Appendix — Theriault v. Silber
Supreme Court brief1979
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No.
48-1106
DR. HARRY W. THERIAULT,
Petitioner,
-~against~
FREDERICK SILBER, Director, United
States Chaplain Service, et al.,
Respondents.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
JONATHAN A. WEISS
Counsel for Petitioner
2095 Broadway,
Room 304
New York, NY 10023
(212) 595-1340
January 12, 1979.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE PAGE
Theriault v. Silber . . . « « « « « A-1
5th Circuit (August 16, 1978)
(Dismissing Appeal)
Theriault v. Silber,- - « »« « « « e« A-5
Sth Circuit (May 16, 1978)
(Order)
Theriault v. Silber, «© «© «© «© «© ec © c« AMG
Western District of Texas
(February 10, 1978) (Decision)
Order Extending Time to File... A-38
Petition for Writ of Certiorari ;
Theriault Ve Carlson, . 6 2 & ©@.6@ ® A-39
Northern District Georgia
(February 25, 1972)
(Decision)
: THERIAULT v. SILBER
Dr. Harry W. THERIAULT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Frederick SILBER, Director, United
States Chaplain Service, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 78-1506.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Aug. 16, 1978.
On appeal from a judgment of the
United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas, at El Paso,
John H. Wood, Jr., J., appellee moved to
strike appellant’s notice of appeal on
ground that it contained vile and insult-
ing references to trial judge. The Court
of Appeals, 574 F.2d 197, struck appel-
lant’s notice of appeal and gave appel-
lant ten days in which to file proper
notice of appeal. Following the filing of
second notice of appeal, the Court of Ap-
peals held that where appellant’s original
notice of appeal was stricken because of
vile and insulting references to trial
judge contained therein, appellant was
given ten days in which to file a proper
notice of appeal, but appellant then filed
1. The appellant, Theriault, purports to appeal
both for himself and one Jerry Dorrough.
Since Theriault is not a member of the bar of
this court his notice of appeal is effective only
for himself. Scarrella v. Midwest Savings and
Loan, 536 F.2d 1207 (8 Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 885, 97 S.Ct. 237, 50 L.Ed.2d 166
(1976); McKinney v. DeBord, 507 F.2d 501 (9
Cir. 1974).
2. We did not include a copy of the notice of
appeal in our original order because we had
hdped that we could avoid publishing the ca-
lumnious document. Now that a comparison
between the original notice of appeal and the
second notice of appeal becomes necessary to
6752
an equally abusive document, appellant’s
appeal would be’ dismissed with preju-
dice.
Appeal dismissed with prejudice.
Federal Courts 666
Where appellant’s original notice of
appeal was stricken because of vile and
insulting references to trial judge con-
tained therein, appellant was given ten
days in which to file a proper notice of
appeal, but appellant then filed an equal-
ly abusive document, appellant’s appeal
would be dismissed with prejudice.
Appeal from the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of
Texas.
Before THORNBERRY, GODBOLD,
and RUBIN, Circuit Judges.
BY THE COURT:
Upon the appellee’s motion, this court
struck the appeilant’s! notice of appeal
and appeal because the appellant’s notice
of appeal contained vile and insulting
references to the trial judge? This
court’s order is reported at 574 F.2d 197
the decision of the case, we feel compelled to
publish the two notices of appeal. The origi-
nal notice of appeal reads:
Notice is hereby given by the Plaintiffs-Peti-
tioners that they appeal the lying “Memo-
randim [sic] Opinion, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law” so hatefully and unAm-
ericanly entered by the Dishonorable
“Judge” John H. Wood, Jr., at El Paso, Tex-
as, February 10, 1978, filed February 13,
1978, to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, this February 14, 1978,
so that a true decision can be entered as law
and justice require.
Synopses, Syllabi and Key Number Classification
COPYRIGHT © 1978, by WEST PUBLISHING CO.
The Synopses, Syllabi and Key Number Classifi-
cation constitute no part of the opinion of the court.
A-1
6753
(5 Cir. 1978).2 We gave the appellant
ten days in which to file a proper notice
', of appeal and directed him to the appen-
dix of forms in the Rules of Appellate
Procedure for a suggested notice of ap-
peal. Within the time allowed, the ap-
pellant filed a second notice of appeal;
however, the appellant apparently has
not taken this court seriously and has
filed an equally abusive document.
For failure to comply with the order
of this court, we therefore direct that
the appellant’s appeal be dismissed with
prejudice.
One of the most significant changes in
our judicial system has been the recogni-
tion that the law and the resolution of
conflict in the court should not turn on
the nicety of pleadings and the triumph
of form over substance. The modern
view is that courts decide cases based on
the merits of the issues and not from the
* pages of a writ book. This change is
nowhere more evident than in the Rules
3. The complete citation to the instant case is
Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F.Supp. 375 (N.D.Ga.
14721975), vacated and remanded, 495 F.2d 390,
5 (5 Cir. 1974), rehearing denied, 498 F.2d
e 1402, cert. denied sub nom. Theriault v. Silber,
419 U.S. 1003, 95 S.Ct. 323, 42 L.Ed.2d 279
(1974), on remand, 391 F.Supp. 578 (W.D.Tex.
8 1975), vacated and remanded, 547 F.2d 1279
(1977), rehearing denied, 551 F.2d 863, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 871, 98 S.Ct. 216, 54 L.Ed.2d
150 (1977), rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 943, 98
S.Ct. 441, 54 L.Ed.2d 396, appeal dismissed
pending proper notice of appeal, 574 F.2d 197
(5 Cir. 1978).
4. The second notice of appeal reads:
” By “Order” of this Court of Thornberry,
Godbold and Rubin, Circuit Judges, May 16,
1978, the plaintiffs-appellants were told to
re-give notice of appeal, because the fact
4 that District Judge John H. Wood, Jr., lied
pointblankly in the decision appealed, when
plaintiff Shiloh mentioned that fact as the
basis of this appeal, plaintiff Shiloh’s refer-
ence thereto is somehow “beneath the digni-
A-2
THERIAULT v. SILBER
of Civil Procedure which direct, “All
pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.”5 Fed.Rules Civ.
Proc. Rule &(f). Moreover, this court
and others have recognized that those
unskilled in the law should not be held
to strict standards of pleading. Hence,
courts have developed the practice of lib-
erally construing pro se petitions and
pleadings.
Neither the modern view of civil
pleading nor the liberal pro se practice
of this court has done away with the
time honored notion that the law and
the courts of the United States are im-
portant parts of American society wor-
thy of respect. This court simply will
not allow liberal pleading rules and pro
se practice to be a vehicle for abusive
documents. Our pro se practice is a
shield against the technical requirements
of a past age; it is not a sword with
which to insult a trial judge. Any com-
plaint the appellant has about the con-
duct of the trial judge can be adequately
ty of this court,” according to the above
mentioned three judges, who so ruled to re-
inforce the cat and mouse game the govern-
ment is playing with plaintiffs at the ex-
pense of their human rights.
Using their right to freedom of speech to tell
the truth against the lying judge, who has no
right to lie like that in the name of the court
or law, etc., plaintiffs hereby again give no-
tice that they appeal to the 5th Circuit Court
of Appeals the lying decision of John H.
Wood, Jr., entered February 13, 1978, in this
case and purporting to overrule the Consti-
tution thereby. The grounds for this appeal
are that the said final decision and judgment
are based on the pointblank lies of John H.
Wood, Jr., and not on the Record herein and
the Constitution.
Today is May 23, 1978, and plaintiff request
that this court not lie, too.
5. See Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5 Cir. 1974)
for an example of our commitment to disre-
gard irregularities in the notice of appeal in
order to do substantive justice.
THERIAULT v. SILBER 6754
addressed in a civil manner in the appel-
lant’s brief. It is totally unnecessary to
make any reference to the trial judge or
the grounds of appeal in the notice of
appeal. See Form 1, Fed.Rules App.
Proc.
6. This is not the first time the appellant has
come to grief as a result of his behavior in the
United States courts. Theriault has been held
in contempt for calling a witness a “liar” and
for personal abuse of a trial judge in open
court. Theriault v. United States, 481 F.2d
1193 (5 Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115,
94 S.Ct. 847, 38 L.Ed.2d 742 (1973); United
States v. Theriault, 474 F.2d 359 (5 Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 984, 93 S.Ct. 2278, 36
L.Ed.2d 960 (1973). At another trial, the trial
judge ordered that Theriault be shackled dur-
ing the trial. We upheld the trial court’s ac-
tion in United States v. Theriault, 531 F.2d 28)
(5 Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 898, 97
S.Ct. 262, 50 L.Ed.2d 182 (1976), dist. ct. affd,
555 F.2d 460 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870,
98 S.Ct. 212, 54 L.Ed.2d 148 (1977).
7. Theriault v. United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, 434 U.S. 953, 98 S.Ct.
493, 54 L.Ed.2d 321 (1977); Theriault v. Carl-
son, 339 F.Supp. 375 (N.D.Ga.1975), vacated
and remanded, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5 Cir. 1974),
rehearing denied, 498 F.2d 1402, cert. denied
sub nom. Theriault v. Silber, 419 U.S. 1003, 95
S.Ct. 323, 42 L.Ed.2d 279 (1974), on remand,
391 F.Supp. 578 (W.D.Tex.1975), vacated and
remanded, 547 F.2d 1279 (5 Cir. 1977), rehear-
ing denied, 55) F.2d 863, cert. denied, 434 U.S.
871, 98 S.Ct. 216, 54 L.Ed.2d 150 (1977),
rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 943, 98 S.Ct. 441,
54 L.Ed.2d 306 (1977), appeal dismissed, 574
F.2d 197 (5 Cir. 1978); United States v. Ther-
jault, dist. ct. aff'd in part, vacated and re-
manded in part, 526 F.2d 698 (5 Cir. 1976),
after remand dist. ct. aff'd in part and remand-
ed in part, 531 F.2d 281, rehearing denied, 534
F.2d 1407, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 898, 97 S.Ct.
262, 50 L.Ed.2d 182 (1976), dist. ct. aff'd, 555
F.2d 460 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870, 98
S.Ct. 212, 54 L.Ed.2d 148 (1977); Theriault v.
Pittman, 423 U.S. 818, 96 S.Ct. 155, 46 L.Ed.2d
114 (1975); Theriault v. Pittman, 423 U.S. 854,
96 S.Ct. 101, 46 L.Ed.2d 78 (1975); Theriault v.
Pittman, 420 U.S. 989, 95 S.Ct. 1437, 43
L.Ed.2d 650 (1975); Theriault v. Carlson, 353
F.Supp. 1061 (N.D.Ga.1973), reversed, 495
F.2d 390, 395 (5 Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub
nom. Theriault v. Silber, 419 U.S. 1003, 95
By failing to file a proper notice of
appeal after this court directed that one
be filed, the appellant has demonstrated
his utter contempt for this court and the
law.6 This appellant has been involved
in numerous other lawsuits’ and there
S.Ct. 323, 42 L.Ed.2d 279 (1974); Theriault v.
United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, 416 U.S. 980, 94 S.Ct. 2414, 40
L.Ed.2d 777 (1974); Theriault v. Bartels, 415
U.S. 979, 94 S.Ct. 1567, 39 L.Ed.2d 875 (1974);
Theriault v. United States, 481 F.2d 1193 (5
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1114, 94 S.Ct.
