Opposition — Henderson v. Fort Worth Independent School District

MAR 15 1979

y

RO Oe,

—

MISHAML BODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1264

THOMAS EARL HENDERSON, JR., e¢ al.,

Petitioner

VS.

FORT WORTH INDEPENDENT SCHOOL

DISTRICT, e¢ u.., Respondent

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Brief in

Opposition to Certiorari

DAVID B. OWEN

CECIL A. MORGAN

2108 Continental Life Budg.

Fort Worth, Texas 76102

Attorneys for Respondent

March 12, 1979

a

Fort Worth Brief Printing Co., 610 S. Jennings Street Phone ED 2-4070 =

— $e ~

Table of Authorities ..

Opinions Below .....

ES:

Question Presented

Statutory Provision Involved .......................

Statement of the Case

Reasons for Denying the Writ:

I,

II.

III.

IV.

Conclusion

the Congress, .....

INDEX

Page

ii

1

2

2

2

3

This Court should not review a matter which by

Act of Congress was committed to the discre-

tion of the district court. .................... 7

The district court applied the correct standard

for the exercise of the discretion vested in it by

9

The district court was correct in concluding that

the special and unique circumstances of this case

would make an award of attorney’s fees against

the school district unjust. ............. 10

This Court should not exercise its supervisory

power over the lower courts on an issue com-

mitted to district court discretion. . 14

sie 15

Perro rrr rrr rrr errr err re err rrr

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Pages

Adams v. Reed, 567 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1978) .................. 8

Blassman v. Markworth, 359 F.Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1973) ... 3

Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d

OR UID ci tulcnicnseiedicincesndiionsceketeseduinibdsasiaedbatendl 3

Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th

GIG TRU Gcicssdschesccichesasecethantsstneicinagpeciesaeslapestiacaieaideedaaieaianniiiaal 8,12

Chimento v. Stark, 353 F.Supp. 1211 (D. N.H. 1973) ........ 3

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,

98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) _.......02..2.2...eeeee eee 8

Henderson v. Fort Worth Independent School District:

(Henderson I-Merits)

5 SS I ve eee rennenn 4

(Henderson II-Attorney’s Fees)

574 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1978) ..............2...... 5, 6,9

(Henderson III-en banc)

fk Renner ever 6

Hutto v. Finney, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) ............................. 8

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714

Se so ensicbeinalieliaiacibiiaanaiaiienan 8

Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Ass’n, 574 F.2d 423

I SIPs, TPO cola clini gd clibpeeehtannicon ciao 8

Manson v. Edwards, 482 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1973) -.......... 3

Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1978) ............ 7

Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 433 F.Supp. 1369

UNE NIST: AUMIEIPTD ipsa tiie: cn bie daelnbdesceseeiibaiaas we 8

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400,

88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968) —......020 2... 9,12

Rainey v. Jackson State College, 551 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.

RARER TESTE ORES SE ee IE AR ONE Met oO 8

Sanford v. R. L. Coleman Realty Co., 573 F.2d 173 (4th

SG ITED: sieatnchcin cites dinchaaeihdiaiecetietinthepesnncabiegpibiin ainiaciiinadieianalansasie 8

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued)

Cases: Pages

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1,

91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) .............2.-..:..:ec0--e00+- 9

Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 517 F.2d

a ccusetunssesbencenencssestoces 14

Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d

a censtbonesenneesnencsencces 5, oi

Miscellaneous :

122 Cong. Rec. $1705, (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976)

(remarks of Sen. Kennedy) ...............-.........-scsee-s-scccsesessseee 13

122 Cong. Rec. H12163, (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976)

I ss esscctnssosccnenccocevorccocs 13

S.Rep.No. 94-1011, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in

[1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 5908,

es susasnunsanrenocvncnosses 9

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1264

THOMAS EARL HENDERSON, JR., e¢ al.,

Petitioner

vs.

FORT WORTH INDEPENDENT SCHOOL

DISTRICT, e¢ al., Respondent

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Brief in

Opposition to Certiorari

The respondent Fort Worth Independent School

District respectfully prays that the writ of certiorari

be denied.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit en banc, filed November 17,

1978, is reported at 584 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1978),

and is reprinted in the Appendix to the Petition at

Pages A-21 through A-22, and will be referred to

herein as Henderson III.

