Petitioner for ReHearing — Holland v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad

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78-1164 Fimo

the ED

, JAN 25 1979

Supreme Court... ...

of the

United States

October Term, 1978

No. A-426

BOBBY WADE HOLLAND,

Petitioner,

vs.

SEABOARD COAST LINE

RAILROAD COMPANY,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF

FLORIDA, FIRST DISTRICT

PODHURST, ORSECK & WALTER H. BECKHAM, JR.,

PARKS, P.A. ESQUIRE

25 West Flagler Street JOEL D. EATON, ESQUIRE

Miami, Florida 25 West Flagler Street

Miami, Florida 33130

SUSAN GOLDMAN, ne

ESQUIRE Tel: (305) 358-2800

PH 1, Roberts Building LAWRENCE V. HASTINGS,

. 28 West Flagler Street ESQUIRE

Miami, Florida 33130 300 7ist Street, Suite 530

HASTINGS AND Miami Beach, Florida 33140

GOLDMAN Counsel for Petitioner

300 71st Street, Suite 530

Miami Beach, Florida 33140

Of Counsel

aA

INDEX

Page

Ne es a is ne oad mnie t Rea 2

SEE ho cos cus cub at pacwinds Routan na 2

I RENEE Oe 3

Statutes and constitutional

ee ilo se secede pecbcscsioe’ 4

SRMRRMNEIIE OT CO OIID oko sisi ses cnccccdopescess 5

Reasons for granting the writ ..................008- 12

1. The decision below defeats a federal right of

recovery under the Federal Employers’

Liability Act by application of restrictive local

pleading rules; conflicting with decisions of this

Court and other courts of appeals as to liberal

federal notice pleading ...................0005: 12

a. The decision below conflicts with decisions

of this Court holding that federal substan-

tive rights may not be infringed under local

practice — specifically holding that local

pleading requirements may not infringe

federally created rights ................... 19

INDEX (Continued)

Page

2. The decision below severely undermines the

force and effect of the Federal Employers’

Liability Act by holding that an erroneous ex-

clusion of one of the plaintiff's theories of

negligence is harmless errer, raising significant

problems insofar as assuring a correct and

uniform application of the FELA in State and

PORE CONTIN otic oN ex ceee ido: Sguite as

3. The exclusion of proof of a viable theory of

liability in an action arising under the Federal

Employers’ Liability Act, because of local

pleading rules, constitutes deprivation of right

to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment to

the Constitution of the United States .........

4. The decision below conflicts with decisions of

this Court and courts of appeals as to the inclu-

sion of a jury charge on legal cause utilizing the

“but for’’ test of proximate cause, in a case un-

der the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. .....

NES ER PPE PR RR MU GENCE Sh Oh cei

il

22

26

28

CITATIONS

Cases: Page

Arnold v. Panhandle & S.F.R. Co.,

363 U.S. 360, 77 S.Ct. 840, (1957) ... 2... coon

Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry.,

319 U.S. 350, 63 S.Ct. 1062 (1943) .............

Boston & M.R.R. v. Meech,

156 F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1946), cert. den. 329 U.S.

FO Nes tn FOROS OSs las cb ace dcsesaees

Brown v. Western Railways of Alabama,

338 U.S. 294, 70 S.Ct. 105 (1949) ..........006.

Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957) .....

Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R. Co.,

342 U.S. 359, 72 S.Ct. 312, 96 L.Ed. 398 (1952)

Eggert v. Norfolk & W.Ry. Co.,

GSS. Fe OOO (Oe CAR. ROTO) onc ncn s cme cnivcssinsis

Eglsaer v. Scandrett, ;

151 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1945) ........... ccc eeee

Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company,

327 U.S. 108, 116, 83 S.Ct. 659, 664 (1963) .....

Harris v. Pennsylvania R.Co.,

361 U.S. 15, 80 S.Ct. 22 (1959) ................

iii

20

14

25

19

13

20

CITATIONS (Continued)

Cases: | Page

Komer v. Shipley,

154 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1946) ..0......ceceeeeees 13

Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co.,

257 P.2d 947 (Utals 19608) x. .iccise vas ccvee tices. 17

Pehowic v. Erie Lackawanna Railroad Company,

430 F.2d 697, 700 (3d Cir. 1970) ............... 30

Rodriquez v. Delray Connecting Rd.,

473 F.2d 810: (Gthe Cie IB TED ois icine Sseedcassees 25

Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,

352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 442 (1957) .............. 23

Seaboard Airline Railroad Co. v. Strickland,

80 So. 38 914 (ie: 21GB ais oe es Bi kis nes 15

Stone v. New York, C. & St.L.R. Co.,

344 U.S. 407 73 S.Ct. 358 (1953). .........0.... 25

Strickland v. Seaboard Airline Railroad Co.,

350 U.S. 893, 76 S.Ct. 157, (1955) ............. 15

Urie v. Thompson,

337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018 (1949) ............. 20

iv

in the

Supreme Court

of the

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

NO. A-426

BOBBY WADE HOLLAND,

Petitioner

vs.

SEABOARD COAST LINE

RAILROAD COMPANY,

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF

FLORIDA, FIRST DISTRICT

The Petitioner, BOBBY WADE HOLLAND,

respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to

review the Judgment and Opinion of the District Court

of Appeal of Florida, First District, entered in this

proceeding on December 20, 1977.

OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the District Court of Appeal at 353

So.2d 618 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) appears in the Appendix

hereto. (A. 1-7) A timely Petition for Rehearing was

denied without opinion by the District Court of Appeal

of Florida, First District, on January 12, 1978. Petition

for Writ of Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court

of Florida on May 17, 1978; a timely Petition for Rehear-

ing was denied without opinion by the Supreme Court of

Florida on August 28, 1978.

JURISDICTION

The Opinion of the District Court of Appeal of

Florida, First District, was entered on December 20,

1977 and a timely Petition for Rehearing was denied on

January 12, 1978. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Florida was denied on May 17, 1978;

Petition for Rehearing was denied by the Supreme Court

of Florida on August 28, 1978. This Court entered its Or-

der on November 6, 1978 extending time to file the Peti-

tion for Writ of Certiorari to and including January 26,

1979. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28

U.S.C. Sec. 1257(3).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a Federal right of recovery under the

Federal Employers’ Liability Act may be defeated by

local State rules of pleading and practice that are in con-

flict with Federal notice pleading.

2. Whether a local harmless error statute may be

applied in an action under the Federal Employers’

Liability Act so as to render harmless the erroneous ex-

clusion of a viable theory of liability from consideration

by the jury.

3. Whether the exclusion of proof of a viable

theory of liability in an action arising under the Federal

Employers’ Liability Act constitutes deprivation of right

to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States.

4. Whether in an action under the Federal Em-

ployers’ Liability Act a jury charge on legal causation

utilizing the “but for’ test of proximate cause is

erroneous and constitutes reversible prejudicial error.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States of America providing in relevant part:

In Suits in common law. . . the right of trial

by jury shall be preserved... .

2. Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A.,

Section 51, providing in part:

Every ... railroad ... shall be liable in

damages. . . for such injury or death resulting

in whole or in part from the negligence of any of

the officers, agents, or employees of such

carrier, or by reason of any defect or insuf-

ficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars,

engines, appliances, machinery, track . . . or

other equipment.

3. Florida Statute, Section 59.041 (1975):

No judgment shall be set aside or reversed, or

new trial granted by any Court of the State in

any cause, civil or criminal, on the ground of

misdirection of the jury or the improper admis-

sion or rejection of evidence or for error as to

any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in

the opinion of the Court to which application is

made, after an examination of the entire case it |

shall appear that the error complained of has

resulted in a miscarriage of justice. This Sec-

tion shall be liberally construed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Proceedings Below

The Petitioner was the Plaintiff in Duval County

Circuit Court, in a personal injury action instituted pur-

suant to the Federal Employers Liability Act, and the

Federal Safety Appliance Act. The plaintiff was a

brakeman, who lost both legs in a switching movement

when he fell from a rear car on the train as it was back-

ing up to be coupled onto the remainder of the train

cars. The wheels passed over his legs, resulting in

amputation.

The incident occurred on the night of October 17,

1973 in Tifton, Georgia. The Petitioner alleged various

acts of negligence on the part of the railroad under the

Federal Employers Liability Act, and claimed various

violations of the Safety Appliance Act.’(A. 7-13). A jury

verdict for the defendant railroad was returned and final

judgment was entered. The motion of the plain-

tiff/Petitioner for a new trial was denied. (A. 13-19). The

plaintiff appealed to the First District Court of Appeal

and the judgment was affirmed. (A. 1-7) Plaintiff’s Peti-

tion for a Writ of Certiorari was denied without opinion

by the Supreme Court of Florida.

2. The Facts Shown at Trial

The Petitioner, BOBBY HOLLAND, was working

as brakeman for the Respondent RAILROAD during a

pre-dawn switching movement in Tifton, Georgia, on

October 17, 1973. The train was headed in a southerly

direction. The engine unit and the front thirteen cars

uncoupled from the rest of the train and left the balance

of the train standing to the north of the sidetrack.

Twenty-six cars were located on the sidetrack and were

to be coupied onto the rear of the engine and thirteen

cars. The entire unit would then back up and couple up

with the balance of the train which had been left

standing a considerable distance to the north.

The engine and thirteen cars proceeded south past

the sidetrack and BOBBY HOLLAND got off the train,

threw the switch, and the engine and thirteen cars

backed up onto the sidetrack, coupling up with the

twenty-six cars. The train then proceeded off the

sidepass, onto the main track and northward, clearing

the switch; and BOBBY HOLLAND threw the switch

again so that the train (engine and thirty-nine cars)

could proceed backward on the main track to couple up

with the cars that had been left behind. Under the

switching movement as performed, BOBBY HOLLAND

was required to get onto a rear car to ride back to the

svanding cars far to the north, and would then walk the

length of the train to the lead engine to board. While the

train was proceeding backward, however, BOBBY

HOLLAND fell from the car and the train rode over his

legs, severing them.

BOBBY HOLLAND sued the railroad, ultimately

alleging in his Complaint, as amended, that the acci-

dent was caused through RAILROAD negligence, in,

among other things, utilizing unsafe equipment; im-

properly signaling HOLLAND as to the movement;

utilizing defective radio equipment; utilizing defective

brakes; proceeding backward and disregarding

HOLLAND’s signals; backing up in such a manner as to

cause excessive slack; failing to property communicate

with HOLLAND; “negligently failing to furnish the

plaintiff a reasonably safe place in which to work”’; and

“negligently instructing and/or directing the train crew

to pick up cars on the pass track in a manner and

method as was known by the defendant to be hazardous

when there was a safer alternative method of accom-

plishing the same objective.” (A. 7-13).

