Opposition — Renard v. Nevada

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MAR 19 1979 |

MIGHABL RODAK, JR. CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1978

No. 78-1251

MICHAEL FRANK RENARD,

Petitioner,

—vVS.—

THE STATE OF NEVADA

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

DANIEL M. SEATON,

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Attorney for Respondent

Robert J. Miller,

District Attorney

H. Douglas Clark,

Deputy District Attorney

Clark County Courthouse

200 East Carson Avenue

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

wat

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1978

No. 78-1251

MICHAEL FRANK RENARD,

Petitioner,

Vv.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

The respondent, by and through

Daniel M. Seaton, Chief Deputy District

Attorney for Clark County, State of

Nevada, respectfully requests that this

Court deny the petition for writ of

certiorari, seeking review of the Supreme

Court of the State of Nevada in the case

of Michael Frank Renard v. State of Nevada,

Case No. 9831, 94 Nev., Advance Opinion

No. 109, 580 P.2d 470 (1978).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The transcript of the sentencing

procedure on May 31, 1977, reveals that

the judge was presented with a presentence

report, defense witness testimony and arg-

ument of defense counsel]. The State stood

silent. There was no indication of any

“hidden motive" in the sentencing. The

defendant was placed on notice of the

possibility of incarceration at the time

he entered a guilty plea to the crime of

ATTEMPT COERCION on March 22, 1977. At

that time the deputy district attorney

stated, "The Court may in fact find this

defendant is an unsuitable candidate for

probation..." The defendant entered his

guilty plea with that knowledge.

The defendant did not request reasons

from the trial court with regard to sen-

tencing or raise an objection for the lack

of specific reasons.

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED

1. Neither the decision below nor

the record raises any violation of due

process. |

The sole issue is whether due process

has been violated by the trial court's

failure to recite reasons for the sentence

imposed. The courts have held in the

absence of specific statutory directive,

that, "while as a matter of public policy

such a requirement might be thought desir-

able, we do not find that it is constitu-

tionally dictated." Walsh v. Picard, 446

F.2d 1209, 1212 (lst. Cir.)(1971); United

States v. Rosner, 549 F.2d 259, 264 (2nd

ir, ; United States v. Velazquez,

482 F.2d 139 (2nd Cir.)(1973).

Indeed, it is apparent from peti-

tioner's own reasoning that he is asking

this Court to embark on a course of policy

ale

_—~ yy

change that is not dictated by the Consti-

tution.

2. There is no conflict of decisions

among the various courts.

The petitioner has failed to establish

that there are conflicting opinions that

require settling by this Court.

3. The Court below followed long

established policy.

"(i]t is an accepted principle that

a... trial judge has wide discretion in

determining what sentence to impose on a

convicted person." United States v.

Johnson, 507 F.2d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 1974).

A number of cases have held that a sentence

imposed within statutory limits is generally

not subject to review. United States v.

Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); United States

s. See, 505 F.2d 845, 857 (9th Cir. 1974),

cert. denied sub. nom Gordon v. United

States, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).

This Court has held that, “stare

decisis is still a powerful force in

[its] jurisprudence", United States v.

Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 527 §.Ct. TI55 (1975).

"One who seeks to overcome the principle

of stare decisis, should be prepared to

offer compelling reasons which outweigh

the public interest in the stability of

legal doctrine."' Ramos v. Beauregard,

Inc., 423 F.2d 916, 917 (Jst Cir.), cert.

denied, 400 U.S. 865, 91 S.Ct. 101 (1970).

It is difficult to find any compelling

reasons for this Court to review a long

settled policy in the sentencing structure

in the appellant's petition. The appellant

fn

recognizes that he is asking this Court

to venture into an area not dictated by

existing law or the Constitution. The

first paragraph of his reasons make that

evident. The appellant fails to demon-

strate why the issue of reasons for

sentencing is ripe for adjudication.

4. The question on appeal was not

preserved at the trial court level.

An examination of the record fails

to disclose any request for reasons or

an objection for the court's lack of

reasons for the sentence imposed.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition for

a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

6 ic Sei

ANLEL M. ATON

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Counsel for Respondent

ROBERT J. MILLER

District Attorney

HOWARD DOUGLAS CLARK

Deputy District Attorney

Clark County, Nevada

ee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 137

day of March, 1979, three copies of

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI were

mailed, postage prepaid, to Patrick R.

Doyle, Esq., 323 Las Vegas Boulevard

South, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101, Counsel

for the Petitioner. I further certify

that all parties required to be served

have been served.

Kripa hy, Sect

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Counsel for Respondent

ROBERT J. MILLER

District Attorney

HOWARD DOUGLAS CLARK

Deputy District Attorney

Clark County, Nevada