847, 38 L.Ed.2d 742 (1973); Theriault v. United
States, 481 F.2d 1193 (5 Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1115, 94 S.Ct. 847, 38 L.Ed.2d
742 (1973); Theriault v. United States, dist. ct.
reversed and remanded, 440 F.2d 713 (5 Cir.
1971), dist. ct. aff'd, 474 F.2d 359 (5 Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 984, 93 S.Ct. 2278, 36
L.Ed.2d 960 (1973); Theriault v. United States,
sentence vacated and case remanded, 434 F.2d
212 (5 Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869, 92
S.Ct. 124, 30 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971), aff'd, 467
F.2d 486 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 984, 93
S.Ct. 2280, 36 L.Ed.2d 961 (1973); Theriault v.
Establishment of Religion on Taxpayers’ Mon-
ey in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 411 U.S.
946, 93 S.Ct. 1937, 36 L.Ed.2d 418 (1973);
Theriault v. Silber, 405 U.S. 1048, 92 S.Ct.
1328, 31 L.Ed.2d 590 (1972); Theriault v. Unit-
ed States, 447 F.2d 1361 (5 Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1064, 92 S.Ct. 750, 30 L.Ed.2d
752 (1972); Theriault v. United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 404 U.S. 936,
30 L.Ed.2d 269 (1971); Theriault v. Pittman,
404 U.S. 952, 92 S.Ct. 156, 30 L.Ed.2d 269
(1971); Theriault v. Mississippi, 404 U.S. 818,
92 S.Ct. 156, 30 L.Ed.2d 119 (1971); Theriault
v. Harris, 404 U.S. 870, 92 S.Ct. 125, 30
L.Ed.2d 113 (1971), 403 U.S. 923, 91 S.Ct.
2238, 29 L.Ed.2d 702, rehearing denied, 404
U.S. 877, 92 S.Ct. 34, 30 L.Ed.2d 125 (1971);
Theriault v. Blackwell, 437 F.2d 76 (5 Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953, 91 S.Ct. 1637,
29 L.Ed.2d 122 (1971); Theriault v. Daggett,
401 U.S. 983, 91 S.Ct. 1205, 28 L.Ed.2d 335
(1971); Theriault v. United States, 401 U.S.
983, 91 S.Ct. 1205, 28 L.Ed.2d 335 (1971);
Theriault v. United States, 409 F.2d 1313 (5
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 933, 90 S.Ct.
274, 24 L.Ed.2d 231 (1969); Theriault v. United
States, 402 F.2d 792 (5 Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 965, 89 S.Ct. 2110, 23 L.Ed.2d 75)
»
6755 THERIAULT v. SILBER
~can be no doubt that he is as familiar
with court practice as almost any lay-
man. It is therefore our conclusion that
«the appellant’s failure to file a proper
(1969), rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 870, 90 S.Ct.
42, 24 L.Ed.2d 128 (1969); Theriault v. Peek,
406 F.2d 117 (5 Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 1021, 89 S.Ct. 1644, 23 L.Ed.2d 47 (1969);
Theriault v. United States, 268 F.Supp. 314
(W.D.Ark.1967), aff'd, 401 F.2d 79 (8 Cir.
notice of appeal must result in his appeal
being dismissed with prejudice.
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH PREJU-
DICE.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1100, 21 L.Ed.2d
792 (1969), rehearing denied, 394 U.S. 939, 89
S.Ct. 1201, 22 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969); Thenault v.
Mississippi, 433 F.2d 990 (5 Cir. 1970); Ther-
jault v. Mississippi, 390 F.2d 657 (5 Cir. 1968).
Adm. Office, U.S. Courts—West Publishing Company, Saint Paul, Minn.
Dr. Harry W. THERIAULT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vv.
Frederick SILBER, Director, United
States Chaplain Service, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 78-1506.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit
May 16, 1978
Dr. Harry W. Theriault, pro se.
Jamie C. Boyd, U. S. Atty., San Antonio,
Tex., Michael T. Milligan, Sp. Asst.
U.S. Atty., El Paso, Tex., for defendants-
appellees.
Joseph S. Blair vro se, amicus curiae.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before THORNBERRY, GODBOLD AND RUBIN,
Circuit Judges
ORDER
The appellee moves to strike the
appellant's notice of appeal and dismiss
the appellant's appeal in the instant case
because the appellant's notice of appeal
contains vile and insulting references
to the trial judge. We have examined
the notice of appeal and agree that it
contains disrespectful and impertinent
references to the trial judge. See
Rule 12(f), F.R. Civ. P. Such documents
are beneath the dignity of this court.
Nothing in our liberal pro se practice
dictates that this court receive
abusive documents. The appellee's
motions to strike the notice of appeal
and dismiss the appeal are therefore
GRANTED. Appellant has ten days from
the issuance of this Order to file a
proper notice of appeal. If he does so,
his appeal and motion to appoint counsel
will be reinstated. The appellant is
further directed to Rule 3(c). Rules
of Appellant Procedure and Form 1 in
the appendix of forms of the appellant
rules for a suggested form for notice
of appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED
IN THE DISTRICT COUR? OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION
HARRY THERIAULT, AKA SHILOH
AKA BISHOP OF TELLUS
EP-72-CA-212
V.
FREDERICK SILBER, ET AL.
MEMORANDUM OPINION, FINDINCS CF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has directed
this Court to "conduct further proceed-
ings on the present record and on such
a supplemental record as it and the
parties initially deem proper to make
more explicit findings of fact and
conclusions as a Finding of Fact that
Theriault's beliefs do not constitute
a religion. Also the Appellate Court
instructed this Court to reconsider what
constitutes a religion "by a thorough
study of the existing case law as weli as
an appropriate evidentiary exploration
of philosophical, theological and other
related literature anc resources on the
issue", this being "just the sort of
thing" that "should be ventilated first
in the Trial Court".
Before proceeding to a consideration
of the new material submitted by Mr.
Harry W. Theriault, specifically that
submitted on January 20, 1977, and before
confronting the issue of what constitutes
a religion, an examination of the record
compiled during the seven months' period
following the beginning of trial on August
20, 1974 would seem to be appropriate.
The El Paso case, EP-72-CA-212,
commenced on August 17, 1972 and evidence
was being received as late as March 18,
1975. During the period from commence-
ment of triai on August 20, 1974 to
the entry of Final Judgement on March 18,
1975 various.extensive Open Court hearings
were held as shown by a 3ll page Transcript
documenting the proceedings. This Court
received the Atlanta case, No. CA 13872,
which had been ordered consolidateec with
the El Paso case, on March 17, 1975.
The El Paso file, together with the re-
cords received from the Atlanta case,
comprises two legal size cabinet drawers
and consist of approximately 21 Volume
plus from eight to ten inches of other
unfiled, but received papers. The record
is made up of seven volumes of pleadings;
one volume of plaintiff's exhibits; two
volumes of defendants' exhibits; eleven
volumes of Transcripts, mostly from the
Atlanta case, and eight to ten inches of
additional unfiled documents. Judgment
was entered on March 18, 1975 dismissing
this suit on the merits. Notice of appeal
was filed on April 8, 1975. While this
Court found then and still believes the
monumental record in all of these con-
solidated cases demonstrates adequate
ventilation of this "sort of thing", the
Court of Appeals on April 29, 1977, over
two years later, vacated the Judgment of
this Court and remanded the case back
for further "ventilation".
Using the nomenclature established
by Judge Ainsworth in this very case styled
Harry W. Theriault v. Norman A. Carlson,
495 F. 2a 390, 1974, this would be laheled
Theriault IV. In his Opinion in Theriault
v. Carlson, supra. Judge Ainsworth out-
fined the history and the background of
Harry W. Theriault and the Organization
called the "Church of the New Song". On
June 18, 1970, in Theriault I, "Dr. Harry
W. Theriault" and a fellow inmate, Rev.
Jerry M. Dorrough, filed a First Amendment
Action against the Catholic and Protestant
Chaplains at Atlanta alleging various
deprivations of their constitutional
right to freely practice their religion.
Dr. Theriault acquired his Doctor of
Divinity Certificate through a mail
Order application. Theriault then, as
the self-appointed Bishop of Tellus or Bi-
shop of the Earth, ordained Dorrough First
Revelation Minister of the "Church of
the New Song" and conferred upon him in
the Courtroom on the date of trial in
1970 the Decrees of Doctor of Divinity,
Doctor of Philosophy and Bachelor of
Philosophy. See Theriault v. Carlson,
495 F. 2d 392 at Footnote 2.
After the Trial Court in Theriault I
announced his intention to allow Theriault
a "trial run" in holding his religious
services at a final hearing in Atlanta
held in January, 1972, several correctional
officers and other prison officials from
Marion, Illinois Penitentiary testified
about various threats by Theriault of mass
violence, veiled threats of murder, actual
physical assault and battery of prison
officers and destruction by Theriault of
prison property. Theriault v. Carlson,
Supra, at page 392. One such incident
A-10
occurred on April 1, 1971 following a request
by Theriault to use the Chapel or Auditorium
for the purpose of holding an organizational
meeting:
"Theriault, an escape artist by his
own admission, having several times broken
away from Federal custody, was considered
by prison officials to be a high escape
risk. Moreover, he and his followers were
known trouble makers. Theriault was told
of the prison policy reaquiring permission
from the Chaplain to secure a meeting place
and it was the Chaplain's duty to coordi-
nate religious activities. Theriault
declined to follow instructions and announ-
ced his intention to hold a meeting warnin
prison authorities that if they used vi-
Olence to break it up there would be blood-
shed. Because of his threats, Theriault was
placed in solitary confinement, to which
he reacted by kicking the correctional sup-
ervisor. He later broke the bed from the
cell wall, destroyed the toilet with a
piece of angle iron, shoved the bed
against the cell door and warned he would
kill anyone who attemvted to enter. =
caste Supplied) Theriault v. Carlson,
Supra, at page 393.
Theriault II, this case, was filed
subsequent to the Atlanta hearing after
Theriault was transferred to the Federal
Penitentiary at La Tuna, Texas. The
Complaint filed by Theriault was dis-
missed forthwith by the District Court
for the Western District of Texas by
the Hon. Judge Frnest Guinn and Theriault
appealed. Theriault III was filed in
the District Court at Atlanta wherein
Theriault alleged a failure to comniv
with Judge Edenfield's rulina. A four
A-11
day hearing was held in Atlanta resulting
in a finding of contempt against Direct-
ors Carlton and Silber. See Theriault
v. Carlson (Northern District of Georgia,
F. Supp. 1061. The Government
appealed. On appeal Theriault III was
overturned and the contempt finding was
held to be an abuse of discretion and was
reversed, annulled and set aside. See
Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F. 2d. 390
(1974) at page - Theriault III was
also vacated and remanded for a full
evidentiary hearing and was consolidated
with this case, Theriault II. After the
hearings and compilation of the record as
outlined above pursuant to the Order of
the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in Theriault v. Carlson!
this Court, having inherited the case
from the Hon. Judge Ernest A. Quinn at
his death, dismissed the case with exten-
sive and comprehensive accompanying Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Approximately two years and one month
later, the case was vacated and remanded
for "further ventilation . .. of appro-
priate evdentiary exploration of philo-
sophical, theological and other related
literature and resources", specifically
referring to the materials submitted
by Theriault to the Court of Appeals on
Janua 20, 1977 which were filed in
the Brstrict Court on July 8, 1977 as
well as a copy of:
"The Living Gospel
of
The New Song
for
The People of the Light"
1/ 495 F. 2a 393 (1974)
A-12
"Ir, Pullfillment of the Prophecy ‘They
sang a new song .. - for the healing
of the nations.'"