With regard to negligence in failing to furnish a

reasonably safe place to work and in negligently

directing the crew to pick up cars by a hazardous

method, when there was a safer alternative method of

accomplishing the same objective, BOBBY HOLLAND,

during discovery, inquired into existence of a growth of

weeds and accumulation of debris, adjacent to the main

tracks, just south of the sidetrack and switch. (A. 20-29).

BOBBY HOLLAND attempted to establish that the

RAILROAD, in permitting the accumulations and

weeds, prevented a safer alternative from being utilized;

and that this was relevant to his claim of negligent

failure to provide the plaintiff with a reasonably safe

place to wor’, and in negligently instructing the

hazardous method utilized when there was a safer alter-

native method of accomplishing the same objectives.

HOLLAND’s counsel emphasized this theory dur-

ing the pre-trial conference, on a discussion of

HOLLAND’s Motion to Produce certain matters which

would demonstrate RAILROAD knowledge of the weeds

and debris—and which in turn would reveal that the

RAILROAD, through permitting the condition to exist

to the south of the switch and sidetrack, precluded a

safer alternative. Counsel advised that riding a car at

night in a back-up movement was dangerous, and that if

the weeds did not exist just to the south of the track, the

safer method could have been utilized. (A. 20).

In short, had the weeds and debris not existed,

BOBBY HOLLAND would never have had to have rid-

den on the back of a moving car as it backed up in the

dark; he could simply have checked the coupling and

walked through the area to the engine. !

Again, in opening statement at the trial,

HOLLAND ’s counsel explained to the jury that a safer

switching movement could have been utilized whereby

BOBBY HOLLAND never would have had to ride

backwards in the dark but for the accumulation of

weeds and debris.

At the trial, the trial court excluded the evidence

which would demonstrate existence of weeds and debris

preventing the use of a safer alternative switching move-

ment. (A. 28-35). The trial court held that this theory

was an afterthought, not covered by the pleadings; was

inconsistent with the pleadings; and that the weeds and

debris existing south of the track was not a cause of the

accident at all. The evidence was excluded and

HOLLAND’s Motion for New Trial was ultimately

denied. (A. 13-19).

At the close of the evidence, the trial court in-

structed the jury improperly on legal cause in this

FELA-Safety Appliance Act case, as follows:

'In the Appendix is a copy of the diagrams which were con-

tained in the reply brief of Holland in the District Court of Appeal

proceeding. The diagrams illustrated the move as it was made and

the move as it could have been made but for the weeds and debris.

The diagrams reflect Holland’s theory as presented in the proffers

that were rejected; as compared to the move as actually made, as

the testimony reflects. (A. 36-41).

Negligence is a legal cause of injury if it di-

rectly and in a natural and continuous

sequence produces, or contributes to producing

such injury so that it can reasonably be said

that but for the negligence, the injury would

not have occurred.

This charge was given over HOLLAND’s objection.

BOBBY HOLLAND appealed to the District Court

of Appeal, First District, urging that the trial court com-

mitted reversible error in rejecting the proffers which

would have shown that the weeds precluded a safer

method. The First District Court of Appeal held as

follows with regard to the evidence on the weeds and

debris:

a. The proffered evidence that the RAILROAD

failed to remove high weeds and debris adjacent to the

track and roadbed near the accident scene was not ad-

missible under any pleaded theory of negligence, in-

cluding allegations in HOLLAND’s Amended Com-

plaint that the RAILROAD failed to furnish a

reasonably safe place in which to work and negligently

directed the train crew to pick up cars by a hazardous

method when there was a safer alternative method of ac-

complishing the same objective.

b. The proffered evidence was not admissible to

_ prove that the RAILROAD failed to provide HOLLAND

a reasonably safe place to work, because HOLLAND

“did not traverse the area said to have been overgrown

with weeds and strewn with debris.”

c. The proffered evidence in support of

HOLLAND’s theory of liability — “that by permitting

an accumulation of weeds and debris, the Railroad

negligently foreclosed appellant’s use of that area of the

track which, if used, would have permitted a safer

operation than the operation actually employed” —

may well have been a potential theory of liability, ‘but

in causative terms, it was a step away from the pleaded

theory.”

d. “The bare mention of that theory of potentia!

liability in the pre-trial conference held a few days

before trial . . . did not amend the Complaint so as to

require expansion of the liability theories at trial.”

e. Any error, in any event, was “harmless” in

the context of the lengthy and complicated trial of

numerous liability issues and numerous theories of

liability, under Florida Statutes Sec. 59.041 (1975).

There is no miscarriage of justice after examination of

the entire record where the jury considered and rejected

HOLLAND’s proof that the particular method used to

move the train at the time and place of his injury was

unreasonably dangerous.

f. The charge on legal cause, incorporating as it

did the “but for’ test of proximate causation, was error

in a FELA or Safety Appliance Act case but was not of

“sufficient magnitude to require reversal, considering

the charge as a whole;” the error was “harmless”

because it was used only once during the charge. The

jury was also charged on the appropriate FELA or

Safety Appliance Act test — that is, causation would be

established if the alleged improper act on the part of the

RAILROAD “contributed in whole or in part’ to

HOLLAND’s injury.

10

g. The First District further held that the

prejudicial effect of the erroneous portion of the of-

fending instruction was obliterated by a following

paragraph stating that under FELA, the RAILROAD

was responsible if it were negligent and the negligence

played any part, however small, in producing the injury

for which damages are sought.?

3. How Federal Question is Presented

This action was brought under the Federal Em-

ployers’ Liability Act and Safety Appliance Act. In

Petitioner’s Suggestion For Certification, filed in the

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, seek-

ing to certify the decision to the Supreme Court of

Florida for certiorari review, upon the grounds that the

decision passes upon questions of great public interest,

Petitioner specifically stated:

* * * * +

Whether exclusion of proof of a viable theory of

liability, in an FELA case, because of local

pleading rules, constitutes deprivation of right

to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment

to the Constitution of the United States?

The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District,

denied Petitioner’s Suggestion For Certification.

Throughout the proceedings, the Petitioner has

asserted the applicable Federal FELA case law that had

heretofore been applied uniformly throughout the coun-

try to protect Petitioner’s substantive rights under the

Federal Employers’ Liability Act.

?The concurring Opinion found no error with the “but for”

language of the charge, harmless or otherwise.

11

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1.

THE DECISION BELOW DEFEATS A

FEDERAL RIGHT OF RECOVERY UNDER

THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY

ACT BY APPLICATION OF RESTRICTIVE

LOCAL PLEADING RULES, CONFLICTING

WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND

OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS AS TO

LIBERAL FEDERAL NOTICE PLEADING.

The decision below holds that a potential theory of

liability under the FELA is properly excluded from con-

sideration by the jury where “in causative terms it was a

step away from the pleaded theories.”’ Included among

the allegations of negligence in this FELA action,

BOBBY HOLLAND asserted that the RAILROAD was

negligent in failing to furnish a ‘‘a reasonably safe place

in which to work” and “‘in negligently directing the train

crew to pick up cars by a hazardous method when there

was a safer alternative method of accomplishing the

same objective.”’ The District Court of Appeal, First

District of Florida, flatly held that the pleaded theory of

negligence was insufficient to permit the introduction of

evidence on the issue of the RAILROAD’s negligent

foreclosure of an area of the railroad track which, if

used, would have permitted a safer operation than the

operation actually employed; the proffered evidence

simply being inadmissible under the pleadings.

This application of a stringent and restrictive

pleading requirement in an FELA action, effectively

defeating BOBBY HOLLAND’s recognized theory of

12

liability, directly conflicts with the liberal notice

pleading rule set forth by this Court in Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957). In consider-

ing the sufficiency of allegations in a complaint for

declaratory relief, this Court announced:

* * * * *

.(T)he Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure do not require a claimant to set out

in detail the facts upon which he bases his

claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is

“a short and plain statement of the claim”’ that

will give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests. . . Such simplified ‘‘notice pleading”’

is made possible by the liberal opportunity for

discovery and the other pre-trial procedures es-

tablished by the Rules to disclose more

precisely the basis of both claim and defense

and to define more narrowly the disputed facts

and issues . . . The Federal Rules reject the

approach that pleading is a game of skill in

which one misstep by counsel may be decisive

to the outcome and accept the principle that

the purpose of ay rood is to pee a proper

decision on the merits.

Accord, Komer v. Shipley, 154 F.2d 861 (5th Cir.

1946). Indeed, the record herein reflects that pre-trial

discovery apprised the RAILROAD of HOLLAND’s

claim that the negligent accumulation of weeds and

debris prevented utilization of a safer alternative

method; in particular, at the pre-trial conference,

HOLLAND’s counsel discussed in depth the relevancy

13

of matters demonstrating the RAILROAD’s knowledge

of the accumulation of weeds and debris and its failure

to remedy same in connection with the claims of

negligence.

Under Federal cases and law, the amended

pleadings were sufficient to advance the theory,

recognized as a potentially viable one by the District

Court of Appeal, that, as the appellate court charac-

terized it, “the Railroad negligently foreclosed Ap-

pellant’s use of that area of the track which, if used,

would have permitted a safer operation than the opera-

tion actually employed.’’ The allegations of

HOLLAND’s amended pleadings alleging negligence in

failure to provide a reasonably safe place to work and in

directing a hazardous method where there was a safer

alternative method, under Federal notice pleading

necessarily incorporated this theory of negligence. In

this regard, the decision below conflicts with the opinion

in Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry, 319 U.S. 350, 63 S.Ct.

