Opposition — Giliberto v. Compagnie Nationale Air France

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Supreme Court, U. S.

FILED

MAR—29 1979

In THE MICHAR, RODAK, JR., CLERK

Supreme Court of the United. States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1337

>

as

THE HONORABLE LOUIS J. GILIBERTO, JUDGE OF

THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLI-

NOIS, ET AL., EITAN ARONOWITCH, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

COMPAGNIE NATIONALE AIR FRANCE and

SINGAPORE AIRLINES,

Respondents.

RESPONDENT AIR FRANCE’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Wru1M J. JUNKERMAN

Wii F. Martin, Jr.

One State Street Plaza

New York, New York 10004

Counsel for Respondent

Air France

Donautp M. Hasketi

MicuHast J. Senr

208 South LaSalle

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Of Counsel

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

rece ec ute kiactcce ceive stscos 1

ai divs Jb vt od ik saecenbe eas see 00 2

Pornt I—All of petitioners’ claims against re-

spondent Air France arising out of the hijacking

to Entebbe are exclusively governed by the con-

ditions and limits set forth in the Warsaw

ED ik Case abGe bd ech ha ane od Wied deaaee 3

Point II—No authority exists for the interpretation

of the word ‘domicile’ in Article 28 of the War-

saw Convention asserted by petitioners ..,.... 6

Point I1I—The provisions of Article 28 of the War-

saw Convention clearly relate to subject matter

SEED? Sas S52 6 v'btib Ge 08.8 wae La niet es evRS bie 12

Porst IV—The provisions of the Warsaw Conven-

tion are clearly constitutional and, in any case,

the issue of the constitutionality of the Warsaw

Convention was not properly raised before the

Illinois Supreme Court ...................08. 16

Pornt V—As to the applicability of the doctrine of

forum non conveniens to this lawsuit .......... 18

ates bbe ss cd crowds sdess¥css ‘Vissdeseus 22

EE Mies dnckehdainchaase itd sé dadends det App 1

ii TaBLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: ; PAGE

Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d

913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, —— U.S. ——

CUE 0 VANS <0 USac <% en evig dhe eneben eae 15, 16

Butz v. British Atrways, 421 F.Supp. i127 (E.D. Pa.

1976), aff'd mem., 566 F. 2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1977) 8,

9,14

Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) .... 5

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Gp., 57 L.Ed.

BG SP ia dain cece cp cagvhsbeneiabesebeses 17

Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804 (2d.

CO: BOE ar tbh Vien i dciens Ses dstak Caskets 8

Galli v. Re-Al Brazilian Int. Airlines, 29 Misc.2d 499,

211 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1961) ... 9

Garcia v. Pan American Airways, 183 Mise. 258, 50

N.Y.S.2d 250, aff’d, 269 App. Div. 287, 55 N.Y.S.

2d 317, aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, cert. denied, 329 U.S.

Vee CHE Ge cele Avantwdilon< ccsuleesgabudaet 17

Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) ........ 20

Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F.Supp. 702

(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240

COR CA GOOD .sieec i tdeivcuncnch dauwreensbeee 5, 6

Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v.

Pan American Airways, 58 F.Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y.

BORED widnon con cinesnncinesccoedaasbannenseen 17

Kahn v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 9 Avi.

ET OT CRRA Es TOGR) oie ac cuss vecsecsdeweves 9

Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427

F.Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ............... 5, 6, 9, 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii

PAGE

Kelley v. Sabena, 242 F.Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1965)... 17

McCarthy v. East African Airways Corp., 13 Avi.

17,385 -(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd mem., 517 F.2d

Re EE Gn Nooo dbavinaeediny oexn 14, 17, 18

Nudo v. Societe Anonyme Belge d’Exploitation, Etc.,

207 F.Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962) .............. 9

Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F.Supp. 486

GE ED ARs s 06 650. SPA bia wildinee... 17

Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.

denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1978) ..........sceeeeees 17

Rinck v. Deutsche Lufthansa, 57 App. Div. 2d 370,

395 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1st Dep’t 1977), aff’d, 44 N.Y. 2d

PE Bettis ee eden hsde sa npere ts cones 14

Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798

& & > gee 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

Varkonyi v. Impressa de Viacao Airea Rio Grandense

(Varig), 71 Mise.2d 607, 336 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup.

i ee cad scenes cccecs 15

Vergara v. Aeroflot “Soviet Airlines’’, 390 F.Supp.

ee pba pals censccccacees 9

Zimonyl v. Varig, court of first instance of Paris 12,

App. 5-11

Statutes and Rules:

United States Constitution, Article III ............ 14

I I ros cent cere cs ccc ccc cccn. 13, 20

Illinois Civil Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 110,

ET EE elath k dee wh dias stn wate owe boos 12, 13, 15

iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

Supreme Court of the United States:

SE SE EE ORE Vaveawacs essen ccaeencnes 2

GE: Graccaens Gttae s odatk Me 'b 55 CAME ED AES 2

eo ) DRA Sr Pon gee Ba OF 2

SG AS aie Bak os SRE baer ed 2

The Warsaw Convention (Convention for the Unifica-

tion of Certain Rules Relating to International

Transportation by Air), 49 Stat. 3000 et seq.

Ser So RNG 7s en esa Se I ee passim

Other Authorities:

Shaweross and Beaumont, Air Law, Fourth Ed.,

1 SURE aR DS ant Tae Be oe ae | Oe Ce ee (Oe PC 10

15 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,

SEND CSE cheba Ky RE ee Redigtbingetd moi 13

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1337

—

Wi

Tue Honorasie Louis J. Gruwerto, JupGe oF THE CiRcuIT

Court oF Coox County, Inurois, et aL., Erran Arono-

WITCH, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

CompaGcnig NationaLe Alin France and

Sruveapore AIRLINES,

Respondents.

