were limited to his

own personal assets. Denied the ability to circulate a

petition on-base, respondent was denied the ability to

reach his limited audience where he and the other

potential petitioners lived and worked. He was pre-

vented from accomplishing his desired communica-

tion in the most traditional, logical, and inexpensive

manner. In a very practical way, respondent was pre-

vented from accomplishing his desired cormmunica-

tion at all.

An individual letter from respondent would only

have indicated respondent’s individual belief that

there was widespread dissatisfaction. A lot of individ-

32

ual letters might have accomplished the same result

as a petition with an equal number of signatures; but

it is much more difficult to convince someone to write

a letter than sign a petition with the same message,

and respondent would have been limited to those per-

sonnel with whom he could discuss the problems of

Air Force grooming standards in this fashion.”

Respondent could not circulate his petition on

Guam at all, whether on base or off. Air Force regu-

lations prohibit circulation of petitions in foreign

countries without prior approval, both on and off mil-

itary bases. See, Brief for the Petitioners at 20, n.8.

During his overnight stopover, respondent didn’t

have time to even request permission. :

Respondent was left with the possibility of circu-

lating his petition in town, out of uniform, if he could

have found somepiace in town where servicemen gath-

ered. In fact, he left copies of his petition in a few

shop windows. (A. 11).

The denial of permission to circulate a petition on

base has an even greater impact in situations like that

in Brown v. Allen (78-1006) where the base was an

aircraft carrier. In such situations, a prohibition

against on-base petitioning results in total infringe-

** It may be that respondent could have stood at a crossroads

and called to strangers to discuss the problems of air force groom-

ing standards. However, he would have been hindered by the

absence of a petition—the traditional accompaniment to legiti-

mate communication about issues with strangers. To avoid an

unlawful assembly, he would have to have called them one by

one, or in small groups. Furthermore, to allow respondent to

function as a petitioner without a petition, but not as a petitioner

with a petition, would be nonsensical.

33

ment of the right to petition during long periods at

sea.

The essential dissimilarity between applicable pol-

icies is evident from this Court’s opinion in Creer.

The Court’s opinion initially distinguished decisions

involving so-called ‘“‘open bases,”’ finding that the au-

thorities at Fort Dix had not abandoned any claim of

special interest in who walks, talks, or distributes

leaflets on the streets of the base. 424 U.S. at 836.

The Court held that the Fort Dix regulations were

valid on their face as part of ‘‘the historically unques-

tioned power of its commanding officer summarily to

exclude civilians from the area of his command.”’ Jd.

at 838. Since respondents had no “generalized consti-

tutional right’’ to engage in first amendment activi-

ties on a military base, the prior approval require-

ments were constitutional on their face. Jd.

Unlike private citizens, military personnel have a

right and affirmative duty to be on a military base

and, subject to appropriate limitations, do have a

‘generalized constitutional right” to engage in First

Amendment activities on a military base. See e.g.,

United States v. Schmidt, 16 USCMA 57, 36 CMR

213 (1966); United States v. Gray, 20 USCMA 63, 42

CMR 255 (1970). See generally, Moyer, Justice and

the Military, Chapter 4 (1972). A military base is

where a serviceman lives, works and has contacts with

other members of the service. His leisure and recrea-

tion areas are on a military base as well as the work

areas. A military base is where military speech is most

likely to take place.

Furthermore, Greer involved ratifying a policy of

insulating the military from “both the reality and

34

appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan

causes of candidates.”’ 424 U.S. 828, 839. The base

pclicy of prohibiting civilian campaign speeches on

base was ‘“‘wholly consistent with the American con-

stitutional tradition of a politically neutral military

establishment under civilian control.”’ Id.

The speech restrained here was directed to the ci-

vilians who are constitutionally charged with respon-

sibility for control of the military, and indicated crit-

icism of military regulations. Policies restraining such

speech conflict with this same constitutional tradi-

tion.

The government argues that a military base is not

a ‘‘public forum” and for that reason, Greer v. Spock

applies to this case. See, Brief for the Petitioners at

26-27. Respondent does not rely upon the “‘public for-

um’’ doctrine to find constitutional protection for the

right to petition. Cf, Steck v. Connally, 199 F. Supp.

104 (D.D.C. 1961, in which a civil service employee’s

circulation of a petition to Congress was held protect-

ed speech despite the fact that circulation took place

at work during working hours.)

However, a military base does possess many of the

attributes of a ‘‘public forum’’ for servicemen as-

signed to the base. Furthermore, as stated by an au-

thority cited by the government,

No longer does the right to effective freedom of

expression turn on the common law property

rig ts of the state, and no longer does it turn on

whether the ——— place at issue had histor-

ically been dedicated to the exercise of First

Amendment rights . . . . In each case, the ‘crucial

question’ is whether the manner of expression is

basically incompatible with the normal activity

of a particular place at a particular time.

35

Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974

Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 252-53.

The question of whether one serviceman handing a

petition to another serviceman is “basically incom-

patible” with the normal activity of a military base is

not answered by the decision that campaign speeches

of civilian political candidates are not incompatible.”’

B. Taking the important governmental in-

terest served by the challenged regula-

tions into account, the Court of Appeals

was correct in finding that the applica-

tion of a prior restraint on all petitioning

on military bases was substantially ov-

erbroad.

1. The significance of the prior approval re-

quirement as a prior restraint.

Respondent recognizes that the government’s in-

terest in maintaining loyalty, discipline and morale is

** Moreover, as the Court of Appeals noted in Huff, the regu-

lations validated in Greer dealt only marginally with petitions,

if they dealt with petitions at all. The regulation authorizing

prior restraint_read as follows:

The distribution or posting of any publication, including

newspapers, magazines, handbills, flyers, circulars, pam-

phlets or other writings, issued, published or otherwise pre-

pared by any person ... is prohibited on the Fort Dix Re-

servations without prior approval ... .

424 US. at 831.

Under this regulation, the only form of ‘publication’ which

might include petitions is the catch-all ‘“‘other writings.’’ This

Court’s opinion in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974),

indicated that military regulations should not be struck for ov-

erbreadth if they only marginally intrude upon constitutionally

protected activities. For this reason as well, validating the Fort

36

important. It is just as clear, however, that the right

to petition the government for redress of grievances

is important and that the means selected to enforce

the armed services’ interest, a prior restraint on pe-

titioning, is ‘‘the most serious and the least tolerable

infringement on First Amendment Rights.’’ Nebraska

Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1975).

The government seeks to lessen the significance of

the prior restraint in this case, arguing that “‘[i]n only

the most narrow sense is speech restrained by the

prior approval requirement.’’ See, Brief for the Peti-

tioners at 31. The government, however, fails to ap-

preciate the significance of its prior approval require-

ment. Professor Tribe describes two distinct reasons

for the particular seriousness of prior restraint re-

quirements: (a) ‘‘dissemination delayed may prove

tantamount to dissemination denied.’’ and (b) ‘‘cen-

sors uncontrolled by courts tend to deny publication

to material protected by the first amendment.’ Tribe,

American Constitutional Law at 725 and 726 (1978).

Both concerns are involved with the prior approval

requirement in the challenged regulations.

(a) Dissemination delayed may prove tanta-

mount to dissemination denied.

