Petition — Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute

Supreme Court brief1980

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

& 8 «9 1 I i EC TF 1978 |

—_—_—_— — — ——

IN THI Phi

LICKEL Ls

Supreme Court of the United States is

October Term, 1978

INpDUSTHIAL UNION Deraxruentr, AFL-CIO.

Petitioner,

¥;

AMEnICAN PeTROoLEUM INSTITUTE, CitemicaL SPRCIALTIES MAN

FACTURERS ASSOCIATION, MANUFACTURING CtleMIstTs ASSOCIATION,

NATIONAL PETROLEUM ReriNneKs ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN PiUTRGFINA

INCORPORATED, ATLANTIC Riciurieip COMPANY, Cities Servicer Com

PANY, CONTINENTAL Ot, COMPANY, DevTra Or, COMPANY, EXXON

CORPORATION, GULF Ou, COMPANY, MAHATHON On COMPANY, Putin

Lvs Perronecm Company, Suet. Om Comvany, Sourun HAMPTON

Ou, COMPANY, STANDARD O11, Company (Indiana). STANDARD OIL

COMPANY Or Outo, Sunx On, ComMVvany or PENNSYLVANIA. SUN OL

COMPANY oF DeLaAware, Texaco Inc.. UNION O11 ComPpaANY oF

CALIFORNIA

ReseerR MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, INC.. Firestone Tine &

tunBER COMPANY, GENEKAL Tiree & Rusuer Company, B. F. Goop

KICH COMPANY, Goopyear Tire & Rupsen COMPANY

KE. 1. Depont pe Nemours AND COMPANY

AKSSTRONG RunbBER COMPANY AND UNInOYAL COMPANY

INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

AMERICAN IRON AND Stee. INStTITUTs, BerTucenem Stren. Coxnrora-

TION, CYCLOPS CORPORATION, JONES AND LAUGHLIN Stren. Corrora-

TION, NATIONAL STEEL CorPoRATION, Revunnic Stern COokroRration,

SHENANGO INCORPORATED, UNITED STATES Steer CORPORATION

and

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTID ADMINISTRATION,

Respondents

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIFTH CIRCUIT

Of Counsel :

MLLioT BREDHOFY George I]. Comen

Gieneral Counsel, Roneert M. WeInbera

Industrial Union Dept., JexemMian A, COLLINS

AFL-CIO Iredholf, Gottesman, Cohen &

1000 Connecticut Ave., NW Weinberg

Washington, D.C. 20036 1000 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20056

Attorneys for Petitioner

————

see 3

|

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I 1

Rea Sibcc a srs eceicccscees 2

Ue Rete BP PMMMOEUIU EID Cece ete c cece eccees 2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ......... 2

wpe yy fs yt ley fy) Ea 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......... 12

1. The Decision Below is in Square Conflict with

Decisions of Three Other Circuits .......... 12

ll. The Decision Below Incorrectly Decides an

Iinportant Issue of Federal Law Which Ought

to be Resolved By This Court .............. 17

ee A 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Aqua Slide 'N Dive v. Consumer Product Safety

Comm., 569 F.2d 831 (Sth Cir, 1978) 000000000.

American Lron and Steel Institute v. OSHA, 575

fg. be AD: | a aie Sone

Certified Color Manufacturers Ass’n. v. Mathews,

ofa F200 208 UDO. Cir, 1076)... kick cc ccacs

iMnvironmental Defense Fund v. WPA, No, 77-1091

LENA Rekas ee MEET chi dis Sli nike a iienk heb)

Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499

EOE CAs RAE AROEED os 6d vate cae eden thse

Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th

Ree MI GMa cd eek 6a eas Ceili

Society of Plasties Industry, Ine. v. OSHA, 509

2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 922

BREE. ie Sears wh oleate wis hone Gah co Pants bal hades

Statutory Provisions:

Occupational Safety and Health Aet of 1970, 29

CR Treen 5 tas lalduenu dod opute via taen

Consumer Product Safety Aet, 15 U.S.C. § 2058

SGPRPSMES REF Cou S Vida teee Rok ely rakes

Regulations:

BP Ade BORER ho discon pc edinds ices cekes

Legislative History:

legislative History of the Occupational Safety

and Health Act of 1970, prepared by the Senate

Committee on Labor and Publie Welfare .....

il

13, 20

12-14

13

12, 14—15

passim

17

17

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1978

[NpusTRIAL Union Department, AFL-CIO

,

Petitioner,

Vv.

