Amicus Brief — Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute

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Nos. 78-911, 78-1036

MAY 18 j979—*

IN THE

MICHABL RODAK, JR., CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States ——-——

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO,

Petitioner,

Vv.

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, et al.,

Respondents;

RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR,

Petitioner,

Ve

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, et al.,

Respondents.

Qn Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF FOR NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNCIL, INC. AS AMICUS CURIAE

RICHARD E. AYRES

DAVID D. DONIGER

Attorneys for Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc.

Mailing Address:

NATURAL RESOURCES

DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

917 15th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 737-5000

May 17, 1979

INDEX

INTERESTS OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES

DEFENSE COUNCIL...

QUESTIONS PRESENTED |

sa Snare AND STATEMENT OF THE

A. THE PROBLEM OF OCCUPATIONAL

RPRPEIREUID voi nicss)secerpnsccses:

B. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND

HEALTH ACT...

THE BENZENE STANDARD . mee

THE LOWER COURT DECISION... |

SCIENTIFIC AND POLICY ISSUES RE-

LATED TO THE RELIABILITY OF

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

AND QUANTITATIVE COST-BENEFIT

pe Reet) MARE Mn

1. The Best Available Scientific Know ledge

Permits Reliable Identification Of

Carcinogens, But Not Reliable Quan-

tification Of Risk ......... 3

a. The Basic Biochemical Process Of Can-

cer Causation Are Largely Un-

MIN Chote

b. Epidemiological Studies Are Capable

Of Identifying Carcinogens, But

Not The Magnitude Of Cancer Risks

ec. Animal Experiments Also Permit

Identification Of Carcinogens, But

Not The Degree Of Risk To Humans.

2. Techniques For Quantifying Economic

SS est NR ceraeaer) Fapeat ial Ma AA ES )

moO

3. Comparing Health And Economic Inter-

TRESS a eS aN SE Res or AEN bes ee ean sae Nee

Page

13

13

il

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

PX th) | ~, 5 See eOnEMee NEROMR TPE OR rey ogee fuce ewes

I. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND

HEALTH ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE

UANTITATIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR

TANDARDS TO PROTECT EMPLOYEES

FROM CANCER-CAUSING CHEMICALS.

A. Conditioning Standards On Quantitative

Assessments Of Risk Conflicts With The

Congress’ Desire To Prevent Disease

Botore Ft TRG WRN acai osccdececsesie cs cceccovae hiss

1. The Primacy Of The Goal Of Pre-

venting Occupationally-Caused Dis-

2. Judicial Recognition Of The Primacy

Of Preventing Disease ........................

B. The Requirement That Standards Be

Feasible Does Not Mandate A Quan-

titative Demonstration That eir

Benefits Exceed Their Costs......................

1. The Legislative History Of The Term

“Feasible” Shows That Congress In-

tended Only A Limited Role For

Cost Considerations In Setting

Stans i eae

2. Prior Cases Have Concluded That

Costs Are To Be Accorded A Limited

Role In Setting Standards..................

C. The Lower Court Erred In Holding That

a epeor Cost-Benefit Analysis Is

andated By The Requirement That

Standards Be “Reasonably Necessary.”

1. The Legislative History Shows That

“Reasonably Necessary” Has No

Bearing On The Role Of Cost Con-

GIO ;... 5.68

Page

28

31

31

35

39

40

48

ili

2. “Reasonably Necessary” Merely Re-

quires A Rational Connection Be-

tween The Means And enna of

Standards ..

D. The Consumer Product Safety Act Does

Not Support The Lower Court’s Con-

struction Of The Occupational ase

and Health Act

1. The Two Acts Are Not Parallel

2. The Consumer Product Safety Act

Does Not Require Quantitative

Cost-Benefit Analysis.

II. THE SECRETARY ACTED WELL WITHIN

HIS DELEGATED AUTHORITY IN

DECLINING TO ADOPT tse eimanaien

RISK ASSESSMENT...

A. The Substantial Evidence Test Does Not

Permit The Court To Substitute Its

Judgment For The Secretary’s On The

Reliability Of Quantitative Risk

Assessments................. LARGE, ‘

1. Standard Setting Under The

Occupational Safety And Health

Act Involves A Mixture Of Fact-

Finding And Policy- Making

2. The Substantial Evidence Test Does

Not Prohibit The Secretary From

Making Policy Judgments .

B. The Secretary Reasonably Determined

That Quantitative Risk Assessment

Techniques Are Not Sufficiently Re-

liable To Be A Basis For Decision...

ee Ga a Oa

Page

49

50

55

63

67

iv

CITATIONS

Page

CASES:

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 1386

(GRRE aU TC as a AG eee treo AU Oe Pa a 62

AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir.

RAR RECRERSVTTA PGT PERI TY Wek tee ot IVa) Ee ee 12,45,46

American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d

825 (3rd Cir. (1978), petition for certiorari

TOES eae le LT CAIER aod CORRAL PURELY fe 8 CRU 15,37,46,

47,54,60

American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493

NN NI eer asi case ciintstanidiyeisieyoshemouetiaivenis 12,13,27,

28,30,37,

38,43,47,

50,54,60,

63,65,66,

67

Arkansas- Best Freight Systems v. Occ. Safety &

Health Rev. Comm'n. 529 F.2d 649 (8th Cir.

eS | ater eRe A Hebe Melannen Ee seen 47

Associated Industries of N.Y.S. v. United States

Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1978).......... 57,60,61

Certified Color Mfrs. Ass’n v. Mathews, 543 F.2d

Be a ee IES sets fates sea nc ascansstypercecs lonvies 15,37

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401

ee seen: 62

Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n 383 U.S. 607

D_* Neg TEs EAR SR. OL Siemnatint Paltoan fy MARC Ate) eee Grates Rn 62

Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, —F.2d—, 8

BERaee MOU CEP Cs RUUD i cesevcenepevcescseccsctsvecsncees 15,37,39

Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 510 F.2d

Be a It I ndash access iocy slacks cuxavastesdevcecesnt 15,37

Federal Communications Comm’n v: National

Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.

1, aaNet Leman le via I Bed 0 OF Rr att ee eR 59

Florida Peach Growers Ass’n v. United States

Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1974) 60

Vv

Page

Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499

ne Ce, CR. Bete sa osviics sasissninedeccchprscactosaans 12,15,35,

44,4754,

57,58,59,

60,61,62,

63

National Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Weinberger,

BES Fmt Geet CH Gey BIT gaa veci ck ccssstscicevecesvernc¥ess 61

Permian Basis Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747

(> PUR ae ae mse a CE e dG Shep aon EROS W Eb Aa PilMerte pr 58

Society of the Plastics Industry v. OSHA, 509 F.2d

1301 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421 U.S. 992

| ARNO eed, tinal Oe cae ee aE AGI Mie MO ot, 15,35,45,

54,60

Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Bren-

nan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3rd Cir. 1974) 0.00.0... ee

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474

i: BRAM Raine) Ment Me ananet ent WR eemo mec bE he 2 62

STATUTES:

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970

Section 3, 2) U.S.C. $651 .....:.......6csccbccses.. 5

Section S, 29 U.S.C. $668...........6.:..6:cc0000.:.. passim

Section 6, 29 U.S.C. §656............00.ccc. passim

Section 20, 29 U.S.C. §669 00000... 10

Section 21, 29 U.S.C. §670.........000. ce. 10

Section 23, 30 U.S.C. $671.....................0..... 10

Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972

Section 7, 15 U.S.C. §2056..............00000000. 50, 59

Section 9, 15 U.S.C. §2058 ......0...0..000. 50

Section 11, 15 U.S.C. $2060................0........ 59

Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 ..............

Section 4, 15 U.S.C. §2608 0.000000... 14

Section 6, 15 U.S.C. §2605.................000000... 59

Section 19, 15 U.S.C. §2618................ Rave 59

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977

Section 307, 42 U.S.C. §7607 ....0.000.0... 62

vi

REGULATIONS AND REGULATORY NOTICES:

Federal Regulations

GE rts, RR, PI hic facsbacasdecdtiscactadeeecst

Fe Es BEE iar ecctisccccedhan |

Federal Register Statements

43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978) ..........00000..00..00.

42 Fed. Reg. 54,148 (1977) 0.0.0.0...

42 Fed. Reg. 26,429 (1977) ................0.0068.

41 Fed. Reg. 46,742 (1976) .........e.,

41 Fed. Reg. 21,402 (1976) ............

36 Fed. Reg. 10,466 (1976) 00.0...

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970

Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate

Committee on Labor and Public Wel-

fare, Legislative History of the

Occupational Safety and Health Act

Oe Re a RE cin inh eae

S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.

So, ERO TR Ke MAE 5 xlrea home de DLC oe 4s

| RASA aR RS j

Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972

H.R. Rep. No. 1153, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.

RPE das lesolietc ccccehna neve acne aeviMepeerate

Page

32, 41,

42, 43,

48

4, 5, 6, 7,

vii

Page

Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976

H.R. Rep. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.

Be BHA NR Sirota be: IVs, Not RE EOE ee 51, 52, 59

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977

H.R. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., lst Sess.

OMAN hic. eersen ed Da cabicnedoks oan dd Al Beis 62

MISCELLANEOUS:

Baram, Regulation of Health, Safety And

Environmental Quality And The Use of Cost-

Benefit Analysis, Final Report to the Adminis-

trative Conference of the United States

RRR CS OR RR Is a ce em pea aba Aa Oe ET 8 25

Boyland, The Correlation of Experimental

Carcinogenesis and Cancer in Man, 11 PRo-

GRESS IN EXPERIMENTAL TUMOR RESEARCH 222

ft” aber pierre ed AR C7 eS ai OLED Bene pat eee ele a 7

BRAUN, THE BIOLOGY OF CANCER (1974) 000000000000... 17

Bridbord, Decoufle, Fraumeni, Hoel, Hoover,

Rall, Saffiotti, Schneiderman & Upton, Esti-

mates of the Fraction of Cancer in the United

States Related to Occupational Factors (US.

IN I a ee ren ach mir, Wrens 7

Cairns, The Cancer Problem, SCIENTIFIC AMERI-

CAN November 1975, at 64....00000000000occocccn. 6

Cornfield, Carcinogenic Risk Assessment, 198

SOOEMPOEE Ge COG ED occ ccckincecssccccecscscocccsscssvsccevecevserss 22

COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SIXTH

FADO AL, TEMPE CATO ooo. eh ci veb vssiccceesebeebicssivescess 6, 20

Crump, Hoel, Langley & Peto, Fundamental

Carcinogenic Processes and Their Implications

for Low Dose Risk Assessment, 36 CANCER RE-

UR IN ooo cadeccss lychee ss vinccccedenatiickdeses 17

DOLL, PREVENTION OF CANCER: POINTERS FROM

BUNUN ARIE Bs odccicebscacconcscsicndvessrecssssclonevcal 7

EPA Carcinogen Assessment Group, Final Re-

port on Population Risk to Ambient Benzene

Exposures (with cover memorandum dated

ME PR aio dlvevccctats oushiiniavideevlcestionst. 65

Viil

Epstein, Environmental Determinants of Human

Cancer, 34 CANCER RESEARCH 2425 (1974) .........

Fischhoff, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Art of

Motorcycle Maintenance, 4—Porreyx—Aterrssss

EF Pong Lessors 7. UND...

FRAUMENI (Ed.), PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF

CANCER, AN APPROACH TO ETIOLOGY AND CON-

GOLDSTEIN, ARONOW & KALMAN, PRINCIPLES OF

DRUG ACTION: THE BASIS OF PHARMACOLOGY

EE MII ated cies atoserk Anson th dcbepeeacea eens vas

Goodrich Cuts Cost of Meeting VCM Limits,

CHEMICAL WEEK, Dec. 10, 1975 ...............000000000.....

Greek, Vinyl Chloride May Force Shortages by

1977, CHEM. & ENGINEERING NEws, Aug. 11,

ARES AR A ee a eel enc, Sa Ae ale

HIATT, WATSON & WINSTEN (Eds.), ORIGINS OF

BRUMBAN COADIGIE CRITE Dons sn cncccscndjeccccescedehsccves(eee

Higginson, /mportance of Environmental Factors

in Cancer, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND

CARCINOGENIC RISKS 15, (C. Rosenfield & W.

Be I, IIE sack ates nestiesectccntrasa hte aeteilee

Hoover, Detection of Environmental Cancer Haz-

ards: Enidemiological Methods, 75 J. OF THE

MEDICAL Soc. OF N.J. 746 (1978) «0.000.

Infante, Wagoner, Rinsky & Young, Leukemia

in Benzene Workers, THE LANCET, July 9, 1977,

" e_ ep ADAIR RY oa rie tc Cnr SL ae Pts SU Ra Rear

INTERNATIONAL UNION AGAINST CANCER (UICC)

CARCINOGENICITY TESTING: A REPORT OF THE

PANEL ON CARCINOGENICITY OF THE CANCER

RESEARCH COMM’N (1969) .o0.0000.0000cccccccccccceeceee,

Kramer & Mutchler, The Correlation of Clinical

and Environmental Measurements For Work-

ers Exposed to Vinyl Chloride, 33 AM. INDUS.

HYGIENE ASS’N J. 19 (1972)...

Page

7,14, 18

14, 20

10

14

20

ix

Mancuso, Comments for Opening of Discussion o

“Neoplastic Effects,” 246 ANNALS OF THE N.Y.

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 251 (1975) 0000000000...

Mantel & Schneiderman, Estimating “Safe” Lev-

els, a Hazardous Undertaking, 35 CANCER RE-

rte MUTAGENICITY, AND TERATOGENICITY

i REI AES CLERIC 9 Bal rh Sa EN 25 Piet [ea oe

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, AN EVAL-

UATION OF THE CARCINOGENICITY OF CHLOR-

DANE AND HEPTACHLOR (1977) 2.0000.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DECISION

MAKING FOR REGULATING CHEMICALS IN THE

ENVIRONMENT (1975) o0oo.o20oo0ccccccccccoccceccceececceeee.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DECISION

MAKING IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

PE, Sey Sai PS Fo wee st

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DRINKIN

WATER AND HEALTH (1977) 220000000000.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, PRINCIPLES

FOR EVALUATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRON-

| | ENTE ALGAE eee IG St ea

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SACCHARIN:

TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF RISKS AND BEN-

RUE EAE AL er Ae Ay OO

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (U.S. Con-

GRESS), CANCER TESTING TECHNOLOGY AND

I REE ce ef

PVC Rolls Out of Jeopardy, Into Jubilation,

CHEMICAL WEEK, Sept. 15,1976...

