Petition — Golding v. City Council of Richmond

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Supreme Count, U,

FILED

78-1277 |

} = FER 16 1979

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WNIGED STATES |

WASHINGTON, D. C.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTORARI

WILLIAM IRVIN GOLDING SR.

Petitioner

THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

and

THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND

HENRY L. MARSH, III

Respondent

PETITION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERT-

ORARI ON AN ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

OR VIRGINIA OF A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Docket Number 781557; No Cite

Ordered on November 22, 1978; No Time

of day Specified.

entitled: THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF

RICHMOND et al v. WILLIAM I. GOLDING SR.

et al.

William Irvin Golding Sr.

2246 Bywood Lane

Richmond, Va. 23224

Phone: 804-276-8376

INDEX

Index to Appendex...cccrcccccccceesecoll

AtCOTNLES. ccccccccccccccccecccccsccccotsl

Members Of Council..cccccccccccccceccolV

Table of Authorities... ..cccccscccseeed

TUTALSGIction. .cccccccccccccccccccscccceVsee

Question Presented... ccccccccccccceeeld

Constitutional Provisions involve.....XII

Statement of Facts of Case...........eX1V

Virginia Supreme Court Order......... XX

Conclusion. ccccccccccccccccccecccecseekav

Notice for a Petition for a Writ......XXVI

Request for a@ Stay... cccccccccccccccccekAVil

Affidavit of Service of Notice & Stay.XxIXx

Refusial of Stay. .cccccccccccccscccccckhas

Certificate of Service of Writ........XXXII

APPENDEX . cccccccccccccccccccccecccccces

Constitution of Virginia Article II

Seotiom tecipeccoecsecesestsesecasune suuen

Code of Virginia 24.1-46.......20020047

Charter of Richmond, Va

Beetion S.Olecacecsicvccedesense \eeeaset

Sectiom SOBs cvcccvcscsecvvctessescscanene

Section 3.03.......e. Terevirir. >.

Seetiem BiGhec css. ede 4skeee .. cae ~53

AFFIDAVIT... ccccccccccccveceseLaSt Page

Index to Appendix

The Supreme Court of Virginia did not

have Jurisdiction to determine the

issues presented to it by the Respondents

as there was lack in due Process of Law

Se ee en eoeweeeeerrwrtcteceeqcorv ea ee@e~dzeegweegss8s ess s a

Did the evidence establish sufficent facts

to support the elements of Mandamus or

did it lack Due Process of Law.......13

The Supreme Court of Virginia should hot

have gone behind the Certificate of election

to determine whether or not a vacancy existed

in the Ninth Election District Seat because

of the lacking in Due Process of Law..17

The releif sought by the Resondents in

the mandamus action was barred by the

Doctrine Of Lache@....c.ses cecces ery +,

The Respondents were estopped in the mand-

amus action from denying that the Petitioner

was a duly elected and qualified member of

the city council.....ccecoee. thaeeee evoke

Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution

of Virginia is unconstitutional (disen-

franchisement of felons)......e.e+eee0027

Are Article II, Section I, of the Consti-

tution of Virginia and Section 24.1-46 of

the Code of Virginia unconstitutional?

(Registration of Voters)........ BP ,

E. A. DUFFY

CLERK OF THE COUNCIL

OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND

9th and BROAD STREETS

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23219

MR. E. A. DUFFY'S ATTORNEY

R. HARVEY CHAPELL JR.

LEE F. DAVIS JR.

PAUL W. JACOBS II

CHRISYIN, BARTON, EPPS, BRENT, AND CHAPPELL

1200 MUTUAL BUILDING

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 22211

THE RESPONDENTS' ATTORNEY

T.S. ELLIS III

JOHN CHARLES THOMAS

ROLLIFF H. PURRINGTON JR.

HUNTON AND WILLIAMS

P.O. BOX 1535

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23212

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

HENRY L. MARSH, III

MAYOR

3211 Q. STREET

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23223

G. S. KEMP

VICE-MAYOR

4605 COVENTRY ROAD

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23221

WAYLAND W. RENNIE

COUNCILMAN DISTRICT 2

1401 WILMINGTON AVE.

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23227

MRS. WILLIE J. DELL

COUNCILWOMAN DISTRICT 3

2923 HAWTHORNE AVE.

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23222

HENRY W. RICHARDSON

COUNCILMAN DISTRICT 5

3115 GRANTLAND DRIVE

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23221

WALTER T. KENNEY

COUNCILMAN DISTRICT 6

1615 BRAYAN STREET

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23223

MRS. CLAUDETTE BLACK McDANIEL

COUNCILWOMAN DISTRICT 8

105 EAST 15th STREET

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23224

AUBREY H. THOMPSON

COUNCILMAN DISTRICT 4

3725 KENMORE ROAD

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23225

State v. Alexander, 77 N.W. 841, 107 Iowa

State v. Oates, 86 Wis. 634, 57 N.W. 296 .

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES State v.\Riffle, 132 Ohio St. 546, 9 N.E.

’ e

Cases 2a 497 (1937 ). eee

Swoford hath “geage Dr ares Oo. v. Owen, 133

Carrington v. Rash, (1965) 380 U.S. 89, 96, P. 913, 37 OKL, 610, DRA, 1916 ym 789 .

79S. os . e e e e e e e e e e oe e e

City of nioteiel v. United States et al 45 \ sentute

e . o oe e @o e eo e oe o ° e eo eo o

D.D. Jones Transf. & Whse. Co v. Commonwe- United States Statue

a ex Rel. ate Corp. Comm'n., a.

Dean v. Paolicelli, 194 Va. 219 (1953)

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965

as amended 42USC,« 1973c. . .. .

De Shazo v. Davis 157 Va. 517 (1932). . + | si specail

Ror RRR mi 7 Sed

BBB, Hebe | Se Te RS

In Re Opinion of the Justices, 252 Ala. 2 ee ase ttt

Norris v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 367 (1944). - - eee Se eee

gisele v: Ehtte 7 eT es: We ees

Pittman v. Pittman, 208 Va. 476, (1968). . me ors a ee

| 239. e e ° ° ° ° ° e e ° ° °

Portsmouth Restuarant Ass'n. v. Hotel and Section 24,1 a ee Oy se ee See

Resturant Employee Alliance, Loca |

es = = eae 6's | Constitutions

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 555, 533, 84S waa copia of United States

Ct. 1302, 1376, 12 L. Ed. 2d S00 «ow ¢ « e dele e Sectien at: .

Richardson v. Ramirez, 94S. Ct. 2655 (1974) Bpeieie t1, Section I... 5.

ager ani At 1st Amendment. . . :

Richmond, Fredicksburg & Potomac Railroad Hit Ra eo ee vie BR cpa sia tees

Co. v. Pugate, 506 Va. 159 (1905)

Richmond-Greyhound v. Davis, 200 Va. 147 . Constitution of Virginia

o 6 0B 50a eee ee Seen es OOGENE 89.5 f. Sk 4 oe: ees

SEE v. Young, 100 Va. 284, 40 S.E. 907 Article <. Section rd eee

. © 6 et 8 eS OE os Bee ee ee eS Article II, Section 2

Article II, Section 5

Article IV, Section 1

Charter

Charter of the City of Richmond, Virginia

Section 3.01, 3.02, 3.03, BeO4eeeeeeeeves

Section 4.04.....

Other

. Ruling Case Law Section 116 and 144....

sia O33 E48 Constitutional Law Section 568

16A CJS 554 Constitutional Law Section 568

31 CIS 292, Estopple Section 4 ..+-+s++-s

320A CJS 242, Evidence Secetion 879

Petitioner's Memorandum

» ae a

VII

JURISDICTION

Gomes ‘now the Petitioner, pro se, to peti-

tion The Supreme Court of the United States for

a Writ of Certiorari on san order of the Virgi-

— Qoereme Coors

nia“ of November 22, 1978; No specified time of

day; Docket Number 781557 of a Writ of Mandamus

in an action entitled: The City Council of the

City of Richmond, Henry L. Marsh III in his

official capacity and at the direction of the

City Council of the City of Richmond,’ Petitio-

ners v. william I. Golding Sr., and E.A. Duffy,

Clerk of the City of Richmond, Respondant.

Yoou Petitioner asks that this Writ of

Certiorari be issued on the finel order entit-

led The City Council of the City of Richmond,

_et al., against William I. Golding, Sr.,eral,

which was ordered on Wednesday,November 22,

1978 Docket Number 781557.

Your Petitioner asks This Court to

issue this Writ of Certiorari on the grounds

that the Virginia Supreme Court's Order of

Writ of Mandamus is in violation of your

Petitioner's Constitutional rights and that

the order of the Supreme Court of Virginia

denied your Petioner Due Process of Law.

The Supreme Court of the United States is

the proper court to ask for releif herein,

according to 28USC Section 1257 (c) which

is the statutory provision believed to

confer this Courts jurisdiction.

VIII

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

This petition for a Writ of Certorari

is asked for by your Petitioner to have

This Court to review an order which the

Supreme Court of Virginia issued as a

final order, issuing a Writ of Mandamus

agains your Petitioner in favor of the

Respondents. This Writ of Mandamus appli-

ed for in the Supreme Court of Virginia,

contrary to the public's best interest,

against your Petioner as an indivial,

in no official capacity, contrary to the

use of mandamus. The Mayor was never was

never authorized by Council to name and

proceed against your Petitioner and

should not have been made a party therof.

The Federal questions among which is

bs follows: First, did the Supreme Court

of Virginia have jurisdiction to hear the

issues presented by Respondents?'Second,

did the facts support the order issuing

of the Writ of Mandamus by the Supreme

Court of Virginia because other legal

remedies, such as Quo Warranto or Declar-

atory Judgement were available? Third,

did the Supreme Court of Virginia order

the petition granted, therefore, subjecting

your Petitioner to undue lidigation

contrary to your Petitioner's status, in

violation of your Petitioner's rights pro-

tected under the Constitution of the United

States. Fourth, due to the fact, no facts

supported the elements of mandamus, did the

Supreme Court of Virginia grant the the Res-

pondents the relief sought in their petition

for a Writ of Mandamus, contrary to Federal

Law and sound uniform of harmony in decisions?