AMERICAN PetroLeum Instirure, et al.,

AND

OccuUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HeauTH ADMINISTRATION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner Industrial Union Department, AFL-CLO (here-

inafter ‘*TUD’’) respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari

issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Cireuit entered in this case on October

i- (

5, 1978.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 581

K’.2d 498 and is reprinted as Appendix A in a separate

Appendix accompanying this petition. The Occupational

Safety and Health Standard governing ‘* Occupational lx

posure to Benzene’’ and the Statement of Reasons of the

Secretary of Labor issued with the standard are reported at

43 Fed. Reg. 5918 and are reprinted as Appendices B and C.

The amendment to the standard is reported at 43 Fed. Reg.

2

27962 and is reprinted as Appendix D. The order of the

court of appeals consolidating the petitions to review the

amendment with the petitions to review the standard is un-

reported and is reprinted as Appendix K. The judgment of

the court of appeals is reprinted as Appendix F.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals’ judgment issued on October 5,

1978. (App. F). On November 1, 1978, the Court of Appeals

consolidated the petitions to review the amendment to the

standard with the petitions to review the standard (App.

KE). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Occupational Safety and Health Act delegates to the

Secretary of Labor the power to adopt standards governing

the exposure of working men and women to toxic materials

and directs the Secretary to ‘‘set the standard which most

adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of

the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer

material impairment of health or functional capacity even

if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt

with by such standard for the period of his working life.’’

In enacting this law, did Congress intend to preclude the

Secretary from promulgating a regulation limiting workers’

exposure to a proven carcinogen until such time as substan-

tial evidence becomes available from which to quantify the

number of lives that would be saved by the proposed regu-

lation?

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29

U.S.C. § 651 et seq. provides in pertinent part:

§ 651. Congressional statement of findings and declara-

tion of purpose and policy

(a) The Congress finds that persona! injuries and

9

vo

illnesses arising out of work situations impose a sub-

stantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, inter-

state commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss,

medical expenses, and disability compensation pay-

ments.

(b) The Congress declares it to be its purpose and

policy, through the exercise of its powers to regulate

commerce among the several States and with roreign

nations and to provide for the general welfare, to as-

sure so far as possible every working man and woman

in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and

to preserve our human resources—

* * ©

(3) by authorizing the Secretary of Labor to set

mandatory occupational safety and health standards

applicable to businesses affecting commerce, and by

creating an Occupational Safety and Health Review

Commission for carrying out adjudicatory functions

under this chapter...

§ 652. Definitions

; . * *

(8) the term ‘occupational safety and health standard

means a standard which requires conditions or the

adoption or use of one or more practices, means meth-

ods, operations, or processes reasonably necessary or

appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment

and places of employment.

§ 655. Standards

(b) J * =

(5) The Secretary, in promulgating standards deal-

ing with toxie materials or harmful physical agents

under this subsection, shall set the standard which most

adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis

of the best available evidence, that no employee will

suffer material impairment of health or functional

capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to

the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period

of his working life. Development of standards under

this subsection shall be based upon research, demon-

strations, experiments, and such other information as

may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of

4

the highest degree of health and safety protection for

the employee, other considerations shall be the latest

available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the

standards, and experience gained under this and other

health and safety laws. Whenever practicable, the

standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of

objective criteria and of the performance desired.

« * -

(f) Any person who may be adversely affected by a

standard issued under this section may at any time

prior to the sixtieth day after such standard is promul-

gated file a petition challenging the validity of such

standard with the United States court of appeals for

the circuit wherein such person resides or has his prin-

cipal place of business, for a judicial review of such

standard. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith

transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Secretary.

The filing of such petition shall not, unless otherwise

ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the standard.

The determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive

if supported by substantial evidence in the record con-

sidered as a whole.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case concerns the validity of the regulation govern-

ing occupational exposure to benzene promulgated by the

Secretary of Labor (‘‘the Secretary’’) pursuant to the

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.

§ 651 et seq. (‘*the Act’’). Benzene is one of the most widely

produced chemicals in the United States, and the amount

produced is rapidly increasing. Most benzene is used as an

ingredient in the production of other organic chemicals; the

remaining amount is used primarily in the manufacture of

detergents, pesticides, solvents and paint removers, and as

a component of motor fuels. Benzene has long been recog-

nized as a toxie substance.

