Petition — Coleman v. United States

|

Supreme Court, U.S. |

FILED

JAN 17 1979

4 i

MICHAEL RODAK, JR, CLERK |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocrosper TERM, 1978

vo. #871124 |

NATHANIEL COLEMAN,

Petitioner.

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

|

|

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO )

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

CHESTER SLAUGHTER,

188 West Randolph Street,

Chicago, Illinois 60601,

312/236-5277,

PHILANDER S. NEVILLE, JR.,

4320 Vincennes,

Chicago, Illinois 60653,

312/373-5155,

Attorneys for Petitioner

Keenan Printing Company 312-648-0050 <a 365

ET OME Sea DeduuUcer ed he c'essccceceescees

Neen ee awe cebucevevwes

Ee

Constitutional Provisions and Federal Statutes In-

volved

z.

II.

ITI.

Seewrrweeeeereeee ecaeereeoesoeeaneeew eee eeeeee e688 8

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECIDED A

QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW THAT

THEFT OF SERVICES IS AN OFFENSE

WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF 18 U.S.C.

§ 665, WHICH SHOULD BE, BUT HAS

NOT BEEN DECIDED BY THE SU-

TEE Sci nececcdecscsvevccic

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT HAS REN-

DERED A DECISION WHICH CON-

FLICTS WITH A NINTH CIRCUIT DE-

ge A Ie a

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

CONFLICTS WITH SUPREME COURT

DECISIONS WHICH PRESCRIBE CAN-

ONS OF CONSTRUCTION FOR CON-

coy SG >

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

VIOLATED THE THIRTEENTH AM-

ENDMENT’S PROHIBITION AGAINST

SLAVERY WHEN THE COURT HELD

THAT CETA WORKERS’ SERVICES,

WHICH WERE PAID FOR WITH FED-

ERAL FUNDS, WERE PROPERTY

OWNED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERN-

EE SURESEE Opp 05,55 e806 ¥00 aes so 008s.

10

11

ii.

V. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECI-

SION VIOLATED THE PROHIBITION

AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS

WHEN THE COURT CONSTRUED THE

WORD PROPERTY IN 18 U.S.C. § 665 TO

INCLUDE SERVICES AND RETRO-

SPECTIVELY APPLIED ITS _ CON-

STRUCTION OF SECTION 665 TO THE

ALLEGED CONDUCT OF THE AC-

GF: 5 ais chi coated anewest wep heheese

VI. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT SANC-

TIONED SUCH A DEPARTURE BY THE

LOWER COURT FROM THE ACCEPT-

ED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDI-

CIAL PROCEEDINGS, AS TO CALL FOR

AN EXERCISE OF THE SUPREME

COURT’S POWER OF SUPERVISION ..

ae i are Se NAP Rae (RL A cam el ct he Or

APPENDICES:

A. THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

AFFIRMING THE DEFENDANT’S CONVIC-

TION FOR THEFT OF SERVICES ...........

B, THE INDIOTMEINT .cccccccsvccsccceccssveess

THE COURT’S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6 ..

THE COURT’S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 7 ..

THE COURT’S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 8 ..

THE COURT’S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 10 .

THE COURT’S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 11 .

THE JURY'S NOTH ow scvcscscsccnvevcvacence

THE CONTRACT BETWEEN GARY MAN-

POWER AND GENERAL SERVICES ......

THE APPLICATION FOR FINANCIAL AS-

BISTANGE onsccscrcvscccccvccccsvdseccccses

14

14

19

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1978

No. ——

NATHANIEL COLEMAN,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

2

The petitioner, NATHANIEL COLEMAN, respectfully

prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment

and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit, affirming the petitioner’s conviction under

18 U.S.C. § 665 for theft of services.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, as yet unreported,

appears at Appendix A, infra, pp. 1-8.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

December 18, 1978. This petition for certiorari was filed

less than 30 days from the beforementioned date, The

jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

Section 1254 (1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. WHETHER THEFT OF SERVICES IS AN OF-

FENSE WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF 18 U.S.C.

§ 665.

Il. WHETHER CONFLICTING DECISION IN THE

NINTH AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS AS TO

WHETHER OR NOT THEFT OF SERVICES IS

AN OFFENSE WILL DESTROY CERTAINTY

AND PREDICTABILITY IN THE LAW.

° II. WHETHER THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECI-

SION CONFLICTS WTH SUPREME COURT DE-

CISIONS WHICH PRESCRIBE CANONS OF

CONSTRUCTION FOR CONSTRUING STAT-

UTES.

3

IV. WHETHER THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECI-

SION VIOLATED THE THIRTEENTH AMEND-

MENT’S PROHIBITION AGAINST SLAVERY

WHEN THE COURT HELD THAT CETA

WORKERS’ SERVICES, WHICH WERE PAID

FOR WITH FEDERAL FUNDS, WERE PROP-

ERTY OWNED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERN-

MENT.

V. WHETHER THE PROHIBITION AGAINST EX

POST FACTO LAWS IS VIOLATED WHEN THE

COURT CONSTRUES THE WORD PROPERTY

IN 18 U.S.C, § 665 TO INCLUDE SERVICES AND

RETROSPECTIVELY APPLIES ITS _ CON.

STRUCTION OF SECTION 665 TO THE AL-

LEGED CONDUCT OF THE ACCUSED.

VI. WHETHER THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AM-

ENDMENT RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL IS VIO-

LATED (A) WHEN INADMISSIBLE HATCH

ACT EVIDENCE IS ADMITTED AT HIS TRIAL,

AND (B) WHEN THE JURY IS IMPROPERLY

INSTRUCTED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND FEDERAL

STATUTES INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Amendment XIII:

Section 1, Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,

except as a punishment for crime whereof the party

shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the

United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

United States Constitution, Amendment VI:

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy

the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial

jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall

have been committed, which district shall have been

previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of

4

the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted

with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory

process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to

have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 9(3) :

No ex post facto law shall be passed.