1062 (1943). In reinstating the verdict for the plaintiff

railroad employee that had been vacated by the

Supreme Court of Vermont, this Court in Bailey, supra,

found the evidence of the railroad’s negligence in failing

to provide the plaintiff with a safe place to work suf-

ficient to support the jury verdict. Of particular

significance here is the Court’s finding that evidence

presented to the jury of a safer alternative method of un-

loading the car, i.e., “the car could have been opened or

unloaded near the bridge on level ground,” was properly

considered by the jury under the allegation of plaintiff’s

complaint that the railroad had failed to furnish plain-

poo in “a safe place to do the work.” (319 U.S. 1063-

14

The decision below also conflicts with that of this

Court in Strickland v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co.,

350 U.S. 893, 76 S.Ct. 157, (1955), where in a per curiam

opinion, this Court granted the petition for writ of cer-

tiorari and reversed a judgment for the railroad, citing

Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry, supra. In the original ac-

tion before the Florida Supreme Court, Seaboard Airline

Railroad Co. v. Strickland, 80 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1955), an

action under the FELA, the plaintiff had secured a ver-

dict. The plaintiff had been injured while changing an

outside brake beam when he slipped and fell back

against the switchbox while performing his work in a

sitting, squatting or stooping position. Plaintiff had

produced evidence that he could have changed the beam

on a flat track over a pit while in a standing position

rather than under the pullman car. There was evidence

that it would have been safer to perform the work in the

pit and that under those circumstances, the plaintiff

could have had the assistance of a helper. The railroad

presented evidence, though, that traditionally the work

was done on a flat track and that had the pullman car

been moved over a pit “it would not have been possible

to get the trains out on time if they had to switch to a pit

each car that they had to be worked on.” (80 So.2d at

916).

In its original decision, the Supreme Court of

Florida reversed a verdict and judgment for the injured

plaintiff holding that proof of a safer place to work had

no bearing on the issue of whether or not the method ac-

tually utilized, i.e., a flat track, constituted a reasonably

safe place for the operation in question and that the

evidence presented was insufficient to sustain a judg-

ment for the plaintiff. In particular, the Supreme Court

of Florida stated in its original opinion:

* * * * *

15

From what has been said, it is apparent that

the plaintiff sought to prove the issue made by

the pleadings — that is, whether the defendant

was negligent in failure to provide him with a

reasonably safe place to work — by showing

that the footing and lighting were better in a

pit, where plaintiff could have had a helper,

and that it was unreasonable — and thus

negligent — for defendant to require him to do

the work on a flat track when a pit was

available. There can be no doubt that there

were sufficient ‘probative facts’, if believed by

the jury, to show that it was easier and safer to

change a brake beam in a pit rather than on a

flat track. But we know of no rule of law which

requires ‘a railroad company to provide a

workman with an easier and safer place to work

if the one provided is, as a matter of fact,

reasonably safe. . . . (80 So.2d at 917).

The United States Supreme Court reversed under

the liberal interpretation of the FELA, citing Bailey v.

Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 63 S.Ct. 1062,

(1943). On remand, the Supreme Court of Florida

necessarily decided, in accordance with the mandate,

that the evidence was sufficient to create a jury question

under the pleading alleging negligent failure to provide a

safe place to work.

‘Errors with regard to attorney conduct and admissibility of

other evidence resulted in reversal for a new trial (88 So.2d at 520-

524); but the Florida Supreme Court was compelled to hold and did

hold that a case of causative FELA negligence was made out by the

proof of the safer alternative — which was not used because the

railroad precluded it; it was not used because of railroad custom

and because it would not have been possible to get the trains out on

_ dime if the railroad had to switch each car which had to be worked

on to a pit.

16

The decision below also conflicts with a decision of

the highest State court of Utah, recognizing that allega-

tions of negligence in failing to furnish a safe place to

work in an FELA action are sufficient to permit

evidence of safer methods of work. In Mooney v. Denver

& R.G.W.R.Co., 257 P.2d 947 (Utah 1953), a safer

method of work was precluded by the railroad’s alleged

negligent scattering of tools throughout a railroad car

which necessitated the plaintiff working in a restricted

area while releasing a flat car handbrake. Because the

railroad had been negligent in permitting the tools to be

scattered throughout the car, the plaintiff had very little

room to stand and was unable to get directly behind the

brakestaff while performing his work. The Supreme

Court of Utah discussed the testimony regarding the

scattered tools and concluded that a jury instruction

outlining the plaintiff's claim of negligence against the

railroad for failure to furnish a safe place to work was

correct. The railroad challenged the instruction as ‘‘not

within the pleadings or supported by the evidence.’ The

Court rejected the railroad’s argument, reasoning that

testimony of the tools scattered throughout the car

precluding utilization of a safer method of operation

“present a jury question concerning negligence or non-

negligence in failing to furnish a safe working place, —

thus justifying the instruction mentioned.” (257 P.2d at

949).

The decision below also conflicts with the above-

cited cases regarding notice pleadings under FELA law

insofar as it holds that the fact that BOBBY HOLLAND

did not “traverse the area said to have been overgrown

with weeds and strewn with debris’ rendered the prof-

fered evidence inadmissible under a general pleading

alleging the RAILROAD negligently failed to provide a

17

reasonably safe place to work. Strickland and Pailey,

supra, allowed proof of an unused alternative method to

establish negligence in the method or area actually used.

Additionally, under liberal Federal notice pleadings an-

nounced by the Court in Conley v. Gibson, supru, the

District Court of Appeal’s narrow construction of

evidence that may be presented to prove “failure to

provide a reasonably safe place to work” cannot be

sustained.

18

THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS

WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT

HOLDING THAT FEDERAL SUBSTAN-

TIVE RIGHTS MAY NOT BE INFRINGED

UNDER LOCAL PRACTICE —

SPECIFICALLY HOLDING THAT LOCAL

PLEADING REQUIREMENTS MAY NOT

INFRINGE FEDERALLY CREATED -

RIGHTS.

In Brown v. Western Railways of Alabama, 338 U.S.

294, 70 S.Ct. 105 (1949), it was specifically held that

local rules of practice and burdensome ruies of pleading

could not be utilized to defeat a right of recovery under

the FELA and that the United States Supreme Court, in

an FELA case, would not and could not accept as final a

State Court’s interpretation of allegations in a com-

plaint asserting a right under the FELA. In FELA ac-

tions, Federal Courts interpret pleadings in the interest

of uniformity of Federally created rights. The Court

announced:

* * * * *

Strict local rules of pleading cannot be used

to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of

recovery authorized by Federal laws.

‘“‘Whatever springes the State may set for those

who are endeavoring to assert rights that the

State confers, the assertion of Federal rights,

when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be

defeated under the name of local practice.

(Citations omitted) Should this Court fail to

19

protect federally created rights from dismissal

because of over exacting local requirements for

meticulous pleadings, desirable uniformity in

adjudication of federally created rights could

not be achieved . . . (338 U.S. at 298-299).

The dismissal of a complaint under the FELA by

the State Courts of Missouri because of stringent

pleading requirements in Missouri was reversed in Urie

vu. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018 (1949). The

Court concluded that the allegations of the complaint

stated a cause of action for negligence under the FELA

pursuant to Federal law and that such a determination

should not vary in accordance with differing pleading re-

quirements under State and local laws. The Court

further noted that any purported insufficiency of allega-

tions in the complaint as to the particular type and

cause of a maladjustment in the equipment would not

accord with applicable Federal standards in such cases

and, in any event, “the matter was at most one for per-

mitting amendment or cure by proof.” (337 U.S. at 179,

F.N. 17)4 Accord, Arnold v. Panhandle & S.F.R. Co.,

353 U.S. 360, 77 S.Ct. 840, (1957); Dice v. Akron, C &

Y.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 72 S.Ct. 312, (1952).

Here, BOBBY HOLLAND pled not only that the

RAILROAD was negligent in failing to provide a

reasonably safe place to work, but further pled that the

‘Similarly, if indeed Holland’s potential theory of liability that

was excluded by the Court below “was a step away from the

pleaded theories,” under liberal Federal practice applicable in

FELA actions, the pleadings should have been amended to conform

to the proof. See, Watson v. Canon Shoe Co., 165 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.

1948); Green v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 299 F.2d 837 (6th

Cir. 1962).

RAILROAD negligently directed the train crew to pick

up cars on the pass track in a manner and method

known by the defendant to be hazardous, when there

was a safer alternative method of accomplishing the

same objective. The pleadings were more than sufficient

under Federal law to allow the precluded proof — which

the First District Court of Appeal here acknowledged

might well have constituted “a potential theory of

liability.” BOBBY HOLLAND has been deprived of his

substantive rights under the Federal Employers

Liability Act through the restrictive pleading require-

ments announced by the District Court of Appeal.

21

2.

THE DECISION BELOW SEVERELY UN-

DERMINES THE FORCE AND EFFECT OF

THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY

ACT BY HOLDING THAT AN ERRONEOUS

EXCLUSION UF ONE OF THE PLAIN-

TIFF’°S THEORIES OF NEGLIGENCE IS

HARMLESS ERROR, RAISING SIGNIFI-

CANT PROBLEMS INSOFAR AS ASSUR-

ING A CORRECT AND UNIFORM AP-

PLICATION OF THE FELA IN STATE AND

FEDERAL COURTS.

The First District Court of Appeal of Florida held

that the exclusion of proof of the RAILROAD’s negligent

preclusion of a safer operation than that actually em-

ployed, even if admissible, constituted harmless error

under Florida Statute Sec. 59.041 (1975 ini

pre ( ). The Opinion

* * + + *

Moreover, when viewed in the context of a

lengthy and complicated trial of numerous

liability issues, any error in the trial court’s

refusal to permit exploration of yet another

theory was harmless. Sec. 59.041, Florida

Statutes (1975). The jury considered and rejec-

ted Appellant’s proof that the particular

method used to move the train at the time and

place of his injury was unreasonably

dangerous. We find no miscarriage of justice af-

ter examination of the entire record.

The District Court of Appeal’s Opinion in this case

has a far reaching impact on the issue of uniform treat-

ment of FELA actions filed in State courts. Relying

upon a State harmless error statute, the District Court

of Appeal of Florida has deemed the erroneous exclusion

of a potential theory of liability in an FELA action to be

“harmless error”, reasoning that the excluded liability

testimony was “‘yet another theory” in a “complicated

trial of numerous liability issues” where the jury had not

found the particular method utilized for the switching

movement to be “unreasonably dangerous.”

A State harmless error statute simply should not

apply in an FELA case so as to permit the exclusion of

proof of a viable, independent theory of FELA liability.

The error simply cannot be harmless where a

finding of an unreasonably safe place to work can arise

out of proof of a safer alternative, the use of which the

RAILROAD improperly foreclosed. Strickland v.

Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., 350 U.S. 893, 76 S.Ct.

157, (1955). Where a jury, as here, was presented with

the question of whether the method actually used was

unreasonably dangerous, proof of a safer alternative

method is directly relevant on the issue of negligence.