Fifth, did the Supreme Court of Virginia

deny your Petitioner Due Process of Law in

going behind your Petitioner's Certificate

of Election legally obtained? Sixth, did the

Supreme Court of Virginia allow the misuse

of the action, Writ of Mandamus, in allowing

the Respondents to use this action to try

title of office, contrary to the intent of

mandamus? Seventh, dii the Supreme Court of

Virginia fail to bar the action of mandamus

because the Respondents were barred by the

Doctrine of Laches in applying for this Writ

of Mandamus? Ea, should the Supreme

Court of Virginia have not ordered the Writ

of Mandamus because Article II Section 1 of

the Constitution of Virginia is unconsti-

tutional according to Federal Law and the

Constitution of the United States? Ninth,

did the Supreme Court of Virginia exceed

its authority in extending the 30 day

period in Section 3.04 of the Charter of

the City of Richmond because the Council

of the City of Richmond allediged no know-

ledge of a vacancy, which is not provided

for in the said section? fenth, did the

results of the Supreme Court of Virginia's

order, in its use by Council, of the said

section 3.04 violate your Petitioner's

protection which is guaranteed by Section

5 of the Voting Richts Act of 1965 as amended

42 USC, 1973c? Also did the said section

allow Council to circumvent and usurp the

intent of This Court in a certain suit

entitled: City of Richmond v. United States

et al., 45 Led 245 (1975)? (See Appendex to

further substansuate these questions).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

Article I, Section II

The House of Representatives shall be

comprised of members chosen every second

year by the people of the several States,

States, and the electors in each State

shall have the qualifications requisite

for electores of the most numerous branch

of the State Legislature.(emphaize added)

Article II, Section I

1st Amendment Regligious and Political

Freedom

Congress may not interfere with free-

dom of religion, speech, meeting, and

petition. Congress shall make no law re-

specting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free excercise therof; or

abridging the freedom of speech, or of

the press; or the right of the people peace-

ably to assemble, and to petition the gov-

ernment for a redress of grievances.

5th Amendment Right to Life, Liberty, and

Property

--enor be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of lasv......

XII

14th Amendment

Section 1. . . Nor shall any State deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.

Section 2. . . the right to vote at any

election. . .is denied to any of the male

inhabitants of such State, .. . or in any

way abridged, except for participation in

rebellion, or other crime. . . -(no mention

of felony only).

XIII

A STATEMENT OF FACTS OF CASE

A city wideCouncilmantic election was

held on May 2, 1978 to comform with a

plan approved by the Supreme Court of

the United States in a certain suit en-

titled; City of Richmond V. United States

et al 45 Led 245 (1975) which provided

that the Council of the City of Richmond

shall appotion the City of Richmond into

nine districts or wards to make in acco-

rdence with the provisions of section 15.

1-803 of The Code of Virginia; one mem-

ber of council to be elected by the voters

of each district or ward. At least three

candidates ran in Richmond's Ninth Elec-

tion District. The Peiiticner, William I.

Golding Sr. , was one of the ninth dis-

tricts candidates. The City Registerar

of the City of Richmond, Virginia, Mrs.

Alice C. Lynch at the time of the fil-

ing as a candidate did qualify.the Pet-

itioner as a candidate. The State Board

of election of the Commonwealth of Virg-

inia did certify the Petitioner as a

qualified candidate for the election to

district nine of the City of Richmond.

XIV

On May 2, 1978 the Petitioner did receive | The Secretary of the Commonwealth wrote

the most votes from that district and was | Mrs. Lynch by letter dated October 25,

declared the winner by the election board | ores eereeene mer thet Be found no re-

of the City of Richmond and a certificate cord pertaining to the petitioner. Mrs.

sf election was issued. On July 1, 1978 Lynch immediately wrote the Petitioner

the Petitioner was sworn in as council- advising him that she was striking his

man of the district by E.A. Duffy, Clerk name from the City's Voters list. She

of the Council of the City of Richmond acted without allowing the Petitioner

and took the seat as a duly elected and to present evidence in his behalf and

qualified representative of the City's therefore denied him the right to vote

Ninth Election District. The Petitioner's without due process of law. A copy of

status as a member of the City Council the letter to the Petitioner was made

was not questioned until October, 1978. available to the Mayor and other officials

In that month rumors began to surface of the City of Richmond..On October 26,

about the Petitioner's qualification to 1978 the Mayor directed the Clerk of the

serve on council. On or before October City Council, E.A. Duffy, to remove the

23, 1978, Alice C. Lynch (Mrs. Lynch) Petitioner, name from the rolls. The

the General Registerar of the City re- Clerk refused to do so on the grounds

ceived rumors that the petitioner had that the certificate furnished to him

been convicted of (non common law) fel- by the State Board of Elections establi-

onies in the mid 1950's. Without the shed that the Petitioner was the duly

knowledge of all the facts Mrs. Lynch elected representative of the City's

then asked the Secretary of the Common- Ninth Election District. Therefore ,the

wealth to search his files to determine City Council without first determining

whether the petitioner's civil righrs weather a quorum was present, directed

had been restored. the Mayor to take all necessary legal

XV XVI

steps to compel the Clerk to remove the

Petitioner,s name from the rolls and

from the City payroll.

City Council and the Mayor then filed

the petition for a writ of mandamus in

the Suprsme Court of Virginia without

giving the Petitioner adequate notice

or proceeding in the proper court or

with the proper action.

The Supreme Court of Virginia held that

at the time of the May 2, 1978 council-

manic election for the office of city

councilman for the Ninth Election Distri-

et of the City of Richmond, The Petitio-

ner was ineligable for and disqualified

from seeking or holding that office be-

cause of his prior conviction of cer-

tain (non common law) felonies. The re-

quest for a writ of mandamus was issued .

The Supreme Court of Virginia directed,

not ordered, the Council of the City of

Richmond to fill the Ninth Election Dis-

trict seat of the City of Richmond per-

suant to section 3.04 of the charter of

the City of Richmond, This allowed the

other eight districts to force their

a es 2 te eee

XVII

will on district nine. further the use

of section 3,04 of the Charter of the

City of Richmond which the Supreme Court

of Virginia directed, not ordered,The

Richmond City Council's attention to

violates section 5 of the Voting Rights

Act of 1965 as amended 42USC 1973c.

On December 18, 1978 there was a black

majority of members seated on council,

black Councilman Henry W. Richardson no-

minated Carolyn C. Wake to the position

of councilperson of the predominately

white Ninth Election District. Black Ma-

yor Henry L. Marsh III seconded the mo-

tion and the vote was unanimous and the

black majority, with the white minority

having little choice but to go along for

harmoney, forced their will and choice of

councilperson, on the predominately white

district nine by appointing a person of

the majority's choice over the predomin-

ately white district. To remove William

I. Golding Sr., the choice of the voters

of the predominately white district and

replace him with Carolyn C. Wake, the choice

of the black majority of council cir-

XVITI

cumvents and violates the Voting Rights

Act.

This was done inspite of and circumvent--

ed the orders of the Federal District

Court, Richmond Divisiun and section 5

of the Voting Righrs Act of 1965 as am-

ended 42USC, 1973c and had not continued

the approved plan, but usurped the power

of the Supreme Court of the United States

in a certain suit entitled; The City of

Richmond V. United States et al 45 Led

245 (1975). The mere fact that an "elec-

tion" was held is i.0t enovgh to satisfy

the above approved plan for an election

in the City of Richmond, Virginia. To

protect the right of the people of the

Ninth Election District an Election that

in fact elects someone must be held if

the Petitioner,William I. Golding was

not elected on May2,1978. Therefore the

Petitioner contends the only way to sat-

isfy the plan of the Supreme Court of the

United States in a certain suit entitled:

The City of Richmond V. United States

et al 44 Led 245 (1975) is posiably to

call for a special election to be held

in the Ninth Election District as soon as

posiable.

XIX

. The City Council of the

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held

at the Supreme Court Building in the City

of Richmond on Wednesday the 22nd day of

November, 1978.

Petitioners,

City of Richmond, et al,

against Record No. 781557 Respondents,

William I. Golding, Sr.,et al.,

Upon a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus

This day came the parties, by counsel,

upon the application for a writ of man-

damus tiled by petitioners, The City Co-

uncil of Richmond and the Mayor of Rich-

mond, Henry L. Marsh,III, in his official

capacity and at the direction of the City

‘Council of the City of Richmond; upon the

special plea to the jurisdiction, motion

to dismiss and grounds of defense of re-

spondent William I. Golding,Sr., upon the

motion to dismiss and grounds of defense

of respondent E. A. Duffy, Clerk of the

City of Richmond; and upon the argument

of counsel.

Upon consideration whereof, the court

overrules the aforesaid special plea

to the jurisdiction and denies the re-

spective motions to dismiss.

Upon further consideration whereof, the

court is of opinion that at the time of

the May 2, 1978 councilmanic election

for the office of city councilman for

the Ninth Election District of the City

of Richmond, the said respondent William

I. Golding, Sr.,was ineligible for and

disqualified from seeking or holding the

office of city councilman because of his

prior convictions of certain felonies.

Accordingly, the court holds that the

election of the respondent William I.

Golding, Sr., as a member of the Coun-

cil of the City of Richmond was a nul-

lity and that a vacancy exists in the

office of the councilman for the said

Ninth Election District.

XX1I

It is therefore ordered that the writ

of mandamus do forthwith issue directed

to the said respondents requiring and

commanding: (1) that respondent Duffy

delete respondent Golding's name from

the rolls as a member of City Council

and delete respondent Golding's name

from the City payroll; and (2) that re-

spondent Golding relinquish forthwith

any claims to the office of member of

City Council for the said Ninth Elect-

ion District, relinquish all muniments

of the office, and desist immediately

from further exercise of the functions,

powers, and responsibilities of that

office.