Federal Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 665(a):

Theft or embezzlement from manpower funds;

(a) Whoever, being an officer, director, agent, or em-

ployee of, or connected in any capacity with, any

agency receiving financial assistance under the Com-

prehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 em-

bezzles, willfully misapplies, steals, or obtains by fraud

any of the moneys, funds, assets, or property which

are the subject of a grant or contract of assistance pur-

suant to this Act shall be fined not more than $10,000

or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both;

but. if the amount so embezzled, misapplied, stolen, or

obtained by fraud does not exceed $100, he shall be

fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more

than one year, or both.

Federal Statute, 29 U.S.C. § 990:

Political Activities Prohibited

The Secretary shall not provide financial assistance for

any program under this Act which involves political

activities; and neither the program, the funds provided

therefor, nor personnel employed in the administration

thereof, shall be, in any way or to any extent, engaged

in the conduct of political activities in contravention of

chapter 15 of title 5, United States Code [U.S.C.

§§ 1501 et seq.].

Federal Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2706(3) :

(3) the term ‘‘financial assistance” includes assistance

advanced by grant, agreement, or contract, but. does

not include the procurement of plant or equipment, or

goods or services.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The government filed a two count indictment against

Nathaniel Coleman on October 14, 1976. Appendix B, infra,

pp. 1-2. Count I alleged that Coleman violated 18 U.S.C. §665

of the United States Code by stealing the services of CETA

employees, and Count II alleged that the defendant vio-

lated 18 U.S.C. § 1503 of the United States Code by attempt-

ing to influence a government witness. The defendant filed

a pretrial motion to dismiss Count I of the indictment be-

cause section 665 did not make theft or misapplication of

services of employees of the Manpower Administration an

offense, and Count II because it failed to charge an offense

under Section 1503. On April 11, 1977, the defendant’s mo-

tion to dismiss was denied and the trial began in the cause.

However, a mistrial was declared and, after the defendant

filed a second motion to dismiss the indictment, the govern-

ment moved to dismiss Count IT of the indictment and the

motion was granted by the court.

THE PROSECUTION

The facts establish that the City of Gary entered into an

agreement with the Department of Labor to set up a pro-

gram to provide employment and training for unemployed

persons who were economically disadvantaged. The City of

Gary created the Gary Manpower Administration to admin-

ister two programs: (1) the Adult Work Experience Pro-

gram (AWE) which provided short term employment (6

months to 1 year), and (2) a Public Service Employment

Program (PSE) which provided extended employment (1

to 2 years). Gary Manpower received money for adminis-

trative expenses and wages for the AWE and PSE pro-

grains from the Department of Labor.

6

Three AWE participants testified that they were on a

special detail which cut grass, constructed a little league

fence, worked around the Coroner’s office, and performed

clean-up work at the Mayor’s house. The AWE participants

also testified that they built a residential foundation for a

house, built a block fence and a cyclone fence at two other

houses, painted a gate at a third house, and dug a latrine

at a fourth house. Finally, one AWE participant testified

that he built a patio and painted at the defendant’s house.

At the close of the government’s case, the defendant made

a motion for a judgment of acquittal. The court denied the

motion and took it under consideration because the court

recognized that theft of services was an offense but was

unsure if section 665 covered the precise conduct com-

plained of in the indictment.

THE DEFENSE

The Superintendent of Park and Recreation for the City

of Gary testified that the little league fence (the one con-

structed by the AWE people) was on city property and

the wire used to construct the fence was purchased with

city funds.

A bricklayer who worked for Coleman testified that he

built the two brick fences and that he poured the residential

foundation for the basement. A city employee testified that

he cut grass for Coleman after work, and Coleman’s

brother-in-law testified that he worked with Coleman and

Coleman’s son at the Coroner’s office. The Coroner testi-

- fied that the work at his office was never performed during

business hours.

Nathaniel Coleman testified that he was the Assistant

Director of General Services in 1975 and that the Coleman

Construction Company, a one man operation, was his com-

pany. The witness testified that he was a part-time custo-

7

dian at the Lake County Coroner’s office, and that he had

a verbal agreement to cut grass in his neighborhood with

Hughes Realty. The witness testified that he built the latrine

on a Saturday with two AWE participants and that he put

in a footing for a customer and constructed a decorative

block fence for two sisters.

Coleman also testified that two AWE participants worked

for him on two or three different Saturdays: they poured

a driveway for the witness, one for his brother-in-law, and

on another occasion, one AWE participant did some ex-

terior painting at a friend’s house. The witness testified

that some of the AWE participants were assigned to the

cosmetic crew which cleaned vacant lots, picked up debris

and cut grass on private property, parkways, and vacant

lots. In addition, the clean-up crew would clean up debris

and garbage when citizens, including the Mayor, requested

such work. Finally, the witness testified that two of his pri-

mary accusers (AWE participants) were suspended by the

Director of Personnel for misconduct although the letters

had his signature on them.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECIDED A QUESTION OF

FEDERAL LAW (THAT THEFT OF SERVICES IS

AN OFFENSE WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF 18 U.S.C.

§ 665) WHICH SHOULD BE, BUT HAS NOT BEEN

DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT.

In United States v. Coleman, the Seventh Circuit decided

that theft of services is an offense within the purview of

18 U.S.C. § 665. Section 665 was promulgated as part of the

‘‘Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)

of 1973’’ which became effective on December 29, 1973. 29

U.S.C. § 801. And section 665 is a part of the embezzlement

and theft statutes in chapter 31, title 18 of the United States

Code and has been in existence for five years, yet the Sev-

enth Circuit was the first Court of Appeals to construe the

statute.