Rall, Problems of Low Doses of Carcinogens, 64 J.

WASH. ACAD. SCI. 63 (1974) 020000.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S COMMISSION ON

PESTICIDES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO

Page

14, 18

o2

23, 24

14, 18, 19

14

15, 22, 23

14

24

22

14

REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL’S AD Hoc

COMMITTEE ON THE EVALUATION OF LOW LEV-

ELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CARCINOGENS (1970) ..

ROWE, AN ANATOMY OF RISK (1977) ........... ees

Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the

Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A. L.

ee IIe pts coh cscs nahargh asl css

Schneiderman, Decoufle & Brown, Thresholds for

Environmental Cancer: Biological and Statisti-

cal Considerations,—ANNALS OF THE N.Y.

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES—(in press) ..........0000........

Schneiderman, Mantel & Brown, From Mouse to

Man--—Or How to Get From the Laboratory to

Park Avenue and 53rd Street, 246 ANNALS OF

THE N.Y. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 237 (1975).......

Tomatis, Agthe, Bartsch, Huff, Montesand, Sa-

racci, Walker & Wilburn, Evaluation of the

Carcinogenicity of Chemicals: A Review of the

Monograph Program of the International

Agency for Research in Cancer, 38 CANCER

IEE T CROP UIED kvecckcovccecnsss adcanetbncesecaeswratsicss

Upton, Speech to American Cancer Society Sci-

ence Writers’ Seminar, Mar. 25-28, 1979............

URBAN ENVIRONMENT CONFERENCE (Eds.),

ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER: CAUSES, VICTIMS,

co Eh I teen Sete nena ely Pee Oana Sa

Weinstein, Yamaguchi, Gebert & Kaighn, Use of

Epithelial Cell Cultures for Studies on the

Mechanism of Transformation by Chemical

Carcinogens, 11 IN VITRO 130 (1975) 0000.

Weisburger, Chemical Carcinogens, in Tox-

ICOLOGY 333 (Casarett & Doull eds. 1975)...........

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, EVALUATION OF

THE CARCINOGENIC HAZARDS OF Foop ADDI-

TIVES, Technical Report No. 220 (1961) ...............

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PREVENTION OF

CANCER, Technical Report No. 276 (1974) ..........

Page

14, 18

23

62

18

72

21

16

14, 20

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-911

INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO,

Petitioner,

Le

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, et al.,

Respondents;

No. 78-1036

RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR

Petitioner,

Wy

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF FOR NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNCIL, INC. AS AMICUS CURIAE

2

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL

The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

(“NRDC”)—a national environmental organization with

more than 44,000 members residing in all states and

territories, as well as abroad—has as one of its principle

objectives the prevention of environmentally-caused dis-

ease. The prevention of cancer caused by exposure to man-

made chemicals is among the highest of NRDC’s priorities,

in view of the fact that it is responsibly estimated that the

majority of the cases of this dreaded disease are caused by

such chemicals.

In pursuit of this objective, NRDC closely monitors

the development of federal cancer policies in the Depart-

ment of Labor, the Environmental Protection Agency,

and other federal agencies that are responsible for

protecting the public from exposure to cancer-causing

substances in the workplace and general environment.

Recently, for example, NRDC submitted detailed scien-

tific and policy comments on the proposed general cancer

policy of the Department of Labor. NRDC has also played

a similar role in the development of the general cancer

policies of the Environmental Protection Agency and the

Food and Drug Administration.

NRDC has also played an important part in a number

of administrative proceedings relating to specific toxic

substances with carcinogenic properties. NRDC . was

among the first to call to the government’s attention the

scientific evidence that synthetic fluorocarbons damage

the stratospheric ozone layer, which protects the world’s

people from solar radiation that causes skin cancer. This

evidence later become the basis for executive and legisla-

tive actions to limit nonessential uses of fluorocarbons.

NRDC also brought to the attention of the Food and Drug

Administration the potential cancer-causing properties of

3

certain kinds of plastic soft drink bottles, which that

agency has since decided should not be used.

In the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and a

number of other major laws, the Congress of the United

States has responded to the growing national concern over

the rapid increase in, and grim results of, exposure to

cancer-causing substances. NRDC and its members have a

substantial interest in preserving the integrity of these

laws, in view of the importance of environmental factors

in causing cancer. In addition, NRDC and its members

have an interest in the outcome of this case because the

basic legal issues presented here permeate the entire body

of the Congressional enactments to control the incidence

of cancer. This Court will provide an authoritative inter-

pretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act,

which will affect as well the many other federal laws

designed to reduce the toll from cancer.

Regarding the issues presented here, NRDC believes

the Secretary properly interpreted the Occupational

Safety and Health Act when he concluded that it com-

mitted to his discretion the question whether quantifying

the magnitude of the risk of cancer-causing substances,

and balancing the costs and benefits of proposed regu-

lations, could be done with sufficient precision to provide

useful guidance in establishing the preventive standards

required by the Act. In addition, we believe the Secretary

properly exercised this discretion when he concluded that

these techniques were too immature to inform his judg-

ment meaningfully. As discussed in this brief, we agree

with the Secretary that quantitative risk assessment, and

cost-benefit analysis, are now too primitive to be thrust

into the prominent role envisioned by the court below. If

the objectives of the law are to be achieved, it is essential

that this Court uphold the Secretary’s authority to act to

prevent cancer on the basis of the best available evidence,

rather than forcing the public to wait for the development

d

of a degree of precision that is, at least at present, beyond

the capabilities of science.

All parties to both cases consented to the filing of a

brief by NRDC as amicus curiae. Copies of the letters of

consent are filed with this brief.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act

provides authority for the Secretary of Labor to limit

employees’ exposure to carcinogenic chemicals to the ex-

tent feasible on the basis of qualitative evidence that they

cause cancer, rather than requiring him to withhold regu-

lation until he has information sufficiently detailed to

permit quantitative assessment of the magnitude of the

health risk, and until he performs a quantitative cost-

benefit analysis of contemplated standards.

2. Whether the Secretary acted within his discretion

when he determined that the techniques of quantitative

risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis would not use-

fully sharpen his judgment in establishing a standard to

prevent cancer induced by workplace exposure to benzene.

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The Problem of Occupational Disease.

In 1970, Congress determined that the devastating

toll of deaths, illnesses and injuries caused in American

workplaces must be drastically reduced. Occupational

accidents alone then claimed more than 14,500 lives and

disabled at least 2.2 million people each year.’ Each year

chemicals and dusts in the workplace caused at least

1S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2 Sess. 2 (1970) [hereinafter

cited as SENATE REPORT].

q

77

390,000 new cases of occupational illness.2 Congress con-

cluded that the engine of American prosperity had to be

made safer for those who operated it. To this end

Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health

Act,3 whose primary purpose is “to assure so far as possible

every working man and woman in the Nation safe and

healthful employment and places of employment.’’

The legislators set special emphasis on controlling the

careless use of toxic substances in the workplace, which are

causing cancer, respiratory and heart diseases, nervous

disorders, sterility and other killing and disabling dis-

eases. The Senate and House Committees cited chemical

dangers running the gamut from the “ancient” poisons

such as lead and mercury to the newest exotic products of

the Petrochemical Age:

|M Jaterials long in industrial use are only now

being discovered to have toxic effects. In addi-

tion, technological advances and new processes

in American industry have brought numerous

new hazards to the workplace. Carcinogenic

chemicals, lasers, ultrasonic energy, beryllium

metal, epoxy resins, pesticides, among others, all

present incipient threats to the health of work-

ers. Indeed, new materials and processes are

being introduced into industry at a much faster

rate than the present meager resources of

occupational health can keep up with. It is

estimated that every 20 minutes a new and

2 Id. at 3. The Committee stated: “In the field of occupa-

tional health, the view is particularly bleak, and, due to the lack

of information and records, may well be considerably worse than

we know.” Jd. at 2.

3PuB. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1591 (codified at 29 U.S.C.

§§ 651-678).

4 Id. §2(b), 29 U.S.C. §651(b).

6

potentially toxic chemical is introduced into in-

dustry. New processes and new sources of

energy present occupational health problems of

unprecedented complexity.5

Congress took especially seriously the developing edge

of scientific knowledge showing alarming trends in

occupationally induced disease:

Recent scientific knowledge points to hith-

erto unsuspected cause-and-effect relationships

between occupational exposures and many of the

so-called chronie diseases—cancer, respiratory

ailments, allergies, heart disease, and others. In

some instances, the relationship appears to be

direct: asbestos, ionizing radiation, chromates,

and certain dye intermediaries, among others,

are directly involved in the genesis of cancer. In

other cases, occupational exposures are impli-

cated as contributory factors. The distinction

between occupational and non-occupational ill-

nesses is growing increasingly difficult to de-

fine.6

Since 1970, these findings and predictions have been

amply borne out.

The chemical hazard most on the public’s and Con-

gress’ mind, then and now, is cancer. One American in

four will contract some form of cancer; one in five is

expected to die from it.” The concensus of scientific experts

is that the majority of cancer is caused by exposure to

5 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.

8 Jd.

7 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SIXTH ANNUAL RE-

PORT 12 (1975); Cairns, The Cancer Problem, SCIENTIFIC AMERI-

CAN November 1975, at 66.

7

chemical substances.® At least a fifth—perhaps a third or

more—of all cancer in the United States is related to

chemicals in the workplace. A grim list of specific

occupational chemicals has been identified as carcinogenic

and continues to grow.'° Benzene, which causes leukemia,

is one such substance.

B. The Occupational Safety and Health Act

The Occupational Safety and Health Act authorizes

the Secretary of Labor to set standards to protect employ-

ees from toxic substances. The Act provides for three

kinds of standards for such substances. As an interim

measure, section 6 (a) of the Act directed the Secretary by

1972 to promulgate as federally enforceable standards any

existing “national consensus standards.’’'' These are safe-

ty and health standards developed before 1970, generally

by industry-funded organizations, and voluntarily agreed

to by individual companies.'2 In 1971 the Secretary

8 World Health Organization, Prevention of Cancer, Tech-

nical Report No. 276 (1974); Higginson, Jmportance of

Environmental Factors in Cancer in ENVIRONMENTAL POLLU-

TION AND CARCINOGENIC RISKS 15, 17 (C. Rosenfield & W. Davis,

eds. 1975); Boyland, The Correlation of Experimental Carcinoge-

nesis and Cancer in Man, 11 PROGRESS IN EXPERIMENTAL TUMOR

RESEARCH 222, 223 (1969); Epstein, Environmental Deter-

minants of Human Cancer, 34 CANCER RESEARCH 2425 (1974).

See also R. DOLL, PREVENTION OF CANCER: POINTERS FROM

EPIDEMIOLOGY (1967).

8 Bridbord, Decoufle, Fraumeni, Hoel, Hoover, Rall, Saf-

fiotti, Schneiderman & Upton, Estimates of the Fraction of

Cancer in the United States Related to Occupational Factors (U.S.

HEW 1978).

10 See Cole & Goldman, Occupation, in PERSONS AT HIGH

RISK OF CANCER, AN APPROACH TO ETIOLOGY AND CONTROL 167

(1975). [hereinafter cited as PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF CAN-

CER].

1129 U.S.C. §655(a).

12 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-6.

8

adopted some 400 such standards for air contaminants,

including the existing 10 parts per million (ppm) stan-

dard for benzene.’ These standards merely codified con-

temporary industry self-regulation. Generally they were

set at levels necessary to prevent only the acute and

chronic effects of moderately high exposures. They were

not designed to protect against the long-term adverse

effects of lower doses, which largely had not been in-

vestigated. This was the case for the benzene standard,

which was aimed only at some of the chemical’s non-

malignant effects.'4 The Senate and House Committees

made clear that national consensus standards were not

substitutes for more protective standards when further

research demonstrated the need.'5

Section 6(c) empowers the Secretary to set without

rule-making “emergency temporary standards” when

necessary to protect employees from “grave danger” due

to new or newly discovered hazards.'* These are effective

immediately upon promulgation, and must be replaced by

so-called “permanent” standards within six months,

which must be developed through normal rulemaking

procedures.'? In May 1977, The Secretary promulgated an

emergency temporary standard of one ppm for benzene

upon concluding that it causes leukemia. '®

1336 Fed. Reg. 10,466 (1971), codified in 29 C.F.R.

§1910.1000 table Z-1.

1443 Fed. Reg. 5919 (1978) (preamble to the Secretary’s

benzene standard).

1S SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6; H.R. Rep. No. 1291,

91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE

REPORT}. ;

16 Occ. Safety & Health Act §6(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §655(¢) (1).

17 Id. §86(c)(2)-(3), 29 U.S.C. §655(c) (2)-(3).

18 42 Fed. Reg. 26429 (1977). The standard never became

effective. It was stayed by the Fifth Circuit, American Petro-

leum Inst. v. OSHA, No. 77-1516 (stay ordered, May 20, 1977),

and the case was rendered moot by the promulgation of the

final standard and the judicial challenge here under review.

9

The main vehicle for protecting employees from toxic

substances is the so-called “permanent standard,” estab-

lished under Section 6(b), the provision at issue in this

litigation.'9 This Act sets out the criteria for such stan-

dards in the detailed provisions of Section 6(b)(5). The

Secretary must set the standard for such a substance

which most adequately assures, to the extent

feasible, on the basis of the best available evi-

dence, that no employee will suffer material

impairment of health or functional capacity even

if such employee has regular exposure to the

hazard dealt with by such standard for the

period of his working life. Development of

standards under this subsection shall be based

upon research, demonstrations, experiments,

and such other information as may be appropri-

ate. In addition to the attainment of the highest

degree of health and safety protection for the

employee, other considerations shall be the latest

available scientific data in the field, the feasibil-

ity of the standards, and experience gained

under this and other health and safety laws.20

Section 6(b) provides for informal rulemaking, supple-

mented by an opportunity for a public hearing.2' Section

6(e) requires the Secretary to give a statement of reasons

with each standard.22 Section 6(f) provides for pre-

enforcement review of such standards in the Courts of

Appeals; the court must uphold the Secretary’s determi-

nations if they are supported by substantial evidence.23

19 29 U.S.C. §655(b).