The court further orders that, under se-

ction 3. 04 of the Charter of the City

of Richmond, the said City Council sha-

ll have thirty days from the date of this

order within which to fill the existing

vacancy. |

A COPY

Allen L. Lucy

Clerk

XXII

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

There was no evidence to establish

suficient facts to support the elements

of mandamus. The Virginia Supreme Court

failed to regonized that the petition

for the Writ of Mandamus was labeled to

your Petitioner, William I. Golding Sr.

as an indivial in no official capacity,

wherefore lacked jurisdiction over your

t. The proper remedies for the

relief sought were Quo Warranto of Declar-

tory Judgement. The Supreme Court of Virginia

ha no right to go behind the Certificate of

Election issued legally to your Petitioner.

Relief sought by the Respondents were barred

by the Doctrine of Laches. The Respondants

were Estopped in the Mandamus action from

denying that the Petitioner was a duly

elected and qualified member of Council.

Article II Section 1 of the Constitution of

Virginia is unconstitutional because of the

1st and 14th Amendments and the enabling acts

"An Act to Provide for more Efficient Govern-

ment of Rebel States. Artile II, Section 1 of

the Constitution of Virginia and Section 24.

1-46 of the Code of Virginia are unconstition-

al by virtue of the 1st & 14th Amendments

which violaed the Due Process of Law. Section

3.04 of the Charter of the City of Richmond

allowed Council to usurp and circumvent This

Court"s order

XXIII

in a certain suit entitled; The City of

Richmond v. The United States et.al. 45 Led

245 (1975) and violated your Petitioners

rights as protected under Section 5 of the

Voting Richts Act of 1965 as amended.

The Virginia Supreme Court's order

herin violates these well established

principles of law. The City of Richmond

which is the Capital of Virginia of over

220,000 citizens. Therefore, your peti-

tioner prays that This Court issue this

Writ of Certorari that would in effect

declare the order of Writ of Mandamus

issued against your Petitioner was null

and void and without merit because of

the facts presented by your Petitioner

nerein show clearly the error in judgement

of the Virginia Supreme Court in issuing

the order of Writ of Mandamus against

your Petitioner. If this Court finds it

cannot give your Petitioner the full

releif herin than your Petitioner ask

This Court to use its discretionary power

to order a special election in the Ninth

Election District of the City of Richmond

to give the voters of the said right to

infact to elect their own Councilperson.

XXIV

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reason, a Writ of

Certiorari should be issued by This Court

against the decision and judgement of the

Supreme Court of Virginia in effect that

would declare the Writ of Mandamus reffered

herin shall be considered null and void,

without merit. Your Petitioner must bring

to This Court's attention the Notice fora

Petition for a Writ of Certorari on

Page XXVI herin, at that time your Peti-

tioner also notified E.A. Duffy, Clerk

of the Council of the City of Richmond,

and Attornies, and Responents herin

mentioned on Page IV herin, of his right

to join, as he was not to be made a party

hereto. Council has not authorized, to my

knowledge, Him to join, nor has he expressed

a desire to join, nor has his attorney

expressed a desire to join, rather the

contrary. If and when the 90 day period

expires to bring this action, he does not

join, it is the contention of your Peti-

tioner he may not join. Amoung the many

issues which This Court must deal with

herin, is whether or not The Supreme Court

of Virginia had a right to issue a Writ

of Mandamus against your Petitioner, William

XXV

atten sie At thee: < artic: pata

‘

Irvin Golding Sr., a private citizen in

no official capicity, just because he

claimed to have title to the office of

Councilman of the Ninth Election District

of the City without Declaratory Judgement

first in Circuit Court. Your Petitioner

further concludes if the Order issued by

the Supreme Court of Virginia is in error

in any way This Court also must conclude

the entire order is defective.and issue

the applied for Writ of Certorari. Further

it is the conclusion of your Petitioner

that all items that were ordered relinquished

by the Supreme Court's Virginia order, by

your Petitioner to the City Attorney,Conard

B. Mattox Jr., forthwith upon the entering

of this Writ of Certerari or Stay of

exicution of the said mandamus order be re-

turned. If This Court finds that Section

3.04 of the Charter of Richmond violates

your Petitioners rights, as well as the rishts

of the citizens of the Ninth Election

District, your Petitioner prays that This

Court use its discretionary power to order a

special election in the said district and/or

to change the said section to conform with

This Court's Plan for election in the City

of Richmond, Virginia. Your Petitioner prays

This Court order that the Respondents pay

XXVa

NOTICE FOR A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTORARI

all your Petitioner's cost in these proceed-

ings and in the action taken against him, as

an indivial, in the petition for a Writ of PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: that the Petitioner,

Mandamus which was granted by the Virginia William I. Golding Sr., pro se, is pet-

Supreme Court. itioning for a Writ of Certorari of an

order entered on November 22, 1978, Do-

cket Number 781557, of the Supreme Court

Respectifully of Virginia in the City of Richmond, Vi-

Submiited rginia in a Writ of Mandamus of which

it ae : | action was brought by the City Council

por me en of Richmond et al v. William I. Golding

William Irvin Golding Sr. | sr. et al to ask the UnitedStates Supr-

eme Court of the United States issue a

Writ of Certorari presuant to 28 USC Sec.

1257.

Also take notice that it is the belief

| of the Petitioner, that E A. Duffy ,

Clerk of the Council of the City of Ric-

: hmond, who also was a Respondent as Wil-

liam I. Golding Sr. in the Mandamus order

of the Supreme Court of Virginia and has

no interest in this petition of Writ of

Certorari and will not be made a party

hereto. NG on y

William I. Golding Sr.

2246 Bywood Lane

Richmond, Virginia 23224

XXVI

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

IN THE CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

WILLIAM I. GOLDING, SR. Petitioner

VS.

THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE

CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

ET AL CONRAD B. MATTOX Respondent

JR. CITY ATTORNEY

9th and BROAD STREETS

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23219

STAY FOR A WRIT OF CERTORARI

Comes now the Petitioner pro se, who de-

sires a stay of the order of this court

for a pending of an appeal for a Writ of

Certorari to be filed for February 20,

1979, in the Supreme Court of the United

States. This stay is presented for the

approval of the judges of this court whose

order is sought to be reviewed by the

Supreme Court of the United States, which

action is required by law, pursuant to

28 USC Section 2101 (f). The Petitioner

XXVITI

asks for this stay as any further delay

by this court will have potentially dis-

astrous impact on pending and proposed

legislation and would effectively deny

the Ninth District of the City of Rich-

mond, Virginia of a duly elected, by the

people, representative on the Council of

the City of Richmond. Further envorcement

of this court order of November 22, 1978

in the matter of the City Council of the

City of Richmond et al against William I.

Golding, Sr., et al, Record No. 781557

would deny.the petition equal protection

under the law and would have an adverse

effect on the public interest for years

to come.

I ask for this stay pending this

Writ of Certorari according to rule 27

of the rules of the Supreme Court of the

United States.

AUT,

William I. Golding Sr.

2246 Bywood Lane

Richmond, Virginia 23224

XXVIII

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF WRIT OF

CERTORARI_ AND STAY : William I. Golding ‘Sr.

I, William I. Golding Sr. hereby certify | STATE OF VIRGINIA

that I have transmitted by mail this no- CITY OF RICHMOND:

tice persuant to rule 33 (3) (c) of the I the under signed, a notary pu-

Rules of The Supreme Court of the United blic do certify that the above person

States to all the above Respondents in appeared before me this 13th day of

this Writ of Certorari and Stay and also February 1979, acknowledged that the

the following persons at the given address. above is true and correctto the best of

his knowledge and belief.

T. S. ELLIS III

JOHN CHARLES THOMAS My commission expires March 12, 1982

ROLLIFF H. PURRINGTON JR.

HUNTON AND WILLIAMS

P.O. BOX 1535

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23212

R. HARVEY CHAPPELL JR.

LEE F. DAVIS JR.

PAUL W. JACOBS II

CHRISTIAN, BARTON, EPPS, BRENT, AND CHAPPELL

1200 MUTUAL BUILDING

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 22211

E. A. DUFFY

CLERK OF THE COUNCIL

OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND

9th and BROAD STREETS

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23219

Bessie Jordan Lynch

Notary Public

XXX

XXIX

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held

at the Supreme Court Building in the City

of Richmond on Wednesday the 14th day of

February, 1979.

The City Council of the

City of Richmond, et al., Petitioners,

against Record No 781557

William I. Golding Sr., et al., Respondents.

Upon consideration of the application

of William I. Golding Sr., in proper person,

prayin for a stay of execution of the judg-

ment rendered herin on November 22, 1978,

pending review on certiorari in the Supreme

Court of the United States, the application

is refused.

A Copy

Teste:

Allen L. Lucy

Clerk

XXXI

—_ a cr re

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, William I. Golding sr., hereby certify

that I have transmitted these copies of

this PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTORARI to

This Court and three copies have been

delivered to the following attornies:

R. Harvey Chapell Jr.

Lee F Davis Jr.

Paul W. Jacobs II

Christin, Barton, Epps, Brent and Chappell

1200 Mutual Building

Richmond, Virginia 222111

zt. S&S. Bliis Iil

John Charles Thomas

Rolliff H. Purrington Jr.

P.O. Box 1535

Hunton and Williams

Richmond, Virginia 23212

Signed

i‘ aM r\ ) 6 Oe Ae

XXXIT

APPENDEX

WILLIAM IRVIN GOLDING SR.

Petitioner

Vv.

THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

and

THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND

HENRY L. MARSH, III

Respondent

I. THE SUPREME COURTOF VIRGINIA DID NOT

HAVE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE ISSUES

PRESENTED TO IT BY THE RESPONDENTS AS

THERE WAS LACK IN DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

Did the Supreme Court of Virginia

have jurisdiction lawfully to determine

the issues in the mandamus action. The

Petitioner submits that the Supreme Court

of Virginia did not?