The proof of an alternative method, which the

RAILROAD through its own fault precluded, has a

direct bearing on jury evaluation in an FELA case, — es-

pecially in light of the slight evidence of causative

negligence that is required. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific

Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443 (1957).

The decision below, insofar as it holds that the ex-

clusion of a viable theory of negligence — negligent

preclusion of a safer alternative method — constitutes

23

harmless error under a State harmless error statute

directly conflicts with the decision of the Second Circuit

in Eggert v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 538 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.

1976). The negligent preclusion of a safer method of per-

forming a particular railroad function was sufficient,

alone, to sustain a finding of negligence since it could

not be said that the negligent preclusion of the safer

method “‘played no part at all in the injury to plaintiff

and it was therefore error to prevent submission of the

issue to the jury.” (538 F.2d at 512). In Eggert, supra,

the plaintiff was the fireman for the railroad and was

responsible for transmitting signals from the ground

crew to the engineer. The plaintiff ordinarily sat in the

rear seat in the engine cab but since the front seat was

defectively turned to one side and would not swivel

properly, there was insufficient leg room to allow plain-

tiff to fit in the rear seat and he instead sat on the

broken front seat. Since plaintiff was not sitting on the

rear seat and the front seat did not swivel properly, it

was necessary for plaintiff to get up and walk to the rear

seat to look for the signal from the ground crew. While

the plaintiff was moving between seats, the “slack ac-

tion” caused by the momentum of the coupled cars

knocked plaintiff off-balance and he fell. The Second

Circuit reversed a directed verdict for the railroad since

a jury could reasonably find that, as here, a properly

functioning front seat would have permitted the utiliza-

tion of a safer alternative method. The Court further

reasoned that under the FELA, the right of the jury to

pass upon the question of fault and causation must be

most liberally viewed and, in that context, it could not

be said — while the evidence was perhaps “‘slim” — that

the broken seat played no part at all in the injury to

plaintiff. Therefore, it was error to prevent the submis-

sion of the issue to the jury.

24

,

The conflict with Eggert is clear since BOBBY

HOLLAND’s proffered proof shows that the

RAILROAD’s negligent failure to eliminate the high

weeds and debris precluded a safer switching movement

which would have eliminated the need for BOBBY

HOLLAND to ride backwards in the dark for approx-

imately one-half mile. It was during this hazardous

back-up movement that BOBBY HOLLAND fell to the

ground and lost both legs. Under applicable FELA case

law, a jury verdict could be sustained on the sole issue of

the RAILROAD’s negligent preclusion of the safer

method of performing the switching movement so that

the exclusion of this theory from consideration by the

jury is necessarily prejudicial and the Florida harmless

error statute should not be applied to defeat Holland’s

claim. Accord, Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 257

P.2d 947 (Utah 1953); Stone v. New York, C. & St.

L.R.Co., 344 U.S. 407, 73 S.Ct. 358 (1953); Boston &

M.R.R. v. Meech, 156 F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1946) cert. den.

329 U.S. 763 (1946); Rodriquez v. Delray Connecting

Rd., 473 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1973).

3.

THE EXCLUSION OF PROOF OF A VIABLE

THEORY OF LIABILITY IN AN ACTION

ARISING UNDER THE FEDERAL EM-

PLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT, BECAUSE OF

LOCAL PLEADING RULES, CON.-

STITUTES DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT TO A

JURY TRIAL UNDER THE SEVENTH

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES.

The decision below departs from the Rule pro-

nounced by this Court that an injured employee’s right

to a trial by jury in an FELA case cannot be defeated or

restricted by local rules of pleading and practice. Brown

v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 296, 70

S.Ct. 105, 106 (1949); Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry.,

319 U.S. 350, 354, 63 S.Ct. 1062, 1064 (1943); Dice v.

Akron, C. & Y.R.Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363, 72 S.Ct. 312

(1952).

This Court announced in Dice, supra:

* * * * *

{

We have previously held that “‘the right to trial

by jury is ‘a basic and fundamental feature of

our system of Federal jurisprudence’ ”’ and that

it is “part and parcel of the remedy afforded

railroad workers under the Employers Liability

Act. Bailey v. Central Vermont R.Co., 319 U.S.

350, 354, 87 L.Ed. 1444, 1447, 63 S.Ct. 1062. We

also recognized in that case that to deprive

railroad workers of the benefit of a jury trial

26

where there is evidence to support negligence

“ig to take away a goodly portion of the relief

which Congress has afforded them.” It follows

that the right to trial by jury is too substantial

a part of the rights accorded by the Act to per-

mit it to be classified as a mere “‘local rule of

procedure” for denial in the manner that Ohio

has here used. Brown v. Western R.Co., 338

U.S. 294, 94 L.Ed. 100, 70 S.Ct. 105 (342 U.S.

at 363).

The decision below sanctions the elimination of a

viable theory of negligence from consideration by the

jury because of local pleading rules. This action con-

stitutes a denial of BOBBY HOLLAND’s right to a jury

trial under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States.

4.

THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS

WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND

COURTS OF APPEALS AS TO THE INCLU-

SION OF A JURY CHARGE ON LEGAL

CAUSE UTILIZING THE “BUT FOR” TEST

OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, IN A CASE UN-

DER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’

LIABILITY ACT.

In charging upon the FELA, the trial court defined

legal cause as follows:

* * * * *

Negligence is a legal cause of injury if it di-

rectly and in a natural and continuous

sequence produces, or contributes to producing

such injury so that it can reasonably be said

that but for the negligence, the injury would

not have occurred.

__ The First District Court of Appeal concluded that

“the instruction was incorrect, however, in charging the

jury it must find that ‘but for the negligence, the injury

would not have occurred.’”’ The Court further held,

however, that the charge was harmless error since

throughout the remainder of the charge, the jury was ap-

propriately instructed that it should find for the plain-

tiff if any improper act on the part of the RAILROAD

“contributed in whole or in part” to the plaintiff’s in-

jury. According to the Court, the error was not “‘of suf-

ficient magnitude to require reversal” and “we find the

| charge as given does not rise to the level of reversible

error.”

28

The decision below departs from decisions of this

Court announcing that under the FELA, if railroad

negligence played any part, however small, in the hap-

pening of the accident, the injured employee still could

prevail. As this Court held in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific

Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443 (1957):

+ * * we

Under this Statute (FELA) the test of a jury

case is simply whether the proofs justify with

reason che conclusion that employer negligence

played any part, even the slightest, in produc-

ing the injury or death for which damages are

sought .... The Statute expressly imposes

liability upon the employer to pay damages for

injury or death due “‘in whole or in part”’ to its

negligence.

The law was enacted because the Congress was

dissatisfied with the common-law duty of the

master to his servant. The Statute supplants

that duty with the far more drastic duty of pay-

ing damages for injury or death at work due in

whole or in part to the employer’s negligence.

The employer is stripped of his common-law

defenses and for practical purposes, the inquiry

in these cases today rarely presents more than

the single question whether negligence of the

employer played any part, however small, in

the injury or death which is the subject of the

suit. The burden of the employee is met, and

the obligation of the employer to pay damages

arises, when there is proof, even though en-

tirely circumstantial, from which the jury may

29

Min

with reason make that inference. (352 U.S. at

502-503).

In Rogers, the United States Supreme Court flatly

rejected the “but for’’ test that had been applied by the

Missouri Court, holding that language of proximate

causation (i.e., “but for’) simply does not belong in an

action arising under the Federal Employers’ Liability

Act. Accord, Harris v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 361 U.S. 15,

80 S.Ct. 22 (1959).

The “but for” proximate causation instruction to

the jury could not be harmless in this FELA case where,

as recognized by this Court, the crucial question is

“whether there was evidence that any employer

negligence caused the harm, or more precisely, enough

to justify a jury’s determination that employer

negligence had played any role in producing the harm.”’

Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 327

U.S. 108, 116, 83 S.Ct. 659, 664 (1963). The applicable

standard, as expressed by the Third Circuit Court of Ap-

peals in Pehowic v. Erie Lackawanna Railroad

Company, 430 F.2d 697, 700 (3d Cir. 1970), in a FELA

case is that all that need be shown is that there be

greater than a “zero probability either of employer

negligence or that any such negligence contributed to

the injury of an employee”, to support a finding of

negligence and causation. Accord, Eglsaer v. Scandrett,

151 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1945).

~

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a Writ of Certiorari should issue

to review the Judgment and Opinion of the District

Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Respectfully submitted,

WALTER H. BECKHAM, JR.,

Esquire

JOEL D. EATON, Esquire

25 West Flagler Street

Miami, Florida 33130

(305) 358-2800

LAWRENCE V. HASTINGS

Esquire

300 71st Street, Suite 530

Miami Beach, Florida 33140

Counsel for Petitioner

PODHURST, ORSECK & PARKS, P.A.

25 West Flagler Street

Miami, Florida 33130

SUSAN GOLDMAN, ESQUIRE

PH I, Roberts Building

28 West Flagler Street

Miami, Florida 33130

HASTINGS AND GOLDMAN

300 71st Street, Suite 530

Miami Beach, Florida 33140

Of Counsel

January 24, 1979

" $1

Appendix

Index to Appendix

Decision and Opinion of the District Court

of Appeal of Florida, First District, dated

ROE Bs BOT is hic hes be kviweee App. 1-7

First Amended Complaint .......... teisss ee. F-3S

Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for New

pe na EEE APU eo a Wore ee Te App. 13-19

Excerpt from Pre-Trial Conference of

Deve By 10 TG ai oo kcccccscckevedcs App. 20

Excerpt from Deposition of Roger Banks .. App. 20-21

Excerpt from Deposition of Shirley Davis.. App. 22-24

Excerpt from Deposition of William

BONIS 6.5 cee succeed ae wk cme be hae App. 24-26

Excerpt from Deposition of Earl Williams . App. 26

Excerpt from Deposition of James Sherrod App. 27-28

Proffer of Witness Zadnichick ............. App. 28-29

Proffer of Witness Thompson ............. App. 30-35

Diagrams from Appellant’s Reply Brief

Demonstrating Switching Move as Made,

and Alternative Safer Method Precluded by

PC i Naka Goke hak RENCE a UER ce Ow App. 36-41

App. i

4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

JULY TERM, A. D. 1977

CASE NO. DD-152

BOBBY WADE HOLLAND,

Appellant,

US.

SEABOARD COAST LINE

RAILROAD COMPANY,

Appellee.

Opinion filed December 20, 1977.

ERVIN, J.

