Petition — Citicorp v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Supreme Court brief1979

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Text

Supreme Court, U.S

FILED

APR 2 1979

ABL RODAK, JR., CLERK

{

‘

. 5

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBER TERM, 1978

CITICORP,

Petitioner,

against

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Joun E. Horrmay, JR.

JoHN J. RocHE

SHEARMAN & STERLING Attorneys for Petitioner

Anprew S. O’Connor 53 Wall Street

Henry 8S. WEISBURG New York, New York 10005

Of Counsel : (212) 483-1000

April 2, 1979

In i ad me

iD tT Os salesbeeesoabbhnn

I Tr cece eneniencrensaianicn remanent

AE LT OE Ter eee

OE IES SEL TR SSA PP PO

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT _____________-___-

I.

II.

IIT.

Interpretations as to the Meaning of This

Section of the Bank Holding Company Act

Should Not Be Permitted to Vary Among

A CEES SE eA Ee Yo

The Court of Appeals Wholl¥ Disregarded

.Facts That Are Part of theRecord _______-

The Court of Appeals Misapprehended the

Congressional Purpose of the Statute

Te a Nid ehsdeerbdnnton

CoNcLUSION eas Ch ailiieibinaeriscinorsaunceiebieapesdhaneipmtoen

Appenpix A—Opinion of the Court of Appeals -___-

Appenpix B—Portions of Section 4 of the Bank Hold-

ing Company Act of 1956, as amended,

I A os a

to

5

PAGE

CasEs

Central Wisconsin Bankshares, Inc. v. Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 583

Pg eZ Es | NRE eerel ee egern ae 10

Citicorp v. Board of Gcvernors of the Federal Re-

serve System, 589 F.2d 1182 (2d Cir. 1979) ______ passim

North Lawndale Economic Development Corp. v.

Board cf Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-

tom, 005 7.20 28 (7th Cir. 1977) _......._.._.. 6, 7

Tri-State Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board of Gover-

nors of the Federal Reserve System, 524 F.2d 562

oy BE. Sa RR RST REM te Geo ES

STaTuTEs

12 U.S.C. § 1842(b), §3 of the Bank Holding Com-

pany Act of 1956, as amended _________-________ 6

12 U.S.C. § 1843(c), § 4(¢) of the Bank Holding Com-

pany Act of 1956, as amended _________________ passim

12 U.S.C. § 1848, § 9 of the Bank Holding Company

Bet Of lees, OF enees 6. lt

Oe ee SED hind enceiine une 1

OrHeR AUTHORITIES

Application by Citicorp, 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 321

EI sbchearisbints Scho oeic ss, << cocaieape eee Ulesanle aka gepeteeslacd akan 15

12 Code of Federal Regulations § 225.4(b)(2) ____ 4,8,9

12 Code of Federal Regulations § 262.3(b) ________ 4

Federal Reserve Board Form F.R. Y-4B, 3 Fed.

Banking L. Rep. (CCH) { 44,058 (1977) ________ 8

H.R. Rep. 91-387, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ______ 10

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser TErm, 1978

BN ete

CiTI1coRP,

Petitioner,

against

Boarp oF GOVERNORS OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SyYsTEM,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

Citicorp petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the

decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit which denied a petition for review and

affirmed an order of the Board of Governors of the Fed-

eral Reserve System which purportedly denied Citicorp’s

application for approval to retain ownership of the Ad-

vance Mortgage Corporation.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (Appendix A) is

reported at 589 F.2d 1182 (2d Cir. 1979). The opinion of the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

(‘‘Board’’) is reported at 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 321 (1978).

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered Jan-

uary 2, 1979. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

2

Question Presented

Is Citicorp’s application to retain ownership of Advance

Mortgage Corporation (‘‘ Advance’’) ‘‘deemed to have been

granted’’ by operation of law by reason of the failure of the

Board to act on the application within the ninety-one-day

period prescribed by § 4(c) of the Bank Holding Company

Act of 1956, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)?

Statute Involved

The statute involved is the Bank Holding Company Act

of 1956, as amended (the ‘‘ Act,’’ relevant portions of which

are set out at Appendix B), and specifically § 4(c), 12 U.S.C.

§ 1843(¢), which provides in part:

In the event of the failure of the Board to act on any

application for an order under paragraph (8) of this

subsection within the ninety-one-day period which be--

gims on the date of submission to the Board of the

complete record on that application, the application

shall be deemed to have been granted.

(Emphasis added.)

Statement

In July 1970, Citicorp acquired 100 percent of the

voting stock of Advance Mortgage Corporation. At the

time of its acquisition, Advance maintained 19 offices located

in 11 states. By late 1977, Advance had grown to 44 offices

located in 22 states, which were engaged in:

(i) the origination and placement with institutional

investors of Federal Housing Administration, Veterans

Administration and ‘‘conventional’’ mortgage loans on

one-to-four family residences ;

(ii) the servicing of mortgage loans for institutional

investors;

(iii) the origination and servicing of mobile home

installment contract loans to be held for investment,

3

and the extension of credit to mobile home dealers for

the financing of inventory; and

(iv) the extension of credit secured by second mort-

gages on one-to-four family residential properties and

the servicing of such loans.

Advance is not a dominant force in the industry or in

any local geographic market. Advance operates in 27

SMSA’s,* in 24 of which it originates less than two percent

of the one-to-four family residential mortgage loans. In the

other three SMSA’s, Advance’s market share is 3.5 percent

or less. The number of competitors in the areas serviced by

Advance ranges from 12 to 109. In 1976, Advance was re-

sponsible for originating only 1.8 percent of the dollar vol-

ume of all one-to-four family mortgage loans made by mort-

gage bankers, and only 0.31 percent of such loans made by

the entire mortgage finance industry.

Following the acquisition of Advance, Citicorp, as a

result of a statutory amendment, fell within the definition of

a bank holding company covered by the Act. Bank Holding

Company Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1763. As such,

Citicorp would be prohibited from retaining its shares of

Advance after December 31, 1980, unless the Board granted

approval for retention under § 4(c)(8) of the Act.