Article IV, section 1, of the Consti-

tution of Virginia, establishes that the

Supreme Court of Virginia, has origi-

nal jurisdiction of Mandamus Cases.

Section 7-96 of the Code of Virginia

conferred the power to the Supreme

Court of Virginia which the Constitu-

tion of Virginia established.

The legislature of Virginia deter-

mined that certain requirements had to

be met in order to invoke the original

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of

Virginia in Mandamus Cases. Virginia

Code Section 8.10-644 must be complied

with before an application for Mandamus

can be made to the Supreme Court of

Virginia. This code section is juris-

dictional. The Respondent made applica-

tion to the Supreme Court of Virginia

for a Writ of Mandamus within one hour

of this Petitioner being served with the

papers, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. on October

31, 1978. The Statute requires reason-

able notice of making application. The

notice given this Petitioner was so un

resonable that it can be said that appli-

cation was make without notice.

The Petitioner was served at approx-

mately 8:00 o'clvck a.m. on October 31,

1978, at his home located at 2246 Bywood

Lane, Richmcend, Virginia which is approx-

imately 15 to 20 minutes from the Supreme

Court of Virginia by automobile, not in-

cluding parking the automobile in the

congested area surrounding The Supreme

Court of Virginia. This Petitioner did

not have time to read and understand the

papers served on him, and get to the

Supreme Court of Virginia by 9:00 o'clock

a.m.. This Petitioner did not have time

to appear and object to the filing, or

if appropriate, to do the "non-descre-

tionary ministerial act" which was sought

to be compelled by the Respondents.

The approch used by the Respondents

was so repugnant to fundimental fairness

and fair play that it violated Due

Process of Law as Provided by the Four-

teenth Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States ‘and Article I, Section

11 of the Constitution of Virginia.

The Supreme Court of Virginia refle-

ected on the right to reasonable notice in

case of Fugate v. Weston, 156 Va. 107,

157 S,E., 736, (1931), stating:

Unless a Constitution provides otherwise,

the right to notice is universally

recognized when qa question essentially

judicial is involved. It is as old as the

common law and is reaffirmed in the Magna

Charta c. 29. In Ramshay's Case, 18 0O.B.

190, it is characterized as one of "the

principles of eternal justice." It is

a part of the law of the land, or of

due process of law. Va. Const. Section

8.11; Foster v. Dansas, 112 U.S. 201, 5S.

Ct. 8, 97, 28 L.Ed. 629, 696: Shurtleff

v. United States, 48 C.J. 898, 22 R.C.L.

547.

It is quite evident that the Respond-

ents had little regard for the manditory

and jurisdictional requirements of

Virginia Code Section 8.01-644, which

provides clearly:

Application for a Writ of Mandamus or a

Writ of Prohibition shall be on petition

verfied by oath, after the part against

whom tne writ is prayed has been served

with a copy of the petition and notice

of the intended application a reasonable

time before such application is made.

(emphasis added)

For this reason alone this Writ of

Mandamus should have been dismissed, however

there are other reasons The Supreme Court

of Virginia did not have Jurisdiction

which are as follows:

The "jurisdictional elements" of

mandamjs were missing in the action that

was pending before the Supreme Court of

Virginia. It is important to state at

the onset that the "Mandamus Label" used

by the Respondents was misleading. It was

used for the purpose of bringing an issue

to the Supreme Céurt of Virginia, without

which the Supreme Court of Virginia had

no jurisdiction. The- proper jurisdiction

lied in a circuit court to determine the

issues presented by the Respondents.

Tue Petition was called a "Petition

for a Writ of Mandamus", however, the

relief sought and prayed for therin was

for a declaratory judgement to determine;

Whether or not a vacancy exists in the

Ninth Election District Seat of the

Council of the City of Richmond. Mandamus",

was not the remedy to resolve this ques-

tion. The: relief sought by the Respondents

can not be obtained by Mandamus. The

Respondents admitted that, "All issues

raised in the Petition grow out of the

essestial question of Golding's status".

In essence, prayed the Supreme Court of

Virginia to decide whether Petitioner,

William I. Golding, Sr, has any right

to claim he was the counciiman from the

Ninth Election District of the City of

Richmond.....". and, "it is a straight-

forward problem of the status of an indiv-

idual...". Better stated, the Respondents

sought a declaratory judgement regarding

the status of an individual. It was

crucial to determine your Petitioner's

status first. The Supreme Court of Vir-

ginia was without jurisdiction.

Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution

of Virginia provides:

KEE

The Supreme Court shall, by virtue of t

Constitution, have maine’. seaiekion

in cases of habesas corpus, mandamus, and

prohibition and in matters of judicial

censure, retirement, and removal under

Section 10 of this Article. All other

jurisdiction of the Supreme Sourt shall

be appellate.

The Supreme Court of Virginia had

no jurisdiction to determine the status

of the Ninth District Seat. The Respondent's

remedy was in a circuit court with a

declaratory judgement action. The Supreme

Court of Virginia should not have declare

a vacancy. The statutory remedy is adequate

in law. If the Respondants, labeled the

papers, "Petition for a Declaratory Judge-

ment", this would have removed the confusion.

The Supreme Court of Virginia would. have

had no trouble recognizing that it was

without jurisdiction. See: D.D. Jones

Transf. and Whse. Co. v Commonwealth ex

rel. State Corp. Common, 174 Va. 184,

5 S.E. 2d 628; Poértsmouth Restaurant

Ass'n v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees

Alliance, Local 807, 183 Va. 757, 33 S.E.

2d. 218 (1945).

The Respondents sought to compel

Duffy, the Clerk of the Council of the

City of Richmond, to perform a discre-

tionary act and moreover an act that consti-

tutes unlawful conduct by Duffy. Duffy

had no right to unlawfully remove the

name of a person duly elected, qualified

and certified by the Board of Electors

of the City of Richmond.

The Virginia Legislature provided

for declaratory judgement by stature,

Section 8.01-184 et seq with jurisdic-

tion in the circuit courts.

The circuit courts also has juris-

diction by statute in contest of elec-

tions Section 24.1-239 and 24.1-240 et

seq and Quo Warranto.

The status as to whether or not a

vacancy exists was to be determined

herein, nothing more. There was nothing

unique in the Golding case that would

have required a mandamus approach to resolve

the issues.

The several*elements of mandamus

must be existing by facts, and prayed

for, by the Responents before mandamus

will lie. The elements of adequate remedy

at law must be absent, and a clear duty

to perform a non-discretionary ministerial

act must exist, because, without then,

the action was not mandamus.

The Respondents relied on Sinclair v.

Yourn, 100 Va. 285, 40S.E. 907 (1902).

The Sinclair case asserts that the Writ

of Mandamus is now the well settled

practice and affords a simple, expedious,

adequate and complete remedy in such cases

as the one that was before the Supreme

Court of Virginia

This is not correct. Sinclare indi-

cates that a combination of quo warranto

and detinue were necessary to resolve the

issue nor would detinue resolve the issue. it must have been the candidate with the

The position was promoted that mandamus would | second highest number of votes in the elec-

resolve both issues which existed. The Sin- | tion, rather then the Council of the City of

clare case and the Golding case should have | Richmond and/or Henry L. Marsh III as Mayor.

been distinguishable. In the Golding case | Logically the next jurisdictional ques-

the only issue was the status of the council tion arises as to whether or not there was

seat. In Sinclair, both delivery of prop- any lawful party named in the Petition as a

erty and title to office were issues petitioner to pursue this matter. It seems

The mandamus case that was at the bar fairly obvious that if no lawful party exists,

did not require a "combination of actions." the Supreme Court of Virginia would have been

In Sinclair, the* petitioner sought indeifi- | without jurisdiction and the petition should

able muniments which was a basis for the di- have failed.

tinue acticn Sthe sucessor and presucessor Were Henry L. Marsh, Kemp, Kenny, Rennie,

were at litigation over the title to the office. Richardson, Thompson and McDaniel acting as

In the mandamus action, the Respondints individuals on October 26, 1978 at 7:15 ina

were not claiming title to the council seat room disignated Council Chambers or were they

and have made no allegation of the fact that acting in their Official capacities, collec-

muniments exist. In the mandamus action there tively as members of the City Council collec-

are no records, books or other instruments tively speaking for the legal entity of the

of the council seat. The items usually sought City Council of the City of Richmond, when

are treasurers records, books of account, Mr. Kemp moved "the Council instructs you

registers or lists of voters, or any great seal, (Marsh) to institute legal proceedings

etc. Determination of the status of the council in the appropriate Court to compel the

seat is the only issue to be resolved. The Clerk (Duffy) to remove Mr. Golding's

Respondents had an adequate remedy at law | name from the rolls as a City Councilman,

in the circuit court. and to remove his name from the City

There was no duty existing at the time | payroll, each effective October 23, 1978."

on Duffy to act, and no indentifiable muni-

ments and no successor, challenger.

If there was a presuccessor challenger,

Mr. Duffy in his official capacity as

Clerk of the City of Richmond had not

called the roll at the time:of the motion

to determine if the persons present were

in fact duly elected and qualified members

of the City Council of the City of Richmond

and to determine whether a quorum was

present to transact the lawful business

of the city. The Petitioner submits that

the persons present acted individually

on Mr. Kemp's motion. The roll call of

the persons present was made as indivi-

duals to concur with Mr. Kemp's sugges-

tion.

If they were acting in their official

capacity, wouid it have not have been

necessary for a notice to be given to Mr.

Golding of the particular item and motion.

Was a suspension of the rules of the pro-

ceedure of the City Council reyuired; or

were the participants trying to be parti-

cularly careful to act as individuals

outside of the regular proper lawful

sucession of the City Council of the City

of Richmond. The Petitioner believes and

urges the later to be the case.