Appellant Bobby Holland brought this action under

the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for

grievous personal injuries suffered while an employee of

the appellee Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company.

He alleged numerous acts of negligence and statutory

violations that resulted in his injuries. The jury,

however, found for the railroad.

Appellant was injured in a switching movement. He

first contends the trial judge erred in excluding evidence

that the railroad failed to remove high weeds and debris

adjacent to the track and roadbed near the accident

scene, and that the weeds and debris made walking

App. 1

there at night dangerous. As the trial court held in its or-

der denying a new trial, the proffered evidence was not

admissible under any pleaded theory of negligence. Ap-

pellant’s amended complaint, as further amended,

alleged the railroad was negligent in several respects,

among them in failing to furnish appellant a reasonably

safe place in which to work and in negligently directing

the train crew to pick up cars by a hazardous method

‘when there was a safer alternative method of accom-

plishing the same objectives.”

The proffered evidence was not admissible to prove

the railroad failed to provide appellant a reasonably safe

place to work, because appellant did not traverse the

area said to have been overgrown with weeds and strewn

with debris. Appellant’s argument for the admissibility

of his proffered evidence is that by permitting an ac-

cumulation of weeds and debris, the railroad negligently

foreclosed appellant’s use of that area of the track

which, if used, would have permitted a safer operation

than the operation actually employed. That theory may

well have been a potential theory of liability, but in

causative terms it was a step away from the pleaded

theories. The bare mention of that theory of potential

liability in the pretrial conference held a few days before

trial, during counsel’s argument on the scope of proper

discovery in the latter states of preparation, did not

amend the complaint so as to require expansion of the

liability theories at trial.

Moreover, when viewed in the context of a lengthy.

and complicated trial of numerous liability issues, any

error in the trial court’s refusal to permit exploration of

yet another theory was harmless. Section 59.041, Florida

Statutes (1975). The jury considered and rejected ap-

%

App. 2

pellant’s proof that the particular method used to move

the train at the time and place of his injury was un-

reasonably dangerous. We find no miscarriage of justice

after examination of the entire record.

Appellant’s second point concerns the jury instruc-

tion defining negligence. The trial judge charged:

‘Negligence is a legal cause of injury if it directly and in

a natural and continuous sequence produces, or con-

tributes to producing such injury so that it can

reasonably be said that but for the negligence the injury

would not have occurred.”

Since Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Com-

pany, 352 U.S. 500 (1957), the test in FELA actions for

determining employer negligence is simply whether it

played any part, even the slightest, in producing the in-

jury for which damages are sought. The burden of the

employee is met, and the obligation of the employer to

pay damages arises when there is proof, though cir-

cumstantial, from which the jury may with reason make

that inference. This reasoning was adopted by the

Florida Supreme Court in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad

Company v. Barrett, 101 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1958).

Therefore, the above quoted instruction is correct in say-

ing the railroad’s negligence is a legal cause of injury if it

‘produces or contributes to producing” such injury. The

instruction was incorrect, however, in charging the jury,

it must find that “but for the negligence the injury

would not have occurred.”

If our appellate task ended upon determining the

instruction was in part incorrect, a new trial would be

mandated. However, we must also determine whether

the error was of sufficient magnitude to require reversal,

App. 3

considering the charge as a whole. McCalley v.

Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, 265 So.2d 11

(Fla. 1972). McCalley involved an alleged violation of

the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 USC §2, which

employs the same causal test as the FELA in determin-

ing an employer’s negligence. During trial the jury was

repeatedly instructed that a verdict should be returned

for the defendant if the alleged negligence was found not

to be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The

Supreme Court found the concept of proximate cause

plays no part in an action under the Federal Safety Ap-

pliance Act, and further, the repeated use of the term

“proximate cause’’, together with an erroneous instruc-

tion from a 1933 pre-Rogers decision, constituted rever-

sible error.

We find the charge as given does not rise to the level

of reversible error. The offending “‘but for” language was

used only once during the extensive instructions to the

jury. The trial judge throughout his charge informed the

jury it should find for the plaintiff if any improper act on

the part of the railroad ‘‘contributed in whole or in part”

to the plaintiff’s injury. In order to determine if any pre-

judice resulted to Mr. Holland, we reviewed the argu-

ment of defense counsel and found no reference to the

“but for” test for determining the negligence of the

railroad. Defense counsel’s brief reference to causation

in his argument is consistent with FELA law: ‘They

have got to show that something is defective, something

isn’t working, that it played some part in the accident

here.” . :

Finally, the prejudicial effect of that portion of the

offending instruction is belied by the second paragraph

following it:

App. 4

‘‘Now, under the Federal Employers’ Liability

Act the defendant Railroad Company is liable

if the defendant, his agents, servants, or em-

ployees, acting in the scope of their agency or

employment were negligent and the negligence

played any part, however small, in producing

the injury for which damages are sought.”

The jury, after nine days of trial, concluded the

railroad was guilty of no improper act making it respon-

sible for Mr. Holland’s injuries. We are sympathetic to

his plight. But we are compelled to find a fair trial was

conducted and a sufficient factual basis existed for the

jury’s verdict.

We have considered the remaining points on appeal

and find no error. The judgment is

AFFIRMED.

MELVIN, J., CONCURS. SMITH, Acting Chief Judge,

CONCURRING WITH OPINION.

SMITH, J., concurring:

I concur in the court’s decision and in all of Judge

Ervin’s opinion except that part which finds error, albeit

harmless error, in the trial court’s adaptation of

Florida’s Standard Jury Instruction 5.la to the FELA

context. Charge 5.la reads

Negligence is a legal cause of injury if it di-

rectly and in natural and continuous sequence

produces or contributes substantially to

producing such injury, so that it can

App. 5

reasonably be said that, but for the negligence,

the injury would not have occurred. (Emphasis

added.)

The trial court excised “substantially” from the charge

given the jury at this trial, thus properly accom-

modating the charge to an FELA case. The trial judge

might also have charged the jury, but was not requested

to do so, with an appropriate revision of charge 5.1b on

concurring cause:

In order to be regarded as a legal cause of in-

jury, negligence need not be the only cause.

Negligence may be a legal cause of injury even

though it operates in combination with some

other cause if such other cause occurs at the

same time as the negligence and if the

negligence contributes [omitting substantially]

to producing such injury.

In my view the “‘but for” language simply requires a

causative relationship which must be demonstrated

even in FELA cases. The feature that distinguishes

FELA cases from others is that the causative effect of

the railroad’s negligence may be “‘slight,”’ not ‘‘substan-

tial,” and yet be actionable. Other portions of the trial

court’s jury charge made that point clearly. I do not con-

ceive that the charge was error, harmless or otherwise.

See Funseth v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 399 F.2d 918

(9th Cir. 1968), cert. den., 393 U.S. 1083; Spinks v.

Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975) (discussing

identical causative requirements under the Jones Act); 3

Devitt & Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instruc-

tions §94.13 (3d ed. 1977).

App. 6

The charge here did not speak in terms of “‘prox-

imate cause,”’ which the Supreme Court found offensive

in Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S. Ct.

443, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1957). Rather, it further

ameliorated Florida’s SJI 5.1a on “legal cause,’’ which

itself ameliorated the more stringent requirements for

proof of “proximate cause.”

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

THE PLAINTIFF, BOBBY WADE HOLLAND,

sues the Defendant, SEABOARD COAST LINE

RAILROAD COMPANY, a railroad corporation, and

says:

COUNT I

CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE

DEFENDANT, SEABOARD COAST LINE

RAILROAD COMPANY, UNDER THE

FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT.

1. At all times material hereto, the Defendant,

SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,

was a corporation having its office and principal place of

business at 300 Water Street, Jacksonville, Florida,

from which address it directs and controls its railroad

system.

2. At all times material hereto, the Plaintiff,

BOBBY WADE HOLLAND, was an employee of the

Defendant, SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD

COMPANY, acting in the course and scope of such

employment.

App. 7

3. At all times material hereto, the Defendant,

SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,

was engaged as a common carrier in interstate or foreign

commerce by a railroad, which embraced and included

the work and employment of the Plaintiff, and the

Plaintiff was engaged in an activity that affected

transportation in interstate commerce.

4. On or about October 17, 1973 at approximately

5:30 A.M., in the vicinity known as “School Bus Cross-

ing:, Tifton, Georgia, the Plaintiff was working as a

brakeman on SEABOARD COAST LINE train 305,

which operates from Albany, Georgia to Waycross,

Georgia, and was engaged in picking up approximately

26 cars at the Tifton pass track, during which pick-up

the Plaintiff was severely injured when the Plaintiff was

whipped and thrown from the last car in a group of ap-

proximately 39 cars being shoved back to join train 305

on the mainline track, and as a result the Plaintiff

struck the track on or between the rails causing the

wheels of approximately 21 cars of the train to run over

the Plaintiff.

_5. The Defendant, SEABOARD COAST LINE

RAILROAD COMPANY, and/or its agents, servants or

employees, were guilty of one or more of the following

negligent acts or negligent omissions which caused or

contributed to the cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries and

damages as hereinafter alleged:

(a) In negligently constructing, or operating

or maintaining its said railroad cars,

engines, or other equipment, or other ap-

pliances.

App. 8

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

(J)

In negligently failing to furnish the Plain-

tiff reasonably safe place in which to

work.

In negligently failing to furnish Plaintiff

respectively safe cars, engines, or other

equipment with which to do his work.

In negligently operating the said engine

shoving back the 39 cars without constant

radio communication with the Plainfiff

brakeman.

In negligently operating the said engine

with defective radio communication be-

tween the engineer and the Plaintiff

brakeman.

In negligently operating the said engine

contrary to the Plaintiffs signals.

In negligently operating the said engine in

disregard of the Plaintiff’s signals.

In negligently operating the said engine so

as to cause excessive slack action.

In negligently failing to give the Plaintiff

reasonable warning of a dangerous and/or

unsafe condition.

In negligently failing to supply and make

available proper radio appliances for use

by the Plaintiff.

App. 9

(k) In negligently failing to maintain a proper

radio communication system.

6. That as a result of the said event, the Plaintiff

sustained personal injuries to his head, neck, back,

shoulders, including body and extremities and injuries

to his nervous system, more particularly the loss of the

Plaintiff's right leg at the hip and left leg at the knee;

and including permanent scarring of the shoulders; and

other injuries not as yet diagnosed; said injuries and the

conditions resulting therefrom are continuing in their

nature, so as to cause him injury, pain and disability

and that the said conditions aforesaid will reasonably be

expected to continue for sometime in the future.