+

rv

RESPONDENT AIR FRANCE’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Counterstatement

One of the surprising aspects of petitioners’ lengthy

“brief” in support of the petition for a writ of certiorari

is that it extends over seventeen pages before even dis-

cussing the alleged legal issues involved. Nine of these

seventeen pages are devoted to an extended recitation of

the facts of the hijacking of June 27, 1976 and the nature

of the treatment accorded to petitioners during their in-

carceration at Entebbe. While such discussion might have

some import if the hijackers or the government of Uganda

were before this Court, it has no relevance whatsoever with

respect to petitioners’ claims against the respondents. The

result is that petitioners’ brief is impermissibly long, and

in flagrant violation of Rule 23 (1.(c) and (e); Rule 23(4);

Rule 40 1.(d)(1), and (f); and Rule 40(5) of the Rules of

this Court.

As remarkable as petitioners’ “brief” may be for what it

does contain, it is even more remarkable for what it does

not contain. Nowhere in petitioners’ seventy-six pages is

there any mention of the fact that actions have been filed

against Air France in either Israel, France or Canada

on behalf of all of the passengers on the hijacked Air

France aircraft who are involved in this petition. In each

instance, these passengers, who are all non-residents of the

United States, have filed suit against Air France in their

country of citizenship. All of such actions were filed by

petitioners shortly before the running of the two-year pre-

scriptive period set forth in Article 29 of the Warsaw

Convention [49 Stat. Part 2—3021]. A complete list of

these passengers on Air France flight 139 of June 27, 1976

who have brought suit against Air France in the courts

of Canada, France and Israel accompanies this brief as

“Appendix A’’. Accordingly, contrary to the false im-

pression created in the petition, the decision of the Illinois

Supreme Court dismissing petitioners’ claims has not de-

prived petitioners of forums in which to litigate their

alleged claims against respondent Air France arising out

of the hijacking.

Question Presented

Should this Court review a decision of the Supreme

Court of Illmois which is in complete accord with United

States authority as to the applicability of the Warsaw

Convention to claims arising out of aircraft hijackings,

as to the interpretation of the permissible forums for suit

enumerated in Article 28 of the Convention [49 Stat. Part

2(1)-3020], and as it relates to the Illinois doctrine of

forum non conventens?

3

POINT I

All of petitioners’ claims against respondent Air

France arising out of the hijacking to Entebbe are

exclusively governed by the conditions and limits set

forth in the Warsaw Convention.

In Point I of their brief in support of the petition for

a writ of certiorari, petitioners allege that respondent

Air France argued before the Illinois Supreme Court,

and that court subsequently held, that petitioners were

and remained “passengers” of Air France at all times,

including the seven day period while they were impris-

oned in Entebbe, Uganda. This assertion is a complete

misstatement not only of Air France’s argument before the

Illinois Supreme Court, but of the express holding of that

court.

The scope of an air carrier’s liability for deaths or in-

juries sustained by passengers in international transporta-

tion is set forth in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention

(49 Stat. Part 2—3018) :

“Article 17

The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in

the event of the death or wounding of a passenger

or any other bodily injuries suffered by a passenger,

if the accident which caused the damage so sustained

took place on board the aircraft or in the course of

any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”

Petitioners’ “passenger’’ argument is apparently based

upon the allegation that many of the injuries and deaths

occurred following petitioners’ disembarkation from Air

France’s aircraft at Entebbe. As the clear wording of

Article 17 demonstrates, however, the applicability of this

Article depends not on the location of the plaintiffs’

injuries, but on the location of the “accident” causing the

4

injuries. As long as the accident causing the injuries

takes place “on board the aircraft or in the course of any

of the operations of embarking or disembarking”, all in-

juries which flow from the accident are covered by Article

17 regardless of the particular location where these in-

juries occur. In this action, the “accident” constitutes the

hijacking of Air France Flight 139, which hijacking

obviously occurred while petitioners were on board Air

France’s aircraft. Accordingly, Article 17 of the Warsaw

Convention comprehends all of the petitioners’ claims for

injuries and damages caused by that “accident”. The

common law question of whether the passenger/carrier

relationship continued to exist after petitioners’ disem-

barkation from Air France’s aircraft is, therefore, entirely

irrelevant to the determination of whether their claims

against Air France are governed by the Warsaw Conven-

tion. In discussing petitioners’ argument relating to the

non-applicability of the Warsaw Convention to petitioners’

injuries incurred after disembarkation from Air France’s

aircraft at Entebbe, the Illinois Supreme Court correctly

interpreted the scope of Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-

vention as follows (74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d at 981):

“From more specific allegations made later in the

complaint it appears that some, at least, of the

threats and physical injuries to which the plaintiffs

were allegedly subjected may not have taken place

while they were aboard the plane but rather while

they were kept in detention at Entebbe. Assuming

that to be the case the Warsaw Convention would

not thereby be rendered inapplicable to this suit. Its

applicability, under Article 17, depends upon the place

where the ‘accident,’ rather than the resulting in-

juries, occurred, and the ‘accident,’ as already noted,

consisted of the hijacking itself.”

In support of its holding relating to the applicability

of the Warsaw Convention to the claims arising out of

5

the hijacking to Uganda, the Illinois Supreme Court cited

a number of recent federal court decisions which have

held the Warsaw Convention applicable to claims arising

out of aircraft hijackings and other intentional acts of

terrorism committed in the course of international flights,

including Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31

(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) ; Husserl

v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F.Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.

1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973); and

Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427

F.Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E. 2d at

980.

In an attempt to discredit the Illinois Supreme Court’s

reliance on the above-cited cases, petitioners claim that the

facts in thix case are “materially different from the facts in

any of the decisions cited by the Illinois Supreme Court.”

This assertion is negated by the fact that the last decision

cited above, namely Karfunkel v. Compagnie National Air

France, arose out of this very same hijacking. In

Karfunkel, Judge Inzer Wyatt of the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed

the claims of the two Karfunkel passengers on Air France

Flight 139 of June 27, 1976 upon the ground that that court

was not a permissible forum for their action against Air

France pursuant to Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention.