Shortly after the Act became effective, the Secretary

promulgated a ‘‘national consensus standard’? limiting the

amount of benzene to which employers could expose their

5

employees.’ Under that standard a permissible exposure

level for benzene was established of 10 parts per million

(ppm) as an 8-hour time weighted average, with a maxi-

mum permissible peak concentration of 50 ppm for 10 min-

utes in any 8-hour period. This standard was adopted from

the consensus standard developed by the American National

Standards Institute, and was based on evidence linking

benzene to certain blood disorders such as aplastic anemia,

but not on what was then considered the possible carcino-

genic effects of exposure to benzene,

In August, 1976, the National Institute for Occupational

Safety and Health (‘‘NIOSH’’), which was established by

§ 22 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 671, and directed to ‘‘develop

and establish recommended occupational safety and health

standards,’’ found ‘‘the accumulated evidence to be conclu-

sive at this time that benzene is leukemogenic’’—i.e., that it

causes leukemia, an irreversible, fatal cancer of the white

blood cells. In accordance with its conclusion, NIOSH ree-

ommended that the existing consensus standard (which, as

noted above, was not based on the leukemogenic effects of

benzene exposure), be modified to take account of the newly-

! Section 3(9), 29 U.S.C. § 652(9), defines a ‘‘national consensus

standard’’ as:

any occupational safety and health standard or modification

thereof which (1) has been adopted and promulgated by a

nationally recognized standards-producing organization under

procedures whereby it can be determined by the Secretary that

persons interested and affected by the scope or provisions of

the standard have reached substantial agreement on its adop-

tion, (2) was formulated in a manner which atforded an oppor-

tunity for diverse views to be considered and (3) has been

designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after consulta-

tion with other appropriate Federal agencies.

Under § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) the Secretary was required ‘‘as

soon as practicable’’ within the first two years after the Act became

effective to promulgate as a legally binding regulation ‘‘any na-

tional consensus standard’’ unless the Secretary determined that

the promulgation of such a standard ‘‘ would not result in improved

safety or health for specifically designated employees.’’

6

obtained evidence establishing benzene as a leukemogen.,

Specifically, NIOSH recommended that ‘‘sinee it is not

possible at this time to establish an éxposure level at which

henzene may be regarded to be without danger... exposure

to benzene be kept as low as possible.’’ NIOSH concluded

that 1 ppm was the lowest level to which exposure could be

reduced ‘tat this time’? and suggested that the exposure

limit be set at that level? NIOSH further recommended that

an emergency temporary standard be promulgated ® estab-

lishing the 1 ppm limit.

On May 3, 1977, the Secretary issued an emergeney tem-

porary standard as proposed by NIOSH.‘ ‘SShortiy there-

after the Secretary, as required by §6(e) (3) of the Aet,

29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (3), initiated rulemaking proceedings to

develop a new, permanent standard, A proposed rule, in-

corporating the emergency temporary standard, was pub-

lished in the Federal Register along with a lengthy explana-

tion, incorporating the preamble to the temporary standerd.

* Two years earlier, NIOSIL had concluded that ‘the possibility

that benzene can induce leukemia cannot be dismissed,’’ but had

not recommended any change in the national consensus standard in

light of what it viewed as the then-uncertain link between benzene

and leukemia.

* Section 6(¢) (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1), direets the

Secretary to adopt, without going through rulemaking proceedings,

“an emergency temporary standard to take immediate effect upon

publication .. . if he determines (A) that employees are exposed

to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined

to be toxie or physically harmful... and (B) that such emergency

standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger.’

‘The emergency temporary standard was never enforced, Peti-

tions for review of the standard were filed first in the District of

Columbia and then in the Fifth Cireuit. The Fifth Cireuit issued

a stay of the standard pending the decision of the D.C. Cireuit as

to whether the petition filed with it was premature. That decision

was not issued for almost six months, at which time the statutory

life of the emergency standard had virtually lapsed. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 655 (¢) (2),(3).

7

42 Fed. Reg. 27452-59. At the same time, notice was given

that an informal publie hearing would be conducted begin-

ning on July 19, 1977, and interested persons were invited

to “submit written data, views and arguments’’ and ‘‘oral

testimony’? with respcet to the issues raised by the emer-

gency standard and the proposed permanent standard, /d.

at 27459.

The public hearings on the proposed standard were held

as scheduled.’ A total of 95 persons testified, including

representatives of and medical and technical experts re-

tained by various employers and labor organizations, and

independent experts from public health organizations (such

as representatives of NIOSH and of the National Cancer

Institute) presented by the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (*fOSHA’’). Hach witness was subject to

cross-examination by all interested parties. The hearings

extended over seventeen hearing days, at the end of which

interested parties were provided with an opportunity to

submit additional written evidence and briefs. In all, the

hearing transcript consumes over 5400 pages, and in addi.

tion over 1400 exhibits and comments were made a part of

the record. _

Although Congress antic pated that the Seeretary would

he able to issue standards within 60 days after the close of

the standard-setting peat see 20 U.S.C. § 655(b) (4), the

Secretary took over four months to study the benzene ree-

*The Act does not specify the nature of the informal hearing

required by § 6(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (3). By regulation the

Secretary has provided that:

The oral hearing shall be legislative in type. Hlowever, fairness

may require an opportunity for cross-examination on crucial

issues, The presiding officer is empowered to permit cross-

examination under such circumstances. The essential intent is

to provide an opportunity for effective oral presentation by

interested persons which can be carried out with expedition

and in the absence of rigid proceedures whieh might unduly

impede or protract the rulemaking process, 29 C.FUR. § 1911.15

(a) (2).