In 1973, Citicorp (then known as First National City

Corporation) applied to the Board for approval to retain

Advance. The Board determined that there was insufficient

evidence to establish that the public benefits produced by the

retention of Advance would outweigh the possible adverse

effects. However, the Board noted that Citicorp had applied

for retention approval well ahead of the statutory deadline

and that additional evidence might become available to

* An SMSA is a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area; sec,

County and City Data Book—1972, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau

of the Census, at xxi.

4

Citicorp before the deadline. \ccordingly, the Board denied

the 1973 application without prejudice to renewal. 60 Fed.

Res. Bull. 50 (1973)

On October 28, 1977, Citicorp filed a new application to

retain Advance, which was submitted by Citicorp to the

Board by delivery to the Federal Reserve Bank of New

York, as required by the Board’s Regulations. 12 C.F.R.

$$ 225.4(b)(2) and 262.3(b). As also required by the

Board, within the thirty days prior to filing the application

Citicorp published a notice, in late September, in 45 news-

- papers in 25 states announcing the application. This notice,

which stated that comments on the application would be

accepted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for

thirty days, was published pursuant to the Board’s Regula-

tions, and in compliance with the statutory requirement of

‘‘due notice and opportunity for hearing.’’ 12 U.S.C. :

§ 1843(c) (8); 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b) (2). No comments were

received.

After analysis of the application, the Federal Reserve

Bank, by letter dated November 18, 1977, requested Citi-

corp to provide specific additional information. On Decem-

ber 5, 1977, Citicorp complied by delivering the requested

documents, by hand, to the offices of the Federal Reserve

Bank of New York. By letter dated December 13, 1977, the

Federal Reserve Bank acknowledged that Citicorp’s Decem-

ber 5 submission had completed the record for the Board’s

consideration and that the application had been forwarded

to the Board’s office in Washington, D.C. The record is

unclear as to when the application actually arrived at the

Board’s office.*

Thereafter, the Board received no additional material

or relevant information concerning Citicorp’s retention

* The opinion of the Court of Appeals at one point states that the

application was received on December 13 (Citicorp v. Board, supra,

589 F.2d at 1187, App. A at 7a) and at another, on December 14 (id.,

589 F.2d at 1189, App. A at 12a). In fact, the record does not show

the actual date of receipt.

5

application. On January 9, 1978, the Board published a

notice of Citicorp’s application in the Federal Register,

which invited interested persons to submit comments to the

Board by January 27. No comments were received in

response to this second invitation for comments. Sometime

in January or February 1978, the Federal Reserve Bank of

New York requested Advance’s 1977 year-end financial

statements. These were provided to the Board by Citicorp,

which specifically stated its belief that the financial state-

ments were unnecessary and that it did not acquiesce in any

extension of the statutory mandate that an application

under § 4(c)(8) be acted upon within ninety-one days.

The Board did not act upon Citicorp’s retention appli-

cation until the ninety-eighth day after Citicorp’s final

relevant submission of December 5. On March 13, 1978,

the Board issued an order (‘‘ March 13 Order’’) purporting

to deny the application. 64:-Fed. Res. Bull. 321 (1978).

(The year-end financial statements of Advance were not a

factor in the Board’s ultimate decision, or in the decision

of the Court of Appeals.)

Citicorp thereupon petitioned the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review and reversal

of the March 13 Order, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1848. Citi-

corp argued, inter alia, that the ninety-one day statutory

period commenced on December 5, 1977, the day that Citi-

corp made its final relevant submission to the Board’s

designated agent, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Therefore, the application was ‘‘deemed granted’’ ninety-

one days later, on March 6, 1978, seven days prior to the

Board’s belated March 13 Order.

. The court below held that the ninety-one-day statutory

time period ‘‘began no earlier than January 28, 1978,’’

following the close of the second comment period, thus

rendering the March 13 Order timely. Ctiicorp v. Board,

supra, 589 F.2d at 1189, App. A at 13a. The panel also

expressed its opinion that the statutory period could not

6

commence before the time the application was received at

the Washington, D.C., office of the Board from the New

York Federal Reserve Bank.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

This appeal brings before this Court for resolution an

explicit conflict between the decision below and the rule of

law established in the decisions of another court of appeals,

as well as an important question as to the meaning of the

Bank Holding Company Act.

Interpretations as to the Meaning of This

Section of the Bank Holding Company Act Should

Not Be Permitted to Vary Among Circuits

The decision below, as the Court of Appeals itself recog- °

nized, is in direct conflict with the decisions of another cir-

cuit. The Seventh Circuit, to date the only other circuit to

construe the ninety-one-day rule, held in 7'ri-State Bancor-

poration, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System, 524 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1975), that ‘‘the 91-day

period of § 1842(b) [and § 1843(c)] begins to run when the

final material needed for the Fed’s decision is received from

the various interested sources outside of the Fed. ...’’ Id.,

at 566. The Seventh Circuit has adhered to this rule in sub-

sequent cases.”

The Second Circuit has only considered the ninety-one

day rule in this case, in which it held that ‘‘ordinarily the

91-day period does not begin until at least expiration of the

period for comments upon an application.’’ Citicorp v.

Board, supra, 589 F.2d at 1187, App. A at 8a. In a footnote

following this holding, the Second Circuit set out the rule

of the Seventh Circuit, and then candidly stated: ‘‘Thus

* See, North Lawndale Economic Development Corp. v. Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 553 F.2d 23 (7th Cir.

1977). »

7

it would appear that in that circuit the time period could

start earlier than the close of the comment period, see North

Lawndale, supra, 553 F.2d at 26-27 [7th Cir. 1977].’’

Citicorp v. Board, supra, 589 F.2d at 1187, n.9, App. A at 8a.

The import of this footnote is clear: the court concedes that

the measure of the ninety-one-day period varies depending

upon the circuit in which the issue is litigated.

