Respondents Brief — Brown v. Glines
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“as Supreme Court, U.S.
i FILED }
JUL 20 1979 |
}
IN THE [MICHAEL RODAK,IR., CLERK
Supreme Court of the United aa
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 78-1006
HAROLD R. BROWN,
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
ALBERT EDWARD GLINES,
Respondent.
On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court
of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
DAVID M. COBIN
Hamline University
- School of
1536 Hewitt Avenue
St. Paul, Minnesota 55104
(612) 641-2143
(Court appointed Counsel
for Respondent)
Of Counsel:
Melvin K. Dayley
Dayley and Blumin
6330 Telegraph Avenue
Oakland, California 94609
(415) 653-8800,
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.
Page
EE ES) 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............05. 3
ARGUMENT:
I. The Court of Appeals was correct in
Il.
finding that the challenged regulations
violated 10 U.S.C. $1034 .............
A. The Court of Appeals was correct in
finding that the protections afforded
armed forces personnel by 10 U.S.C.
$1034 include communication by peti-
B. The Court of Appeals was correct in
finding that regulations placing a
prior restraint on all petitioning on
military bases were not necessary to
the security of the United States....
If this Court finds that the challenged
regulations violated 10 U.S.C. 1034, the
lower courts’ rulings in favor of respon-
dent should be affirmed ..............
A. The action taken against respondent
was based upon petitions directed to
members of Congress as well as a peti-
tion to the Secretary of Defense. ... .
B. Protections afforded armed forces
personnel for communication to
members of Congress should be held
to include communication directed
21
22
22
Page
additionally to the Secretary of
SR Ssh ha Rw eho yevieev ales
III. The Court of Appeals was correct in
finding that regulations requiring com-
mand approval prior to circulation of
petitions on a military base violate the
First Amendment...................
A. The Court’s decision in Greer v.
Spock is not dispositive of the
issues in this case ................
B. Taking the important governmental
interests served by the challenged
regulations into account, the Court of
Appeals was correct in finding that
the application of a prior restraint on
all petitioning on military bases was
substantially overboard...........
1. The significance of the prior
approval requirement as a prior
restraint..... eae ed oak ae ee
a) Dissemination delayed may
prove tantamount to dissem-
ination denied..............
b) Censors uncontrolled by courts
tend to deny publication to
material protected by the First
Amendment ...............
2. Applying the analysis employed in
Nebraska Press Association v.
27
29
29
35
35
36
iii
Page
b) The availability of other mea-
sures to mitigate the harm
Ee 47
c) The effectiveness of the prior
command approval require-
ment in protecting the military
DU Sauaiys bas 66 enedas 55
rj ae ig age Bb Wee 57
Se RS cc Sis oak be Awake UAC SOAS OO 60
: CITATIONS
CASES:
Abbott Labs v. Portland Retail Druggists, 425
Se RR ek eee Lee Wie oa acecn ne ook 9, 29
Allen v. Monger, 404 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Cal.
1975), 583 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1978), petition
for cert. pending sub. nom. Brown v. Allen,
ee Te Pee ree passim
Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1970)... 49
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413, U.S. 601 (1973) .... 50
Carlson v. Schlesinger, 364 F. Supp. 626 (D.D.C.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 511 F.2d 1327
EA Ri RU EMN A ake 6 aioe es OS Ve Wee a as 39
Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir.
EME EN a padiaie Delve spas ee kers 21, 39, 45, 57
Chenoweth v. Van Arsdall, Mis. No. 73-1
(USCMA Mar. 13, 1973), 1 Mil. L. Rptr. 2098
Ey TSRMESNAL SAS Bap ih Peek NOSE eI yee 57
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569(1941)..... 47
iv
Page
Eastern Air Lines v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir.
TOGRD . bc ss osc d.o0b 56S ee ate eeee ies 27
Easton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974)..... 23
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(ROG: 5). kn eves Coa Orie eeaares 52
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)........ 23
Fleischmann Construction Co. v. United States,
270 U.S. 840 (199G). . cc ic vieclccctccscievs 28
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)......... passim
Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 413 F. Supp. 863
(D.D.C. 1976) 575 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. granted sub. nom. Brown v. Huff, No.
i EE Pe ey es PT err i passim
Montana Pow:.- Co. v. Federal Power Com-
mission, 445 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1971) cert.
den. 400 U.S. 1013 (1971). ................ 27
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
GOR ROT: i's wee vias Rice caeeesueeaees passim
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
TES (IGT 8 ice Vee sea ea ee ees 21
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).... 35,50, 51, 53
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975)...... 28
Steck v. Connally, 199 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C.
BOGE a ick Na cee eon eee 34
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) .... 3,22, 23
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)....... 17,18
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) ....... 51
Tygrett v. Washington, 543 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir.
976: oan Fe Sdekee van gs SRR ee 2 23
Page
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar
Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967)........... 18
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 545
a a Sita giaie ai, a aaa ve eam wb u'achle'e Ae 17,18
United States Donner, 497 F.2d 184 (7th Cir.
1974) cert. den., 419 U.S. 1047 (1974) ....... 23
United States v. Gray, 20 USCMA 63, 42 CMR
ID hide! Gd 6. athe 00-070 64 AO LD oles 33
United States v. Schmidt, 16 USCMA 57, 36
UE RMEEINE ov k'b band dceeeketvcebs 33, 47
Waters v. Peterson, 495 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.
ee re eh a ee ce al ie ace es 4 bb bcp 23
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) ...... 43
Yancy v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 207, 122 S.W.
NES bs SUN wkd, bee heal weak Cae aes 19
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1959) . 3, 22, 26
CONSTITUTION, TREATY, STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS:
United States Constitution, First Amend-
Sahih td wile d ip a vik Neo 8 0 B08 8 8 passim
IN 6 54°55. \0'oco-o°0 a awe ove vivrache o's © 28
hid a Ss Gra hvala Hale Kb ole > oeee 8s pe 48
10 UBC. $016 mse cei cece cen ncenn 47
IEE iia. oon ok evn wo abba wa wriee paints 48
Se a5 a oy 3.0.00 5-60.80 ER 4,0 OAs 48
PP NE ns os be bes ec dba bh ouleee's passim
DTM Mieco k So) kee Cavaeeees 28
Page
Department of Defense Directive 1325.6 III G
PR ee Odie Sed we ke Awd Sob wks WE 10
Navy Regulation Article 1248................ 7,9
TREATISES AND ARTICLES:
Blackstone, Commentaries (Oxford, 1765) (Phil-
| i c < | aS ara ae are eee eno A 11
Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process (1921)... 27
Kalven, The Concept aj t'1e Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 Supreme Court Reviewl... 51
Moyer, Justice and the Military (1972)......... 33
Rehnquist, Civility and Freedom of Speech, 49
I RAO Gris dee e eb W iene eb cs 60
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights (1978)......... passim
Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places,
1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 238......ccccceccesecs 35
» Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978)... 36, 37,
38, 39, 42, 44
Tucker, Constitution of the United States
RR Se dinG es hiew dns es eas ae aoe esas
Wills, Inventing America (1978) ............6: 11
MISCELLANEOUS:
97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951)............ 22 e ee eee 7
97 Cong. Rec. A4977 (1951) .............. 9, 20, 28
97 Cong. Rec. A4977-78 (1951)............004. 28
Federal Register Vol. 33 No. 16, p.841......... 28
Vii
Page
Executive Order No. 11390, 47, January 24,
PEI 5p eulld kale eed ap Rd a as Sa
28
55
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 78-1006
HAROLD R. BROWN,
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
ALBERT EDWARD GLINES,
Respondent.
On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court
of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit
~~ BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
STATEMENT
Respondent was a Captain in the Air Force Re-
serves. He had been evaluated as dedicated, energetic,
zealous officer, clearly the most competent navigator
within his flight and probably the most competent
within his entire group (A.9, Appendix A to this brief),
and had accumulated more than 15 years of service in
2
the Air Force Reserves. (A. 31). Although he was a
member of the Reserves, respondent had been on near-
ly full-time active duty for the two years prior to
initiation of this lawsuit. (A. 8).
Respondent was concerned about the negative im-
pact Air Force grooming standards were having on
the morale and retention of servicemen in the Air
Force; he prepared a petition to members of Congress
and the Secretary of Defense to show the widespread
dissatisfaction of servicemen with the grooming
standards.' The substantive portion of the petition
stated the following:
We, the undersigned, all American citizens serv-
ing in the armed services of our nation, req:vst
your assistance in changing the grooming stand-
ards of the United States Air Force.
We feel that -.:e present regulations on grooming
have caused more racial tension, decrease in mor-
ale and retention, and loss of respect for author-
ities than any other official Air Force policy.
(A. 18-22) At the time of the events herein, respondent
was serving active duty was involved in a navigator
instructor upgrade training program. (A. 34).
' The record does not include an explanation of how grooming
standards caused the problems indicated. Counsel’s understand-
ing is that the standards had a disparate effect on Blacks and
Whites in the Reserves. Reservists had to satisfy the grooming
standards for the weekend-a-month they were on active duty.
Persons with tightly-curled hair, often Blacks, could mat their
hair while on active duty and comb it out as a civilian to conform
with current civilian hair styles. Persons with straight hair, often
Whites, had to keep their hair short at all times, remaining out
of style with civilian hair styles. This disparate effect caused
racial tension.
3
In April, 1974, during a training flight to Japan,
respondent had an overnight stopover at Anderson
Air Force Base, Guam. After his plane landed in
Guam, respondent handed a ground crew member a
copy of the petition. The ground crew member took
the petition back to his barracks and, in time, a total
of eight servicemen signed the petition. (A. 25-27). For
initiating the circulation of his petition in this manner,
respondent was removed from active duty and trans-
ferred out of the Active Reserves to the Standby Re-
serves.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I,
The statutory protection afforded members of mil-
itary service “communicating with a member of Con-
gress” in 10 U.S.C. $1034 includes communication by
petitions. Noi only are petitions generally understood
as a proper means of communicating with Congress,
the right to petition the government has been under-
stood as a fundamental right since colonial times.
Furthermore, the legislative history of 10 U.S.C.
$1034 demonstrates that it was enacted to open chan-
nels of communication between members of the armed
services and members of Congress which explicitly
included joint petitions.
II.
Respondent should not lose statutory protection
even though his petition to members of Congress was
directed additionally to the Secretary of Defense. Un-
der Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) and Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1959), the government
4
must prove to a certainty that the action taken
against respondent was not based in the least degree
on his petitions to members of Congress for respond-
ent to lose statutory protection. The government can-
not meet this burden.
Furthermore, since the addition of a copy of re-
spondent’s petition to the Secretary of Defense serves
the congressional goals that underlie 10 U.S.C. §1034,
it would be unjust, if not absurd, for respondent to
lose statutory protection as a result of directing an
additional copy to the Secretary of Defense.
Ill.
The Court’s decision in Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828 (1976), relied on by the government, is not dis-
positive of the issues in this case because the nature
of the speech interests and the policies involved in the
two cases are entirely different. The inability of a
civilian national political candidate to make political
speeches on a military base has very little impact on
the candidate’s ability to reach his national audience.
However, the inability of a serviceman to circulate a
petition to be signed by other servicemen on a military
base has a substantial impact on the serviceman’s
ability to reach his limited audience. Furthermore, the
decision to prohibit civilian campaign speeches on
base comports with the American constitutional tra-
dition of a politically neutral military establishment
under civilian control. However, the decision to pro-
hibit the circulation of petitions to the civilians con-
stitutionally charged with control over the military
establishment conflicts with the same constitutional
tradition.
5
Prior restraints on speech are ‘‘the most serious
and the least tolerable infringement on First Amen¢d-
ment Rights,’’ Nebracka Press Association v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 559 (1975), and the prior approval re-
quirement is as serious an infringement on the first
amendment rights of servicemen as is prior restraints
on speech generally. Prior restraints on petitioning
on-base can prove tantamount to a prohibition of all
petitioning. For servicemen assigned to foreign bases
and ships, it has that effect so long as servicemen are
assigned to the base or so long as the ship is at sea.
If timeliness has importance, a prior restraint
amounts to total infringement. In every case, denial
of permission to circulate a petition on-base substan-
tially interferes with petitioner’s ability to accomplish
the desired communication. Furthermore, the prior
approval requirement has the same procedural signif-
icance as other prior restraints.
Moreover, the broad delegation of authority to mil-
itary commanders to restrain petitioning on the basis
of such amorphous interests as “‘loyalty,’’ ‘‘disci-
pline’’ and ‘‘morale,”’ invites censorship. In every case
where permission to circulate on-base has been re-
quested it has been denied, even when the government
now admits that denial was wrongful. In the present
case, respondent was taken off active duty and re-
moved from the reserves even though his conduct was
innocuous.
Applying the analysis employed in Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart, supra, demonstrates that the
prior approval requirement is unnecessary, ineffective
and unconstitutional. The danger to military interests
6
from petitioning is minimal, especially when com-
pared with other forms of protest which may be ex-
ercised when the right to petition is denied. Further-
more, there are less restrictive alternatives available
to the government to mitigate the dangers that peti-
tioning might present. These alternatives include ap-
propriate time, place and manner restrictions and the
broad power of military authorities to punish disrup-
tive petitioning.
ARGUMENT
I
The Court Of Appeals Was Correct In Finding That
The Challenged Regulations Violate 10 U.S.C. §1034.
A. The Court of Appeals was correct in find-
ing that the protections afforded armed
forces personnel by 10 U.S.C. $1034 in-
clude communication by petition.
10 U.S.C. §1034 states:
No person may restrict any member of an armed
force in communicating with a member of Con-
gress, unless the communication is unlawful or
violates a regulation necessary to the security of
the United States.
In the district court, the Court of Appeals and in
this Court, the Government has argued that the pro-
tections afforded armed forces personnel by this stat-
ute do not extend to communication by petition be-
cause (1) the language of the statute is written in the
singular and (2) the original incident which prompted
7
the statute involved a letter. Brief for the petitioners
at 37-42. The lower courts in this case and in two
other cases found this argument unpersuasive. Glines
v. Wade, 401 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Cal. 1975), 586 F.2d
675 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, sub. nom., Brown
v. Glines, No. 78-1006 (Mar. 19, 1979); See, Huff v.