"(Book of Revelation, 5:9 and 14:3 and
22:2)"
"An Inspired Text"
"THE PARATFSTAMENT
in the New Language of the Church"
"CHURCH OF THE NEW SONG
Iowa City, Iowa 52240"
The Court has now considered these
additional submissions of Harry W.
Theriault as well as a number of
religious encyclopedias such as
the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics
James Hastings’ edition, Volume 10
(Scrivner's sons, 1951), The Universal
Jewish Encyclopedia, the new Catholic
Se edie (Catholic University of
America, 1967), the Encyclovedia of
Islam, Lewis, et al. edition, F. J. Brill,
1965, as well as the King James version
of the Holy Bible.
EXPLORATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL, THEOLOG-
ICAL AND OTHER RELATED LITERATURE AND
RESOURCES
Before proceeding to an examination
of the works of Harry W. Theriault,
the Court will first examine the afore-
mentioned resources and other materials
with respect to the definition of re-
ligion. Implicit in such an examination
is a study of what the religions say of
themselves. Thus, each of the religious
texts will of covrse, take on the bias
A-13
of its faith. The Judeo-Christian tra-
dition, with whick we are most familiar,
recognizes the existence of a superior
Supernatural and all-powerful diety.
a commensurate attitude of submission to
that diety on the part of the practition-
er or believer. Thus, a leading Protestant
work, the Encyclopedia of Religion and
Ethics, James Hastings Ed., Vol. 10,
at page 675, states:
"It is true that there is in religion
a characteristic submission (not necessar-
ily an attitude of pacifity) to the su-
preme of the divine will -- 'Thy will
be done.'"
This also refers to "dependence, prayer,
sacrifice, necessity of moral behavior,
etc" as irportant religious concepts.
Ibid at page 678.
The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia,
Volume 9, page 124, also points out this
Supreme Being-creature relationship "of
a creature overwhelmed by his nothingness
in contrast to the overpowering, myster-
ious and supreme, Being". The text goes
on to examine the origins of the term
"religion" which originally was a latin
word which Cicero explained as heing
derived from the latin verb "re-legre"
which means to "care or practice", being
the opposite of "neg-ligere" meaning "to
neglect" and would thus entail "con-
scientiousness, scrupulousness, respect
for what is sacred . . . devotion to
the gods". Ibid at page 125. Other
possible derivations are discussed in
the same text. The Jewish Encyclopedia
goes on to conclude that a religion will
then develop into a community, congrega-
A-14
tion or church with a cult of ritual and
ceremony, code of morality or standards
of law and discipline for the group with
a creed of beliefs with respect.to Goce.
Ibid at page 126
The New Catholic Encyclopedia aaain
reaffirms the concept of the Supreme
Diety in religion in its concept of
"the sacred". New Catholic Encyclopedia,
Volume 12, at page 240. “Sacred” is
explained as an "essentially ambivalent
character which makes man feel that one
is irresistably attracted by its gran-
deur and frightened by its superiority”
Ibid , at page 241. Again, the attitude
of dependence upon the "sacred"...
"a reality superior to man, a reality
that is beyond the control of man's will
and all of the forces of nature". Ibid
at page 241. The New Catholic Encyclopedia
goes on to discuss the topics of prayer,
devotion, ritual, priesthood and other
religious attitudes with respect to
this sacred supreme reality.
The Encyclopedia of Islam dis-
tinguishes between din (religion)
and dawla (government,politics) and
sets forth that Moslems nevertheless
believe that their religion is also
a form of government. Encyclopedia of
Islam , Lewis, et al. edition, FE. J. Brill,
, Volume 2, Page 295. In the discussion
of din, the Encyclopedia of Islam points
out the following: "Religio [sic] -evokes
primarily that which binds man to God; and
din, the obligations which God imposes
upon His ‘reasoning creatures'. Now,
the first of these obligations is to
submit to God and surrender oneself to .
Him since the definition or the etymological
A-15
ee ee ee ee
sense of Islam is 'the surrender of self
(to God) , e ° ° e ws
The concept of the Supreme Being,
Supreme Diety or Supreme reality is the
most familiar and perhaps easiest to
understand for those of us in the Judeo
Christian tradition. The pre-eminence
of this concept and understanding of
religion is of considerable historic
significance in the United States.
The Declaration of Independence stated:
"We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created ecual,
that they are endowed by their creator with
certain inalienable rights, that among
these are life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness. That to secure these
rights, governments are instituted
among men deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed." .
Declaration of Independence, U.S.C.A.
Constitution, Article I, Section 1 to
Section 8, Clause 3, at Page 2.
While this belief in a Supreme Being
or Creator may be pervasive in our
society this belief cannot be sustained
as a distinguishing characteristic of
religion. In United States v. Seeger,
85 S. Ct. 850, 865 (1965), Mr. Justice
Douglas in his Concurring Opinion in
that case pointed out the insufficiency
of a belief in a Supreme Being and a
concept of a personal God in the writing
of Hinduism and Buddhism.
In examining the materials submitted
by Harry W. Theriault to the Appellate
Court, it is important to note in Mr.
Theriault's writings which he entitles
A-16
"The Paratestament" or "The Living Gospel
of the New Song” that Mr. Theriault
does not simply allege to hold a concept
of a Supreme Being or Diety wr the vaguer
concepts of reality or God as outlined
by Hinduism and Buddhism, but rather
claims to be Jesus Christ. In his
Paratestament, Chapter 7, Versus 6 through
52, note particularly Verse 9:
"So they began to call me Jesus; and my
fame spread with this name, and reached
King Herod's ears; and his soliders were
after me, and so were Governor Pilate's
publicans, and especially the high priest
of Palestine."
Verse II then states:
"After this, I had gone throughout -
the whole territory of the Jordan river,
preaching; Repent, and you are forgiven."
Verse 45 states:
"I remember saying, Eli, Eli, Iama
sabachthani." (These are the words
of Jesus Christ as he died on the
Cross as recorded in the New Testament.)
EXISTING CASE LAW
As indicated above, the threshold
issue before this Court to decide is
"whether the beliefs professed by
[petitioners] . . . are sincerely held
and whether they are, in [their] own
scheme of things, religious.”
A-17
+ oie +
a
See United States v. Seeger, 380
U. S. 163, 185, as cited by the Fifth
Circuit of Avpeals in Theriault 1 and IT.
2/In the Seeger case involving consci-
entious objections to war and violence,
the test of what was meant by “religious
traininc and belief so as to embrace all
religious and to exclude essentially vo-
litical, socioloagical or philosovhical
views" (Seeger, sunra, at page 165)
was whether such "belief that is sincere
and meaningful occupies a place in the
life of its possessor parallel to that
filled by the orthodox belief in God".
(Seeger, supra, at page 166)
It should be noted that in the con-
scientious objector cases the eliefs
held by petitioners were in oppositicn to
violence and war in contrast to the
violence and destructiveness of plaintiff
in this case.
In view of the "long list of court
actions to which [petitioner] is a party,
some of which are still pending, as well
as the lenathy »orison record which he
has established over the years," this
Court will employ "sharp and careful
scrutiny of his activities, including
his claim of religious sincerity."
See Theriault 1 and II, Sth Cir. 1974,
495 F. 26 at page 394. For, as reiterated
by the Fifth Circuit in Theriault 1 and IT,
Supra, at page 394, "First Amendment
freedoms are not absolute. They are
properly restricted when a sufficiently
important governmental interest appears.
ae States v. O'Brian, 391 U.S. 367,
2/ See Supra, (495 F. 2d at p. 395)
A-18°
Further, this Court recoanizes, as does
the Fifth Circuit in Theriault I and II,
supra, at vo. 395, the difficulty in
establishing satisfactory and precise
standards by which to judge the hona
fides of netitioner's alleged religion.
Whatever the difficulties are, they
Co not, by their existence, obviate the
necessity of deciding the issue nor
do they provide an impenetrable obstacle
"to denials of First Amendment protection
to so-called religions which tend to mock
established institutions and are obviously
shams and absurdities and whose members
are patently devoid of religious sin-
cerity. . ." Theriault I and II, sunra,
at p. 395.
Several facts developed during
the proceedings had at Atlanta in the
case of Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F.
Supp. 375, anc succinctly restated by
the Fifth Circuit in Theriault I and II,
are relevant to this Court's consideration
herein. Among these are:
1. That "the Felatarian faith, or
Church of the New Song, was
originally founded by Theriault
and Jerry M. Dorrougn at the
federal penitentiary at Atlanta,
Georgia, allegedly as the result
of visions exnerienced by Theriault
at the Marion, Illinois federal
penitentiary in which he received
prophetic messages from ‘Mclat'
informing him that he was the
"Eclatarian Nazarite' and directine
him to establish the Church of the
New Song.” Theriault I and II,
supra, footnote l, p. 391;
3/ Supra at p. 391, Footnote 1.
A-19
a Bee Pt *
That "Theriault acquired his
Doctor of Divinity certificate
through a mail order application.
Theriault then, as self-apvvointed
"Bishop of Tellus' ordained
Dorrough First Revelation Minister
of the Church of the New Sona. ."
supra, footnote 2, p. 392;
That when Theriault "and Dorrough
decided to file this complaint
(in the U. S. District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia,
Theriault, et al. v. Carlson, et
al., supra) they needed the proper
caption. Dorrough came forward
with his suggestion which they
adepted: ‘you put yourself down,
you be the head of the church,,
[sic] that's the Bishop, you put
yours, and put me down as the
First Minister," supra, footnote
3, Pe 392;
That the "Eclatarian faithful,
aside from one secretary, are
to be found only in the feceral
penitentiaries of Atlanta and
Marion." Theriault, 339 F. Supp.
375, 377 N.3. Of course, now
the federal penitentiary at La
Tuna, ‘texas can be added to the
list as the petitioner Theriault
is now incarcerated there;
That "at the final hearing at
Atlanta held in January, 1972,
several correctional officers
and other prison officials from
the Marion, Illinois
A-20
’
penitentiary testified about various
threats by Theriault of mass violence,
veiled threats of murder, actual
physical assault and hattery of
prison officials, and destruction
by Theriault of prison property."
Theriault I and II, supra, 495 F.,
2d at vo. 392;
To this incomplete, but represent-
ative, list of relevant factors can
be added Theriault's conviction
before this Court by a Jury of
assault on federal officers and
destruction of government property
arising out of an incident occurring
during Theriault's transfer to the
Federal Penitentiary at La Tuna, Texas,
during which Theriault, handcuffed
and confined by legirons,[sic] vaulted
over the back seat of the aovernment
vehicle in which he was being trans-
ported by Federal officers and, by
jamming his feet through the steering
wheel of the vehicle, caused it to
proceed out of control and overturn
injuring the federal officers so
transporting him;
That Harry W. Theriault claims to he,
among other things, the seconde Messiah,
the Rishop of Farth (Tellus) (See
generally Paratestament, Theriault)
supra; and
That in the document submitted by
Harry W. Theriault he claims that
he would have established a new
World order by 1976.