The Seventh Circuit would have disregarded the January

27 close of the comment period (during which no comment

was received) and would have looked to the actual receipt

of relevant material. Such was the case in North Lawndale,

supra, in which the statutory period was held to commence

just four days following the announcement of a comment

period, which was the day when the final relevant submission

was received. (A comment period is generally thirty days

long. See, Citicorp v. Board, supra, 589 F.2d at 1188, App.

A at 9a.)

The Second Circuit, to the contrary, would not begin the

statutory count until the close of the comment period, with-

out regard to the receipt of any information. For the ap-

plicant this difference in interpretation is significant, as

the Second Circuit view can potentially add weeks of delay.

Congress commanded that the Board act within ninety-

one days. Those ninety-one days should be determined by

the same factors whether the bank holding company happens

to be located in the Second Circuit or the Seventh. The

resolution of these conflicting decisions is important. Bank

holding companies have a continuing need, incidental to

their growth and the expansion of the services they offer

to.the public, to apply for Board rulings under § 4(c) (8)

of the Act. It is essential that the ninety-one-day time limit

within which the Board must act be subject to uniform and

consistent administration.

8

vif

The Court of Appeals Wholly Disregarded

Facts That Are Part of the Record

The public comment periods are a creation of the

Board—not of the statute. The court below decided, how-

ever, that the statutory requirement of ‘‘due notice and

opportunity for hearing,’’ 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (8), signified

that the ninety-one-day period ‘‘does not begin until at

least expiration of the period for comments upon an ap-

plication.’’ Citicorp v. Board, supra, 589 F.2d at 1187, App.

A at 8a. Even assuming, arguendo, that this rule is con-

sistent with the statutory purpose, the panel’s ultimate con-

clusion that the ninety-one days commenced after January

27 entirely ignored the critical fact that January 27 was

the expiration of the second comment period regarding.

Citicorp’s application.

The Board’s rule about notice procedures applicable here

states :

Every such application shall be accompanied by a copy

of a notice of the proposal (in substantially the same

form as [form] F.R. Y-4B) published within the pre-

ceding 30 days in a newspaper of general circulation

in the communities to be served. The Board will publish

in the Federal Register notice of any such application

and will give interested persons an opportunity to ex-

press their views ....

12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b) (2).

The recommended notice set forth in form F.R. Y-4B

contains the following language: ‘‘ Persons wishing to com-

ment on this proposal should submit their views in writing

within 30 days of the date of publication of this notice

to...’’ the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank. See, 3 Fed.

Banking L. Rep. (CCH) {| 44,058 (1977).

9

Citicorp satisfied the notice provisions of 12 C.F.R.

§ 225.4(b) (2) before filing its application to retain Advance

on October 28, 1977. Citicorp’s notice, in the form pre-

scribed by the Board, was placed in 45 newspapers of gener-

al circulation in 25 states on or about September 28, 1977.

This notice invited comments, and asked that any comments

upon Citicorp’s application be directed to the Federal Re-

serve Bank of New York within 30 days of publication.

The Court of Appeals ignored this first notice period,

certainly a significant omission. Instead, it erroneously

relied upon the second, and redundant, notice which ap-

peared in the Federal Register of January 9, 1978, more

than one month after Citicorp’s final relevant submission.

If, as the court below did recognize, the purpose of the

ninety-one-day rule was to encourage the expeditious dis-

position of applications, to eliminate ‘‘sluggish Board

action,’’ Citicorp v. Board, supra, 589 F.2d at 1186, App. A

at 6a, and to require the Board to act with ‘‘reasonable

promptness”’ id., at 1188, App. A at 9a, duplicative and

time consuming procedures cannot be condoned. The court

adopted the theory that ‘‘the expiration of the period for

comments’’ was controlling, yet failed to apply this rule to

the facts in the record before it.

The Court of Appeals Misepprehended the Congressional

Purpose of the Statute Before It

The Second Circuit, in holding that the ninety-one-day

period did not commence prior to the close of the comment

period on January 27, and in suggesting that the time period

could not have commenced prior to receipt of the application

at.the Board’s office in Washington on or about December

13, has failed to recognize either the Congressional purpose

underlying the time limit or the chain of events surrounding

Citicorp’s application.

The legislative history of the ninety-one-day time limit

makes very clear that it was imposed to correct the Board’s

practice of unduly delaying the processing of applications.

10

See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 91-387, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 13

(1970). Both the Second and the Seventh Circuits have

stated that the purpose of the time limit would not be

achieved if the Board or its agents retained the power to

control its passage: ‘‘The rule would lose much of its effec-

tiveness ... if the Fed had discretion to determine when

the 91-day period begins to run.’’ Central Wisconsin

Bankshares, 'nc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal

Reserve System, 583 F.2d 294, 296 (7th Cir. 1978) (cited

favorably in Citicorp v. Board, swpra, 589 F.2d at 1187,

App. A at 8a). Yet the two events which the Second Circuit

recognizes as potentially opening the ninety-one day period

are both within the absolute control of the Board or the

local Federal Reserve Bank, the Board’s agent by dele-

gation in the processing of applications.

One such event was the acknowledgement, ou December:

13, 1977, by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York of the

prior receipt of the complete Citicorp application and the

announcement that the application had been transmitted to

Washington. The other such event, which the court below

recognized as paramount in this case, was the close of the

second comment period on the day fixed by the Board,

January 27, 1978, without any comment having been re-

ceived. It is plain that both of these events are within the

Board’s control, and thus afford it the opportunity to defeat

the legislative purpose underlying the statute. See, Tri-

State Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board, supra.

The history of Citicorp’s application illustrates the ne-

cessity of a rule limiting the discretion of the Board and the

Reserve Banks to control the statutory clock. The New York

Reserve Bank took a total of 46 days to consider the applica-

tion before forwarding it to the Board. It had the initial

application for 21 days—from October 28 to November 18—

before it requested specific additional information from

Citicorp. The New York Reserve Bank then had the com-

plete application for an additional eight days—from Decem-

5 through December 13. Yet the Second Circuit would ex-

11

clude these 46 days of analysis and processing from the stat-

utory ninety-one days.