Secretary of the Navy, 413 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C.
1976), 575 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. granted,
No. 78-599 (Mar. 19, 1979); Allen v. Monger, 404 F.
Supp. 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1975), 583 F.2d 438 (9th Cir.
1978), petition for cert. pending, sub. nom., Brown v.
Allen, No. 78-1005. This Court should find the argu-
ment unpersuasive as well.
In its brief the Government asserts that the lan-
guage “‘communicating with a member of Congress”’
in $1034 by its nature omits any reference to petition-
ing. Brief for the petitioner at 37. But petitioning is
certainly generally understood as a proper means of
communicating with Congress.
To support an interpretation limiting the meaning
of ‘‘communicating”’ to communication by individual
letters, the Government’s brief refers to portions of
the Congressional Record purporting to quote from
the Navy Regulations in effect in 1951 which regulat-
ed communication with Congress:
At that time, Articles 1248 and 1249 of Navy
Regulations (1948) provided ‘‘any letter from a
member of the naval service to Congress or to a
Congressman which affects the Naval Establish-
ment should be sent through official Channels. “
97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951).
Brief for the petitioners at 38.
In fact, the above quotation is not from the text of
Navy Regulations, but from a letter of the Secretary
8
of the Navy, which in turn quoted an opinion of the
Judge Advocate General of the Navy.’
* The letter was from Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the
Navy and addressed to Congressman Byrnes of Wisconsin. The
letter in its entirety ie as follows:
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Washington, March 13, 1951.
Hon. John W. Byrnes,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.
DEAR MR. BYRNES: This is in reply to your letter of Feb-
ruary 26, 1951, requesting and interpretation of articles 1248
and 1249, Navy Regulations (1948).
In an opinion dated April 7, 1950, the Judge Advocate General
of the Navy, with reference to articles 1248 and 1249, Navy
Regulations (1948) stated in conclusion:
“The provisions of the above-quoted articles 1248 and 1249
would seem to be sufficiently broad to cover any communication
intended or designed to influence Congress or a Member of Con-
gress to favor or oppose any legislation or appropriations affect-
ing the Naval Establishment, whether pending, proposed, or sug-
gested. Hence, in every case where a person in the naval service
desires to send a communication to Congress, or a Member of
Congress, the question to be answered by such person is whether
his communication concerns legislation or appropriations relat-
ing to the Naval Establishment. Such a determination is made
by the member of the naval forces at his own risk. If he has any
doubt as to whether his proposed letter relates to the Naval
Establishment, he should send it via the Secretary of the Navy.
“Accordingly, in the light of the above-quoted articles 1248
and 1249, it appears that any letter from a member of the naval
service, to Congress or to a Congressman which affects the Naval
Establishment, should be sent through official channels.”’
I consider this to be the correct interpretation of these articles.
You will agree, I am sure to the basic administrative policy on
which these articles are based: That the Department of the Navy
should at all times be advised as to all matters relating to the
Naval Establishment. These articles are not intended to prohibit
9
Article 1248 of Navy Regulations (1948), which was
entitled ‘‘Communications to the Congress,” actually
read as follows:
All petitions, remonstrances, memorials and
communications from any person or persons in
the naval service, whether on the active or retired
list, addressed to Congress, or to either House
thereof, on any subject of legislations relating to
the Naval Establishment, whether pending, pro-
posed, or suggested, shall be forwarded through,
or as authorized by, the Secretary of the Navy.
97 Cong. Rec. A4977 (1951) (emphasis added).
Contrary to the Government’s assertions, this leg-
islative history indicates that the meaning of ‘“‘com-
municating”’ in §1034 does include communicating by
petitions since §1034 was enacted to open channels of
communication which explicitly included petitions.
Application of other rules of statutory construction
suggests the same result. As stated by this Court,
‘‘fbjecause the Act is remedial, it is to be construed
broadly to effectuate its purposes.”’ Abbott Labs. v.
Portland Retail Druggists, 425 U.S. 1, 12, (1976).
The Courts of Appeals in Brown v. Glines, supra
(78-1006), Brown v. Allen, supra (78-1005), and Sec-
retary of the Navy v. Huff, supra (78-599), extensively
correspondence between naval personnel and their Congressmen.
Whenever correspondence addressed to a Congressman is sent
via the Secretary of the Navy, it is, as a matter of policy, for-
warded promptly.
Your inquiry in this regard is appreciated and your letter is
being further referred to the Chief of Naval Mperations for study
of your suggestion that the articles might be clarified.
Sincerely yours,
FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS
10
analyzed the language and legislative history of the
statute. The majority of the Court of Appeals in Huff
concluded,
[T}he legislative history indeed leaves no doubt
that the right to present a solitary, individual
grievance to a member of Congress is encom-
passed by §1034. But there is no indication that
this is the outer limit of the communication
which Congress sought to protect. ... We would
suppose that quite often a soldier’s intended com-
munication with Congress could not effectively
be accomplished through solitary letters, as, for
instance, when the objective is to communicate
widespread dissatisfaction concerning a particu-
lar aulersaa rather than merely the grievance
itself.
* * *
Particularly in view of the long and cherished
tradition in this country, embodied in the first
amendment ... of collective presentation of
grievances to those in authority in the form of
petitions, we think it most unlikely that in pro-
tecting the right to communicate grievances to
Congress, Congress did not intend to protect the
right to solicit others to sign such communica-
tions.
Huff (78-599 Pet. App. 12a-13a)
The Court of Appeals in Huff also noted that
D.O.D. Directive No. 1325.6, §III G (1969) refers to
§1034 as protecting the right of a member of the
armed forces to “‘petition or present any grievance to
any member of Congress.”’ Huff (78-599 Pet. App.
12a).
11
The Court of Appeals in Allen and Glines reached
similar conclusions.
Congress clearly intended to protect communi-
cation with several members of Congress at a
time, even though it is used in the singular; while
the record is not so clear, it is unlikely that Con-
gress intended to restrict protected communica-
tion by more than one member of the armed
forces at a time.
We therefore hold that $1034 protects petition-
ing. The importance petitioning Congress has
"8 in our history, combined with a legislative
istory that shows Congress concerned to kee
communications open despite threats to disci-
pline and a history of verbal changes in the stat-
ute that encourages a broad interpretation of its
protections, all lead to this conclusion. The right
to petition, of course, includes a reasonable op-
portunity to solicit signatures for the petition.
Allen (78-1005 Pet. App. 10a).
The Courts of Appeals’ appreciation for the impor-
tance petitioning has played in our history is entirely
justified. Not only is the right to petition protec.ed
by the First Amendment, but it is a right that was
fundamental to the origins of the United States. “It
is too often forgotten that the entire raison d’etre of
the [First] Congress, assembled in Philadelphia, was
to petition for redress.’’ G. Wills, Inventing America,
57 (1978).
The right to petition was by 1774 a well-established
principle of British law,’ and in the colonies had been
* See, 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 138-39, ch. I §4 (Oxford,
1765), id. at 143 (American Edition, Philadelphia, 1771):
4. If there should happen any uncommon injury, or infringe-
ment of the rights beforementioned, which the ordinary
12
designated as a fundamental right as early as 1641.‘
The First Congress relied on assembly and petition as
“the recognized way of addressing and defining what
the seventeenth and eighteenth century Englishmen
called ‘fundamental law’.” G. Wills, supra, 54 (1978).
course of law is too defective to reach, there still remains a
fourth subordinate right appertaining to every individual,
namely, the rights of petitioning the king, or either house of
parliament, for the redress of grievances.
(Typeset modernized). See also, The English Bill of Rights (1689),
reprinted in, 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 43 (1971):
[Tyhe said lords . . . being now assembled in a full and free
representative of this nation, taking into their most serious
consideration the best means for attaining the ends afore-
said, do in the first place (as their ancestors in like case have
naturally done) for the vindicating and asserting their an-
cient rights and liberties, declare ... that it is the right of
the subjects to petition the king, and all commitments and
prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal. . . .
* MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES, 1641
A Coppie of the Liberties of the
Massachusetts Colonie in New England
12. Every man, whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not
free shall have libertie to come to any publique Court, Coun-
cel, or Towne meeting, and either by speech or writeing to
move any lawfull, seasonable, and materiall question, or to
present any necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill or
information, whereof that meeting hath proper cognizance,
so it be done in convenient time, due order, and respective
manner.
Reprinted in, 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 73 (1971).
Schwartz states, id. at 69, “‘[o]f the documents discussed thus far
[English: Magna Carta (1215), Petition of Right (1628), Agree-
ment of the People (1649), A Healing Question (1656), Bill of
Rights (1689); American: First Charter of Virginia (1606), Fun-
damental Orders of Connecticut (1639), Maryland Act for the
Liberties of the People (1639)], there is no doubt that the 1641
Massachusetts Act was the most important as a forerunner of
the federal Bill of Rights.”
13
The colonies had used group petitions to the King as
a means of seeking redress of grievances as early as
1765,° and unanimously asserted the right to do so at
the First Continental Congress.°
* After the Stamp Act in 1765, the colonists convened a Con-
gress to assert their right to be treated as were English citizens.
Included in their Declaration was an assertion of the right to
petition.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES, 1765
The members of this Congress, ... with minds deeply
impressed by a sense of the present and impending misfor-
tunes of the British colonies on this continent; having con-
sidered as maturely as time will permit the circumstances
of the said colonies, esteem it our indispensible duty to make
the following declarations of our humble opinion respecting
the most essential rights and liberaties of the colonists, and
of the grievances under which they labor, by reason of sev-
eral late Acts of Parliment.
XIII. That it is the right of the British subjects in these
colonies to petition the King or either House of Parliment.
1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 196-98 (1971). :
* DECLARATION AND RESOLVES OF THE FIRST
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774
And whereas, Assemblies have been frequently dissolved,
contrary to the rights of the people, when they attempt to
deliberate on grievances; and their dutiful, humble, loyal,
& reasonable petitions to the crown for redress, have been
repeatedly treated with contempt, by his majesty’s minis-
ters of state:
The good people of the several Colonies . . . justly alarmed
at these arbitrary proceedings of parliment and administra-
tion, have severally elected, constituted, and appointed de-
puties to meet and sit in general congress, in the city of
Philadelphia, in order to obtain such establishment, as that
their religion, laws, and liberties may not be subverted:
Whereupon the deputies so appointed being now assem-
bled, in a full and free representation of these Colonies,
taking into their most serious consideration, the best means
14
As the states of the new country began erecting
their own Constitutions, many included expressions
of the rights of their citizens. The first to expressly
protect petitioning was Pennsylvania, in 1776.’ That
of attaining the ends aforesaid, do, in the first place, as
Englishmen, their ancestors in like cases have usually done,
for asserting and vindicating their rights and liberties, de-
clare,
That the inhabitants of the English Colonies in North
America, by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of
the English Constitution, and the several charters of com-
pacts, have the following Rights:
Resolved, N.C.D. 8. That they have a right peaceably to
assemble, consider their grievances, and petition the King;
and that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations, and
commitments for the same, are illegal.
1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 216-17 (1971). The letters
“‘N.C.D.”’ before the resolution indicate that the resolution was
adopted nemine contradicente: i.e., without dissent. Schwartz,
supra, at 214. Cf., the Declaration of Independence, { 29 (1776):
In every state of these oppressions we have petitioned for
redress in the most humble terms. Our repeated petitions
have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince,
whose character is thus marked by every act which may
define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.
Reprinted in, 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 254 (1971).
’ A DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE
INHABITANTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, OR STATE
OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1776.
XVI. That the people have a right to assemble together,
to consult for their common good, to instruct their repre-
sentatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of
grievances, by address, petition, or remonstrance.
1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 276-77 (1971).
oa oe
15
state was followed by similar provisions in Delaware
(1776),° North Carolina (1776), Massachusetts
(1780),'° New Hampshire (1783),'' and the territory of
* DELAWARE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1776
A Declaration of the Rights and Fundamental Rules of
the Delaware State, formerly stiled, The Government of the
counties of New-Castle, Kent and Sussex, upon Delaware.
Sect. 9. That every man hath a right to petition the leg-
islature for the redress of grievances in a peaceable and
orderly manner.
1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 276-77 (1971). °
* NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1776
XVIII. That the people have a right to assemble together,
to consult for their common goods, to instruct their Repre-
sentatives, and to apply to the Legislature, for redress of
grievances.
1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 286-87 (1971).
‘© Massachusetts’ Constitution was not adopted until 1780. A
1778 version had been overwhelmingly rejected by the people for
lack of a Bill of Rights, among other reasons. 1 B. Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights 337 (1971). The Constitution finally passed con-
tained this provision:
XX. The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable
manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good; give
instructions to their representatives; and to request of the
legislative body, by the way of addresses, petitions, or re-
monstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and the
grievances they suffer.
Id., 372-73.
7. NEW HAMPSHIRE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1783
XXXII. The penple have a right in an orderly and peace-
able manner, to assemble and consult upon the common
good, give instructio..s to their representatives; and to re-
quest of the legislative body, by way of petition or re-
monstrance, redress of wrongs done them, and of the griev-
ances they suffer.
1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 378-79 (1971).
16
Vermont (1777) (Vermont was not recognized as a
state until 1791).'* See also, the Georgie Constitution
(1777).'*
Even though most states had adopted their own
Bills of Rights, the 1787 federal Constitution con-
tained no such provisions. 2 B. Schwartz, The Bill of
Rights 435 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Schwartzj. The
lack of a Bill of Rights created serious reservations
among Antifederalists about ratification. Seven of
eleven states proposed amendments to the Constitu-
tion,'‘ and one state, North Carolina, refused to ratify
the Constitution until a Bill of Rights was included."*
2 VERMONT DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1777
XVIII. That the people have a right to assemble together,
to consult for their common good—to instruct their repre-
sentatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of
grievances by address, petition or remonstrance.