A-21
a
Rate owe
.
ae he
Oe
The Court has examined all of the
Gocurents, testimony anc records made
of recore in the instant case tocether
with the evidence presented at the various
hearings had herein ane the arquments
of all varties and finds the netitioner's
contentions to be lackina.
The Church of the New Sono anvears
not to be a reliacion, but rather as
a masquerade designed to obtain First
Amenéement protection for acts which
otherwise would he unlawful and/or
reasonably disallowed by the various
prison authorities hut for the attempts
wnich have been and are heinc made to
Classify them as "relicious” and, there-
fore, presumably vrotected hy the First
Amendment.
Rather than urging uvon its followers
any particular theolocy or philosophy
of life, the Church of the New Song
appears to enccurage a relatively non-
structured and free-form, do-as-vou-please
philosovhy, the sole purpose of which is
to cause or encourage disruption of
estab ished prison discipline tor the
sake of disruption. Yisruption o* and/or
problems for prison authorities is not
the result of this so-called relicion;
it is rather the underlying vurnose of
it. For example, the "Church's" one
attempt at a paschal type feast vroduced
a tongue-in-cheek request for prison
authorities to supply steak and wine.
Further, as Warden Riashy has cestifiedc,
the services which petitioner's followers
were allowed to hold at the Atlanta
penitentiary were nothing more than
"gripe sessions" designed to attempt
to gain advantages over other inmates
not belonging to the "group" and were tor.
tally lackina in anything approaching .:
religious content.
Petitioner and his cohorts have
formed an organization whose purvose
is to improve the position of memher
prison inmates vis-a-vis the prison
administrations. To ohtain leveraae
for the organization and to enable it
to operate more freely within the
Federal Penitentiaries, petitioner has
christened it a "religion" and endowed
it with the trappings thereof. Thus,
it is that the unmistakeable stench
of the skunk is found emating from
that which petitioner has declared
a rose.
the Fifth Circuit has held that
some standards must be applied to
determine the legitimacy and validity
of a "religion" and has recommended
that such standards be applied with
sharp and careful scrutiny to petitioner's
"Church of the New Song". The exclusively
political and non-religious nature of
the doctrine of the "Church of the New
Sona" as that doctrine has developed
in the writings of the petitioner over
the past three years, together with the
violent and raucous tone of its services
at the Atlanta Penitentiary, indicate
that the "Church" has totally failed
the "trial run" test which it received
inthe Northern District of Georgia
three years ago.
The professed belief of Mr. Theriault
that he is the second Messian (Para-
testament, Theriault, Chap. 7, V.1-114)
appears to this Court to be insincere :
and, like the rest of the actions of the
A=-23
——— ee
petitioner, are "essentially political,
sociological and vhilosophical”. The
professed views of Mr. Theriault that
he “would have established a new “World
order" with Harry "I. Theriault as the
head of the Order (see generally Para-
testament, Theriault) supra noi Pee
opinion of the Court, more clo:
roa ao the megalomania of Adolph Hitler
and the Nazis or Charles Manson and
his "family" than any “belief... that
‘occupies a place’ parallel to that F
fillea by the orthodox belief in God".
The First Amendment to the United
States Constitution states that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof". In interpreting the
Amendment, the Courts have recocnized
with respect to prisoners' religious
freedom that:
"Although the law acknowledaes a
prisoner's ‘forum of conscience’
deserving of protection, Remmers v.
Prewer, 494 F. 2a 1277 (8th Cir. 1974)
Tt also recognizes that a_person, in or
out of prison, may not, in the name
of religion, become a law unto himself.
Re we said in Fvans v. Ciccone, [377 F.
2a 4(8th Cir. 1967); ‘Freedom of religion.
can never mean... freedom to flagrantly
disregard reasonable rules of conduct in
or out of prison'. 377 F. 2d at 6.
(Emphasis supplied.) Proffitt v. Ciccone,
506 F. 2a 1020 (1974).
"Tt has never been held that upon
entering a prison one is entirely bereft
of all his civil rights and forfeits
every protection of the law.'" Sewell
A-24
v. Pegelow, 291 F. 2d 196, 198 (4 Cir., 1961)
See also Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F. 2d 233
(2 Cir. 1961).
This statement was cited with approval
in the case of Brown v. Peyton, 437 F,. 2d
1228 (4th Cir., »- wudace Winter,
writing for the majority of the Three
Judge Panel and also citing Coover v. Pate,
378 U. S. 546, 84 S. Ct. 1733, I2 t. Fd.
24 10390 (1964) went on to affirm:
"These cases clearly establish that
a prisoner does not shed his first amendment
richts et the prison portals.”
In Brown, the majority pointed out that:
"While.first amendment rights are
‘preferred"” rights, nonethelees, they are
not unlimited. The state may restrict
religious acts if it can be shown that
they pose ‘some substantial threat to
public safety, peace or order,’ and that
there is a ‘compelling state interest
in the *** regulation.’ Sherhbert v. Verner,
374 U. S. 398, 493, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1793,
10 L. Ed. 24 965 (1963)."
Judge “inter pointed out certain State
interests upon which prison authorities
may justify repression or restriction
of First Amendment rights of prisoners.
They included:
1. Prison officials have to confine
dangerous men in unpleasant circumstances.
A-25
-
-_
— ee
2. They must protect the public at
large, prison employees and also other
prisoners, who are almost totally denen-
dent on the prison for their well being.
3. Prison authorities have a
lecitimate interest in the rehabilitation
of prisoners.
4. The State has an interest in
reducing the burden and expense of
administration.
The majority in Brown also noted that
“many restrictions on First Amendment
rights are undoubtedly justifiabie as
part of the punitive regimen of a prison:
confinement itself, for example, prevents
unlimited communication with the outside
world but is permissible in order to
punish and deter crime; .. ." Brown,
supra, at page 1231.
The Court in Brown held that the
"burden of proving [paramount state
interests) rests on the state". This
Court agrees.
Turning to the case at Rar. The
petitioner, Harry W. Theriault, is
@parently requesting (assuming that his
political activities are entitled to
the status of a religion) the following
relief;
1. To form a seminary to train his
ministers. (R. Vol. VI Tr. l,
11-70-71, Pp. 145-146)
A-26
5.
To preach the "Fclatarian Demar-
date of Natural Rights”, in-
cluding the richt to pursue
happiness. (Td. po. 147-148)
To wéar a beard because of
the awe and respect that it
inspires in his followers.
(Id. pp. 149-150)
The right to corresponée with
such figures as Jane Fonda,
Lewis Wolfson, Sam Bataglia
and Felix Alderisio (the
last two individuals alleged
to be Mafia figures in the
Government's brief) as well
as his fellow prisoners, all
for the purpose of soliciting
financial contributions.)
(Id., pp. 151-165)
The right to hold meetings
where he presides uvon short
notice without approval of
prison authorities. Theriault
stated that he demanded in one
instance immediate access to
the Chapel at La Tuna and when
his demand was not met he
broke down the door of the
chapel. (Id., pp. 50-54)
The record is replete with
the actions of Mr. Theriault
which indicate to this Court
that Mr. Theriault wants all
the privileges of a chaplain
rather than an inmate of
the institution wherein he
resides.
A-27
As was stated hy Judage J. Marshall
in Hundley v. Sieloff, 407 F. Suvv. 543,
545 (1975) in another case involvine
Mr. Theriault's organization:
"In Cruz v. Reto, 405 .S, 319,
92, S. Ct. 1079, 3I LL. Fa. 2d 263 (1972)
(ver curium), the court in considering
the claims of a Buddhist wrisoner who
Claimed he was punished for vracticina
his religion, stated that not
‘every religious sect or group
within a wrison - however few in
number - must have identical facili-
ties or versonnel. A snecial
chavel or place of worshin need
not be vrovided for every faith
regardless of size; nor must a
chaplain, priest, or minister he
provided without recard to the
extent of the demand. Rut reason-
able opportunities must he afforded
to all prisoners to erercise the
relicious freedom guaranteed bv
the First and Fourteenth Amendments
without fear of penalty.’ 405 U.S.
at 322 n. 2, 92 S. Ct. at 1981.
"Mr. Chief Justice Burger, concurring,
stated further that,
"There cannot possibly he any con-
stitutional or lecal reauirement that the
government provide materials for every
religion and sect practiced in this
diverse country. At most, Buddhist
materials cannot be denied to prisoners
if someone offers to sunply them.' 405
U.S. at 323, 92 S. Ct. at 1082."
A-28
In conformity with Cruz, supra,
it appears to this Court that Petitioner's
demand for seminary facilities, the riaqht
to exercise unfettered authority over the
prison chavel, and the right to all of the
orivileges of a prison chaplain should
be, and the same are hereby, in all things
DENIED in light of the compelling State
interests heretofore enumerated. Fven
if the so-called "Church of the New Sona"
is in fact a religion (which it obviously
is not), reasonable and necessary restraints
and requlations may he imposed »y the
penal institution on all of its inmates.
To give a prisoner who is an admitted
escape artist and who has heen convicted
of assault and battery on corrections
officers the unrestricted freedom which
he demands would make a mockery of the
corrections system and would afford him
privileges not available to other inmates,
unless they joined his union.
Reasonable State prison requlations
as to personal hygene [sic] and qrooming
have long been upheld in this Circuit.
See Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F. 2d 652
(Sth Cir., 1970). Such requlations
have keen sustained in other Circuits
as well. See e.g. Proffitt v. Ciccone,
506 F. 2d 1020 (8th Cir., 1974); Pinehart
v. Brever, 491 F. 2d 705 (8th Cir.,
Lay, J., aissenting).
The general rule is that Courts
should not interfere in the internal
management or functions of State prisons.
In the recent case of Fill v. Fstelle,
537 F. 2d 214 (5th Cir., 1976) the Fifth
Circuit upheld the decision in Brooks in
a per curium opinion:
A-29
ee
"In Brooks we stated that haircut and
shaving requlations in a state prison
did not violate the inmates' free dom of
exoression, or due process of law." Hill,
supra at p. 215.
This Court agrees with the rationale of
Hill ané under the senaration of nowers
would not interfere with the duty of
the Fxecutive Branch to administer
the prisons "where prisoner reoulations
are neither unreasonable nor arbitrary"
with resvect to hair lenoth or heards.
Hill, suvra, 537 F. 2d at p. 215. See
also Williams v. Hoyt,556 F. 2c 1336
at 1339 (5th Cir., 1857). Accordinaly,
petitioner's demand for the riqht to
grow his beard is herehev DFNTFN,
The denial of Petitioner's demand
to espouse in prison his particular
creed of the "Eclatarian Demandate °
of Natural Rights" cannot he held
by this Court to he an unconstitutional
abridaement of the First Amendment.
When dangerous felons are involved,
it has heen held that even the refusal
of prison authorities to allow a high-
risk orisoner to attend chapel, much
less the right to "preach" to fellow
inmates, is not a denial of First
Amendment rights. Sharp v. Sigler
408 F. 2d 966 (8th Cir., 1969). ‘The
Court states in Sharp v. Sigler at
page 970:
"While freedom to helieve is
absolute, the exercise of relicion is not."
A-30
It has also been held that:
"Laws are made for the government
of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious helief
and ovinions, they may with practices,'
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.
Iq, 166, 25 LG. rade 244 (1879),"
The "gosvel" Mr. Vheriault espouses
proclaims a new World Order with a new
"bishoo of the earth" - Harry W. Theriault.
