Petition — Carter v. United States
Supreme Court brief1979
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Suprery Court, US NT
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MAR 15 1979
IN THE
| MI@MAPL BODAK, JR., CLERK
Supreme Court of the Unite
Octoser TERM, 1978
——#8-1421
No.
GEORGE FRANKLIN CARTER, ITI,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
OLIVER M. SPURLOCK,
180 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1212,
Chicago, Illinois 60601, (312) 263-2664,
Attorney for Petitioner.
CHESTER SLAUGHTER,
188 West Randolph Street, Suite 2105,
Chicago, Illinois 60601, (312) 236-5277,
Of Counsel.
Keenan Printing Company 312-648-0050 <i> 3865
/
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroser TERM, 1978
No.
GEORGE FRANKLIN CARTER, ITI,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and Associated Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court of the United States.
GEORGE FRANKLIN CARTER, III, the petitioner
herein, prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the
judgment of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals entered
in the above entitled case on February 15, 1979.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the appeals court of February 15, 1979,
affirming the conviction of petitioner is not officially re-
ported (Appendix A, infra).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court below (Appendix A, infra,
page 7) was entered on February 15, 1979. The jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether an interrogation and routine search of a travel-
ler’s luggage, which reveals nothing unusual is sufficient
grounds for a more intensive cooperative search by Customs
inspectors and DEA agents?
Whether a Drug Enforcement Administration agent may,
without probable cause, jointly participate with a United
States Customs Inspector in a warrantless border search of
a traveler’s person and luggage?
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
1. United States Constitution Amendment IV. The
rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized.
2. Law Enforcement in Illicit Drug Activities. Reorgani-
zation Plan No. 2 of 1973. The following plan prepared by
the President and transmitted to the Senate and the House
of Representatives in Congress assembled, March 28, 1973,
pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 9 Title 5 of the United
States Code (5 U.S.C.S. §§ 901 et seq.) and amended Mar.
16, 1974, P. L. 93-253, § 1, 88 Stat. 50, became effective July
1, 1973. Section 1. Transfers to the Attorney General. There
are hereby transferred from the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Department of the Treasury, and any other officer or
any agency of the Department of the Treasury, to the At-
torney General all intelligence, investigative, and law en-
forcement functions, vested by law in the Secretary, the
Department, officers, or agencies which relate to the sup-
pression of illicit traffic in narcotics, dangerous drugs, or
marihuana, except that the Secretary shall retain, and con-
tinue to perform, those functions, to the extent that they
relate to searches and seizures of illicit narcotics, danger-
ous drugs, or marihuana or to the apprehension or detention
of persons in connection therewith, at regular inspection
locations at ports of entry or anywhere along the land or
water borders of the United States: Provided, that any illi-
cit narcotics, dangerous drugs, marihuana, or related evi-
4
dence seized, and any person apprehended or detained by
the Secretary or any officer of the Department of the Treas-
ury, pursuant to the authority retained in them by virtue
of this section, shall be turned over forthwith to the juris-
diction of the Attorney General; Provided further, that
nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting in any
way, any authority vested by law in the Secretary of Treas-
ury, the Department of the Treasury, or any other agency of
that Department on the effective date of this Plan with re-
spect to contraband other than illicit narcotics, dangerous
drugs, and marihuana: and Provided further, that nothing
in this section shall be construed as limiting in any way any
authority the Attorney General, the Department of Justice,
or any other officer or any agency of that Department may
enforcement activities, including activities relating to the
suppression of illicit traffic in narcotics, dangerous drugs,
and marihuana, at ports of entry or along the land and wa-
ter borders of the United States.
3. Title 5 U.S.C. § 905. Limitations on powers.-(a) A
reorganization plan may not provide for, and a reorganiza-
tion under this chapter (§§ 901-9B of this title) may not
have the effect of-
(4) authorizing an agency to exercise a function
which is not expressly authorized by law at the
time the plan is transmitted to Congress;
4. Title 19 U.S.C. § 482. Customs Duties—Enforcement
Provisions. Any of the officers or persons authorized to
board or search vessels may stop, search, and examine, as
well without as within their respective districts, any vehicle,
beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect
there is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have
been introduced into the United States in any manner con-
5
trary to law, whether by the person in possession or charge,
or by, in, or upon such vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and
to search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which
he may have a reasonable cause to suspect there is mer-
chandise which was imported contrary to law; and if any
such officer or other person so authorized shall find any
merchandise on or about any such vehicle, beast, or person,
or in any such trunk or envelope, which he shall have rea-
sonable cause to believe is subject to duty, or to have been
unlawfully introduced into the United States, whether by
the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such
vehicle, beast, or otherwise, he shall seize and secure the
same for trial.