20 Jd. §655(b) (5).

21 Id. §655(b)(1)-(4).

22 Id. §655(e).

23 Id. §655(f).

10

C. The Benzene Standard

The Secretary promulgated a section 6(b)(5) per-

manent standard for benzene in February 1978, after

extensive comment and hearings.24 The standard reduced

the permissible benzene exposure from 10 parts per mil-

lion (“ppm’’) to one ppm.?5 The Secretary accompanied the

standard with a detailed statement of the reasons for this

reduction. He based the requirement both on benzene’s

clearly demonstrated leukemogenicity and on its capacity

to cause a wide variety of non-malignant rc ei of the

blood-forming system. The most recent, Was by the

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,26

of employees in Ohio exposed to benzene in the manufac-

ture of Pliofilm.2?7 The study showed at least a five-fold

excess of leukemia over the unexposed population in these

workers.28 The Secretary concluded that because benzene

was a carcinogen, a safe level of exposure could not be

demonstrated. Finally, he concluded that the reduction to

one ppm would produce “appreciable” health benefits, in

terms of reduced risk of both cancer and other benzene-

induced disease.29

Facing a life-threatening substance for which no safe

level of exposure could be established, he determined that

under section 6(b)(5) he must reduce benzene exposure to

“the extent feasible.”’%0 After carefully estimating the

2443 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978), 29 C.F.R. §1910.1028.

25 29 C.F.R. §1910.1028(c¢).

26The Occupational Safety and Health Act established

NIOSH as an institute in the National Institutes of Health,

under the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and

gives it duties to perform research and to aid the Secretary in

setting standards. Occ. Safety & Health Act §§20-22, 29 U.S.C.

§§669-671.

27 Infante, Wagoner, Rinsky & Young, Leukemia in Ben-

zene Workers, THE LANCET, July 9, 1977, at 76.

28 Id.

22943 Fed. Reg. 5940 (1978).

30 Jd. at 5934, 5940-41.

11

total costs of compliance by the industries making and

using benzene, the Secretary concluded that a permissible

exposure level of one part per million was feasible, as, even

under the industries’ cost assumptions, “the economic

impact of the final benzene standard will not be such as to

threaten the financial welfare of the affected firms or the

general economy.’’3'

The Secretary rejected the claims—then raised under

the rubric of “feasibility” —that prior to setting a stan-

dard to protect employees from an undisputed carcinogen,

he must quantify the cancer risk reduction the standard

would achieve and show through a quantitative cost-

benefit analysis that the standard’s health benefits out-

weighed its economic costs. For reasons detailed below, he

concluded that techniques do not exist to quantify risks

with accuracy and reliability necessary to be of use to him

in making his decision.32 Moreover, he concluded that no

basis exists to determine the value of life and health in

dollars, so that no objective method of conducting a

quantitative cost-benefit analysis existed. Neither form

of quantitative analysis would “significantly clarify the

ultimate decision.’’33

The Secretary observed that the Occupational Safety

and Health Act does not require him to delay regulation of

known cancer-causing substances until precise quan-

titative knowledge of the number of cancers that will

occur at particular doses can be established.

Rather, he stated that he must act now to protect the

employees from known causes of killing and disabling

illness. As the House Report stated, he must act on the

basis of the best available evidence and must not be

“paralyzed by debate surrounding diverse medical opin-

ions.”34 When facing a life-threatening substance for

31 Jd. at 5939.

32 Jd. at 5940-41.

33 Jd.

34 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 18.

12

which no safe dose can be determined, the Secretary

determined that the Act directs him to reduce employee

exposure to the extent feasible. Citing prior cases,°5 he

concluded that a standard which closed whole industries or

forced a substantial fraction of employers in an industry

out of business would not be feasible. But short of this

drastic result, he concluded employees are entitled by the

Act to protection from such hazards.%6

D. The Lower Court Decision

The American Petroleum Institute and other trade

organizations and individual companies sought review of

the standard in the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit. The court vacated the standard in October

1978.37

The lower court decision held, for the first time, that

in setting a standard under section 6(b)(5) for an undis-

puted carcinogen, the Secretary must quantify the health

benefits the standard would provide and show through a

quantitative cost-benefit analysis that the benefits bear a

“reasonable relationship” to the costs. The court based

this holding not on the requirement that achieving the

standard be “feasible” as required by Section 6(b) (5), but

on Section 3(8), which defines an occupational safety and

health standard as a standard “which requires conditions,

or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means,

methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or

appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and

places of employment.”3* As additional bases for the

court’s conclusion that the Secretary must have quan-

35 Industrial Union Dep’t AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d

467 (D.C. Cir. 1974); AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (8rd

Cir. 1975).

36 43 Fed. Reg. 5934 (1978).

37 American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th

Cir. 1978).

38 Jd. at 502-03; 29 U.S.C. §652(8).

13

titative knowledge of the size of cancer risks at particular

doses before he may set a standard, the court pointed to

four phrases in Section 6(b)(5)—“the best available evi-

dence,” “research, demonstrations, experiments, and such

other information as may be appropriate,” “the latest

available scientific data in the field,” and “experience

gained under this and other health and safety laws.’’39

Finally, although the court conceded the Serretary

had acted rationally, it held the Secretary’s corciusion

that “appreciable” health benefits would flow from the

standard not to be supported by substantial evidence. The

court held that substantial evidence could be provided only

by a quantitative assessment of the risks.40

‘E. Scientific and Policy Issues Related to the Reliability

of Quantitative Risk Assessment and Quantitative

Cost-Benefit Analysis

A correct appraisal of the requirements of the Act

and the reasonableness of the Secretary’s actions depends

on a firm understanding of the techniques of risk assess-

ment and quantitative benefit analysis. Weighing the

costs and benefits of a proposed regulation of the sort

under review requires being able to quantify the magni-

tude of the health and economic interests at stake, and to

know the appropriate way to balance them.

1. The Best Available Scientific Knowledge Per-

mits Reliable Identification of Carcinogens, But

Not Reliable Quantification of Risk

The main tools for identifying chemicals that cause

cancer are studies of exposed human populations (epide-

39581 F.2d at 504; Occ. Safety & Health Act §6(b)(5), 29

U.S.C. §655(b) (5).

40581 F.2d at 503.

14

miology)4' and laboratory studies on animals.42 These

techniques provide a well-recognized basis for identifying

chemicals posing carcinogenic risk for humans. The vali-

dity of these techniques has been confirmed repeatedly for

two decades by expert scientists and scientific in-

stitutions.43 They have been accepted by Congress,44 the

41 Hoover, Detection of Environmental Cancer Hazards:

Epidemiological Methods, 75 J. OF THE MEDICAL Soc. OF N.J. 746

(1978) [hereinafter cited as Hoover]; Hoover, Cancer Epide-

miology, in ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER: CAUSES, VICTIMS, SOLU-

TIONS 4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER];

Mancuso, Comments for Opening of Discussion of “Neoplastic

Effects,” 246 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 251

(1975) [hereinafter cited as Mancuso]. See generally articles in

PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF CANCER, supra note 10, and in

ORIGINS OF HUMAN CANCER, Book A (Hiatt, Watson, & Winsten

eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as ORIGINS OF HUMAN CANCER].

42 CARCINOGENICITY TESTING, A REPORT OF THE PANEL ON

CARCINOGENICITY OF THE CANCER RESEARCH COMM’N, INTER-

NATIONAL UNION AGAINST CANCER (UICC) (1969); Saffiotti,

Identifying and Defining Chemical Carcinogens, in ORIGINS OF

HUMAN CANCER, supra note 41, Book C, at 1311.

43 E.g., REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL’S AD Hoc Com-

MITTEE ON THE EVALUATION OF LOW LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL

CARCINOGENS (1970), reprinted in Chemicals and the Future of

Man, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization

and Government Research of the Senate Comm. on Government

Operations, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 180 (1971). [hereinafter cited as

SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT]; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,

DRINKING WATER AND HEALTH 29-59 (1977) [hereinafter cited

as DRINKING WATER AND HEALTH]; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY

ASSESSMENT (U.S. CONGRESS), CANCER TESTING TECHNOLOGY

AND SACCHARIN (1977); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, AN

EVALUATION OF THE CARCINOGENICITY OF CHLORDANE AND

HEPTACHLOR (1977) [hereinafter cited as NAS CHLOR-

DANE/HEPTACHLOR EVALUATION]; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCI-

ENCES, PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATING CHEMICALS IN THE

ENVIRONMENT (1975); MINISTRY OF HEALTH & WELFARE (CAN-

ADA), THE TESTING OF CHEMICALS FOR CARCINOGENICITY,

MUTAGENICITY, AND TERATOGENICITY (1975); REPORT OF THE

SECRETARY’S COMMISSION ON PESTICIDES AND THEIR RELATION-

SHIP TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH (U.S. HEW 1969). For an

early report reaching these conclusions, see World Health Or-

ganization, Evaluation of the Carcinogenic Hazards of Food

Additives, Technical Report No. 220 (1961).

44 See e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, §4, 15 U.S.C. §2603,

which requires testing for carcinogenicity, among other effects.

15

agencies,*5 and the Courts of Appeals*¢ as a valid basis for

preventive regulation.

But at this time these techniques do not permit

reliable quantification of human risk, particularly at and

below levels to which employees are currently exposed.

Even where a qualitative causal relationship is clearly

visible, as is the case for benzene, reliable quantitative risk

estimates for humans cannot be made. For a given

substance the risk estimates from equally respected quan-

titative models—each based on different plausible

assumptions about how chemicals cause cancer—differ by a

factor of 5,000,000 or more.47

Facts such as these have led some of the nation’s

leading scientific experts in cancer cause and prevention

to conclude that quantitative risk assessment (and thus

cost-benefit balancing) are not useful aids to standard-

setting at this point. Dr. Arthur C. Upton, who is Director

of the nation’s anti-cancer program at the National

45 See e.g., the Secretary’s Proposed Carcinogen Policy, 42

Fed. Reg. 54,148 (1977), and the Environmental Protection

Agency’s Interim Carcinogen Policy, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,402 (1976).

46 See e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, —F.2d—, 8

ELR 20765 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (PCBs, toxic water pollutants);

American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir.

1978) (coke oven emissions); Society of the Plastics Industry v.

OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421 U.S. 992

(1975) (vinyl chloride); Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n

v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (8rd Cir. 1974) (ethyleneimine);

Industrial Union Dep’t AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C.

Cir. 1974) (asbestos); Certified Color Mfrs. Ass’n v. Matthews,

548 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (food color additives);

Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir.

1975) (pesticides aldrin/dieldrin).

47 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SACCHARIN: TECHNICAL

ASSESSMENT OF RISKS AND BENEFITS 3-72, Table 3-8 (1978)

[hereinafter cited as NAS SACCHARIN STUDY].

16

Cancer Institute, summarized their conclusions recently as

follows:

Based on current scientific knowledge it is

not possible to accurately calculate risks for most

substances. Various recently developed statisti-

cal methods attempt to extrapolate from animal

data to human risk, thereby computing an esti-

mate of how many persons in a given population

can be expected to get cancer from a given

dosage of a particular carcinogen. But the pro-

cess has severe limitations.

We have the scientific means to identify

substances which cause cancer in animals and

which are, therefore, potentia! carcinogens for

humans. There is as yet, however, no scientific

way to arrive at quantitative and precise risk

estimates for humans based on extrapolating

from animal data and, therefore no scientific

basis for accurately and confidently weighing

the benefits of a particular substance against its

risks as a potential carcinogen.48

The basic biochemical mechanisms of chemically-

induced cancer are as complicated as life itself. They are

not adequately understood, and the uncertainties will

undoubtedly be removed only through years of research,

depending largely on unpredictable, sereridipitous insight.

In the interim, however, we have the means to identify

qualitatively many carcinogenic chemicals.

a. The Basic Biochemical Processes of Cancer

Causation are Largely Unknown

The biological mechanism by which chemicals cause

cancer is not well understood. There is general agreement

48 Upton, Speech to American Cancer Society Science

Writers’ Seminar, Mar. 25-28, 1979, at 2-3.

17

that chemical carcinogenesis involves changes in the gen-

etic material of an individual cell, or small group of cells,

or in the mechanisms by which cells regulate growth and

differentiationg. These changes cause the affected cells to

grow without restraint, without performing the functions

of normal cells, and eventually threatening the life of the

host.49

These processes appear to be enormously complex.

Some chemicals appear to accomplish these changes di-

rectly. Most seem to need to be “activated” by being

metabolized by the body into the actually carcinogenic

substances. Still other chemicals apparently “potentiate”

or otherwise facilitate the action of others. Which chem-

icals operate in which of these manners is not always

known.‘

In addition, cancers usually appear to be the result of

a sequence of steps: a series of changes caused in the same

cells by repeated exposures to the same chemical, by a

sequence of exposures to different substances, or a complex

interaction of chemicals with genetic susceptibility, vi-

ruses or radiation. The theory of sequential steps suggests

that cancer may be caused even by past exposure to a

chemical long since eliminated from the body; that chem-

ical may have been responsible for an early step in a

process completed by other factors.5'

49 See BRAUN, THE BIOLOGY OF CANCER (1974); Weinstein,

Yamaguchi, Gebert, & Kaighn, Use of Epithelial Cell Cultures for

Studies on the Mechanism of Transformation by Chemical

Carcinogens, 11 IN VITRO 130 (1975).

50 See Weisburger, Chemical Carcinogens, in TOXICOLOGY 333

(Casarett & Doull eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Weisburger }.

51 Crump, Hoel, Langley & Peto, Fundamental Carcinogenic

Processes and Their Implications for Low Dose Risk Assessment,

36 CANCER RESEARCH 2973 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Crump

et al.}.

18

The complexity of the processes by which a chemical

gets from its point of entry (e.g., lungs, skin, digestive

system) to its point of damage adds further uncertainty.

These absorption, distribution, and excretion processes are

rarely more than partly known.®2 It also appears that

there are certain chemical reactions that can “detoxify”

some amounts of some carcinogens and perhaps certain

biological mechanisms that can repair or destroy some

damaged cells. These mechanisms do not appear to be

fully effective, however.‘

Moreover, the human population is genetically, geo-

graphically, and culturally heterogeneous. For this rea-

son, it is thought that people vary in sensitivity to a

particular carcinogen. It appears that genetic hetero-

geneity alone accounts for a substantial variation in

human response. Subgroups exposed to other substances

because of their diet, or place of residence or work, may be

especially sensitive to particular substances.*®4

These apparent properties of chemically-induced can-

cer have led to a virtual consensus among expert scien-

tists, committees, and institutions that “thresholds” for

carcinogens—i.e., doses for which no human cancer risk

exists—cannot be determined.55 While theoretically a

threshold dose may exist for a given person exposed to a

given substance in particular conditions, the enormous

variation in sensitivities and in past and future exposures

52 GOLDSTEIN, ARONOW, & KALMAN, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG

ACTION: THE BASIS OF PHARMACOLOGY 129-226 (2d ed. 1974).