; It was also be brought to the Supreme

Court's of Virginia attention that if this

action was a part of the City Council

of the City of Richmond, that the Mayor

had exceeded the direction and instruction

of the City Council by instituting legal

proceedings against Mr. Golding. The

"authority and power to act in the name or

on behalf of the Council was limited to

instituting a legal proceeding to compel

the Clerk to act. The petition pre-

sented to the Supreme Court of Virginia

far exceeded that. It was submitted to

the Supreme Court of Virginia that if the

Supreme Court of Virginia had the juris-

diction, the power and the authority to do

equity for all parties, including the

appointment of Mr. Golding. The Respondents

did in their prayer ask the Supreme Court

of Virginia for such other further and

general relief as the nature of the case

in the Court may require or as The Supreme

Court of Virginia deemed appropriate.

The Petitioner, William I. Golding.

Sr., stated tc the Supreme Court of

Virginia that if the Supreme Court of

Virginia did have jurisdiction to render

general relief as the nature of the case

may require or as the Supreme Court of

Virginia had deemed appropriate that if

the Supreme Court of Virginia did find

that it had jurisdiction, that it should

have done equity for all parties includ-

ding your Petitioner, William I. Golding

This was to appoint your Petitioner as

the Ninth District Member of the City

Council of the City of Richmond.

Iherefore the Petitioner moves that

that the Petition herin be granted on the

grounds and for the reasons set forth herein

above. The Petitioner recognizes that argu-

ment of the "jurisdictional elements" of

Mandamus which will be treated in argu- ‘

ment # II hereinafter set forth.

II DID THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISH SUFFICENT

FACTS TO SUPPORT THE ELEMENTS OF MANDAMUS

OR DID IT LACK DUE PROCESS OF LAW

Petitioner Golding contends that the

evidence did not estavlish sufficient

facts to support the elements of mandamus.

In the interest of brevity, the Petitioner

will not repeat his contention in the

prior argument concering that the

Respondent failed to prove the jurisdic-

tional elements of mandamus, but incor-

porated by reference the essence of these

arguments hersin on the merits of the

case.

The essentials for the issuance of

a writ of mandamus were stated in

Richmond - Grayhound Lines v. Davis,

200 Va. 147 (1958) as follows.

"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary

remedial process, which is not awarded

as a matter of right but in the exercise

of a sound judicial discretion. Due to

the drastic character of the writ, the

law has placed safeguards around it.

Consideration should be had for the

urgency which prompt an exercise of the

discretion, the interests of the public

and third persons, the results which

would follow upon a refusal of the writ,

as well as the promotion of substantial

use eee In doubtful cases the writ will

e denied, but where the right involved and

the duty sought to be enforced are clear

and certain and where there is no other a-

vailable specific and adequate remédy the

writ will.issue. It will not lie where it

would serve no useful purpose or where

it world work as injustice or hardship

or be harmful to the public interest."

(Emphasis added)

In the case of Richmond, Fredericksburg

& Potomac Railroad Co., v Fugate 206 Va.

159 (1965), The Supreme Court of Virginia

stated that it was not a proper function

of a mandamus proceedings to consider and

evaluate technical and conflicting evi-

dence. The Supreme Court of Virginia con-

tinued on to say that the principle func-

tion of mandamus was to command and

execute, not to inquire and adjudicate.

In the Mandamus case, the evidence was

conflicting and the issues were complex,

and the nature o# the cave should have

required the Supreme Court of Virginia to

conduct inquires before adjudication

could have been made. Since Respondents

had adequate remedies available to them

on the Circuit Court level, where the

Court was better equipped to conduct any

required investigations. The Supreme Court

of Virginia as a matter of sound judicial

discretion, should have refused Respondents

the relief requested and left them to

other available legal remedies, such as

Quo Warranto or Declaratory Judgment,

or such other relief as may be available.

Further, in determining whether or

not to exercise any jurisdiction, it

should have been here, the Supreme Court

of Virginia should have looked to the facts

presented herein showing the hardship

that a writ of Mandamus did work on the

Petitioner, in light of the way he has

rehabitilated himself since 1955, in

view of the exemplary manner in which he

had represented his District on the City

Council, and, also to the injustice and

harm that was done to the people of the

Ninth District of the City of Richmond

who elected the Petitioner and who contin-

ue® to support him by their comments of

Support, public appearance in his behalf,

and circulation of petitions requesting

that he should have been retained as

as their Councilman regardless of his

past mistakes. Here the promotion of

substantial justice would have seem best

reached by the Suprem? Court of Virginia

aqenying the Petition. This position

was clearly supported by the action of the

Governor tc the Commonwealth of Virginia

in forthwith removing the Petitioners politi-

cal disabilities on October 27, 1978, pursu-

ant to Petitioner application on October 26,

1978.

III THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA SHOULD NOT

HAVE GONE BEHIND THE CERTIFICATE OF ELECTION

TC DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT A VACANCY EXISTED

IN THE NINTH ELECTION DISTRICT SEAT BECAUSE

OF THE LACKING IN DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

The Respondents' argument which dealt

with their alleged right to require the

Petitioner to relinguish all claims to

the office, which deals with the question

of whether or not there was a vacancy in

office, argued that the Petitioner's

election to City Council was void ab

initio. The case cited by the Respondents

in support of the contention were not

controlling in the mandamus action. The

first case cited, Dean v. Pallicelli,

194 VA. 219 (1953) a taxpayer action

filed by bill of equity in the Circuit

Court of Arlington County, dealt with

an elective public office but not with

the effect of the existence of a valid

Certificate of Election as was in the

mandamus action. The second case cited,Norris

v. Gilmer,183 VA. 367 (1944), dealt with

an appointed public office, not with

an elected one, and again did not deal

with the effect of the existence of a valid

Certificate of Election, as in this case.

The third case citied, State v. Riffle,

132 Ohio St. 545, 9 N.E. 2a 497 (1937),

a@ quo warranto action in Ohio, is in appar-

ent conflict with existing Virginia law

applicable to this case.

In De Shazo v.!Davis, 157 (1932), a”

Mandamus Case involving the effect of the

existence of a Certificate of Election,

the Supreme Court of Virginia, citing

State v. Oates, 86 Wis. 634, 57 N.W. 296,

stated:

"The question first presented is, what

effect is to be given to the canvass and

certificate of election?* * * The effect

which it has plainly must be to determine

who is elected to the office. Not neces-

sarily to determine the fact permanently

or beyond the possibility revision or

reversal, but to determine the fact for the

time being, and until a different result

be reached in a proper proceceing to

contest the title of the certificate holder

to the office."

The Supreme Court of Virginia continued

to state:

"Plainly, the man with the certificate

and canvass in his favor must be

admitted to the office, until a compe-

tent tribunal reverses the decision of

the canvassers. Any other doctrine

would be subversive of all law and order."

the Supreme Court of Virginia citing

9 Ruling Case Sections 116 and 144,

after asserting that Mandamus must not

be assumed to be a substitute for quo

warranto or other proceedings wherein

the facts on which the claim of title

may be termined, stated that this:

"Court will not go behind the certificate,

commission, or other declaration of title to

the orrice issed or made by the proper

authority to inquire into the ultimate

rignt. . ." 3

In that case the Supreme Court of Virginia

held that:

", . ewkere the relator holds a prima

facie and uncontested title to the

office .. .awrint of mandate may be

issued to put him in possession of the

office ...* * *#

"Nor will the right to the writ be

affected by the fact that another

Claiming a right to the office, or its

actual incumbent, may be able to quo

warranto sucessfully to contest the

relator's prima facie title, either on

the ground that another received a greater

number of legal voter at the election,

or that the relator is ineligible

(Emphasis added), or that the eledtion

was illegal."

In the mandamus action, the converse

was true. Petitioner Golding was the

holder of an unchallenged, valid prima

facie Certificate that he was duly

elected as City Councilman, which had

not been disputed in any proceedings.

No action has been made by the Respondents

to invalidate this Certificate of the

Electoral Board of the City of Richmond,

this Board was not a party before the

Supreme Court of Virginia in that procee-

dings, and until amappropriate tribunal

reverses this Certificate, the Supreme

Court of Virginia should have not have

gone behind it This was true regardless

of whether or not the Respondents were

able to sucessfully contest Petitioner.

Respondents did not take the necessary

actions under the law to allow them to

be granted the relief sought in that case.

If the Petitioner had been excluded from

performing his duties of office by

Respondents, mandamus would lie to re-

admit him to office as long as he did

hold a valid Certificate of Election

to that office; and as long as he did

hold the required Certificate here, he

is entitled to retain this office.

Therefore no vacancy did exist in

the Ninth Election District's seat on

City Council, as alleged by the Respondents,

In addition, in the arguments in Petitioner's

response to the Mandamus Petition, any action

taken by Alice Clark Lynch, General Regis-

tar of he City of Richmond, in removing

the Petitioner name from the voting rolls

of the City was or no legal significiance

in determining whether or not a vacancy

occurred in this office after the Petitioner

was sworn in on July 1, 1978.

However, thé Supreme Court of Vir-

ginia did declare that a vacancy did

exist in this office and that teh Petitioner

was never elected thereto. It is the

position of the Petitioner that section

3.04 of the Charter of the City of

Richmond, which the Supreme Court of

Virginia pointed Council to, to fill the

position that was vacated by their order,

was improper if not illegal. First the |

section required that the Chief Judge of |

the Circuit Court of Richmond fill this

vacancy, although this section is vague

it did not require that Council have know-

ledge of a vacancy before the thirty day

period stated therin commences to run.