The Seventh Circuit held that theft of services was an

offense within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 665, despite the

fact that the preamble for section 665 provides that the

prescription applies to ‘“‘theft of manpower funds,’’ and

despite the fact that services is not delineated in the pre-

scription. See 18 U.S.C. § 665. Section 665 is violated when

the accused embezzles, willfully misapplies, steals or ob-

tains by fraud ‘‘money’’, ‘‘funds’’, ‘‘assets’’, or ‘*prop-

- erty’’, which is the subject of the grant or contract of as-

sistance. See 18 U.S.C. § 665.

Finally. section 665 was not violated in the instant

ease because theft of services was not an offense delineated

in the prescription. Congress promulgated the Com-

prehensive Employment Training Act (29 U.S.C. § 801),

9

and authorized the Secretary of Labor (hereinafter Secre-

tary) to make financial assistance available to prime spon-

sors (e.g. City of Gary) to carry out the CETA programs.

29 U.S.C. § 812 (a) (2). Then in 1975, Congress authorized

that two and one half billion dollars ($2,500,000) would be

appropriated to fund the programs and the Secretary was

authorized to enter into arrangements with eligible appli-

cants to make assistance available for the purpose of pro-

viding transitional employment for unemployed persons in

jobs providing public service. 29 U.S.C. § 962. Congress

clearly appropriated money for the CETA programs and

not people or services. It is also clear that the application

for financial assistance submitted by Gary Manpower to the

Department of Labor made a request for money but made

no request for people or services, Appendix B, Infra, p. 9.

Therefore, the subject of the grant or contract of assistance

would be the money appropriated by Congress and applied

for by Gary Manpower, rather than the CETA employees

or their services which were not appropriated by Congress

or requested in the application for financial assistance.

Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 2706 (3) (Supp. X, 1976)! defines

financial assistance and provides that financial assistance

includes assistance advanced by grant, agreement, or con-

tract, but does not include the procurement of plant or

equipment or goods or services. Therefore, according to

42 U.S.C. § 2706 (3) (Supp. X, 1976) the money applied for

by Gary Manpower and not services procured with appro-

1. The definition for financial assistance in 42 U.S.C.

§ 2706 (3) was used in conjunction with the “Manpower Pro-

gram’’ in the Economie Opportunity Act which was re-

placed with the “Manpower Program”’ in the Comprehen-

sive Employment Training Act of 1973. H.R. No. 659, 93d

Cong. 2d Sess. 2936 (1973).

10

priated money, would be covered, if stolen, by 18 U.S.C.

§ 665. Consequently, in light of the proceeding, theft of serv-

ices is not an offense, within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 665

and ihe services of the CETA employees, which were paid

for with federal money, would not be money, funds, assets

or property which is the subject of the grant or contract of

assistance. Therefore, the Supreme Court should review

this case since it is the only decision construing 18 U.S.C.

§ 665, and since theft of services is not an offense within the

purview of the prescription, See 18 U.S.C. § 665.

Il.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT HAS RENDERED A DECI-

SION WHICH CONFLICTS WITH A NINTH CIRCUIT

DECISION.

In United States v. Coleman, the Seventh Circuit held that

theft of services was an offense within the purview 18 U.S.C.

§ 665 of the United States Code. While in Chappell v. United

States, 270 F. 2d (9th Cir. 1959), the Ninth Cireuit held that

theft of services was not an offense within the purview of

18 U.S.C. § 641 of the United States Code. Although the

Courts in Coleman and Chappell were construing different

statutes, both statutes are in chapter 31 of title 18, the em-

bezzlement and theft statutes in the United States Code,

and both statutes were promulgated to prohibit the theft of

public money or property. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 665. There-

fore, because of the disagreement in the Ninth and Seventh

* Cireuits as to whether or not theft of services is an offense

within the purview of the embezzlement and theft statutes in

chapter 31, and because the conflicting decisions have de-

stroyed certainty and predictability in this area of the law,

the Supreme Court should issue a Writ of Certiorari and

resolve this conflict in the circuits.

11

IIl.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION CONFLICTS

WITH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

The Supreme Court has on several occasions enunciated

a variety of canons of construction to be used in interpret-

ing federal criminal statutes. The opinion rendered in the

case at bar by the Seventh Circuit ignored every applicable

canon and reached a result inconsistent with these canons.

In Coleman, the Seventh Cireuit construed a statute which

made it a crime to wrongfully obtain any ‘‘money, funds,

assets, or property’’. See 18 U.S.C. § 665(a). When con-

struing this portion of the statute, the Court held that

‘recognizing that the term property is protean, capable of

assuming varied meanings depending on context, and that

the criminal law does not of necessity adopt the most re-

strictive meaning as the ‘literal terms’, there is no reason to

suppose that Congress intended to withhold protection from

services purchased while extending protection to tangible

property purchased”, Appendix A, infra, p. 6-7. In reaching

this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit ignored several very im-

portant canons of construction which this court has stated

should be used in construing federal statutes. The Seventh

Circuit’s opinion ignored the canon that a criminal defend-

ant is entitled to a reasonably strict construction of the law

he is accused of violating. See United States v. Fruit Express

Company, 279 U.S. 363, 369. This construction also ignored

the canon that the federal judiciary is not to create crimes or

enlarge the reach of criminal statutes by construing them

from anything less than the incriminating components con-

templated by the words used in the statute. See Morissette v.

United States, 263 U.S, 246, 263. Additionally, according to

the principles of ejusdem generis, where a general word fol-

lows a series of more specific words in a statute, the general

12

word’s meaning is limited by the more specific words. United

States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91. If these canons are applied

to the case at bar, it becomes apparent that a court applying

these canons would give the word ‘‘property’’ a different

construction than the one given it by the Seventh Circuit.

Clearly, the Seventh Circuit gave a very broad construc-

tion to the word ‘‘property.’’ The Congressional Record in

no way indicates that Congress intended to use the word

in this manner. H.R. No. 659 98d Cong. 2d Sess. 2959.

Moreover, the words ‘‘money’’, “funds’’, and ‘‘assets”,

when used in conjunction with the word ‘‘property,’’ indi-

cate that Congress had in mind tangible things rather than

intangibles. Therefore, when the word ‘‘property’’ is viewed

in the context of these more specific words, a court should

limit the meaning of the word property to tangible things.