STATEMENT
On February 8, 1978 the petitioner arrived at the inter-
national terminal at O’Hare Field in Chicago, Illinois after
an non-stop flight from Amsterdam, Holland. He was
cleared through immigration and he proceeded to the Uni‘ed
States Customs inspection line with his luggage. Petition-
er’s luggage consisted of a brown vinyl suitcase, a blue gar-
met bag, and a sealed, yellow plastic shopping bag which
contained duty-free purchased cigarettes and liquor from a
duty-free shop in the Amsterdam airport.
The Customs Inspector, David Guoding, asked petitioner
a series of routine questions, and wrote some of petitioners
answers to those questions on the back of petitioner’s cus-
toms declaration form. Inspector Gooding examined the
contents of the brown vinyl suitcase and found nothing un-
usual. Petitioner was then ordered to proceed to a small sec-
ondary search room located away from the main customs
area. Agent John Whittington of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, on his own volition, immediately followed
petitioner and the customs inspector into the secondary
search room.
Inside the search room inspector Gooding instructed Peti-
tioner to empty his pockets on the table. Petitioner placed
a large quantity of American bills on the table along with
his receipt for the purchase of cigarettes and vodka. Good-
ing then searched Petitioner’s overcoat and found another
large quantity of bills. The facts are in dispute as to the
dialog that occured between Gooding and Petitioner re-
garding Petitioner’s answer to questions about his money.
The Customs inspector claimed that when he first asked
Petitioner if he was carrying more than five thousand dol-
lars Petitioner replied that he was carrying two thousand
7
dollars. He further claimed that after he discovered -more
money in Petitioner’s overcoat he again asked Petitioner
if he was carrying more than five thousand dollars and
Petitioner stated ‘‘five thousand and no more.” Petitioner
testified that his answer to both questions was ‘‘A few
thousand dollars.”
The facts were also in dispute as to whether govern-
ment’s exhibit number one, a piece of tin foil, containing
a minute amount of white powdery substance was recov-
ered from the inside suitcoat jacket of Petitioner. The
Customs inspector claimed that he removed a small, one-
half inch square, piece of foil from Petitioner’s inside suit-
coat pocket, opened it, observed a small amount of white
powder, refolded it and placed it inside his pants pocket.
Petitioner testified that the Customs Inspector did not
remove a piece of tin foil from his pocket.
The Customs inspector then closed the door of the search
room and he and agent Whittington performed a strip
search upon Petitioner. They did not observe any weapons
and they instructed Petitioner to redress. The Customs
inspector left Petitioner alone with agent Whittington and
went to get a form that is required for passengers carry-
ing more than five thousand dollars. While the Customs
inspector was away, agent Whittington maintained custody
of Petitioner and counted his money. Inspector Gooding
returned with the form and instructed Petitioner in how to
complete it, and again left Petitioner alone with Whitting-
ton. Gooding returned with Petitioner’s luggage and left
all three bags on the floor of the hallway outside the search
room.
Gooding then asked permission to observe -Petitioner
while Petitioner completed the negotiable instruments form.
After giving Petitioner additional instructions, Gooding
elias
8
again left Petitioner in Whittington’s custody and carried
the brown suitcase and blue garment bag into another
search room and examined them.
While Gooding was searching the luggage, U.S. Customs
Inspector Edward Gross arrived at the search room. Agent
Whittington asked Gross whether the yellow duty-free bag
on the floor of the hallway belonged to Petitioner. Both
Gross and Whittington looked into the bag and observed a
bottle of vodka and four cartons of cigarettes. Inspector
Gross took a knife and cut the green Amsterdam tape that
sealed the top of the bag. Whittington and Gross each
removed cigarette cartons, and Whittington asked Petiti-
tioner what was inside. Petitioner replied ‘‘Cigarettes, go
ahead and open them.’’ Whittington then instructed Gross
that the cigarettes should be opened.
Inspector Gooding returned to the hallway and picked up
the yellow duty-free bag and took it into the other search
room. Agent Whittington followed Gooding, observed him
open the cartons and individual packages, and saw the
white powdery substance. Agent Whittington’s partner per-
formed a field test for heroin and agent Whittington then
formally placed Petitioner under arrest.
Petitioner was charged in a two count indictment with
the importation of a controlled substance (21, U.S.C.
952(a)) and with possession with the intention to distribute
a controlled substance (21, U.S.C. 841(a)(1)).
The first trial of this matter was heard before the Honor-
able John P. Crowley and a jury. Appropriate pre-trial
motions to suppress the physical evidence were filed and
after a hearing were denied. The matter was then tried
before the jury which, after lengthy deliberation, announced
that it was hopelessly deadlocked. Judge Crowley declared
a mistrial on March 22, 1978.