8

ord. On February 10, 1978, the Secretary promulgated a

new benzene standard lowering the permissible exposure

level to what he determined to be the lowest feasible level—

1 ppm. At the same time, the Secretary issued a comprehen-

sive Statement of Reasons which takes up 45 pages in the

Federal Register. App. at 67a-251a.°

In the Statement of Reasons the Secretary made a num-

her of findings and conclusions of critical importance to this

case. First, the Secretary found that

**the accumulated evidence is conclusive that benzene

exposure is causally related to the induction of

leukemia (a cancer of the blood-forming system), vari-

ous cytopenias (decreased levels of a formed element

[red cells, white cells, and platelets] in the circulating

blood), aplastic anemia (a non-functioning of bone

marrow) and to the development of chromosomal aber-

rations.’ [/d. at 8la).

With particular regard to the leukemogenie properties of

benzene, the Secretary reported that from the published

literature alone one scientist had been able to identify at

least 250 cases in the United States in which workers had

contracted leukemia as the result of benzene exposure. /d.

at 12la. The Secretary further reported that a series of

retrospective studies of groups of benzene-exposed workers

had found the rate of leukemia deaths among these persons

to be many times higher than the leukemia death rate in

the population as a whole. /d. at 99a-119a, And the Secre-

*On June 27, 1978, the Secretary published in the Federal Regis-

ter an amendment to the standard which, infer alia, exempted from

the standard all work operations in which the exposure to benzene

derives solely from liquids containing .5% or less of benzene by

volume. App. at 252a. Petitioner herein and several of the re-

spondents herein filed petitions seeking review of the amendment.

Subsequent to the issuance of its decision thvalidating the standard

the court sua sponte consolidated the petitions to review the amend-

ment with the petitions to review the standard, thereby disposing

of the former petitions. The judgment challenged here thus en-

compasses the dismissal of IUD’s petition to review the amendment.

9

tary correctly notedthat even ‘‘{i]ndustry participants in

the benzene rulemaking did not, for the most part, challenge

benzene’s leukemogenicity.’’ 7d. at 123a.

With respect to the industry participants’ contention that

at low exposure levels benzene is safe, the Secretary con-

cluded, as had NIOSH, gee p. 6, supra, and numerous

experts quoted by the Secretary, App. at 184a-86a,’. that

there is no evidence to support that claim. /d. at 123a-25a,

182a-87a. The Seeretary explained that because of the long

latency period for cancers generally-an? the variability in

individual/sensitivity to carcinogens, determining whether

low levels of benzene are harmless would require studying

the mortality rates of large groups of workers who could

be shown to have been exposed to iow levels of benzene up

to 30 years earlier. The Secretary found that ‘‘to recon-

struct and define employees’ exposure retrospectively’’ and

then to trace the exposed population for a prolonged period

of time is ‘‘extremely difficult’? and that because of these

and other difficulties there are no reliable studies. /d. at

124a, 182a. Indeed, the Secretary concluded that ‘‘there

does not exist an adequate scientific basis for establishing

the quantitative dose-response relationship between expo-

sure to benzene and the induction of leukemia and other

blood diseases [7.e., the number of persons who will be made

ill by various incremental doses of benzene].’’ /d. at 160a.

But the Seeretary did find that there is ‘‘ general agreement

that a dose-response relationship is likely to exist; that is,

exposure > higher doses carries with it a higher risk of

cancer, and conversely, exposure to lower levels is ac-

companied by a reduced risk, even though a precise quan-

7The Secretary quoted reports in the record by the National

Cancer Institute’s Ad Hoe Committee on the Evaluation of Low

Levels of Environmental Carcinogens, the International Workshop

on the Toxicology of Benzene, the MAK-Werte Working Group,

and the testimony of Drs. Kraybill (of the National Cancer Insti-

tute), Goldwater (testifying for respondent Manufacturing Chem-

ists Association) Goldstein, and Aksoy.

10

titative relationship cannot be established.’’ 7d. Thus, the

Secretary concluded that it ‘‘is apparent... that a decrease

in exposure level and/or duration will result in a decreased

risk of leukemia.’’ Jd, at 183a.

Based on all of these findings—and given the large

number of workers exposed to benzene—the Secretary de-

cided, as he has consistently done in regulating carcinogens,

that ‘‘prudent public health policy’’ requires that the

permissible exposure level for henzene be set as low as

feasible. The Secretary concluded that the decreased risk

to the health of workers that would be achieved by so re-

ducing the exposure level justified this decision.