53 See id. at 623-667. See also Weisburger, supra note 50.

54 DRINKING WATER AND HEALTH, supra note 43, at 39; see

generally articles in PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF CANCER, supra

note 10.

55 See e.g., SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 43;

Schneiderman, Decoufle & Brown, Thresholds for Environmental

Cancer: Biological and Statistical Considerations, —ANNALS OF

THE N.Y. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES— (in press); DRINKING WATER

AND HEALTH, supra note 43, at 37-48, NAS CHLOR-

DANE/HEPTACHLOR EVALUATION, supra note 43.

19

to this and other substances is thought to preclude

determining reliable thresholds for whole populations.

For the same reasons, the size of the risk at particular

doses may vary greatly for different people. Even if the

size of the risk for a given person in given circumstances

could be demonstrated, one would not necessarily know

the size of the risk for members of a larger group.‘

b. Epidemiological Studies Are Capable of Identi-

fying Carcinogens, But Not the Magnitude of

Cancer Risks

Epidemiological studies take advantage of the

unfortunate fact that groups of people are already ex-

posed to a wide variety of chemicals. The most fruitful

studies are of occupational groups exposed to chemicals to

which the general public is not exposed, or only at much

lower levels. Studies of this type, for example, supplied

the principal basis for identifying benzene as a cause of

leukemia. The Infante study of workers in Ohio exposed

to benzene in the manufacture of Pliofilm and numerous

other studies discussed in the preamble to the benzene

standard’ demonstrate beyond doubt that benzene causes

leukemia.

But epidemiological studies are relatively insensitive.

Because of the small size of most occupational group

studies, an effect generally will not be detected unless it is

occurring in five to ten percent of the population. If the

effect is relatively common, such as lung cancer, and has

many chemical causes, an even greater response is needed

from one chemical in order to be detected. For the most

part, people are exposed to too many substances at un-

known doses for unknown periods to permit the drawing

56 DRINKING WATER AND HEALTH, supra note 43, at 39-47;

Crump et al., supra note 51.

57 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5925-32 (1978).

20

of statistically reliable conclusions from epidemiological

studies about the magnitude of the risk.5¢

The same factors that render epidemiological studies

insensitive as a means of identifying carcinogens make

them extremely unreliable for quantifying the risks of the

carcinogens they do identify.59 Some of the most impor-

tant factors are as follows.

First, sufficient latency periods often have not run to

reveal the full effect. Latency in humans ranges from 15-

40 years.® Second, dose information is often highly specu-

lative, especially for periods of two or more decades ago,

when exposure began. It is often difficult to determine

even which workers in a factory were exposed, let alone at

what level.6' Third, not all exposed persons have been

followed and their fate determined. Their illnesses and

causes of death, or even whether they still live, is not

determined. Since ill employees are the most likely to

have left employ, the failure to follow them can seriously

understate cancer incidence. Fourth, common cancers are

often not related to their causes. Lung cancer, for

example, appears to have many chemical causes. It is more

difficult to relate this cancer to a specific chemical than one

which is extremely rare and readily traced to a particular

source. ®2

58 See Hoover, supra note 41; ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER,

supra note 41.

59 See sources in note 58, supra.

60 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SIXTH ANNUAL

REPORT 23 (1975).

61 The benzene studies provide an example of this problem.

See discussion at 43 Fed. Reg. 5927. Sometimes doses two or

more decades past can be reconstructed only speculatively. For

an effort to do such reconstruction, see Kramer & Mutchler, The

Correlation of Clinical and Environmental Measurements For

Workers Exposed to Vinyl Chloride, 33 AM. INDUS. HYGIENE

Ass’N J. 19 (1972).

62 See sources in note 58, supra.

21

c. Animal Experiments Also Permit Identi-

fication of Carcinogens, But Not the Degree of

Risk to Humans

Lifetime studies on rodents are the major source of

data on the carcinogenicity of chemicals. The animals’

response to these chemicals is considered essentially sim-

ilar to that of humans, so that a substance carcinogenic to

one species is likely to be carcinogenic to the others.

Nearly all of the chemicals whose human carcinogenicity

has been proven epidemiologically have also been shown to

cause cancer in animals. Most of the 65,000 chemicals in

commerce pose no cancer risks. But there are at least

several hundred chemicals that have been identified as

carcinogens in animals, for which adequate epidemiologi-

cal studies are unavailable.®

But animal studies cannot reliably indicate the

magnitude of risks to people. To investigate directly the

effects of the doses of carcinogen commonly experienced

by people would require huge experiments. For example,

to demonstrate with 95 percent confidence that a realistic

dose of just one substance causes fewer than one cancer in

a million subjects would require a test involving at least

6,000,000 animals. Such ‘“mega-mouse” experiments

would be impractically expensive.®

Scientists attempting to estimate the risks from com-

monly encountered doses use mathematical models of

dose-response relationships to extrapolate from ex-

63 Tomatis, Agthe, Bartsch, Huff, Montesand, Saracci,

Walker & Wilburn, Evaluation of the Carcinogencity of Chem-

icals: A Review of the Monograph Program of the International

Agency for Research in Cancer, 38 CANCER RESEARCH 877 (1978);

Saffiotti, Jdentifying and Defining Chemical Carcinogens, in

ORIGINS OF HUMAN CANCER, supra note 41, at 1311.

64 Mantel & Schneiderman, Estimating “Safe” Levels, a

Hazardous Undertaking, 35 CANCER RESEARCH 1379, 13838

(1975).

22

perimental results on animals at higher doses. However,

reflecting the lack of knowledge of precisely what is

happening at and above the cellular level, the different

models yield widely divergent estimates of the risk associ-

ated with each low dose. While the major mathematical

models all agree with observed results, they can differ by a

factor of 100,000 on the size of the dose that creates a risk

of one cancer in a million animals.

Our ignorance of how to translate dose-response esti-

mates across species lines adds more uncertainties to risk

estimates. Not enough is known to determine confidently

the relative sensitivity of humans and each species or

strain of test animals. For example, people are bigger

than animals; there is uncertainty whether the proper

way to scale up doses is on the basis of relative body

weights or on the basis of relative surface areas of tissue.

Moreover, in contrast to human genetic heterogeneity

and diverse chemical exposures, test animals are inbred

for genetic homogeneity in order to facilitate uniform,

reproducible test results, and they are generally exposed

to only one substance at a time. Consequently, there may

be subgroups of the human population far more sensitive

than these inbred strains, and there may be interactions

between chemicals that the animal tests do not reveal.¢®7

Recent attempts by a committee of the National

Academy of Sciences to quantify the risks from saccharin

graphically illustrate the uncertainties. Using the results

of the recent animal studies, the various plausible models,

85 Cornfield, Carcinogenic Risk Assessment, 198 SCIENCE 693,

694 (1977).

86 Rall, Problems of Low Doses of Carcinogens, 64 J. WASH.

ACAD. ScI. 63 (1974). See also NAS SACCHARIN STUDY, supra

note 47, at 3-68 to 3-72 and table 3-8.

67 See DRINKING WATER AND HEALTH, supra note 43, at 35;

SCHNEIDERMAN, MANTEL & BROWN, From Mouse to Man—Or

How to Get From the Laboratory to Park Avenue and 58rd Street,

246 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 237 (1975).

23

and the differing assumptions about how to cross species

line to humans, they attempted to quantify the effects of a

consuming one can of diet soda per day. The results

suggested that in each 50 million people there could be as

few as 0.0007 cancers per year or as many as 3640. This is

a range of error more than 5,000,000- fold.

2. Techniques for Quantifying Economic Impact

Forecasting the costs of controlling or avoiding ex-

posure to a carcinogen is also difficult. Adequate control of

carcinogens sometimes requires significant changes in

equipment and operating procedures. The precise cost of

improved measures to control exposure is difficult to

determine, and the uncertainty increases with the degree

of change. Moreover, as costs increase, consumers of the

dangerous chemical tend to use less of it. They shift to

safer chemicals or to other means of accomplishing the

purpose the dangerous chemical serves. The magnitude of

these effects and their economic value are extremely

difficult to predict. Over time consumers (whether in-

dustries or individuals) adjust and learn new ways of

satisfying their needs with less of a dangerous chemical or

with none at all. Thus the actual costs may turn out to be

smaller than first predicted after some time for in-

novation and adjustment.®9

Moreover, objective analysis of economic impacts is

hampered by the fact that often the parties with the most

accurate information on the costs and effects of con-

trolling a carcinogen have little incentive to make it

available.70 The industries making and using benzene, for

example, have the best access to technological and eco-

68 NAS SACCHARIN STUDY, supra note 47, at 3-72, table 3-8.

69 The uncertainties are illustrated by graphs in W. ROWE,

AN ANATOMY OF RISK 233-34 (1977).

70 See NATIONAL A.CADEMY OF SCIENCES, DECISION MAKING

IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 51-58 (1977)

[hereinafter cited as DECISION MAKING IN EPA]

24

nomic data to analyze the availability of substitutes and

likely consumer responses, yet they may not feel that

revealing it is in their commercial interest while a stan-

dard is under consideration.

An example illustrates the point. In 1974 the in-

dustries subject to the Secretary’s standard for vinyl

chloride stated that the one part per million standard for

that carcinogen was technologically impossible to meet

and that attempting to meet it would drive them into

bankruptcy. The industries urged their positions without

success before the Secretary, before the Second Circuit

Court of Appeals,’' and before this Court.72 Yet within a

month of the failure of their legal challenge, the com-

panies began to announce dramatic technological ad-

vances and to drop their cost estimates to a fraction of

their prior levels.73 Polyvinyl chloride plastic today re-

mains strongly competitive with other plastics despite

compliance with the standard.”4

3. Comparing Health and Economic Interests

There is no acceptable way of reducing health effects

to dollars to allow comparison with the costs of controlling

exposure. Economists have proposed a number of

methodological approaches to such an evaluation.’5 But,

71 See Society of the Plastics Industry v. OSHA, 509 F.2d

1301 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421 U.S. 992 (1975).

72 Id.

73 Greek, Vinyl Chloride May Force Shortages by 1977, CHEM.

& ENGINEERING NEws, Aug. 11, 1975, at 8, 9. See also Goodrich

Cuts Cost of Meeting VCM Limits, CHEMICAL WEEK, Dec. 10,

1975, at 59.

74 PVC Rolls Out of Jeopardy, Into Jubilation, CHEMICAL

WEEK, Sept. 15, 1976, at 34.

75 The various methods were surveyed and criticized by the

Secretary in the preamble to his standard for coke oven emis-

sions, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,750-51. For a concise summary of methods

and problems, see also DECISION MAKING IN EPA, supra note 70,

at 228-34.

25

none of the techniques can evaluate the questions of

fairness which arise when the risks and benefits fall to

different people, nor can they adequately evaluate the

present value of preventing disease in the future.’6 In the

end, they founder on the most basic ethical tenets, whic

turn away from consciously placing a monetary value on

human life.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Occupational Safety and Healti: Act empowers

the Secretary of Labor to adopt highly protective stan-

dards in order to reduce the devastating toll of deaths,

illnesses, and injuries in American workplaces. The Act

places special emphasis on controlling exposure to chem-

icals that cause cancer and other fatal and disabling

diseases among employees. Section 6(b)(5) of the Act

directs the Secretary to set the standard for such a

substance

which most adequately assures, to the extent

feasible, on the basis of the best available evi-

dence, that no employee will suffer material

impairment of health or functional capacity even

if such employee has regular exposure to the

hazard ... for the period of his working life.7’

Congress recognized that with effects such as cancer,

the hazards of chemicals in the workplace can be identi-

fied well before their precise magnitude can be known.

Long latency periods, subtle cause-and-effect relation-

76 See generally Baram, Regulation of Health, Safety And

Environmental Quality And The Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis,

Final Report to the Administrative Conference of the United

States (1979); Fischhoff, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Art of

Motorcycle Maintenance, -Bopreesteeatyrsts-64eeGe_

77 29 U.S.C. §655(b) (5). @ Policy Sevewces 177 61472)

26

ships, and complex interactions preclude having reliable

quantitative data until long after the availability of re-

liable qualitative information, In the interim, because

employees’ lives and health are at stake, the Act per-

mits—indeed requires—the Secretary to take action to

prevent cancer, on the basis of such qualitative informa-

tion, the best evidence then available.

By directing the Secretary to act on the basis of the

best available evidence, the statute commits to him the

determination of when, if ever, scientific knowledge has

progressed sufficiently to allow reliable quantification. As

long as he may reasonably determine such techniques are

not yet reliable, the Act neither requires the Secretary to

postpone taking protective action, nor demands that he

undertake a sham quantitative analysis.

In this case, the Secretary has reasonably determined

that quantitative risk assessment techniques do not re-

liably indicate the size of the cancer hazard. Accordingly,

he concluded he must establish a standard for benzene, an

undisputed carcinogen, using his best judgment about

what is needed to protect employees, on the basis of the

best qualitative evidence. He has not chosen to act blind-

folded; rather, he has determined that quantitative risk

assessment will not improve his vision.

Although the health of employees is the Secretary’s

paramount concern, Congress also recognized the need for

practical considerations in setting standards. Con-

sequently, the Act required the Secretary to set “feasible”

standards. There is, however, nothing to support and

much to refute the notion that the feasibility require-

ment, or any other provision of the Act, imposes on the

Secretary the obligation to show through a quantitative

analysis that the benefits of a standard outweigh its costs.

Congress recognized the severe ethical and methodological

limitations of such quantitative cost-benefit analysis. Not

the least of these are the usual absence of reliable quan-

27

titative information about risks, and the absence of any

acceptable way to place a dollar figure on the value of a

life.

Despite the requirements and poiicies of the law, the

lower court held that the Secretary may not adopt a

standard to reduce the cancer hazard from benzene, unless

he performs a quantitative assessment of the risk reduc-

tion to be gained, and provides a quantitative cost-benefit

analysis demonstrating that these benefits bear a “rea-

sonable relationship” to the costs to employers of com-

plying with the standard.78

To reach its desired result, the court had to turn the

terms and legislative history of the Occupational Safety

and Health Act on their heads. Holding that “the best

available evidence” and related phrases require quan-

titative risk assessment, the court imposed on them mean-

ings exactly opposite to what their legislative history

indicates.7? Contrary to the court’s conclusion, these

phrases require preventive action while risks are still

debated, rather than block it.