As indicated earlier in this brief, denial of permis-

sion to circulate a petition on a military base can

substantially interfere with the petitioner’s ability to

accomplish the desired communication. Supra pp. 23-

24. In the case of military bases in foreign countries,

Dix regulations has only marginal significance for determining

the constitutionality of regulations aimed directly at limiting the

right to petition.

37

regulations require permission to circulate petitions

both on and off base. See, Brief for the Petitioners at

20, n.8. For ships at sea, denial of permission to cir-

culate on base amounts to total infringement during

long periods at sea. Even in the case of domestic

bases, denial of permission to circulate a petition on

base isolates the circulator from his audience.

Furthermore, in the case of petitions where timeli-

ness is of particular significance, denial of permission

can have an impact at least as great as delays on

newsworthy articles. See, Nebraska Press Ass’n v.

Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1975). For example, in

Brown v. Allen, (#78-1005) Captain Monger denied

permission to circulate a petition asking Congress ‘“‘to

investigate the necessity of having the Hancock make

another West Pacific cruise,” but might have allowed

circulation ‘‘well after the Hancock had been deployed

. when the petition would be of no effect.’’ Allen

(78-1005 Pet. App. 14a and 12a).

Also involved is the procedural significance of pre-

publication restraints. As noted by Professor Tribe,

The extraordinary power of a prior restraint to

foreclose timely expression is derived primarily

from the body of procedural rules which form a

backdrop to the doctrines in this field..An indi-

vidual who speaks, or a newspaper that publish-

es, is ordinarily free in a subsequent criminal

prosecution to assert the claim that the speech

or publication was protected by the first ament-

mend. But where a prior restraint operates, any-

one who ignores it may lose the right to assert

that constitutional defense in a subsequent pros-

ecution for ignoring the restraint instead of ob-

eying it while challenging it judicially.

Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 726 (1978)

[hereinafter cited as Tribe].

38

Thus, in this case, respondent is limited to raising

the facial invalidity of the prior approval requirement

even though the actions for which he was punished

were completely innocuous. See, Pet. App. 13a.

(b) Censors uncontrolled by courts tend to

deny publication to material protected by

the first amendment.

Professor Tribe describes the problem of ‘“‘over-

broad delegation” as follows:

Statutes which open-endedly delegate to ad-

ministering officials the power to decide how and

when sanctions are applied or licenses issues are

overbroad because they grant such officials the

power to discriminate—to achieve indirectly

through selective enforcemeut a censorship of

communicative content that is clearly unconsti-

tutional when achieved directly. This covert cen-

sorship cannot be checked rk «mon by judicial

review of the scheme as applied in particular cas-

es. For first amendment protection often depends

on balancing free speech rights and governmen-

tal interests in particular situations, which de-

pends in turn on a close, after-the-fact scrutiny

of the factual circumstances by the reviewin

court. Except in those rare instances in whic

bad faith is manifest, the abuse of administrative

discretion is likely to find shelter behind a record

of contradictory testimony and retrospective ra-

tionalization. A court may seek to e its own

characterization of the expressive activity, but

its perception of the facts is inherently subjec-

tive. When was a demonstration too obstructive

of traffic? A noise too loud? Violence imminent?

The tendency is to be satisfied that the evidence

is sufficient if the record is not ‘‘totally devoid

of evidentiary support,’’ the minimal due process

standard. Factual review is therefore an unrelia-

39

ble cure for an overbroad delegation, and thus

the Supreme Court has consistently chosen facial |

invalidation of statutes containing essentially

standardless delegations in areas affecting first

amendment rights.

Tribe, at 733-34.

The dangers of overbroad delegation are particu-

larly significant in the case of military authorities. As

stated by Judge Parker in Carlson v. Schlesinger,

Military authority is not trained or attuned to

the sensitivity involved in questions relating to

First Amendment rights. It is quite understand-

able, therefore, that when confronted with regu-

latory language as that found in the two vecaln.

tions, where sg age ay pi constitutional rights

are tempered by such laudable yet amorphous

terms as ‘morale,’ ‘loyalty,’ and ‘discipline,’ the

commander will favor and make determinative

the military considerations.

364 F. Supp. 626, 639-640 (D.D.C. 1973), rev’d on

other grounds 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

Thus, in Brown Huff, (78-599) the military author-

ities denied permission to circulate petitions when the

government now admits denials were wrongful. See,

Brief for the Petitioners at 22 n. 10. In Brown v.

Allen, (78-1005) the District Court found that permis-

sion to circulate the petitions in that case was wrong-

fully denied, under the regulations’ standards. See,

Allen, supra (Pet. App. 23a).

In the present case, the extremity of the measures

taken against respondent and the statements made

concerning respondent’s petition eloquently demon-

strate the dangers of the prior approval requirement.

For preparing his mildly worded petition and initiat-

40

ing its circulation among eight servicemen, respond-

ent was abruptly taken off active duty and then re-

moved from the Air Force Reserves. (A. 24, Brief for

the Petitioners at 8.)

According to Colonel Harley S. Black, commanding

officer of Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, respond-

ent’s petition, as respectful as it was, “‘had great po-

tential to bring undue embarrassment on the Air

Force.”’ (Clerk’s Record at 46). The Colonel’s lack of

appreciation for the importance of the constitutional

liberties involved is clear. He said,

All told eight of my personnel were signatories

to the petition, each feeling, I suspect, it was a

‘notable cause’ and thus, in need of their support.

The members were young, junior enlisted types,

all of whom have since n counselled and

shown the error of their ways.

(A. 25).

It is no wonder that this Court has described a

prior restraint on publication as ‘‘one of the most

extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence.”’

Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,

562 (1975).

2. Applying the analysis employed in Ne-

braska Press Association v. Stuart.

The issue before this Court is whether the Court of

Appeals was correct in finding that regulations plac-

ing a prior restraint on all petitioning on military

bases violates the First Amendment. The Court of

Appeals applied the analysis employed by this Court

in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S.

539 (1975).

41

“The Supreme Court insists on less restrictive al-

ternatives to prior restraint when they are available,

and it critically examines whether the restraint will

have its intended effect.”’ (Pet App. 12a, citing, Ne-

braska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, supra.) The Court of

Appeals concluded that the regulations were substan-

tially overbroad. (Pet. App. 13a-14a).

Nebraska Press, like the present case, involved the

use of a prior restraint on first amendment rights to

protect a recognized, important interest. There the

interest was the right to a fair trial; here it is the

maintenance of loyalty, discipline and morale. The

issue in Nebraska Press was not whether the interest

in ensuring a fair trial was sufficient to justify some

limitation on the exercise of first amendment rights,

but whether the use of a prior restraint could be jus-

tified as the chosen means. Nebraska Press, supra at

561. This Court concluded it could not. Jd at 570.

In determining that the prior restraint was not jus-

tified in Nebraska Press, this Court employed a three

part test. 427 U.S. 539, 562. Translated into the issues

involved in this case, the areas of inquiry should be

(a) the nature and extent of the harm threatened; (b)

the availability of other measures, to mitigate the

harm threatened and (c) the effectiveness of the prior

command approval requirement in protecting the mil-

itary interests. To justify the use of a prior restraint

here, the government must show that, in light of these

three factors, a prior restraint is necessary to avoid

the danger. Jd.