Unlike any of the present petitioners, the plaintiffs in

Karfunkel were United States citizens, a fact which il-

lustrates that the citizenship of a plaintiff may not be a

relevant factor in determining the emia of a particular

forum under Article 28.

In holding that all of the Karfunkel claims against Air

France were subject to the terms of the Warsaw Conven-

tion and thus barred by the provisions of Article 28, Judge

Wyatt placed primary reliance upon the earlier decision of

that court in Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., supra.

Husserl arose out of a hijacking in which a Swissair air-

craft was diverted to a desert airport in Jordan where the

6

passengers were forced to stay in the aircraft for approxi-

mately twenty-four hours and were then confined to a hotel

in Amman, Jordan for another four days. In commenting

upon this set of facts, Judge Wyatt in Karfunkel observed

that Husserl involved “a hijacking in all respects in-

distinguishable from that at bar.” 427 F.Supp. at 975.

Perforce, then, the facts in Husserl are equally “in-

distinguishable” from the facts of the hijacking involved

herein.

Since the Illinois Supreme Court was clearly correct in

holding that the Warsaw Convention is applicable to all

of petitioners’ claims against respondent Air France for

injuries arising out of the hijacking of June 27, 1976, it is

apparent that these claims are exclusively governed by the

conditions and limits established by the Warsaw Conven-

tion including (49 Stat. Part 2—3020) :

“Article 24

(1) In the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any

action for damages, however founded, can only be

brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in

this Convention.

(2) In the cases covered by Article 17 the provisions

of the preceding paragraph shall also apply, without

prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons

who have the right to bring suit and what are their

respective rights.”

POINT II

_ No authority exists for the interpretation of the

word ‘domicile’ in Article 28 of the Warsaw Conven-

tion asserted by petitioners.

Petitioners’ primary grounds for seeking review by this

Court of the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, as it

relates to the scope of Article 28 of the Warsaw Conven-

tion, is their argument that the Illinois Supreme Court

7

erred in holding that the word “domicile” contained in

Article 28 does not mean any country in which the air-

line carries on business on a “regular and substantial”

basis.

Petitioners are unable to cite any authority for such

an interpretation of the word “domicile’’. The reason

for this lack of support is that no one has ever had

the temerity to suggest such a meaning. The fact that

no party, despite the multitude of United States decisions

concerning the interpretation of Article 28, has argued for

the meaning of “domicile” proposed by the petitioners is

ample demonstration of the absurdity of this argument.

On those occasions where courts have commented upon the

“domicile” provision of Article 28, they have unequivo-

cally stated that a corporation is domiciled at its place

of incorporation, a proposition previously considered not

worthy of even contesting. ,

The leading case in the United States concerning the

interpretation of Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention

is Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798

(2d Cir. 1971). That action involved a claim for personal

injuries sustained by a United States citizen on a flight

of Canadian Pacific, an airline incorporated in Canada,

between Vancouver, British Columbia and Tokyo, Japan.

The plaintiff’s contract of carriage had been purchased in

Vancouver. The facts of the Smith action are therefore

comparabie to the facts of petitioners’ claims against Air

France, in that the plaintiff in Smith was suing a foreign

airline for personal injuries sustained outside of the

United States, on a contract of carriage which did not in-

volve the: United States as a final destination and which

had not been purchased in the United States. As with

petitioners herein, the only basis upon which the plain-

tiff in Smith could allege jurisdiction in his action brought

in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-

trict of New York was that Canadian Pacific maintained

a ticket office in that jurisdiction and was generally sub-

8

ject to service of process therein. In Smith, the Second

Circuit dismissed plaintiff’s action for lack of jurisdiction

under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention. In its dis-

cussion of the four forums enumerated in Article 28, the

Second Circuit held as follows with respect to the meaning

of the “domicile” forum (452 F.2d at 802, emphasis

supplied) :

“The domicile of Canadian Pacific Airways is in

Canada, where it is incorporated, a fact not disputed

by [plaintiff] appellee.’’

The Second Circuit then went on to specifically hold,

in discussion of a previous decision of that court in Eck

v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966),

that the presence of the defendant airline in the jurisdic

tion generally, without any other United States contacts

with the particular contract of carriage, would noi sup-

port jurisdiction under Article 28 (452 F.2d at 803):

“In Eck, the ticket for an international flight was

purchased in Oakland, California for a Switzerland-

Sudanese Republic trip. Relying on the purchase of

the ticket at a site within the United States, through

an agency of the carrier, plus the existence of a regu-

lar ticketing and booking office within the United

States, this court concluded that Article 28(1) was

satisfied. 360 F.2d at 814-815. Eck quite clearly did

not hold that suit in the United States would be

proper where the ticket was purchased outside the

United States and no United States contacts, includ-

ing but not limited to interline or intraline ticketing

arrangements, existed beyond the presence of a ticket-

ing and booking office of the carrier-defendant.”’

Numerous other cases have ruled that an airline’s domi-

cile for the purposes of Article 28 is its place of incorpora-

tion. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 809

(2d Cir. 1966); Bute v. British Airways, 421 F.Supp. 127,

9

131 (E.D.Pa. 1976), aff'd mem., 566 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir.

1977) ; Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427

F.Supp. 971, 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (in which the attorneys

who are co-counsel to petitioners herein, in an action aris-

ing out of the same hijacking, conceded that the domicile

of Air France is its place of incorporation); Vergara v.

Aeroflot “Soviet Airlines”, 390 F.Supp. 1266, 1269 (D. Neb.

1975); Kahn v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 9 Avi.

17, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Nudo v. Societe Anonyme Belge

d’Exploitation, Etc., 207 F. Supp. 191, 192 (E.D. Pa. 1962) ;

Galli v. Re-Al Brazilian Int. Airlines, 29 Mise.2d 499, 500,

211 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1961).

Petitioners’ asserted interpretation of “domicile” would

render meaningless Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention

by reducing the question of jurisdiction under the Conven-

tion to a strictly local matter of in personam jurisdiction.

