Appendix — Girard v. Schweitzer
Supreme Court brief1979
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Supreme Court, U, 71
FILED
JAN @ 1979
|
° JR., CLERK
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1978
No. 78-1046
JOHN J. GIRARD, et al.,
Petitioners,
.
GORDON D. SCHWEITZER, Sheriff of the City of St. Louis,
Successor to BENJAMIN GOINS,
Respondent.
SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
JEROME J. DUFF
JAMES E. HECKEL
1139 Olive Street, Suite 302
St. Louis, Missouri 63101
Co-Counsel for Petitioners
December .., 1978
St. Louis Law Printing Co.,. Inc., 812 Olive Street 63101 314-231-4477
a al
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1978
No. 78-1046
JOHN J. GIRARD, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
GORDON D. SCHWEITZER, Sheriff of the City of St. Louis,
Successor to BENJAMIN GOINS,
Respondent.
SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
This order was issued by the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals on December 29, 1978, amending, for clarification, its
orders of September 29, 1978 (A-39, 40) denying probable
cause for appeal to each of the eleven (11) petitioners for cer-
tiorari herein.
pony pee
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
No. 78-1700
John J. Girard, John E. Taylor,
Appellants,
and
Eugene P. Grossmann, Charles E.
Kelting, Louis H. Feldhaus,
Dudley Alsop, Ronald McKen-
zie, Wray Hambrick, Jerry
Becht, Michael Manion, and {
Ron Hosfeld,
Appellants,
vs.
Benjamin Goins, Sheriff of the City
of St. Louis,
Appellee.
4
,
September Term, 1978
Appeal from the United
States District Court
for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Missouri.
The order entered by this Court on September 29, 1978 is
A true copy.
Attest: Robert C. Tucker
hereby amended to reflect the correct caption of the case in
this Court as it is now shown in this order.
December 29, 1978
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Girard et al. v. Goins, Sheriff,
Now reported as:
575 F(2) 160 (8th Cir., 1978)
The page references in the petition for certiorari are to
575 F(2).
_— >
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
No. 78-1043
John Girard, John E. Taylor, Eugene
P. Grossman, Charles E. Kelting,
Louis H. Feldhaus, Dudley Alsop,
Ronald McKenzie, Wray Hambrick, Appeal from the
Jerry Becht, Michael Manion and United States Dis-
Ron Hosfeld, trict Court for the
Eastern District of
Missouri.
Appellants,
v.
Benjamin Goins, Sheriff of The City of
St. Louis,
Appellee. |
Submitted: February 15, 1978
Filed: April 13, 1978
Before HEANEY, STEPHENSON and HENLEY, Circuit
Judges.
HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
The eleven petitioners' appeal from the District Court’s denial
of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254 from fines and
sentences imposed upon their conviction for criminal contempt
1 The petitioners filed separate petitions in the District Court, but
subsequently requested that the cases be consolidated. This Court
ordered the cases to be consolidated on appeal.
— A-44 —
by the Circuit Court of St. Louis. Their principal contention
is that the failure of the Circuit Court to offer them a jury trial
violated their constitutional right to a jury trial. They also con-
tend that the record is void of evidence to support their convic-
tions and that the Circuit Court’s orders of commitment and
judgment are fatally defective. We reverse and remand for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The petitioners are all members or officers of the Brewery
Drivers and Helpers Local Union No. 133 of St. Louis.2 The
incidents forming the basis for the convictions occurred dur-
ing the course of a long strike by the local union against the
wholesale beer distributors in the St. Louis metropolitan area
and are described in detail in State ex rel. Girard v. Perpich,
557 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). During the course of
the strike, the Circuit Court® issued orders restraining mem-
bers of the local union from harassing, intimidating, frighten-
ing and interfering with customers of the beer distributors.
The orders were issued on April 22 and 28, 1976. On May
28, the beer distributors filed a motion for the issuance of con-
tempt citations for violations of the restraining orders. The Cir-
cuit Court held a preliminary hearing from June 1 to 3, and
found probable cause to issue contempt citations. Each of the
petitioners! was served with a notice of prosecution and was
ordered to appear on June 10 to show cause why they should
2 The local union is affiliated with the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
* The Circuit Court acted in response to a petition filed by Lohr
Distributing Company, Inc., which was the exclusive distributor for
Anheuser-Busch products within the City of St. Louis. The petition
was subsequently amended to include claims by Grey Eagle Distrib-
rae Inc., the exclusive Anheuser-Busch distributor for St. Louis
ounty.