While the Second Circuit recognized that Congress was

aware of the practice of having a local Reserve Bank ‘‘clean

up’’ applications prior to transmission to Washington,

Citicorp v. Board, supra, 589 F.2d 1187, App. A at 7a, it is

inconsistent with the purpose of the statute for that court

to grant the Board a series of undefined and discretionary

‘clean up’’ periods outside of the ninety-one days per-

mitted under the statute. Such a view can only encourage

the ‘‘sluggishness’’ the statute was designed to eliminate.

CONCLUSION

This petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted,

and upon review the decision of the court below should be

reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Joun E. Horrman, Jr.

Joun J. Rocus

Attorneys for Petitioner

53 Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

(212) 483-1000

SHEARMAN & STERLING

Anprew S, O’Connor

Henry S. WeEispuRrG

Of Counsel

April 2, 1979

la

Appendix A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE Seconp Circuit

No. 103—August Term, 1978.

(Argued November 1, 1978

Decided and Filed January 2, 1979.)

Docket No. 78-4039

CrTIcorP,

Petitioner,

—against—

Boarp oF GOVERNORS OF THE

FeperAL Reserve System,

Respondent.

Before:

F'ernBerc, TimMBEeRS and Moore,

Circuit Judges.

Petition for review of order of Board of Governors of

the Federal Reserve System denying petitioner’s appli-

cation to retain ownership of a nonbanking subsidiary.

Joun E. Horrman, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Shear-

man & Sterling, New York, N.Y., John J.

Roche, Andrew S. O’Connor, of Counsel),

for Petitioner.

2a

Frepp: Liestern, Attorney, Appellate Section,

Civil Division, Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C. (Barbara Allen Babcock,

Assistant Attorney General, Ronald R.

Glanez, Attorney, Appellate Section, Civil

Division, Department of Justice, Washing-

ton, D.C., Neal L. Petersen, General Coun-

sel, J. Virgil Mattingly, Attorney, Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System,

Washington, D.C., of Counsel), for Re-

spondent.

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge:

Citicorp, a bank holding company under the Bank Hold-.

ing Company Act of 1956, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-

1850, petitions for review of an order of the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, denying Citi-

corp’s application to retain ownership of Advance Mortgage

Corporation.' Citicorp contends that under a specific

provision in the Act, the application had to be deemed

granted by the Board’s failure to rule on it within the

statutory time limit of 91 days. Citicorp also argues that

even if the Board’s order was timely, the Board applied

incorrect legal standards in denying the application and

the order is. not supported by substantial evidence. For

reasons given below, we deny the petition for review and

affirm the order of the Board.

I

The Bank Holding Company Act generally prohibits

_ bank holding companies from engaging in nonbank activ-

1. This court has jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1848.

3a

ities. 12 U.S.C. § 1843. In 1970, the Act was amended to

cover for the first time one-bank holding companies such

as Citicorp. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of

1970, 84 Stat. 1760. Absent approval of the Board, these

companies must cease nonbank activities and divest shares

of nonbank companies by December 31, 1980.2 12 U.S.C.

§ 1848(a)(2). In ruling on bank holding company applica-

tions to retain ownership or control of a company engaged in

nonbank activities, the Board is instructed to vonsider vari-

ous factors affecting the public interest, more fully discussed

in Part III below. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(¢)(8). Section 4(c) of

the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(¢), provides that if the Board fails

to act upon such an application within 91 days, the applica-

tion is ‘‘deemed . . . granted.’’

In July 1970, petitioner Citicorp, now the second

largest banking corporation in the United States, acquired

all the voting shares of Advance Mortgage Corporation,

now the nation’s second largest mortgage banking company.

Citicorp applied to the Board in 1973 to retain Advance,

but was unsuccessful. In 1977, Citicorp again submitted

an application, the subject of this appeal.

At this point, the precise dates of various events become

potentially significant, so we will list them in more detail

than might otherwise be necessary. Citicorp submitted its

application to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on

October 28, 1977.4 On November 18, 1977, the Reserve

2. There are exceptions to the divestiture requirement not perti-

nent here.

3. The Board denied this application in December 1973, but the

ruling was without prejudice to renewal prior to the statutory deadline

should Citicorp believe more persuasive evidence of public benefits had

become available.

4. Board regulations require applications to be filed with the Fed-

eral Reserve Bank in the district in which the applicant is located.

12 C.F.R. § 262.3(b).

4a

Bank requested additional information, which Citicorp

delivered to the Bank on December 5, 1977. On December

13, the Bank forwarded the application to the Board in

Washington, D. C., and sent Citicorp a letter formally

acknowledging receipt of the application. The Board’s

public notice, dated December 30, 1977, soliciting comments

on the application, was published on January 9, 1978 in the

Federal Register. On January 17, Citicorp released its 1977

year-end financial statements and routinely forwarded a

copy to the Board. Also on January 17, the Board received

a staff memorandum from the New York Reserve Bank

containing its analysis of, and recommendation on, Citi-

corp’s proposed retention of Advance. The public comment

period closed on January 27, 1978. Around February 3,

1978 the Board requested the 1977 year-end financial state-

ments of Advance, which Citicorp supplied on February 8,

stating that by doing so it did not acquiesce in the tolling or

re-starting of the 91-day statutory time limit. On March

10, 1978 the Board requested, and Citicorp furnished, infor-

mation concerning the extent of Advance’s dependence on

Citicorp for managerial resources.

The Board denied Citicorp’s application on March 13,

1978 for reasons discussed in greater detail below. These

may for present purposes be briefly summarized as holding

that Citicorp had not sufficiently justified an exemption.

Shortly thereafter, Citicorp filed its petition for review in

this court. .

II

As already indicated, the key provision of the Act on

this petition for review is section 4(c), which provides in

pertinent part: |

In the event of the failure of the Board to act on

any application for an order under paragraph (8) of

this subsection within the ninety-one-day period which

_—_—-

5a

begins on the date of submission to the Board of the

complete record on that application, the application

shall be deemed to have been granted.