9
The second trial was heard before the Honorable Joel M.
Flaum and a jury. Judge Flaum granted defendant leave
to adopt the pre-trial motions filed in the first trial before
Judge Crowley, and without a hearing, denied defendant’s
motion to suppress the physical evidence. Following the
trial before Judge Flaum and a jury the defendant was
found and adjudged guilty of both counts in the indictment.
Appropriate post-trial motions were filed, but denied. Peti-
tioner was sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General
for a period of twelve years on each count, said sentences
to run concurrently and a $15,000.00 fine on count one.
10
REASONS FOR GRANTING
THE WRIT
This court should examine and clearly articulate the con-
stitutional validity of a joint, Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration—-Customs Bureau border search, as it affeets the
constitutional rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.
Searches by customs officials are common but on occasion
present problems that are unique in the area of Fourth
Amendment rights. Since the first border search statute
was enacted in 1789, customs officials have been authorized
to stop and examine any vehicle, person, or baggage arriv-
ing in the United States on suspicion that merchandisee is
concealed which is subject to duty or which cannot legally
be imported in the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964).
This statutory power is supplemented by regulations pro-
mulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury and which deal
with the search of persons and baggage 19 U.S.C.A. § 1582
(1964).
The Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 spe-
cifically reserved to the Secretary of the Treasury, the ex-
clusive duty to conduct searches of travellers and their
belongings at ports of entry. This same Reorganization
Plan has been judicially interpreted to authorize concur-
rent authority by the Drug Enforcement Administration to
also conduct warrantless searches without probable cause,
of travelers and their belongings at borders and ports of
entry. Untied States v. Bates, 526 F. 2d 966, 967 (5th Cir.
1976) ; United States v. Ortega, 471 F. 2d 1350, 1360 (2d
Cir. 1972), Cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973) ; United States
v. Carter, No. 78-1666, (7th Cir. 1979).
11
It is the contention of the petitioner that warrantless
border searches without probable cause by agents of the
Drug Enforcement Administration was neither authorized
nor contemplated by the Presidential Reorganization Plan
No. 2. That the developing judicial interpretations of co-
operative efforts between the Customs Bureau and DEA
represent the engraftment of an unconstitutional exception
to the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States.
The petitioner further contends that Reorganization Plan
No. 2, is controlled by the Limitation of Powers section of
Title 5 §§ 905(a) (4) which provides that;
(a) A reorganization plan may not provide and an
reorganization under this chapter may not have
the effect of—
(4) authorizing an agency to exercise a function
which is not expressly authorized by law at the,
time the plan is transmitted to Congress.
Agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration have
never been authorized to conduct or participate in warrant-
less border searches, without probable cause. Whether the
authority of DEA agents may be extended to fall within
an exemption from the requirements of probable cause
should be settled by this Court.
The petitioner further contends that the doctrine of joint
participation enunciated by this Court in Byars v. United
States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) and Lusting v. United States,
338 U.S. 74 (1949) should be applied to warrantless border
searches conducted by the combined efforts of U.S. Customs
inspectors and Drug Enforcement Administration agents.
12
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this petition of a writ of
certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Ottver M. SpurLock,
180 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1212,
Chicago, Illinois 60601, (312) 263-2664,
Attorney for Petitioner.
CuHEsTER SLAUGHTER,
188 West Randolph Street, Suite 2105,
Chicago, Illinois 60601, (312) 236-5277,
Of Counsel.
Al
APPENDIX
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 78-1666
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appllee,
v.
GEORGE FRANKLIN CARTER,
Defendant-A ppellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 78 CR 68—JOEL M. FLAUM, Judge.
Argued January 4, 1979—Decided February 15, 1979.
Before CUMMINGS, SPRECHER and BAUER, Circuit
Judges.
SPRECHER, Circuit Judge. This appeal raises the ques-
tion of whether a Drug Enforcement Administration agent
may participate with customs inspectors in conducting a
border search. We hold that there is neither constitutional
nor statutory infirmity in such participation under the cir-
cumstances of this case.
A2
I
The defendant arrived at the international terminal at
O’Hare Airport in Chicago on February 8, 1978, terminat-
ing a nonstop flight from Amsterdam, Netherlands. He
passed through immigration, retrieved his luggage, consist-
ing of a brown vinyl suitcase, a blue garment bag, and a
yellow duty-free bag, and proceeded to the customs inspec-
tion area. He handed his customs declaration form, airline
ticket and passport to Customs Inspector Gooding, who
asked routine questions and inspected the brown suitcase.