Recognizing it could find no support for quantitative

cost-benefit, 1h *the term “feasible” or its legislative his-

tory, the court poured this meaning into an innocuous

provision—“reasonably necessary” in the definition of

standards—that Congress never contemplated would bear

on the issue. The court also constructed a faulty parallel

with the Consumer Product Safety Act.% The parallel

would be of no help even if real, since the authors of the

latter Act explicitly rejected quantitative cost-benefit

analysis.

78 American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 503

(5th Cir. 1978).

79 Td. at 504.

80 Jd. at 502-03.

28

In its zeal to require quantitative risk assessment and

cost-benefit analysis, the court bent the statutory

“substantial evidence” test for review into a barrier to

achievement of the Act’s protective policies. While the

court allowed that the Secretary’s decision was rational, it

held that without a quantitative risk assessment this was

not enough.*' To so read the substantial evidence test

would cancel the Secretary’s authority—clearly indicated

by the remainder of the Act—to act on the basis of

qualitative evidence when he reasonably determines that

it is the best available.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision conflicts with all other

cases reviewing the validity of standards promulgated

under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, from the

District of Columbia, Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits.

It would prevent the Secretary from effectively fulfilling

his statutory mandate to protect employees from

chemically -induced cancer and other killing and disabling

diseases. It would place requirements on the Secretary

that Congress did not impose, and that the Secretary

reasonably determined were inappropriate. For these rea-

sons, the decision should be reversed.

ARGUMENT

I. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

DOES NOT REQUIRE QUANTITATIVE JUSTIFICA-

TION FOR STANDARDS TO PROTECT EMPLOY -

EES FROM CANCER-CAUSING CHEMICALS

The Occupational Safety and Health Act particularly

emphasizes standards to protect employees from cancer

and other killing and disabling diseases caused by toxic

81 Jd. at 508.

29

chemicals and dusts in the workplace. Section 6(b)(5)

directs the Secretary to set the standard

which most adequately assures, to the extent

feasible, on the basis of the best available evi-

dence, that no employee will suffer material

impairment of health or functional capacity even

if such employee has regular exposure to the

hazard dealt with by such standard for the

period of his working life. Development of

standards under this subsection shall be based

upon research, demonstrations, experiments,

and such other information as may be appropri-

ate. In addition to the attainment of the highest

degree of health and safety protection for the

employee, other considerations shall be the latest

available scientific data in the field, the feasibi-

lity of the standards, and experience gained

under this and other health and safety laws.®2

Recognizing the long delays frequent between ex-

posure to carcinogens and illness, the subtle nature of

many cause-and-effect relationships, and the fact that

employees’ lives and health are at stake, Congress deter-

mined that a policy of minimizing exposure to these

substances as much as feasible was the only one consistent

with a prudent regard for public health. While obviously

it would be desirable if more exect quantitative data were

available on the risks of carcinogens and the costs of

controlling them, the Occupational Safety and Health Act

clearly reflects Congress’ conclusion that the protection of

public health from cancer-causing substances should not

await the development of techniques needed to provide it.

In effect, the Act represents a judgment that the potential

human and economic costs to our nation of providing too

little protection from this dread disease are too high to

warrant awaiting more precise information, even though

82 29 U.S.C. §655(b) (5).

30

the standards the Secretary adopts may entail substantial

expense, require technological innovation, or even cause

significant economic change within an mdustry.

The lower court has proposed an entirely different

approach from the precautionary one Congress adopted.

It would prohibit the Secretary from adopting standards

to protect employees from carcinogenic substances until

he provided quantitative estimates of the reduction in

risks associated with the proposed standard, and a quan-

titative analysis showing that the benefits outweighed the

costs. This position, contrary to the understanding of all

four of the other Courts of Appeal that have reviewed the

validity of standards adopted under the Act, is as unwise a

public health policy as it is contrary to the intention of the

legislators who wrote the Act.

In attempting to justify its proclivity for quan-

tification, the lower court could offer nothing more than a

“But see” citation to the contrary decisions of the other

circuits8? and a lame assertion that the issues in those

essentially identical cases were somehow different.® Sim-

ilarly, it was forced to turn the Occupational Safety and

Health Act inside out, disregarding the plain meaning

and legislators’ understanding of the terms Congress

chose to address the proper manner cf evaluating health

evidence and the role of economic factors in standard-

setting, while pouring its own notions of the role of costs

and risk assessment into terms not meant to contain

them.

At some point in the future, techniques for quan-

tifying the magnitude of risks from workplace carcino-

gens and comparing the costs and benefits of alternative

standards may be developed which are capable of increas-

83 American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 504

(5th Cir. 1978).

84 Jd. at 505.

31

ing the precision of occupational safety and health stan-

dards. But to this point Congress has not been persuaded,

and the lower court has no power to substitute its own

conclusions for those of the legislature.

A. Conditioning Standards on Quantitative Assessments

of Risk Conflicts with the Congress’ Desire to Prevent

Disease Before It Develops.

Since cancer is a disease that resists a cure, pre-

venting it is one of the most basic purposes of the

Occupational Safety and Health Act. Thus the Act em-

powers—indeed requires—the Secretary to prevent ex-

posure to carcinogens before they take their toll in human

life. Since cancer is a disease that develops only after a

long latency period and one whose mechanisms are not

precisely known, prevention necessarily requires acting

before all the data are available to assess precisely the

magnitude of the risk. All too often, definite proof that a

substance causes cancer, let alone evidence to assess the

magnitude of its potency, can be found only after

unacceptable damage to public health has already oc-

curred—after some people have already contracted killing

or disabling disease and many more have been irreversibly

exposed.

It is abundantly clear in the Congressional debates

accompanying the passage of the Occupational Safety and

Health Act that Congress understood the import of these

considerations and intended that action should occur

without waiting until the numerical toll could be assessed.

1. The Primacy of the Goal of Preventing

Occupationally-Caused Disease

The legislators who wrote the Occupational Safety

and Health Act repeatedly stressed the seriousness of the

problem of occupationally-induced disease, and their

conclusion that rapid preventive action was both required

and practical. Section 6(b)(5) reflects this urgency

32

throughout, requiring that each standard “most ade-

quately assure|[ |,” to the degree feasible, “that no employ-

ee will suffer material impairment of health or functional

capacity,” even after life-long exposure.® It requires the

Secretary to seek “the highest degree of health and safety

protection for the employee.”%6

Moreover, the statute directs the Secretary to act on

“the best available evidence” and “the latest~Sctehtific

data in the field.’’®? By these phrases, the House Report

said, the legislators intended the Secretary to take pre-

ventive action promptly without waiting until the evi-

dence necessary to determine the precise magnitude of

the threat eventually becomes available: “The Committee

feels it is vital that when the Secretary sets an

occupational health standard he does so on the basis of the

best available professional evidence; it is not intended that

the Secretary be paralyzed by debate surrounding diverse

medical opinions.’’®8 By contrast, not a single Senator or

Representative even suggested an intent to require quan-

titative assessment of the risks before the Secretary

acted.

The legislative history of the Act shows that Congress

clearly. recognized the killing and disabling properties of a

growing number of chemicals and dusts once thought to

be safe, and the problems of latency and statistical sub-

tlety that impede early discovery of the magnitude of

risks.8° These factors added urgency to taking protective,

85 29 U.S.C. §655(b) (5).

86 Jd. The references to “employee” in the singular empha-

size the goal of protecting all employees, even those more

sensitive than average. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15 at 18.

87 29 U.S.C. §655(b) (5).

88 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 18 (emphasis added).

89 See e.g., Statement of Senator Saxbe, reprinted in SuB-

COMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC

WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 338-39 (1971) [hereinafter cited as

LEG. HIST. }.

33

preventive action as soon as a substance’s dangers are

identified, without waiting for years until the precise

contours of the danger are fully researched.

The Senate Report on the bill emphasized the growing

pattern of discovering life-threatening dangers even in

familiar substances, as well as in the new chemicals of the

post World War II period:

[| M jaterials long in industrial use are only now

being discovered to have toxic effects. In addi-

tion, technological advances and new processes

in American industry have brought numerous

new hazards to the workplace. Carcinogenic

chemicals, lasers, ultrasonic energy, beryllium

metal, epoxy resins, pesticides, among others, all

present incipient threats to the health of work-

ers. Indeed, new materials and processes are

being introduced into industry at a much faster

rate than the present meager resources of

occupational health can keep up with. It is

estimated that every 20 minutes a new and

potentially toxic chemical is introduced into in-

dustry. New processes and new sources of

energy present occupational health problems of

unprecedented complexity.”

The Report took especially seriously the developing edge

of scientific knowledge on occupationally-induced disease:

Recent scientific knowledge points to hitherto

unsuspected cause-and-effect relationships be-

tween occupational exposures and many of the

so-called chronic diseases—cancer, respiratory

ailments, allergies, heart disease, and others. In

some instances, the relationship appears to be

90 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.

34

direct: asbestos, ionizing radiation, chromates,

and certain dye intermediaries, among others,

are directly involved in the genesis of cancer. In

other cases, occupational exposures are impli-

cated as contributory factors. The distinction

between occupational and non-occupational ill-

nesses is growing increasingly difficult to de-

fine.9"

In addition, the Report observed that “the modern worker

encounters health hazards involving complex, often

synergistic interactions of numerous physical and chem-

ical agents. . . .’’92

The Committee cited the need to set standards forth-

with to protect employees from the chemicals, metals, and

dusts named above, as well as “ancient” poisons such as

lead and mercury. The Committee did not consider

quantification of the risk a precondition to regulation;

employee protection from identified killers should not be

postponed solely because their precise potency was uncer-

tain.9%

The House Report reiterated the same themes. It

cited the dangers of these same chemicals and the rapidly

growing knowledge of new dangers. Moreover, the Com-

mittee stated:

|WlJorkers are in daily contact with literally

hundreds of new chemicals and formulations

about which little is known. As occupational

health research becomes more _ sophisticated,

there is every indication that the toxicity of the

fumes, gases, and chemicals to which workers are

exposed will be discovered by researchers.%

91 Jd.

92 Jd. at 19.

93 Jd. at 2-4.

94 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 14-15.

% Jd. at 19.

35

As stated above, the House Committee emphasized that in

setting standards for toxic substances, the Secretary must

not be “paralyzed” by scientific uncertainties and differ-

ences of opinion.%* He must resolve the uncertainties in

favor of protecting the employees.

2. Judicial Recognition of the Primacy of Pre-

venting Disease

Except for the Fifth Circuit, the Courts of Appeals

that have reviewed OSHA standards for carcinogens have

all correctly emphasized the law’s requirement to take a

precautionary, preventive view of the evidence of health

harm. They have repeatedly upheld the Secretary’s au-

thority to set standards on the basis of qualitative evi-

dence that identifies a substance as a carcinogen. Only the

Fifth Circuit has sought to make quantifying the magni-

tude of risk a necessary prerequisite to protective action.

In Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,%’ the

District of Columbia Circuit upheld the standard for

asbestos. The Secretary’s knowledge of the effects of

asbestos precisely paralleled his knowledge about benzene

in the case under review here: he had firm evidence that

asbestos ‘ai a carcinogen, although the precise effects of

particular doses was not known. The court observed that

the statute required the Secretary to base standards upon

conclusions drawn from well-established data and from

information “on the frontiers of scientific knowledge.”%

The court concluded:

[I]n this case the evidence indicated that reliable

data is not currently available with respect to the

precisely predictable health effects of various levels

of exposure to asbestos dust; nevertheless, the Sec-

96 Jd. at 18.

97 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

98 Jd. at 474.

36

retary was obligated to establish some specific level

as the maximum permissible exposure. After con-

sidering all the conflicting evidence, the Secre-

tary explained his decision to adopt, over strong

employer objection, a relatively low limit in

terms of the severe health consequences which

could result from over-exposure. Jnasmuch as the

protection of the health of employees is the over-

riding concern of [the Act], this choice is doubtless

sound. .. .99

The Second Circuit faced the identical issue reviewing

the standard for viny! chloride. This chemical had been

shown to cause cancer in workers exposed to relatively

high doses (around 200 parts per million) and in animals

at lower doses (down to 50 ppm). In Society of the Plastics

Industry v. OSHA,’ the court rejected the claim that the

Secretary could not reduce exposures to one ppm without

evidence of human harm down to that level. The court

acknowledged that “though the factual finger points, it

does not conclude.” 'o' Nonetheless, ‘‘Under the command

of [the Act], it remains the duty of the Secretary to act to

protect the workingman, and to act even in circumstances

where existing methodology or research is deficient.” '°2

The Third Circuit upheld the Secretary’s standard for

ethyleneimine, another carcinogen, in Synthetic Organic

Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Brennan,‘ on the basis

of two animal studies and the judgment of committees of

cancer experts that current knowledge showed no level of

exposure to a carcinogen can'€onsidered completely safe. 194

The court found no requirement that the Secretary be able

99 Jd. at 475 (emphasis added).

100 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992

(1975).

101 Jd. at 1308.

102 Jd.

103 503 F.2d 1155 (3rd Cir. 1974).

104 Jd. at 1157-61.

37

to quantify the risk. And in American Iron & Steel

Institute v. OSHA,‘ the court held that the Secretary had

ample evidence, from epidemiological studies of coke oven

workers and expert opinion on the issue of safe doses for

carcinogens, to conclude that coke oven emissions were

carcinogenic and no level of exposure could be considered

risk - free, 106

The lower court decision is starkly inconsistent with

those of its sister circuits. These courts have correctly

perceived that statutory phrases such as “the best avail-

able evidence”'°7 permit—even require—the Secretary to

take protective action when he discovers that a substan:e

is a carcinogen, without waiting for the development of

the capability to quantify the magnitude of the threat to

life. Yet the Fifth Circuit turned these phrases on their

heads, interpreting them to block preventive action. 10

This reading ignores their plain meaning and the legisla-

tive history indicating that the very purpose of such

105 577 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1978).

106 Jd. at 831-32.

'07 Oce. Safety & Health Act § 6(b), 29 U.S.C. §655(b) (5).