(See generally Paratestament, Theriault)
Supra. Mr. Theriault has heen convicted
of escape involving assault of federal
officers. Theriault v. United States,
409 F, 2a I313 (5th Cir., 19695) (reversed
as result of change in insanity law while
case pending appeal) wherein Mr. Theriault
leaped from the back seat of a Deputy
Marshal's car, obtained tne Marshal's
gun, thereby gaining control over the
Marshals and then abandoned the Marshals
in the country chained to a tree. Fxcept
for the resourcefulness of the Marshals,
Mr. Theriault's actions could have re-
sulted in their deaths. Mr. Theriault
has been found cuilty of escape and
assault in another case involving quite
similar circumstances. See United States
v. Theriault, 531 F. 2d 281 (5th Cir.,
1976).
Theriault again leaped from the hack
seat of a Marshal's car causing the
wreck of the government automohile and
injuring both Marshals. Apparently,
at least four United States Deputy Marshals
have come near death due to the violent
actions of the Petitioner. The Appellate
Court in the second escape case noted the
prior contempt convictions of the
A-31
Petitioner in upholding the Trial
Judge's refusal to remove Petitioner's
shackles during Courtroom prceceedings.
The contemptuos acts on the part of
Theriault "included the use of foul
language and calling a witness a liar, and
we noted a communication from apnellart
(petitioner herein) to the trial judge
that threatened ‘another Attica' escape
and bloodshed". 351 F. 2d at 284. ‘The
dangerous propensities of the petitioner
toward assault and violence have heen
established on numerous occasions.
This Court finds that to allow
petitioner to preach his "Doctrine"
of violence, bloodshed and rebellion
against authorities and to corresnond
with whomever he desires without proper
surveillance would constitute "a clear
and present danger of a breach of prison
security or discipline or some other
substantial interference with the
orderly function of the institution".
Knuckles v. Prasse, 435 F. 2d 1255,
1256; Long v. Erker 3rd Cir., 399 F. 2d
816, 820,
Accordinaly, Petitioner's claims
for relief in his First Amendment action
and subsequent pleadings, whether or
not his beliefs constitute a "religion",
are hereby in all things DENIED.
Therefore, having considered
the entire record in all of these
consolidated cases, the arauments of
counsel. and the applicable law, including
a thorough exploration and study of.
"philosophical, theological, and other
related additional literature and re-
sources on the issue” of religion, vel
A-32
non, and having once again further
"ventilated this sort of thing", vract-
ically to the point of hyperventilation,
the Court makes the following "more
explicit" additional Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.
A-33
ee :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Early in 1971, while
incarcerated at the Federal Peni-
tentiary at Atlanta, Georgia,
petitioner, Harry W. Theriault,
and Jerry M. Dorrough formed an
organization among their fellow
prisoners and denominated it the
"Church of the New Song". Over
the past five years the
organization has met with some
small success within State
and Federal prisons, but has
been of negligible appeal outside
of prison.
2. Petitioner contends without
dispute and the Court so finds that
he is the leader and head of the
"Church of the New Song". His
pronouncements on the tenets,
beliefs, ideas, practices and
general principles of the
"Church of the New Song" are thus
authoritative of the official
position of the "Church of the
New Song".
3. Petitioner has committed
various and numerous infractions
of prison rules during his stay
at the Federal Correctional
Institution at La Tuna, Texas
beginning in March of 1972.
4. The beliefs professed by the
petitioner are not sincerely held
and do not in their own
scheme of things constitute a
"religion" nor are they sincerely
of a “religious" character.
5. The so-called "Church
A--34
of the New Song" does not meet the
criteria adopted by this Court in
its analysis above to entitle it
to First Amendment protection as
a religion. It is clearly a sham
designed and calculated to obtain
favored treatment for its members
incarcerated in various prisons
and has no measurable following
outside Federal Penitentiaries.
6. There is no evidence of
probative force to substantiate
plaintiff's claims that defendants
violated the “establishment of
religion" clause of the First
Amendment in their provision of
religious services to the
inmates at Federal prisons.
7. There is no evidence of
probative force that defendants
or anyone acting for them or
under their authority or control
illegally reported anything to
anyone in any way concerning any
of petitioner's activities or
that defendants in any manner
improperly or illegally
interfered with or impeaded [sic]
the petitioner or his followers
in attempting to establish or
practice a "religion".
8. That the claim of Mr.
Theriault to be the second
Messiah is merely a front for what
is essentially a political "union"
or organization with primary goals
of establishing a unit to bargain
with prison officials and ultimate-
ly establish a new social order
based on "votaries" with Harry
W. Theriault as its head.
A-35
ee eee
9. While an inmate does not
forfeit all of his rights under
the Constitution, he does lose some
of them such as the must valued
one, i.e. the right to his freedom.
Thus, he is by necessity subject
to reasonable and necessary
disciplinary rules, regulations
and measures, including those
imposed by the penal institution
in this very case.
10. The Court adopts, reaffirms
and incorporates herein, and
finds even more applicable now,
all of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law that were
made in his earlier decision and
Judgment filed in this case.
(See 391 F.Supp. 678).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Any restraints and/or
disciplinary measured invoked
against petitioner by defendants
resulted from his various infractions
of prison rules and not out of
retaliation for or in response to
any legitimate religious activities.
Even if under any conceivable theory
the so-called "Church of the New
Song" is in fact a religion, such
restraints and disciplinary measures
imposed by the institution were of
reasonable and necessary nature
under the circumstances.
2. The “Church of the New Song"
is not a religion within the scope
of the First Amendment.
3. Not being a religion within
the scope of the First Amendment,
A- 36
"Church of the New Song" is not
entitled to First Amendment
protection claimed by the petitioner.
4. Having fully again “ventilated"
the alleged religious claims of
petitioner, the relief sought by
him is in all respects DENIED.
SIGNED AND ENTERED THIS 10th day
of February, 1978.
/s/ John H. Wood, Jr.
HN H. WOOD, JR. Lee
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
A-37
- ee oe oe ee. —
ae ee
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. A-439
HARRY W. THERIAULT,
Petitioner,
Vv.
FREDERICK SILBER, DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES
CHAPLAIN SERVICE, ET AL.
ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Upon Consideration of the application
of petitioner,
IT IS ORDERED that the time for
filing a petition for writ of certiorari
in the above-entitled cause be, and the
same is hereby, extended to and including
January 13, 1979.
/s/ Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the .
United States
Dated this 13th
day of November, 1978.
A~38
Dr. Farry W. THERIAULT, Bishop, Church
of the New Song of Universal Life, and
Rector, The Fountainhead Seminary,
Rev. Jerry M. Dorrough, Vice-Rector, The
Fountainhead Seminary, and Minister, Church
of the New Song of Universal Life, et al.
Vv.
Norman A. CARLSON, Director, Bureau
of Prisons; Rev. Frederick Silber, Director
of Chaplaincy Services, Bureau of Prisons;
J. D. Henderson, Warden, United States
Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia; Rev. Jack
A. Hanberry, Protestant Chaplain, United
States Department of Justice, Bureau of
Prisons, United States Penitentiary,
Atlanta; Fr. Raymond A. Beane, O.M.F.,
Catholic Priest, United States Department
of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, United .
States Penitentiary, Atlanta.
Civ. A. No. 13872
United States District Court
N.D. Georgia,
Atlanta Division,
Feb. 25, 1972
Harry W. Theriault, pro se (Glenn Zell,
Atlanta, Ga. of counsel), for plaintiffs,
John W. Stokes, Jr., U.S. Atty., P.
Bruce Kirwan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Atlanta,
Ga., for defendants.
A-39
— ee
OPINION AND ORDER OPINION
EDENFIELD, District Judge.
Harry William Theriault, self-styled
Bishop of Tellus'*tind self-proclaimed
leader of a group designated by pet} ion-
ers as the Church of the New Song, | is
also a federal prisoner incarcerated
presently in the Atlanta federal peniten-
tiary on "holdover" status from the Marion
(Illinois) federal penitentiery. For a year
and a half he has sought to compel prison
officials in Atlanta and Marion to grant
him the right to hold religious services
in prison for those who shared his be-
lief in the Eclatarian faith(fa faith
of which he is the supreme exponent.
The prison authorities denied his requests
and his appeals to respondent Silber,
Director of Chaplaincy Services for the
Bureau of Prisons, and respondent Carlson,
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, were
unsuccessful. Petitioners then filed this
class action here and the court, predicating
its jurisdiction upon 28 U.S.C. § 1361
(1970), held four full days of hearings on
the matter. Walker v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d
66 (5th Cir. 1966). ("Walker I".) The
court has concluded that petitioners and
the class they represent have been denied
First Amendment rights, and it will order
relief.
A full recitation of the history of this
case is unnecessary. Briefly, Pheriault
and co-petitioner Dorrough founded the
Church of the New Song and the Fountainhead
Seminary in 1970 while incarcerated in
Atlanta. They nad obtained "doctor of
divinity" certificates from a mail-crder
organization and, as a "game", they decided
to challenge the chaplaincy program in the
A-40
federal prisons and, at the same time, tc
develop a new religion of their own. The
petition filed in this court alleced that
the Government had established religion
in the Atlanta penitentiary and was also
prohibiting its free exercise by those
prisoners who belonged to the Church of
the New Song. Petitioners claimed that
a “pall of establishment orthodcyy"
had been cast over their lives because
respondents Hanberry and Beane, the
Protestant and Catholic chaplains, respect-
ively, who were members of the prison staff
and federal employees, regularly submitted
reports on the religious activities of the
prisoners which had a direct bearing on
the grant or denial of parole. They
also contended that the chaplains were
promoting the majority faiths at the
expense Of minority faiths by failing to
grant religious standing to the Church of
the New Song. The petition was supported
by the signatures of 165 prisoners.
Immediately after the petition was al-
lowed filed in this court, Theriault was
transferred to Marion which houses the
most severe security risks in the federal
system. Theriault now began to take his
own religious claims seriously and attempted
to explain them to the prisoners and staff
at Marion. The Chief of Classification
and Parole at Marion testified in this
court that, at this point, Theriault's
activities were truly religious in nature.
Theriault approached the Protestant chaplain
at Marion for permission to holé religious
services for himself and his followers,
but the request was denied hecause the
chaplain felt the Church of the New Song
was not "recognized." Theriault attempted
to meet this objection by assurinc the
chaplain he would obtain an official charter
A-41
from the Universal Life Church, Inc., the
mail-order organization which supplied
Theriault with his "doctor of divinity"
degree. The chaplain brought the aster
to the attention of respondent Silber ana
Rev. Silber testified in court that he
upneld the Gecision of the Marion chaplain
because the Church of the New Sonc and
the Eclatarian faith were nct “recognized.”
Theriault also wrote to respondent Carlson
but received only a form response directing
him to the institutional staff.
As Theriault continued his activities
among the Marion prisoners, the staff
began to suspect that he was actually
organizing a radical political moverent.
One staff member filed a memorandun on
the subject and urged that something be
done to control Theriault's activities. (5)
Three days after the memorandum was
filec, Theriault was placed in punitive
segregation ("H-Unit") for failinc to
obey the order of a security officer
to move. He was subsequently released
and later citea for a minor violation and
for threatening a security officer. On
April 1, 1971 Theriault approachec Mr.