It would mean that the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit in Smith v. Canadian Pacific Air-

ways, Ltd., swpra, and numerous other courts, had wasted

their judicial time by considering Article 28 since they

could have merely accepted jurisdiction in those cases

based on consideration of in personam requirements. The

Illinois Supreme Court clearly recognized the incom-

patibility of petitioners’ interpretation of the “domicile’’

forum with the jurisdictional scheme of Article 28 of the

Warsaw Convention when that court observed that “piain-

tiffs’ request to adopt this basis of jurisdiction is in effect

a request to create a new jurisdictional standard for the

Convention.” 74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d at 981.

Petitioners, unable to find any United States authority

for their proposed interpretation of the “domicile” forum

contained in Article 28, make reference to the fact that in

certain foreign jurisdictions and treatises, the word “domi-

cile” employed in the official French text of Article 28 has

been interpreted as “ordinarily resident”. However, the

petitioners have cited this difference in translation in a

10

vacuum, and have come forth with no authority to indicate

that “ordinarily resident” would be given any different

interpretation by United States courts than “domicile” has

been. In fact, examination of the law of the United King-

dom, wherein “domicile” in Article 28 has been translated

to mean “ordinarily resident”, reveals that this translation

only serves to support the interpretation of the word

“domicile” that has been announced by United States

courts. The leading English treatise on air law, and in-

deed one ofsthe leading treatises in the world on this sub-

ject, is Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law.

In their Fourth Edition (1977), Shawcross and Beaumont

succinctly explain the meaning of ‘‘ordinarily resident” in

the following manner:

‘*T, WHERE THE CaRRIER IS OrnDINARILY RESIDENT.

439. One of the four bases of jurisdiction ap-

plicable to actions for damages under the Act is

that the court has jurisdiction ‘where the car-

rier is ordinarily resident.’ The notion of ordinary

residence is more often used in relation to in-

dividuals; but the carrier will generally be a

corporation, for which the notion is inap-

propriate. In tax cases, it has been held that a

company is resident ‘where the central manage-

ment and control actually abides;’ that a company

can be resident in two or more countries, provided

that central management and control is divided

between those countries. It seems likely that the

English courts would adopt # similar approach in

the present context, so that in almost every case

the question will be where does the board of di-

rectors have its seat.’?

Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, Fourth Ed., 1977, Vol.

1 at 413. It is beyond dispute that respondent Air France

is a French corporation, primarily owned by the French

11

government, with its headquarters in Paris. The “central

management and control” of Air France undeniably abides

in France. Examination of the law of a jurisdiction which

has interpreted “domicile” to mean “ordinarily resident”,

therefore, serves to underscore the complete lack of au-

thority for the interpretation of the word “domicile’’ in

Article 28 expounded by petitioners.

As a final attempt to submit some “authority” to this

Court for the interpretation of “domicile” that they

propose, petitioners have resorted to “authority’’ of their

own making, namely an affidavit from a “French expert’’

to the effect that the phrase “du domicile du transporteur”

contained in the official French text of Article 28 can be

interpreted to mean any place where the carrier carries on

business on a regular and substantial basis.

While the “bootstrap” nature of petitioners’ affidavit

is obvious, respondent Air France will additionally point

out that whatever credibility petitioners’ affidavit might

have is totally destroyed by the fact that the “domicile”

forum in Article 28 has specifically been the subject of

interpretation by the French courts. Set forth as “Ap-

pendix B”’ to this brief is a certified translation of @

decision of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris,

dated April 28, 1978, in an action entitled Zimonyl v.

Varig. That action, which arose out of the crash of a

Varig Airline Boeing 707 near Paris on July 11, 1973,

involved a claim for the wrongful death of a passenger

who was travelling on that flight pursuant to a contract

of carriage issued in Budapest, Hungary calling for trans-

portation from Budapest to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and

return. Plaintiff, while conceding Varig’s principal place

- of business was in Brazil, attempted to argue that the

“domicile’’ of Varig, for the purposes of Article 28, could

be regarded as Paris, since the airline had a ticket office

there. The Paris court specifically rejected plaintiff’s

contention, holding that a corporation can have only one

12

domicile, which in the case of Varig was in Brazil where

it was incoroorated and had its principal place of busi-

ness. It is apparent, therefore, that “du domicile du

transporteur” has been given the same meaning by the

French courts as ‘‘domicile of the carrier” in the United

States decisions.

Accordingly, no authority exists for the interpretation

of the word “domicile” propounded by petitioners. To

the contrary, authority in the United States and abroad

is unanimous to the effect that the “domicile” of an air

carrier is its place of incorporation, and does not consti-

tute any place where the carrier carries on business on a

regular and substantial basis.

POINT Ill

The provisions of Article 28 of the Warsaw Con-

vention clearly relate to subject matter jurisdiction.

Just as baseless and unfounded as_ petitioners’

‘*domicile” argument is their argument that respondent Air

France somehow waived the provisions of Article 28 of

the Warsaw Convention by not filing a special appearance

in the action instituted in the Circuit Court of Cook County,

Illinois.

The circumstances under which a party must enter a

special appearance in an action in Illinois are specifically

set forth in the Illinois Civil Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat.,

Ch. 110, § 20(1) (1975) (emphasis supplied) :

“§ 20. Special Appearance. (1) Prior to filing any

other pleading or motion, a special appearance may

be made either in person or by attorney for the pur-

pose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over

the person of the defendant. A special appearance

may be made as to an entire proceeding or as to any

cause of action involved therein. Every appearance,

13

prior to judgment, not in compliance with the fore-

going is a general appearance.”

The essential problem with petitioners’ argument relating

to the manner in which respondent Air France originally

appeared in this action is that it does not involve an issue

which is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. There

has been no provision for a special appearance in the Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure since 1938. 15 Wright &

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3829, at 196

(1976). Accordingly, the manner by which the [Illinois

courts interpret the provisions of Article 28 with respect

to the somewhat unique pleading practices of that state

can hardly constitute a federal question subject to review

by this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).