7. Asa result of his said injuries, the Plaintiff was

compelled to seek medical attention, hospitalization,

surgical procedures and to incur medical expense for the

treatment of his said injuries and for travel necessary to

secure such medical treatment; and that in the future he

will be compelled to incur similar expenses for such

medical care, hospitalizations, surgical procedures, and

travel.

8. As a further result of his injuries and the condi-

tions resulting therefrom, the Plaintiff's earning

capacity and working ability were impaired; and in the

future he will suffer future loss of his earning capacity

and his ability to work.

9. Asa further result of his said injuries, the Plain-

tiff suffered physical handicap and disability in connec-

tion with his usual activities and recreation, and will

continue so to suffer such handicap and disability into

the future.

? App. 10

10. As a further result of his said injuries and the

conditions resulting therefrom, the Plaintiff suffered

great humiliation and embarrassment; great mental

pain and suffering, and will continue so to suffer in the

future.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff sues the Defendant,

SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,

and demands judgment in excess of TWO THOUSAND

FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($2,500.00) with interest

and the costs of this action; and demands trial by jury of

all issues triable as of right by a jury.

COUNT I

CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE

SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD

COMPANY UNDER THE BOILER INSPEC-

TION ACT

11. The Plaintiff adopts and incorporates each

and every allegation of Paragraphs 1 through 4 above.

12. The injuries to the Plaintiff occurred as the

result of a defective engine radio receiver whereby the

engineer was unable to hear the Plaintiff’s signals.

13. The Defendants were in violation of the Boiler

Inspection Act and the Safety Appliance Act in the

following respect:

(a) That the locomotive radio was defective

and not serviceable for the use intended.

App. 11

(b) That the locomotive brakes were defec-

tive and inadequate.

(c) That the train brakes were defective and

inadequate.

(d) That the engine’s radio communications

system was defective.

14. The Plaintiff adopts and incorporates each

and every allegation of Paragraphs 6 through 10 above.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff sues the Defendant,

SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,

and demands judgment in excess of TWO THOUSAND

FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($2,500.00) together with

interest and the costs of this action, and demands trial

by jury of all issues triable as of right by a jury.

MOTION TO AMEND

AMENDED COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, by and through his

undersigned attorneys, and moves this Honorable

Court, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 1.190, for leave to amend

his Amended Complaint previously filed herein by in-

terlineation and to add thereto in Court I, paragraph 5

an additional allegation of negligence by subparagraph

(1), thereof, all of which is in the furtherance of justice

and which amendment reads as follows:

(1) In negligently instructing and/or directing

the train crew to pick up cars on the pass

track in a manner and method as was

App. 12

known by the Defendant to be hazardous

when there was a safer alternative method

of accomplishing the same objectives.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff's motion for new trial, after being twice

continued, was argued before this Court on May 27,

1976. The plaintiff has listed 28 reasons why the Court

should set aside the judgment entered on the jury ver-

dict on this case and grant a new trial. However, during

the arguments on the motion, plaintiff's counsel argued

basically three of these reasons, namely, Nos. 4, 7 and

21. However, the Court has considered all of the reasons

set forth in plaintiff's motion and has studied the cases

cited by the parties during the arguments, and after due

deliberation, the plaintiff's motion for new trial is

denied.

The Court feels impelled to detail its reasoning for

denying a new trial.

It is undisputed that the plaintiff in this case suf-

fered grievous injuries, and if the case were to be decided

on sympathy, there is no doubt but that a new trial

would be granted. But, of course, this is not the stan-

dard to be applied nor was it the standard for the jury to

apply in reaching their verdict.

Reason No. 4 in plaintiffs motion states that ‘the

verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the

evidence’’. However, the verdict is amply supported by

the evidence in this case and the jury could easily have

found that the railroad was not at fault. Reasons Nos. 9

App. 13

through 24 urge as error: failure of the Court to give

some of the plaintiff's requested instructions, failure of

the Court to give in their entirety some of plaintiff's re-

quested instructions, and the giving by the Court of

some of defendant’s requested instructions. Plaintiff

alleges that defendant was liable under the Federal Em-

ployers’ Liability Act, Safety Appliance Act, Boiler In-

spection Act and the Power Brake Law. The instructions

as given to the jury adequately and properly instructed

them as to each of these statutory duties. 45 U.S.C.A.

§1, et.seq.; 45 U.S.C.A. §51, et.seq.; Rogers vs. Missouri

Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 1 L.Ed.2d 493, 77

S.Ct. 443; Bertrand vs. Southern Pacific Co., 282 F.2d

569 (9th Cir., 1960); Idzojtic vs. Pennsylvania Railroad

Co., 431 F.2d 1029 (3rd Cir., 1970); Ely vs. Reading

Company, 424 F.2d 758 (3rd Cir., 1970).

Plaintiff's counsel has spent a great deal of time

urging upon this Court their contention that excluding

evidence concerning weeds and grass allegedly located

south of the pass track switch in Tifton, Georgia was the

reason that the jury returned an adverse verdict against

plaintiff. No doubt this will be the primary contention

on appeal. Plaintiff's counsel now claims that the entire

thrust of their case under the FELA aspect of the case

was their contention that weeds growing along the

mainline south of the pass track switch between Tifton

and Waycross, Georgia was the reason for the particular

move which was being made at the time of the plaintiff's

injury. Otherwise, they contend, it would have been

made differently as the defendant knew the move which

was made on the night of the plaintiff's accident was

unsafe.

App. 14

It is to be noted that this contention was not men-

tioned at all in the plaintiff's original complaint, Count I

(their FELA Count), which set forth eleven specific

allegations of negligence, none of which made any men-

tion whatsoever of weeds south of the pass track switch,

but rather the majority of them were allegations of

negligent train handling in contributing to the cause of

plaintiffs injury. The plaintiff filed a first amended

complaint which again set forth eleven allegations of

negligence, and again failed to mention anything about

weeds south of the pass track switch.

It is perfectly clear that their primary thrust in

alleging negligence dealt with train handling, negligent

communications and/or a negligent communication

system. Following this, the plaintiff further amended his

complaint on several occasions, supplementing their

allegations under their Counts dealing with Safety Ap-

pliance Act, Boiler Inspection Act and one further

allegation under their FELA Count which read:

“In negligently instructing and/or directing the

train crew to pick up cars on the pass track in a

manner and method as was known by the

defendant to be hazardous when there was a

safer alternative method of accomplishing the

same objective.” |

Plaintiff's contention also is not supported by piain-

tiff’s counsel’s opening statement to the jury. During his

opening statement he mentioned about fourteen

theories of liability under the FELA, Safety Appliance

Act, Boiler Inspection Act and Power Brake Law. Near

the end of his opening statement and while discussing

the alternative means by which the cars could have been

App. 15

picked up, plaintiff's counsel mentioned weeds south of

the pass track switch in a sense which virtually con-

tradicted his earlier statement that using that area was

an alternative method, as from his statement concern-

ing weeds it appeared that it was not a reasonable alter-

native. Thus, from the issues as framed by the

pleadings, as well as plaintiff's counsel’s opening state-

ment, it is clear to this Court that their present conten-

tion that the primary thrust of their case involved the

weeds theory is an afterthought when trying to review in

their minds why the jury returned an adverse verdict to

them.

During the trial, the testimony was uncontradicted

that the method which was being employed to pick up

the cars from the pass track had been used by the defen-

dant for over twenty-five years without any complaints

from employees or mishaps of any kind. Further, the

evidence at trial was undisputed that the track crew, of

which the plaintiff was a member, used the same

method on the morning of the plaintiff's accident. Dur-

ing arguments (held outside of the presence of the jury)

concerning this point, plaintiff's counsel was unable to

show that there was any connection whatsoever between

any weeds or lack of weeds located south of the pass

track switch and the method which was decided upon by

the plaintiff's crew to pick up the cars from the pass

track. It was not necessary to rule on the admissibility of

the profferred testimony relating to the defendant’s

knowiedge or lack of knowledge of any weeds south of

the pass track switch during a reasonable period prior to

plaintiff's accident (plaintiff proffered one or two letters

which predated the accident by four or five years) as

there is no question but that under the issues as framed

by the pleadings and testimony at trial that evidence of

App. 16

weeds or lack of weeds south of the pass track switch had

absolutely no relevancy or materiality in this case.

The plaintiff was allowed to put on testimony from

their expert who testified that the method being em-

ployed by the defendant at the time of plaintiff’s acci-

dent was unsafe and then testified as to four alternative

methods which would have been, in his opinion,

reasonably safe alternative methods which should have

been used. The jury was appropriately instructed to the

effect that the general custom of the defendant railroad

in picking up the cars did not justify or excuse

negligence and that in determining whether or not the

defendant failed to provide the plaintiff with a

reasonably safe place to work, etc., they could consider

the alternative methods. After carefully considering the

pleadings, trial testimony and the law, it is clear that

the plaintiff's attempt to pu‘ in evidence concerning

weeds which had nothing to do with the plaintiff's acci-

dent was properly excluded. Black vs. Penn Central Co.,

507 F.2d 269 (6th Cir., 1974); Smith vs. Illinois Central

R. R. Co., 486 F.2d 943 (5th Cir., 1974); Dobson vs.

Grand Truck Western Railroad Co., 248 F.2d 545 (7th

Cir., 1957); Atlantic Coastline Railroad Co. vs. Darden,

216 F.2d 125 (5th Cir., 1954); Mensen vs. Baltimore and

Ohio Railroad Co., 250 N.E.2d 303.

During the oral arguments on their motion for new

trial, plaintiff cited several cases in support of their con-

tention that the evidence concerning the weeds or lack

thereof should have been admitted at the trial, and I

have read those cases and feel that they are clearly not

applicable to this case. Cereste vs. New York, New

Haven and Hartford R. Co., 231 F.2d 50 (2nd Cir., 1956),

involved an employee who tripped over a lump of coal

App. 17

between a set of tracks, which is a situation almost com-

pletely opposite of that involved in this case, wherein

the plaintiff was riding a boxcar from which he fell.

Another case cited by the plaintiff during oral argument

was Chicago, B. & O. R. Co. vs. Kelley, 74 F.2d 80 (8th

Cir., 1934), which involved weeds that had accumulated

on tracks which then caused a braking locomotive to

slide further than normal into a cut of cars. The only

similarity between that case and this case is the word

“weed” as it is clear that in that case the weeds had

something to do with causing or contributing to the acci-

dent, whereas in this case there was no connection be-

tween the plaintiff's accident and any alleged weeds

south of the pass track.