Reprinted in, 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 324 (1971).
¥ GEORGIA CONSTITUTION, 1777
Art. LXIII. No alteration shall be made in this consti-
tution without petitions from a majority of the counties,
and the petitions from each county to be signed by a ma-
jority of voters in each county within this State; at which
time the assembly shall order a convention to be called for
that purpose, specifying the alterations to be made, accord-
ing to the petitions preferred to the assembly by the major-
ity of the counties as aforesaid.
Reprinted in 1, B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 300 (1971).
'‘* The seven states were Massachusetts, Maryland, South Car-
olina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina. See,
2 Schwartz, 627-933. Pennsylvania approved the constitution
without amendments, but a minority of the convention circulated
a document after the convention that influenced later public
opinion as to why a Bill of Rights should be adopted. Schwartz,
628.
‘6 2 Schwartz 932-33.
Ph, Wor. at
17
\
Four of the seven states that expressed a desire for
amendments included in their recommendations a pro-
tection for the right to petition.'®
In 1789, when James Madison assumed the lead-
ership in meeting the widespread demand for a federal
Bill of Rights, a consensus had developed among
Americans regarding the fundamental rights that the
Bill of Rights should protect.'’ Madison recommended
to Congress fourteen of the twenty-two state propos-
als. It is significant that more states recommended
the right to petition than recommended free speech,
grand jury indictment, double jeopardy, self-incrimi-
nation, just compensation, right to counsel, right to
confront witnesses, right to know nature of accusa-
tion, and that powers not delegated are reserved to
the people.'* There was no challenge to the right to
petition during the Congressional debates on the
amendments,’* and it was, of course, included in the
First Amendment.
After adoption in the Bill of Rights, the right to
petition, intertwined with the right of assembly, has
repeatedly been found woven into the very fabric of
the United States. See e.g., United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U.S. 545, 552 (1875); Thomas v. Collins,
‘©The four states were Virginia, Maryland, New York, and
North Carolina. See, 2 Schwartz 729-933. Two days after drawing
up its own list of amendments, a motion was made in the Mas-
sachusetts convention to add a provision which, in part, protect-
ed petitioning. The amendment was denied. 2 Schwartz 680-81.
‘7 2 Schwartz 983.
'8 See, 2 Schwartz 1167.
'® See, 2 Schwartz 1054-1167.
18
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); United Mine Workers v.
Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 222
(1967).2° It has always been recognized as the appro-
priate mechanism for citizens to inform their elected
representatives.”' It has always included the right to
*” From United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing
else connected with the powers or duties of the national govern-
ment, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under
the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The
very idea of government, republican in from, implies a right on
the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of griev-
ances.
From Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 530:
It was not by accident. or coincidence that the rights to freedom
in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the
rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for
redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inse-
parable. They are cognate rights. Cf. DeJogne v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 364, and therefore are united in the First Article’s
assurance. Cf. 1 Annals of Congress 759-760.
From United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association,
389 U.S. at 222:
We start with the premise that the rights to assemble peaceably
and to petition for a redress of grievances are among the most
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. These
rights, moreover, are intimately connected both in crigin and in
purpose, with the other First Amendment rights of free speech
and free press.
" During the House Debates on the Bill of Rights, a motion
was made to add the right of the people “‘to instruct their rep-
resentatives."" 2 Schwartz 1091. The motion was defeated by
Madison's argument that the right to instruct representatives is
included in the rights of free speech and petition—particularly in
the right of petition. 2 Schwartz 1096. Representative Jackson
(Georgia), speaking in favor of the amendment, discussed the
LT ae
PgR tilt IO TD a, a tU a E PL a BS
ae ee ee ee lees Rae Filet hk
19
circulate a petition as well as to present an individual
grievance.” In connection with 10 U.S.C. $1034, it is
also linked to maintenance of civilian control over the
military establishment.”
importance of encouraging the people to communicate with their
representatives.
The people will be encouraged to come forward with their
instructions, which will form a fund of useful information
for the Legislature. We cannot, I apprehend, be too well
informed of the true state, condition, and sentiment of our
constituents, and perhaps this is the best mode in our power
of obtaining information. I hope we shall never shut our
ears against that information which is to be derived from
the petitions and instructions of our constituents. I hope we
shall never presume to think that all wisdom of this country
is concentred [sic] within the walls of this House. Men,
unambitious of distinctions from their fellow-citizens, re-
main within their own domestic walk, unheard and unseen,
possessing all the advantages resulting from a watchful
observance of public men and public measures, whose voice,
if we would descend to listen to it, would give us knowledge
superior to what could be acquired amidst the cares and
bustles of a public life... .
2 Schwartz 1095-96.
* It [the First Amendment] simply protects the petitioners in
their right to get up the petition, circulate it for signatures,
and have it presented.
II Tucker, Constitution of the United States 671 (1899). See also,
Yancy v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 207, ___., 122 S.W. 123, 124
(1909), construing the right to petition under a state constitution:
[The Bill of Rights confers upon any citizen, or number of
citizens, the right to petition the Legislature of the state for
any necessary and proper purpose, and if one may lawfully
sign his name to a petition to be presented to the Legislature
for a proper purpose, he may likewise lawfully circulate the
petition and procure others to sign it.
** See, Remarks of the Honorable Jacob K. Javits, then Con-
gressman from New York, speaking in 1951:
Mr. Speaker, with millions of Americans serving in the
Armed Forces and with the new emphasis upon a civilian
20
As the Courts of Appeals recognized, the signifi-
cance of petitioning in this country’s history mintend-
ed to exclude it from protected communication in
§1034 ‘most unlikely.’’ Huff (78-599 Pet. App. 13a).
The Government finally asserts that interpreting
$1034 to exclude communication by petition “‘is sup-
ported by good sense”’ because ‘‘circulating a petition
on base ... [produces] an inevitable potential that
factions will be created, morale lowered and discon-
tent spread—with the result that the discipline and
fighting capacity of the military is injured.’’ Brief for
the petitoners at 41-42.
The nature and extent of the harm threatened by
on-base petitioning is discussed in section III, B, 2 of
this brief, infra. At this point, it is sufficient to note
chat, whatever potential circulating petitions on base
has for producing the evil attributed to it, nothing in
the language or legislative history of $1034 reflects
Congressional concern for such potential. Rather, the
value of petitions to communicate widespread dissat-
isfaction, the clear intention of Congress t> open the
channels of communication between members of the
armed services and members of Congress, and the
historical importance of petitioning all suggest that
Congress would not have chosen to exclude petitions
from the communication protected in $1034.
army—America’s traditional weapon against dictatorship
and oppression—the right of Armed Forces personnel to
communicate freely with members of Congress is of the
utmost importance. It will be recalled that the Congress
endeavored to preserve this right inviolate by a new provi-
sion ... [referring to what is now 10 U.S.C. §1034).
97 Cong. Rec. A4977 (1951).
a. ——<_.
a yl tlds
21
B. The Court of Appeals was correct in find-
ing that regulations placing a prior re-
straint on all petitioning on military bas-
es were not necessary to the security of
the United States. .
Regulations which interfere with communications -
protected by 10 U.S.C. §1034 are improper unless the
regulations are necessary to the security of the United
States.
The prior approval requirements imposed by the
challenged regulations place a prior restraint on all
petitioning on military bases. In each of the reported
cases where permission was sought to circulate peti-
tions on military bases, such permission was denied.
See, Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Allen v. Monger and Moses v. Foley, 583 F.2d
438 (9th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. pending, sub.
nom., Brown v. Allen, No. 78-1005; Brown v. Huff,
No.: 78-599. {n Huff, armed forces officials conceded
that the denials were wrongful. Huff (78-599 Pet. App.
3a).
In reference to these regulations, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit stated:
Prior restraints are suspect in the constitutional
context. Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.
S. 539, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L. Ed.2d 683 (1976);
New York Times Coxv. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971). They
stand no better in a statutory setting. Well pub-
licized petitioners may inconvenience the mili-
tary. Some petitions may even produce division
and morale problems, but we cannot say that
there is no less restrictive method than total
rior restraint to protect the national security.
Shans the regulations are overbroad and exceed
22
the needs of the national security, we affirm the
district court.
Allen (78-1005 Pet. App. 12a). See also, Glines (78-
1006 Pet. App. 9a) and Huff (78-599 Pet. App. 16a-
17a).
This conclusion is justified because of the limited
nature and extent of the harm threatened by on-base
petitioning; the availability of other measures to mit-
igate the harm threatened (including reasonable time,
place and matter restrictions and punishment for dis-
ruptive petitions); and the ineffectiveness of the prior
command approval requirement in protecting the mil-
itary interests. A discussion of these considerations
appears in section III, B, below.
II.
IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE
CHALLENGED REGULATIONS VIOLATE 10
U.S.C. §1034, THE LOWER COURTS’ RULINGS
IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
A. The action taken against respondent was
based upon petitions directed to members
of Congress as well as a yetition to the
Secretary of Defense.
It is unnecessary for the Court to separately con-
sider respondent’s right to circulate a petition to
someone other than a member of Congress. The fact
that among the group of petitions respondent circu-
lated one was addressed to the Secretary of Defense
is important only if the record ‘‘negates the possibil-
ity’’ that the sanction respondent suffered was not
j
?
a
;
23
based in the least degree on his petitions to members
of Congress. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 588
(1969); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 311-312
(1957). See also, Easton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S.
697, n. at 699.(1974); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (White, J., concurring); United States v.
Donner, 497 F.2d 184 (7 Cir. 1974), cert. den., 419 U.S.
1047 (1974).
Street dictates that a sanction cannot stand where
the record fails to prove that the sanction was founded
exclusively on nonprotected speech activity.** Apply-
ing the rationale behind Street indicates that where,
as here, a sanction is imposed for a general violation
without a specific designation of the particular of-
fense, there is an “unacceptable danger that the trier
of fact will have regarded the [petitions to Congress
and the Secretary] as ‘intertwined’ and have rested
the [sanction] on both together.’’ Street, 394 U.S. 576,
588 (1969).
The trier of fact for the purposes of respondent’s
dismissal and transfer is the Air Force. The danger
specified in Street is eliminated only if the Air Force
can sustain its strong burden of proof to enable this
Court to say “with certainty’’ that respondent’s pe-
titions to members of Congress were not even a con-
——— ~
* Street involved a criminal sanction, but has been extended
to include the situation at bar—civil sanctions against a federal
employee. See, Tygrett v. Washing'ton, 543, F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir
1974) (Street applied to sanction against a D.C. police officer);
Waters v. Peterson, 495 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Street applied
to sanction against a Federal Bureau of Census employee). There-
fore, assuming arguendo that peptitions to the Secretary of De-
fense are not protected speech, petitioners must nevertheless
meet the heavy burden of Street before respondent’s dismissal
and transfer can be accepted.
24
tributing cause to respondent’s dismissal and transfer
from the Active Reserves. Street, 394 U.S. 576, 589
(1969). If the Court cannot find from the record this
degree of certainty, affirming the lower courts’ rulings
in favor of respondent on the basis of his petitions to
mbers of Congress will satisfy the entire case. The
record demonstrates that the Air Force cannot meet
this burden.
1. Nowhere in the record is there any indication
that petitions to Congress were deemed protected
while those to the Secretary of Defense were not. On
the contrary, all indications are that any petitioning
done by the respondent was considered improper.
2. The District Court treated the petitions as a
unit, making no distinction based on the person to
whom the petition was to be sent. In its unpublished
Opinion and Order of December 12, 1975, the District
Court stated:
In April, 1974, while on Active Duty Status at
Travis Air Force Base, [respondent] circulated a
_ petition aimed at relaxing Air Force hair-length
regulations ....
The letter notifying Captain Glines of his dis-
missal from the Active Reserves and his transfer
to the standby Reserves stated that his actions
in circulating the petition ... demonstrated that
he had failed ‘‘to meet the professional standards
expected of an officer in the Air Force.”’. . : [T]he
[petitioners] have admitted that had it not been
for the distribution. of the petition, the decision
to remove Captain Glines from Active Duty
would not have been made at this time.
In this case the evidence established that but
for his peticiconing activities, Captain Glines
would have .. . remained on Active Duty. ....
(A. 31-32, 34) (emphases added).
25
These conclusions by the District Court further
demonstrate that the government treated Captain
Glines’ petitioning as a single act, and that no dis-
tinction was ever made based on the addressees.
3. Colonel Wade’s letter of Reassignment and
Transfer, dated April 26, 1974 (A. 24) refers to advice
Colonel Wade had given respondent not to circulate
the petition. Jd., 42. Since each copy of the petition
contains as its final paragraph a statement of the
other designated recipients (see, A. 18-22), Colonel
Wade could easily have informed respondent that pe-
titions to Congressmen were permitted but those to
the Secretary of Defense were not. Moreover, the pe-
tition originally,,reviewed by Colonel Wade was a
handwritten copy addressed to Senator Cranston.
(Clerk’s Record, 4, 21).
4. Signatories to the Guam petition testified in af-
fidavits that the petition with which they were in-
volved was Exhibit F-1 to the plaintiff's complaint
(A. 18), the petition addressed to Senator Cranston.
IO: I show you Exhibit F-1 attached to Com-
plaint filed by Captain Glines, and request
that you read it and determine whether
this is the petition that you came into
contact with on that date?
A: Yes, to my knowledge that is the petition,
the exact petition.
[R. at 166, Affidavit of Sergeant Nilles (emphasis
added).] ;
Q: Sergeant Wolf, you have seen Exhibit F-
1 attached to the Complaint in this mat-
ter. Is that exhibit the haircut petition
with which you involved [sic] at Anderson
Air Force ody Guam, on or about 15
April, 1974?
26
A: yes.
(R. at 160, Affidavit of Sergeant Wolf.)
IO: I show you Exhibit F-1, attached to the
Complaint filed by Captain Glines. Does
that exhibit generally reflect what you
read or what you saw and read on or about
15 April, 1974?
A: sium ¥ €S.
(R. at 274, Affidavit of Sergeant Elizey.)