(a) The nature and extent of the harm threat-

ened.

The government has never been very clear about

how circulating petitions affects loyalty, discipline

42

and morale. Rather, the government’s brief simply

states that ‘‘circulating a petition on base [produces]

an inevitable potential that factions will be created,

morale lowered and discontent spread—with the re-

sult that the discipline and fighting capacity of the

military is injured,’’ leaving the Court to infer how

this result follows from the proposed cause. Brief for

the Petitioners at 41-42.

In analyzing the nature and extent of the aarm

threatened by on-base petitioning, it is important to

include only the harm peculiar to petitioning, exclud-

ing harm that might result from forms of speeh cur-

rently permitted by regulations. Further, the consid-

eration of harm from petitioning must be reduced to

the extend that appropriate time, place, and manner

restrictions regulate the on-base exercise of petition-

ing. The government recognizes that ‘‘the regulations

do not restrict a serviceman’s freedom to engage in

oral discussions of political topics or other issues

either off base or on base.’’ Brief for the Petitioners

at 19. Respondent does not dispute the authority of

the armed services to impose reasonable restrictions

on the time, place and manner of petitioning on base—

including limitations } on the number of people gath-

ering at one place‘at one time. See, Pet. App. 11a-12a;

Respondent’s brief in opposition to cert. at 2-3; Brown

v. Allen (78-1005 Pet. App. 30a-32a).

The harm under consideration, then, is limited to

the communicative impact which petitioning alone

produces.

In the only military petition case which went to

trial, Judge Robert Peckham stated, ‘‘[djefendants

maintain that circulation of a petition with which

43

members of a crew might disagree is enough in and of

itself to cause disruption on board ship and therefore

impair morale.’’ Brown v. Allen (78-1005 Pet. App.

21a). It is possible that a person holding a view op-

posing one stated in a petition would become upset

seeing a petition when he or she would not have heard

an oral communication. However, it is also possible

for one to overhear an oral communication when one

would not have seen a petition. To argue harm from

persons opposing a view stated in a petition suggests

that a greater number will be upset by a petition than

from an oral discussion—at most a doubtful proposi-

tion. ,

Furthermore, a basic premise of the First Amend-

ment’s guarantees is that suppression is not the prop-

er way to avoid the impactvof ideas. As noted by the

Court of Appeals in this cas

The First Amendment protects this country’s

basic commitment to open and vigorous debate.

We have assumed as a nation that free discussion

will be likely to lead to the right decisions, that,

as Justice Brandeis said, when falsehoods and

fallacies abound, ‘the remedy to be applied is

more speech, not enforced silence.’ Whitney v.

California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed.

1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The First

Amendment reflects a conscious choice to prefer

citizen autonomy to conformity.

Pet. App. 10a.

As stated by Professor Tribe,

[I]jf the constitutional guarantee is not to be

trivialized, it must mean that government cannot

justify restrictions on free expression by refer-

ence to the adverse consequences of allowing cer-

tain ideas or information to enter the r of

44

discussion and awareness. Whatever might in

theory be said either way, the choice between

“the dangers of suppressing information and the

dangers of its misuse if it is freely available’ is,

ultimately, a choice ‘‘that the First Amendment

makes foi us.”

Tribe, at 581. (citation omitted.)

The remaining harm resulting from petitioning can

only come from those who agree with a view stated in

a petition. The findings of fact in Judge Peckham’s

opinion indicates that from the military perspective

the harm from those who agree comes from the act of

solicitation, not the communication to servicemen.

Judge Peckham found that Ad:niral Monger, who had

been Captain of the U.S.S. Hancock, “‘might have

permitted circulation of the Hancock petition had it

not ‘been asking for support in the form of a signa-

ture’ and been directed to a member of Congress.”

Brown v. Allen, supra (Pet. App. 21a).

Aside from giving increased communicative value

to a member of Congress by sending a petition with

all of the supporting signature, Admiral Monger’s

fear must be that soliciting signatures on a petition

would somehow commit the signers to greater fidelity

to a statement than would making, reading or hearing

statements on the same issue. In other words, the

harm from the act of petitioning would come from the

greater seriousness of purpose that may be produced

by petitioning the government for redress of griev-

ances rather than just talking, if that be a harm.

Assuming that petitioning does produce greater se-

riousness of purpose than other forms of expression,

that can only be considered harmful if it leads to some

further harmful result. Indifference is not in itself an

important military value to be protected.

45

The government has provided no evidence that ex-

ercising the right to petition would impel the petition-

ers to further, harmful acts. In fact, all indications

are to the contrary. For example, Brown v. Allen (78-

1005, Pet. cert. pending) originally involved two suits,

Allen v. Monger and Moses v. Foley, that were con-

solidated for trial. Each suit had five named plaintiffs.

In Allen, all named plaintiffs indicated a desire to

circulate a petition. See, Brown v. Allen (78-1005 Pet.

App. 16a). In Moses, the plaintiffs actually circulated

their petition for a week before seeking permission.

See, Brown v. Allen, supra (Pet. App. 18a). At the

time, the district court opinion was filed, more than

two years after plaintiffs filed suit, four of the plain-

tiffs were still in the Navy, two of them still assigned

to their original ship, the U.S.S. Hancock. There is no

indication in the record of these two cases or any of

the petition cases, that any of the plaintiffs failed to

perform their military duty, despite the fact that they

not only declared themselves to be circulators of pe-

titions, but actually filed suit to enforce their right to

petition.

The court of Appeal. reached the following conclu-

sion:

We do not believe that vocal disagreement with

ublic policy by itself necessarily leads to diso-

ience to orders. “I think, and any society

which truly believes in a First Amendment must

assume, that soldiers like other citizens can dis-

agree with governmental policy and yet still re-

alize that they must follow the rear requisites of

that policy, including military service, until the

policy is changed by democratic means.’’ Carlson

v. Schlesinger, 167 U.S. App. D.C. 325, 335, 511

F.2d 1327, 1337 (1975) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).

Pet. App. lla n.8.

46

The officials’ conduct in petition cases suggests

that they were motivated less by a fear of creating

factions and discontent than a sense that the act of

petitioning the government somehow has an unsavory

character.

The government still maintains that denial of per-

mission to circulate the Hancock petition in Brown v.

Allen (78-1005) was proper despite that petition’s be-

nign nature. Brief for the petitioners at 22 n.10. That

petition stated:

Dear Congressman Stark,

We, the undersigned crew members of the U.S.S.

HANCOCK, in recognition of the fact that the

United States is ap eevee no longer at war with

the countries of Indo-China, and because the

HANCOCK has already been in commission for

29 years, respectfully request that you ask Con-

ss to investigate the necessity of having the

ANCOCK make another West Pacific cruise.

Brown v. Allen (78-1005 Pet. at 4 n.3).