The Supreme Court of Virginia exceeded it's

authority in granting an extention beyond

30 days which had expired, if on election

day Iiay 2, 1978 the Petitioner was never

elected as the Respondents claimed,

3.04 has never been approved by this court

as a method of filling a position on Coun-

cil in a certain suit entiled: City of

Richmond v. United States et al 45 Led 245

(1975), however, section 3.01, 3.02 and

3.03 were approved by this court in the

above suit as the only methods of filling

a position on the Council of the City

of Richmond. Inéidentally election at

large for Council are illegal in the

City of Richmond by this Courts order in

Third Section 3.04,

which was never changed to incompass,

the same above suit.

this Courts order, allowed a portion of

Council comprised of the other eight dis-

tricts to force their will on the Ninth

Election District. Results of Kovember

22,1978, Supreme Courts order are as follows:

On December 18, 1978 there was a black

majority of members seated on council,

black Councilman Henry ‘’. Richardson

nomited a Carolyn C. Wake, with black

Mayor Henry L. Marsh III seconding the

motion, to the position of council-

person of the predominately white

Ninth Election District. The Black

vote was unanimous with the White

minority having little choice but to

go along for harmoney. This allowed the

black majority of council to force their

choice of councilperson on the predomin-

ately white Ninth Election District. To

remove William I. Golding Sr., the choice

of a predominately white district and re-

place him with Carolyn C. Wake, the choice

of the black najvrity of council members

circumvents and violates the intent behind

the suit entitled: The City of Richmond

v. United States et al 44 Led 245(1975)

also this violates your Petitioners rights

which are protected under Section 5 of

the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended

42USC, 1973c.

IV THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE RESPONDENTS

IN THE MANDAMUS ACTION WAS BARRED BY

THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES

Respondents' action against Petitioner

Golding was barred by Laches. "laches"

is such neglect or omission to do what

one should do as warrants the presumption

that he has abandoned his claim, and

23 :

declines to assert his right. There is

not absolute rule as to what constitutes

laches or staleness of demand, and no

one decision constitues a precedent in

the strict sense for another; each case

is to be determined according to its own

particular circumstances. Pittman v

Pittman , 208 VA 476, (1968).

In the mandamus action, the records of

the Circuit Gourts of the City of Richmond

showed that the Petititioner was convicted

therein 1955 of questionable felonies.

The record shows that the Petitioner had been

a registered City voter for many years,

and had been certified as a candidate by

the City of Richmond in the last two council-

matic elections, and has served on City

Council since July 1, 1978. All these

records are maintained by the City of

Richmond and the Respondents knew or

should have known, of their existence.

The neglect or omission of the City of

Richmond and the Respondents to act prior

to now against your Petitioner Golding

was so inequitable that this action

should as a matter of equity have been

barred.

V THE RESPONDANTS WERE ESTOPPED IN THE

MANDAMUS ACTION FROM DENYING THAT THE

PETITIONER WAS A DULY ELECTED AND QUALI-

FIED MEMBER OF THE CITY COUNCIL.

The City Council of the City of

Richmond was Estopped by Record and was

precluded to deny the truth of matters

setforth in their legislative Records,

31 CJS 292, Estopple Section 4, Swoford

Brothers Dry Goods Co., Owen, 133 P.

193, 37 OKL. 616, LRA. 1961 C., CIS

Further, parol or extrinsic evidence

should have not been admitted to vary or

contradict municipal Records, 32A CJS

242, Evidence Section 879, unless some-

thin appearing in the Record itself

gave ground for an attack 32A CJS 242,

Evidence Section 879, State v. Alexander,

77 N.W. 841, 107 Iowa 177.

Accordingly, City Council being

judge of the election and qualification

of its members was estopped from therafter

challenging them since as reflected fy

the fact that Petitioner Golding was

seated on Council on July 1, 1978 at

Councils organizational meeting pursuant

to Section 4.05 of the Charter of the

City of Richmond which reads in relevant

part as follows;

"Council shall be the judge of the election

and qualification of its members but the

decision of the Council in this matter

shall be subject to review by the Hustins

Court of the City of Richmond. .

IV ARTICLE II, SECTION 1 OF THE CON-

STITUTION OF VIRGINIA UNCONSTITUTIONAL

(DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF FELONS )

"While the right to vote in Federal

elections is confirmed by Art. I, Section

2 of the Constitution (United States),

the right to vote in State elections is

nowhere expressly mentioned." Harper v.

Virginia State Board of Elections (1966)

86 Ct. 1079, 1080. .

The California Suprame Court said

in Otsuka v. Hite, (1974), 51 Cal. Rptr.

284, 414 Ped, 412, that:

"The question of the source of the

right to vote in state elections appears

still to be open (Harper v. Virginia

State Bd. of Elections (1966) supra, 86

S. Ct. 1079, 1080-1081); but it is

settled that whatever the source, "once

the franchise is granted to the elector-

ate, lines may not be drawn which are

inconsistent with the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendteht". . .

"While the right to vote is not among

the specifically enumerated rights of

the first Amendment, it is nevertirless

one which this (U.S. Supreme) Court

has been so zealous to protect." (Car-

rington v. Rash (1965) "supra, 380 U.S.

89,96 85 8S. Gt.". es

"The Supreme Court of the United States)

"has stressed on numerous occasions,

"(t)he right to vote freely for the candi-

date of one's choice is the essence of a

democratic society, and any restrictions

of that right strike at the heart of

representative government." Renolds

v¥. Sine 577 U. S. 533,555, 84 S. Ct. 1362,

1378 , 12 LEd. 2d 506. Thesright is fun-

damental ‘because preservative of all

rights.' Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 U.S.

390, 210, Be. CB. 1064, TOTT 350 L. Ba.

220." ( Harman v. ForsseNius (1965) 380

U.S. 89,96,85 S. Ct. 775) and “vital

to the maintenance of democratic insti-

tutions." (id. at p. 94, 85 S. Ct. at

p. 779, quoting-from Schnider v. State

or New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60S.

Ct. 146, 84 LEd. 155). (See also

United States v. Mississippi (1965)

380 U.S. 128, 144, 85 S. Ct. 208, 13

L. Ed. 2d 717 ("the right to vote in

this country is * * * precious");

Louisiana v. United States (1965) 380

U.ew. 145, 153, 85 S. Ct. 817,13 L. Ed.

2d. 709 \"The cherished right of people

in a Country like ours to vote"); and,

finally, the recent case of Harper v.

Virginia State Bd. of Elections (1966)

supra, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 1083 ("the right

to vote is * * * precious * * * fundamen-

tal" P "

Rather than being a creature of the

Virginia Constitution, the right of

suffrage in this as in every other state

of the Union flows from the wellsprings

of our national political heritage.

In Richardson V. Ramirez (1974, 94

S:'Ct. 2655, the United States Supreme

Court stated:

"More impressive than the mere exis-

tance of the state constitutional provisions

disenfranchising felons at the time of the

adoption of the Fourteenth Amendmant is

congressional treatment of State thus

readmitted. . .a part of the readmission

process. . . established conditions on

which the former Confederate States would

be readmitted to representation in Congress.

That when the people of any one of

said rebel States shall have formed a con-

stitution of government. . . except such

as may be disenfranchised for felony at

common law, .and when such constitution

shall provide that the elective franchise

shall be enjoyed by all such persons as

have the qualifications herein stated for

electors. ..

A series of enabling acts in 1868 and

1870 admitted those States to representation

in Congress. The Act admitting. .. the ..

first State to be so admitted, attached a

condition to its admission. . .

"Wheras the people. .. that the State

is entitled and admitted to representation

in Congress as one of the States of the

Union upon the following fundamental con-

dition: That the constitution. . . shall

never be so amended or changed as to de-

prive any citizen or class of citizens of

the United States of the right to vote

who are entitled to vote by the constitution

herein recognized, except as a punishment

for such crimes as are now felonies at

common law. . .

The same "fundamental condition as

was imposed by the act. . . with only slight

variations in language, imposed. .. that

condition. - « by the Acts readmitting

Virginia. .. Act of Feb. 1, 1870, c 12,

16 Stat. 63."

In light of the fact that Virginia

was readmitted to the Union by "An Act For

The More Efficient Government of the Rebel

States" pursuant to the condition that the

Virginia Constitution shall never be amended

or and providing only for the exclusion from

the right to vote of citizens convicted of

crimes as are felonies at common. law.

Petitioner contends that it is unconstitu-

tional for the State of Virginia to enlarge

the class of persons excluded from the

right to vote to include all felons as has

been provided in Article II, Section 1 of

the Virginia Constitution.

Further, if the Virginia Constitution

grants the right to vote to some citizens

and denies the franchise to others, the

Court must determine whether the exclusions

are necessary to promote a compelling

state interest.

As was stated in the disenting opinion

in Richardson v. Ramirez (1974) 94S. Ct.

2655, at 2682, when this test applies:

"The State has the heavy burden of

showing, first, that the challenged disen-

franchisement is necessary to legimate and

substantial state interest; second, that

the classification is drawn with precision-

that it does not exclude too many people.

who should not and need not be excluded;*

and, third, that there are no other.:reason=.

able ways to achieve the State's goal with

a lesser burden’on the constitutionally

protected interest. E. g. Dunn v. Blunstein,

Supra, at 343, 360, 92 S. Ct., at 1003,

1012;

Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395

U.S. 621, 632, 89 S. Ct. 1886, 1892 23L.Ed.

583 (1969); see Rosario v. Rockfeller,

410 U.S. 752,770,953 S. Ct. 1245, 1256,36

L. Ed. 2d. 1 (1973) (Powell J., dissenting) ;

cf. Memorial Hospital v. Maicopa, 415 U.S.

250, 94S. Ct. 1076, 39 L. Ed. 2a. 306 (1974);

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83S.

Ct. 328, 340, 9b. Ed. 2a 405 (1963$; Shelton

v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81S. Ct. 247,

252, 5 Le. Ed. 2d. 231 (1960)."

It appears that historical constitu-

tional restraints limit the Virginia Consti-

tution to disenfranchisement of voting rights

to those persons only convicted of "Common

Law Felonies" and it apparently does not

include statutory felonies.

We turn then to the scope fo common

law felonies as applied to the classifica-

tion adopted by Article II Section I of the

Constitution of Virginia. Appellant contends

that "Felony" should not be construed to

mean "any felony" and that when construed

the section discriminates because it does

not distinguish between felonies malum

prohibitum and/or those that are malum in

se. The Court must reach and determine

the question whether classifications drawn

in the Constitution of Virginia are reason-

able in light of its purpose. The unreason-

ableness of classification disfranchising

all former felons, regardless of thier crime,

if readily demostrable; it raises the

spectre of citizens automatically deprived

of their right to raise the spectre of

citize:.s automatically deprived of their

right to vote upon conviction, for example,

of seduction under promise of marriage

(Va. Code Section 18. 2-68), cross burning

(Va. Code Section 18. 2-423), disinterment

of body (Va. Code Section 18. 2-126), second

offense involving obsecent publications

(Va. Code Section 18. 2-380), injury to

property by persons unlawfully assembled

(Va. Code Section 18. 2-414), detaining a

female to persuate her to marriage (Va.