Finally, the preceding clearly establishes that the Seventh

Circuit has deviated from the Supreme Court’s canons of

construction by broadly construing 18 U.S.C. § 665 and has

created a crime by construing the word property to include

services when theft of services is not an offense delineated

in the statute.

IV.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION VIOLATED

THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT’S PROHIBITION

AGAINST SLAVERY WHEN THE COURT HELD

THAT CETA WORKER'S SERVICES, WHICH WERE

PAID FOR WITH FEDERAL FUNDS, WERE PROP.

ERTY OWNED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

In this theft of services prosecution the United States

goevrnment had to prove it owned (52 A O.J.S. §1 (1)

(1955)), had title to or possession of the property, the

CETA workers services, which was allegedly stolen by the

defendant. See United States v. Farrell, 418 F. Supp. 308,

13

(M.D. Pa. 1976). It is axiomatic that the United States

(U.S.) can have title to real property (e.g. land) or per-

sonal property (e.g. automobiles) because these are chat-

tels or things. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1649 (4 rev. ed.

1968). But, the U.S. can not own or acquire title to or

possession of people, including CETA workers, because peo-

ple have not been chattels or things since the Thirteenth

Amendment abolished slavery. Slavery exists whenever the

law recognizes a right of property in a human being. Robert-

son Vv. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 292. In Coleman, the Seventh

Cireuit recognized a right of property in human beings by

holding ‘‘(a) right to benefit of services for which one pays

is a property right. Appendix A, infra, p. 7. Therefore,

according to the Seventh Circuit, the U.S. government ac-

quired a property right in CETA workers’ services by pro-

viding the funds which paid their wages. If certiorari is

denied, the Seventh Cireuit’s decision will set a dangerous

precedent because the U.S. will acquire a ‘‘ property right”

in all the people (e.g. welfare recipients) it subsidizes

throughout the United States. Of course, the Seventh Cir-

cuit’s holding is erroneous because the U.S. and no one

else acquires a property right, because of the Thirteenth

Amendment, in CETA workers or their services by paying

their wages. A careful analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s

opinion reveals that the Court had to hold there was a

property right in order to assist the U.S. in proving owner-

ship, a material clement of the offense of theft. However,

because the U.S. does not own, have title to or possession

of the CETA workers or their services (it is impossible to

separate a worker from his labor, his services), there is no

federal property (See Patmore v. United States, 1 F. 2d 8,

10 (6th Cir. 1924)) and therefore, no violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 665. See United States v. Farrell, 418 F. Supp. 308, 311

(M.D. Pa. 1976).

14

V

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION VIOLATED THE

PROHIBITION AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS

WHEN THE COURT CONSTRUED THE WORD PROP.-

ERTY IN 18 U.S.C. § 665 TO INCLUDE SERVICES

AND RETROSPECTIVELY APPLIED ITS CON-

STRUCTION OF SECTION 665 TO THE ALLEGED

CONDUCT OF THE ACCUSED.

The United States Constitution provides that ‘‘No...

ex post facto law shall be passed.’’ U.S. Const. Art. I § 9(3).

While section 665 was passed prior to the alleged conduct

complained about in the indictment, theft of services did

not become an offense, it was not delineated in the prescrip-

tion, until the Court of Appeals construed the statute to

include the offense. By construing the statute to include

theft of services, the Court of Appeals made an action,

done before its construction, criminal. Therefore, the pro-

hibition against ex post facto laws was violated when the

court restrospectively applied its construction of the stat-

ute to the conduct of the defendant which was complained

about in the indictment.

VI.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT SANCTIONED SUCH

A DEPARTURE BY THE LOWER COURT FROM THE

ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF

THE SUPREME COURT’S POWER OF SUPERVISION.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

guarantees an accused person a fair trial. In order to ef-

fectuate this amendment, Congress promulgated the Fed-

eral Rues of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure. These rules prescribe the evidence which is ad-

missible and the procedure which is to be followed during

a trial. The defendant maintains that the Seventh Circuit

15

sanctioned a departure from the rules and from the ac-

cepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by approv-

ing the introduction of inadmissible Hatch Act evidence

and by approving the erroneous instructions given by the

judge over the objections of the defendant.

A

The Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right To A Fair Trial

Was Violated When Inadmissible Hatch Act Evidence Was

Admitted At The Trial.

The trial court permitted a Department of Labor Repre-

sentative, who was not qualified as an expert, to express an

opinion about the Hatch Act and political conduct pro-

scribed by the Hatch Act, and the Seventh Circuit approved

this testimony in its opinion. Appendix A, infra, p. 7.

The representative’s testimony was not relevant because

section 665 does not prohibit political activities (See 18

U.S.C. § 665), and because the defendant was not charged in

the indictment with violating the Hatch Act. Moreover, the

Hatch Act specifically excludes the defendant from the

purview of the prohibition because the defendant was a

City employee paid with City funds and not with loans or

grants paid by the United States or a federal agency. See

15 U.S.C. § 1501(4) (a). While the Court of Appeals is cor-

rect that 29 U.S.C. $990 incorporates the Hateh Act prohi-

bitions and prohibits all forms of political activities by

agencies and personnel which get CETA funds, the Court

apparently overlooked 1) the fact that 15 U.S.C. § 1501(4)

(a) specifically excludes the defendant from the purview of

the Hatch Act, and 2) the fact that General Services, the

defendant’s agency, received no CETA funds. Appendix

B, infra, p. 8. Therefore, the evidence couldn’t be used to

show the commission of another offense because Coleman,

the Assistant Director of General Services, was not subject

to the Hatch Act.

16

The labor representative also testified about political

etivity which is proscribed by the Hatch Act. By permit-

t..g¢ this testimony, the court permitted the witness to in-

vade its province by instructing the jury on the law. See

United States v. McCullough, 427 F. Supp. 246 (D.C. Pa.