At any rate, as was aptly observed by the Illinois Su-

preme Court in its decision, petitioners have made their

argument relating to the nature of Article 28 of the War-

saw Convention “without citation of any supporting deci-

sion”. 74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E. 2d at 983.

The leading case involving the interpretation of Article

28 of the Warsaw Convention is Smith v. Canadian Pacific

Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971), already dis-

eussed at length in this brief. In reversing the district

court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the com-

plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Second

Cireuit held (452 F.2d at 801):

“We agree, however, that Article 28(1) ‘... must be

considered as absolute and mandatory, on the national

level, in the jurisdictional sense, and be given [its]

proper status as a treaty obligation of our nation with-

out equivocation.’ The Warsaw Convention, by virtue

of its status as a treaty made under the authority of

the United States, is the supreme law of the land, equal

in stature and force to domestic laws of the United

States. U.S. Const. art. VI... .”

14

Having held that the provisions of Article 28(1) relate

to jurisdiction, the Second Circuit in Smith went on to

explain the manner by which courts must apply Article 28

to the faets of a particular action (452 F.2d at 802):

“We therefore look to the Convention to determine

its applicability here. Only if it does apply so as to

permit of treaty jurisdiction need we answer domestic

jurisdiction and venue questions. If treaty jurisdiction

under the Convention does not lie, federal jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), which permits cases arising

under United States treaties, clearly cannot be estab-

lished. Similarly, if the Convention precludes suit, our

inquiry ceases without an examination of diversity jur-

isdiction under 28 U.S.C. 4 1332(a) (2); in other words,

treaty provisions, being of equal constitutional status,

may operate under article VI of the Federal Constitu-

tion as limitations on diversity jurisdiction, just as

the requirements of jurisdictional amount may so

operate.”

It is therefore apparent that the Second Circuit in Smith

referred to Article 28 as “treaty jurisdiction” merely to

differentiate the Article 28 limitations from the other limi-

tations on the subject matter jurisdiction of Federal Courts

that are based on Article IIT of the United States Consti-

tution and the jurisdictional provisions of the United

States Code.

In numerous decisions since Smith, courts have granted

motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

because of the operation of Article 28. McCarthy v. East

African Airways Corp., 13 Avi. 17,385 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),

aff’d mem., 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1975); Bute v. British

Airways, 421 F.Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mem.,

566 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1977); Karfunkel v. Compagnie

Nationale Air France, 427 F.Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ;

Rinck v. Deutsche Lufthansa, 57 App. Div. 2d 370, 395

N.Y.S.2d 7 (1st Dep’t 1977), aff’d, 44 N.Y. 2d 714 (1978) ;

15

_Varkonyt v. Impressa de Viacao Airea Rio Grandense

(Varig), 71 Mise.2d 607, 336 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup. Ct., N. Y.

Co. 1972).

Therefore, no basis exists for petitioners’ interpretation

of the “treaty jurisdiction” term employed by the Second

Circuit in Smith. However, petitioners do more than

argue that “treaty jurisdiction” does not constitute sub-

ject matter jurisdiction. They assert, as they must in

view of the specific language of Section 20(1) of the

Illinois Civil Practice Act, that the provisions of Article

28 can be equated with jurisdiction over the person.

Such argument absolutely flies in the face of the specific

holding of the Second Circuit in Smith. That decision, in

its discussion of the jurisdictional nature of Article 28 of

the Warsaw Convention, declares unequivocally that the

concept of “treaty jurisdiction” empioycd by that court

with respect to Article 28 has absolutely no relation to the

domestic law notion of jurisdiction over the person (452

F.2d at 800, n. 4):

“No question of in personam jurisdiction was raised in

this case, although such jurisdiction is also an impor-

tant element of the power of a court to decide a case.”

Similarly, in Benjamins v. British European Airways,

572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, —— U.S. ——

(1979), a wrongful death action arising out of the crash of

a British Airways aircraft in England, the Second Circuit

made a parallel observation in discussing the application of

the provisions of Article 28 to the facts of that action (572

F.2d at 915, n. 4):

“Personal jurisdiction is not an issue in this case, as

each defendant has submitted to the in personam

jurisdiction of the court.”

No clearer indication of the fallacy of petitioners’ argu-

ment relating to the nature of Article 28 exists than the

16

above two quotes from the Second Circuit’s Smith and

Benjamins decisions. Petitioners have based their argu-

ment that the provisions of Article 28 of the Warsaw Con-

vention do not relate to subject matter jurisdiction pri-

marily upon the “treaty jurisdiction” language employed

by the Second Circuit in Smith. At the same time, peti-

tioners completely ignore Smith when they argue that the

provisions of Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention can be

equated with the domestic notion of jurisdiction over the

person.

POINT IV

The provisions of the Warsaw Convention are

clearly constitutional and, in any case, the issue of

the constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention was

not properly raised before the Illinois Supreme Court.

Petitioners accuse the Illniois Supreme Court of “gross

misrepresentation’’ of the record which they assert “is

tantamount to an unconstitutional denial of due process and

equal protection to the plaintiffs.” It should be pointed

out that petitioners never moved in the Illinois Supreme

Court for a rehearing, in order to refer that court to its

alleged misrepresentation of facts in the record. Such a

petition is a pre-requisite to accusing the highest court of

the State of Illinois of “gross misrepresentation.”

Petitioners also include in their brief to this Court an

extended discussion of the alleged unconstitutionality of the

Warsaw Convention. Such discussion, however, was not

included in their brief to the Illinois Supreme Court, and

the constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention was not

among the questions certified for review by the Illinois

Supreme Court from the decision of the Cireuit Court of

Cook County, Illinois. While the decision of the Illinois

Supreme Court briefly discusses the allegation of uncon-

stitutionality of the Warsaw Convention, giving this allega-

17

tion the short shrift that it deserves, it is apparent that the

Illinois Supreme Court was of the opinion that petitioners

had “waived their point as to unconstitutionality in this

court under our Rule 341(e)(7) (58 Ill. 2d, R.341(e)(7))”.