* Ten individuals, other than petitioners, were also served with
notices of prosecution for contempt. Nine were acquitted by the Cir-
cuit Court. The tenth was convicted but was ee by Missouri
Court of Appeals. State ex rel. Girard v. Perpich, 557 S.W.2d 25,
40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
om Apb§ on
not be held in contempt of court. The attorney for the beer
distributors was appointed special prosecutor and further tes-
timony was taken at the June 10 hearing. The parties stipu-
lated that evidence presented at the preliminary hearing be
admitted for the consideration of the Circuit Court. On June
24, the Circuit Court found the petitioners guilty of criminal
contempt and imposed the following sentences and fines:
Confinement Fine
John J. Girard 40 days $10,000
John E. Taylor 40 days $10,000
Eugene P. Grossman 10 days $ 2,500
Charles E. Kelting 10 days $ 2,500
Louis H. Feldhaus 10 days $ 2,500
Dudley Alsop 10 days $ 2,500
Ronald McKenzie 30 days $ 5,000"
Wray Hambrick -— $ 2,500
Jerry Becht o $ 2,500
Michael Manion — $ 5,000°
Ron Hosfeld — $ 2,500
None of the petitioners has as yet been confined or paid their
fines. In a hearing before the Circuit Court on December 28,
the petitioners stipulated that the local union had agreed to
pay their fines.
The petitioners sought, and were denied, habeas corpus re-
lief in the Missouri Court of Appeals. State ex rel. Girard v.
Perpich, supra. They then sought habeas corpus relief from the
5 Both Ronald McKenzie and Michael Manion were convicted of
violations of more than one of the paragraphs of the restraining order.
McKenzie received a sentence of thirty days and a fine of $2,500
for one violation and a fine of $2,500 for another. Manion received
two $2,500 fines.
6 See n.5, supra.
— A-46 —
Missouri Supreme Court which denied relief for the reasons
stated by the Court of Appeals “plus the fact that the additional
allegations in the petition{s] filed in this court state no basis
on which petitioner[s are] entitled to relief{.]” State ex rel.
Girard et al. v. Benjamin Goins, Sheriff, Nos. 60393 through
60403 (Mo., filed December 19, 1977). The petitioners finally
brought this action in federal district court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Missouri seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254. The
District Court denied relief in an order on January 11, 1978.
I
We consider whether the petitioners had a constitutional right
to a jury trial in light of the severity of the fines and sentences
imposed upon them for their conviction for criminal contempt.
Before we reach the merits of this issue, however, we must
initially determine whether they waived any right to a jury
trial that they might have and whether they exhausted their
state remedies.
The District Court held that the petitioners had waived their
right to a jury trial because they agreed that the Circuit Court
could consider testimony from the preliminary hearing in deter-
mining whether or not they were guilty of criminal contempt.
It also noted that the petitioners did not request a jury trial.
We cannot agree that the petitioners waived their constitutional
right to a jury trial. “oth the Missouri and the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure provide that the right to a jury trial per-
sists until it has been appropriately waived. Fed.R.Crim.P.
23(a); Mo.R.Crim.P. 26.01(a). In order for such an important
constitutional right to be waived “there must be an express,
positive waiver—as distinguished from mere failure to request
a jury.” Douglass v. First Nat. Rity. Corp., 543 F.2d 894, 900 n.
37 (D.C. Cir. 1976). We have carefully reviewed the record,
paying particular attention to the agreement that the Circuit
—_ oe
Court could consider the evidence given at the preliminary
hearing and find nothing indicating that the petitioners ex-
pressly waived their right to a jury trial. The petitioners were
not offered a jury trial—they merely acquiesced in non-jury
proceedings.‘ Such acquiescence does not amount to an ex-
press waiver of the right to a jury trial, see Douglas v. First Nat.
Rity. Corp., supra at 899-900 n.37, 902, particularly when
none of the petitioners were aware that the Circuit Court con-
templated imposing fines and sentences as severe as those im-
posed here.
We next must consider whether the petitioners exhausted
their state remedies with respect to their right to a jury trial.
The petitioners first made a claim with respect to the denial of a
jury trial when they contended, in their motion for a new trial,
that their punishment was cruel and unusual because they had
been denied a jury trial. The issue was next raised by four of
the petitioners in their petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the
Missouri Court of Appeals.” However, the issue was not pursued
in briefs or oral argument before the Court of Appeals, and that
7 We recognize the difficulty in administering the rule that con-
temnors are entitled to a jury trial in cases of serious criminal con-
tempt. The rule requires the trial court to make a preliminary pretrial
assessment of the matter in order to determine whether or not to
proffer a jury trial. See Douglass v. First Nat. Rity. Corp., 543 F.2d
894, 903 (DC. Cir. 1976). The obvious answer to the problem is
to proffer a jury trial in those cases in which it appears that circum-
stances may require imprisonment for more than six months or the
imposition of a fine of such magnitude to constitute a serious offense.
* Under Missouri law, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
merely a preliminary document and the issues raised are determined
by “hake to the return and the traverse. See Ryan v. Wyrick,
518 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Curtis v. Tozer, 374 S.W.