1977). In McCullough, the court was presented with a simi-

lar problem, and the court held that only the court can

instruct the jury on the law and that a witness invades the

court’s province when he expresses an opinion on issues

of law which are exclusively in the court’s domain.

The trial court also permitted two other witnesses to

testify about the defendant’s political activities (poltical

sign making). However, the evidence should have been ex-

cluded since it related to another crime, since there was no

Hatch Act violation charged in the indictment and since

defendant was not subject to the Hatch Act.

The Court of Appeals also approved, sub silencio, the

cross examination of the defendant about his political acti-

vities. The trial court should have excluded this evidence

because the cross examination of the accused exceeded the

scope of direct examination and the accused was not

charged with violating the Hatch Act in the indictment nor

was he subject to it. Therefore, all the political evidence

was inadmissible in a theft of services prosecution under

18 U.S.C. § 665.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court will assist the lower

courts in nullifying First Amendment Rights (the right to

engage in political activities) if political evidence is ad-

"mitted at trial when the defendant is neither charged with

nor subject to the Hatch Act.

17

The Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right To A Fair Trial

Was Violated When The Jury Was Improperly Instructed

By The Trial Judge.

The Court of Appeals also approved the trial court’s in-

structions in this case by holding that the defendant’s

failure to tender specific instructions defining the words

‘‘wilfully misapplies’’, ‘‘steals’’ or ‘‘obtains by fraud”’

constituted a waiver. Appendix A, infra, p. 7-8. However,

the Seventh Circuit erred because the defendant is not re-

quired to tender instructions on the government’s theory

of the case and the defendant preserved the issues for re-

view by objecting to the instructions before the judge

instructed the jury. The defendant submits that an exam-

ination of instruction numbers 6, 7 and 8 reveals that the

offenses ‘‘embezzle,” ‘‘willfully misapplies,’’ ‘‘steals,’’ or

‘‘obtains by fraud’’ are used together throughout the in-

structions. Appendix B, Infra, p. 2-3. However, embezzle-

ment is the only offense that was defined by the Court in

instruction number 11. Appendix B, infra, p. 4. By so in-

structing the jury and singling out embezzlement, the

Court directed the jury to the offense it thought the de-

fendant was guilty of committing since the other offenses

were left undefined. Moreover, the jury was directed to the

offense of embezzlement because this was the only offense

the jury inquired about when they sent a note to the judge

asking him about the exact meaning of what embezzlement

curtails in this case. Appendix B, infra, p. 5. Defendant eon-

tends that all the offenses should have been defined or they

should have been left undefined otherwise you run into the

problem of the jury only considering if the defendant em-

bezzled the services of CETA employees which is a legal

impossibility (ownership of property, herein services,

ean’t be proved by the government).

18

Instruction number 8 required the jury to find five essen-

tial elements in order to prove the defendant guilty of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant submits

that it is arguable as to whether or not he is connected in

any capacity with an agency receiving financial assistance

under CETA. However, the defendant submits that the

law conclusively establishes that the services of the CETA

participants were not the subject of a grant or contract

of assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 2706(3) (Supp. X, 1976).

Therefore, the defendant submits that the court erred by

asking the jury to make findings of fact which are incon-

sistent with the evidence thereby making the court’s in-

struction erroneous as a matter of law.

The defendant also submits that the trial court also

erred by giving instruction number 10 which defined the

services of an employee paid by federal funds provided

under a grant or contract of assistance as constituting

‘fassets or property” for the purposes of the violation.

Appendix B, infra, p. 4. By defining services of an employee

paid by federal funds as constituting ‘‘assets or property,”’

the court made it unnecessary for the jury to consider if

the defendant received money, funds, assets or property

which are the subject of a grant or contract of assistance

as they were required to do in instruction number 8. As a

result of the preceding, the trial court invaded the jury’s

province and directed them to make findings of fact which

are inconsistent with the law and culminated in a guilty

verdict.

The defendant submits that by defining the offense of

- embezzlement and leaving the other offenses undefined, by

asking the jury to make findings of fact which are incon-

sistent with the law, and by defining services of federal

employees paid under a grant as assets or property thereby

19

directing the jury to find the defendant guilty, the lower

courts violated the rights of the accused because the in-

structions, when considered as a whole, misled the jury.

Finally, the evidence introduced during the trial and the

instructions given at the conclusion of the trial was such

a departure from the Federal Rules of Evidence and the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that the Supreme

Court should exercise its supervisory power to effectuate

the fair trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, Petitioner prays that a

writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

Curster SLAUGHTER,

188 West Randolph Street,

Chicago, Illinois 60601,

312/236-5277,

PHILaAnDer 8. NEVILLE, JR.,

4320 Vincennes,

Chicago, Illinois 60653,

312/373-5155,

Attorneys for Petitioner

Al

APPENDIX A

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 77-1844

Unrrep States or America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

NATHANIEL CoLEMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 76-Cr-118—Phil M. MeNagny, Jr., Judge.

Arovep Sepremser 11, 1978—Derctpep December 18, 1978

Before FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge, NICHOLS, Associate

Judge*, and WOOD, Circuit Judge.

* Associate Judge Philip Nichols of the United States

Court of Claims is sitting by designation.

A2

FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge. Appellant Coleman was con-

victed of an offense defined by 18 U.S.C. § 665."

Count I of the indictment charged that:

‘*. . . Coleman, being the assistant director of the

General Services Department of the City of Gary,

Indiana, an agency receiving financial assistance under

the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of

1973, did embezzle, wilfully misapply, steal and obtain

by fraud for his own personal use and enrichment for

political purposes, moneys, funds, assets and property

which were the subject of a grant under said Act, to

wit: the services of employees participating in the

Adult Work Experience Program of the Gary Man-

power Administration, a prime sponsor under the

Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973

which services were a value of .. . $4,500... .”