74 Tl. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d at 984. It is therefore sub-

mitted that petitioners have failed to properly preserve

this issue for review by this Court.

In any case, as the Illinois Supreme Court aptly ob-

served, the petitioners are unable to cite “any decision

holding the Convention invalid, either with respect to Ar-

ticle 28(1) or otherwise”. 74 Ill. 2d 90, 383. N.E.2d at

984. To the contrary, this Court, in Duke Power Co. v.

Carolina Env. Study Gp., 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978), recently

commented that statutes and treaties such as the Warsaw

Convention, specifically as they relate to limitations on li-

ability, have “consistently been enforced by the courts”. 57

L.Ed.2d at 620-621, n. 32. On many other occasions the

Warsaw Convention has been held to be constitutional.

Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,

434 U.S. 922 (1978); McCarthy v. East African Airways

Corp., 13 Avi. 17,385 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d mem., 517 F.2d

1395 (2d Cir. 1975); Garcia v. Pan American Airways, 183

Mise. 258, 50 N.Y.S.2d 250, aff’d, 269 App. Div. 287, 55

N.Y.S.2d 317, aff’d, 295 N.Y. 852, cert. denied, 329 U.S.

741 (1946); Kelley v. Sabena, 242 F.Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y.

1965); Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F.Supp. 486

(D.N.J. 1957); Indemnity Insurance Company of North

America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F.Supp. 338

(S.D.N.Y. 1944).

In fact, no appellate court, state or federal, has ever held

the Warsaw Convention to be unconstitutional. Nor has

this Court ever held any treaty of the United States in-

valid on constitutional grounds.

A constitutional challenge to the provisions of Articie

28(1) was clearly rejected in a decision squarely on point

with petitioners’ claim against Air France herein. Mc-

18

Carthy v. East African Airways Corp., 13 Avi. 17,385

(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd mem., 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir.

1975). That decision emanated from the very sort of mo-

tion that was granted by the Supreme Court of Illinois—

a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention. The

court in McCarthy granted the airline’s thotion to dismiss,

and in its decision the court rejected the same constitutional

argument relating to Article 28 that the pecitioners are

presenting to this Court (13 Avi. at 17,386):

“. , . [P]laintiffs’ argument that Article 28(1) of the

Convention unconstitutionally denrives them of the

right to litigate in the Federal Courts must fail. The

jurisdiction of the Federal Courts extends only as far

as Congress permits, which in some cases is less than

the limit of the federal jurisdictional power as set

forth in Article III of the Federal Constitution.

Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850); Jaconski v. Ad-

visun Corp., 359 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1966); Glidden Co.

v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). As a treaty provision

having the force and effect of the domestic laws of the

United States, Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Conven-

tion may and does constitutionally restrict the subject

matter jurisdiction of this Court.”

POINT V

As to the applicability of the doctrine of foram non

conveniens to this lawsuit.

Air France moved to dismiss this action upon the ground

that the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois lacked

jurisdiction of the action by virtue of Article 28 of the

Warsaw Convention, and upon the further ground that the

suit should be dismissed under the doctrine of forwm non

conveniens. Singapore moved to dismiss the action upon

the latter ground only.

19

The Supreme Court of Illinois granted defendants’

motions and directed that the order of the Circuit Court

of Cook County, Illinois denying the motion of Air France

and of Singapore to dismiss the action be vacated and

the court remanded the case to the Circuit Court of Cook

County with directions to dismiss the action as to Air

France and Singapore. It is obvious that the Supreme

Court of Illinois, in dismissing the lawsuit against Air

France upon the ground that the suit was barred as to it

by the Warsaw Convention, felt it unnecessary to pass

upon Air France’s alternative motion to dismiss upon

the ground of forwm non conveniens. In fact the court

made that very clear (74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d at 984) :

‘*For the reasons given, we hold that the trial court

was in error in denying the motion by Air France

to dismiss it from the suit on the ground that suit

was barred by the Warsaw Convention.

While the foregoing discussion disposes of the appeal

by Air France, there remains to be considered the

appeal by Singapore, which, since the complaint did

not allege any injury to its own passengers, so as to

make the Warsaw Convention applicable, based its

motion solely on the ground that the doctrine of

forum non conveniens required dismissal of the case.

Our holding that the plaintiffs’ suit against Air France

could not be brought in Cook County because of the

Warsaw Convention would seem to diminish, if not

eliminate, the suitability of Cook County as a forum

for the plaintiffs. The dismissal of Air France from

the suit removes the base of the plaintiffs’ desire

to retain Singapore in the cireuit court of Cook

County.’’

The court thereafter reviewed the Illinois law with respect

to forum non conveniens and dismissed the lawsuit upon

that ground as to Singapore. It is obvious from the

opinion of the court that, had it not dismissed the ac-

20

tion against Air France on the basis that the suit against

it was barred by the Warsaw Convention, it would have

dismissed the action against Air France upon the ground

of forum non conveniens.

While the Illinois Supreme Court’s discussion of the

doctrine of forum non conveniens does not directly consti-

tute its grounds for dismissal of petitioners’ claims against

Air France, said respondent feels constrained to corhment

upon several of the points raised by petitioners in their

brief with respect to this issue.

First, petitioners appear to claim that the LIllinois

Supreme Court’s alleged failure to apply the forum non

conveniens principles announced in Gulf Oil Corp. v.

Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947),

violated their constitutional rights. Petitioners are un-

able, however, to cite even one case which decided the

forum non conveniens doctrine on a constitutional basis.

Gilbert was not based on constitutional considerations, but

on the inherent discretion of federal courts of law and

equity to decline to exercise jurisdiction even where they

otherwise may have jurisdiction over the parties and sub-

ject matter; and where the venue of the action may other-

wise be proper. Petitioners attempt to raise the standards

set forth in Gilbert to federal constitutional dimensions.