The crucial question with regard to the timeliness of the

Board’s order under this section is when the 91-day statu-

tory period began, an issue not previously considered in this

circuit.’ Citicorp contends that since the Board received

no outside comments on the proposed retention of Advance,

the application itself became the ‘‘complete record on that

application.’’ Thus, the time period started running on

December 5, 1977, the date when Citicorp submitted the

final additions to the application to the New York Reserve

Bank, and the application was ‘‘deemed’’ granted 91 days

later, on March 6, 1978.

The Board argues that Congress intended the 91-day

period to commence only after all the data relevant to the

Board’s decision has been assembled. Thus, according to

the Board, the earliest the time clock could have begun to

run is December 13, when the application was forwarded

from the New York Reserve Bank to the Board in Washing-

5. The Seventh Circuit, however, had decided several cases rais-

ing similar issues. See Tri-State Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board of

Governors of Federal Reserve System, 524 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1975)

(construing both § 1842(b) and § 1843(c)) ; First Lincolnwood Corp.

v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 546 F.2d 718 (7th

Cir. 1976) (construing § 1842(b)), modified en banc on other

grounds, 560 F.2d 258 (1977), reversed, —— U.S.——, 99 S.Ct.

505, 58, L.Ed.2d 484 (1978) ; North Lawndale Economic Develop-

ment Corp. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 553

F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1977) (construing both § 1842(b) and § 1843(c));

Central Wisconsin Bankshares, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed-

eral Reserve System, 583 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1978) (construing

§ 1842(b)). In addition, one case on the issue is pending in the

Ninth Circuit. BankAmerica Corp. v. Board of Governors of Federal

Reserve System, Civ. No. 77-1005 (N.D.Cal.1977), appeal docketed,

No. 77-3629 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1977). See also Blackstone Valley Nat'l

Bank v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 537 F.2d

1146 (1st Cir. 1976).

6a°

ton. Since this was only 90 days prior to the Board’s

March 13 order denying the application, that order was

timely and the automatic grant of section 4(c) was not

triggered. The Board goes on, however, to suggest a

number of alternative theories which would start the run-

ning of the 91-day time period much later, e.g., publication

of notice in the Federal Register, expiration of the comment

period after such notice and receipt of the year-end finan-

cials of Citicorp and Advance, the staff recommendation

from the New York Reserve Bank and the information

concerning Advance’s dependence on Citicorp. Petitioner

replies that the dates proposed by the Board relate to events

within the Board’s control, and that use of those occur-

rences to trigger the 91-day limit would render the statutory

time constraint meaningless. Citicorp also asserts that the

year-end financial statements did not provide any new data

and that a Board request for irrelevant and unnecessary ©

material should not re-start the time period.

The issues raised by these volleys back and forth are not

simply resolved, since the language of section 4(c) is suscep-

tible of conflicting interpretations. But contrary to peti-

tioner’s contention, the phrases ‘‘complete record’’ and

‘‘submission to the Board’’ imply that Congress at least did

not intend the 91-day period to start as soon as a completed

application is filed with a local Reserve Bank. The leg-

islative history tends to support this view. The 91-day

requirement of section 4(c), enacted as part of the 1970

amendments, was obviously a response to sluggish Board

action in the past. See H.R.Rep. 387, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.

13 (1969). Cf. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.

1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1458, 55 L.Ed.2d

500 (1978). Yet, even a chief proponent of the new rule,

when asked whether the 91-day period allowed enough time

for consideration of complex applications, responded that

the time would not begin to run until the application was

7a>

‘‘cleaned up.’ He explained that the statutory period

would start when ‘‘[the Fed] was ready to investigate at

the Board level and felt all they had to do was deliberate

and not hunt for additional facts and send it back.’ It is

apparent that Congress was aware of the practice whereby

applications were ‘‘cleaned up’’ by the local Reserve Bank

and then forwarded to the Board. In this context, the

words ‘‘submission to the Board’’ are significant, and we

reject petitioner’s argument that they mean ‘‘ receipt within

the Federal Reserve System.’’

A holding that the time period did not start until receipt

of the application by the Board on December 13, 1977 would

dispose of this case,* and it is tempting to stop there. We

believe, however, that sound judicial administration re-

quires consideration of at least one later starting point

suggested by the Board. The statute requires ‘‘due notice

and opportunity for hearing’’ upon an application such as

the one here involved. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). See also

12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b) (2). Even if no comments are received;

the lack of objection to the proposal is an important fact

for the Board, which is not confirmed until the close of the

comment period. Further, a rule that if there are no com-

ments the time period starts upon receipt of the applica-

tion, but if comments are received the time period is re-

started, would place the Board in somewhat of a dilemma.

6. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., testifying on behalf of the Associa-

tion of Registered Bank Holding Companies, Hearings On Bills to.

Amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Before the Com-

mittee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate, 91st Cong.,

2d Sess. 961 (1970).

7. Id.

8. Such a holding is apparently consistent with the Seventh Cir-

~s position. See North Lawndale, supra note 5, 553 F.2d at 24,

8a:

In order to assure the full 91 days for careful deliberation,

the Board would have to assume that no comments would be

received and begin intensive deliberations during the com-

ment period. Then if there were comments that altered the

focus of inquiry or changed the information available to

the Board, the initial deliberations might become useless.

We do not think Congress intended to force the Board

either to waste time in possibly premature deliberations

or to sacrifice part of its 91 days for decision-making.

Thus we hold that ordinarily the 91-day period does not

begin until at least expiration of the period for comments

upon an application.?

We recognize that the purpose of the statute could be

undercut if the local Reserve Bank unduly delays in for-

warding an application to the Board, or if the Board delays

in publishing notice, or allows an unreasonably long period .

for comments. Concern with Board control of the com-

mencement of the time period also has been expressed by

the Seventh Circuit in its opinions dealing with the 91-day

time limit.'? Most recently, that court stated:

The purpose of the 91-day rule was to counteract

the dilatoriness of the Fed. The rule would lose much

of its effectiveness in serving this purpose if the Fed

had discretion to determine when the 91-day period

begins to run. (Citation omitted).

Central Wisconsin Bankshares, supra note 5, 583 F.2d at

296.