The jury was told at the outset of the case that it

was expected that the entire trial would last approx-

imately three or four days. Actually, the plaintiff's case

lasted seven full days with the liability phase of their

case consisting of putting on testimony concerning

switching operations, braking systems (including very

detailed and technical evidence of engine and train

brake systems), radio systems (including very technical

aspects of radio sensitivities, gain, etc.) and the details

of the movements being made at the time of plaintiff's

accident. As the plaintiff's case wore on, it was obvious

that the jury of six women was becoming inattentive and

bored and I informed both counsel of this observation on

several occasions. It was obvious that the length of time

in which it took the plaintiff to present his case and the

type of testimony presented was completely boring to

the jury. On the other hand, the defendant’s case was

presented clearly, concisely and briefly and was listened

to most attentively by the jury.

App. 18

While there were numerous factual issued to be

resolved by the jury, perhaps the two most important

were: (1) Whether or not the engine and cars were han-

dled in a negligent manner and thus produced unusual

and severe slack action, or whether they were handled

reasonably and produced normal slack action, if any;

and (2) Whether or not the plaintiff was riding the side

of the leading boxcar, as he testified, or whether he was

riding the end of the leading boxcar at the time of his ac-

cident.

After deliberating for approximately three hours,

the jury returned their verdict resolving the factual

issues in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.

I find no basis to disturb the jury verdict in this

case.

It is therefore

ADJUDGED that plaintiff's motion for new trial

be, and the same, is hereby, denied.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida,

this 29th day of July, 1976.

/s/ Marion W.- Gooding

CIRCUIT JUDGE

App. 19

EXCERPT FROM PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

MR. HASTINGS: Your Honor, so you understand

what we are talking about, because this is a factual

situation, what it is in essence in this particular area

where this movement is taking place, there are high

weeds, we are alleging, and there is a lot of debris. As a

result of these extremely high weeds and debris, they

had to do the movement not the way we feel it should

have been done and we will produce evidence to say it

shouldn’t have been done because I say if you try to do it

in this area where weeds are, you are bound to fall or

trip. It is dangerous at night and an accident can hap-

pen. In any event, it is because of these weeds, that is

one of the causal factors of this accident. We want to

prove this is so through these particular communica-

tions we are talking about. Not only is this a dangerous

condition that existed there and caused that particular

movement to be necessary, but the railroad was warned

not once but told many times that these weeds were

high. There is debris. They were told many times and

the railroad has correspondence from the working people

to the effect that this condition is intolerably bad and

this should be cleared up or a different movement

should be made.

DEPOSITION OF ROGER BANKS

Q All right. Are you familiar with the area south

of the south pass — south switch of the south pass track

at Tifton as the same was in October, or on October 17th

of 1973, specifically on October 17th?

A Yes, sir, I am. I was there.

App. 20

Q Can you describe that area on the main line just

south of the south pass track?

A South of the south pass switch? Is that right?

Q_ Yes.

A Pretty well grown up, had some tie butts laying

on the right of way, weeds were approximately, I guess,

about waist high.

Q_ All right. Were the weeds thick?

A Yes, sir, they were pretty thick.

Q Did that affect the manner in which the pickup

of cars off that pass truck was conducted by your crew at

that time?

A Well, yes, sir, they would try to cut off to where

they didn’t have to walk through all of that. They tried

to cut off far enough back to where they could make the

pickup and then walk down the pass track.

Q_ Is that what requires a man to ride a car on this

movement, picking up cars off that pass track?

A That and the fact that you have that School

Bus Road crossing there. You have to leave that open at

certain times in the morning. And that requires him to

ride back to a make a coupling there and inspect the

brakes as he comes back forward.

App. 21

DEPOSITION OF SHIRLEY DAVIS

Q In discussing with Mr. Taylor, that you

described earlier, the conditions there around Tifton,

did you ever discuss with him the ground conditions and

overlying weed conditions and debris conditions?

MR. MELTON: I will have to object to the

vagueness of the question.

You can answer, Mr. Davis, if you understand it.

THE WITNESS: I understand the question, and

I’m not in a position to state now whether I did or didn’t,

because this is a problem that we are faced with over

almost 10,000 miles of railroad.

And the basic fact is that the American public is

just not willing to pay for us to maintain a 100-percent

control of weeds over our system.

BY MR. KIKER:

Q Would this have been a business decision again

relating to cost factors on upkeep of the maintenance of

way?

A Well, there again, those decisions are made on a

much higher level than I have yet achieved in this com-

pany. But the primary focus or the primary — let me say

the item that in my view would get the first priority

would be the actual maintenance of the track itself, for

therein lies the greatest danger to the employees, to the

equipment and to the traveling public.

App. 22

And it’s simply a question of economics, of how

much money you have to spend.

Q Wouldn’t you also be concerned with areas

' where the men were required to walk, specifically with

respect to the weeds and grass and debris that are in

those areas where the men have to walk day in and day

out?

A Yes. We give some consideration to that, too.

We certainly do. We operate a — basically a weedspray-

ing outfit over the entire system every year, to my

knowledge, spraying weeds along our entire right of way.

We have numerous mowing machines that are engaged

in mowing our right of way.

~

Q Do you also have men who clean up debris?

A Basically our section forces do that on a regular

basis. Now, I am not saying we pick up everything,

everywhere, every day.

Q You just want to clean up the major things that

the forces would see or be instructed to clean up?

MR. MILTON: Let me again object. I think, again,

this is out of Mr. Davis’ area completely. I don’t think he

is competent to be questioned along this line.

But you can give an answer, Mr. Davis, if you feel

like you have an answer.

-THE WITNESS: Well, your question is — appears

to me to be general in nature. But we certainly around

our major terminals are constantly faced with the

App. 23

problem of picking up pulpwood and other debris. And

we do this on a regular basis. It’s not as frequent as we

would like to do, probably. But there again, economics is

a factor in how much we are able to do.

And we certainly attempt to mow around our road

crossing and our sidings and give them more attention

than we do areas where normally there’s not too much

activity.

BY MR. KIKER:

Q Wouldn’t you consider crossties lying out beside

the track where the men have to walk a major item

which would need to be cleaned up and policed

regularly?

‘A There again, this-depends on the location of the

crosstie, how close it is to the track, and this and that

and the other. We frequently place crossties along the

track when we are starting up a program of tie renewal.

DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM HUCKEBA

Q And I assume, as far as the condition of weeds,

that this is a matter that you have to keep up with on a

regular basis?

A They will grow back.

Q And I suppose you got a lot of complaints over

the years about the weeds and —

A Yes, sir, weeds will grow, and it requires a lot of

work to keep them —

App. 24

Q Cut down?

A — cut down and under control.

Q And when you would receive such complaints,

you would handle them in the manner I think you ex-

plained before, that they were referred to the —

A We did something about it just as quickly as we

could.

Q Did you have some type of a program within

your supervisory personnel there to check these condi-

tions along the railroad?

A Oh, yes, trainmasters, road foremen, road-

masters, division engineer, myself, in covering the

railroad would check those conditions.

Q And if you found something that looked to be

dangerous or something like that, what was your

procedure?

A If we found a condition that appeared to need

attention, we set about having the matter taken care of

as quickly as possible.

Q How often would you make these inspections?

A Oh, a roadmaster would cover his territory

weekly, or more frequently sometimes. A division

engineer, every week or two. Of course, the trainmaster

and road foreman, they would make frequent trips. I

couldn’t say to the day.

App. 25

Q If they saw some kind of condition, they would

come back and either report it to your office or have it

handled in some type of manner; is that correct?

A Yes, that’s correct.

Q And I assume these individuals would be riding

the area that Train 305 covered from Albany to Tifton to

Waycross and be aware of conditions along that route?

A Yes.

DEPOSITION OF EARLE WILLIAMS

Q Had this type of movement ever been discussed

with representatives of the union and either yourself or

Mr. Huckeba in regard to alternate methods?

A You are speaking, sir, of alternate methods of

picking up from the siding at Tifton?

Q Yes.

_ A To the best of my knowledge, it was never dis-

cussed, brought up or considered.

Q Let me ask you this, Mr. Williams: Had

anyone, either in writing or to you verbally, complained

or mentioned the tall weeds that were present at the

pass track and also the debris and, I believe, some tie

butts and what have you theet

App. 26

DEPOSITION OF JAMES SHERROD

Q Were you ever made aware of any complaints in

regard to the weeds in the area of the Tifton pass track

prior to the day of the accident here?

A In that particular area?

Q Yes.

A No, sir.

Q Have you ever been made aware of any com-

plaints in regard to the use of radios and outside inter-

ference on the radios?

A No.

Q Do you ever get involved with your book of rules

and the violations of various rules or the implementa-

tion of new rules?

A Are you speaking of operating rules —

Q Yes.

A — or safety rules?

exactly — I can’t pinpoint the area that I looked at. I

looked at the area in general there.

Q I see.

A I could possibly have looked at this area.

App. 27

Q Do you know if there were any tall weeds in the

area east of the main line and just south of the switch of

the pass track?

A Ican’t remember, sir, if there was or not.

Q You don’t know then whether there were any

weeds there or not?

A That’s correct, I don’t know.

Q And the same would be true of the west side of

the track; is that correct?

A That’s correct, yes, sir.

PROFFER [ZADNICHICK]

BY MR. FEHNER:

Q Mr. Zadnichick, assuming that there were a

large number of weeds in this area south of the pass

track, and there were cut tie butts, for some con-

siderable distance down to the south of the switch, and

that, on the other side of the track there was a deep

ravine dropped off the side of the track.

Now, what effect would this have on any of your

movements here that required walking?

A They’d certainly be an impediment on the

movement of walking.

Q Let’s assume these were chest-high where it was

almost impossible for a person to walk?

App. 28

A Well, I wouldn’t consider that a safe condition

to walk under those circumstances.

Q And would it in any way affect the efficiency

and safety of the movement?

A Yes.

Q_ If those weeks began just shortly south of this

switch area, shortly south several hundred feet, would

that have any more effect on the movement?

A You say they did not exist until you reached a

distance some several hundred feet south of the switch?

Q No, more than that, possibly less of the switch.

A The conditions you described in a very un-

satisfactory working condition, whatever the location

may be.

Q What effect would that have on train handling

movement in that area?