The Secretary recognized that the absence of evidence

as to the precise effects of exposure to low levels of benzene

‘*place[d] the estimation of benefits [from the reduced

exposure level] on ‘the frontiers of scientific knowledge.’ ”’

Id, at 160a. Even without an exact estimate of the number

of lives to be saved, however, the Secretary was still able to

conclude, based on the evidence establishing that reducing

the exposure to benzene would reduce the risk of leukemia

and other blood disorders faced by thousands of workers,

that the lower exposure level is ‘‘necessary in order to ef-

fectuate the statutory purpose of the Act and to adequately

protect employees from the hazards of exposure to ben-

zene.’’ Id. at 163a.

Immediately upon the issuance of the standard (and

Statement of Reasons) a number of trade associations rep-

resenting producers and users of benzene as well as indi-

vidual.companies that produce or use benzene* sought

review of the standard under 46(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.

§ 655(f).° The cases were consolidated in the Fifth Cireuit

* All parties who sought review of the standard below are listed

as respondents on the cover of this petition.

® Section 6(f) provides:

(f) Any person who may be adversely affected by a standard

issued under this section may at any time prior to the sixtieth

11

and were heard on an expedited basis. On October 5, 1978,

a division of that Circuit issued its opinion vacating the

permissible exposure level for benzene, and with it the en-

tire benzene standard.

In overturning the benzene standard the court of appeals

did not disturb the Secretary’s findings as to the dangers

posed by benzene, the absence of a known safe exposure

level to this poison, or the beneficial impact that a reduction

ot the exposure level would have. To the contrary, the court

acknowledged that the Secretary’s conclusion ‘‘that the

standard is likely to result in benefits is not unsupported.”’

App. at 18a. The court concluded that the record *‘ provides

substantial evidence which would support the finding that

exposure to benzene at the present level of 10 ppm poses

some leukemia risk,’’ id., and the court further found

that ‘‘[t]he general agreement in the scientific community

that exposure to carcinogens at low levels is safer than

exposure at higher levels permits the further factual deduc-

tion that reducing the permissible exposure limit from 10

ppm to 1 ppm will result in some benefits,’’ id2° What

the court held, quite simply, was that these findings by

the Secretary were not sufficient to sustain the regula-

tion. Rather, the court concluded, the Secretary also was

required to make a specific ‘‘estimate of benefits supported

by substantial evidence.’’ Jd. at 19a-21la. Since the Secre-

tary had not done so because in his view present scientific

knowledge did not permit such an estimate, the court found

that the standard could not survive.

day after such standard is promulgated file a petition chal-

lenging the validity of such standard with the United States

court of appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or

has his principal place of business, for a judicial review of

such standard. .. . The determinations of the Secretary shall

be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record

considered as a whole.

‘The court also left undisturbed the Secretary's finding that

reducing benzene exposure to 1 ppm was feasible.

12

The court of appeals candidly acknowledged the neces-

sary consequence of its decision: it has disabled OSHA

from adopting a standard more stringent than the pre-

existing national consensus standard for benzene, notwith-

standing the fact that in the court’s own words ‘*exposure

to benzene at the present: level... poses some leukemia

risk.’’ The court expressly rejected ““OSHA’s argument

that ‘iis standard should be upheld since the lack of knowl-

edge concerning the effects of exposure to benzene at low

levels makes an estimation of benefits from reducing the

permissible exposure level impossible.’’ 7d. at Wa. Ae

cordingly, the court concluded that ‘‘[u]ntil such estimates

[of the extent of benefits expected from reducing the per-

missible exposure level from 10 ppm to lt ppm] are pos-

sible,’? OSHA will be barred from acting." 7d. at 21a,

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE DECISION BELOW IS IN SQUARE CONFLICT

WITH DECISIONS OF THREK OTHER CIRCUITS

The Fifth Cireuit’s decision is in direct confliet with

Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467

(D.C. Cir. 1974), Society of Plastics Industry, Ine. vy, OSTLA,

509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 US, 922 (1975);

and American Tron and Steel Institute (AIST) vy. OSITA,

575 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1978). Indeed, the court below reecog-

nized this conflict but expressly declined to ‘‘attempt to

reconcile’’ its decision ‘‘with the eases from other cireuits

which uphold other standards regulating exposure to car-

cinogens.’’ App. at 2la. And those cases cannot be so

reconciled. For each upheld an OSHA standard limiting

exposure to a carcinogen on findings by the Secretary ana-

'’ Tn the course of so concluding the court dropped the following

telling citation; ‘‘But see Society of Plastics Industry, Ine. v.

OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, (2d Cir. 1975).’’ Society of Plastics Indus-

fry, the decision upholding OSHA’s regulation of vinyl chloride, is

discussed at pp. 14-15 infra.

13

lytically indistinguishable from the findings on which the

standard at issue here was based."

In Industrial Union Department, supra, the District of

Columbia Circuit reviewed the validity of an OSHA stand-

ard governing exposure to asbestos dust. The standard was

promulgated at a time when, in the court's words, ‘reliable

data [was] not available with respect to the precisely

predictable health effects of various levels of exposure to as-

bestos dust.’’ 499 F.2d at 475. Unlike the court below, which

held (with respect to benzene) that the Secretary was dis-

abled from acting until such evidence becomes available, the

District of Columbia Cireuit unanimously found no infirm-

ity in the regulation. Writing for the court, Judge McGowan

reasoned that in delegating authority to promulgate oceu-

pational health standards to the Secretary, Congress had

intended to authorize the Secretary to make decisions which

implicate questions ‘‘on the frontiers of scientific knowl-

edge’’ as to which ‘‘insufficient data is presently available

to make a fully informed factual determination.”’ Id. at 474.

With respect to such decisions, Judge MeGowan concluded

that Congress had vested in the Seeretary the power to

make ‘‘a prediction based upon pure legislative judgments.”

Id. Accordingly, the court found the asbestos standard law-

'? The decision below is also inconsistent with decisions that have

been rendered under numerous other statutes upholding an adminis-

trator’s authority to regulate carcinogens without waiting for con-

elusive evidence establishing the extent of harm that the carcinogen

is likely to cause at the levels being regulated and thus the extent

of benefits likely to result from the regulation. See, e.g., Environ-

mental Defense Fund vy. EPA, No, 77-1091 at 54-58 (D.C. Cir., Nov.

3.1978) (Tamm, J.) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act amend-

ments) ; Certified Color Manufacturers Ass’n. v. Mathews, 543 F.2d

284, 297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Wilkey, J.) (Federal Food, Drug

and Cosmetie Act); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 24-25 (D.C.

Cir. 1976) (en bane) (Clean Air Act) ; Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,

514 F.2d 492, 527-29 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (Federal Water

Pollution Control Act).

14

ful notwithstanding the absence of evidence as to the

extent of the benefits that would be realized, since ‘‘the pro-

tection of the health of employees is the overriding concern

of OSHA,” and the Secretary’s determination ‘over strong

employer objection [to set] a relatively low limit © * * rests

in the final analysis on an essentially legislative policy

judgement rather than a factual determination concerning

the relative risks of underprotection as compared to over

protection.” fd, at 475.

In Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc., supra, the vinyl

chloride ease, the Second Cireuit reached a decision in ae-

cord with Industrial Union Department and equally in con-

fliet with the decision below. In Plastics Industry the em

ployers challenged the vinyl chloride standard on the

ground

that the available scientific medical evidence does not

establish that the 1 ppm exposure level adopted by the

Secretary is required by health or safety considera-

tions. They claim[ed] that ne proof exists in the record

to justify such a low standard, since all of the medical

witnesses testified that no one can say whether exposure

sure to [vinyl chloride] at low levels was safe or un-

safe. [509 F.2d at 1308. ]

Writing for the court, the late Mr. Justice Clark rejected

that argument, concluding ‘that the evidence is quite sufh

cient to warrant the Seeretary’s choice,’? notwithstanding

the absence of data as to the effects of exposure to low

levels of vinyl chloride. /d. Mr. Justice Clark explained:

As in Industrial Union Department, APL-CIO vy.

Hodgson, supra, the ultimate facts here in dispute are

‘on the frontiers of selentifie knowledge,’ and though

the factual finger points it does not conelude. Under the

command of OSILA it remains the duty of the Seere-

tary to net to protect the workingman, and to act even

in circumstances where existing methodology or re-

search is deficient. The Secretary .. . has chosen to

reduce the permissible level to the lowest detectable one.

15

We find no error in this respect. [lnphasis added. | '

Finally, in American Iron and Steel Institute [AISI),

supra, the Third Cireuit, per Judge Rosenn, also upheld an

OSHA standard requiring that exposure to a proven ecar-

cinogen—in that case coke oven emissions—be redueed to

the lowest level that is technically and economically feasible.