J. Culley, a correctional supervisor, and
demanded a place to hold religious ser-
vices. Culley discussed the matter with
Theriault but refused to accede to his
demand. Then, "as a preventive measure,"
Culley had Theriault placed in punitive
segregation ("H-Unit") 6) Theriault remained
in H-Unit from that night until he was
transferred to Atlanta for the hearings
before this court?) The day Theriault
was received back in Atlanta he was
immediately placed in the appregation unit
and he is still there today£) The court
finds as fact that the sole basis for the
punitive segregation of Theriault was
his demand to hold religious services.
A-42
A. The "Establishment" Claim
The "establishment" claim raised by
petitioners is, for the most part, without
merit. The Bureau of Prisons is statu-
torily charged with the responsibility
of providing for the care, subsistence,
protection, instruction and discipline
of federal prisoners. 18 U.S.C. § 4042
(1970). The Bureau has carried out
this responsibility by creating proqrams
to meet the needs of the inmates - be
they physical, mental, or spiritual needs.
In order to effectuate these programs the
Bureau, of course, must hire professional
staff - doctors, social workers, teachers,
and clergymen. The Bureau cannot maintain
a full compliment of medical, educational,
or religious professionals on the prison
staffs, and a representative selection
must necessarily suffice, The ordained
clergymen on the federal payroll who
serve as chaplains in the federal prison
system are hired to provide for the
spiritual needs of all prisoners, whatever
their religious denomination, and they
are not merely the emissaries of their
respective churches. As Mr. Justice
Brennan has written:
"There are certain practices, conceivably
violative of the Establishment Clause,
the striking down of which might seriously
interfere with certain religious liberties
also protected by the First Amendment.
Provisions for churches and chaplains at
military establishments for those in the
armed services may afford one such example.
The like provision by state and federal
governments for chaplains in penal in-
stitutions may afford another example. It
is argued that such provisions may be
assumed to contravene the Fstablishment
A-43
cs om
-
Clause, yet be sustained on constitutional
grounds as necessary to secure to the members
of the Armed Forces and prisoners those
rights of worship gquarenteed under the Free
Exercise Clause. Since qovernment has de-
prived such persons of the opportunity to
practice their faith at places of their
choice, the argument runs, government
may, in order to avoid infringing the free
exercise guarantees, provide substitutes
where it requires such persons to he...
"Such activities and practices seem
Gdistinguishable from the sponsorshin of
daily Bible reading and prayer recital.
For one thing, there is no element of
coercion present in the appointment of
military or prison chaplains; the soldier
or convict who declines the opportunities
for worship would not ordinarily subject
himself to the suspicion or obloquy of
his peers. Of special significance to this
distinction is the fact that we are here
usually dealing with adults, not with
impressionable children as in the public
schools. Moreover, the school exercises
are not designed to provide the pupils
with general opportunities for worship
denied them by the legal obligation to
attend school. The student's compelled
presence in school for five days a week
in no way renders the regular religious
facilities of the community less accessible
to him than they are to others. The
situation of the school child is therefore
plainly unlike that of the isolated soldier
of the prisoner.
"The State must be steadfastly neutral in
all matters of faith and neither favor nor
inhibit religion. In my view, qovernment
cannot sponsor religious exercises in the
A~44
public schools without jeovardcizino that neu-
trality. On the other hand, hostility, not
neutrality, would characterize the refusal
to provide chaplains and places of worshin
for prisoners anc soldiers cut off by |
the State from all civilian opportunities
for public communion, the withholding
of draft exemptions for ministers and
conscientious objectors, or the denial
of the termporary use of an empty public
building to a congregation whose place
of worship has heen destroyed by fire
or flood, |
et Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-299, 83
S. Ct. 1560, 1610, 10 L.Fdad. 2a 844
(1963) (concurring opinion).
The court concludes that the
maintenance by the Bureau of Prisons
of chaplains at the Atlanta federal
penitentiary is not unconstitutional.
See Horn v. People of California,
321 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Cal. 1968).
Notwithstanding this conclusion,
the court does find merit in petitioners'
claims about the filing of relicious
reports by respondents Hanberry and
Beane. The testimony before this court
established that Rev. Hanberry an@ Fr.
Beane reqularly submit reports to the
caseworkers at the Atlanta penitentiary
in which they comment on the inmates’
participation or lack of participation
in their respective religious activities.
These reports, together with reports
from other staff members, are culled by the
caseworkers and form part of the inmates’
profiles which are presented to the
Board of Pardle when the inmates are
being considered for release on parole.
It is not inconceivable that the qrant
A-45
or denial of parole is hased to some deqree
on the religious reports submitted by the
chaplains.
In the court's view, the submission
of religious reports by respondents
Hanberry and Beane involves the Government
in a violation of the neutrality it must
maintain with resnect to religion. There
can be no doubt that an inmate whose file
contains a positive religious report
stands a better chance of being released
on parole than an inmate with a neutral
or negative religious report. Indeed,
it is likely that the inmates' very know-
ledge of the existence of these religious
reports may compel some to participate
in religious activities. The Government,
by allowing these religious reports to
be submitted, is in effect promoting
religion among inmates and indirectly
punishing the atheist, agnostic, or
Eclatarian who declines to participate
in these religious programs. This is
unconstitutional. As the Supreme Court
has declared:
“Government in our democracy, state
and national, must he neutral in matters
of religious theory, doctrine, and
practice. It may not be hostile to
any religion; and it may not aid, foster,
or promote one religion or religious
theory against another or even against
the militant opposite. The First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between
religion and religion, and between re1igion
and nonreligion." Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 103-104, 89 S.Ct., 266, 270,
21 L.Ed. 2d 228 (1968).
The court will accordingly enjoin the
submission of these religious reports by
respondents Hanberry and Beane. :
A~46
B. The "Free-"xercise" Claim
The chaplains at Atlanta and
Marion, as well as Rev. Silber, denied
Theriault's requests to hold religious
services hecause they felt the Church
of the New Song and the Eclatarian faith
were not "recognized." The insistence
by these federal employees that Theriault
and his followers meet this "recognition"
standard before they mignt freely exercise
their religious beliefs runs. squarely
afoul of the First Amendment$°) One of
the purposes of the First Amendment was
to prohibit the imposition by government
of any standard as a prerequisite to the
free exercise of religion. As the
Supreme Court has noted:
"By the time of the adoption
of the Constitution, our history shows
that there was a widespread awareness
among many Americans of the dangers of
a union of Church and States. These
people knew, some of them from bitter
personal experience, that one of the
greatest dangers to the freedom of the
individual to worship in his own way lay
in the Government's placing its official
stamp of approval upon one particular
kind of prayer or one particular form
of religious services. They knew the ar-
guish, hardship and bitter strife that
could come when zealous religious groups
struggled with one another to obtain
the Government's stamp of approval from
each King, Queen, or Protector that
came to temporary power.” Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S., 421, 429, 82, S..Ct. 1261, 1266,
8, L. Ed. 2d, 601 (1962).
But respondents go further. They argue
that Theriault's "religion" is not a re-
ligion at all but merely a random amalga-
mation of pseudo-political notions; that
his "church" is nothing but a collection
of some of the worst prisoners in the
federal system. Similar arguments were
offered by prison officials when so-called
Plack Muslim prisoners kegan suing in
federal court for religious freedom. One of
the first courts to deal with these argu-
ments responded as follows:
"Under freedom of religion in the
country a person has an absolute right
to embrace the religious belief of his
choice. The Constitution dves not define
‘religion' and reference to standard
sources of the meaning of words indicates
that there is not complete agreement
On even a definition of the term. Mor
is it the function of the court to con-
sider the merits or fallacies of a reli-
gion or to praise or condemn it, however
excellent or fanatical or preposterous
it may be. Whether one is right about
his religion is not a subject of knowledae
but only a matter of opinion. ;
"It is sufficient here to say that
one concept of religion calls for a be-
lief in the existence of a supreme being
controlling the destiny of man. That _
concept of religion is met by the Muslims
in that they believe in Allah, as a su-
prene being and as the one true god. It
follows, therefore, that the Muslim faith
is a religion." Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206
F. Suop. 370, 373 (D.D.C. 1962).
The record in this case amply reflects
the tenets, such as they are, of the
Church of the New Song and the Fclatarian
faith. The Eclatarian faithrul worship
a devine and universal spirit which they
identify as "Eclat" and which they he-
lieve manifests itself in all animate and
inanimate objects. Since each person is
thought to possess some of this universal
spirit, the Fcelatarians believe that :
loneliness may be overcome and true
brotherhood achieved if people became
A-48
more conscious of Eclat. Petitioners have
their own Eclatarian Sible,.their own
Eclatarian newsletter ("The Leaves"), their
own religious paraphernalia. A number of
inmates testified before this court that
Theriault and his teachings have had a
positive, rehabilitative effect upon their
lives anc have inspired them religiously.
This court is not unmindful of the very
real possibility that petitioners are still
engaging in a "game" and attempting to
perpetrate a colossal fraud upon both
this court and the federal prison system.
Nevertheless, with all due respect to
respondents, the court cannot declare peti-
tioners' religion illegitimate.
Respondents contend, however, that
even if the Eclatarian faith is not illegit-
imate, they need not permit its free exer-
cise in prison because Theriault and his
followers are violent and threaten the
security of the prison. Certainly if
respondents could show that a compvelling
and substantial public interest recuired
the subjucation of petitioners' First
Amendment rights, they would prevail.
Walker v. Blackwell 4 1 F. 2d 23 (5th Cir
1969) ("Walker rr) 4 ut the burden
upon respondents is heavy, and a cursory
review of the Black Muslim cases reveals
how very heavy that burden is.
In Cooper v. Pete, 324 F.2d 165 (7th
Cir. 1963), a state prisoner had filed
a civil rights claim alleging that he
was confined in punitive segregation and
deprived of religious rights because he was
a Black Muslim, and the district court had
dismissed the prisoner's petition. On
appeal the Attorney General of the State
of Illinois asked the Seventh Circuit to
take judicial notice of certain social
A-49
ewe
studies purporting to show that, "despite
its pretext of a religious facade," the Black
Muslim Movement was an organization dedicated
to the overthrow of the white race and to
the incitement of riots and violence inside
prison walls. The Attorney General also
asked the court to take judicial notice
of an official police study which document-
ed numerous acts of violence committed by
members of the Black Muslim Movement in
a variety of state and federal prisons,
including the Atlanta federal penitentiary.
The Seventh Circuit agreed to take
judicial notice of these studies and
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the
petition. The Supreme Court reversed and
held that the petition stated a valid cause
of action. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546,
84, S. Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1964).
On remand, the district court enjoined
prison officials from denying the petitioner
and other Black Muslim prisoners the
right to communicate with and visit mini-
sters of their faith and the right to
attend religious services conducted by them.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Cooper v.
Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967).
Similarly, in Long v. Parker, 384 U.S.