Code Section 18. 2-355), unlawful throwing

of missiles at car, train, or vessel (Va.

Code Section 18. 2-154). No reasonable re-

“

hation is apparent between this result

and the purpose of protecting the inte-

grity of the elective process,

The constitutional construction of

"felony" to include any and all felonies

would, as observed above, sweep into its

amit milum prohibitum conduct which is

but little detrimental to society at large

and is totally unrelated to the goal of

preservation of the integrity of the elec-

tive process.

At common law crime which rendered

the person doing them infamous were treason,

felony, and crime falsi, the latter em-

bracing not only offenses involving fasee-

hood, but offenses injuriously affecting

the administration of justice. What a felony

is "at common law" depends to some extent

on when the question is asked, for the

common law did not remain static in this

respect. A typical definition however,

would comprise murder, manslaughter, may-

hem, rape, arson, robbery, burglary, and :

larceny.

"The nature of the punishment," in

this day of indeterminate sentences and

proliferation of technical, malum prohi-

bitun offenses, requires inquiry to focus

more precisely on the nature of the crime

itself; to determine whether the elements

of the crime are common law felonies classi-

fied as malum in se and further of a nature

such that he who has committed the crime

may reasonable be deemed to constitute a

threat to the integrity of the elective

process.

Upon careful study, by this Court

of the qugstionable felonies committed by

‘your Petitioner in 1955, the Court will

discover the conviction records are vague

as to the circumstances invdlved in the

offences,in one locality the convictions

are labeled statuatory and in the other

jarisdictions the conviction records were

labeled larceny. The complaints and the

grand jury statement np word of "larceny"

is mentioned, although your Petitioner

was convicted of larceny. The Petitioner

could not be convicted for something

greater than he was charged with. Your

Petitioner was charged withunotherized

use of an automobile and breaking and

entering, which are statutory offences in

the State of Virginia and later labeled

larceny in the conviction records, al*hough

evidence was presented to the Supreme Court

of Virginia and the court obviously did not

make this distinction. Your Petitioner prays

that this Court do so and set the convictions

aside or declare all the convictions statu-

tory in fact. Your Petitioner is suffering

unjustly to day from possible bad proceedures,

magustrates, procuting attornies or the hurry

of a trial which denied your Petitioner Due

Process of law as your Petitioner was denied

Attornies advice from the start. This could

not happen today because of the protections

placed by this Court for the accused.

The Respondent stated in The Virginia

Supreme Court that your Petitioner abandoned

his right to vote by his concictions of 1955.

Your Petitioner must bring to this Courts

attention, your Petitioner was 18 years of

age in 1955 without the right to vote, as

the age to vote was 21 years old and it is

the contention of your Petitioner that he

was unable to abandon something he had

not acquired, therefore this lacked Due

Process of Law.

Further, Petitoner believes. .. "that

the State has not met its burden of justify-

ing the blanket disenfranchisement of former

felons presented by this case. There is

certainly no basis for asserting that ex-

felons have any less interest in the democra-

tic process than any other citizen. Like

everyone else, their daily lives are deeply

affected and changed by the decision of

government.

As the Secretary of the State of Cali-

fornia observed in his menorandum to the

California Court. in Otsuka V. Hite (1974),

supra.

"It is doubtful. . . Whether the state

can demostrate either a compelling or ration-

al policy interest in denying former felons

the right to vote. The individuals involved

in the present case are persons who have

fully paid their debt to society. They

are as much affected by the actions of

government as any other citizen, and have

as much of a right to participate in govern-

mental decision-making. Futhermore, the

denial of the right to vote to such persons

is a hindrance to the efforts of society

to rehabilitate former felons and convert

them into law-abiding and productive citi-

zens." (Memorandum of the Secretary of the

State of California in Opposition to Cert-

iorari, in Class of County Clerks and Regi-

strars of Voters of California +. Ramirez,

BO... Toesebits 'o- s

It is argued that disenfranchisement

is necessary to prevent vote frauds. Although

the State has legitimate and, in fact,

compelling interest in preventing election

fraud, the challenged provision is not sus-

tainable on that ground.

It encompasses all former felons and

there has been no showing that ex-felons

generally are any more likely to abuse the

ballot than the remainder of the population.

@:.. Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469, F. 2d. at 1225.

It has also been asserted that former

felons should not be allowed to vote because

their voting pattern might be subversive of

the interest of an orderly society. See

Green v. Board of Zlections, 380 R. ad

445, 451 (CA2 1967). _

The U.S. Supreme Court stated that to

the extent Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 1.S. 15,

5S. Ct. 747, 29 L. Ed. 47 (1885), and Davis

v. Beason 133 U.S. 333, 10S. Ct. 299, 33

@.. Ed. 637 (1890), approve". ..

the doctrine that citizens can be barred

from the ballot box because they would vote

to change the existing criminal law, those

decisions are surely of minimal continuing

precedential value. We have since explicitly

held that such "differences of opinion can-

not justify for excluding (any) group from. . .

'the franchise,' " Cipriano v. City of

Houma, :395 U.S. at 705-706, 89S. Ct. at

1900-1901; see Communist Party of Indiana v.

Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 94S. Ct 656, 38

L. Ed. 2d. 635 (1974); Evans v. Conman,

398 U.S. 419, 423, 90"S. Ct. 1752, 1755,

26 L. Ed. 2d. 370 (1970).

In addition to the above quotation,

the dissenting opinion expressed the

following in Richardson v. Ramires (19

74) 94S. Ct. 2655.

"(I)f they are..... residents,... they,

as all other qualified residents, have

la right to an equal opportunity for pol-

itical representation, .... 'Fencing

out' from the franchise a sector of the

population because of the way they may

vote is constitutionally impermissible."

Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S., at 94, 85S.

Ct. at 779. See Dunn, 405 U. S., at 355,

92 S. Ct. at 1009."

And the dissenting opinion in Richa-

rdson v. Ramirez, supra, continued as

follows:

"the public purposes asserted to be

served by disenfranchisement have been

found wanting in many quarters. When this

suit was filed 23 states allowed ex-fe-

lons full access to the ballot. since

_that time, four more states have joined

their ranks. Shortly after lower federal

courts sustained New york's and Florida's

disenfranchisement provisions, the legis-

lature repeal those laws. Congress has

re cently provided for the restoration

of felons' voting righrs at the end of

sentence or parole in the District of Col-

umbia, D.C. Code Section 1-1102 (7) (19

73) The National Conference on.-

Uniform State Laws, The American Law Insti-

tute, fue National Probation and Parole Ass-

ociation, the National Advisory Commission

on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,

The. President's Commission of Law Snforce-

ment and the Administration of Justice, the

California League: of Women, the National

Democrtic Party, and the Secretary of

State of Califoria have all stronhly endorsed

full suffrage rights for former felons."

Richardson v. Ramirez, (1974) 94S. Ot.

2655 (dissenting Opinion).

Accordingly, it is the Petitioner's

position that Article II, Section I. of the

Constitution of Virginia violates the

Constitution of the United States Article I,

Section 2 and the First and Fourteenth

Amendments therto as violating equal pro-

tection of the law and due process of law

and is in direct contradiction.of the

enabling acts of 1868 and 1870 titled

"An Act to provide for More Efficient Govern-

ment of the Rebel States".

VII ARB ARTICLE II, SECTION I, OF THE CONSTI-

TUTION OF VIRGINIA AND SECTION 24.1-46 OF

THE CODE OF VIRGINIA UNCONSTITUTIONAL

(REGISTRATION OF VOTERS}

As an element of qualification to vote

or hold public office, a person "shall be

registeced to vote......"Constitution

of Virginia, Art II, Section I, Sect-

ion 5, to register an applicant is re-

quired to apperr in person, complete

und sign under oath the application to

"whether the applicant has ever been ....

convicted of a felony, and if so, under

what circuastances the applicants right

to vote has been restored,"

Constitution of Virginia,Art, II,Sec, II.

"In addition to other duties provided

by law, it shall be the duty of the gen-

eral Registerar to:.... (12) strike

from the list of voters the names of all

persons known to him to be disqualified

to vote, as provided in the Constitution

unless such disability has been removed

- oe ips by law.....(Va. Oode Section

ote 140

"The fourteenth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States pro-

vides:

"Nor shall any State deprive any

per-

son of life, liberty or property, with-

out due process of law." "Its persuasive

function is to exact from the states ob-

servance of basic liberties." 16A OJS

Constitutional] Law Section 568. 3 a

"The due process guaranties extend to

and"binds the state or federal govern-

ment in every one of its branches, agen-

cies, and political subdivisions, and

binds all its creatures." 16A CJS 548,

Constitutional Law Section 568.

It necessarily follows that the Due Pro-

cess of Law protection must extend and

bind the General Registerar of Richmond,

and it appears that supportive of this

position is a case involving the Board of

Registerars of Alamaba,In Re Opinion of

the Justices, 252 Ala. 351; 40 So. 2d 849.

It guarantees a course of legal procedure

which has been established in our juris

prudence for the protection and enforce-

ment of private rights......

Due Process of Law has been held to mean

the right to be heard, so, its.... in-

dispensable elements,.... or minimal re-

quirements, are notice and opporunity to

be heard or to defend. The legislative is

without authority to dispense with these

requirements of due process; and the due

process guaranty of hearing me-

aN gy “Aer

ans a right in persons, not a mere pri-

vileges to be extended to them....