Defendant moved for dismissal, asserting among other

things that services of employees are not ‘*moneys, funds,

assets, or property’’ under 18 U.S.C. § 665. The district

court denied the motion, concluding that the word ‘prop-

erty’’ is broad enough to encompass services, and that the

1, 665. Theft or embezzlement from manpower funds—

Improper inducement.—(a) Whoever being an officer, diree-

tor, agent, or employee of, or connected in any capacity with,

any agency receiving financial assistance under the Compre-

hensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 embezzles,

willfully misapplies, steals, or obtains by fraud any of the

moneys, funds, assets, or prop§erty which are the subject of

a grant or contract of assistance pursuant to this Act shall

be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more

than two years, or both; but if the amount so embezzled,

misapplied, stolen, or obtained by fraud does not exceed

$100, he shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned

not more than one year, or both. °

——

A3

theft, embezzlement or misapplication of ‘‘services’’ paid

for by funds supplied under a CETA grant is an offense

described in § 645.

Count I was tried, with a verdict of guilty, the only other

count being dismissed before trial.

The proof reflected the theory of Count I, that a city

employee’s use for private benefit of the services of train-

ees, under a CETA program, compensated out of CETA

funds, amounted to embezzlement or willful misapplieation

of property which was the subject of the CETA grant.

The evidence established that a special crew of five me»,

paid with CETA funds, was assigned by Gary Manpower

(an agency of the City) to the General Services Department

of the City, of which Coleman was Assistant Director. De-

spite limitations imposed upon use of such employees by

statute regulations® precluding their use for political pur-

poses and personal enrichment, Coleman directed the crew

to construct political signs for the mayoral primary cam-

2, 29 U.S.C. § 990 provides:

$990. Political activities prohibited

The Secretary shall not provide financial assistance for

any program under this Act which involves political

activities; and neither the program, the funds provided

therefor, nor personnel employed in the administration

thereof, shall be, in any way or to any or en gt

in the conduct of political activities in contravention o

chapter 15 of title 5, United States Code [5 USCS §§

1501 et seq.].

29 U.S.C. § 845(c)(3) requires assurances by the prime

sponsor that ‘‘the public services provided by such jobs. . .

be designed to benefit the residents of the area.”

Ad

paign, and to perform various tasks in his construction

business and otherwise for private benefit.®

To obtain a conviction under § 665 the government must

prove two elements:

(1) that the accused was an officer, director, agent or

employee of, or connected in any capacity with an agency

receiving financial assistance under CETA;

») 4

(2) that the accused embezzled, willfully misapplied,

stole, or obtained by fraud “moneys, funds, assets, or prop-

erty which are the subject of a grant or contract of assist-

ance,”’

Defendant appears to argue that under the arrangements

for the CETA grant,‘ Gary Manpower, rather than the City

3. During the summer of 1975 AWEP w ai

y orkers painted

houses, constructed a dog run and dog house, thea a

residential foundation, built a fence, and fulfilled contracts

Coleman had with the Veterans’ Administration (VA) to

nari “orgie VA held homes and to clean the Coroner’s

olfice, Menial chores around Colmen’s h

hy AWEP personnel. Le techie rca

4. Department of Labor testimony at trial explained the

funding arrangements as follows: CETA programs are

funded by the Department of Labor and administered by

state and local governments, (the prime sponsors). The

prime sponsor either administers the program directly or

uses subagencies working for it to carry out the program

activities. In this case, the City of Gary, (the prime spon-

sor), and the Department of Labor signed an agreement in

P which, Gary Manpower was designated as the local agency

with regulatory responsibilities over the funds. Gary Man-

power administered two programs for the prime sponsor:

the Adult Work Experience Program (AWEP) which pro.

(Footnote continued on next page)

A5

of Gary, was the ‘‘agency receiving financial assistance’

under CHTA, and that defendant, a city employee attached

to a different department of the City, did not fulfill element

(1) above. It may well be argued that the City itself was

the ‘‘agency receiving financial assistance’’ under CETA,

so that any employee of the City fulfills element (1). Even

if a narrower view be taken, that Gary Manpower was the

‘‘agency,’’ there was an agreement that the City’s General

Services Department would use some of the trainees, and

defendant was Assistant Director of that Department. We

think that defendant had sufficient responsibility for par-

ticipation in the program so that he would be deemed *‘con-

nected in any capacity’? with Gary Manpower for the pur-

pose of § 665.

Defendant further argues that services of persons com-

pensated out of grant money are not ‘‘property . . . the

subject of a grant’’ and that misappropriation of such

services is not theft, embezzlement, or willful misapplica-

tion of such property.

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

vided short-term employment (6 months to one year) in

sub-professional jobs and the Public Service Employment

Program (PSEP) which provided extended employment

(one to two years) at the journeyman level. Administrative

expenses and wages for program participants were paid

directly by Gary Manpower from the Department of Labor

grant funds. Because the primary purpose of CETA is to

provide employment and training, Gary Manpower entered

into subordinate agreements with other municipal agencies

for the use of AWEP trainees. The General Services De-

partment of which defendant-appellant Coleman was As-

sistant Director had entered into such an agreement. The

agreement involved no payment between the two municipal

agencies, however. General Services was bonded to issue

GMA checks during the employment period.

A6

The decision of the Ninth Cireuit in Chappell v. United

States, 270 F. 2d 274, 276-78 (1959) provides some support

for defendant’s contention that § 665 should be construed

narrowly and according to the more traditional meanings

of its terms. In Chappell an Air Force sergeant was charged

with converting to his own use the services of an airman

in painting, during duty hours, property of the sergeant.

The statute there considered provided a penalty for one

who ‘‘knowingly converts to his use. . . any record, vouch-

er, money, or thing of value of the United States... or

any property made or being made under contract for the

United States.’’ Applying strict construction, the court de-

cided that the services misappropriated were not a thing of

value subject to conversion,

The Third Cirenit has recently suggested that Chappell

had heen too narrowly decided, although in the present case

the court found a technical larceny and thus did not need

to reach a broader interpretation of § 641. United States v.