The panel opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, filed June 12, 1978, is

2

reported at 574 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1978), and is

reprinted in the Supplemental Appendix C to the

Petition at Pages C-1 through C-15, and will be re-

ferred to herein as Henderson II.

The opinion of the District Court, filed on July

15, 1977, on the issue of attorney’s fees, is unreported,

and is reprinted in the Appendix to the Petition at

Pages B-23 through B-31.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals on the merits,

filed on January 22, 1976, is reported at 526 F.2d

286 (5th Cir. 1976), and will be referred to herein as

Henderson I.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §1254 (1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the district court abused the discretion

conferred upon it by the Congress in the Civil Rights

Attorney’s Fee Award Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. §1988),

by finding that under the unique and special circum-

stances of this case an award of attorney’s fees would

be unjust, and, therefore, denying such award.

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

United States Code, Title 42:§1988

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision

of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this

Title, and Title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any

civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the

United States of America, to enforce, or charging a

3

violation of, a provision of the United States Inter-

nal Revenue Code, or Title VI of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, The Court, in its discretion, may allow

the prevailing party, other than the United States,

reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1925, the Fort Worth Independent School Dis-

trict was created by Act of the Texas Legislature.

The Act required, among other things, that a candi-

date for the school board be a qualified voter in the

school district for a period of three years.

In 1974, nearly 50 years later, petitioner Earl Hen-

derson, then 18 years of age, filed application to be-

come a candidate for the school board. Believing them-

selves bound by the state statute, the school authori-

ties denied Henderson’s application because he did

not meet the 3-year qualified voter requirement.

On February 28, 1974, Henderson filed this suit,

seeking an injunction to require that his name be

placed on the ballot. After denials of preliminary

relief by both the district court and the Court of

Appeals, the district court, on May 12, 1975, entered

an order upholding the validity of the 3-year qualified

voter requirement and denying any relief to the plain-

tiff. The district judge, relying upon such authorities

as Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31

L.Ed.2d 92 (1972), and others' was of the opinion

that the “rational basis” test should be applied and

that the questioned provision was constitutional. The

case was submitted to the district court on stipula-

le.g., Manson v. Edwards, 482 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1973); Blassman

v. Markworth, 359 F.Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Chimento v. Stark, 353

F.Supp. 1211 (D. N.H. 1973).

4

tions of fact and briefs, without the necessity of an

evidentiary hearing.

On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Circuit’s panel

(Henderson I)? disagreed with the trial court, applied

a “strict scrutiny” test, and held that the Texas Legis-

lature exceeded its authority in requiring that a can-

didate for the school board be a qualified voter for

three years. The decision of the Court of Appeals was

rendered on January 22, 1976—nine months prior

to enactment on October 19, 1976, of the Civil Rights

Attorney’s Fee Award Act (42 U.S.C. §1988).

The school district did not move for rehearing or

file a petition for a writ of certiorari. On the contrary,

the school district immediately ceased to enforce the

3-year qualified voter requirement and honored peti-

tioner’s application to become a candidate in the 1976

school board election, held just 72 days after the de-

cision of the Court of Appeals, and six months before

passage of §1988.

It was over a year after the decision of the Fifth

Circuit that the district court, on February 14, 1977,

formally entered its order complying with the man-

date. The entry of such order was, of course, a pure

formality under the circumstances. Nine days later,

petitioner filed his motion asking for an award of

attorney’s fees under §1988. While a prayer for at-

torney’s fees had been included in the original com-

plaint, such issue having been severed, nothing had

been done by petitioner to obtain a ruling from the

court, and this was the first time that entitlement to

fees was asserted under $1988.

After an evidentiary hearing, the district court held

2526 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1976).

5

that “technically 42 U.S.C. 1988 is applicable.” (Ap-

pendix B, p. 24) Noting that an award of attorney

fees is, by the precise wording of the statute, discre-

tionary with the court (Appendix B, p. 26), the trial

judge said:

“In the discretionary judgment of this Court it

would be inappropriate to award attorney’s fees

under the facts presented in this case, ... .”