‘08 American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 504

(5th Cir. 1978). Besides “the best available evidence” and “the

latest scientific data in the field,” the court pointed to two other

phrases in section 6(b)(5): “research, demonstrations, ex-

periments, and such other information as may be appropriate,”

and “experience gained under other health and safety laws.” If

the last phrase indicates anything at all, it cuts against the

lower court, for the weight of experience under other laws

upholds the validity of the Secretary’s approach to carcinogen

regulation. See e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, —

F.2d —, 8 ELR 20765 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (toxic water pollutants);

Certified Color Mfrs. Ass’n v. Mathews, 543 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir.

1976) (food color additives); Environmental Defense Fund v.

EPA, 510 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (pesticides). As for

“research ...and such other information as may be appropri-

ate,” this phrase most fairly read envisions the use of just such

epidemiological studies as the ones on which the Secretary

relied.

38

phrases was to permit the Secretary to act to protect

employees from known dangers without being “paral-

yzed” by the lack of scientific certainty on the extent of

the hazard.'°9 Yet rather than address the inconsistency of

its position with the law and the other circuits, the court

lamely refused even to discuss the contrary cases.'1°

In sum, the Act and the legislative history empower

the Secretary not only to find facts about chemicals’

toxicity, but also to make judgments where necessary to

resolve scientific unknowns. The power to make such

judgments is a necessary consequence of the Act’s man-

date that the Secretary set standards for chemicals iden-

tified as carcinogens. To be sure, the Secretary cannot

regulate every existing substance simply because it might

be harmful; he must have a firm basis for identifying a

substance as dangerous, such as epidemiological or animal

studies. But where qualitative identification of risk is best

that can be done, Congress did not pose an impossible

barrier to regulation.

Shortly after the decision in this case, the District of

Columbia Circuit upheld toxic water pollutant standards

for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), which have pro-

duced cancer in laboratory animals. The court stated that

when faced with claims of substantial economic impact,

the temptation to demand that the agency fur-

nish conclusive proof of carcinogenicity as sup-

port for the regulations is great. However, the

decision to delegate authority to an agency to

control suspected carcinogens is a legislative

judgment that is not open to question in this

court. Congress’ direction to EPA to protect

against incompletely understood dangers could

not be carried out if we were to adopt the proof

requirements advocated by industry petitioners.

109 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 18.

110 American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 4938, 505

(5th Cir. 1978).

39

What scientists know about the causes of

cancer is how limited is their knowledge. The

record in this case demonstrates that it may take

decades for human exposure to carcinogens to

result in cancer; in the meantime, the case for

inferring a cancer danger with respect to an

incompletely understood substance is vigorously

disputed. If regulation were withheld until the

danger was demonstrated conclusively, untold

injury to public health could result.'"'

The Fifth Circuit has succumbed to this temptation and

substituted its judgment for that of Congress.

B. The Requirement that Standards be Feasible Does Not

Mandate a Quantitative Demonstration that their

Benefits Exceed Their Costs.

While the purpose of the Occupational Safety and

Health Act was to decrease drastically the incidence of

workplace-induced disease, its authors recognized that

practicality imposed limits on the achievement of this

goal. Thus in section 6(b)(5) they limited the measures

that the Secretary might require to reduce exposure to

cancer-causing substances to those that were “feasible.”

While the use of the term feasibility obviously implies that

the Secretary must consider the economic cost of proposed

regulations to employers when he adopts workplace ex-

posure standards for carcinogens, the legislative history

demonstrated that Congress did not intend the consid-

eration of economic costs to impede vigorous action to

prevent occupationally-induced disease. In short, while

recognizing that a wholly risk-free working environment

might not always be practical, the legislators did not

111 Environmental Defense Fund v. FPA, —F.2d—, —, 8

ELR 20765, 20780 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

40

contemplate an unrealistic quantitative demonstration

that the benefits of a proposed standard outweighed its

costs to industry.

1. The Legislative History Of The Term “Feasible”

Shows That Congress Intended Only A Limited

Role For Cost Considerations In Setting Stan-

dards

Section 6(b)(5) directs the Secretary to set standards

‘that prevent impairment of employees’ health “to the

extent feasible.”''2 The legislative history shows that all

congressional discussion of the role of economic consid-

erations in setting standards was structured around this

feasibility requirement. Nothing in this provision or its

legislative history can be construed as requiring quan-

titative cost-benefit analysis.

Tracing the meaning of the feasibility requirement

begins with the bill reported by the House Committee in

July 1970.1'3 This bill, the so-called Daniels bill, would have

established the employees’ right to standards providing

fully safe workplaces without any qualification:

The Secretary, in promulgating standards

under this subsection, shall set the standard

which most adequately assures, on the basis of

the best available professional evidence, that no

employee will suffer any impairment of health or

functional capacity, or diminished life ex-

pectancy, even if such employee has regular

exposure to the hazard dealt with by such stan-

dard for the period of his working life.''4

The Senate Committee, which reported a bill several

months later, added the feasibility requirement to the

112 29 U.S.C. §655(b) (5).

113 H.R. 16785, reprinted in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15,

at 1-14.

114 Jd. §7(a)(4).

41

Daniels formulation. As reported, Section 6(b)(5) at-

tained its nearly final form:

The Secretary, in promulgating standards

under this subsection, shall set the standard

which most adequately and feasibly assures, on

the basis of the best available evidence, that no

employee will suffer any impairment of health or

functional -capacity, or diminished life ex-

pectancy even if such employee has regular ex-

posure to the hazard dealt with by such standard

for the period of his working life. Development

of such standards shall be based on research,

demonstrations, experiments, and such other in-

formation as may be appropriate. In addition to

the attainment of the highest degree of health

and safety protection for the employee, other

considerations shall be the latest available scien-

tific data in the field, the feasibility of the stan-

dards, and experience gained under this and

other health and safety laws.''5

The feasibility requirement was added in committee

at the suggestion df Senator Javits, one of the principal

architects and managers: of the bill. He explained the

amendment in his individual views attached to the Re-

port:

As a result of this amendment the Secretary, in

setting standards, is expressly required to con-

sider feasibility of proposed standards. This is an

improvement in the Daniels bill, which might be

interpreted to require absolute health and safety

in all cases, regardless of feasibility, and the

Administration bill, which contains no criteria

for standards at all.''6

115. 2193 §6 (b)(5) (Oct. 5, 1970), reprinted in LEG. HIST.,

supra note 89, at 242 (emphasis added).

116 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 58.

42

The Senate Report reiterated that “standards promul-

gated under section 6(b) shall represent feasible require-

ments. .. .”"1'7

The comments of Senator Javits in the Committee

Report,''® and a colloquy on the Floor between Senators

Williams and Dominick over the final fine-tuning amend-

ment to section 6(b)(5),''9 show that Congress recognized

completely risk-free workplaces might not always be

possible to achieve. The feasibility limit was intended to

free the Secretary from the duty to set absolutely safe

standards in those situations. Congress also recognized

that it would not make sense to protect employees by

eliminating their jobs in a wholesale manner. But these

legislators’ statements, and many others in the Senate

and House Reports and floor debates, also underscore that

the standards must drastically reduce the intolerably high

rates of work-related deaths, illnesses, and injuries. '20

Congress recognized that sometimes adequate protection

17 Jd. at 7.

18 Jd. at 58.

9 Amendment No. 1058, reprinted in LEG. HIST., supra

note 89, at 502-03 (colloquy between Senators Williams and

Dominick). In his original remarks on this subject, Senator

Dominick missed the point of Senator Javits’ feasibility amend-

ment in committee, which was to relieve the Secretary of the

obligation to set standards guaranteeing complete safety in all

cases. /d. at 480-82 (remarks of Senator Dominick.) But after

changing the Committee’s “most adequately and feasibly as-

sures” to the final version’s “most adequately assures, to the

extent feasible,” (thereby expressing feasibility syntactically as

a limitation but not changing meaning), Senators Dominick,

Javits, and Williams came to full accord. Jd. at 502-03.

120 See e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, 2-4; HOUSE

REPORT, supra note 15, at 14-16. See also, LEG. HIST., supra note

89, at 411-14 (remarks of Sen. Williams), 509-11 (remarks of

Sen. Yarborough), 512-13 (remarks of Sen. Muskie), 518 (re-

marks of Sen. Nelson), 522 (remarks of Sen. Cranston), 985

(remarks of Rep. Perkins), 1212 (remarks of Rep. Daniels).

43

would entail substantial expense and sometimes would

even result in closing some businesses.'2) As Senator

Eagleton stated, the costs of assuring such protection

must be borne as “necessary costs of doing business.” He

added: “| W Je can no longer permit profits to be depend-

ent upon an unsafe or unhealthy worksite.’’'22

_ The legislative history contains not a single statement

by any member of the House or Senate suggesting that

decisions should be reached through quantitative cost-

benefit analysis. Indeed, the legislative history reveals a

strong hostility to this approach, particularly to the idea

of putting a dollar price on human life. As Senator

Yarborough, then chairman of the full committee that

reported the bill, stated: “We are talking about people’s

lives, not the indifference of some cost accountants.’’'23

2. Prior Cases Have Concluded That Costs Are To

Be Accorded a Limited Role in Setting Stan-

dards

The cases reviewing standards prior to American

Petroleum Institute were unanimous that the requirement

that standards be feasible is the limit of economic concern

in the Act. The District of Columbia, Second, and Third

Circuits all upheld the Secretary’s “lowest feasible level”

approach to setting standards for carcinogens. In addi-

tion, the Third and Eighth Circuits specifically rejected

claims that the Act requires quantitative cost-benefit

analysis.

121 Both the Senate and House Committees contemplated

that some substances were simply too dangerous to remain in

use. See discussion of betanapthylamine, a very potent carcino-

gen, SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4; HOUSE REPORT, supra

note 15, at 15. See also the statement by Senator Saxbe: “It is a

real question to me as to whether asbestos can be used at all,

whether it can be handled,” reprinted in LEG. HIST., supra note

89, at 338. ;

122 LEG. HIST. at 1150-51 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton).

123 Jd. at 510 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough).

44

In Jndustrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,'24

reviewing the asbestos standard, the District of Columbia

Circuit stated: “There can be no question that [the Act]

represents a decision to require safeguards for the health

of employees even if such measures substantially increase

production costs.’’'25 The court recognized that feasibility

imposed a practical limit on standards. Citing Senator

Javits’ comments in the Committee Report, the court

stated:

The thrust of these remarks would seem to be

that practical considerations can temper protec-

tive requirements. Congress does not appear to

have intended to protect employees by putting

their employers out of business—either by

requiring protective devices unavailable under

existing technology or by making financial via-

bility generally impossible. '26

On the other hand, short of this drastic result the costs of

employee protection must be borne. When lives are at

stake, standards cannot be restricted to the lowest com-

mon denominator that the most recalcitrant employer will

eee, Accept;

Standards may be economically feasible even

though, from the standpoint of employers, they

are financially burdensome and affect profit

margins adversely. Nor does the concept of

economic feasibility necessarily guarantee the

continued existence of individual employers. It

would appear to be consistent with the purposes

of the Act to envisage the economic demise of an

employer who has lagged behind the rest of the

124 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

125 Id. at 477.

126 Id. at 477-78.

45

industry and is consequently financially unable

to comply with new standards as quickly as other

employers. '27

The court opined that extreme burdensomeness might be

reason for phasing requirements in over some lead time. '28

But it did not suggest even extremely burdensome stan-

dards could never be imposed. Moreover, the court em-

phasized that the Act did not permit the Secretary to

delay standards “needlessly.’’'29

In Society of the Plastics Industry v. OSHA,’ review-

ing the standard for another carcinogen, viny! chloride,

the Second Circuit, Justice Clark writing, articulated the

technology -forcing character of the Act:

In the area of safety, we wish to emphasize, the

Secretary is not restricted by the status quo. He

may raise standards which require the devel-

opment of new technology, and he is not limited

to issuing standards based solely on devices al-

ready fully developed. '3'

In AFL-CIO v. Brennan,'32 the Third Circuit agreed

that standards may require technological innovation and

may alter the economic status quo. The court stated that

although standards must be feasible,

we agree with the Second Circuit in Society of

Plastics ... that, at least to a limited extent, [the

Act] is to be viewed as a technology-forcing

piece of legislation. Thus the Secretary would

127 Jd. at 478 (footnote omitted).

128 Jd.

129 Jd. at 479.

130 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421 U.S. 992

(1975).

131 Id. at 1309.

132 530 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1975).

46

not be justified in dismissing an alternative toa

proposed health and safety standard as in-

feasible when the necessary technology looms on

today’s horizon. '33

The Third Circuit also held that imposing substantial costs

on industry was contemplated within the notion of

feasibility. It held that standards need not be limited to

the lowest common denominator that ali employers in an

industry will accept: “Congress did contemplate that the

Secretary’s rulemaking would put out of business some

businesses so marginally efficient or productive as to be

unable to follow standards otherwise universally feas-

ible.”’'34 Moreover, the court suggested that some work was

too dangerous to be permitted, especially if economic

consequences of doing without such activities were rela-

tively mild:

We do not question that there are industrial

activities involving hazards so great and of such

little social utility that the Secretary would be

justified in concluding that their total prohibi-

tion is proper if there is no technologically fea-

sible method of eliminating the operational haz-

ard, 135

In American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA,'36 the

Third Circuit reiterated this approach, upholding the

feasibility of the standard to control carcinogenic coke

oven emissions. The court held that the Act permitted the

Secretary to base the standard on the performance of the

best plant in operation and on improvements that could be

reasonably forecast in its performances, by using addi-

tional technology in use elsewhere or “looming on today’s

133 Jd. at 121 (citation and footnote omitted).

134 Jd. at 123 (footnote omitted).

135 Jd. at 121.

196 577 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1978).

47

horizon.’’'37 The court upheld the Secretary’s conclusion

that the cancer hazard warranted the cost of the stan-

dard, which the employers admitted they could bear with-

out significant disruption.'%* Moreover, the court approved

the Secretary’s rejection of quantitative cost-benefit

analysis. '39

The Eighth Circuit also explicitly rejected quan-

titative cost-benefit ahalysis in Arkansas-Best Freight

Systems v. Occ. Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n.\4o The court

quoted with approval the discuss‘on of feasibility in J/n-

dustrial Union Dep't and added: “The Act does not

attempt to balance as neatly as does Arkansas- Best the

costs of compliance against the cost of employees’ in-

juries.”’"41 The court ‘held that the standard there in

question was within the Secretary’s legislative grant of

power “to protect the health of employees even though

increased production costs may result.’’'42

These four courts found nothing in the statute’s

notion of feasibility or any other provision of the Act to

require quantitative risk assessment or cost-benefit ana-

lysis. In this regard they stand in stark contrast to the

decision here under review. In this case the Fifth Circuit

did not even dispute the other courts’ understanding of

the notion of feasibility. Recognizing the hopelessness of

finding support for its quantitative requirements in this

term, the court merely brushed it away. In an act of pure

judicial legislation the court poured its quantitative

requirements into the unwilling vessel of the phrase

“reasonably necessary” in section 3(8). But this provision

offers the court no support either.