2d 557, 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Wolff and Passante, Habeas
Corpus, 24 ST. LOUIS B. J., No. 3, 36, 37 (1978). Thus, the a
pellee contends that the right to a jury trial issue was not properly
raised by the petitioners in the Missouri Court of Appeals. We need
not reach this question since it is clear that the issue was properly
raised in the Missouri Supreme Court.
— A-48 —
Court did not mention the issue in its opinion. Each of the
petitioners raised the issue in their petitions for writs of habeas
corpus in the Missouri Supreme Court. The special prosecutor
devoted four of fifteen pages in his responsive brief to arguments
answering the petitioners’ contentions on this issue. The Mis-
souri Supreme Court did not specifically address the issue. It
denied the writs on the basis of the opinion of the Missouri
Court of Appeals. However, it also stated that petitioners were
not entitled to relief on any of the additional issues raised before
it. The United States Supreme Court has recently stated that:
It is too obvious to merit extended discussion that
whether the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)
has been satisfied cannot turn upon whether a state appel-
late court chooses to ignore in its opinion a federal con-
stitutional claim squarely raised in petitioner's brief in the
state court, and, indeed, in this case, vigorously opposed
in the State’s brief.
Smith v. Digmon, 98 S.Ct. 597, 599 (1978).
In light of Smith v. Digmon, supra, and under the circumstances
of this case, we hold that the petitioners have exhausted their
state remedies with respect to their constitutional claim of a
right to a jury trial.
Since we have held that the petitioners did not waive their
right to a jury trial and have exhausted their state remedies,
we consider the merits of the petitioners’ constitutional claim.
Historically, both the state and federal courts have exercised
the power to punish criminal contempt without a jury trial. See
generally Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Note, Consti-
tutional Law: The Supreme Court Constructs a Limited Right to
Trial by Jury for Federal Criminal Contemnors, 1967 DUKE
L. J. 632; Annot., Supreme Court's Views as to Right to Trial
by Jury in Contempt Proceedings, 45 L.Ed.2d 815 (1974)
(hereinafter cited as Annot.). However, in 1966, the Supreme
—
Court recognized the right to a jury trial in serious federal
criminal contempt cases. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 US.
373 (1966). After the Supreme Court held, in 1968, that the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was binding on the states,
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), it then held that
the right to a jury trial extended to serious state criminal con-
tempts. Bloom v. Illinois, supra. Thus, the petitioners are only
entitled to a jury trial if the criminal contempt was a “serious”
as opposed to a “petty” offense.
The “exact location of the line between petty offenses and
serious crimes” has not been clearly established. Duncan v.
Louisiana, supra at 161. The seriousness or pettiness of an
Offense is usually determined by reference to the punishment
authorized by the statute. See Annot., supra at 819. The Su-
preme Court has held that “when the legislature has not expressed
a judgment as to the seriousness of an offense by fixing a maxi-
mum penalty which may be imposed, we are to look to the
penalty actually imposed as the best evidence of the seriousness
of the offense.” Bloom v. Illinois, supra at 211. By analogy,
the Supreme Court has looked to the definition of petty offenses
under 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) which provides that a petty offense
is one “the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for
a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both.”
While the Supreme Court has stressed that the definition should
not be accorded “talismanic significance,” Muniz v. Hoffman,
422 U.S. 454, 477 (1974), it has held that imprisonment
of a contemnor for longer than six months without also granting
an opportunity for a jury trial is constitutionally impermissible.
See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974); Taylor
v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Frank v. United States, 395
U.S. 147 (1969). It has held, however, that it “cannot accept
the proposition that a contempt must be considered a serious
crime under all circumstances where the punishment is a fine
of more than $500, unaccompanied by imprisonment. * * *
From the standpoint of determining the seriousness of the
— A-50 —
risk and the extent of the possible deprivation faced by a con-
temnor, imprisonment and fines are intrinsically different.”
Muniz v. Hoffman, supra at 477. Applying this rationale, the
Supreme Court held in Muniz v. Hoffman, supra, that while a
criminal contempt fine of $10,000 assessed against a large local
union was not insubstantial, it was not of such magnitude to
trigger a right to a jury trial.
In this case, the penalties imposed ranged from a fine of
$10,000 and a sentence of forty days, to a fine of $2,500 and
no sentence. The sentences imposed are not alone enough to
require that an opportunity for a jury trial be offered to the
contemnors. Thus, we must apply the Muniz standard of the
“seriousness of the risk and the extent of the possible depriva-
tion.” Jd. In this case, unlike Muniz, the fines were assessed
against the individual contemnors. The fact that the local union
later agreed to pay the fines is not relevant as the trial court
had already imposed the fines and thus made its determination
of the seriousness of the offense. Cf. United States v. Hamdan,
552 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1977); Douglass v. First Nat. Rity.