(Appendix B, p. 26-27)

The district court considered that there are unique

and special circumstances in this case that render the

award of a fee not to be “just, equitable, or in good

conscience.” (Appendix B, p. 30) In particular, the

court discussed: (1) the fact that if it had not been

for the court’s delay in acting on a procedural for-

mality, the case would have been disposed of long be-

fore §1988 was enacted; (2) the fact that the school

district’s enforcement of the questioned provision was

mandated by legislative enactment, with which the

school district had a duty to comply until the statute

was changed or until instructed by a court to do other-

wise; (3) the fact that this case was not a class

action; (4) the relative unimportance of the case in

terms of social significance; and (5) the complete

and unchallenged good faith of the school district. In

this last connection, the court made'‘clear that no bad

faith standard is required by §1988, and that the

court’s comment on that point was for “clarity and

perspective.” (Appendix B, p. 28)

On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Circuit’s panel

(Henderson II)* held that the record factually sup-

3574 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1978).

6

ports the district court’s finding of special circum-

stances that would render the award of attorney’s

fees unjust in this case. Under the abuse of discre-

tion standard of revue, Henderson II found no abuse

of discretion by the district court.

Henderson II also called attention to the fact that

in enacting §1988, Congress’ “overriding concern was

to encourage individuals, particularly members of

racial minorities, to seek relief from invidious dis-

crimination based on race, sex, religion, wealth, and

other inherently offensive criteria” (Appendix C, p.

5), and that such concern did not apply to the facts

of this case. The Henderson II panel also noted that

the asserted constitutional infirmity of the Texas

statute “was virtually impossible for defendants to

ascertain and correct, short of litigation or a change

in legislation” (Appendix C, p. 12); that petitioner

made no attempt to effect legislative change (Appen-

dix C, p. 12); that this was not a class action (Ap-

pendix C, p. 12); and that the financial burden of a

fee award would fall on people who participated in

no discriminatory act, viz, the taxpayers of the school

district (Appendix C, p. 7).

The Court of Appeals granted a petition for re-

hearing en banc and reached an even division (Hen-

derson III)* resulting in an affirmance of the district

court by operation of law. The Henderson III opinion

does not set forth the views of the various judges.

The petitioner is in error at pages 3, 7, and 15 of

the Petition in claiming that he was successful in

“striking down” a further provision of the 1925 Texas

statute which required that school board candidates

4584 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1978).

7

must also be freeholders in the district for one year.

The school district has never sought to enforce the

freeholder requirement since this Court’s decision in

Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.

2d 567 (1970). The record will show that the parties

stipulated that, “The defendants agree that the first

requirement [the freeholder requirement] is constitu-

tionally infirm and they do not undertake to enforce

it.” That issue was never in this case. The validity of

the 3-year qualified voter requirement was the only

issue on the merits.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I.

This Court should not review a matter which by

Act of Congress was committed to the discretion of

the district court.

Congress specifically made the award of attorney’s

fees a matter for the exercise of discretion by the

district court under the circumstances of each case.

The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Award Act of 1976

(42 U.S.C. §1988) says in pertinent part:

“ . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the

prevailing party ...a reasonable attorney’s fee

The principle of trial court discretion has often

been recognized by the courts in cases involving §1988

and identical provisions in other statutes. In Morrow

v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1300 (5th Cir. 1978), the

Fifth Circuit said:

“The language of the Act itself unequivocally

and expressly makes the award of fees a ques-

tion of discretion for the court. Its judgment

should be reversed only for an abuse of discre-

tion.” Sandford v. R. L. Coleman Realty Co., 573

F.2d 173, 179 (4th Cir. 1978).

In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.

412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648, 653 (1978), a

Title VII case involving language identical to that of

§1988, this court referred to the principle of:

“... entrusting the effectuation of the statutory

policy to the discretion of the district courts.”

Mr. Justice Rehnquist, specifically referring to 4.988

in his dissenting opinion in Hutto v. Finney, 57 L.Ed

2d 522, 551, footnote 4 (1978), said:

“But that statute leaves the decision to award

fees to the discretion of the district court, which

may be expected to alleviate any possible unfair-

ness.

To the same effect is Adams v. Reed, 567 F.2d 1283,

1287 (5th Cir. 1978), where the court said:

“The discretion to determine the propriety of

awards is committed to the trial judge.” Johnson

v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 5 Cir., 1974,

488 F.2d 714, 717.

See also Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Ass’n, 574

F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1978); Rainey v. Jackson

State College, 551 F.2d 672, 676 footnote 6 (5th Cir.