The Court concluded that the Secretary's findings that coke

oven emissions are carcinogenic and that there is no known

sale exposure level to them is sufficient to sustain the stand.

ard. In the course of its opinion the court explained:

The Secretary’s decision to establish a .15 mg/m* ex-

posure level... was a policy judgment on the basis of

the best available evidence as to what the industry

could achieve in an effort to best protect its coke oven

employees, This decision is not a f _tual determination

for which we need to find substantial evidence in the

record to support. Under the Act, the Seeretary’s task

combines elements of legislative policy determinations

and fact finding... . In this instance his ultimate deter-

mination of the appropriate exposure level is a legis-

lative decision in the exercise of congressionally dele-

gated powers. [577 F.2d at 833. |

The conflict created by the decision below requires imme-

diate resolution. There are presently pending before courts

of appeals challenges to three OSHA standards involving

toxic substances: inorganic arsenic (before the Ninth Cir-

cuit) ; cotton dust (before the District of Columbia Circuit) ;

and lead (before the Fifth and Third Circuits). In each

ease the Secretary was unable to determine the precise

effect of low level exposure to the particular substance and

thus to make the finding required by the Fifth Cireuit (but

not by the other circuits) as to the extent of benefits that

will result from reducing exposure to the lowest feasible

level. The validity of those standards, each of which affects

hundreds of workplaces and thousands of workers, thus

depends upon how the question presented here is resolved.

8 This is the portion of Plastics Industry that the court below

cited as contrary to its holding. See n. 11 supra.

16

Moreover, the standards presently under review are only

the first of the standards that must be set to regulate the

myriad of carcinogens in the workplace. Tf the Court does

not settle the question presented here as to the Seeretary's

power to issue standards regulating carcinogens, the See

retary will be unable to get on with the congressionally

mandated job of protecting the health of American workers,

As matters now stand, employer organizations, by filing the

first instituted review petition in the Fifth Cireuit, will be

able to use the decision below to defeat the Seeretary’s

power to issue each new standard, Mmployers will be unable

to do so, however, if the first petition is filed in the District

of Columbia, Second or Third Cireuits.'' The misehief

ereated by this situation was reeently highlighted by a

courthouse race which ended ina dead heat when those who

thought the new standard governing occupational exposure

to lead went too far filed in the Tifth Cirenit’ while those

who felt the standard did not go far enough simultaneously

filed in the Third Cireuit.

‘

“Under $602), see n. 9 supra, any person “adversely affeeted™’

by an OSTLA standard ean bring a pre-enforcement petition to

review the standard in the eirewuit ino whieh sueh person “

or has his prineipal place of business.” This means that every

standard which impacts upon an employer in the Fifth Cireuit

whieh is to say every OSTLA standard could be challenged before

that court if employer groups arrange their filings so that the first

review petition is filed by an employer in the Fifth Ciruit, and

if no other aggrieved group first files for review elsewhere, (Under

28 USC. (2112(a) all challenges to an ageney’s orders are to be

transferred to and heard by the court in whieh the first challenge

is filed.)

resides

ee

V7

HW. THE DECISION BELOW INCORRECTLY DE

CIDES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF FEDERAL

LAW WHICH OUGHT TO BE RESOLVED BY

THIS COURT,

The court of appeals’ decision requiring the Secretary

before promulgating a regulation lowerine the permissible

exposure level for a carcinogen to estimate with some pre

cision the number of workers who thereby would be saved

from contracting cancer is inconsistent not only with the

decisions of three other eirenits; the eourt’s decision is also

at war with the language, history and purpose of the Aet

itself, as we proceed to show.

The purpose of the Act is stated in its preamble: ‘to

assure so far as possible every working man and woman in

the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and. to

preserve our human resourees,’? 29 U.S.C. 6 651. OF partion

lar concern to Congress in enacting this statute was what

Representative Daniels, the floor manager of the bill in the

House, aptly called the ‘‘on-the-job pollution erisis’’—that

is, the fact that there are ‘millions of ... men and women

in our workforee whose lives are daily being plaeed in

Jeopardy from chemicals, insecticides, and pestieides.’?

The method Congress adopted to deal with this ‘“erisis’’

was to delegate to the Seerctary of Labor broad discretion

fo promulgate ‘‘oceupational safety and health stand

ard[s|,"" 29 U.S.C. §655(b), and to impose upon employ.

ers the duty to “comply with occupational safety and health

standards [thus] promulgated,’’ id. § 654(a) (2).

Congress defined in express terms the substantive eviteria

hy which the Secretary is to exercise the power delegated

'® The Subeommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Public

Welfare has published a compilation of the Act's legislative history

entitled, Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Wealth

Act of 1970. Representative Daniels’ statement appears at pp. 1002

03.

18

to him. Those criteria are set forth in §6(b)(5) of the Act,

29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5), which provides in pertinent part:

The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with

toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this

subsection shall set the standard which most adequately

assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best

available evidence, that no employee will suffer material

impairment of health or functional capacity even uf

such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt

with by such standard for the period of his working life.