32, 86 S.Ct. 1285, 16 L.Ed.2d 333(1966),
the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of
a district court, which had been affirmed
by the Third Circuit, dismissing the
petition of a Black Muslim prisoner at
the federal penitentiary in Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania, whe complained of the
deprivation of religious rights. On remand,
the district court denied relief and relied
on its decisimin Desmond v. Blackwell,
235 F. Supp. 246 (M.D. Pa. 1964). In
Desmond the district court found that
Black Muslim meetings were devoted to
the doctrine of hate, that those attending
A-50
such meetings referred to staff as "monsters
of inferior intelligence," "devils", and
"sxunks,"” that the sunervision of such
meetings caused a depletion in the staff
force and made it less available for other
duties, that militarily-trained prisoners
known as the Fruit of the Islam stood guard
at the entrance to the meetings, that
some Black Muslims assaulted and stabhed
another prisoner in order to induce him
to join their faith, and that when discipli-
nary action had to he taken aqainst one
member of the group the entire membership
approached the control center of the in-
stitution and demanded his release from
administrative segregation. On appeal,
however, the Third Circuit vacated the
judgment of the district court and remanded
the case for further proceedings. Long v.
Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968).
The court found that the district court's
reliance on Desmond was misplaced and that:
"Mere antipathy caused by statements
derogatory of, and offensive to the white
race is not sufficient to justify the
suppression of religious literature even
in prison. Nor does the mere speculation
that such statements may ignite racial or
religious riots in a penal institution
warrant their prescription." At 822.
No one has testified that the Church
of the New Song preaches hate. There
was evidence, that Theriault kicked a
prison official, destroyed government
property, threatened security officers,'11)
and sent vile letters to a 5 dera?
district judge in Tllinois\! ‘owever, in
view of the Black Muslim cases, this
court cannot say on the basis of this
evidence that Theriault or his group are
so menacing that they should not be
allowed to freely exercise their religion.
A-51
The court finds that respondents have
failed to show a sufficiently compelling
public interest requiring the subjugation
of petitioners’ First Amendment rights.(13
Walker II, supra. Accordingly, it must
grant petitioners appropriate relief so
they may freely exercise their rights with-
in the context of a prison community.
l. Religious activities
This court interprets the First
Amendment as guarantéeing the right of
federal prisoners who share a common
religion to gather for devotional
meetings and to study the teachings
of that religion. This right cannot
be denied the members of the Church
of the New Song. Since respondent
Carlson has already promulgated a .
detailed policy statement - Bureau of
Prisons Policy Statement 7300.43A - concerr
ing the religious rights of federal prison-
ers, the court need only order him to
direct prison authorities to apply that
policy to petitioners.
Policy Statement 7300.43A
authorizes the scheduling of worship
services, religious nature "with
reasonable frequency” for all committed
offenders under superviscry procedures
established by the warden. It also
directs the prison chaplains to allocate
a proportionate share of the funds they
receive to meet the religious needs of
interested faith groups. Thus, for
example, the Black Muslims at the
Atlanta penitentiary are given meeting
space and permitted to meet twice weekly.
Respondent Beane, who serves as their
advisor in religious matters, revroduces
A-52
religious material for the Muslims on in-
stitutional equipment, permits them the
use Of a tape recorder, and coordinates
the purchase of various religious books
from the funds of the institution. Bethea
v. Daggett, 329 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ga. 1979
aff'd 444 F. 2d 112 (5th Cir. 1971).This
is not to say, of course, that respondenta
must pay for all the printing petitioners
seek or that the members of the Church of
the New Song may collect "tithes" to
fund their own activities. As in other
areas, prison officials should wisely
use their discretion in the handling of
these matters.
Since there are no ministers
of the Eclatarian faith outside pris-
on walls, prison authorities may not
disqualify Theriault from leading
religious services for his Church.
See Bethea v. Daggett, supra. This
does not mean Theriault is to be treated
as a privileged person; he has no more
"right" to a beard than any other inmate.
Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652
(5th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Wainwright,
419 F. 2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1970). And
while Theriault may preach the doctrines
of his faith - including the "Eclatarian
Demandate of Natural Rights" - at his re-
ligious gatherings, any proclamations
by him urging violence, riots, or in-
surrection, may be suppressed by prison
authorities and may afford the authori-
ties with a sufficient reason to dis-
continue the activities of the Church
of the New Song. Knuckles v. Prasse,
302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd,
435 F. 2a 1255 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 936, 91 S. Ct. 2262,
29 I. Fd. 24 717 (1971).
A-53
~—e
2. Religious Correspondence
The Fifth Circuit has heidc that
Black Ituslims and other federal prison-
ers may correspond with their. religious
leaders for spiritual guidance and
advice. Walker II, supra. It follows
that members of the Church of the New
Song may correspord with their religious
leader - Theriault - for spiritual
guidance and spiritual advice.
Of course, prison authorities
may ascertain the contents of such
correspondence to make certain that
what is sought is spiritual guidance
and spiritual advice. However, tney
may not simply characterize all corre-
spondence of the members of the Church
of the New Song as "nonreligious"
because of their subjective evaluations
of the Eclatarian faith.
Theriault has no "right" to corre-
spond with famous personalities to solicit
funds for his Church. Such correspon-
dence falls outside the scope of First
Amendment protection and may be con-
trolled by prison officials in the cus-
tomary manner. Shack v. Wainwright,
391 F.2d 608 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
392 U. S. 915, 88 S. Ct. 2078, 20 L. Ed.
2d 1374 (1968).
3. Punishment for Religious Activities
This court has found as fact
that Theriault was placed in punitive
segregation at Marion on April 1, 1971
solely to prevent him from holding ©
religious services for himself and his
followers. He remained in puniti’e seacre-
A-54
cc. cross-examine accusers, call wit-
gation thereafter and upon his transfer to nesses, and have legal counsel
Atlanta for the hearinas before this court or counsel substitute, and
he was summarily placed in punitive segrece d. written decisions with specific
tion where he is today.
Since the Marion authorities un-
constitutionally denied Theriault his
First Amendment rights and confined him
in punitive segregation solely because
he sought to exercise those richts, his
present confinement in punitive secre-
gation is unlawful and he must te restored
to the general prison population. Cooper
vs. Pate, 382 F. 2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967),
Howard v. Smyth, 365 F. 2d 428 (4th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 988,
87 S. Ct. 599, 17 L. Ed. 24 449 (1966) (14)
The court reiterates that authorities
may take whatever disciplinary measures
are necessary ~- including the imvoosition
of punitive segregation, - if Theriault
or his group begin to preach insurrection
or violence, or if they violate institu-
tional rules and regulations recuiring
punishment subsequent to the date of the
Opinion and order.
4. Other Matters
Petitioners have raised fcur other
issues which the court finds are unre.ated
to the central claim. They pray for.
(1) The right to give legal advice
to all members of their faith:
(2) The right, at disciplinary
hearings, to:
(a) a written copy of the
charce,
(b) a hearing before an im-
partial official,
A=-53
ee ee
findings and supporting decisions;
3 The right to subscribe to and receive
an Atlanta weekly publication called
"The Great Speckled Bird", and
4. The right to freely communicate
with the press and the publishing
media.
There has been no showing that
respondents have prevented inmates - whethe
they be members of the Church of the New
Song or not-from furnishing legal assis-
tance to other inmates in contravention of
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483, 89 S.
Ct. 747, 21 L. Ed 2d 718 (1969), and
Wainwright v. Coonts, 409 F. 2d 1337
(Sth Cir. 1969). Of course, vorison
officials may regulate the legal activities
of inmates and petitioners have not shown
that respondents have arbitrarily or capri-
ciously regulated their legal activities.
See Arey v. Peyton, 378 F. 2d 930 (4th
Cir. 1967).
This court is aware that some
recent decisions dealing with state
prisons have granted the procedural due
process rights sought by petitioners,
E.g. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621
(E.D. Va. 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier,
328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Never
theless, the court finds itself in agree-
ment with the observation of the Second
Circuit that the federal prisons already
afford inmates due process in discipli-
nary hearings (see Bureau of Prisons
Policy Statements 7400.€A) and that those
procedural rights which are not afforded
are not constitutionally mandated.
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2a 178 (2d
Cir. 1971), petition for cert. filed, 40
U.S.L.W. 3170 (U. S. Aug. 18, 1971) No. 7l-
246).
No evidence was adduced at the
hearings that petitioners ever requested
"The Great Speckled Bird" or that such
requests, if made, were denied. Peti-
tioners do not contend that this publi-
cation is a relicious newsletter of the
Church of the New Sono and no "free exer-
cise" issue is involved. Cf. Jackson
v. Godwin, 400 F. 2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
Prison officials may make reasonable
reculations as to the circulation of
magazines and newspapers and this court
will not interfere with such administra-
tive matters. Royal v. Clark, 447 F. 2d
501 (5th Cir. 1971).
Finally, the court notes tnrat
Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 1220.1A
(February 11, 1972) now permits federal
prisoners full access to the news media
through the Prisoners Mail Box. The
court also notes that under Bureau of
Prisons Policy Statement 7300.46 federal
prisoners may submit manuscripts for
publication so long as they do not deal
with the details of the author's life,
other inmates, criminal careers, and
matters currently in litigation, and so
long as they do not jeopardize the security
and discipline of federal prisons. The
court does not find the limitations in
Policy Statement 7300.46 unconstitutional
ana will not interfere with it. FPoyal
v. Clark, supra.
A-57
=.
ORDER
_ For the foregoing reasons
petitioners' petition for injunctive
and other relief is granted in part
and denied in part. It is granted
in part as follows:
(1) Respondents Fanberry anda
Beane are enjoined fror
preparing or submitting
Oral or written reports
to other staff members of
the Atlanta federal
penitentiary concerning the
religious activities of in-
dividual inmates at that
penitentiary;
(2) Respondent Carlsen and re-
spondent Silber are ordered
to direct prison authorities
uncer their jurisdiction to
grant petitioners the right
to freely exercise their reli-
gion, including the right to
correspond with petitioner
Theriault for the purpose of
seeking spiritual guidance,
as regulated by Bureau of
Prisons Policy Statemert
7300.43A and in accordance
with the opinion of this
court;
(3) Respondent Henderson is
hereby ordered to immediately
release petitioner Theriault
from confinement in punitive
segregation and restore him to
the general prison population; ari
A~58
(4)
Respondent Carlson is hereby
ordered to instruct prison .
authorities under his jurisdi- 2
ction that they may not re-impose
confinement in punitive segre-
gation upon petitioner Theriault
unless Theriault violates an in-
etitutional rule or regulation
requiring such confinement sub-
sequent to the date of this ;
opinion and order or incites
riot or insurrection during the
conduct of his religious activ-
ities subsequent to the date of
this opinion and order.
In all other respects it is denied.
It is so ordered.
A-59 )
FOOTNOTES
Theriault testified that he Aerives
his authority to be "Bishop of
Tellus" (Bishop of the Farth) from
the Book of Fevelations of the
New Testament. Chapter 3, Verse 3
of the Book of revelations states:
"Remember, then what you
received and heard; keep that, and
repent. If you will not awake, I
will come like a thief, anc you will
not know at what hour I will come
upon you." (Emphasis added.)
Theriault, who is incarcerated for
robbery, claims that he is that
"thieft”.
Theriault testified that the name
of the Church is cerivede fror the
"new song" that the younger gener-
ation is now sincing as weil as
from the "new sonc" of the new era
described in the 300k of Revelations,
59:9 and 14:3 ("|. . . and they sang
a new song").
According to Theriault, Felat is
the "new name" of the Civinity
referred to in the Book of Revela-
tions 3:12. The Eclatarian faithful,
aside from one secretary, are to be
found only in the federal peniten-
tiaries of Atlanta and Marion.
The text of the chaplain's letter to
Rev. Silber is as follows:
"FREDERICK SILBER, 25 Sept 79
DIRECTOR OF Cli. SERV.