No court has ever done so. The doctrine of forwm non

conventens is a doctrine based on equitable principles

within the discretion of each court system. As such, the

application of the doctrine by the Supreme Court of Iilinois

is a matter of state law and is not subject to review by the

United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).

Second, petitioners’ entire argument concerning forum

non conveniens is grounded upon the allegation that no

jurisdictional barriers exist to suit against the three named

defendant airlines in the Cireuit Court of Cook County,

Illinois. However, discussion of the issue of forwm non

conventens in the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court

21

does not even commence until after that court’s dismissal

of the claims brought against Air France for lack of

jurisdiction under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention.

Since, as has beer. demonstrated in this brief, the Illinois

Supreme Court was clearly correct in holding that Article

28 precluded suit by petitioners against Air France in the

Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, it is submitted that

petitioners’ entire discussion of the issue of forum non con-

veniens is based upon a false premise and is entirely

irrelevant.

Third, petitioners’ allegation regarding the amenability

to suit of the three defendant airlines in the Circuit Court

of Cook County, Illinois, also conveniently ignores the

fact that the third defendant airline, Gulf Air Lines,

Inc., has filed a motion to dismiss petitioners’ actions

against it for lack of jurisdiction over the person. While

petitioners mention in their brief (p. 14) that decision on

that motion has been stayed pending the outcome of this

petition for a writ of certiorari, petitioners’ brief is

written as though Gulf Air’s motion had already been

denied.

Finally, and most importantly, respondent Air France

must emphasize once again that petitioners have com-

pletely failed to mention in their brief that timely actions

have been filed against Air France in either Israel, France

or Canada on behalf of all the passengers of the hijacked

Air France aircraft who were named in the action brought

in the Cireuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. A complete

list of the passengers whose claims have been brought

against Air France in the courts of Israel, France and

Canada accompanies this brief as “Appendix A”.

22 App 1

CONCLUSION APPENDIX A

4 The petition for a writ of certiorari should be The following is a list of plaintiffs whose cases were

enied. dismissed by order of the Supreme Court of Illinois

Respectfully submitted, Conbaar Praney bared saitly hetion's the ipdases ip-

Wisi 3. Fénmeiens tive period expired under Article 29 of the Warsaw

Wit F. Martin, Jr. Convention.

One State Street Plaza

New York, New York 10004 MontrEAL, CANADA:

Counsel for Respondent

Ping antl Salomon Weizman

Anna Morina (Ninette Anna Benaroche)

Donaup M. Haskeun

MicHak. J. SEHR Paris, FRANCE:

208 South LaSalle

Chicago, Tllinois 60604 Sylver Ayache

Of Counsel Maurice Benshimon (Maurice Bensimon)

Sofie Zaoui Chamak (Sophie Chamak)

Jean-Mare Dahan

Miriam Field (Myriam Field)

Meudel Liebesman (Mendel Liebesmann)

Jocelyn Mounnier (Jocelyne Monnier Lanners)

Georgette Poilain (Georgette Poulain Bettleheim)

Solomon Rubin (Charles Salomon Rubin)

Regine Rubin

Dov Shlaen (Dov Boris Shlaen)

Elie Silvera (Claude Silvera)

Gilbert Weill

Héléne Weill (Héléne Rosenblum Weill)

” Oliver Cojot (Olivier Cojot)

Palu H. Baries, as administrator of the estate of

Ida Borukchovitch (Paul Baris, as adminis-

trator for the estate of Ida Boruchovitch)

App 2

Tex Aviv, Ispag.:

Eitan Aronowitch

Miram Aronowitch

Estate of Dora Block

Arieh Brodsky

Yael Brodsky

Anat Brodsky

Dana Brodsky

Estate of Pasco Cohen

Hannah Cohen

Yaakov Cohen

Tzipporah Cohen

Michael Cojot

Nahoum Dahan

Ichak David

Hadasza Agnes David

Uzi Davidson

Sara Davidson

Ron Davidson

Benjamin Davidson

Yehuda Gottlieb (Gotlieb)

Regina Gottlieb (Gotlieb)

Baruch Gross

Ruth Gross

Shy Gross

Tlan Hartuv

Itzchak Hirsh

Akiva Laxer (Avida Laxer)

Joseph Aboujdid

Ezra Almog

Janet Almog

David Benitah

Odette Benitah

Yoram Benitah

Esther Dahan

App 3

Alkeslassy Heftsibah (Eskelassy)

Arno Hilf

Nadia Israel

Zeev Josepovici (Iosipovic)

Hara Josepovici (Iosipovic)

Monique Khalepski-Epstein (Kaplansky-Epstein)

Jerachmiel Kiper (Kipper)

Rina Kiper (Kipper)

Lifsa Lazarovici (Lazarovicz)

Ada Lazarovici (Lazarovicz)

Chana Lenczner

Michael Livni

Michael Rabinovitz

Rivka Rabinovitz

Renata Reisfeld

Abraham Rubinstein

Gavriela Rubinstein

Michal Warshavsky

Elie Roger Zeitan

Aimee Aouva Zeitan (Zerbit)

Hana Zriehn (Zeritan)

Claude Rosenkovitch

Emma Rosenkovitch

Noam Rosenkovitch

Ella Rosenkovitch

Patricia Martell

Estate of Jean-Jacques Mimouni

App 4

APPENDIX B

BERLITZ TRANSLATION SERVICE

A Division of the Berlitz Schools of

Languages of America, Inc.

BERLITZ

No. 26734

40 West 5lst Street

New York, New York 10020

Telephone: (212) 765-1000

State or New York

Crry or New Yorx

County or New York

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the attached translation No. 26734

is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true and ac-

curate rendition into English of a Judgment rendered in

the matter of Zimonyl vs. Varig Company, written in

French.

New York, New York, the 22nd day of June 1978.

Beruitz TRANSLATION SERVICE

EBH

Eileen B. Hennessy

Subscribed and sworn to before me

on this the 22nd day of June 1978.

Notary

(Seal)

AuBert J. LaMoTHE, JR.