5. Prior practice of the military with respect to
petitions gives no reason to believe the designated
receipient of the petition was of any significance. In
Brown v. Huff, No. 78-599; Brown v. Allen, No. 78-
1005; and Brown v. Moses, id., prior restraints were
applied to petitions addressed solely to members of
Congress. See, Brief for Petitioners, No. 78-599 at 7
(Huff); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, No. 78-1005 at
4 (Allen, Moses). If the government did not hesitate
to apply prior restraints to petitions to Congress in
“these instances, it cannot now be inferred that no
action would have been taken against respondent had
he only addressed his petitions to members of Con-
gress.
The record does not, as required by Street, negate
with certainty the possibility that respondent’s dis-
missal and transfer was at least in part due to his
petitioning members of Congress. The most reasona-
ble inference is that his Congressional petitions were
indeed a reason for the action taken against him.
Therefore, the copy of the petition to the Secretary
need not be considered by this Court. If the action
taken against respondent is not supportable as to the
petitions to Congress, it is supportable as to none.
See, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957).
Y %
27
B. Protections afforded to armed forces per-
sonnel for petitions to members of Con-
gress should be held to include a petition
directed additionally to the Secretary of
’ Defense.
Even if the actions taken against respondent had
been based solely on his petition to the Secretary of
Defense, respondent should not be held to lose sta-
tutory protection because he sent an additional copy
to the Secretary of Defense.
Respondent’s petition to the Secretary of Defense
was one of five petitions, each with exactly the same
substantive provisions, reworded only so that each
would speak directly to its recipient. (A. 18-22). The
other four recipients were all members of Congress.
The final paragraph of each petition indicated that
the signers were similarly petitioning each of the other
four recipients ‘‘in the hope that one of our elected or
appointed officials will help correct this problem.”’ Jd.
Petitions to Congress that include a petition to the
Secretary of Defense was undoubtedly not within the
specific contemplation of the Congress that enacted
10 U.S.C. $1034. However, ‘‘it is no bar to interpreting
a statute as applicable that ‘the question which is
raised on the statute never occurred to the legisla-
ture.’ ’’ Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507,
510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1965). To construe the statute in this
instance, the Court must therefore “‘[start] from the
areas where the legislative intent is readily discerni-
ble, and [project] to fair and reasonable corollaries of
that intent for the specific issue’ at hand. Montana
Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 445 F.2d
739, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. den. 400 U.S. 1013,
(1971). See, Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process
15 (1921).
28
This Court has stated the guidelines for this meth-
od of statutory construction:
The strict letter of an act must, however, yield
to its evident spirit and purpose, when this is
necessary to give effect to the intent of Congress.
[citations omitted]. And unjust or absurd conse-
quences are, if possible, to be avoided.
Fleischmann Construction Co. v. United States, 270
U.S. 349, 360 (1926). Cf, Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421
U.S. 707, 713-714 (1975).
The legislative history of 10 U.S.C. $1034 indicates
congressional concern with maintaining civilian con-
trol over the military establishment. See, Extension
of Remarks of Hon. Jacob K. Javits, 97 Cong. Rec.
A4977 (1951), supra-p. 15, n.22. In order to maintain
civilian control, the Congress must communicate free-
ly with members of the armed forces and with indi-
viduals who determine military policies—the Secre-
tary of Defense and the secretaries of the various
military branches. See, supra p.6, n.1; see, also 10
U.S.C. §1034; Cong. Rec. 3776-77, A4977-78 (1951).
For purposes of reforming Air Force grooming reg-
ulations, the Secretary of Defense is a logical recipient
both of respondent’s petition and Congressional in-
quiries. The Secretary of Defense is the head of the
Department of Defense and, as such, has authority,
direction, and control over the Department of the Air
Force. 10 U.S.C. §133(a); 10 U.S.C. §8010. The Secre-
tary of Defense had been delegated dential au-
thority regarding Air Force uniform standards, which
includes grooming standards. Exec. Ord. #11390, 4 7
(January 24, 1968); 33 Fed. Reg. No. 16 at 841 (1968).
Furthermore, no danger to any governmental interest
a ae a
~~,
29
results from directing a copy of a Congressional pe-
tition to the Secretary of Defense.
Respondent’s petition to the Secretary of Defense
is therefore consistent with the congressional goals
that underlie 10 U.S.C. §1034. It would be unjust if
not absurd to afford the protection of the statute to
one member of the armed forces who petitions Con-
gress while withholding such protection from another
member of the armed forces who petitions Congress
and demonstrates the courtesy and respect of simul-
taneously petitioning the Secretary of Defense. Such
a result would be especially inappropriate since 10
U.S.C. §1034 is remedial legislation, to be construed
broadly. Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggists,
425 U.S. 1, (1976).
iil.
THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN
FINDING THAT REGULATIONS REQUIRING
COMMAND APPROVAL PRIOR TO
CIRCULATION OF PETITIONS ON A
MILITARY BASE VIOLATE THE FIRST
AMENDMENT.
A. The Court’s decision in Greer v. Spock is
not dispositive of the issues in this case.
It should be obvious that the Court’s decision in
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) is not dispositive
of the issues in this case. Greer involved the right of
civilian political campaigners to enter Fort Dix, New
Jersey, a ‘“‘closed’’ military base, to make political
speeches and distribute campaign literature. This case
involves the right of military personnel, properly on
30
a military base, to circulate to other military person-
nel, properly on a military base, a petition to the
government for redress of grievances. While both cas-
es involve prior command approval requirements
grounded on the military interest in maintaining loy-
alty, discipline and morale, the nature of the compet-
ing speech interests and the policies involved are en-
tirely different.”
The essential dissimilarity between the two speech
interests is demonstrated by looking at the impact a
denial of permission would have on the individual’s
ability to accomplish the desired communication. In
Greer, the respondents were candidates for national
political office who were seeking to communicate their
ideas and gain political support among voters. The
personnel at Fort Dix, and the sum of all personnel
on all military bases, were a small percentage of the
** Twice in its brief, the Government has quoted the following
statement from this Court’s opinion in Greer v. Spock :
[t]here is nothing in the Constitution that disables a military
commander from acting to avert what he perceives to be a
clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops
on the base under his command.
This statement was certainly not intended by this Court as a
constitutional standard which would obviate the need for con-
stitutional analysis. For example, a military commander could
not employ the use of the rack or another torture against an
unpopular serviceman under his command—no matter how sin-
cere his belief that such action was necessary to avert a clear
danger to loyalty, discipline or morale to troops on the base
under his command—without his actions being subject to scru-
tiny under the eighth amendment’s protection against cruel and
unusual punishment. Nor could he discriminate in advancement
on the basis of race, even if equal treatment on the basis of race
would negatively impair the loyalty and morale of a majority of
his troops.
31
prospective voters. Though barred from engaging in
speech activities on base, the respondents in Greer
were not impaired in reaching the vast majority of
their audience. Furthermore, the respondents in Greer
could still have reached the on-base audience through
paid political advertisements on radio, television and
newspaper. Members of national, though minor, polit-
ical parties, the candidates had their party financial
resources available to reach their audience, both ci-
vilian and inservice, through the use of expensive
means of communication.
In this case, respondent was a Captain in the Air
Force Reserves. He was seeking to communicate to,
members of Congress and the Secretary of Defense
widespread dissatisfaction among armed service per-
sonnel, demonstrating the signers’ belief that ‘‘the
present regulations on grooming have caused more
racial tension, decrease in morale and retention, and
loss of respect for authorities than any other official
Air Force policy.’ (A. 18-22). Respondent’s audience
consisted of government officials and members of the
armed services and his resources were limited to his
own personal assets. Denied the ability to circulate a
petition on-base, respondent was denied the ability to
reach his limited audience where he and the other
potential petitioners lived and worked. He was pre-
vented from accomplishing his desired communica-
tion in the most traditional, logical, and inexpensive
manner. In a very practical way, respondent was pre-
vented from accomplishing his desired cormmunica-
tion at all.
An individual letter from respondent would only
have indicated respondent’s individual belief that
there was widespread dissatisfaction. A lot of individ-
32
ual letters might have accomplished the same result
as a petition with an equal number of signatures; but
it is much more difficult to convince someone to write
a letter than sign a petition with the same message,
and respondent would have been limited to those per-
sonnel with whom he could discuss the problems of
Air Force grooming standards in this fashion.”
Respondent could not circulate his petition on
Guam at all, whether on base or off. Air Force regu-
lations prohibit circulation of petitions in foreign
countries without prior approval, both on and off mil-
itary bases. See, Brief for the Petitioners at 20, n.8.
During his overnight stopover, respondent didn’t
have time to even request permission. :
Respondent was left with the possibility of circu-
lating his petition in town, out of uniform, if he could
have found somepiace in town where servicemen gath-
ered. In fact, he left copies of his petition in a few
shop windows. (A. 11).
The denial of permission to circulate a petition on
base has an even greater impact in situations like that
in Brown v. Allen (78-1006) where the base was an
aircraft carrier. In such situations, a prohibition
against on-base petitioning results in total infringe-
** It may be that respondent could have stood at a crossroads
and called to strangers to discuss the problems of air force groom-
ing standards. However, he would have been hindered by the
absence of a petition—the traditional accompaniment to legiti-
mate communication about issues with strangers. To avoid an
unlawful assembly, he would have to have called them one by
one, or in small groups. Furthermore, to allow respondent to
function as a petitioner without a petition, but not as a petitioner
with a petition, would be nonsensical.
33
ment of the right to petition during long periods at
sea.
The essential dissimilarity between applicable pol-
icies is evident from this Court’s opinion in Creer.
The Court’s opinion initially distinguished decisions
involving so-called ‘“‘open bases,”’ finding that the au-
thorities at Fort Dix had not abandoned any claim of
special interest in who walks, talks, or distributes
leaflets on the streets of the base. 424 U.S. at 836.
The Court held that the Fort Dix regulations were
valid on their face as part of ‘‘the historically unques-
tioned power of its commanding officer summarily to
exclude civilians from the area of his command.”’ Jd.
at 838. Since respondents had no “generalized consti-
tutional right’’ to engage in first amendment activi-
ties on a military base, the prior approval require-
ments were constitutional on their face. Jd.
Unlike private citizens, military personnel have a
right and affirmative duty to be on a military base
and, subject to appropriate limitations, do have a
‘generalized constitutional right” to engage in First
Amendment activities on a military base. See e.g.,
United States v. Schmidt, 16 USCMA 57, 36 CMR
213 (1966); United States v. Gray, 20 USCMA 63, 42
CMR 255 (1970). See generally, Moyer, Justice and
the Military, Chapter 4 (1972). A military base is
where a serviceman lives, works and has contacts with
other members of the service. His leisure and recrea-
tion areas are on a military base as well as the work
areas. A military base is where military speech is most
likely to take place.
Furthermore, Greer involved ratifying a policy of
insulating the military from “both the reality and
34
appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan
causes of candidates.”’ 424 U.S. 828, 839. The base
pclicy of prohibiting civilian campaign speeches on
base was ‘“‘wholly consistent with the American con-
stitutional tradition of a politically neutral military
establishment under civilian control.”’ Id.
The speech restrained here was directed to the ci-
vilians who are constitutionally charged with respon-
sibility for control of the military, and indicated crit-
icism of military regulations. Policies restraining such
speech conflict with this same constitutional tradi-
tion.
The government argues that a military base is not
a ‘‘public forum” and for that reason, Greer v. Spock
applies to this case. See, Brief for the Petitioners at
26-27. Respondent does not rely upon the “‘public for-
um’’ doctrine to find constitutional protection for the
right to petition. Cf, Steck v. Connally, 199 F. Supp.
104 (D.D.C. 1961, in which a civil service employee’s
circulation of a petition to Congress was held protect-
ed speech despite the fact that circulation took place
at work during working hours.)
However, a military base does possess many of the
attributes of a ‘‘public forum’’ for servicemen as-
signed to the base. Furthermore, as stated by an au-
thority cited by the government,
No longer does the right to effective freedom of
expression turn on the common law property
rig ts of the state, and no longer does it turn on
whether the ——— place at issue had histor-
ically been dedicated to the exercise of First
Amendment rights . . . . In each case, the ‘crucial
question’ is whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity
of a particular place at a particular time.
35
Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974
Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 252-53.
The question of whether one serviceman handing a
petition to another serviceman is “basically incom-
patible” with the normal activity of a military base is
not answered by the decision that campaign speeches
of civilian political candidates are not incompatible.”’
B. Taking the important governmental in-
terest served by the challenged regula-
tions into account, the Court of Appeals
was correct in finding that the applica-
tion of a prior restraint on all petitioning
on military bases was substantially ov-
erbroad.
1. The significance of the prior approval re-
quirement as a prior restraint.
Respondent recognizes that the government’s in-
terest in maintaining loyalty, discipline and morale is
** Moreover, as the Court of Appeals noted in Huff, the regu-
lations validated in Greer dealt only marginally with petitions,
if they dealt with petitions at all. The regulation authorizing
prior restraint_read as follows:
The distribution or posting of any publication, including
newspapers, magazines, handbills, flyers, circulars, pam-
phlets or other writings, issued, published or otherwise pre-
pared by any person ... is prohibited on the Fort Dix Re-
servations without prior approval ... .
424 US. at 831.
Under this regulation, the only form of ‘publication’ which
might include petitions is the catch-all ‘“‘other writings.’’ This
Court’s opinion in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974),
indicated that military regulations should not be struck for ov-
erbreadth if they only marginally intrude upon constitutionally
protected activities. For this reason as well, validating the Fort
36
important. It is just as clear, however, that the right
to petition the government for redress of grievances
is important and that the means selected to enforce
the armed services’ interest, a prior restraint on pe-
titioning, is ‘‘the most serious and the least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment Rights.’’ Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1975).
The government seeks to lessen the significance of
the prior restraint in this case, arguing that “‘[i]n only
the most narrow sense is speech restrained by the
prior approval requirement.’’ See, Brief for the Peti-
tioners at 31. The government, however, fails to ap-
preciate the significance of its prior approval require-
ment. Professor Tribe describes two distinct reasons
for the particular seriousness of prior restraint re-
quirements: (a) ‘‘dissemination delayed may prove
tantamount to dissemination denied.’’ and (b) ‘‘cen-
sors uncontrolled by courts tend to deny publication
to material protected by the first amendment.’ Tribe,
American Constitutional Law at 725 and 726 (1978).