197 Id. at 833-35.

138 Jd. at 836-37.

139 Jd. at 836.

140 §29 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1976).

141 Td, at 654.

142 Jd. at 653.

48

C. The Lower Court Erred In Holding That Quantitative

Cost-Benefit Analysis Is Mandated by the Requirement

that Standards Be “Reasonably Necessary.”

Section 3(8)'43 supplies no additional requirements

regarding the role of economic considerations in setting

standards. Instead, it merely means that the measures the

Secretary includes in a standard must be rationally con-

ris to alleviating the hazard at which the standard is

aimed.

1. The Legislative History Shows That “Reason-

ably Necessary” Has No Bearing On The Role

Of Cost Considerations

In contrast to the extensive legislative history on the

feasibility requirement, section 3(8) received absolutely

no discussion. It was an innocuous, uncontroversial provi-

sion common to every bill introduced on occupational

safety and health in the 91st Congress.'44 Some of these

bills differed substantially on the role of economic consid-

erations. Yet all bills defined standards the same way.

Thus the legislators could not have understood this provi-

sion to bear at all on this issue, let alone to create a

quantitative cost-benefit analysis requirement.

The comments of Senator Javits, one of the legislators

most concerned to assure that the Secretary would consid-

er economic aspects of standards, make this clear. Despite

the fact that all bills contained the “reasonably necessary”

provision, Javits stated that without the feasibility

amendment the Daniels bill “might be interpreted to

require absolute health and safety in all cases,” and the

143 29 U.S.C. §652(8).

144 Each bill introduced into the 91st Congress defined

occupational safety and health standards as requirements either

reasonably necessary” or “reasonably necessary or appropri-

ate” to provide safe or healthful employment and places of

employment. See the bills collected in LEG. HIST., supra note 89.

49

Administration bill would “contain{ | no criteria for stan-

dards at all.”'45 If he had attached any importance to

section 3(8), Javits could not have reached this conclusion.

2. “Reasonably Necessary” Merely Requires A

Rational Connection Between The Means And

Objectives of Standards

Section 3(8) has a far more natural meaning than the

lower court wished to force upon it. By defining standards

as measures “reasonably necessary or appropriate’ to

provide safe or healthful workplaces, this provision merely

requires the Secretary to show that measures have a

rational connection to reducing the hazard at which the

standard is aimed. Thus, it prohibits the Secretary from

imposing patently unnecessary or irrelevant require-

ments, such as fire-fighting equipment for dealing with a

non-flammable substance. There can be no serious con-

tention that this lenient test of relevance requires the

Secretary to quantify cancer risk. This conclusion would

negate the precautionary approach so clearly indicated by

the remainder of the statute and its legislative history.

D. The Consumer Product Safety Act Does Not Support

The Lower Court’s Construction Of The ‘ -cupational

Safety and Health Act.

Unable to find any support for quantitative cost-

benefit analysis in the Occupational Safety and Health

Act or its legislative history, the court turned to a com-

pletely independent statute adopted two years later. The

court asserted that section 3(8) is identical to certain

provisions in the Consumer Product Safety Act,'4® which

the court further asserted require quantitative cost-

benefit analysis. Neither assertion is correct.

145 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 58.

14615 U.S.C. §§2051-2081.

50

1. The Two Acts Are Not Parallel

Section 3(8) of the Occupational Safety And Health

Act defines standards as measures “reasonable necessary

or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employ-

ment.’’'47 Sections 7(a) and 9(c)(2)(A) of the Consumer

Product Safety Act (CPSA) limit standards under that

Act to requirements “reasonably necessary to eliminate or

reduce an unreasonable risk of injury”.48 Comparing

these provisions, the court stated: ‘We decline to construe

the precisely similar requirements of these two Acts

differently or to read words out of the OSHA legisla-

tion.’’'49 In fact, the provisions are not “precisely similar,”

and the court has read words into the Occupational Safety

and Health Act.

The court failed to comprehend that “unreasonable

risk,” not “reasonably necessary,” is the phrase which

establishes the obligation to consider costs in the CPSA.

This is clearly evident in the CPSA legislative history. 15°

The phrase “unreasonable risk” is pointedly absent from

the Occupational Safety and Health Act. So rather than

read “reasonably necessary” out of the Act, the court has

read “unreasonable risk” in.

2. The Consumer Product Safety Act Does Not

Require Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis

Even if the CPSA were parallel to the Occupational

Safety and Health Act, it would provide the lower court no

support, because the CPSA does not require quantitative

cost-benefit analysis. The House Report on this statute

specifically rejected cost-benefit analysis as an element of

147 29 U.S.C. §652(8).

14815 U.S.C. §§2056(a), 2058(c)(2)(A).

‘49 American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 502

(5th Cir. 1978).

150 See H.R. REP. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1972)

(House Report on Consumer Product Safety Act).

51

determining “unreasonable risk.” The committee made

clear that the Commission must consider the traditional

elements of the tort law reasonableness test: the probabi-

lity and gravity of harm and the effect of regulation on

the product’s utility, cost, or availability.'5' The committee

then added the following explicit caveat: “There should be

no implication, however, that in arriving at its determi-

nation the Commission would be required to conduct and

complete a cost-benefit analysis prior to promulgating

standards under this Act.’’'52 Thus, even in enacting

“unreasonable risk” statutes Congress recognizes that

formal, quantitative techniques are not adequate to the

decision-making task.

The rejection of quantitative cost-benefit analysis for

determining “unreasonable risk” is by no means an anom-

aly of the CPSA. For example, Congress reached the same

conclusion in enacting the Toxic Substances Control Act'59

in 1976. The House Report stated:

During the hearings a number of witnesses rec-

ommended that the bill include a definition of

unreasonable risk. Because the determination of

unreasonable risk involves a consideration of

probability, severity, and similar factors which

cannot be defined in precise terms and is not a

factual determination but requires an exercise of

judgment on the part of the person making it, the

Committee did not attempt a definition of such

risk. In general, a determination that a risk

associated with a chemical substance or mixture

is unreasonable involves balancing the probabi-

lity that harm will occur and the magnitude and

severity of that harm against the effect of pro-

151 Jd.

152 Jd.

163 15 U.S.C. §§2601-2629.

52

posed regulatory action on the availability to

society of the benefits of the substance or mix-

ture, taking into account the availability of

substitutes...and other adverse effects which

such proposed action may have on society.

The balancing process described above does

not require a formal benefit-cost analysis under

which a monetary value is assigned to the risks

associated with the substance and to the cost to

society of proposed regulatory action on the avail-

ability of such benefits. Because a monetary value

often cannot be assigned to a benefit or cost, such

an analysis would not be very useful.'54

The fact that these “unreasonable risk” statutes ex-

plicitly reject quantitative cost-benefit analysis makes the

lower court’s attempt to use them to shoehorn quan-

titative analysis into the Occupational Safety and Health

Act even less plausible.

II. THE SECRETARY ACTED WELL WITHIN HIS

DELEGATED AUTHORITY IN DECLINING TO

ADOPT QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

The Occupational Safety and Health Act establishes

the basic criteria for standards for toxic substances: the

'54H.R. REP. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1976)

(footnote omitted, emphasis added), The footnote quoted from

an influential study on chemical regulation and decision mak-

ing:

Highly formalized methods of benefit-cost analysis can

seldom be used for making decisions about regulating

chemicals in the environment. Thus the development of

such methods should not have high priority.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DECISION MAKING For REGU-

LATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 44 (1975) (emphasis in

original).

53

goal of no impairment of health, the duty to take pre-

ventive action on the basis of the best available evidence,

and the constraint of feasibility.‘55 But within the bounds

of these criteria, the Act delegates to the Secretary

substantial responsibilities to determine which substances

shall be covered by standards and what requirements such

standards shall contain.

In this case, the Secretary determined from repeated

epidemiological studies that benzene causes leukemia in

humans. He also concluded that there was very little

margin, if any at all, between the benzene levels at which

the chemical had already been shown to induce leukemia

in humans and the existing 10 parts per million (ppm)

standard, which had been developed years before and was

aimed only at benzene’s non- malignant effects.

Relying on the best expertise among cancer scientists,

the Secretary determined that a safe level of human

exposure to a carcinogen cannot be demonstrated, and

that the size of the cancer risk at particular doses cannot

now be established with any useful precision. He con-

cluded, however, that a 90 percent reduction in exposure

would significantly reduce employees’ risks, and that such

a reduction was feasible. Consequently, he set the new

standard at one ppm.

The Secretary’s decision was well within the statutory

criteria that bound his delegated authority. His determi-

nations were supported by both the best available scien-

tific evidence and expertise. The basis for each of his

judgments was well represented in the record of the

decision.

In cases with essentially identical issues and records,

the three other Courts of Appeals to review the Secre-

tary’s carcinogen standards have respected the Secre-

165 Occ. Safety & Health Act §6(b)(5); 29 U.S.C.

§ 655(b) (5).

54

tary’s expertise and his mandate and upheld his deci-

sions.'5¢ On the issue of quantifying risk, they have re-

spected his expert judgment that the quantitative tech-

niques are not sufficiently precise or reliable to be useful in

determining standards. In fact, these courts have recog-

nized that the Secretary would exceed his authority if he

delayed acting until cancer risks could be reliably quan-

tified, since the statute mandates standards to protect

employees from life-threatening hazards on the basis of

qualitative evidence when that is the best available.

The lower court in this case, however, held that unless

the Secretary showed quantitatively the amount by which

the new benzene standard would reduce the employees’

cancer hazard, his decision could not be supported by

substantial evidence.'5? With this holding, the lower court

simply substituted its judgment for the Secretary’s on the

question whether benzene’s cancer risk at particular doses

can be reliably quantified. But the decision whether these

techniques are sufficiently reliable that they constitute an

appropriate basis for determining permissible exposure

levels to carcinogens is a judgment committed to the

Secretary, to which, if adequately supported and rational,

the courts must defer. The lower court’s drastic over-

estimation of the accuracy and reliability of the tech-

niques for quantifying risk classicly illustrates the dan-

gers of appellate judges’ venturing into areas requiring

detailed knowledge of a highly complex body of scientific

study and thought.

'86 Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d

467 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Society of the Plastics Industry v. OSHA,

509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421 U.S. 992 (1975):

Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d

1155 (8rd Cir. 1974); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577

F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1978).

'S? American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 503

(5th Cir. 1978).

55

A. The Substantial Evidence Test Does Not Permit The

Court To Substitute Its Judgment For The Secretary’s

On The Reliability Of Quantitative Risk Assessments

1. Standard Setting Under The Occupational Safe -

ty And Health Act Involves A Mixture Of Fact-

Finding And Policy-Making

The Secretary’s determination in setting standards

for carcinogens under section 6(b) (5) consist of both fact-

finding and policy-making. He begins with a core of well-

established facts about a chemical’s toxicity. In this

instance, epidemiological studies establish firmly that

benzene causes leukemia. But his inquiry does not end

with traditional fact-finding, because the solid facts do

not supply the complete picture. The Act mandates that

the Secretary take preventive action on the best available

evidence.'5® This means that he must take into aammEh

consideration the qualitative but not completely precise

evidence of harm, and, relying on the best scientific

expertise, resolve the uncertainties as to the magnitude of

the cancer risk in the manner that most protects employ -

ees’ health.

These determinations to resolve scientific uncer-

tainties are essentially policy judgments. The power to

make these policy judgments is a necessary consequence of

the Act’s mandate to protect employees from identified

hazards on the basis of the best available evidence. Re-

stricted to traditional fact-finding, the Secretary would

only be able to protect workers from the doses of carcino-

gens that already have been shown to kill,. despite the

strong but not completely certain belief that lower doses

are dangerous too. The Secretary necessarily must have

the most discretion to make such protective policy judg-

158QOcc. Safety & Health Act §6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C.

§ 655(b) (5).

56

ments with regard to the most serious health effects, such

as cancer, and in situations where difficulties in precisely

pinning down the risks are greatest. 159

The determinations that safe doses of carcinogens

cannot be identified, that lower doses are safer than

higher ones, and that risks cannot be reliably quantified

are mixed conclusions of fact and policy. They have a firm

base in observed facts, supplemented by scientific theory

of the processes of cancer. Ultimately, however, they rest

on the judgments guided by the policy of the Act to

resolve doubts about safety in the employees’ behalf.

2. The Substantial Evidence Test Does Not Prohi-

bit The Secretary From Making Policy Judg-

ments

The Occupational Safety and Health Act provides for

basically informal rulemaking of the kind traditionally

associated with policy-setting. Section 6(b) provides for

notice-and-comment procedures, supplemented with an

opportunity for a public hearing.‘ Section 6(e) requires

the Secretary to accompany standards with a statement of

reasons!®'

This statute was one of the first to combine informal

rulemaking with the substantial evidence test for judicial

review, which is specified by section 6(f).'62 Interpreting

159 The feasibility limitation does not detract from the duty

to take a precautionary view of the evidence. Rather, the

Secretary must take feasibility considerations into account only

after appraising the risk, on the basis of the best available

evidence. One must keep distinct the process of determining

what risk exists from the process of determining what risk will

be tolerated.

160 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1)-(4).

161 Jd. § 655(e).

162 Jd. § 655(f).

57

this “anomalous combination,”'®: the courts reviewing

standards set under section 6(b) (5), with the exception of

the Fifth Circuit, have correctly perceived their role as

having a dual aspect. With respect to factual issues, they

must assure that the Secretary’s determinations are sup-

ported by substantial evidence. But they have understood

that the test cannot be interpreted to bar the Secretary

from making policy judgments that the provision of

informal rulemaking and the substantive mandates of the

Act so clearly indicate he must make. Consequently, with

respect to issues ‘on the frontiers of scientific know-

ledge,”’'®* these courts have recognized that the Secre-

tary’s duty is to explain the reasoning he uses to resolve

uncertainties and to show that this reasoning is consistent

with the protective policies of the Act. The essential task

of the courts as to these issues is to assure that the

Secretary acted rationally.