In the present case, Col. Black initiated an inves-

tigation of the respondent i ause his respectfully

worded petition “had great potential to bring undue

embarrassment on the Air Force.’”’ (Clerk’s Record at

46). On the basis of ‘‘embarrassment”’ and “‘discredit”’

(A. 24) this “‘dedicated,’’ ‘energetic, zealous officer,’’

“clearly . . . the most competent navigator within [his]

flight, and probably the most competent within the

entire group”’ (A. 9), with more than 15 years of ser-

vice in the Air Force Reserves (A. 31) was removed

from active duty and transferred to inactive status.”

a Respondent's officer evaluations covering September, 1971

through July, 1973 (Clerk's Record 12-20) are included as Ap-

47

To the extent that the officials’ distate for petition-

ing is shared by other members of the armed services,

and even if general distaste for the exercise of fun-

damental liberties can lead to disruption, the solution

is for this Court to encourage respect for constitu-

tional rights. It would be ironic, indeed, for this Court

to endorse disrespect for those very rights that mem-

bers of the armed forces voluntarily pledge their lives

to protect. ‘“The right to petition Congress for a re-

dress of grievances is too dear to permit its exercise

to be limited by petty tyrannies.’’ United States v.

Schmidt, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 57, 61 (1966), (concurring

opinion).

(b) The availability of other measures to mit-

igate the harm threatened.

As indicated earlier, respondent does not dispute

the authority of the armed services to impose reason-

able restrictions on the time, place and manner of

petitioning on base—including limitations on the

number of people gathering at one place at one time.

(See, supra p. 31). So long as such restrictions do not

“deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly

and the opportunities for the communication of

thought ...’’ they are entirely proper. Cox v. New

Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).

Furthermore, should petitioning activities lead to

a disturbance of the peace or threaten good order and

discipline, they are punishable under 10 U.S.C. §§916,

pendix A to this brief. These evaluations were intended to be

included as a part of the Appendix for this case, but were mis-

takenly omitted by the government when preparing the Appen-

dix.

48

917, and 934 (1976), (Articles 116, 117 and 134, re-

spectively, of the Uniform Code of Military Justice

[UCMJ] ). Moreover, acts done with the intent of caus-

ing a dis. urbance are punishable under 10 U.S.C. $880

(1976) (Article 80 of the UCM J), without awaiting any

disturbance.”*

* 10 U.S.C. $916 (Art. 116) states:

Riot or breach of peace

Any person subject to this chapter who causes or participates

in any riot or breach of the peace shall be punished as a court-

martial may direct.

10 U.S.C. $917 (Art. 117) states:

Provoking speeches or gestures: towards any other person

subject to this chapter shall be punished as a court-martial

may direct.

10 U.S.C. $934 (Art. 134) states:

General article

Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders

and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in

the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit

upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of

which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be

taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-

martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and

shall be punished at the discretion of that court.

Pampee §880 (Art. 80) states:

Attempts

(a) An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense

under this chapter, amounting to more than mere preparation

and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is

an attempt to commit that offense.

(b) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts to com-

mit any offense punishable by this chapter shall be punished

as a court-martial may direct, unless otherwise specifically

prescribed.

(c) Any person subject to this chapter may be convicted of an

attempt to commit an offense although it appears on the trial

that the offense wes consummated.

49

The Court of Appeals concluded that,

Punishment after the fact for genuinely disrup-

tive petitions, limitation of circulation to certain

areas and to off-duty periods, and protection

from pressure by superiors who are seeking sig-

natures would adequately protect the govern-

ment’s interest.

(Pet. App. 12a), citing the limitations adopted by

Judge Peckham in Allen v. Monger, supra (Brown v.

Allen 78-1005 Pet. App. 30a-32a) and approved on

appeal.

The government argues that these less restrictive

alternatives are not sufficient to mitigate the harm

threatened because, ‘“‘the injury to national security

occurs when the improper material is distributed and

discipline and morale are lowered, or the military mis-

sion is threatened.”’ Brief for the petitioners at 33.

However, the government does not explain how this

chain reaction occurs, let alone how the bad result

happens before it can be stopped.

The government further complains that ‘the court

of appeals offered no argument showing that [alter-

native measures] would be adequate to avoid or ‘mit-

igate the effects’ of an improper distribution.” Id.

However, the government has provided no basis for

finding that less restrictive alternatives would not

sufficiently protect the government’s interest. Cer-

tainly the government has the burden of justifying

the use of a prior restraint. ‘‘Any system of prior

restraints of expression comes to this Court with a

heavy presumption against its constitutional validi-

ty.”’ Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).

In Nebraska Press, this Court “‘reaffirm[{ed] that the

guarantees of freedom of expression are not an abso-

50

lute prohibition under all circumstances, but the bar-

riers to prior restraint remain high and the presump-

tion against its use continues intact.’’ 427 U.S. 539,

570.

When a government regulation is aimed at the com-

municative impact of expressive activity to protect a

compelling governmental interest, the government

has the burden of showing that the regulation is nec-

essary to protect the asserted interest. Not only must

the interest be compelling, the regulation must be

narrowly aimed at those permissible objectives so as

not unnecessarily to reach expressive conduct pro-

tected by the first amendment. Tribe, at 602.

When a government regulation is designed to pro-

tect a military interest, it should not be declared un-

constitutional if the regulation could validly be ap-

plied to numerous situations and invalidly to only

‘marginal’ situations. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,

760 (1974). However, if the regulation’s reach into

protected conduct is substantial, it is unconstituti-

tutioual on its face. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.

601 (1978).

To justify the use of a prior restraint on petitioning

in the present regulations, the government must show

that this extraordinary measure is necessary to pro-

tect loyalty, discipline and morale in all but excep-

tional circumstances.” It is inconceivable that a form

*° In footnote 11 of its brief, the government states:

Because this case involves a challenge to the regulations on

their faces, the Court must sustain them if anything that

might have been written and circulated in Guam in 1974—

or in a combat-ready missile base in North Dakota in 1980—

could possibly present a clear danger to military readiness.

ol

of expression as mild as petitioning presents such an

extraordinary threat to loyalty, discipline and morale

that the ordinary means of control will not suffice.

It is instructive to compare petitioning with other

forms of protest where ordinary measures of control

are employed. In The Concept of the Public Forum:

Cox v. Louisiana, 1965. Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, Professor

Kalven distinguished three forms of protest:

It may prove helpful to risk the pretentious-

ness of ae among three closely relat-

ed gestures of protest often lumped together in

popular discussions of the civil rights movement:

revolution, civil disobedience, and protest. A rev-

olutionary gesture is intended as a direct defi-

ance of law and order; it is a declaration of open

war; it is coercive and obstructive. It may well

be morall justifiable, but only under the strin-

gent conditions by which Western tradition has

measured the right to revolution.

* * *

The government here misstates the standard for facial invalidity.

The proper standard appears in Tribe: ‘‘A law is void on its face

if it ‘does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable areas

of [government] control, but ... sweeps within its ambit other

activities that consitute an exercise ‘of protected expressive or

associational rights’ ’’. Tribe, at 710, quoting, Thornhill v. Ala-

bama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (statute prohibiting all picketing

void on its face since it bans peaceful picketing protected by the

first amendment).

The ‘“‘substantial overbreadth’’ requirement of Parker v. Levy,

supra does not change the legal standard to a “‘scintilla’’ test,

but demands that the ‘‘sweep”’ into protected expression be sub-

stantial.

The government does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ finding

that respondent has standing to raise facial invalidity under

Parker v. Levy, supra. (See, Pet. App. 13a).