Both concerns are involved with the prior approval
requirement in the challenged regulations.
(a) Dissemination delayed may prove tanta-
mount to dissemination denied.
As indicated earlier in this brief, denial of permis-
sion to circulate a petition on a military base can
substantially interfere with the petitioner’s ability to
accomplish the desired communication. Supra pp. 23-
24. In the case of military bases in foreign countries,
Dix regulations has only marginal significance for determining
the constitutionality of regulations aimed directly at limiting the
right to petition.
37
regulations require permission to circulate petitions
both on and off base. See, Brief for the Petitioners at
20, n.8. For ships at sea, denial of permission to cir-
culate on base amounts to total infringement during
long periods at sea. Even in the case of domestic
bases, denial of permission to circulate a petition on
base isolates the circulator from his audience.
Furthermore, in the case of petitions where timeli-
ness is of particular significance, denial of permission
can have an impact at least as great as delays on
newsworthy articles. See, Nebraska Press Ass’n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1975). For example, in
Brown v. Allen, (#78-1005) Captain Monger denied
permission to circulate a petition asking Congress ‘“‘to
investigate the necessity of having the Hancock make
another West Pacific cruise,” but might have allowed
circulation ‘‘well after the Hancock had been deployed
. when the petition would be of no effect.’’ Allen
(78-1005 Pet. App. 14a and 12a).
Also involved is the procedural significance of pre-
publication restraints. As noted by Professor Tribe,
The extraordinary power of a prior restraint to
foreclose timely expression is derived primarily
from the body of procedural rules which form a
backdrop to the doctrines in this field..An indi-
vidual who speaks, or a newspaper that publish-
es, is ordinarily free in a subsequent criminal
prosecution to assert the claim that the speech
or publication was protected by the first ament-
mend. But where a prior restraint operates, any-
one who ignores it may lose the right to assert
that constitutional defense in a subsequent pros-
ecution for ignoring the restraint instead of ob-
eying it while challenging it judicially.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 726 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Tribe].
38
Thus, in this case, respondent is limited to raising
the facial invalidity of the prior approval requirement
even though the actions for which he was punished
were completely innocuous. See, Pet. App. 13a.
(b) Censors uncontrolled by courts tend to
deny publication to material protected by
the first amendment.
Professor Tribe describes the problem of ‘“‘over-
broad delegation” as follows:
Statutes which open-endedly delegate to ad-
ministering officials the power to decide how and
when sanctions are applied or licenses issues are
overbroad because they grant such officials the
power to discriminate—to achieve indirectly
through selective enforcemeut a censorship of
communicative content that is clearly unconsti-
tutional when achieved directly. This covert cen-
sorship cannot be checked rk «mon by judicial
review of the scheme as applied in particular cas-
es. For first amendment protection often depends
on balancing free speech rights and governmen-
tal interests in particular situations, which de-
pends in turn on a close, after-the-fact scrutiny
of the factual circumstances by the reviewin
court. Except in those rare instances in whic
bad faith is manifest, the abuse of administrative
discretion is likely to find shelter behind a record
of contradictory testimony and retrospective ra-
tionalization. A court may seek to e its own
characterization of the expressive activity, but
its perception of the facts is inherently subjec-
tive. When was a demonstration too obstructive
of traffic? A noise too loud? Violence imminent?
The tendency is to be satisfied that the evidence
is sufficient if the record is not ‘‘totally devoid
of evidentiary support,’’ the minimal due process
standard. Factual review is therefore an unrelia-
39
ble cure for an overbroad delegation, and thus
the Supreme Court has consistently chosen facial |
invalidation of statutes containing essentially
standardless delegations in areas affecting first
amendment rights.
Tribe, at 733-34.
The dangers of overbroad delegation are particu-
larly significant in the case of military authorities. As
stated by Judge Parker in Carlson v. Schlesinger,
Military authority is not trained or attuned to
the sensitivity involved in questions relating to
First Amendment rights. It is quite understand-
able, therefore, that when confronted with regu-
latory language as that found in the two vecaln.
tions, where sg age ay pi constitutional rights
are tempered by such laudable yet amorphous
terms as ‘morale,’ ‘loyalty,’ and ‘discipline,’ the
commander will favor and make determinative
the military considerations.
364 F. Supp. 626, 639-640 (D.D.C. 1973), rev’d on
other grounds 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Thus, in Brown Huff, (78-599) the military author-
ities denied permission to circulate petitions when the
government now admits denials were wrongful. See,
Brief for the Petitioners at 22 n. 10. In Brown v.
Allen, (78-1005) the District Court found that permis-
sion to circulate the petitions in that case was wrong-
fully denied, under the regulations’ standards. See,
Allen, supra (Pet. App. 23a).
In the present case, the extremity of the measures
taken against respondent and the statements made
concerning respondent’s petition eloquently demon-
strate the dangers of the prior approval requirement.
For preparing his mildly worded petition and initiat-
40
ing its circulation among eight servicemen, respond-
ent was abruptly taken off active duty and then re-
moved from the Air Force Reserves. (A. 24, Brief for
the Petitioners at 8.)
According to Colonel Harley S. Black, commanding
officer of Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, respond-
ent’s petition, as respectful as it was, “‘had great po-
tential to bring undue embarrassment on the Air
Force.”’ (Clerk’s Record at 46). The Colonel’s lack of
appreciation for the importance of the constitutional
liberties involved is clear. He said,
All told eight of my personnel were signatories
to the petition, each feeling, I suspect, it was a
‘notable cause’ and thus, in need of their support.
The members were young, junior enlisted types,
all of whom have since n counselled and
shown the error of their ways.
(A. 25).
It is no wonder that this Court has described a
prior restraint on publication as ‘‘one of the most
extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence.”’
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
562 (1975).
2. Applying the analysis employed in Ne-
braska Press Association v. Stuart.
The issue before this Court is whether the Court of
Appeals was correct in finding that regulations plac-
ing a prior restraint on all petitioning on military
bases violates the First Amendment. The Court of
Appeals applied the analysis employed by this Court
in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539 (1975).
41
“The Supreme Court insists on less restrictive al-
ternatives to prior restraint when they are available,
and it critically examines whether the restraint will
have its intended effect.”’ (Pet App. 12a, citing, Ne-
braska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, supra.) The Court of
Appeals concluded that the regulations were substan-
tially overbroad. (Pet. App. 13a-14a).
Nebraska Press, like the present case, involved the
use of a prior restraint on first amendment rights to
protect a recognized, important interest. There the
interest was the right to a fair trial; here it is the
maintenance of loyalty, discipline and morale. The
issue in Nebraska Press was not whether the interest
in ensuring a fair trial was sufficient to justify some
limitation on the exercise of first amendment rights,
but whether the use of a prior restraint could be jus-
tified as the chosen means. Nebraska Press, supra at
561. This Court concluded it could not. Jd at 570.
In determining that the prior restraint was not jus-
tified in Nebraska Press, this Court employed a three
part test. 427 U.S. 539, 562. Translated into the issues
involved in this case, the areas of inquiry should be
(a) the nature and extent of the harm threatened; (b)
the availability of other measures, to mitigate the
harm threatened and (c) the effectiveness of the prior
command approval requirement in protecting the mil-
itary interests. To justify the use of a prior restraint
here, the government must show that, in light of these
three factors, a prior restraint is necessary to avoid
the danger. Jd.
(a) The nature and extent of the harm threat-
ened.
The government has never been very clear about
how circulating petitions affects loyalty, discipline
42
and morale. Rather, the government’s brief simply
states that ‘‘circulating a petition on base [produces]
an inevitable potential that factions will be created,
morale lowered and discontent spread—with the re-
sult that the discipline and fighting capacity of the
military is injured,’’ leaving the Court to infer how
this result follows from the proposed cause. Brief for
the Petitioners at 41-42.
In analyzing the nature and extent of the aarm
threatened by on-base petitioning, it is important to
include only the harm peculiar to petitioning, exclud-
ing harm that might result from forms of speeh cur-
rently permitted by regulations. Further, the consid-
eration of harm from petitioning must be reduced to
the extend that appropriate time, place, and manner
restrictions regulate the on-base exercise of petition-
ing. The government recognizes that ‘‘the regulations
do not restrict a serviceman’s freedom to engage in
oral discussions of political topics or other issues
either off base or on base.’’ Brief for the Petitioners
at 19. Respondent does not dispute the authority of
the armed services to impose reasonable restrictions
on the time, place and manner of petitioning on base—
including limitations } on the number of people gath-
ering at one place‘at one time. See, Pet. App. 11a-12a;
Respondent’s brief in opposition to cert. at 2-3; Brown
v. Allen (78-1005 Pet. App. 30a-32a).
The harm under consideration, then, is limited to
the communicative impact which petitioning alone
produces.
In the only military petition case which went to
trial, Judge Robert Peckham stated, ‘‘[djefendants
maintain that circulation of a petition with which
43
members of a crew might disagree is enough in and of
itself to cause disruption on board ship and therefore
impair morale.’’ Brown v. Allen (78-1005 Pet. App.
21a). It is possible that a person holding a view op-
posing one stated in a petition would become upset
seeing a petition when he or she would not have heard
an oral communication. However, it is also possible
for one to overhear an oral communication when one
would not have seen a petition. To argue harm from
persons opposing a view stated in a petition suggests
that a greater number will be upset by a petition than
from an oral discussion—at most a doubtful proposi-
tion. ,
Furthermore, a basic premise of the First Amend-
ment’s guarantees is that suppression is not the prop-
er way to avoid the impactvof ideas. As noted by the
Court of Appeals in this cas
The First Amendment protects this country’s
basic commitment to open and vigorous debate.
We have assumed as a nation that free discussion
will be likely to lead to the right decisions, that,
as Justice Brandeis said, when falsehoods and
fallacies abound, ‘the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence.’ Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed.
1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The First
Amendment reflects a conscious choice to prefer
citizen autonomy to conformity.
Pet. App. 10a.
As stated by Professor Tribe,
[I]jf the constitutional guarantee is not to be
trivialized, it must mean that government cannot
justify restrictions on free expression by refer-
ence to the adverse consequences of allowing cer-
tain ideas or information to enter the r of
44
discussion and awareness. Whatever might in
theory be said either way, the choice between
“the dangers of suppressing information and the
dangers of its misuse if it is freely available’ is,
ultimately, a choice ‘‘that the First Amendment
makes foi us.”
Tribe, at 581. (citation omitted.)
The remaining harm resulting from petitioning can
only come from those who agree with a view stated in
a petition. The findings of fact in Judge Peckham’s
opinion indicates that from the military perspective
the harm from those who agree comes from the act of
solicitation, not the communication to servicemen.
Judge Peckham found that Ad:niral Monger, who had
been Captain of the U.S.S. Hancock, “‘might have
permitted circulation of the Hancock petition had it
not ‘been asking for support in the form of a signa-
ture’ and been directed to a member of Congress.”
Brown v. Allen, supra (Pet. App. 21a).
Aside from giving increased communicative value
to a member of Congress by sending a petition with
all of the supporting signature, Admiral Monger’s
fear must be that soliciting signatures on a petition
would somehow commit the signers to greater fidelity
to a statement than would making, reading or hearing
statements on the same issue. In other words, the
harm from the act of petitioning would come from the
greater seriousness of purpose that may be produced
by petitioning the government for redress of griev-
ances rather than just talking, if that be a harm.
Assuming that petitioning does produce greater se-
riousness of purpose than other forms of expression,
that can only be considered harmful if it leads to some
further harmful result. Indifference is not in itself an
important military value to be protected.
45
The government has provided no evidence that ex-
ercising the right to petition would impel the petition-
ers to further, harmful acts. In fact, all indications
are to the contrary. For example, Brown v. Allen (78-
1005, Pet. cert. pending) originally involved two suits,
Allen v. Monger and Moses v. Foley, that were con-
solidated for trial. Each suit had five named plaintiffs.
In Allen, all named plaintiffs indicated a desire to
circulate a petition. See, Brown v. Allen (78-1005 Pet.
App. 16a). In Moses, the plaintiffs actually circulated
their petition for a week before seeking permission.
See, Brown v. Allen, supra (Pet. App. 18a). At the
time, the district court opinion was filed, more than
two years after plaintiffs filed suit, four of the plain-
tiffs were still in the Navy, two of them still assigned
to their original ship, the U.S.S. Hancock. There is no
indication in the record of these two cases or any of
the petition cases, that any of the plaintiffs failed to
perform their military duty, despite the fact that they
not only declared themselves to be circulators of pe-
titions, but actually filed suit to enforce their right to
petition.
The court of Appeal. reached the following conclu-
sion:
We do not believe that vocal disagreement with
ublic policy by itself necessarily leads to diso-
ience to orders. “I think, and any society
which truly believes in a First Amendment must
assume, that soldiers like other citizens can dis-
agree with governmental policy and yet still re-
alize that they must follow the rear requisites of
that policy, including military service, until the
policy is changed by democratic means.’’ Carlson
v. Schlesinger, 167 U.S. App. D.C. 325, 335, 511
F.2d 1327, 1337 (1975) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
Pet. App. lla n.8.
46
The officials’ conduct in petition cases suggests
that they were motivated less by a fear of creating
factions and discontent than a sense that the act of
petitioning the government somehow has an unsavory
character.
The government still maintains that denial of per-
mission to circulate the Hancock petition in Brown v.
Allen (78-1005) was proper despite that petition’s be-
nign nature. Brief for the petitioners at 22 n.10. That
petition stated:
Dear Congressman Stark,
We, the undersigned crew members of the U.S.S.
HANCOCK, in recognition of the fact that the
United States is ap eevee no longer at war with
the countries of Indo-China, and because the
HANCOCK has already been in commission for
29 years, respectfully request that you ask Con-
ss to investigate the necessity of having the
ANCOCK make another West Pacific cruise.