The District of Columbia Circuit, Judge McGowan

writing, appropriately stated the Secretary’s task and the

court’s role in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodg-

son. 165

From extensive and often conflicting evidence,

the Secretary in this case made numerous factual

determinations. With respect to some of those

questions, the evidence was such that the task

consisted primarily of evaluating the data and

drawing conclusions from it. The court can

review that data in the record and determine

whether it reflects substantial support for the

Secretary’s findings. But some of the questions

163 The combination was so characterized in Industrial

Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 473 (D.C. Cir.

1974). The legislative history leading to this combination is

traced in Associated Industries of N.Y.S. v. United States Dep’t

of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 347-50 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.).

164 Industrial Union Dep't, 499 F.2d at 474.

165 Jd.

58

involved in the promulgation of these standards

are on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, and

consequently as to them insufficient data is

presently available to make a fully informed

factual determination. Decision making must in

that circumstance depend to a greater extent

upon policy judgments and less upon purely fac-

tual analysis. Thus, in addition to currently

unresolved factual issues, the formulation of

standards involves choices that by their nature

require basic policy determinations rather than

resolution of factual controversies. Judicial re-

view of inherently legislative decisions of this

sort is obviously an undertaking of different

dimensions.

Policy choices of this sort are not susceptible to

the same type of verification or refutation by

reference to the record as are some factual ques-

tions. Consequently, the court’s approach must

necessarily be different no matter how the stan-

dards of review are labeled. 66

The court sensitively summarized the Secretary’s obliga-

tion as follows:

What we are entitled to at all events is a careful

identification by the Secretary, when his pro-

posed standards are challenged, of the reasons

why he chooses to follow one course rather than

another. Where that choice purports to be based

166 Jd. at 474-75 (footnotes omitted). In one of the foot-

notes the court stated: ‘Where existing methodology or research

is deficient, the agency necessarily enjoys broad discretion to

attempt to formulate a solution to the best of its ability on the

basis of available information.” Jd. at 474 n. 18, citing Permian

Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 811 (1968).

59

on the existence of certain determinable facts,

the Secretary must, in form as well as substance,

find those facts in the record. By the same token,

when the Secretary is obliged to make policy

judgments where no factual certainties exist or

where facts alone do not provide the answer, he

should so state and go on to identify the consid-

erations he found persuasive. '§”

Judge McGowan’s view has been cited with approval

by this Court. Federal Communications Comm’n v. Na-

tional Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775,

814 (1978).

Moreover, this view has been explicitly sanctioned by

Congress. Congress has adopted the combination of basi-

cally informal rulemaking and the substantial evidence

test in several subsequent health, safety, and

environmental protection statutes.'6® An example is the

1976 Toxic Substances Control Act;'®9 its legislative history

on judicial review expressly endorses the approach of

Industrial Union Dep’t..7 Congress has determined to

continue using this combination in laws dealing with

highly technical areas where there is substantial scientific

uncertainty, even for the experts. As the District of

Columbia Circuit recognized, the achievement of the Act’s

purposes is inseparable from and dependent on the Secre-

tary’s power to make policy judgments to resolve uncer-

tainties, and the Secretary’s actions must not be reviewed

in a manner that frustrates action “where facts alone do

167 499 F.2d at 475-76.

168 F.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056,

2060(c); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2605(c),

2618.

169 Jd.

170 See H.R. Rep. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55-56 (1976)

(House Report). The Committee paraphrased Judge McGowan’s

statement with approval.

60

not provide the answer.’’'7' Other courts have adopted this

formulation of their review task, or have reached func-

tionally similar formulations that require the Secretary to

demonstrate the reasonableness or rationality of his policy

judgments but do not block him from accomplishing the

statute’s purposes. '72

Other than the Fifth Circuit, the courts have also

come to understand that, at least in these highly technical

subject areas, there is little, if any, meaningful difference

171 499 F.2d at 476.

172 Judge Friendly’s analysis in Associated Industries for

the Second Circuit is quoted in note 173, infra. Also for the

Second Circuit, Justice Clark adopted the District of Columbia

Circuit’s formulation. Society of the Plastics Industry v. OSHA,

509 F.2d 1301, 1303-04 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421 U.S. 992

(1975).

The Third Circuit has stated a five-part formulation of its

review function. The principle ones bearing on this issue are

whether the Secretary has adequately set forth his reasons,

whether his reasons reflect “consideration of factors relevant

under the statute,” whether he considered “presently available

alternatives,” and, if his determination is based “in whole or in

part on factual matters subject to evidentiary development,

whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports

the determination.” Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v.

Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3rd Cir. 1974). See also American

Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 830-31 (3rd Cir. 1978).

Even the Fifth Circuit’s formulation, although not its

practice, is consistent with these. After reviewing these ap-

proaches, the court stated: “[I]t seems clear that even with the

required substantial evidence test, our review basically must

determine whether the Secretary carried out his essentially

legislative task in a manner reasonable under the state of the

record before him.” American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581

F.2d 493, 497 (5th Cir. 1978), quoting from Florida Peach

Growers Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 129

(5th Cir. 1974). In practice, this court substituted its judgment

for the Secretary’s expert conclusion that quantitative risk

assessments for carcinogens are too unreliable to be the basis of

standard-setting.

61

between the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary

and capricious test normally applied to rulemaking. The

tests have converged to a point where any remaining

theoretical distinction between them simply is not admin-

istrable.'73 The essential function of review under either

test is to assure that the agency has taken into account

173 See e.g., Associated Industries of N.Y.S. v. United States

Dep’t of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.):

While we have felt constrained to determine and

sustain the applicability of the substantial evidence

test, it may well be that the controversy is semantic

in some degree, at least in the context of informal

rulemaking, and that it lacks the dispositional impor-

tance that respondents imply .... In WBEN, Ine. v.

United States ..., while we applied to F.C.C. rulema-

king the “arbitrary and capricious” standard ..., it is

hard to see in what respect we would have treated the

question differently if we had been applying a

“substantial evidence” test .... While we still have a

feeling that there may be cases where an adjudicative

determination not supported by substantial evi-

dence... would not be regarded as arbitrary and

capricious, ...in the review of rules of general appli-

cability made after notice and comment rulemaking,

the two criteria do tend to converge.

Id. at 349-50 (citations and footnotes omitted). See also

Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1267,

1318-14 (1975).

In Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d

467 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court stated that which of the two tests

applied would not “affect the rigorousness of our review to the

extent the Government seems to suppose, or that petitioners

purport to fear.” Jd. at 473. In National Nutritional Foods Ass’n

v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975), a case arising under

the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Judge Lumbard asserted

outright that the two tests are identical: “In essence I think

that when an agency engages in substantive rule-making, it

abuses its discretion (or acts arbitrarily or capriciously) if its

actions are not supported by substantial evidence.” Jd. at 705

(concurring opinion of Lumbard, J.).

(footnote continued )

62

the information before it and has acted rationally. And

the fundamental rule under either test is that courts may

not substitute their judgment for the Secretary’s. Consolo

v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-21 (1966);

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1950);

SEES Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401

U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971).

In Industrial Union Dep't,'74 the court illustrated the

application of these principles as follows:

For example, in this case the evidence in-

dicated that reliable data is not currently avail-

able with respect to the precisely predictable

health effects of various levels of exposure to

asbestos dust; nevertheless, the Secretary was

obligated to establish some specific level as the

(footnote concluded )

The Conference Report on the 1977 Clear Air Act Amend-

ments cites this trend, and Associated Industries in particular,

with approval. H.R. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178

(1977). °

It has been suggested that the primary function of speci-

fying the substantial evidence test with informal rulemaking

may be to restrict the agency to a record. Scalia & Goodman,

Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20

U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 899, 935, n. 188 (1973). But even this dis-

tinction between the tests is elusive, since some recent statutes

specifying the arbitrary or capricious test also provide for such a

record. See § 307(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d).

Under either review test, such a record must reflect both the

factual matters at issue and the principles, hypotheses, and

policies by which the agency reasons to its decision.

Thus it may be time for this Court to re-examine the

assumption, expressed in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387

U.S. 186, 143 (1967), that the tests really do define different

depths of judicial scrutiny of agency decisions, at least in highly

technical, largely legislative areas such as these.

174 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

63

maximum permissible exposure. After consid-

ering all the conflicting evidence, the Secretary

explained his decision to adopt, over strong em-

ployer objection, a relatively low limit in terms of

the severe health consequences which could re-

sult from over-exposure. Inasmuch as the

protection of the health of employees is the

overriding concern of [the Act], this choice is

doubtless sound, but it rests in the final analysis

on an essentially legislative policy judgment,

rather than a factual determination, concerning

the relative risks of underprotection as compared

to overprotection.'75

This is the conclusion the Fifth Circuit should have

reached.

B.. The Secretary Reasonably Determined That Quan-

titative Risk Assessment Techniques Are Not Suffi-

ciently Reliable To Be A Basis For Decision

In this case, the Secretary determined that tech-

niques for quantifying cancer risk cannot yet yield esti-

mates that are sufficiently reliable to be a basis for setting

the permissible level of exposure to benzene.'76 He con-

cluded that the exercise could not “significantly clarify the

ultimate decision.'7”? He stated the essential uncertainties

about how chemicals cause cancer which preclude reliable

quantification. He stated the problems that preclude

quantitative reliance on the epidemiological studies which

identify benzene as a leukemogen. There were large

175 Jd. at 475.

176 43 Fed. Reg. 5940-41 (1978). In addition, the Secretary

explicitly incorporated into the benzene preamble, id. at 5941,

his detailed consideration of the same issue in setting the coke

oven emissions standard, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,742, 46,750-51 (1976).

177

F, Fee. ee

64

uncertainties about the exact doses to which employees

studied had been exposed. It was lik«!y that the studies

had not recorded all the cases of leukemia caused by

benzene in these employees, because the full latency period

may not yet have run since exposure began, and because

all exposed employees have not been located and exam-

ined. There could be no quantitative estimates based on

animal studies even if these estimates could be made

reliably, because benzene’s carcinogenicity has not yet

been adequately shown in an animal test. Whether

benzene interacts with other chemicals and whether it

causes other cancers less readily identified and traced to a

source than leukemia could not be established. Also, any

reliable quantitative estimate would have to take into

account benzene’s effects other than cancer, some of which

can also be fatal, and about which there are many similar

quantitative uncertainties. '78

For these reasons, the Secretary rejected the back -of-

the-envelope calculations offered by industry witnesses

and declined to generate ones of his own.'79 This decision

was reasoned and well-supported. Indeed, the Secretary

could not have reached any other conclusion consistent

with the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s mandate to

take preventive action on the basis of the best available

evidence.

The Fifth Circuit opinion shows that it simply failed

to grasp how uncertain and imprecise the quantitative

risk estimates really are. The court appears to have been

misled into concluding that such techniques could pinpoint

the size of the danger, when in fact they cannot even

78 43 Fed. Reg. 5930-32, 5940-41.

79 Td. at 5940-41.

65

provide assurance of being within several orders of

magnitude of true risks. 18

In any event, it is not the court’s role to decide de

novo whether the Secretary’s conclusion was correct. The

court can only overturn his rejection of quantitative risk

180 American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 503-05

(5th Cir. 1978). In a footnote, the court referred to two

particular items. /d. at 504 n. 23. The court cited a quantitative

risk assessment performed for benzene by a unit in the

Environmental Protection Agency. But this early version of the

EPA document lacked a passage present in the final draft,

which explains some of the heroic assumptions that the authors

made concerning the substantial uncertainties. This addition

undercuts the undeserved confidence the court placed in its

quantitative conclusions. See the final version, EPA Carcinogen

Assessment Group, Final Report On Population Risk to Ambient

Benzene Exposures (with cover memorandum dated January 10,

1979).

Moreover, while a unit at EPA produces such estimates for

informational purposes, the EPA Administrator has not

adopted the policy of.relying on these estimates in determining

standards or other regulations under any of the half dozen

statutes for control of chemical hazards that he administers.

Thus the lower court had no basis from EPA's actions to impugn

the Secretary’s judgment.

The court also cited the mere averment by an economic

consultant to the agency to the effect that he could do cost-

effectiveness analysis, which the court stated was “an analysis

which would have included some kind of risk quantification.”

This statement, by one who is not expert in the complex

scientific issues of cancer causation, was hardly a sound basis for

the court’s conclusion that reliable quantitative risk assessments

can be performed.

Beyond these specifics, the court appears simply to have

accepted the assurances of employer’s witnesses, who ignored

the massive uncertainties in the techniques. The lower court

adopted the term “rough” to describe the estimates it required.

Id. at 504. This choice of terms reflects its confusion on the

power of these techniques. If the court actually believed that

(footnote continued )

66

assessment if it can properly conclude that, under the

present state of knowledge and the policies of the Act, the

Secretary was irrational. In fact, the court conceded the

Secretary’s determinations were rational.'*' Thus, the

lower court’s decision cannot stand.

(footnote concluded )

“rough” estimates can come usefully close to the true risk, then

it simply failed to comprehend the irreducible uncertainties in

these techniques. If the court understood that “rough” esti-

mates really may be off by a factor of as much as 5,000,000 (see

text accompanying note 68, supra), then the court’s conclusion

that they are a useful basis for decisions was simply without

logical foundation. This use of the term “rough” distorts the

English language to the point of squeezing all meaning out of

the word.

181581 F.2d at 503.

67

CONCLUSION

The lower court has substituted its judgment for that

of Congress and the Secretary on the proper means to

protect employees from cancer and other serious diseases

caused by chemicals in the workplace. The court would

impose on the Secretary quantitative decision-making

requirements that Congress did not mandate, and that

the Secretary reasonably rejected. The decision would

preclude the Secretary from taking effective preventive

measures until a speculative future time when science has

solved the mysteries of carcinogenesis and policy-makers

have devised adequate quantitative means of making

basic societal decisions. With the knowledge that this day

is remote, Congress envisioned, and the Secretary has

practiced, a decision making process sensitive to the

qualities of the best available data and to the reality that

human lives and health are at stake. The lower court

would undo this. For these reasons, this Court should

reverse the decision below, and remand with instructions

for a decision consistent with the Occupational Safety and

Health Act as outlined here.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD E. AYRES

DAVID D. DONIGER

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Natural Resources

Defense Council

May 17, 1979

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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