9. The Seventh Circuit rule is that the time clock starts when

“the final material needed for the Fed’s decision is received from the

various interested sources outside of the Fed,” Tri-State, supra note

5, 524 F.2d at 566, followed in First Lincolnwood, supra note 5, 546

F.2d at 721; North Lawndale, supra note 5, 553 F.2d at 28. Thus it

would appear that in that circuit the time period could start earlier

than the close of the comment period, see North Lawndale, supra, 553

F.2d at 26-27.

10. Tri-State, supra note 5, 524 F.2d at 566; North Lawndale,

supra note 5, 553 F.2d at 27.

9a

Although Congress did not place an explicit deadline

on completion of the Board’s pre-deliberation activities,

we think the Board’s discretion to determine the start of

the 91-day time period is limited by the implicit statutory

requirement that these activities be accomplished with rea-

sonable promptness. Since the Board has chosen to have

applications initially processed by local Reserve Banks, see

note 4 supra, it is the Board’s responsibility to oversee their

performance of this activity. Thus any undue delay at

the Reserve Bank level in forwarding the application should

be substracted from the 91 days allotted to the Board. It

is also the duty of the Board promptly to publish notice

upon receipt of an application and to provide for a reason-

ably short comment period. Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b) (2).

We were informed at oral argument that an internal unpub-

lished Board regulation provides for publication of notice

within two weeks of receipt of an application and for a

comment period of thirty days.'' These objective guide-

lines adequately curtail the potential for Board control or

manipulation of the time limit. However, we suggest that

the Board add reasonably defined time periods to its al-

ready formally adopted and published regulations on this

topic so the public and applicants can be assured of no

undue delays.

11. A 1972 Federal Reserve opinion letter stated :

It should be noted that, at a minimum, the complete record

on a given application cannot be ready for submission to the

Board prior to the expiration of any comment period. Normally,

notice of an application is published in the Federal Register

within five to seven days following acceptance of the application

by a Reserve Bank. Generally 30 days are allowed for comment

from interested persons, from the public, and from Federal and

State supervisory authorities.

Letter from Federal Reserve System to Mr. Donald L. Rogers,

Executive Director, Association of Registered Bank Holding Com-

panies, Nov. 14, 1972, quoted in part in C. Blaine, Federal Regulation

of Bank Holding Companies at 3-7 (1973).

10a

The Board further suggests that after the period al-

lowed for notice and comment, there may be instances when

new data, such as the financial statements in this case, first

become available. Or, the Board may discover during de-

liberations that further information would be helpful. The

Board urges us to hold that the 91-day period does not

start to run until such additional material is received, a

position accepted by the Seventh Circuit so long as the

new material is both relevant and necessary to the Board’s

decision.'2 The case for insuring that the Board is able

to obtain and use such information after the close of the

comment period is obviously a strong one, but whether

receipt of such new data should re-start the entire 91-day

period is more questionable. The potentia! for manipula-

tion of the time constraint is greatest at this stage, as the

deadline grows closer.'? Moreover, as petitioner points out,

new financial statements become available every quarter,

and theoretically could be used to extend the time limit

indefinitely, thus nullifying Congressional intent. Although

the Seventh Circuit’s relevant and necessary requirements

in theory limit the Board’s power to re-start the time period,

in practical effect these restraints might be difficult to en-

force. Virtually all new data about an applicant will be

relevant to the Board’s decision. And, without performing

its own detailed analysis, and comparing the additional in-

formation with that previously available, it is difficult for

12. Central Wisconsin Bankshares, supra note 5, 583 F.2d at

296-97 & n.3; North Lawndale, supra note 5, 553 F.2d at 27; First

Lincolnwood, supra note 5, 546 F.2d at 721; Tri-State, supra note

5, 524 F.2d at 566.

13. The Seventh Circuit has recognized this possibility and has

indicated that the Board cannot gain the benefit of the re-starting

doctrine if it is found to have acted in bad faith. Central Wisconsin

Bankshares, supra note 5, 583 F.2d at 296 & n.3, citing Tri-State,

supra note 5, 524 F.2d at 567.

Ila

a reviewing court to determine whether the new data was

‘*necessary’’ to the decision."

It is arguable, therefore, that a request for new informa-

tion after the close of the comment period should not re-

start the 91-day period, but should merely toll the running

of that period until the information is supplied by the ap-

plicant." Such a tolling doctrine would still allow the

Board freely to obtain additional relevant information and

would encourage the applicant to comply with requests

promptly. However, there are problems with this view,

as well, not the least of which is that the Board may dis-

cover very late in the 91-day period that new information

might be significant in its decision, and then, after obtain-

ing the information, be left with only a few days in which

to decide. Under the circumstances, we leave resolution

of such issues to another day, when they are crucial to de-

termination of the case before us.

14. The Board has been upheld in the two reported decisions in

which it asserted that new information from sources outside the

Board re-started the time period. First Lincolnwood, supra note 5,

546 F.2d at 721; Central Wisconsin Bankshares, supra note 5, 583

F.2d at 296-98. In North Lawndale, supra note 5, the court rejected

the Board’s argument that an oral conference between representatives

uf the applicant and Board personnel re-started the time period. 553

F.2d at 27. However, in that case the Board conceded that no new

facts were presented at the conference. Id. In Tri-State, supra note

5, 524 F.2d at 564, 566, the court rejected the Board’s argument that

staff reports re-started the time period, but the Board did not argue

that any new outside information had been received.

15. The Board itself adopted a tolling doctrine in its Nov. 14,

1972 opinion letter, supra note 11. However, the Board’s rule gave

its staff complete discretion to determine when the 91-day period

started, a position with which we disagree.

* The Seventh Circuit recently rejected a tolling theory, adopting

the re-starting doctrine discussed in text at notes 12-14 supra. Cen-

tral Wisconsin Bankshares, supra note 5, 583 F.2d at 296.