A Well, certainly it would impede the efficiency,

it is not a satisfactory walking condition.

Q What about at nighttime?

A It is a hazard that is increased.

App. 29

DIRECT EXAMINATION (ON PROFFER)

[THOMPSON]

BY MR. HASTINGS:

Q_ Sir, ’'m — ia there anything — to cut down to

the area where you make your cut and switch is, so that

they won’t have to make this 35-car ride or so down to

the school bus crossing, is there anything about that

area, rather than cut off at the switch, you know, to clear

the switch with standing cars they cut off — why they

cut off way down at that street crossing? That is, do — I

am talking about in the area, weeds or anything like

that?

A In other words, you are asking me why did we

stop back like this?

Q That’s right.

A_ To do our work?

Q Yes.

A South of this switch about four car lengths,

three or four, the shoulders of the railroad narrows up to

a standard roadbed, standard — according to this type

railroad. And, there is some — it is growth down there,

type grass that grows real fast, prolific, it’s that Sudan

grass, type of Sudan grass like.

Q Grow about waist high and thick and heavy?

App. 30

A It will get up above your knees, would get waist

high, yes, sometimes, but normally about a little above

your knees, around your knees.

Q_ And from there down to the next switch is about

40 or 50 cars, I believe you stated?

A Something in the neighborhood of that, yes, sir.

Q_ And that is the reason you cut off back there so

that people will have a clean place to walk?

(Nods.)

All right, sir.

Yes, sir.

Now, this grass is on both sides of the track?

Same thing on both sides, grass.

Te. SS ee

Yes, sir. And is that area lighted at night?

A Well, there is a little light that comes across

from these lights I was talking about, I could see across

through the engine, but it wouldn’t help in walking

purposes.

Q_ And is there a lot of scrap there or metal in that

area, scrap yard?

A There is a scrap yard there and we do get scrap

around out of the cars and occasionally you will see a

piece of scrap, you know, on the ground along there.

App. 31

Q_ And in — in your opinion with what you have

described there, would you feel that it’s an unsafe place

to walk?

A Well, that gets back to terminology. If a man

wanted to take his time and walk carefully, it would be a

safe place to walk. But, a man walking and trying to

check brakes, I would have to say that it would be a

hazardous walking.

Q Particularly at night, I would imagine?

A That is what I am talking about, night.

Q Allright, sir. And, sir, have you personally ever

requested the company to clean up that walkway so that

a movement could be made without having to have a

man hang on the side such as Mr. Holland?

A Yes. Yes. I— I once represented the firemen on

the organization and on this district and I had an access

to the superintendent on other — lots of other

businesses, and the brakemen would ask me to speak to

the superintendent and see if we couldn’t get the grass

cut down there, which I did on numerous occasions.

Q_ And, sir, was this in a — up to an area of the

time of this accident we are talking about, this is 1973

October area? '

A You mean had I spoken to the superintendent

previous?

Q No. Was this condition existing in October,

1973?

App. 32

A In October, ’73 they had came there that year

and cut the weeds with the lawnmower there that year

and cut the weeds with the lawnmower — I mean, a

mowing machine which cuts them about four or five

inches above the ground. But, that being that warm,

real warm under there, had gotten back up about

something like this.

Q About this, you are referring to how many —

About 14, 16 inches.

14 to 16 inches?

Yes, sir.

oOo F&- O& PY

All right, sir.

MR. HASTINGS: I think that is all. Thank you.

That is the proffer.

MR. MILTON: I have a few more questions on

redirect —

THE COURT: Surely.

MR. MILTON: I am sorry, on the proffer itself

you want me to ask?

THE COURT: I think you better straighten it out

for the record, this may go to appellate court, they may

think this occurred right at the place of the accident.

App. 33

CROSS EXAMINATION (ON PROFFER)

BY MR. MILTON:

Q Mr. Thompson, is the area that you have just

been asked questions about by Mr. Hastings, is this

anywhere in the area where your move was progressing

at the time of Mr. Holland’s accident?

A No, sir. This area I discussed with Mr. Hastings

just previous to this was in the area south of the engine

after the coupling was made.

Q In other words, it would be considerably south

of, say, school bus crossing or the south pass track itself?

A Approximately three to four cars past the south

pass track switch, is where it starts.

Q_ And the walking area from the school bus cross-

ing to the south pass track is a good clean walking area?

A That’s right.

MR. MILTON: That is all I have.

MR. HASTINGS: One last question, I apologize.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION (ON PROFFER)

BY MR. HASTINGS:

Q_ So, sir, if you didn’t pull out, for example, with

your 39 cars here going forward, before you started shov-

App. 34

ing back, and if a man had to walk to the head end, he

would have to be walking through this region that we

have described that is south of the —

A Had I left my —

Q Switch.

A Had I left the train at the — in the vicinity of

the derailer you are talking about, and pulled the train

down in the clear?

Q_ Right.

A Clearing point? Yeah, he would have had to

walk in this area.

Q_ Had to walk?

A To get to the head end. Sure.

MR. HASTINGS: All right, sir. \

THE COURT: All right. Ask the jury to return.

App. 35

HOLLAND TO CUT

(UNCOUPLE) HERE---

L

1 mat NY

AYCKUSS

METHOD -

PREVE'NTED

Ww

, TALL GPASS

| ABE_DESETS

trAcre

AKIN

“CT TO SCALE

AAT

-$--Main Track

~Side Track

---Derail

MAN + Direction of Travel

OLLAND TO CUT

(UNCOUPLE) HERE ---

ore es

MM 4 - mngines Aue

BB 2 - Car Pickup

> - Firestone Cars

iH Rest of Train —*C+L

4

App. 36

wSchoo] Sus Road

ALTERNATIVE

METHOD -

PREVENTED

Y WEE

TALL GRASS

AND DEBRIS

School Bus Road

Ane

AMNAwW

+

AA Are

he hesias

AAcw

NOT TO SCALE

Nw |weens

&

-Main Track

“Side Track

HOLLAND

UNCOUPLES 13

FIRESTONE

CARS FROM

REST OF

TRAIN AND

RIDES 1/2

MILE TO

SWITCH.

---Derail

uiSchool Bus Road

HOLLAND

UNCOUPLES 13

FIRESTONE CARS

AND WALKS ABOUT |

150 FEET TO

SWITCH. ,

TALL

GRASS,

DEBRIS

+ Direction of Travel

Lo] 4 - Engines Se Aada da

| Pe - Car Pickuo

my: - Pirestone Cars

yres* of Train

5

AT

App. 37

Aan AcT [

aes,

_

Arce

---4Main Track

--Side Track

|

|

j—-—Switch

Aer

ALTERIATIVE

METHOD _-

PRFVE!:~

w

TALL GRASS

AND DEEFTS

School Bus Road

ANA

AAcKe

NOT TO SCALE

|Bchool Sus Road

------Main Track

-Side Track

HOLLAND HANDLES SWITCH,

-~-Derail

--Switch

Are “TALL

GRASS,

WEEDS

&

DEBRIS

AAwe

>» Direction of Travel

AAC pag 4 - msines Ae

i. | 26 = Car Pickup

i” | 13 - Firestone cars

ty Rest of Train

—--—-Main Track

6.

App. 38

ALTER?:), TIVE

METI!OD -

i TALL GPASS

| AND DEEFIS

School Bus Ryad

Aanere

Ae ANC | ents

MA” Fe

AA

Ane Err

NOT TO SCALE

iSchool Pus Road

------Main Track

--Side Track

ENGINES, FIRESTONE CARS AND

26 - CARS - RICKED UP PULL

OUT TO MAIN TRACK (WITH NO

MAN RIDING ON| END OF ANY

CAR). HOLLAND THEN HANDLES

SWITCH, ETC.

---Derail

--Switch

MAN

AnrANw

GRASS,

WEEDS

&

DEBRIS

ae Direction of Travel

AA ww 4 - Engines Sane)

26 - Car Pickup

13 ~ Firestone Cars

es ed

fl) Rest of Train y

App. 39

aie wb Track

e—Sice Track

i

ole

---Derail

--Switch

School Bus Road

AAW

AA

NOT TO SCALE

---+mMain Track

--Side Track

THE 1/2 MILE

WALK TO THE

ENGINE IS

THROUGH CLEAR

Atuirenc space.

che Ate

AA

A P'ATIV

METHOD -

PREVEZ:7ED

BY WrESs

TALL GPASS

AND DEE?TS

School =us Road

ENGINE BACKS

UP OR SHOVES

TO COUPLING

OF 39 CARS _

WITH REST OF

TRAIN, WITH

NO ONE RIDING

HOLLAND WOULD

THEN WALK 1/2

MILE TO ENGINE

EXCEPT FOR HIGH

WEEDS, ETC. SOUTH

er Direction of Travel

| 4 - Engines ATC

Bz - Car Pick Up

mg» - Firestone Cars

{TT}}®es* of Train

&

App. 40

----Main Track

--Side Trac}.

---Derail

—-—<-Switch

TALL

GRASS,

WEEDS

&

AAC 7

———— eo oe

ACTUAL RR

METHOD N

USED wee

School Bus Road

1/2 MILE

----| rMain Track

k—Side Track

s

ALBANY

t

DISTANCES

COMPAS

Ww

sehu

E

ALTERNATIVE

METHOD —

PRE‘JENTED

BY WEEDS

TALL GRASS

AND

chool Bus Road

ACTUAL METHOD

USED

1. REQUIRES

1/2 MILE

SHOVING -

RIDE ON

39th CAR

TO CHECK

COUPLING.

2. ALLOWS 1/2

MILE WALK

Derail

w

Switch-—

niernew

An Ae

AAW

An AN

NOT TO SCALE

4:

THROUGH

CLEAR AREA

TO GET TO

ENGINE

AFTER

COUPLING.

Aw

MAAN

Arnw

ALTERNATIVE METHOD

PREVENTE) BY WEEDS

1. REQUIRES 150

FOOT WALK TO

CHECK COUPLING.

2. ALLOWS 1/2 MILE

WALK THROUGH

CLEAR AREA TO

GET TO ENGINE

AFTER COUPLING

EXCEPT “HEN

TALL GPASS AND

WEE Ni

(DESPITE

REQUEST OF

THOMPSON, ETC) «

NO ONE EVER

HAS TO RIDE

THE 39th CAR.

AniAr

Anse

App. 41

ain Track

i--Side Track

~g-Derail

we 150 FEET

<a.--4-switen

AAT

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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