The defendant was then taken to a secondary search room
by Gooding, where they were immediately joined by Drug
Enforcement Administration agent Whittington. Gooding
asked the defendant to empty his pockets onto a table in
the search room, which resulted in the defendant’s removal
of a large quantity of United States currency. Gooding then
requested the defendant to remove his overcoat which Good-
ing examined and in which he found another large quantity
of currency. Gooding then requested the defendant to re-
move his suiteoat which Gooding examined and in which he
found a folded tinfoil packet holding a white, powdery sub-
stance later determined to contain heroin.
At this point, Gooding’s supervisor, Customs Inspector
Knezev appeared in the secondary search room, and Knezev
obtained a small plastic bag into which the tinfoil packet
was placed. Knezev also ordered Gooding to conduct a strip
search of the defendant. Gooding, with Whittington still
present, conducted the strip search.
As the defendant dressed, Gooding left the search room
to obtain a form necessary when more than $5,000 in cur-
rency is brought into the country. While Gooding was ab-
A3
sent, Whittington counted the money. When he returned
the defendant filled out the currency form. Gooding then
left the defendant with Whittington while he carried the
brown suitcase and the blue garment bag into another search
room and inspected them. At that time, Knezev returned
with Customs Inspector Gross, who joined Whittington and
the defendant.
The yellow duty-free bag had remained in the hallway
outside the secondary search room, where Gross and Whit-
tington examined it and found it to contain a bottle of vodka
and four cartons of cigarettes. Gross cut the tape which
sealed the bag shut and removed a carton. Whittington re-
moved a second carton and asked the defendant, ‘‘ What is
in here, besides cigarettes?” The defendant appeared to be-
come somewhat nervous and responded, ‘‘Nothing, go
ahead, open them, if you want to.” The cartons were re-
turned to the yellow bag.
Gooding returned and picked up the yellow bag which
he proceeded to inspect. Upon removing one of the cigar-
ette cartons, he noted that it felt heavy and resisted pres-
sure when squeezed. He opened the carton and removed one
of the individual packs which also resisted pressure when
squeezed and shook when rattled. He opened the pack and
found a plastic bag containing a white powdery substance.
A second pack produced the same result.
Whittington, who had been present, then instructed his
DEA partner to test the substance. The test revealed that
the substance contained an opiate. It developed that 36 of
the 40 cigarette packs contained a total of 930.40 grams of
heroin, 786.16 grams of which were 85% pure and 144.24
grams of which were 84% pure. The tinfoil packet contained
.02 grams of heroin.
A4
Whittington arrested the defendant and Gooding turned
over to Whittington the duty-free bag and its contents, as
well as the tinfoil packet. Gooding took custody of the
$6,969 in currency.
The defendant was charged in a two-count indictment with
intentional importation and possession with intent to dis-
tribute heroin in violation of 21 U..C. §§ 952(a) and 841(a)
(1). He was found guilty of both counts by a jury and was
sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment on each count, to run
concurrently, to be followed by a three-year mandatory
special parole term. The defendant was also fined $15,000.
II
The defendant argued on appeal that the search was un-
constitutionally conducted because of the participation by
the DEA agent with the customs inspectors. In his presen-
tation the defendant has not given full consideration to the
unique nature of a border search.
A search of a passenger and his luggage upon arriv-
ing by airplane at O’Hare Airport after a nonstop flight
from Amsterdam is the functional equivalent of a border
search. United States v. Brown, 499 F. 2d 829 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974). Searches made at the
border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign
to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and
property crossing into the country, are reasonable simply
by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border. United
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). Routine in-
spections and searches of individuals or conveyances seek-
ing to cross the borders or their functional equivalents are
not subject to the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
A5
272 (1973).* See also United States v. Odland, 502 F. 2d
148, 150-51 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974).
Customs officers characteristically and properly inspect
luggage. ‘‘[I]t is an old practice and is intimately associ-
ated with excluding articles from the country.” United
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376
(1971).? Also, those entering the country may be examined
as to their “belongings and effects” without violating the
Fourth Amendment. California Bankers Association v.
Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 62-63 (1974). Belongings and effects
have been held to include the contents of a person’s purse,
wallet or pockets. Henderson v. United States, 390 F. 2d
805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). See also United States v. Flores,
477 F. 2d 608, 609 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 841
(1973); United States v. Summerfield, 421 F. 2d 684, 685
(9th Cir. 1970).