12a

We do believe it prudent, however, to dispose of the

further argument of the Board that the 91-day time limit

does not ordinarily begin to run until the Board receives

the staff reports of local Reserve Banks on an application

that has already been submitted to the Board. In Tri-State,

supra note 5, 524 F.2d at 566, the Seventh Circuit held that

reports from the Board’s own staff are not part of the

‘‘complete record’’ for purposes of commencement of the

91-day period. The Court reasoned that staff reports are

part of the decisional process of the Board and that allow-

ing their completion to determine the start of the 91-day

period would give the Board complete control over the time

period. We agree with this reasoning and think that it

applies equally to staff reports from local Banks after an

application is forwarded to the Board in Washington."®

We now turn to application of these general rules to the:

facts of the present case. We begin analysis with the date

of Citicorp’s submission of additional material for the ap-

plication, December 5, 1977. The New York Reserve Bank

forwarded the application to the Board within eight days

thereafter and we think this was a reasonable period in

which to examine the added material and determine that

the application was complete. It appears that the Board

received the application on December 14, 1977,'’ and notice

was published in the Federal Register on January 9, 1978.

Thus, it is apparent that the Board took a little longer to

publish notice than the two weeks specified in its internal

regulation. See text at note 11 supra. Under the Board’s

16. Since the report from the New York Reserve Bank was

received by the Board in this case prior to the close of the comment

period, the issue is not determinative here. However, since such

reports appear to be common, we think it wise judicial administration

to dispose of this issue now.

17. The copy of the application in the record appears to have been

stamped “77 Dec 14” and “Received Clearing Unit.”

13a

own internal policies, the notice should have been published

by December 28, 1977 and the comment period should have

closed around January 27, 1978. Therefore, we find that

the time period began no earlier than January 28, 1978 and

that the Board’s March 13 order, clearly within 91 days of

this date, was timely.

Ill

Petitioner also argues that the Board did not apply the

correct legal standards in denying Citicorp’s application

and that the order is not supported by substantial evidence.

We conclude that the Board correctly interpreted the sta-

tutory standards and that there is ample support for its

order.

The applicable provision of the statute is section 4(c) (8),

which provides that the prohibition on bank holding com-

panies’ ownership of nonbanking companies shall not

apply to:

shares of any company the activities of which the Board

after due notice and opportunity for hearing has

determined (by order or regulation) to be so closely

related to banking or managing or controlling banks as

to be a proper incident thereto. In determining whether

a particular activity is a proper incident to banking or

managing or controlling banks the Board shall consider

whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding

company can reasonably be expected to produce bene-

fits to the public, such as greater convenience,

increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that out-

weigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concen-

tration of resources, decreased or unfair competition,

conflicts of interests, or unsound banking practices. In

l4a

erders and regulations under this subsection, the Board

may differentiate between activities commenced de

novo and activities commenced by the acquisition, in

whole or in part, of a going concern. ...

This section has been interpreted to mean that the acquired

activity must be ‘‘closely related to banking,’’ and that the

reasonably expected public benefits of the particular pro-

posal must outweigh possible adverse effects. See, e. g.,

Ass’n of Bank Travel Bureaus v. Board of Governors of

Federal Reserve System, 568 F.2d 549, 551-52 (7th Cir.

1978). The legislative history indicates that the burden is

on the applicant affirmatively to establish the net public

benefit of its proposal,'* and the Board’s findings may not

be overturned if they are supported by substantial

evidence.'® |

There was no serious issue before the Board with regard

to the requirement that the activities of Advance Mortgage

Corporation be ‘‘closely related to banking’’ since the Board

has determined by regulation that mortgage banking meets

that test. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) and (3). At issue before

us is whether the Board correctly applied the factors

specified in the second sentence of section 4(c)(8). The

Board found that the acquisition of Advance lessened com-

petition in the mortgage banking field by eliminating

Citicorp as a potential de novo entrant, that the combination

resulted in undue concentration of resources and that Citi-

corp’s interest in Advance weakened Citicorp financially.

18. See, e. g., H.R.Rep. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)

(Conf.Rep.).

19. See 12 U.S.C. § 1848; Alabama Ass'n of Insurance Agents v.

Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 533 F.2d 224, 246

(Sth Cir. 1976) ; Independent Bankers Ass'n of Georgia v. Board of

Governors of Federal Reserve System, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 278, 289,

516 F.2d 1206, 1217 (1975). Cf. Board of Governors of Federal Re-

serve System v. First Lincolnwood Corp., —— U.S. ——, 99 S.Ct.

505, 58 L.Ed.2d 484 (1978).

lida

The Board considered the public benefits which Citicorp

asserted the acquisition produced—Advance’s product inno-

vation, expanded services, commitment of funds to neigh-

borhood preservation projects and its countercyclical role

in mortgage acquisitions. However, the Board concluded

that some of the claimed benefits had anticompetitive effects,

that others could have been achieved through Citicorp’s de

novo entry into mortgage banking and that the actual public

benefits of the acquisition did not outweigh the adverse

effects.

Focusing particularly on the Board’s finding that the

acquisition would result in undue concentration of resources,

petitioner asserts that the Board improperly condemned

size alone and found no specific adverse effects flowing from

the concentration. But the specific statutory reference to

‘‘undue concentration of resources’’ as one of the ‘‘ possible

adverse effects’’ reflected a Congressional concern over

control of economic resources that contemplated a more

searching inquiry than the usual antitrust considerations of

ease of entry and relative market shares. Cf. H.R.Rep.

1747, supra note 18, at 17. We agree with the conclusion of

the Fifth Cireuit that ‘‘Congress believed that concentration

of economic resources in a single entity beyond a certain

point was harmful regardless of the proven existence of any

anticompetitive effects of such concentration.’’ Alabama

Association of Insurance Agents v. Board of Governors of

Federal Reserve System, 533 F.2d 224, 251 (5th Cir. 1976),

amended and rehearing denied, 558 F.2d 729 (1977), cert.

denied, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 1448, 55 L.Ed.2d 494 (1978).

Although this does not mean that Congress has condemned

bigness as bad per se,-we think Congress did commit to the

expertise of the Board the task of determining when size

alone makes the combination of banking and nonbanking

corporations against the public interest. With regard to

l6a

this factor, we conclude that the Board in this case applied

the proper legal standard and the record supports its

conclusion.