BUREAU OF PRISONS,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
A-60
VIILLIAM G. EZ=LL,
PROTESTANT CYAPLAIN
U. S. PENITENTIARY,
MARION, ILLI:NOIS
RECOGNITION OF CHURCH
GROUPS
As you know, Harr: Theriault,
#90987, was transferred to Marion
from the Atlanta venitentiary. He re-
presents himself as a Zishop in the
Church of the New Sonc.
His initial moves to have use 0%
the chapel, distribute literature and
hold study classes have been denied. The
reason for such denial is that he is not
recognized as a churc>. He now comes
with a letter addressee? to a Universal
Life Church in Modestc, California re-
questince a church charter, etc. It is
reportec that he has «his kind of charter
for the church he had in the penitentiary
in Atlanta. There are no doubt 'diplo-
ma mills', etc. who for fees or favors
would send him the necessary papers
ana documents. ‘Je will have a check by
a probation officer in this area made
on this particular man and church.
When Theriault is denied one place,
he goes another. He has some of our
Staff involved now in his requests for
recognition. There is little question
that if we deny his efforts to secure
documents that there ';ill be writs, etc.
Therefore, if you have previous exper-
ience in similar cases or could advise
us, it would be appreciated. Also, .
we want to advise you of this case
sO you vould not be unaware.
A-61
The move with him has been rade with
diplomacy and while it is not an
emercency, it could develov. Any help
in this matter would be anpreciatec.
WGE: kw"
5. The text of the memorancum is as
follows: au
"SUBJECT: Theriaults [sic] activities
and oraanizetion of in-
mates. (90987-1311)
e vast quarter in "F' unit,
I have ouserved Thexiaulte {sic] -gigridiabata
both in and out of the unit. Following
is a listing of incidents anc wg ae
tions that has led me to believe e oe
formulatec a strong, radical power str
ure in this institution and others.
Also, it would not be hard to believe,
he may have some followers on the outside.
Theriault has organized a group called
"The New Church of World Song or rear
thino similar to this. Ne is rindi ncaag
and members address him as agrees a
Others have been ordained as minis Pai
by him. I have no 1aea, as to stg :
this orcanization might be.— Sore i
vestigation would reveal this.
Kessler 1707-135, E-B-10, attempted
to assist Theriault in his dut 23 * F
orderly, a few weeks ago. Both gen
warned and Kessler sent out of — °
This time I was informed icles om aa
one of his ministers and as such shou be
allowed to assist him.
t, when
Theriault was greatly voset,
Gomez F-C 18, was taken to F Unit the
A~62
First time and became very inquisitive
fter informince me this was another of
his ministers and seezec to convey to me
1}
that he should he aiven this information
because he was Gomez Sishop.
He has constantly “eot occuvied, writ-
ing writs and other lecal papers for
the inmate population. This seems to he
a very big business, <nat occupies most
of his time.
Arnold from I unit recently made
an attempt to assist in the orderly work
and again both were warned. Minshew
F-A-9 has assisted Theriault on a few
occasions, before beinc assigned to the
Food Service detail.
Mr. Temper returnec some pavers to
him recently, advisinc “im they could
not be sent out. He immediately
asked me to call Mr. “eohane. I
compiled and was edvisec that lir. EAmonds
was in charge that da‘. Mr. Edmonds
would not give Theriazlt permission to
send the papers out. Theriault became
very upset and proceecec to say this was
a conspiracy to prevent him from mailing
this material. He nroceeded to use
several colorful adjectives to descrihe
Mr. Fdmrond to Welty F-A-8. I advised him
to be careful in using these terms in
relation to staff mem-ers. His corment
was "Freedom of speecn, man.‘ Durina
the discussion, Welty advised him, the
matter should be taker to the Warden and
not mess with these veople.
Theriault became cuite frustrated
after not being allowed to visit Alderislo
85719-132 in the hospital (12-10-70).
A-63
He seemed to think regulations does not
apply to him as one perittinag his position.
I was told he held a meeting in the
V.T. building (12/11/79), with several
members of his group. This can he
verified by the Suvervisor of the
evening watch and the V.T. officer.
We left the unit 12/12/70 with a NRible.
I believe he conducted a meeting some-
where on this date. This would need
some checking. Gomez attempted to
attend Mr. Sumners [sic] group on this
date but suddenly changed his mind. He
seemec to have some purpose in checking
the group. ‘
I have observed Cavpnola 1642-135,
Heard, Kolburg 27388-138 and several
other inmates, either contacting or
being contacted by Theriault. _
Considering these incidents and
other information gathered durina
these past days, I feel Theriault
has shown great disregard for the
institutional authority and regulations
and has went about setting up this
organization, with him as the central
power figure, utilizing the talents
of several key figures as ministers.
This group has members of all races
and has the characteristics of an
extremist group on the far left, com-
pletely against the system (whatever
it may consist of) and will let nothing
stop or stand in its way.
It is my opinion, that if something
is not done to control the activities
of Theriault, we will have an incident
in the near future causing darace
to the institution proper or injuries
A-64
to versonnel to compel agreement to the
grouvs [sic] demands."
6. The text ot the report vorepared
by Culley on the incident is as
follows:
"At approximately 5:30 pm [sic]
this evening Theriault approached Mr.
J. White C/S and myself in the east
corridor and demanded a place to hold
a religious service. I exrlained
to him that to hold a meeting of a
religious nature he would have to
obtain approval of the Administration
by working through the Chaplain. Fe
would not accent this as an answer to
his question or demand. At this time
he appeared to be cetting emotional,
so I asked him to step into the office
and we would discuss the matter.
"To take away the opportunity of
Theriault creating am incident, if he
so desired, I kept him in the office
until the evening yard was closec and
we had began[sic] to count.
"During our talk in the otfice,
Theriault still demanded to be
permitted to worship his lord in a
place where other inmates could come
if they so desired.
"He stated he would hold his
services and 1f I attempted to break
it up, I would have to resort to violence
because no one would leave if T instructed
them to leave. As Theriault left the
office for count [sic] he commentec,
I will do what I feel T have to.
A-65
"as a preventive [sic] measure toward
any type of incident taking place as he
indicated, I placed him in F-Unit
immediately after count before the ceneral
population was released for evenine
activities.
"Theriault offered no resistance curing
the move. He asked if this was ny
decision or had I called someone.
told him it was mine. He then stated,
"Can't we come to an understandina, I
Gidn't say I was going to do it tonight.'
He further stated that he woulée do as
I instructed.
"In H-Unit, [sic] Theriault refused
to remove: his cle*hing for a shakecown.
It was very clear that he wented the
staff to man-handle him. His pockets
were emptied, belt removed and he was
given a very thorough frisk shakecown.
“oO assure the chance of contraband not
being introduced into the unit, Theriault
was placed in a closed front cell.
NOTE: At approximately 9:00 po m [sic]
I visited with Theriault in H-Unit. I
asked if he was willing to submit to
a strip shakedown. He stated, "I am
not playing your silly games and if vou
try something there will be violence.'
I advised him again why he was in the
closed front cell and if he submitted
to the shske-down [sic] I would move
him to the front at this time. He
would not have anything to do with
the reauest.
/s/3C"
A-66
10.
That night Theriault destroyed part of
his H-Unit cell and the next day both
kicked and threatened a secvrity offi-
cer.
On October 28, 1971, prior to
Theriault's transfer to Atlanta,
the Special Intelligence Suvervisor
at the Atlanta penitentiary circu-
lated a memorandum advisine all
staff that Theriault wrs tc be
placed in seareaation uvon his
reception at Atlanta anc was not
to be removed from seqrecation
without the approval of the Associate
“Yarden - Controls. When Theriault
was received back to Atlanta on
November 6, 1971, he was placed in
the Secregation Unit in accordance
with the October 28th memorandum.
It appears also to run afoul of
Policy Statement 7300.43A of the
Bureau of Prisons which was issued
by respondent Carlson. That State-
ment commits the Pureau to extendine
the greatest amount of reliaious
freedom possible within a prison
context to committed offencers,
and assisting them in the vractice
of "the religion of their choice."
Nowhere in the Statement is there
an indication that only "recognized"
religions can be practiced.
This same standarec has heen applied
in cases dealing with state insti-
tutions. F. gq. Brown v. Peyton, 437
F. 2€ 1228 (4th Cir. 1971). In Lone
v. Parker, 390 F. 2d 816 (3rd Cir.
1968), and Banks v. Havener, 234
F. Supp. 27 (F. D. Va. 1964),
- A-67
however, a "“cle@rand present danger"
test was enunciated. In a thouchtful
note, Judge Higginbotham has sucaested
that the "clea and present danger" test
might be inapplicable in the context
of a prison community and that a less
rigorous “clear and probable dancer" test
might be more appropriate so that vrison
officials need not suffer a catastrovhic
riot in order to create a factual record
sufficient to justify the imposition
of restraints. Knuckles v. Prasse,
302 F. Supp. 1036, 1048-49 (E.D. Pa.
1969). aff'd 435 F. 24 1255 (3d Cir.
1970), cert. denied 493 U.S. 936. 91
S. Ct. 2262, 29 L.Ed 24 717 (1971).
Judce Fiaginbotham's observa-
tions have much appeal. However,
in the instant case, this court con-
cludes that respondents have not even
shown a clear ane probable dancer enman-
ating from Theriault or the Church of
the New Song.
ll. Prison officials from Marion
testified that Theriault's
threats caused them to fear
he anc his group micht engace
in violent and disruptive
actions, and they characterized
Theriault as a serious security
risk. However,in response to
questions from the bench, these
officials admitted they would
characterize all the inmates of
Marion as serious security risks,
and the regular worship services
are held at Marion for these inmates.
A--68
12.
13.
It is a federal offense to send
any mail which threatens to in-
jure the person of the addressee.
18 U.S.C. §876 (1970). A person
who commits this offense is liahle
to a $10,000 fine or up to five years
in prison. The vile letters which
Theriault sent to the judge were
brought to the attention of the
warden at Marion an@ resnonéent
Carlson. Nevertheless, the
letters were apparently not deemed
sufficiently threatening to warrant
criminal prosecution.
The issues involved in this case
might also be cast in an "eoual
protection” setting. Although
the instant case involves a
federal penal institution and the
actions of federal employees so
that the Faual Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is
inapplicable, the Supreme Court
has read "equal protection” notions
into the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment (which does
apply to the federal government) and
has held tret federal action may
be so discriminatory as to be
violative of due process. Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct.
1322, 22 L.Fd. 2d 600 (1969);
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163,
84 S. Ct. 1187, 12 L.Ed. 24a 218
(1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 74 S. Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed.
884 (1954).
Nevertheless, since this court
A-69
finds amole room within the Free Bxer-
cise Clause to cover the issue in this
case (see Brown v. Peyton, supra) and
since the Supreme Court itself has
warned that the “ecual vorotection
and "due process" concepts may not
be alwavs interchanaeehle (Rolling v.
Sharpe, supra at 499, 74S. Ct. 693),
the court will rest its conclusions on
the First Amendment.
° here is no basis in the record
= - support Theriault's claim that
he was transferred to Marion in
1970 solely hecause he filed his
petition in this court. Had there
been such a basis, the court might
have branded the transfer an abuse
of administrative discretion.
Cf., Lawrence v. Willingham,
373 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1967).
A-70
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.