52

Civil disobedience is deliberate violation of law

for the sake of protest and as a matter of indi-

vidual conscience. It is a gesture we associate

with Socrates, Thoreau, and conscientious objec-

tors. In the famous formula of Plato’s Apology

and Crito, this gesture requires that the actor

accept the onidienauh. It is a refusal to obey the

law coupled with a willingness to accept the legal

consequences. Insofar as it is symbolic, it is also

an intense form of protest.

* * *

Finally, there are the various forms of mass pro-

test in public places using parades, picketing,

and so on. Here the essential feature is appeal to

public opinion. The intention is not to violate

that law, and the claim is one of privilege in the

exercise of basic rights.

Kalven, supra, at 10-11.

Professor Kalven concluded that, when done in an

orderly manner, the last of the three is protected by

the first amendment. Jd. at 12. Quoting from Edwards

v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) Professor Kal-

ven noted:

The memorable thing about Edwards was that

Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for everyone but

Mr. Justice Clark, said of the defendants and of

their ‘‘rights of free speech, free assembly, and

freedom to petition for redress of their griev-

ances”’: ““The circumstances of this case reflect

an exercise of these basic constitutional rights in

their most pristine and classic form.”’

Id. at 6-7 (emphasis in original).

Viewed in this perspective, peaceful petitioning in-

volves the exercise of “‘basic constitutional rights in

[its] most pristine form.’’ Furthermore, among the

53

various forms of peaceful protest, petitioning is the

most peaceful, least disruptive of all.

Contrast the exercise of the right to petition by

Captain Glines in this case with the form of protest

exercised by Captain Levy in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.

733 (1974). Levy was a physician assigned as Chief of

the Dermatological Service at the base hospital, Fort

Jackson, South Carolina. During the summer of 1966,

Captain Levy made several public statements to en-

listed personnel at the base, urging them not to obey

orders to go to Vietnam and not to fight if they did

go. The following statement was representative:

The United States is wrong in being involved

in the Viet Nam War. I would refuse to go to

Viet Nam if ordered to do so. I don’t see why any

colored soldier would go to Viet Nam: They

should refuse to go to Viet Nam and if sent

should refuse to fight because they are discrimi-

nated against in Viet Nam by being given all the

hazardous duty and they are suffering the ma-

jority of casualties. If I were a colored soldier

and were sent I would refuse to fight. Special

Forces personnel are liars and thieves and killers

“ peasants and murderers of women and chil-

en.

Parker, supra at 737. In conjunction with these state-

ments, Captain Levy refused to follow orders to per-

form his training duties ‘‘because of his medical eth-

ics.’’ Parker, supra at 736.

Captain Levy’s conduct would be classified as a

‘revolutionary’ gesture by Professor Kalven. It was

clearly inappropriate for a military officer and, if ef-

fective, would have substantially interfered with the

military mission of the base, training special forces

54

aides. Id. Yet, the government employed the ordinary

procedures for enforcement of military obligations.

Appellee’s military superiors originally con-

templated nonjudicial proceedings against him

under Art. 15 of the Us

Justice, 10 U.S.C. $815, but later determined

that court-martial proceedings were appropriate.

The specification under Art. 90 alleged that ap-

pellee willfully disobeyed the hospital comman-

dant’s order to establish the training program, in

violation of that article, which punishes anyone

subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice

who “willfully disobeys a lawful command of his

superior commissioned officer.’’ Statements to

enlisted personnel were listed as specifications

under the charges of violating Arts. 133 and 134

of the Code. Article 133 provides for the punish-

ment of ‘conduct unbecoming an officer and a

gentleman,” while Art. 134 proscribes, interalia,

‘all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of

good order and discipline in the armed forces.”

Parker, supra at 737-38.

It is inconceivalbe that the milder form of expres-

sion, petitioning, could not be satisfactorily managed

by these same measures.

Finally, military commanders are in a unique posi-

tion to mitigate dangers which might accompany the

exericse of first amendment freedoms. As stated by

Judge Peckham in Allen v. Monger, supra:

As Captains of their respective ships, Admirals

Monger and Foley exerted considerable leader-

ship on their crews. Admiral Monger had suc-

cessfully asserted the principles of racial equality

on board ship and ball had a substantial impact

in lessening racial tensions by informing the crew

that racism was not to be tolerated on board

niform Code of Military:

55

ship. If either Captain had informed the crew

that the free expression of differing views was

not only to be tolerated, but to be encouraged in

a free society, such leadership would have had a

substantial impact in lessening the disruption, if

any, which might be caused by circulation of a

petition.

(Pet. App. 22a). These observations are equally appli-

cable to commanders of land bases.

(c) The effectiveness of the prior command

approval requirement in protecting the

military interests.

The third and final consideration employed in Ne-

braska Press is the effectiveness of the.prior restraint

in serving the asserted interests. Even if circulating

petitions on base were to present serious dangers and

even if there were no other remedies available to the

government to mitigate those dangers, the govern-

ment should be required to demonstrate the effective-

ness of the prior restraint before servicemen desiring

to exercise the right to petition are forced to tolerate

the least tolerable infringement on this fundamental

constitutional right.

The government’s asserted interest is defined in

the regulations as ‘“‘loyalty,”’ ‘discipline’ and ‘“‘mor-

ale’. The loyalty of those servicemen who value our

form of government is certainly not increased when

they are denied the right to petition the government

for redress of grievances. ‘‘Loyal”’ is defined in Webs-

ter’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1977) as ‘faithful in

allegiance to one’s lawful sovereign or government.”’

Our Pledge of Allegiance is made to a symbol of a

republic: ‘‘a government in which supreme power re-

56

sides in a body of citizens entitled to vote and is

exercised by elected officers and representatives re-

sponsible to them and governing according to law.”’

Id. at 983.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that the morale of ser-

vicemen who value their constitutional rights is in-

creased when they are denied constitutional rights.

Only those servicemen who, like Col. Black, care little

for fundamental liberties are disspirited when citizens

exercise their constitutional rights. The measures rec-

ommended by Judge Peckham, supra p. 40, provide

a more constitutionally palatable means of promoting

those servicemen’s morale.

The remaining governmental interest is discipline.

If denying the right to petition were enough to stifle

a serviceman’s concern about his grievances, these

regulations might promote discipline. However, con-

cern about serious grievances is not likely to disap-

pear simply because the right to petition is sup-

pressed. Furthermore, only petitions about serious

grievances could arguably justify suppression under

the regulations.

As noted by Professor Kalven, supra p. 38, there

are many different forms of protest, even when lim-

iting consideration to different forms of expression.

Parades, picketing, sit-in demonstrations, counselling

disobedience and revolution, all present more dangers

to military interests than does peaceful petitioning.

Furthermore, serious grievances can spawn other,

more destructive non-speech measures of protest,

when peaceful petitioning is eliminated.

Grievances stemming from the Vietnam war

spawned many protests, military as well as civilian.

57

Among those protests were the anti-war petitions in

Carlson v. Schlesinger, supra and the amnesty peti-

tion in Brown v. Huff, (78-599, see, Pet. App. 3a, n.2).