Notary Public, State of New York

No. 30-7410630

Qualified in Nassau County

Certificate filed in New York County

Commission Expires March 30, 1980

App 5

Court or Fimst Instance or Paris

First Division

Section Two

Hearine or: April 28, 1978

In THE Matter oF: Zimonyl, widow of Hegedus

Agcarnst: Varig Co.

Sussect: Lack of Jurisdiction.

No. 17.345/77

ASS/8-11-75

Lack of Jurisdiction

JUDGMENT RENDERED ON Aprit 28, 1978,

By tHe Court or First Instance or Paris

First Drviston—Seconp Two

PLAINTIFF:

Mrs. Emese Zimonyl, widow of Mr. Bela Hegedus, resid-

ing at Tusnadi u. 25, Budapest, Hungary,

represented by:

Joseph Caporal, Attorney at Law

DEFENDANT:

Vanic Airlines (Empresa pe Axzrea Rio GranpEsE), with

headquarters at 365 Avenue Almirante Sylvio de Noro-

anha, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and with‘its general agency

for France at 27 Avenue des Champs Elysées, Paris 8,

represented by:

André Garnault, Attorney at Law

Tue Pusiic ProsecuTor

Mr. Boittiaux, Deputy

App 6

MEMBERS OF THE CouRT

Magistrates sitting:

Mr. Metayer, Presiding Judge

Miss Cochard, First Judge

Mrs. Tarabeux, Judge

SecretTary-CLERK OF THE Division:

Mr. Michaud.

Puieapines: At the public hearing of March 17, 1978.

JupcMent: Pronounced in public session after hearing

both parties—subject to objection

x

x x

1) Facts anp PRockEDINGs

On July 11, 1975, Mrs. Emese Zimonyl, widow, served a

summons upon the Brazilian company Empresa De Viacao

Agrea Rio GranvesE ‘(logo Vania), for interim payment of

the sum of 4,200,000 Franes, representing damages occa-

sioned by the death of her husband, Bela Hegedus, in the

air crash of July 11, 1973, near Saulx-les-Chartreux (Hs-

sonne).

By Court document of June 16, the Varia Company, based

on the provisions of Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention,

alleged:

1) Territorial non-jurisdiction of the Court of the First

Instance of Paris as against the Federal Court of Rio de

Janeiro;

2) Plea of suit pending elsewhere, the plaintiff having also

brought an action for the same claims before the Court of

First Instance of Corbeil.

App 7

In her pleadings of March 2, 1977, Mrs. Hegedus main-

tained that the Court of Paris did have jurisdiction, as the

Varia Company has a domicile at 27 Avenue des Champs

Elysées, Paris, where the summons was served upon it.

She further alleged that the existence of a rule of lis alibi

pendens between French and foreign courts was at the

very least questionable; and declared that she had no ob-

jection to postponement of a decision on her application

for relief until a decision was made on the actions pending

before foreign courts and contesting the lis pendens in

France, the summons before the Court of Corbeil not having

been returned.

In its answer, dated March 7, 1978, the Varig Company

declared that Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention did not

place an agency on the same footing as the domicile of the

carrier, and that a mere decentralized office, such as

that of Paris, determined a special jurisdiction only if it

had issued the transportation contract concerned, which is

not the case here as regards Varig’s agency in Paris;

Wherefore it was pleading lack of jurisdiction.

II—ARGUMENT

Whereas Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, applicable

in France, provides that an action for liability must be

brought before one of four courts, restrictively listed, at

the choice of the plaintiff:

—That of the carrier’s domicile;

—That of the principal headquarters for its operation;

—That of the place where it has an office which entered into

the contract;

—That of the place of destination.

App 8

Whereas the plaintiff maintains that the Varig Company

has a domicile in Paris at its agency at 27 Avenue des

Champs-Elysées; whereas this domicile is of necessity sep-

arate from the principal headquarters of its operation,

since it is mentioned separately in the list of the places of

possible jurisdiction ;

Whereas Mr. Hegedus’s ticket was written in Budapest by

the Martev Company for a trip from Budapest and return

by way of Rio de Janeiro and Paris;

Whereas the principal headquarters of the defendant is at

Rio de Janeiro, and Paris is only one of its agencies and is

not the agency that made the contract;

Whereas, in contrast to Mrs. Hegedus’s allegation, Paris

cannot be the carrier’s domicile, as a person, whether

physical or legal, can have only one domicile, which in this

ease is Rio de Janeiro, the headquarters of the Varig

Company ;

Whereas Article 28 hereinabove cited uses the word ‘‘domi-

cile’’ in the singular, and does not take into consideration

the location of the establishment or agency unless the con-

tract was made there;

Whereas Mrs. Hegedus’s interpretation of the idea of

domicile actually refers to the so-called jurisprudence of

‘*principal stations,’’ which is an essentially domestic at-

tack on the principle of uniqueness of domicile and cannot

be internationally applied without a specific text; where-

fore Article 28 §1 of the Warsaw Convention cannot be

subjected to an incorrect extension that it does not have;

Whereas in this case the domicile of the Varig Company

is the same as the principal headquarters of its operation,

and is its corporate headquarters; whereas it is located at

Rio de Janeiro, which fact excludes any competence of the

Court of First Instance of Paris to be seized of Mrs.

Hegedus’s action for liability;

App 9

Whereas in these conditions the objection of lack of juris-

diction raised by the Varig Company should be admitted,

and in accordance with Article 96 $1 of the New Code of

Civil Procedure competence should be disclaimed ;

WHEREFORE

the Court, in public session, rendering judgment after hear-

ing both parties and subject to objection,

Disclaims competence,

Dismisses both parties,

Orders Mrs. Hegedus to pay the expenses that may be paid

directly by André Garnault, the attorney retained, pro-

vided he paid same out of his own pocket without advance

therefor.

So made and adjudged in Paris on April twenty-eighty,

one thousand nine hundred seventy-eight.

The Secretary-Clerk The Presiding Judge

Drawn up by: Mr. Metayer

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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