Brown v. Allen (78-1005 Pet. at 4 n.3).
In the present case, Col. Black initiated an inves-
tigation of the respondent i ause his respectfully
worded petition “had great potential to bring undue
embarrassment on the Air Force.’”’ (Clerk’s Record at
46). On the basis of ‘‘embarrassment”’ and “‘discredit”’
(A. 24) this “‘dedicated,’’ ‘energetic, zealous officer,’’
“clearly . . . the most competent navigator within [his]
flight, and probably the most competent within the
entire group”’ (A. 9), with more than 15 years of ser-
vice in the Air Force Reserves (A. 31) was removed
from active duty and transferred to inactive status.”
a Respondent's officer evaluations covering September, 1971
through July, 1973 (Clerk's Record 12-20) are included as Ap-
47
To the extent that the officials’ distate for petition-
ing is shared by other members of the armed services,
and even if general distaste for the exercise of fun-
damental liberties can lead to disruption, the solution
is for this Court to encourage respect for constitu-
tional rights. It would be ironic, indeed, for this Court
to endorse disrespect for those very rights that mem-
bers of the armed forces voluntarily pledge their lives
to protect. ‘“The right to petition Congress for a re-
dress of grievances is too dear to permit its exercise
to be limited by petty tyrannies.’’ United States v.
Schmidt, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 57, 61 (1966), (concurring
opinion).
(b) The availability of other measures to mit-
igate the harm threatened.
As indicated earlier, respondent does not dispute
the authority of the armed services to impose reason-
able restrictions on the time, place and manner of
petitioning on base—including limitations on the
number of people gathering at one place at one time.
(See, supra p. 31). So long as such restrictions do not
“deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly
and the opportunities for the communication of
thought ...’’ they are entirely proper. Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
Furthermore, should petitioning activities lead to
a disturbance of the peace or threaten good order and
discipline, they are punishable under 10 U.S.C. §§916,
pendix A to this brief. These evaluations were intended to be
included as a part of the Appendix for this case, but were mis-
takenly omitted by the government when preparing the Appen-
dix.
48
917, and 934 (1976), (Articles 116, 117 and 134, re-
spectively, of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
[UCMJ] ). Moreover, acts done with the intent of caus-
ing a dis. urbance are punishable under 10 U.S.C. $880
(1976) (Article 80 of the UCM J), without awaiting any
disturbance.”*
* 10 U.S.C. $916 (Art. 116) states:
Riot or breach of peace
Any person subject to this chapter who causes or participates
in any riot or breach of the peace shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct.
10 U.S.C. $917 (Art. 117) states:
Provoking speeches or gestures: towards any other person
subject to this chapter shall be punished as a court-martial
may direct.
10 U.S.C. $934 (Art. 134) states:
General article
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit
upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of
which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be
taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-
martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and
shall be punished at the discretion of that court.
Pampee §880 (Art. 80) states:
Attempts
(a) An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense
under this chapter, amounting to more than mere preparation
and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is
an attempt to commit that offense.
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts to com-
mit any offense punishable by this chapter shall be punished
as a court-martial may direct, unless otherwise specifically
prescribed.
(c) Any person subject to this chapter may be convicted of an
attempt to commit an offense although it appears on the trial
that the offense wes consummated.
49
The Court of Appeals concluded that,
Punishment after the fact for genuinely disrup-
tive petitions, limitation of circulation to certain
areas and to off-duty periods, and protection
from pressure by superiors who are seeking sig-
natures would adequately protect the govern-
ment’s interest.
(Pet. App. 12a), citing the limitations adopted by
Judge Peckham in Allen v. Monger, supra (Brown v.
Allen 78-1005 Pet. App. 30a-32a) and approved on
appeal.
The government argues that these less restrictive
alternatives are not sufficient to mitigate the harm
threatened because, ‘“‘the injury to national security
occurs when the improper material is distributed and
discipline and morale are lowered, or the military mis-
sion is threatened.”’ Brief for the petitioners at 33.
However, the government does not explain how this
chain reaction occurs, let alone how the bad result
happens before it can be stopped.
The government further complains that ‘the court
of appeals offered no argument showing that [alter-
native measures] would be adequate to avoid or ‘mit-
igate the effects’ of an improper distribution.” Id.
However, the government has provided no basis for
finding that less restrictive alternatives would not
sufficiently protect the government’s interest. Cer-
tainly the government has the burden of justifying
the use of a prior restraint. ‘‘Any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court with a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validi-
ty.”’ Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
In Nebraska Press, this Court “‘reaffirm[{ed] that the
guarantees of freedom of expression are not an abso-
50
lute prohibition under all circumstances, but the bar-
riers to prior restraint remain high and the presump-
tion against its use continues intact.’’ 427 U.S. 539,
570.
When a government regulation is aimed at the com-
municative impact of expressive activity to protect a
compelling governmental interest, the government
has the burden of showing that the regulation is nec-
essary to protect the asserted interest. Not only must
the interest be compelling, the regulation must be
narrowly aimed at those permissible objectives so as
not unnecessarily to reach expressive conduct pro-
tected by the first amendment. Tribe, at 602.
When a government regulation is designed to pro-
tect a military interest, it should not be declared un-
constitutional if the regulation could validly be ap-
plied to numerous situations and invalidly to only
‘marginal’ situations. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
760 (1974). However, if the regulation’s reach into
protected conduct is substantial, it is unconstituti-
tutioual on its face. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601 (1978).
To justify the use of a prior restraint on petitioning
in the present regulations, the government must show
that this extraordinary measure is necessary to pro-
tect loyalty, discipline and morale in all but excep-
tional circumstances.” It is inconceivable that a form
*° In footnote 11 of its brief, the government states:
Because this case involves a challenge to the regulations on
their faces, the Court must sustain them if anything that
might have been written and circulated in Guam in 1974—
or in a combat-ready missile base in North Dakota in 1980—
could possibly present a clear danger to military readiness.
ol
of expression as mild as petitioning presents such an
extraordinary threat to loyalty, discipline and morale
that the ordinary means of control will not suffice.
It is instructive to compare petitioning with other
forms of protest where ordinary measures of control
are employed. In The Concept of the Public Forum:
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965. Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, Professor
Kalven distinguished three forms of protest:
It may prove helpful to risk the pretentious-
ness of ae among three closely relat-
ed gestures of protest often lumped together in
popular discussions of the civil rights movement:
revolution, civil disobedience, and protest. A rev-
olutionary gesture is intended as a direct defi-
ance of law and order; it is a declaration of open
war; it is coercive and obstructive. It may well
be morall justifiable, but only under the strin-
gent conditions by which Western tradition has
measured the right to revolution.
* * *
The government here misstates the standard for facial invalidity.
The proper standard appears in Tribe: ‘‘A law is void on its face
if it ‘does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable areas
of [government] control, but ... sweeps within its ambit other
activities that consitute an exercise ‘of protected expressive or
associational rights’ ’’. Tribe, at 710, quoting, Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (statute prohibiting all picketing
void on its face since it bans peaceful picketing protected by the
first amendment).
The ‘“‘substantial overbreadth’’ requirement of Parker v. Levy,
supra does not change the legal standard to a “‘scintilla’’ test,
but demands that the ‘‘sweep”’ into protected expression be sub-
stantial.
The government does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ finding
that respondent has standing to raise facial invalidity under
Parker v. Levy, supra. (See, Pet. App. 13a).
52
Civil disobedience is deliberate violation of law
for the sake of protest and as a matter of indi-
vidual conscience. It is a gesture we associate
with Socrates, Thoreau, and conscientious objec-
tors. In the famous formula of Plato’s Apology
and Crito, this gesture requires that the actor
accept the onidienauh. It is a refusal to obey the
law coupled with a willingness to accept the legal
consequences. Insofar as it is symbolic, it is also
an intense form of protest.
* * *
Finally, there are the various forms of mass pro-
test in public places using parades, picketing,
and so on. Here the essential feature is appeal to
public opinion. The intention is not to violate
that law, and the claim is one of privilege in the
exercise of basic rights.
Kalven, supra, at 10-11.
Professor Kalven concluded that, when done in an
orderly manner, the last of the three is protected by
the first amendment. Jd. at 12. Quoting from Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) Professor Kal-
ven noted:
The memorable thing about Edwards was that
Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for everyone but
Mr. Justice Clark, said of the defendants and of
their ‘‘rights of free speech, free assembly, and
freedom to petition for redress of their griev-
ances”’: ““The circumstances of this case reflect
an exercise of these basic constitutional rights in
their most pristine and classic form.”’
Id. at 6-7 (emphasis in original).
Viewed in this perspective, peaceful petitioning in-
volves the exercise of “‘basic constitutional rights in
[its] most pristine form.’’ Furthermore, among the
53
various forms of peaceful protest, petitioning is the
most peaceful, least disruptive of all.
Contrast the exercise of the right to petition by
Captain Glines in this case with the form of protest
exercised by Captain Levy in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733 (1974). Levy was a physician assigned as Chief of
the Dermatological Service at the base hospital, Fort
Jackson, South Carolina. During the summer of 1966,
Captain Levy made several public statements to en-
listed personnel at the base, urging them not to obey
orders to go to Vietnam and not to fight if they did
go. The following statement was representative:
The United States is wrong in being involved
in the Viet Nam War. I would refuse to go to
Viet Nam if ordered to do so. I don’t see why any
colored soldier would go to Viet Nam: They
should refuse to go to Viet Nam and if sent
should refuse to fight because they are discrimi-
nated against in Viet Nam by being given all the
hazardous duty and they are suffering the ma-
jority of casualties. If I were a colored soldier
and were sent I would refuse to fight. Special
Forces personnel are liars and thieves and killers
“ peasants and murderers of women and chil-
en.
Parker, supra at 737. In conjunction with these state-
ments, Captain Levy refused to follow orders to per-
form his training duties ‘‘because of his medical eth-
ics.’’ Parker, supra at 736.
Captain Levy’s conduct would be classified as a
‘revolutionary’ gesture by Professor Kalven. It was
clearly inappropriate for a military officer and, if ef-
fective, would have substantially interfered with the
military mission of the base, training special forces
54
aides. Id. Yet, the government employed the ordinary
procedures for enforcement of military obligations.
Appellee’s military superiors originally con-
templated nonjudicial proceedings against him
under Art. 15 of the Us
Justice, 10 U.S.C. $815, but later determined
that court-martial proceedings were appropriate.
The specification under Art. 90 alleged that ap-
pellee willfully disobeyed the hospital comman-
dant’s order to establish the training program, in
violation of that article, which punishes anyone
subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
who “willfully disobeys a lawful command of his
superior commissioned officer.’’ Statements to
enlisted personnel were listed as specifications
under the charges of violating Arts. 133 and 134
of the Code. Article 133 provides for the punish-
ment of ‘conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman,” while Art. 134 proscribes, interalia,
‘all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline in the armed forces.”
Parker, supra at 737-38.
It is inconceivalbe that the milder form of expres-
sion, petitioning, could not be satisfactorily managed
by these same measures.
Finally, military commanders are in a unique posi-
tion to mitigate dangers which might accompany the
exericse of first amendment freedoms. As stated by
Judge Peckham in Allen v. Monger, supra:
As Captains of their respective ships, Admirals
Monger and Foley exerted considerable leader-
ship on their crews. Admiral Monger had suc-
cessfully asserted the principles of racial equality
on board ship and ball had a substantial impact
in lessening racial tensions by informing the crew
that racism was not to be tolerated on board
niform Code of Military:
55
ship. If either Captain had informed the crew
that the free expression of differing views was
not only to be tolerated, but to be encouraged in
a free society, such leadership would have had a
substantial impact in lessening the disruption, if
any, which might be caused by circulation of a
petition.
(Pet. App. 22a). These observations are equally appli-
cable to commanders of land bases.
(c) The effectiveness of the prior command
approval requirement in protecting the
military interests.
The third and final consideration employed in Ne-
braska Press is the effectiveness of the.prior restraint
in serving the asserted interests. Even if circulating
petitions on base were to present serious dangers and
even if there were no other remedies available to the
government to mitigate those dangers, the govern-
ment should be required to demonstrate the effective-
ness of the prior restraint before servicemen desiring
to exercise the right to petition are forced to tolerate
the least tolerable infringement on this fundamental
constitutional right.
The government’s asserted interest is defined in
the regulations as ‘“‘loyalty,”’ ‘discipline’ and ‘“‘mor-
ale’. The loyalty of those servicemen who value our
form of government is certainly not increased when
they are denied the right to petition the government
for redress of grievances. ‘‘Loyal”’ is defined in Webs-
ter’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1977) as ‘faithful in
allegiance to one’s lawful sovereign or government.”’
Our Pledge of Allegiance is made to a symbol of a
republic: ‘‘a government in which supreme power re-
56
sides in a body of citizens entitled to vote and is
exercised by elected officers and representatives re-
sponsible to them and governing according to law.”’
Id. at 983.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the morale of ser-
vicemen who value their constitutional rights is in-
creased when they are denied constitutional rights.
Only those servicemen who, like Col. Black, care little
for fundamental liberties are disspirited when citizens
exercise their constitutional rights. The measures rec-
ommended by Judge Peckham, supra p. 40, provide
a more constitutionally palatable means of promoting
those servicemen’s morale.
The remaining governmental interest is discipline.
If denying the right to petition were enough to stifle
a serviceman’s concern about his grievances, these
regulations might promote discipline. However, con-
cern about serious grievances is not likely to disap-
pear simply because the right to petition is sup-
pressed. Furthermore, only petitions about serious
grievances could arguably justify suppression under
the regulations.
As noted by Professor Kalven, supra p. 38, there
are many different forms of protest, even when lim-
iting consideration to different forms of expression.
Parades, picketing, sit-in demonstrations, counselling
disobedience and revolution, all present more dangers
to military interests than does peaceful petitioning.
Furthermore, serious grievances can spawn other,
more destructive non-speech measures of protest,
when peaceful petitioning is eliminated.