The opporunity to be heard has been

required to be adequate, fair, and rea-

sonable. The hearing or defense must be

before a competent, as well as before a

just, equitable and fair, and impartial

court or tribunal, and before trail,and

pcceenan® Or decree...

There must be an orderly proceeding

--.-adequate to safeguard the right for

which the constitutional protection is

invoked....

Due process of law implies the right

to contradict by proof every material

fact which bears on the question of

right involved....

The forgoing protective priniciples

are not confined to strictly court pro-

ceedings, but extend to every proceed-

ing which may deprive a person of life,

liberty, or property whether the proc-

ess be judical or administrative or ex-

cutive in its nature. 16A CJS 571-577,

Constitutional Law Section 569 (4)

The Registerar of the City of Richmond

has been vested by the legislature with

the authority to exercise judicial>or

quasijudicial discretion indirectly upon

the question of whether a person has "

qualified" to vote or hold public office.

The procedures established by Virginia

Code Section 24. 1-46 are without due

process of law in that no notice is re-

quired or hearing held.

It appears that such action or adjud-

ication may be exercised, even, upon he-

resay evidence on questions that bear

zealous protection.

Your Petitioner was struck as a regi-

stered voter upon only hearsay evidence

without prior notice or opporunity to

be heard.

Your Petitioner was denied the right

to vote in the Federal Election of Nov-

ember 6,1978 for the election of the

United States senate because of the City

Resisterar's action inspite of the fact

that your Petitioner had re-registared

prior to the election of which he should

have never been struck from in the first

place, therefore your Petitioner was de-

nied Due Process of Law and a right gua-

ranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment

to the Constitution of the United States.

The Commonwealth of Virginia attempts

to shift the burden of proof to the in-

dividual but yet at the same time strips

him of due process of law.

The fact that your Petitioner was re-

gistered to vote and did vote in vnuesterf-

ield County, Henrico County and the City

of Richmond for approximately eighteen

years and declared a candidate by the

Board of Elections 1977 and 1978 for City

Council is evidence enough of the unen-

forcability of the requirements and lack

of capacity of the Commonwealth to main-

tain the standard established for qual-

ification.

It is clear that Article II, Section

1 of the Virginia Constitution and de-

pendent constitutional provisions and

statues including Virginia Code Section

24. 1-46 lacks due process of law and

are unenforcable, vague and uncertain.

Accordingly, your Petitioner asserts that

they are unconstitutional.

CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA

ARTICLE II SECTION 1

Franchise and Officers

Section 1. Qualifications of voters. --

In elections by the peiple, the quali-

fications of voters shall be as follows:

Each voter shall be a citizen of the United

States, shall be eighteen years of age,

shall fulfill the residence requirements

set forth in this section, and shall be

registered to vote pursuant to this article.

No person who has been convicted of a felony

shall be qualified to vote unless his civil

rights have been restored by the Governor

or other appropriate authority. As pres-

cribedby law, no person ajudicated to be

mentally incompetent shall be qualified to

vote until his competency has been reesta-

blished.

The residence requirement shall be that

each voter shall have been a resident ot the

Commonwealth for six months and of the

precinct where he votes for thirty days. A

person who is qualified to vote except for

having moved his residence from one precinct

to another fewer than thirty days prior to

an election may in any such election vote

in the precint from which he has moved.

Residence, for all purposes of qualifica-

tion te vote, requires both domicile and a

place of abode. The General Assembly may

provide, in elections for President and

Vice-President of the United States, a

residence requirement of less than six

months and alternatives to registration

for new residents of the Commonwealth.

Any person who will be qualified with

respect to age to vote at the next general

election shall be permitted to register in

advance and also to vote in any intervening

primary or specual election.

CODE OF VIRGINIA

SECTION 24.1-46

Duties of general registrar - In addition to

the other duties provided by law, it shall

be the duty of the general registrar to:

(1) Maintain the public office provided by

the local governing body and to establish

and maintain such additional public offices

for the registration of voters as are

(2) Provide the appropriate forms for appli-

cation to register and to obtain the infor-

mation necessary to complete the application

to the provisions of the Constitution.

(3) Maintain, only in the principal office

of the general registrar, separate books

containing the names of registered voters

in alphabetical order for each election

district within his jurisdiction and make

them available for all election in such

districts. |

(4) Maintain in his office suitable books

containing lists in alphabetical order of

persons registered and carry out such

other duties as prescribed by the electoral

board.

(5) Certify the list of election districts,

the number of voters and information as

required by the State Board of Elections.

(6) Preserve as part of the official records

the written applications of all persons who

are registered and preserve for a period of

two years the written applications of all

persons who are denied registration.

(7) If a person is refused registration,

notify such person in writing of such

refusal and the reason forthwith.

(8) Upon being informed and determining

that a voter is registered in a precinct,

election district, county or city, in

which he no longer resides, if such voter

be within the same jurisdiction, transfer

such voter and notify him by mail of such

change. If such voter be without the juris-

diction, the general registrar shall notify

such voter of the voter's duty to transfer

to the election district of his residence,

and if such voter fail to comply with the

law, remove such voter's name by purge as

provided by Section 24.1-24.

(9) In the event that election districts

are rearranged or a new district created,

cause the names of those registered voters

residing in the rearranged or new districts

to be placed on the books and lists for the

proper election district and notify such

voter by mail of the changes.

(10) In the event through annexation,

merger or similar means an area in which

registered voters reside becomes a part of

another election district, county or city,

furnish to the appropriate general regis-

tar lists of registered voters so affected.

Such registered voters shall be placed on

the registration books of the new election

dictrict, county of city, so notified by

mail, or stricken from the registration |

books of the general registrat so trans-

ferring then.

(11) In the event of registration of a

qualified voter, who was previously regis-

tered in another place, notify the appro-

priate authority of the last place of

previous registration of such new regis-

tration. Such notice shall be upon a form

prescribed or approved by the State Board

of Elections. |

(12) Strike from the list of voters the names |

of all persons known to him to be disqualified

to vote, as provided in the Constitution,

unless such disability has been removed as

provided by law. The various records concer-

ning such name shall be retained for a

period of two years.

(13) Purge the registration books pursuant

to Section 24.1-59 through Section 24.1-62

and maintain accurate books of registered

voters. A voter's name may be removed from

the registration records Pursuant to Section

24.1-60 at any time during the year at

which the registrar discover that such person

is no longer entitled to be registered in

such district, except within sixty days of

the general election in November or within

thirty days of any other election in such

district.

(14) Whenever the registration books in any

election district are so mutilated, blotted,

defaced, or otherwise in such condition as

to render it difficult, troublesome or unsafe

to use them longer, the electoral board

shall then order, or may at any time order,

that the books shall be copied, cause fair

copies to be made of the old registration books,

and they shall take the place of the old books.

The general registrar shall preserve the old

books.

(15) Upon request of the local governing body,

to inform in writing those local govermental

agencies or departments duly designated the

names and addresses of all new registered

voters, all those removed from the regis-

tration lists and all those changes of ad-

dress occurring within the period requested.

CHARTER OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

Section 301. ELECTION OF COUNCILMEN

On the first Tuesday. in May, nineteen

hundred seventy-eight and on the first

Tuesday in May in every second year

thereafter there shall be held a general

city election at which shall be.elected

by the qualified voters of the city one

member of council from each of the nine

elections districts in the city, the

voters residing in each such district

to elect one member for said district

for terms of two years from the first

day of July following their election.

Section 3.02. NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES

FOR COUNCIL.

No primary election shall be held for

the nomination of candidates for the

office councilman, and candidat-s shall

be nominated only by petition. There

shall be printed on the ballots used

in the election of councilmen in each

election district the names of all

candidates who have been nominated for

election in such district by petition

and the filing of a notice of candid-

acy as provided herein and no others.

The requirements for nomination shall

be:

(a) Any qualified voter of the city may

be nominated for election as councilman

for the district in which he resides by

filing no later than the fixed time for

the closing of polls on the first Tuesd-

ay in March, withthe clerk of the Cir-

cuit Court of the City of Richmond, Div-

ision I, a petition signed by not less

than one hundred twenty-five qualified

voters of the district in which such

candidate resides and for which he seeks

election, each signature to which has

been witnessed by a person whose affid-

avit to that effect is attached thereto,

together with a notice of candidacy re-

quired by the general laws of the Comn-

onwealth relating to elections.

(b) The petition shall state the name

and street address of the residence of

the person whose name is presented the-

reby as a candidate, and the persons si-

gning the same.

Section 3.03 CONDUCT OF GENERAL MUNICI-

PAL ELECTION.

The ballots used in each district in the

election of councilmen shall be without

any distinuishing mark or symbol. Each

qualified voter shall be entitled to

cast one vote for one person to serve

as councilman for the district in which

such voter resides and no more. In cou-

nting the vote any ballot found to have

been voted for more than one person sh-

all be void. The candidate reciving the

highest number of votes cast in such el-

ection in each district shall be decla-

red elected. The general laws of the Com-

monwealth relating to the conduct of the

elections,so far as pertinent, shall ap-

ply to the conduct of the general muni-

cipal election.

Section 3.04. VACANIES IN OFFOCE OF CO-

UNCILMAN,.

Vacancies in the office of councilman

from whatever cause arising , shall be

filled for the unexpired portion of the

term by majority vote of the remaining

members of the council or, if the coun-

cil shall fail to fill a vacancy in

its membership within the thirty days

of the occurence of the vacancy, by

appointment by the chief judge of the

City of Richmond. (Acts 1975, ch. 112.

& 1.)

I, William I. Golding Sr. hereby certify

that the information presented in this

Petition for a Writ of Certorari is true

and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

This Petition for a Writ of Certorari has

been prepared according to rule 23 of the

Rules of The Supreme Court of the United

States.

William I. Golding Sr.

STATE OF VIRGINIA

CITY OF RICHMOND:

I, the undersigned, notary public do

certify that the above person appeared be-

fore me this | day of

1979, acknowledge that the abbove is the

and correct to the best of his knowledge and

belief.

My commission expires_ Mlarrh!),/989 a. |

Notary Pub

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