Another of those protests is described in Chenoweth

v. Van Arsdall, Mis. No. 73-1 (USCMA Mar. 13, 1973),

1 Mil. L. Rptr 2098 (1973). In that case Patrick Chen-

oweth, an enlisted man in the United States Navy,

was charged with dropping a wrench or other metallic

object into the gears of the U.S.S. Ranger, an aircraft

carrier docked in the United States pending departure

to the Western Pacific. The wrench caused extensive

damage to the main reduction gears of the Ranger’s

number 4 engine. Repair of this damage, at a cost of

about $800,000.00, delayed the departure of the Rang-

er for several months.

Not only is petitioning far less damaging to mili-

tary interests than the form of protest exercised in

Chenoweth, participants in petitions to the govern-

ment are quite visible. Should petitioning lead to dis-

ruption, the participants can easily be controlled and

called to account. Patrick Chenoweth was acquitted.

See, Affidavit of Eric A. Seitz, appended hereto as

Appendix B.

C. Conclusions

Placing little value in the importance of the right

to petition the government for redress of grievances,

the armed services have placed a prior restraint on all

petitioning on military bases. Each time a request has

been made to circulate a petition on base, the request

has been denied. It hasn’t mattered what the nature

of the particular petition was. There was an anti-war

petition (Carlson), a petition supporting amnesty

(Huff), a petition about the age of a ship (Allen) and

58

one about a ship’s home port (Moses). There were

polite petitions, e.g., Allen, and petitions with stri-

dent language, e.g., Moses. There were petitions over-

seas, e.g., Huff, and petitions at domestic ports, e.g.,

Allen and Moses. All requests were denied. When

respondent circulated his petition about grooming

standards to eight servicemen, he was removed from

-active duty and kicked out of the Air Force Reserves.

Five. times servicemen have come to the federal

courts for relief from the armed service’s prior re-

straint. In four of those cases, the federal courts have

granted the requested relief. Respondent requests

that this Court find the prior restraint on all on-base

petitioning to be unconstitutional.

It is respondent’s contention that this prior re-

straint is unnecessary and ineffective and, like most

prior restraints, unconstitutional. Restraining peti-

tioning does not eliminate the concerns which spawn

petitions, and military interests would be better

served by taking steps to insure that petitioning is

done peacefully rather than restraining it. Unlike

other forms of protest, peaceful petitioning is consist-

ent with civility and compatible with military service.

Respondent would conclude as did Mr. Justice

Rehnquist of this court in a speech republished in the

Indiana Law Journal:

I would like to return finally to another quo-

tation from Learned Hand:

What do we mean when we say that first

of all we seek liberty? I often wonder

whether or not we do not rest our hopes

too much upon constitutions, upon laws,

and upon courts. These are false hopes;

believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty

59

lies in the hearts of men and women; when

it dies there, no constitution, no law, no

court can save it; no constitution, no law,

no court can even do much to help it.

I would not underrate the importance of con-

stitutions or laws in preserving freedom of

expression, any more than would Judge Hand,

but I would be very skeptical that what they can

do by themselves is sufficient to preserve in-

formed public discussion. The truly resolute po-

litical revivalist will not be deterred by the threat

of being driven from the podium. Indeed, he may

lory in it. The zeaiot will not be turned aside by

ae de words or sneering looks. But surely free-

dom of expression is too important a matter to

be left entirely to political revivalists and to zeal-

ots. There must be room in the process for the

less positive, thele ss informed, the thin-skinned.

But only in an atmosphere of civility can these

forensic late bloomers be expected to play the

game.

Judge Hand says the ultimate tate of freedom,

and surely he would include here freedom of

expression, is reposed in the hearts and minds of

men and women. An atmosphere of civility is an

indirect assurance of continuing to maintain the

broad based support of this liberty in its fullest

form in the minds and the hearts of the men and

women of this country. These men and women

are not apt to rise up in its defense if they feel

that freedom of a Bory is the prerogative of

only a few, in which they do not participate and

from which they derive no benefit. They are even

less apt to rise to its defense if those who claim

the freedom for themselves would opm it to

others. I am convinced, however, that so long as

the men and women of this country can believe

that the process of debate and discussion is not

simply the special preserve of some small group,

60

but is instead a process in which all may partic-

ipate and from which all will benefit, this free-

ome will be secure in their minds and hearts.

Rehnquist, ‘‘Civility and Freedom of Speech,” 49 In-

diana Law Journal 6-7 (1973).

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

/s/ David M. COBIN

David M. Cobin

Court-appointed Attorney

for Respondent

APPENDIX

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Vi. COMMINIS FACTS AND SPECIFIC ACHIEVEINTS: Captain Glines clearly is the most

tent navigator within my flight, and probably the most competent within the

ent group. My observations of him during several MAC support missions makes me

completely confident of his exceptionally high level of skills, knowledge, and

judgment. He has been among the most active, if not the most active, participant in

the Reserve Program. His flying time during the past 12 months was approximately

800 hours. He has flown all available Flying Training Periods, has made himself

available for MAC support missions on an almost unlimited basis and has performed a

number of "fill in" administrative duties for the squadron when needed. His work ha

been uniformly excellent. His mobilization potential is of the highest. STRENGTHS:

In addition to the highly superior navigational campetence described above, Captain

Glines is an officer possessing superior leadership potential. He is highly

intelligent, dependable, and thoroughly considerate of the needs of others. Further,

Captain Glines has the courage, as well as the ability and initiative, to assume

responsibility where appropriate. SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENTS: Captain Glines is

currently awaiting reassignment to the 349th MAG. After his requalification in the

new aircraft I would anticipate he should progress rapidly to instructor and flight

examiner. SELF IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: Captain Glines is currently taking a

correspondence course in Evaluation of Financial Reports, a graduate level course

given by the University of California. He has applied for entrance to the graduate

school of Economics at UC. OTHER COMMENTS: Captain Glines' transfer will be a loss

keenly felt by this unit. His performance has been outstanding. Captain Glines has

used his personal and professional capabilities to actively promote equal opportunity

programs. Captain Glines is @ student studying for his Masters Degree.

7

Vill, REPORTING OFFICIAL

HAGE SNABE ATEN VIAN AND SROAR Lf | a en

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JOHN M COHAN, Major Flight Commander KA. MV & -

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McClellan AFB. Calif (AFRES) Sr_Navigator i 1 7 July Te

BY INDORSING OFFICIAL

I have observed the performance of Captain Glines and concur with the remarks and

ratings of the reporting official.

p ik ‘.

MAME. GRADE Ass S546 460 ORGANIZATION ovry nme Moma! iy a

CHESTER W ANDERS, Lt Colonel uadron Commander “i ‘ ?

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SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET TO RATING FORM wHiCH 0 LETTER OF EVALUATION COVERING THE FOLLOWING

COVERS THE FOLLOWING PERIOD OF REPORT PERIOD OF OBSERVATION

io Teau vaow Teau

30 Sep 71 31 May 72 |

Precede comments by eppropriete dete, 1.6. seetion continustion, indorsement continuation, additionel indorse-

went, ete. Follow comments by the euthentication te inchude: meme, grade, AFSN. orgenssetion, duty tithe, date

ond signature.