Grievances stemming from the Vietnam war
spawned many protests, military as well as civilian.
57
Among those protests were the anti-war petitions in
Carlson v. Schlesinger, supra and the amnesty peti-
tion in Brown v. Huff, (78-599, see, Pet. App. 3a, n.2).
Another of those protests is described in Chenoweth
v. Van Arsdall, Mis. No. 73-1 (USCMA Mar. 13, 1973),
1 Mil. L. Rptr 2098 (1973). In that case Patrick Chen-
oweth, an enlisted man in the United States Navy,
was charged with dropping a wrench or other metallic
object into the gears of the U.S.S. Ranger, an aircraft
carrier docked in the United States pending departure
to the Western Pacific. The wrench caused extensive
damage to the main reduction gears of the Ranger’s
number 4 engine. Repair of this damage, at a cost of
about $800,000.00, delayed the departure of the Rang-
er for several months.
Not only is petitioning far less damaging to mili-
tary interests than the form of protest exercised in
Chenoweth, participants in petitions to the govern-
ment are quite visible. Should petitioning lead to dis-
ruption, the participants can easily be controlled and
called to account. Patrick Chenoweth was acquitted.
See, Affidavit of Eric A. Seitz, appended hereto as
Appendix B.
C. Conclusions
Placing little value in the importance of the right
to petition the government for redress of grievances,
the armed services have placed a prior restraint on all
petitioning on military bases. Each time a request has
been made to circulate a petition on base, the request
has been denied. It hasn’t mattered what the nature
of the particular petition was. There was an anti-war
petition (Carlson), a petition supporting amnesty
(Huff), a petition about the age of a ship (Allen) and
58
one about a ship’s home port (Moses). There were
polite petitions, e.g., Allen, and petitions with stri-
dent language, e.g., Moses. There were petitions over-
seas, e.g., Huff, and petitions at domestic ports, e.g.,
Allen and Moses. All requests were denied. When
respondent circulated his petition about grooming
standards to eight servicemen, he was removed from
-active duty and kicked out of the Air Force Reserves.
Five. times servicemen have come to the federal
courts for relief from the armed service’s prior re-
straint. In four of those cases, the federal courts have
granted the requested relief. Respondent requests
that this Court find the prior restraint on all on-base
petitioning to be unconstitutional.
It is respondent’s contention that this prior re-
straint is unnecessary and ineffective and, like most
prior restraints, unconstitutional. Restraining peti-
tioning does not eliminate the concerns which spawn
petitions, and military interests would be better
served by taking steps to insure that petitioning is
done peacefully rather than restraining it. Unlike
other forms of protest, peaceful petitioning is consist-
ent with civility and compatible with military service.
Respondent would conclude as did Mr. Justice
Rehnquist of this court in a speech republished in the
Indiana Law Journal:
I would like to return finally to another quo-
tation from Learned Hand:
What do we mean when we say that first
of all we seek liberty? I often wonder
whether or not we do not rest our hopes
too much upon constitutions, upon laws,
and upon courts. These are false hopes;
believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty
59
lies in the hearts of men and women; when
it dies there, no constitution, no law, no
court can save it; no constitution, no law,
no court can even do much to help it.
I would not underrate the importance of con-
stitutions or laws in preserving freedom of
expression, any more than would Judge Hand,
but I would be very skeptical that what they can
do by themselves is sufficient to preserve in-
formed public discussion. The truly resolute po-
litical revivalist will not be deterred by the threat
of being driven from the podium. Indeed, he may
lory in it. The zeaiot will not be turned aside by
ae de words or sneering looks. But surely free-
dom of expression is too important a matter to
be left entirely to political revivalists and to zeal-
ots. There must be room in the process for the
less positive, thele ss informed, the thin-skinned.
But only in an atmosphere of civility can these
forensic late bloomers be expected to play the
game.
Judge Hand says the ultimate tate of freedom,
and surely he would include here freedom of
expression, is reposed in the hearts and minds of
men and women. An atmosphere of civility is an
indirect assurance of continuing to maintain the
broad based support of this liberty in its fullest
form in the minds and the hearts of the men and
women of this country. These men and women
are not apt to rise up in its defense if they feel
that freedom of a Bory is the prerogative of
only a few, in which they do not participate and
from which they derive no benefit. They are even
less apt to rise to its defense if those who claim
the freedom for themselves would opm it to
others. I am convinced, however, that so long as
the men and women of this country can believe
that the process of debate and discussion is not
simply the special preserve of some small group,
60
but is instead a process in which all may partic-
ipate and from which all will benefit, this free-
ome will be secure in their minds and hearts.
Rehnquist, ‘‘Civility and Freedom of Speech,” 49 In-
diana Law Journal 6-7 (1973).
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
/s/ David M. COBIN
David M. Cobin
Court-appointed Attorney
for Respondent
APPENDIX
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Navigator, Aarlift (Squadron Level)
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and other means. Accomplishes additional administrative work as directed.
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Vi. COMMINIS FACTS AND SPECIFIC ACHIEVEINTS: Captain Glines clearly is the most
tent navigator within my flight, and probably the most competent within the
ent group. My observations of him during several MAC support missions makes me
completely confident of his exceptionally high level of skills, knowledge, and
judgment. He has been among the most active, if not the most active, participant in
the Reserve Program. His flying time during the past 12 months was approximately
800 hours. He has flown all available Flying Training Periods, has made himself
available for MAC support missions on an almost unlimited basis and has performed a
number of "fill in" administrative duties for the squadron when needed. His work ha
been uniformly excellent. His mobilization potential is of the highest. STRENGTHS:
In addition to the highly superior navigational campetence described above, Captain
Glines is an officer possessing superior leadership potential. He is highly
intelligent, dependable, and thoroughly considerate of the needs of others. Further,
Captain Glines has the courage, as well as the ability and initiative, to assume
responsibility where appropriate. SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENTS: Captain Glines is
currently awaiting reassignment to the 349th MAG. After his requalification in the
new aircraft I would anticipate he should progress rapidly to instructor and flight
examiner. SELF IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: Captain Glines is currently taking a
correspondence course in Evaluation of Financial Reports, a graduate level course
given by the University of California. He has applied for entrance to the graduate
school of Economics at UC. OTHER COMMENTS: Captain Glines' transfer will be a loss
keenly felt by this unit. His performance has been outstanding. Captain Glines has
used his personal and professional capabilities to actively promote equal opportunity
programs. Captain Glines is @ student studying for his Masters Degree.
7
Vill, REPORTING OFFICIAL
HAGE SNABE ATEN VIAN AND SROAR Lf | a en
™ AOE, AFSN SSAN. AND DRGAMNIZATION $1GMa!
JOHN M COHAN, Major Flight Commander KA. MV & -
$64-38-S683FV, 314th TASq - ; welll J t
McClellan AFB. Calif (AFRES) Sr_Navigator i 1 7 July Te
BY INDORSING OFFICIAL
I have observed the performance of Captain Glines and concur with the remarks and
ratings of the reporting official.
p ik ‘.
MAME. GRADE Ass S546 460 ORGANIZATION ovry nme Moma! iy a
CHESTER W ANDERS, Lt Colonel uadron Commander “i ‘ ?
317-14-7S511FV, 314th TAS
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Glines, Albert E 552-52-9680FV NONEAD
(CHECK APPROPRIATE SLOCK AND COMPLETE AS APPLICABLE)
SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET TO RATING FORM wHiCH 0 LETTER OF EVALUATION COVERING THE FOLLOWING
COVERS THE FOLLOWING PERIOD OF REPORT PERIOD OF OBSERVATION
io Teau vaow Teau
30 Sep 71 31 May 72 |
Precede comments by eppropriete dete, 1.6. seetion continustion, indorsement continuation, additionel indorse-
went, ete. Follow comments by the euthentication te inchude: meme, grade, AFSN. orgenssetion, duty tithe, date
ond signature.
ADDITIONAL INDORSEMENT
Concur. The evaluation of this officer accurately portrays his performance
and abilities. My contacts with him have impressed me with his potential.
oy t. Ay mee
A FORSYTHE, Colonel, 541-14-3967FV, 940th Tactical Airlift Group, Commander,
Jul 72
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Travis AFB CA 94535
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Navigates aircrart to accamplish cargo airlift and other assimed missions.
Plans the navigational phase of each mission and insures that all navigational
equipment is inspected and prerlichted.
and maintains flight logs and records.
Thee aa
552-52 -9660 FV NOMEAD
+ s680 Bales oot 7, eee OF etroet
Naviga lL feeas ‘un =
El a oF her , o Batam foe etPcer
199 CRO
PRESERT OUTY
parse 1545. SQUADRON NAVIGATOR C-141.
Performs minor in-flight maintenance
RATING FACTORS (Conerder Row thee officer se perferesme on Rew sod )
+ NOM FOCE OF CUTIES
-
geterse
MOD GAPS Oe =} mom
“ue
Hum Damts 10. 9" OF
“so
yar beac roar &
mr
owt
~~ ouases o-
i. efomte Ge mer
waves oF wrk 108
crceuaeet sron cece or ms
ees OF ws 108
3
gecenreenes LmOr OS Tamora
on y res
Ad
oO
> PCR Om~NCE OF CUTIES
O
Bete of anti ty OF
ome OFfte fers fo meter
900 HG eheters
er eromeanct EET) Ar
“ee Ae a OtmeTE
Dat re eee Quail
w0es 48E vhey Dat Sractoer
oz)
Peomucis veer x waste
wo Qari ty oF mers
Cx)
“A WOrteS
Gaile e690 Dati te oe
“e ane cutanae syeumren
oO
L_denevte
veserective
Cy
oescerte
: CEFECT) VENESS IN SDR ING OF OTHERS
wr yoeeeecy tet os 2Ome vee ety mae os woe seus t arty oR ots ere PT OPE | HORE Om wemONY BF tm * LCCeT A
hl kl coosceare oe Ath eeG Oe OF veote women © ecumsranct). omnes 4 whey GOOD "tee ite *
O oes womet Scr ivkey OCMNTES mameOn®
wore Ld ~ CJ
Le —
‘ See
orrts etee noe "= png bt TORR y EMME TORTERT OF ND TOSTES & wha OF LOE - ab us ares soetes at
" mrtearied One. stare ” etyrantiere! ony eae tow s accarns OF mETOATENE amO ACCEPT: a]
Poms erty ” ar tori etseens: ornare OF OC SPONS era i ty
2 1,——_ oe Cx] Cc)
pS os 2v0ctuen?
RE Samy ane oe nese teen ru ta
Sumo Ou? wi tase ~n
teeoes
wit =6 om ta
Creuetiae OF fac toes
Cid
Ane 06) Weiwer®
CONS OCOS O44 Facroes to
eee AC OUATE OCS ONS
Cx)
nn a alacte ng tte ar
‘ fre
wuts ore aa
=
e acartagicity
-— ——
Team fe e+ ~~
we Le = ote en
’
Pr re taut ‘st Se ruat ome
eiersmnenc TH ONT nae
oF 1S Ofer e Mean
be ~ ' =u ees sretss
tad styeteame
onet ater
tet veore
moe rr pr tuatiens
eo —— t
“
tot cmon prem “ne
'
*e
> Use OF etsquerts
Teen ee)
or Mmomeres
eMES FENOTES om 8 BeOtKe
Vat SAC TORY waneee
TONNER ES OF UheRe BOUT ene
rotons
CPPRC TT OERT OFC aml Hes
Vee ed OF OC rT OF me
(wPeOrtO POOCT OR OES
ana ®
et
(=~) fon)
Cae) Ce]
=
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beeps
en not ~ ae
om Mee ow
O ertreaerrrnt)
te a0 O88 FE PRE SS ON
~~
CSE SESE OME TO EB.
weres Ot0d Cr tem
Loe | tee |
Sa =e thy Sen me ey eer ooo its
Ca) Can | Ce c= Se
“whan Quen Tits Comerdes Boo thee altrcer eeete a
ie iy were wee as Hone Ti Re eee
— Lees * | Sears . Sate one y= “tes
: ae tee A teh hel
force standeré
Sa err ey
+e eNge8 ere
tone
oc
~ Bink
ee ee
emieit C
” pees GRADE OFFICER EFFECTIVENESS REPCRI
-
5a
009
OVER-ALL EVALUATION (Compere thie ef ficer ONLY wrth officers af the seme grade )
yr
em tie fee
fener tech reee
@ecr0 se PPT es
oe tee
ease
Ba oy) Oe ioe el
+ BOLD HOT OLarrSTeATE & CAPsOrL TTY FOR PRGEOT ION At tere Teme
D Obwowsteetes CamemicrThts fom om “
~emnes oe or vd aety
COPS OLE FOR FO vem tein! atau OF Frm
es 1 plaromene e114 9 Petstet yenoe | tama D OF Casinr are ow
‘oe Oe eee
© GIT TeRDreG Lert bs fy die eet Ge Germ fretee
x PERT em PRR ITE ELK BwE AO OF COM TiN Mami tS
FACTS AND SPECIFIC ACHIEVE ENTS:
his time and talent to the Air Force Reserve progran s
Comat ns
Capt Glines has made sinificant contributions of
ince joining the 933 MAGp
(Assoc) (AFRES). Capt Glines has attended the C-141 navigator training course at
Altus AFB, Oklahora, where he distinguished himself by graduating second in his
class. Capt Glines has also received a recormendation for a checkride in the
minimum am 1t of time. He has devoted 45 days of his time to Active Duty during
the past three months and has flown several overwater training missions during that
period. He has the additional duties of Squadron Cormunications Security Officer
and Plans Officer. In this capacity, he has developed a communications security
briefing to be conducted at his monthly unit training assemblies. He hes also
contributed significantly to the development of his unit's operations plans.
Because of his potential, Capt Glines has been selected to attend the C-5 navigator
training course at Altus AFB, Oklahom.
His participation in the Air Force Peserve
has been excellent and he has accumulated the maximum allowable number of additional
flying training periods. STREIGTHS:
and has a cooperative attituce.