Di Gilio, 588 F. 2d 972, 978 (3d Cir. 1976). These eases un-

der § 641 are the closest cited to the situation at hand.

Whatever the proper interpretation of § 641, we have a

different statute before us. Congress was entrusting large

sums of non-federal agencies to accomplish the purposes of

CETA. A principal purpose was providing paying jobs to

trainees. In § 665 Congress was exerting its power to pro-

tect these funds from misuse at the hands of employees of

these agencies. Concededly as to tangible property the pro-

tection extended to that which was purchased by the funds

as well as the funds themselves. Much of the funds, how-

“i ever, were expected to be spent to compensate people for

services; the programs are intended to generate jobs. Rec-

ognizing that the term ‘‘property’’ is protean, capable of

assuming varied meanings depending on context, and that

the criminal law does not of necessity adopt the most re-

<set sc

AZ

strictive meaning as the ‘‘literal terms,’’ there is no reason

to suppose that Congress intended to withhold protection

from services purchased while extending the protection to

tangible property purchased. Willful misapplication of

services generated by the granted funds is indistinguish-

able from willful misapplication of funds themselves. A

right to benefit of services for which one pays a property

right. In the CETA context, we feel a contrary result would

accomplish an absurd interpretation of the statute, one that

should not be imputed to Congress by a court having the

proper degree of respect for that body. Thus, we think the

word ‘‘property’’ need not be narrowly construed so as to

include tangibles, but exclude services.

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the

services of trainees contemplated by the program and com-

pensated by the granted funds were property which is the

subject of a CETA grant and that a § 665 offense has been

charged and proved. |

We find no error in the district court’s permitting a wit-

ness to testify with regard to provisions of the Hatch Act

as they applied to AWEP participants assigned to the City

of Gary. Under 29 U.S.C. § 990, supra, note 4, all forms of

political activity are forbidden agencies and personnel which

get CETA funds. Section 990 specifically incorporates the

Hatch Act’s prohibitions. Thus, testimony regarding the

Hatch Act could have been the substance of an instruction.

It would be relevant to the question whether making politi-

eal signs by AWEP workers was appropriately paid for

with CETA funds. :

We find no reversible error as a result of the trial court’s

failure to provide definition of the terms ‘‘willfully mis-

applies,” ‘‘steals,’’ or ‘‘obtain by fraud.’’ The only term

A8

defined by the court was ‘‘embezzlement.’’ The record

shows, however, that instructions tendered by appellant

Coleman did not include definitions of these additional

terms. We agree with the government’s position that fail-

ure to tender specific instruction constituted a waiver and

that there was not plain error.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Bl

United States District Court

FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Hammond

Criminal No.

vs. \ H CR 76-118

18 U.S.C.

NATHANIEL COLEMAN 665: 1503

J ’

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT I

From on or about the 1st day of May, 1975, up to and in-

cluding the 30th day of August, 1975 at the City of Gary,

Indiana in the Northern District of Indiana, NATHANI-

EL COLEMAN, being the assistant director of the General

Services Department of the City of Gary, Indiana, an

agency receiving financial assistance under the Compre-

hensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, did em-

bezzle, willfully misapply, steal and obtain by fraud for

his own personal us. and enrichment for political purposes,

moneys, funds, assets and property which were the subject

of a grant under said Act, to wit: the services of employees

participating in the Adult Work Experience Program of

the Gary Manpower Administration, a prime sponsor un-

der the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of

1973 which services were of a value of four thousand, five

hundred dollars ($4,500.00) more or less, in violation of Sec-

tion 665, Title 18 of the United States Code.

B2

COUNT II

On or about the 14th day of September, 1976, at Gary,

Indiana in the Northern District of Indiana, NATHANT-

EL COLEMAN did corruptly endeavor to influence and im-

pede Myrtle King, a witness before the September, 1975

Special Grand Jury of the United States District Court of

the Northern District of Indiana, in violation of Section

1503, Title 18 of the United States Code.

A TRUE BILL:

Foreman.

John R. Wilks

United States Attorney

By: Richard A. Hanning

Assistant United States Attorney

COURT INSTRUCTION NO. 6

The indictment alleges the defendant to have embezzled

misapplied, stolen or obtained by fraud, moneys, funds a

assets with a value exceeding $100. The crime charged

necessarily includes a lesser offense where the amount so

embezzled, misapplied, stolen or obtained by fraud does

not exceed $100.

— et ee

ee een —

B3

COURT’S INSTRUCTION NO. 7

Section 665, Title 18 of the United States Code provides

in part that: Whoever, being an officer, director, agent or

employee of . .. any agency receiving financial assistance

under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act

of 1973 embezzles, willfully misapplies, steals or obtains

by fraud any of the moneys, funds, assets or property which

are the subject of a grant or contract of assistance .. . shall

be guilty of an offense against the laws of the United

States.

COURT’S INSTRUCTION NO. 8

Before you may find the defendant guilty of Count I

of the indictment, the following essential elements must

each be proved beyond a reasonable doubt :

1) That the defendants is an officer, director, agent or

employee of an agency receiving financial assis-

tance under the Comprehensive Employment and

Training Act of 1973 [hereinafter referred to as the

Act];

2) That the defendant received moneys, funds, as-

sets or property which are the subject of a grant

or contract of assistance pursuant to the Act;

3) That the defendant did so by one of the following

means : embezzlement, willful misapplication, steal-

ing or obtaining by fraud;

4) That the amount of money or funds or the value

of the assets or property exceeds $100; and

5) That the defendant acted knowingly and willfully.

B4

COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10

Services of an employee paid by federal funds provided

under a grant or contract of assistance pursuant to the

Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, con-

stitute ‘‘assets or property’’ for the purposes of this viola-

tion.

COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 11

To ‘*embezzle’’ means willfully to take, or convert to one’s

own use, another’s money or property, of which the wrong-

doer acquired possession lawfully, by reason of some office

or employment or position of trust.

To convert money or property to one’s own use means to

apply, or appropriate, or use, such money or property

for the benefit or profit of the wrongdoer.

B5

6/23/77

Judge: \

We need clarification on the exact meaning on what em-

bezzlement curtails as in this case. ‘‘Does property include

Gov’t. funded employees”? according to the definition of

embezzlement provided to us.

6/24/77

TOM CAPPER

Foreperson

C. B. YATES

8:34 P.M.

B6

GARY MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION

ADULT WORK EXPERIENCE AGENCY AGREEMENT

This Agreement entered into this 26th day of June, 19—,

by and between the Gary Manpower Administration (here-

inafter referred to as G.M.A.), and General Services, a

public/private non-profit agency, (hereinafter referred to

as Agency/User Agency).

WITNESSETH THAT:

WHEREAS, the Gary Manpower Administration desires

to engage the General Services Agency to provide work

training experience and priority in hiring, based on the

progress of the GMA/Adult Work Experience participant,

(hereinafter referred to as AWE).

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto do mutually

agree as follows:

A. Scope of Services: The Agency will properly and

satisfactorily, as determined by the Gary Manpower Ad-

ministration, perform the following services:

1. Develop job descriptions (not in the so-called

“dead-end” category) for each AWE participant

assigned to said agency. (See statement of pur-

pose and procedures).

2. Become familiar with and adhere to the Fair La-

bor Standards Act regulations.

3. Provide proper and adequate supervisi to

GMA/AWE participants. eA

4. Keep accurate records on attendance and progress

of the GMA/AWE participants. sit

5. Provide an agency supervisor capable of actively

assisting the GMA participant in properly and ac-

curately completing the time sheets.

—mee

a a —

B7

6. Make sure the GMA/AWE participant sign his/

her time sheet daily.

7. Make sure the time sheets are properly and ac-

curately completed and available each Tuesday,

to be picked up by the GMA Job Coach Her-

nandez.

8. Issue GMA/AWE participant checks Friday or

every other Friday at the end of the day.

9. Become as familiar with the GMA/AWE par-

ticipant as with regular agency employees.

10. Make sure that the GMA/AWE participants know

the rules, regulations and policies that govern all

persons employed by the said agency.

11. Provide safe and healthy work standards.

12. Explain the necessity of safe work habits.

13. Provide sufficient training for the GMA/AWE

participants to do an adequate job without the

need for additional outside training.

14. Provide counseling geared to elevate the GMA/

AWE participants attitude and understanding of

the expectations of the job performance and po-

tential for advancement.

15. Encourage the GMA/AWE participant to study

and practice his/her skills or profession when not

performing assigned duties.

16. Secure Gary Manpower Administration’s appro-

val prior to assigning GMA/AWE participants

to work outside said agency or GMA jurisdie-

tion.

17. Exert every effort to hire GMA/AWE partici-

pants upon their completion of work training

(preferably in area of experience or training).

B. Time of Performance: This Agreement covers the

period of May 1, 1975 to Sept. —, 19—.

B8

C. Termination of Agreement: This Agreement may

be terminated with or without cause by either party, upon

10 days written notice.

D. Compensation and Method of Payment: This

Agreement involves no payment between Gary Manpower

Administration and said agency. Agency is, however, bond-

ed to issue GMA checks to AWE participants during this

agreement period. Agency will provide the same fringe

benefits, if possible, to GMA/AWE participants as regular

agency employees during this agreement period.

E. Anticipated number to be assigned ——.

F. This Agreement is subject to renewal on .

19—, should additional services be requested by either par-

ties to the agreement.

IN WITNESS HEREOF, the parties have affixed their

signature this 26th day of June, 1975.

By: JESSE STEVE MORRIS.

APPROVED BY:

EA

«

es,

7

-

— ---

Ct-£sz

40 #9 tavepey ~s \

: |

3

[9S9/b%6 | STZ NES af oF Sage

“333 eicmn< 328 vier z0ketg Zayo3eH ° 5 pxreyst a3

a pasta ieee hit be * > wea asst pee,

wores ange ty ye m3Q “S)

I eceppur

vZ6T “97 FSnENyY

Srey ep mp deg *7;

syzucu ZT

sseless 50 qibvey “ty

sates Oy way Surmpereg Ay13001g wermmety 1)

(4g 245) yD “wer } ‘me-y X

eS rwetiety se ates %

—_——— : 2 —-

(49 2045) sedvey> smig “mown ting a ee ee | "merd wey = ee

aes ey 2 ure «se

(4it 2975) ng 4u> xX “Lunay rs

026 °2L79°7 5

pore emba-y Sorpurs poropay “¢

wexzSoig ButTutezL pue queudotdug SAT SUsYardusD

tt ———,

249 “O"g ~ t8Oppy teens

tatorg ov res mtn “5

o> &? orerg *pe2 42 overs : tn

ZOvsy euetpulL 90909 StTOUuTTTI ‘o&eatyS

famed a> Fg “O"4 — SOP 7y wH8Hs

a42T Aze9 ,

oP) Motrsagtperepy

Aempe2org [oF

WON NERS we mer et ag

eATIG T2ex{DPM YINOS OOE (

‘

SOTFIO Teucrbay c&25TuD

UorsyerystTutupy /f{zey so AjztD

Zenccuey Aze9

megs wo ysiy °p

i Pel power ses wotay

UOTZeARS{TUTUDY AemoduEN |

Smoty area) sep 24 -¢

One wtree SEG 8 wea misty “¢

B=STH=52

fOty meee, SA ey Sur -wer > erere *)

ZOqeT i1yyesO *3ydeq °S*n

(S¥#¥E9O0¥S NOILINELSNO DON)

BINYLSISSY W¥US034 YOS HOILYSINddyY

—_

tee 4 On eno

6a