ADDITIONAL INDORSEMENT

Concur. The evaluation of this officer accurately portrays his performance

and abilities. My contacts with him have impressed me with his potential.

oy t. Ay mee

A FORSYTHE, Colonel, 541-14-3967FV, 940th Tactical Airlift Group, Commander,

Jul 72

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Navigates aircrart to accamplish cargo airlift and other assimed missions.

Plans the navigational phase of each mission and insures that all navigational

equipment is inspected and prerlichted.

and maintains flight logs and records.

Thee aa

552-52 -9660 FV NOMEAD

+ s680 Bales oot 7, eee OF etroet

Naviga lL feeas ‘un =

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199 CRO

PRESERT OUTY

parse 1545. SQUADRON NAVIGATOR C-141.

Performs minor in-flight maintenance

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OVER-ALL EVALUATION (Compere thie ef ficer ONLY wrth officers af the seme grade )

yr

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x PERT em PRR ITE ELK BwE AO OF COM TiN Mami tS

FACTS AND SPECIFIC ACHIEVE ENTS:

his time and talent to the Air Force Reserve progran s

Comat ns

Capt Glines has made sinificant contributions of

ince joining the 933 MAGp

(Assoc) (AFRES). Capt Glines has attended the C-141 navigator training course at

Altus AFB, Oklahora, where he distinguished himself by graduating second in his

class. Capt Glines has also received a recormendation for a checkride in the

minimum am 1t of time. He has devoted 45 days of his time to Active Duty during

the past three months and has flown several overwater training missions during that

period. He has the additional duties of Squadron Cormunications Security Officer

and Plans Officer. In this capacity, he has developed a communications security

briefing to be conducted at his monthly unit training assemblies. He hes also

contributed significantly to the development of his unit's operations plans.

Because of his potential, Capt Glines has been selected to attend the C-5 navigator

training course at Altus AFB, Oklahom.

His participation in the Air Force Peserve

has been excellent and he has accumulated the maximum allowable number of additional

flying training periods. STREIGTHS:

and has a cooperative attituce.

Cant Glines is an energetic, zealous officer

Ne is easy to get along with and gets along well

with others. He has excellent potential and is a dedicated officer. SUGGESTED

ASSIGNMENTS: Capt Glines should be upzraded to line navigator as socn as possible

and is recommended for attendance at the C-5 navigator training school. OTTER

COMMENTS: Capt Glines is athletically inclined and in this regard, enjoys coacning

a softball team. His civilian occupation is that of automobile salesman.

vit.

REPORTING OFFICIAL

45-32-8157 FIB12 MASq (Assoc)

Travis AFB, CA (AFFES)

i CT a ee ee) Bate The T ae SA

FRANK L. JACKSON, Major, USAFR | Squadron Navigator Front Joe en

af80 Bat ne care

Senior Mav

3 April 1973

ACVICW BY IMOORSING OFFICIAL

I concur with the comments and ratings of the reporting official. Capt Clires is

energetic ard possesses a strong desire to do an exceptional job for the Peserve

program. Due to his rapid prccression and fine attitude, I have selected him for

conversion to the C-5 Associate Reserve squadron,

Crk

a Cat NS ee eee ye vray 2, <7 7 y

EDMOND F. COONEY, JR., Majcr, Squadron Navigator Ort Carmuy jt

USAFR, 508-364-1945 FV30l MASQ == [Har ere ¥ 758 77

(Ansoc), Travis APS, CA (aeTeS) Master Nav 3 April 1973

; Seen

6a : Ta

mh 083

/ “PUCROFILIED 1 “y'7a rm APN PA aeeorn Fi J)! 261 1373

1. iDimTie ica CATA Boot ana DOr td care%eTIf BOAO Hitiin oar tee ) 7

LEU ML rie l aie O ry T WSR Gat a

nes, Albert E. 552-52 -9680FV NONEAD Captain

SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET TO RATING FORM WHICH LETTER OF EVALUATION COVERING THE FOLLOWING 5 Chines, Famine tne Oat iom Tie Se er pt

pF

Q COVERS THE FOLLOWING PERIOD OF REPORT PERIOD OF OBSERVATION 301 MASq (Assoc) (AFRES) Sr Nav vom 26 Feb 73 [~~ 29 Jul 73

yeow ea Travis AFB CA 4535 TOS or re TOS Tee HT

active

“CHECK APPROPRIATE BLOCK AND COMPLETE AS APPLICABLE)

vam way 154 CRO

1 Jun 72 25 Feb 73 i. PRESENT OUTY

additionel sndorse-

Deosede coansate br coprens tere Gate. i cusscrsen te tactuse:, sees. grees, APES, gegeabaat ene. duty Cathe, dete oust 1545L parse LS4SL SQUADRON NAVIGATOR C-Lh1.

ond signature. Navigates aircrart to accomplish cargo airlift and other assigned missions.

Plans the navigational phase of each mission and insures that all navigational

’

ADDITIONAL INDORSEMENT

S igh ° orms - :) nan

Captain Glines' excellent ability as a C-141 navigator vas demonstrated when he peg sce Edges sedate foe ag er minot in-flight mintenance

attended the C-141 navieator training course and graduating second in his class.

I concur with the reporting and indorsing officials. .

CT NOS AS ae

CHARLES H. MICHAEL, Colonel, USAFR, 568-26-2982FV, 938 Mil Alft Gp (ASSOC)(AFRES),

Commander, 6 April 1973 -

whe RATING FACTORS (Consrder haw thie officer +a pertorming On Rie pee }

‘ BNOM LOGE OF CUTIES

7 ° ” Seer euS eee te its eee | covtinn peases or ars soo. [oman er wis s00. fasseh'os ars een” | cease seo tatecunys

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. oe OES oof ,

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, CIFECTIVENESS IN MGR ING aii OTHERS

wor TEPPER TIE tm CORR ING oF tm] Sometimes was MiRFICA TY Ere Te te er ne Oe Teveiwtae SELES

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re tt eed _

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wr OCC SONS ame OCC maetNre. or eee os woes COOe POmwat CONC ts ee PS ee

TiOnS OF Tim SRONE Of CUNO Bul wants HC CASHONME | BME TING foc TO sO COWSHO4OS Oin FaCtOes (Oo “Per ot OFC 5) Fete oe

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O Oe ee Raut me Se hua awe om OOF CURT Be tuateaes ety te mates OF

’ Use OF BER ES

my) TeattaCiind tm Canvaevarren] ost Siw BLES 1m O Gaetay | ciasierrd Ov Uses Gulia PECONCh whi OCC mms its woe wa enc |

mes Mar DF aC Tome manne orem mes Tee Neh OF OF EL ree seme or omerns

|

0° > called Ga |Ge) Ge Et Ge |e

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(OCR qeeer ed ten wi tere me ee ee Th On te w Sftshe ome OES | ero rr

“tem sees ‘ 1 oo feet POLLED Teh ete Cte Perks 0888 (tome “_* oe “es to

© @) re ‘ We ome MA vate

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wr UT a er ee I wee Tete one re ee |