Cant Glines is an energetic, zealous officer
Ne is easy to get along with and gets along well
with others. He has excellent potential and is a dedicated officer. SUGGESTED
ASSIGNMENTS: Capt Glines should be upzraded to line navigator as socn as possible
and is recommended for attendance at the C-5 navigator training school. OTTER
COMMENTS: Capt Glines is athletically inclined and in this regard, enjoys coacning
a softball team. His civilian occupation is that of automobile salesman.
vit.
REPORTING OFFICIAL
45-32-8157 FIB12 MASq (Assoc)
Travis AFB, CA (AFFES)
i CT a ee ee) Bate The T ae SA
FRANK L. JACKSON, Major, USAFR | Squadron Navigator Front Joe en
af80 Bat ne care
Senior Mav
3 April 1973
ACVICW BY IMOORSING OFFICIAL
I concur with the comments and ratings of the reporting official. Capt Clires is
energetic ard possesses a strong desire to do an exceptional job for the Peserve
program. Due to his rapid prccression and fine attitude, I have selected him for
conversion to the C-5 Associate Reserve squadron,
Crk
a Cat NS ee eee ye vray 2, <7 7 y
EDMOND F. COONEY, JR., Majcr, Squadron Navigator Ort Carmuy jt
USAFR, 508-364-1945 FV30l MASQ == [Har ere ¥ 758 77
(Ansoc), Travis APS, CA (aeTeS) Master Nav 3 April 1973
; Seen
6a : Ta
mh 083
/ “PUCROFILIED 1 “y'7a rm APN PA aeeorn Fi J)! 261 1373
1. iDimTie ica CATA Boot ana DOr td care%eTIf BOAO Hitiin oar tee ) 7
LEU ML rie l aie O ry T WSR Gat a
nes, Albert E. 552-52 -9680FV NONEAD Captain
SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET TO RATING FORM WHICH LETTER OF EVALUATION COVERING THE FOLLOWING 5 Chines, Famine tne Oat iom Tie Se er pt
pF
Q COVERS THE FOLLOWING PERIOD OF REPORT PERIOD OF OBSERVATION 301 MASq (Assoc) (AFRES) Sr Nav vom 26 Feb 73 [~~ 29 Jul 73
yeow ea Travis AFB CA 4535 TOS or re TOS Tee HT
active
“CHECK APPROPRIATE BLOCK AND COMPLETE AS APPLICABLE)
vam way 154 CRO
1 Jun 72 25 Feb 73 i. PRESENT OUTY
additionel sndorse-
Deosede coansate br coprens tere Gate. i cusscrsen te tactuse:, sees. grees, APES, gegeabaat ene. duty Cathe, dete oust 1545L parse LS4SL SQUADRON NAVIGATOR C-Lh1.
ond signature. Navigates aircrart to accomplish cargo airlift and other assigned missions.
Plans the navigational phase of each mission and insures that all navigational
’
ADDITIONAL INDORSEMENT
S igh ° orms - :) nan
Captain Glines' excellent ability as a C-141 navigator vas demonstrated when he peg sce Edges sedate foe ag er minot in-flight mintenance
attended the C-141 navieator training course and graduating second in his class.
I concur with the reporting and indorsing officials. .
CT NOS AS ae
CHARLES H. MICHAEL, Colonel, USAFR, 568-26-2982FV, 938 Mil Alft Gp (ASSOC)(AFRES),
Commander, 6 April 1973 -
whe RATING FACTORS (Consrder haw thie officer +a pertorming On Rie pee }
‘ BNOM LOGE OF CUTIES
7 ° ” Seer euS eee te its eee | covtinn peases or ars soo. [oman er wis s00. fasseh'os ars een” | cease seo tatecunys
“ts jai wm
: PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES
Gait of %
oot e008
BS. rod 0 ROE on -” Es oO
“ite ow eter omen t wets mr @esti ty anO Gaarte oe CES WEOe wie Queer Day ee ye
Cotte fons TO eer ew 8 EG eters w0m 400 HEMT Sati Sractoer ano Quai ty OF eoes aesie Cy tem HOLE Oe
. oe OES oof ,
VON aie Oo Oo Ta Oo
, CIFECTIVENESS IN MGR ING aii OTHERS
wor TEPPER TIE tm CORR ING oF tm] Sometimes was MiRFICA TY Ere Te te er ne Oe Teveiwtae SELES
OMCRS OLS SOT COOFLGATE | Im GETTING #hONG @riw «| umOl® soma, Cretuestencts | Gr=tet © vier GoOO tae | eoee 4G wit ©
omens womere
QO, Oo oO os Zz
4. LEADERSHIP Cramactiersrics
‘
‘ .
a00s
ACT Ye PRCTED mam
Wee Acct Pence TET Tea Ohms RATES] Chums OATES & iter OFC MET | A wars Comms wares mT.
v SOery ant quatt STATE amd ACCEPTS mT iat eee an ACCEPT. STAND RE MET OTE WE ONO
rust ows at aromsemiar te ant OF ML SPONS TONLE TY ACCEPT ance OF
re tt eed _
Lb '
seatente Lo iad Ce) ae
—
, JUOGEMENT
wr OCC SONS ame OCC maetNre. or eee os woes COOe POmwat CONC ts ee PS ee
TiOnS OF Tim SRONE Of CUNO Bul wants HC CASHONME | BME TING foc TO sO COWSHO4OS Oin FaCtOes (Oo “Per ot OFC 5) Fete oe
% teaver Gr OF rectoes O1ace AC Cumeth OFC IS Ome rane Cee warnces
OR eRe cs AB 7 co mH =
. apa ras ty
sor Team 10 Pier me ane cer re ee rr ee er ee a TOT I aT
Guatice om Ofete Mea rer ee oe ee SH THeT aes tyim Mote POLE OF ee ae
O Oe ee Raut me Se hua awe om OOF CURT Be tuateaes ety te mates OF
’ Use OF BER ES
my) TeattaCiind tm Canvaevarren] ost Siw BLES 1m O Gaetay | ciasierrd Ov Uses Gulia PECONCh whi OCC mms its woe wa enc |
mes Mar DF aC Tome manne orem mes Tee Neh OF OF EL ree seme or omerns
|
0° > called Ga |Ge) Ge Et Ge |e
. COL TING ami tty ar UMM EME SS Ow
(OCR qeeer ed ten wi tere me ee ee Th On te w Sftshe ome OES | ero rr
“tem sees ‘ 1 oo feet POLLED Teh ete Cte Perks 0888 (tome “_* oe “es to
© @) re ‘ We ome MA vate
eo. wee we DL este wees x ie 1 | [on wae
C= C= | C= CeCe) [Ce Ce Ce Ce
WW. MILITARY QUALITICS (corecwer te © officer wants aie Pavee stamdaras +
wr UT a er ee I wee Tete one re ee |
F00E THO GURY Or te Hrd ate Oe POOL! 1 Oem =) * LOO PON 0 Oat ny eter eS ~
eter FerOreQt ere tt am oes -
o
ereecr) anes are renee
AF sng A 77a uavovens enr¥eus ° wat oeun isa SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET TO AF FORMS 77, O — (| Cc Ce) ot ~~
mn ere 18 Ganaysres oni me-nafe§ 707, 909, 910, 911 MnO ne a ane mrp
EXHIBIT D-1
ar Ege ee ee ee ee
8a 9a
%3
‘. Ovte-al cY Oe (Coopers thie officer OMLY @rth efficore he seme grade) 2 itf8 LAST MAME FURST ame mr OORE FIT IAL
active Outy Gaaoe
s3an
WEE Glines, Albert £. \' 552-52-9680FV NONEAD
Craeaeee syseseegeriee (CHECK APPROPRIATE BLOCK AND COMPLETE 4S APPLICABLE)
ees >|
tonne feet ame
SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET TO RATING FORM WHICH LETTER OF EVALUATION COVERING THE FOLLOWING
Ce ot. bog Ct). Co (Co eae COVERS THE FOLLOWING PERIOD OF REPORT PERIOD OF OBSERVATION
nares. Pron Ot ow avtnece CPPECT IVE ted COMPETENT weer font CACC ORAELT) Qurstanoing = ry 7} rer
YI PROMOTION POTENTIAL 26 Feb 73 29 Jw 73 |
s. muee noe ectamnvenne 0 casemscen ven cocmproen av ture cumm, fj] * SPSS, mccturgsusiahene © Sonim C7 cosertcT™PCien’ octets ty ene suthenestavion's sorta "han graces AvShy vgunievion, day shel dot
eleneture.
memareems Gtaituter atts Ss tenons eR ee ee 1.
OT ADDITIONAL INDORSEMENT: I concur. Capt Glines in addition to flying has made
FACTS AMD SPECIFIC ACHIEVIZENTS: Capt Glines has performed his duties in an ' himself available for additional duties during the unit training assemblies.
exceptionally fine manner throurhout the period of this report. His participation I personally assigned him several projects in the Navigator Section and he
ami perforrance in all scheduled unit training assemblies have been especially oy rg ber ae oe te and with dispatch. Recommend Capt Glines enroll
noteworthy. lis effective use of materiel and perscnne] while serving as Manuals % Air Comman tarf College by correspondence in order to better utilize his
Control Officer demonstrated his great efficiency and success while working with administrative and managerial abilities.
others. Capt Glines has proven to be a canpetent and professional navigator.
The examiner on his recent C-141 initial evaluation had many favorable comments Ei es > b
on his performance. In order to broaden his technical knowledge, he also accumu- Lyra ve tat,
lated the maximum number of additicnal flying training periods. Because of his : EDMOND F. COONEY, JR., f‘9/jor, USAFR, 508-34-1945FV, 301 MASq (Assoc), Squadron
proven abilities, he has been selected to transition to the highly sophisticated Navigator, 20 August 1
C-5A aircraft end entered training on 30 July 1973. He has expressed a high degree
of enthusiasm for this essimment and will undoubtedly be an asset to the 301 MAS.
STRENGTHS: Capt Glines is a conscientious officer who will see e project through
aDDITIONAL INDORSEMENT: Capt Glines has d trated ded
to its comiction. He has excellent potential and gets along well with others. 4 " ph soa pe oi eoreecly sage ate
1S COMPAR VAC & through a high level of participation. I concur with this evaluation and the
SUGGESTED ASSIGIMENTS: In eto to best —_ his eng maf Glines should recommendations of his reporting and indorsing officicls to upgrade as C-5
be upgraded to navigator imme iately upon his return from formal C-5A school. a ‘ onal ed
OTHER CQOMINTS: Capt Glines' devoted interest and outstanding abilities in the navigator cad inerense his profess CELL Ls 'Thvemgh eaEreppenrenss SuErees,
field of athletics have aided greatly in the high success of the local softball ~ 2
program where he volunteers his services as a eoneh - ranager. iy Rag Soe ; , A Lie AA
4 44 that of ' _ Capt Glines prerotes the Pua : , J os
See san eS Sas B.C. MEWS, Colonel, USWFR, $51-12-5762FV 349,11 1ft Wig (iss0c), (ARES),
Commanier, 2° .ugust 1973
vir. REPORTING OFFICIAL
CeCe ee SIT TRwT —=
CHARLES EGIZIANO, Capt, USAFR Squadron Navigator LO * 4 lie .
127-30-6610FV, 301 MASq (Assoc [OSE bas _
Travis AFB, CA (AFFES) | Senior Mav 1 20 august 1943
m. REVIE@ BY [MOORSING OFFICIAL
I concur with the above report. Capt Glines is an officer whose full potential
has not yet been realized. He should be an asset to the 301 MASq.
a ee mv veer
Seer -”
JOEL V. FALK, Capt, USAFR Squadron Navigator Stel leh
503-24 -5 303FY, 302 “ALG (Asse PTS “ae coy ’ ery} Peter dus CHT Om
Travis AFR, CA (AFT *) Navigator ‘| 1 20 August 1973 AF we @ 778 as vern warn ores paps gy SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET TO AF FORM
D-2 Tew a tome ou “p-3 707, 909, 910, 911) AND 475 7
lla
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC A. SEITZ
STATE OF HAWAII )
) SS.
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU )
ERIC A. SEITZ, being first duly sworn on oath,
deposes and says:
1. I am an attorney admitted to practice before the
Supreme Court of the United States, before state
courts in California and Hawaii, and before numerous
federal courts for trial and appellate proceedings.
2. Currently I ar engaged in the private practice
of law with offices located at 681 South King Street,
Suite 200, Honolulu, Hawaii 96813.
3. Commencing in September, 1972, I represented
an individual named PATRICK CHENOWETH in
connection with his trial before a Navy court-martial
on charges alleging, in substance, acts of sabotage to
the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Ranger.
4. The court-martial proceedings in Mr. CHEN-
OWETH’s case occurred over a period of several
months at the United States Naval Base, Treasure
Island, California, terminating on or about June 5,
1973, by findings of the military court that he was.
not guilty of the specifications and charges on which
he was tried.
5. During the entire period of time, from his arrest
in July, 1972, until his acquittal in early June, 1973,
Mr. CHENOWETH was confined without bail at the
correctional facility on Treasure Island. A petition for
habeas corpus was filed in his behalf and ultimately
12a
reached the Supreme Court upon a petition for cer-
tiorari, resulting in the Order that is appended hereto
as Exhibit A.
/s/ E.A. Seitz
ERIC A. SEITZ -
Subscribed and sworn to
before me this 3rd day
of July, 1979.
/s/ Marilyn Joy Barbain
Notary Public, First
Judicial Circuit, State of Hawaii
My commission expires: 5/1/83
13a
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543
October 9, 1973
Eric A. Seitz, Esq.
405 Capp Street
San Francisco, Calif. 94110
RE: CHENOWETH v. WARNER, SEC’Y of
NAVY, et al., 72-6812 =
Dear Sir:
The Court today entered the following order in the
above-entitled case:
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted.
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to
the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California with directions to dismiss the
case as moot.
Very truly yours, |
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., Clerk
By
/s/ HELEN TAYLOR
Helen Taylor, (Mrs.)
Assistant Clerk
AIRMAIL
RECEIVED OCT 30 1973
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.