The discovery of incriminating matter during routine
searches is ‘‘reasonable cause to suspect” that a more in-
tensive search will produce more contraband. Customs
agents customarily proceed from the less intrusive to
1. The Court in Almeida-Sanchez stated that, for ex-
ample, ‘‘a search of the passengers and cargo of an air-
line arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight
from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equiva-
lent of a border search.’’ 413 U.S. at 273.
2. The statute authorizing border searches expressly
provides that any customs officer ‘‘may... search any trunk
or envelope ... in which he may have a reasonable cause
to suspect there is merchandise which was imported con-
trary to law... .’? 19 U.S.C. § 482. The statute authorizing
the Secretary of Treasury to prescribe regulations for bor-
der searches speaks of searching ‘‘persons and baggage.’’
19 U.S.C. § 1582.
A6
the more intrusive form of search. United States v. Afana-
dor, 567 F. 2d 1325, 1329 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1978) ; United States
v. Asbury, 586 F. 2d 973, 976 (2d Cir. 1978).
The defendant’s argument is centered on the fact that a
DEA agent was involved with the customs inspectors in
conducting the search of the luggage, belongings and effects
of the defendant.
Customs officials under the supervision of the Secretary
of Treasury and drug enforcement officials under the super-
vision of the United States Attorney General have tradi-
tionally cooperated and exercised some joint powers over
drugs searched for and seized in border searches.* The
present relationship between these kinds of federal offi-
cers is detailed in Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973,‘
3. In United States v. Ortega, 471 F. 2d 1350 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973), the court said
‘*{w]e may remark, parenthetically, that a combination of
customs agents and agents of the Bureau of Narcoties and
Dangerous Drugs made an examination of the Jaguar and
its contents in the hold of the Elizabeth II as she came up
the harbor and one of the 180 bags of heroin was removed
for testing.’’ Zd. at 1353-54. The court concluded that
‘*[t]he search by a Customs Agent and others helping him,
in the hold of the Elizabeth II while still in midstream, was
clearly proper as a border search.’’ Jd. at 1360.
See also United States v. Thompson, 475 F. 2d 1359 (5th
Cir. 1973) (respective powers of customs agents and border
patrol officers who are employees of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service under the supervision of the United
States Attorney General).
4. Effective July 1, 1973, 38 F.R. 15932, 87 Stat. 1091, as
amended March 16, 1974, Pub. L. 93-253, § 1, 88 Stat. 50, 28
U.S.C. § 509 annotation, promulgated pursuun! to 5 U.S.C.
§§ 902-12.
- eee
sr
A7
which provides that all intelligence, investigative and law
enforcement functions vested in the Secretary of Treasury
which relate to the suppression of illicit traffic in drugs are
transferred to the Attorney General
except that the Secretary shall retain, and continue to
perform, those functions, to the extent that they relate
to searches and seizures of illicit narcotics, dangerous
drugs, or marihuana or to the apprehension or deten-
tion of persons in connection therewith, at regular in-
spection locations at ports of entry or anywhere along
the land or water borders of the United States: Pro-
vided, that any illicit narcotics, dangerous drugs,
marihuana, or related evidence seized, and any person
apprehended or detained by the Secretary or any offi-
cer of the Department of the Treasury, pursuant to the
authority retained in them by virtue of this section,
shall be turned over forthwith to the jurisdiction of the
Attorney General. . and Provided further, that noth-
ing in this section shall be construed as limiting in any
way any authority the Attorney General, the Depart-
ment of Justice, or any other officer or any agency of
that Department may otherwise have to make investi-
gations or engage in law enforcement activities, in-
cluding activities relating to the suppression of illicit
traffic in narcotics, dangerous drugs, and marihuana,
at ports of entry or along the land and water borders
of the United States.
Section 1, Reorganization Plan No. 2, 28 U.S.C. § 509
annotation.
The Reorganization Plan contemplates the very kind of
cooperation and joint effort engaged in by the officers in
this case. The DEA agent was primarily an onlooker until
the tinfoil packet of heroin was found in the defendant’s
pocket, whereupon his participation became somewhat more
active. After the sizeable quantity of drugs was discovered,
he made the arrest and the evidence was ‘‘turned over
A8
forthwith” to him by the customs inspector. The search was
proper in every way.
The defendant sought to rely upon Byars v. United
States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), holding that when a federal
officer participates officially with state officers in a search,
the constitutionality of that search is to be tested as though
it were an official federal search and not merely as a state
or private search, the fruits of which would be fully usable
by federal officers. The issue posed by Byars is not present
here; the search here was an acknowledged federal search
governed by border search standards. Defendant’s reliance
upon United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), is also
misplaced since Chadwick does not deal with a border
search.
Iil
We find no merit in the defendant’s second argument that
the evidence was insufficient to show knowing possession
of heroin.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
A true Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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