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eter FerOreQt ere tt am oes -

o

ereecr) anes are renee

AF sng A 77a uavovens enr¥eus ° wat oeun isa SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET TO AF FORMS 77, O — (| Cc Ce) ot ~~

mn ere 18 Ganaysres oni me-nafe§ 707, 909, 910, 911 MnO ne a ane mrp

EXHIBIT D-1

ar Ege ee ee ee ee

8a 9a

%3

‘. Ovte-al cY Oe (Coopers thie officer OMLY @rth efficore he seme grade) 2 itf8 LAST MAME FURST ame mr OORE FIT IAL

active Outy Gaaoe

s3an

WEE Glines, Albert £. \' 552-52-9680FV NONEAD

Craeaeee syseseegeriee (CHECK APPROPRIATE BLOCK AND COMPLETE 4S APPLICABLE)

ees >|

tonne feet ame

SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET TO RATING FORM WHICH LETTER OF EVALUATION COVERING THE FOLLOWING

Ce ot. bog Ct). Co (Co eae COVERS THE FOLLOWING PERIOD OF REPORT PERIOD OF OBSERVATION

nares. Pron Ot ow avtnece CPPECT IVE ted COMPETENT weer font CACC ORAELT) Qurstanoing = ry 7} rer

YI PROMOTION POTENTIAL 26 Feb 73 29 Jw 73 |

s. muee noe ectamnvenne 0 casemscen ven cocmproen av ture cumm, fj] * SPSS, mccturgsusiahene © Sonim C7 cosertcT™PCien’ octets ty ene suthenestavion's sorta "han graces AvShy vgunievion, day shel dot

eleneture.

memareems Gtaituter atts Ss tenons eR ee ee 1.

OT ADDITIONAL INDORSEMENT: I concur. Capt Glines in addition to flying has made

FACTS AMD SPECIFIC ACHIEVIZENTS: Capt Glines has performed his duties in an ' himself available for additional duties during the unit training assemblies.

exceptionally fine manner throurhout the period of this report. His participation I personally assigned him several projects in the Navigator Section and he

ami perforrance in all scheduled unit training assemblies have been especially oy rg ber ae oe te and with dispatch. Recommend Capt Glines enroll

noteworthy. lis effective use of materiel and perscnne] while serving as Manuals % Air Comman tarf College by correspondence in order to better utilize his

Control Officer demonstrated his great efficiency and success while working with administrative and managerial abilities.

others. Capt Glines has proven to be a canpetent and professional navigator.

The examiner on his recent C-141 initial evaluation had many favorable comments Ei es > b

on his performance. In order to broaden his technical knowledge, he also accumu- Lyra ve tat,

lated the maximum number of additicnal flying training periods. Because of his : EDMOND F. COONEY, JR., f‘9/jor, USAFR, 508-34-1945FV, 301 MASq (Assoc), Squadron

proven abilities, he has been selected to transition to the highly sophisticated Navigator, 20 August 1

C-5A aircraft end entered training on 30 July 1973. He has expressed a high degree

of enthusiasm for this essimment and will undoubtedly be an asset to the 301 MAS.

STRENGTHS: Capt Glines is a conscientious officer who will see e project through

aDDITIONAL INDORSEMENT: Capt Glines has d trated ded

to its comiction. He has excellent potential and gets along well with others. 4 " ph soa pe oi eoreecly sage ate

1S COMPAR VAC & through a high level of participation. I concur with this evaluation and the

SUGGESTED ASSIGIMENTS: In eto to best —_ his eng maf Glines should recommendations of his reporting and indorsing officicls to upgrade as C-5

be upgraded to navigator imme iately upon his return from formal C-5A school. a ‘ onal ed

OTHER CQOMINTS: Capt Glines' devoted interest and outstanding abilities in the navigator cad inerense his profess CELL Ls 'Thvemgh eaEreppenrenss SuErees,

field of athletics have aided greatly in the high success of the local softball ~ 2

program where he volunteers his services as a eoneh - ranager. iy Rag Soe ; , A Lie AA

4 44 that of ' _ Capt Glines prerotes the Pua : , J os

See san eS Sas B.C. MEWS, Colonel, USWFR, $51-12-5762FV 349,11 1ft Wig (iss0c), (ARES),

Commanier, 2° .ugust 1973

vir. REPORTING OFFICIAL

CeCe ee SIT TRwT —=

CHARLES EGIZIANO, Capt, USAFR Squadron Navigator LO * 4 lie .

127-30-6610FV, 301 MASq (Assoc [OSE bas _

Travis AFB, CA (AFFES) | Senior Mav 1 20 august 1943

m. REVIE@ BY [MOORSING OFFICIAL

I concur with the above report. Capt Glines is an officer whose full potential

has not yet been realized. He should be an asset to the 301 MASq.

a ee mv veer

Seer -”

JOEL V. FALK, Capt, USAFR Squadron Navigator Stel leh

503-24 -5 303FY, 302 “ALG (Asse PTS “ae coy ’ ery} Peter dus CHT Om

Travis AFR, CA (AFT *) Navigator ‘| 1 20 August 1973 AF we @ 778 as vern warn ores paps gy SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET TO AF FORM

D-2 Tew a tome ou “p-3 707, 909, 910, 911) AND 475 7

lla

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC A. SEITZ

STATE OF HAWAII )

) SS.

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU )

ERIC A. SEITZ, being first duly sworn on oath,

deposes and says:

1. I am an attorney admitted to practice before the

Supreme Court of the United States, before state

courts in California and Hawaii, and before numerous

federal courts for trial and appellate proceedings.

2. Currently I ar engaged in the private practice

of law with offices located at 681 South King Street,

Suite 200, Honolulu, Hawaii 96813.

3. Commencing in September, 1972, I represented

an individual named PATRICK CHENOWETH in

connection with his trial before a Navy court-martial

on charges alleging, in substance, acts of sabotage to

the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Ranger.

4. The court-martial proceedings in Mr. CHEN-

OWETH’s case occurred over a period of several

months at the United States Naval Base, Treasure

Island, California, terminating on or about June 5,

1973, by findings of the military court that he was.

not guilty of the specifications and charges on which

he was tried.

5. During the entire period of time, from his arrest

in July, 1972, until his acquittal in early June, 1973,

Mr. CHENOWETH was confined without bail at the

correctional facility on Treasure Island. A petition for

habeas corpus was filed in his behalf and ultimately

12a

reached the Supreme Court upon a petition for cer-

tiorari, resulting in the Order that is appended hereto

as Exhibit A.

/s/ E.A. Seitz

ERIC A. SEITZ -

Subscribed and sworn to

before me this 3rd day

of July, 1979.

/s/ Marilyn Joy Barbain

Notary Public, First

Judicial Circuit, State of Hawaii

My commission expires: 5/1/83

13a

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543

October 9, 1973

Eric A. Seitz, Esq.

405 Capp Street

San Francisco, Calif. 94110

RE: CHENOWETH v. WARNER, SEC’Y of

NAVY, et al., 72-6812 =

Dear Sir:

The Court today entered the following order in the

above-entitled case:

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted.

The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to

the United States District Court for the Northern

District of California with directions to dismiss the

case as moot.

Very truly yours, |

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., Clerk

By

/s/ HELEN TAYLOR

Helen Taylor, (Mrs.)

Assistant Clerk

AIRMAIL

RECEIVED OCT 30 1973

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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