[Mmphasis added. ]

Under § 6(b)(5) the Secretary is thus required to regulate

occupational exposure to a toxic material when he concludes

from the ‘‘best available evidence’’ that absent such regula-

tory action employees will suffer material impairment of

health from regular exposure to the particular toxie sub-

stance. That section does not leave room for an interpreta-

tion that would render the Secretary powerless to act in

such circumstances until further evidence becomes available

showing how mmany employees will suffer health impair-

ments. Yet that is precisely what the holding of the court

below requires.

The Fifth Cireuit was of the view that it was unnecessary

to reconcile its holding with the substantive criteria sect

forth in §6(b) (5). See App. at 15a-16a, 21a. The court ap-

parently believed it was relieved of that burden by a sub-

section of the general definitional section of the Act. That

subsection, §3(8), 29 U.S.C. §652(8), defines an ‘‘occupa-

tional safety and health standard’’ as a standard ‘‘ which

requires conditions ... reasonably necessary or appropriate

to provide safe or healthful employment and places of em-

ployment.’ The court below thought that without a finding

as to the extent of benefits that will result from an OSHA

standard, the Secretary could not ‘‘determine that [the]

standard ... is reasonably necessary.’’?® But §3(8) does

16 The court below pointed to nothing in the legislative history of

19

not state that a standard must, in the abstract, be *‘reason-

ably necessary’’—whatever that might mean. Rather, the

Act declares that a standard must be reasonably necessary

or appropriate to achieve a particular end. That end is the

one stated in §6(b)(5): to provide the most adequate as-

surance feasible that no employee will suffer health impair-

ment from exposure to the substance being regulated, even

if the employee’s exposure is both regular and prolonged.

The Secretary can determine what is reasonably necessary

or appropriate to provide that assurance without a finding

as to the number of employees who would otherwise actually

suffer a health impairment. Thus the language of §§ 3(8)

and 6(b)(5) cuts against, not for, the decision below.

Further, the interpretation of the statute just set forth,

but not the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, is consistent with

Congress’ intent in enacting this law. The Fifth Cireuit has

read into the Act a requirement that would preclude the

Secretary from regulating any carcinogen until he is able

to resolve an issue on the ‘‘frontiers of science’’: the extent

the Act or in the cases interpreting it to support the court’s inter-

pretation of §3(8). Instead, the court relied entirely on its own

decision in Aqua Slide ’N Dive v. Consumer Product Safety Comm.

[CPSC], 569 F.2d 831 (1978). But that decision involved inter-

pretation of a very different Act with very different language and

a very different history applied to a very different problem. The

question in Agua Slide was whether the CPSC could require a

particular label—one warning users of swimming pool slides of the

danger of beeoming paralyzed through improper use—without

making a determination as to whether anyone was likely to heed

such a warning—a determination which plainly is not on the fron-

tiers of scientific knowledge. In holding that such a finding was

required, the court relied on the peculiar language of 15 U.S.C.

§ 2058(¢) (2) (A) which compels the CPSC, before promulgating a

regulation, to find that the regulation is ‘‘reasonably necessary to

eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury’’ and on the

special legislative history of that section. See 569 F.2d at 839-40.

Thus, whatever its merits, Aqua Slide sheds no light on the meaning

of §3(8).

20

to which exposure to low levels of carcinogens causes can-

cer (and thus the extent of the benefits that would be real-

ized by regulating low level exposures). Yet in adopting the

Act Congress expressly authorized the Secretary to act on

the basis of available evidence and declared it ‘‘vital’’ that

the Secretary not ‘‘be paralyzed by debate surrounding

diverse medical opinions.’"? The importance of avoiding

such paralysis was recently explained by Judge Tamm:

What scientists know about the causes of cancer is

how limited is their knowledge. The record in this case

demonstrates that it may take decades for human ex-

posure to result in cancer; in the meantime, the case

for inferring a cancer danger with respect to an in-

completely understood substance is vigorously dis-

puted. If regulation were withheld until the danger was

demonstrated conclusively, untold injury to public

health could result.®

The court below thus was wrong in holding that the Secre-

tary lacked sufficient information to restrict the exposure

of employees to benzene to the lowest feasible level.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

Of Counsel: Respectfully submitted,

ELuiot BrepHOFF Grorcr H. CoHen

General Counsel Rosert M. WEINBERG

Industrial Union JEREMIAH A, CoLLINs

Department Bredhoff, Gottesman,

1000 Connecticut Cohen & Weinberg

Ave., N.W. 1000 Connecticut Ave. N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20036

1” ALR. Rep. No. 91-1291 at 18, in Legislative History, supra note

15, at 848.

18 Pnvironmental Defense Fund v. EPA, No, 77-1091, Slip. op.

at 57-58 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 3, 1978).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.