1977); Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co:, 541 F.2d

1040, 1045 (4th Cir. 1976) ; Naprstek v. City of Nor-

wich, 433 F.Supp. 1369 (N.D. N.Y. 1977). Cf., this

Court’s reliance upon “. . . the informed judgment of

9

the district courts... .” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-

burg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.

2d 554, 574 (1971).

Petitioner would have this Court place a construc-

tion on §1988 that would eliminate the word “discre-

tion” from the statute. He argues for a mechanistic

award of fees in any civil rights case without con-

sideration of circumstances which would make a fee

award unjust in a given case.

Review of a matter committed to the exercise of

discretion by the district court does not authorize

reversal merely because some might have reached a

different conclusion. We respectfully submit that this

Court should not substitute its judgment of the jus-

tice or injustice of a fee award in this case for that

of the district court.

The district court applied the correct standard for

the exercise of the discretion vested in it by the

Congress.

Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit panel

in Henderson II found that the facts of this case pre-

sent special circumstances which would render the

award of attorney’s fees unjust. Such findings are

clearly a correct application of the standard for the

exercise of judicial discretion which Congress in-

tended under §1988, viz, that a prevailing plaintiff

“should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless

special circumstances would render such an award

unjust.’”’ S.Rep.No.94-1011, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 5, re-

printed in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News,

pp. 5908, 5912, quoting Newman v. Piggie Park En-

10

terprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19

L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968).

Thus, there is no issue here whether the lower

courts followed an improper standard. The discretion

conferred by §1988, having been exercised under the

correct standard, should not be set aside.

The district court was correct in concluding that

the special and unique circumstances of this case

would make an award of attorney’s fees against the

school district unjust.

Even if this Court were to hold that it, rather than

the district court, should pass on whether the circum-

stances of this case would make a fee award against

the school district unjust, we respectfully submit that

the district court reached the correct result.

Delay of the District Court

Although the school district pursued no appeal and

immediately ceased enforcement of the questioned

provision upon the January 22, 1976, decision of the

Court of Appeals, there was a delay of over a year

before the district court carried out the procedural

formality of entering a final judgment pursuant to

the mandate. If such formality had been carried out

with ordinary promptness, this case would not have

been pending, even technically, when §1988 was en-

acted in October, 19'76.

It would be unjust to award fees under a statute

that was not enacted until nine months after the case

was decided and enforcement of the unconstitutional

provision had ceased. An award under such circum-

11

stances would be to exalt form and completely ignore

substance. It would penalize the school district for an

act not of its doing or under its control. It would give

petitioner an undeserved windfall. It would not serve

the Congressional policy of encouraging private liti-

gation to enforce important constitutional rights.

The State Statute

The school district’s enforcement of the 3-year

qualified voter requirement was not voluntary, but

mandated by a 50-year old statute that had never be-

fore been questioned. The school district had no power

to alter the statute. Petitioner made no effort to

change the law through legislative processes. The

school district was duty-bound to follow the state law

until it was changed or a court instructed otherwise.

Furthermore, the asserted constitutional infirmity

of the 3-year qualified voter provision was virtually

impossible for the school district, unilaterally, to

ascertain and correct. In marked contrast, the uncon-

stitutionality of the freeholder provision of the same

statute was clear, under Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S.

346, 90 S.Ct. 582, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970). The school

district did not enforce or defend the freeholder pro-

vision. The 3-year qualified voter provision was an

apparently valid exercise of the state legislature’s

power to prescribe minimal candidate qualifications.

The district court so held. In all reason the issue

seemed to favor upholding the validity of the provi-

sion until the Court of Appeals applied the “strict

scrutiny” test and held it invalid. It would be danger-

ous and unrealistic to require school boards to attain

constitutional clairvoyance on such doubtful issues,

12

and in doing so to ignore their sworn and constitu-

tional duty to follow the laws of the state.

Furthermore, when the Court of Appeals declared

the questioned provision unconstitutional, the school

district ceased to comply with it immediately, pursued

no appeal, and placed petitioner’s name on the ballot

for the school board election just 72 days later. Just

as the Fourth Circuit said in affirming the denial of

a fee award in Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541

F.2d 1040, 1045 (4th Cir. 1976):

“We cannot say that it [the defendant] failed to

act with reasonable dispatch as soon as a murky

area of the law was clarified.”