The Board also justifiably found that the combination

produced anticompetitive effects. It is clear that competi-

tion between Citicorp and Advance has been lost in the orig-

ination of construction and income-producing property

loans and that there was a basis for finding that the acquisi-

tion caused loss of Citicorp as a potential competitor in

the residential mortgage loan business. In determining

the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition, the Board

properly took into account the likelihood that Citicorp

would have entered into mortgage banking de novo or

through acquisition of a smaller firm. As indicated above,

the statute specifically permits the Board to ‘‘differentiate

between activities commenced de novo and activities com-.

menced by the acquisition, in whole or in part, of a going

concern... .’’

The weighing of possible adverse effects against rea-

sonably expected public benefits is committed to the

expertise of the Board, and in this case the Board’s findings

are supported by the evidence. In conclusion, we hold that

the Board’s March 13, 1978 order denying Citicorp’s appli-

cation to retain Advance Mortgage Corporation was timely

and in conformity with the governing statutory standards

and the evidence. We deny Citicorp’s petition for review

and affirm the order of the Board.

17a

Appendix B

Portions of Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company

Act of 1956, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1843.

Interest in nonbanking organizations—Ownership or

control of voting shares of any company not a bank; engage-

ment im activities other than banking

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no

bank holding company shall—

(1) after May 9, 1956, acquire direct or indirect

ownership or control of any voting shares of any com-

pany which is not a bank, or

(2) after two years from the date as of which it

becomes a bank holding company, or in the case of a

company which has been continuously affiliated since

May 15, 1955, with a company which was registered

under the Investment Company Act of 1940, prior to

May 15, 1955, in such a manner as to constitute an

affiliated company within the meaning of that Act,

after December 31, 1978, or, in the case of any

company which becomes, as a resul! of the enactment

of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of

1970, a bank holding company on the date of such enact-

ment, after December 31, 1980, retain direct or indirect

ownership or control of any voting shares of any

company which is not a bank or bank holding company

or engage in any activities other than (A) those of

banking or of managing or controlling banks and

other subsidiaries authorized under this chapter or of

furnishing services to or performing services for its

- subsidiaries, and (B) those permitted under paragraph

(8) of subsection (c) of this subject to all the conditions

specified in such paragraph or in any order or regula-

tion issued by the Board under such paragraph:

Provided, That a company covered in 1970 may also

18a

engage in those activities in which directly or through

a subsidiary (i) it was lawfully engaged on June 30,

1968 (or on a date subsequent to June 30, 1968 in the

case of activities carried on as the result of the acquisi-

tion by such company or subsidiary, pursuant to a

binding written contract entered into on or before

June 30, 1968, of another company engaged in such

activities at the time of the acquisition), and (ii) it has

been continuously engaged since June 30, 1968 (or such

subsequent date). The Board by order, after oppor-

tunity for hearing, may terminate the authority con-

ferred by the preceding proviso on any company to en-

gage directly or through a subsidiary in any activity

otherwise permitted by that proviso if it determines,

having due regard to the purposes of this chapter that

such action is necessary to prevent undue concentration

of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts

of interest, or unsound banking practices; and in the

case of any such company controlling a bank having

bank assets in excess of $60,000,000 on or after Decem-

ber 31, 1970, the Board shall determine, within two years

after such date (or, if later, within two years after the

date on which the bank assets first exceed $60,000,000),

whether the authority conferred by the preceding pro-

viso with respect to such company should be terminated

as provided in this sentence. Nothing in this paragraph

shall be construed to authorize any bank holding com-

pany referred to in the preceding proviso, or any sub-

sidiary thereof, to engage in activities authorized by

that proviso through the acquisition, pursuant to a con-

tract entered into after June 30, 1968, of any interest in

or the assets of a going concern engaged in such activ-

ities. Any company which is authorized to engage in

any activity pursuant to the preceding proviso or sub-

section (d) of this section but, as a result of action of

the Board, is required to terminate such activity may

(notwithstanding any otherwise applicable time limit

prescribed in this paragraph) retain the ownership or

19a

control of shares in any company carrying on such

activity for a period of ten years from the date on which

its authority was so terminated by the Board.

The Board is authorized, upon application by a bank hold-

ing company, to extend the two year period referred to in

paragraph (2) above from time to time as to such bank

holding company for not more than one year at a time, if,

in its judgment, such an extension would not be detrimental

to the public interest, but no such extensions shall in the

aggregate exceed three years.

Exemptions

(c) The prohibitions in this section shall not apply to

any bank holding company which is (i) a labor, agricultural,

or horticultural organization and which is exempt from

taxation under section 501 of Title 26, or (ii) a company

covered in 1970 more than 85 per centum of the voting stock

of which was collectively owned on June 30, 1968, and

continuously thereafter, directly or indirectly, by or for

members of the same family, or their spouses, who are

lineal descendants of common ancestors; and such prohib-

itions shall not, with respect to any other bank holding

company, apply to— 7

(8) shares of any company the activities of which

the Board after due notice and opportunity for hearing

_ has determined (by order or regulation) to be so closely

related to banking or managing or controlling banks as

to be a proper incident thereto. In determining

whether a particular activity is a proper incident to

banking or managing or controlling banks the Board

shall consider whether its performance by an affiliate of

20a

a holding company can reasonably be expected to pro-

duce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience,

increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that out-

weigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concen-

tration of resources, decreased or unfair competition,

conflicts of interests, or unsound banking practices. In

orders and regulations under this subsection, the Board

may differentiate between activities commenced de novo

and activities commenced by the acquisition, in whole or

in part, of a going concern....

In the event of the failure of the Board to act on any

application for an order under paragraph (8) of this sub-

section within the ninety-one-day period which begins on.

the date of submission to the Board of the complete record

on that application, the application shall be deemed to have

_ been granted. The Board shall include in its annual report

‘to the Congress a description and a statement of the reasons

for approval of each activity approved by it by order or

regulation under such paragraph during the period covered

by the report.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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