Corp., supra at 902-903. Moreover, the primary responsibility
for the payment of the fines remains with the individual peti-
tioners as the commitment by the local union to pay the fines
may be subject to challenge.®
In cases since Muniz, two circuits have noted that the poten-
tial impact of a large fine is immensely greater where the con-
temnor is an individual. United States v. Hamdan, supra at 280;
Douglass v. First Nat. Rity. Corp., supra at 902. In Douglass v.
First Nat. Rity. Corp., supra, the District of Columbia Circuit
held that a $5,000 fine could not be assessed against an indi-
® The opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals states that the
local union agreed to pay the stra fines for them. State ex rel.
Girard v. Perpich, supra at 35 n.11. However, neither the Missouri
Court of Appeals opinion nor the record before this Court reveals
whether the commitment was made by union officers, the union execu-
tive committee or by a vote of the full local union membership.
— A-51 —
vidual in a non-jury criminal contempt proceeding. In United
States v. Hamdan, supra, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant
found guilty of an offense punisiable by a possible $1,000 fine
or up to six-months imprisonment was entitled to a jury trial.
Both the circuits have indicated that until further guidance is
received from the Supreme Court, “they feel that it is not un-
realistic to treat any fine in excess of $500 as a serious matter
to all individuals.” United States v. Hamdan, supra at 280;
Douglass v. First Nat. Rity. Corp., supra at 902. While we are
unwilling to establish the principle in this Circuit that any fine
assessed against an individual in excess of $500 is of such magni-
tude to constitute a serious offense, we have no difficulty in hold-
ing on the basis of this record that fines ranging from $2,500 to
$10,000 assessed against the individual petitioners do indeed
constitute a serious offense.
For this reason, we are of the view that the failure of the Cir-
cuit Court to affirmatively offer the petitioners a jury trial was
a violation of their constitutional right in light of the severity of
the fines and sentences imposed for criminal contempt. Since
this is a state case, we do not have authority to revise the sen-
tence ourselves as we would in a federal case. See Cheff v.
Schnackenberg, supra at 380; Douglass v. First Nat. Rliy. Corp.,
supra at 903. However, if the state court reduces the fines to a
non-serious level, then a jury trial would not be required. See
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496 (1974). We, therefore,
remand the case to the District Court with directions to it to
issue the requested writs of habeas corpus unless the Circuit
Court of the City of St. Louis either reduces the fines to the level
of a non-serious offense or provides the petitioners with an op-
portunity for a new trial with a jury within a reasonable time.
II
The petitioners next contend that the record is void of evi-
dence to support their criminal contempt convictions. Federal
— A-52 —
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254 is only available to the
ground of insufficiency of the evidence if there is a total lack of
evidence to sustain the state conviction. White v. Wyrick, 530
F.2d 818, 819 (8th Cir. 1976); Cunha v. Brewer, 511 F.2d
894, 898 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975). We
cannot agree that there is a total lack of evidence to support the
petitioners’ criminal contempt convictions. See State ex rel.
Girard v. Perpich, supra. Since there is at least some credible
evidence on the record supporting each of the petitioners’ con-
victions, their petitions for relief on this ground must be denied.
Ill
The petitioners’ final contention is that the Circuit Court's
orders of commitment and judgment are fatally defective and
are, therefore, unenforceable and void. The orders of commit-
ment require the petitioners to pay court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees to be assessed by the court. Since the court has
not yet fixed costs and attorney's fees,’® the petitioners contend
that the orders improperly subject them to an indefinite confine-
ment. They also contend that Missouri law forbids any award
of attorney's fees to a special prosecutor in a criminal contempt
proceeding.
This contention has not been raised by the petitioners in any
of the proceedings in state courts. It was first raised in the Dis-
trict Court. The petitioners contend that the order of commit-
ment cannot be clarified or changed by the state courts. How-
ever, as the District Court noted, Mo.R.Crim.P. 27.26 “spe-
cifically provides for motions to vacate or correct an unlawful
or unconstitutional sentence.” The parties have not filed a Rule
27.26 motion, nor have they otherwise presented this issue to
10 We note that the record of a hearing held in the Circuit Court
on December 28, 1976, reflects an understanding among the parties
that the assessment of costs and attorney's fees would be held in abey-
ance pending appeal.
a ©
state courts. Under 28 U.S.C. §2254(b) and (c), all available
state remedies must be exhausted before a writ of habeas corpus
may issue. See, e.g., Bonner v. Wyrick, 563 F.2d 1293 (8th
Cir. 1977); Tyler.v. Swenson, 527 F.2d 877 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 915 (1976). Accordingly, this issue cannot
be raised at this time since the petitioners have failed to exhaust
their state remedies.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIR-
CUIT.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.