The fact that the defendant in Chastang did not have

an unrestricted right to alter the situation was held to

be a special circumstance that would render the award

of an attorney fee unjust.

Social Significance

As the district court put it, “the judgment rendered

for plaintiff is not of sufficient social significance to

justify an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C.

1988.” (Appendix B, p. 27) The private attorney

general rationale announced in Newman v. Piggie

Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19

L.Ed. 2d 1263 (1968), came from this Court’s aware-

ness that:

“When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed

it was evident that enforcement would prove dif-

ficult and that the nation would have to rely in

part upon private litigation as a means of secur-

ing broad compliance with the law.” (19 L.Ed.2d

at 1265)

13

The national importance of the rights vindicated in

Newman, and the inherently difficult enforcement

problems that spawned the rule to encourage private

litigants, are wholly lacking in the case at bar.

Likewise, the overriding concern of Congress in

enacting $1988 was to encourage individuals, particu-

larly members of racial minorities, to seek relief from

invidious discrimination based on race, sex, religion,

wealth, and. other inherently offensive criteria, See

the examples of cases given by Senator Kennedy, 122

Cong. Rec. S1705, (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (re-

marks of Sen. Kennedy), and by Representative Fish,

122 Cong. Rec. H12163, (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (re-

marks of Rep. Fish), during debate on $1988. In each

of the examples, the discrimination was discoverable

(to say the least) and could have been unilaterally

remedied by the discriminator. Not so in the case at

bar.

A state statute which “discriminated” between

those who had been qualified voters for three years

and those who had not, for the purpose of providing

minimal candidate qualifications, does not fit in the

list of examples considered by the Congress in the

debate on §1988. There is no invidious discrimina-

tion based on inherently offensive criteria. Inherent

problems of enforcement are not present. No funda-

mental or national importance is involved. The case

at bar was not even a class action. Its result was of

extremely limited effect and narrow scope. It does not

further or fit the Congressional purpose. It would be

unjust to expand $1988 to such cases.

14

Good Faith

The actions of the school district in this case were

in complete and unchallenged good faith. We recog-

nize, as did the district court, that no bad faith stan-

dard is required by §1988. We comment on it, as did

the trial judge, for “clarity and perspective.” (Appen-

dix B, p. 28) Furthermore, the absence of bad faith

negatives any ground for the recovery of attorney’s

fees other than §1988. We also suggest that in consid-

ering whether there are special circumstances that

would render an award of attorney’s fees unjust in a

given case the courts should not be guilty of tunnel

vision. No case is made up of just one fact or circum-

stance. Surely, good faith should count for something

in the cummulative consideration of all the circum-

eo bearing on the justice or injustice of a fee

award.

“To hold otherwise would compel a mechanistic

application of fee awards which would preclude

entirely the exercise of discretion by the district

court.” Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation

Ass’n, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141, 1152 (4th Cir. 1975),

“a opinion of senior Circuit Judge Bore-

man

Considering all the circumstances of this case, we sub-

mit that the district court was correct in finding that

an award of attorney’s fees would be unjust.

IV.

This Court should not exercise its supervisory power

over the lower courts on an issue committed to dis-

trict court discretion.

Petitioner urges this Court to exercise its supervi-

15

sory power over the lower courts merely because the

Court en bane reached an even division. We submit

that to do so on an issue committed to district court

discretion would be to cast this Court in the role of a

super legislature. It would be to render an advisory

opinion. This Court should not attempt to determine

what circumstances would or would not render the

award of a fee in a given case unjust. but should leave

such determination to the district courts, on a case by

case basis, subject to the familiar standard of review

for abuse of discretion. Such circumstances as the

trial court’s delay in carrying out the procedural

formality of entering final judgment, resulting in

the technical pendency of this case when $1988 was

enacted nine months after the issues were decided, are

exteremely unlikely to occur again. Future cases will

have their own uniqueness. Formulation of mecha-

nistic special circumstance rules by this Court could

not be broad enough to alleviate the task of the lower

courts, the task assigned by Congress, to determine

those cases where an award of attorney’s fees would

be unjust.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, respondent

respectfully prays that the Writ be denied.

Respectfully submitted

DAVID B. OWEN

CECIL A. MORGAN

2108 Continental Life Bldg.

Fort Worth, Texas 76102

Attorneys for Respondent

March 12, 1979