Petition — Carr v. United States

Supreme Court brief1979

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S

October Term, 1978

NO. Ae <4

BENJAMIN CARR, JR.,

l, Supreme Court, U. aii

FILED

DEC 18 1978

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

AND APPENDIX

JOHN R. WILLIAMS

265 Church Street

New Haven, CT.

(203) 562-9931

06510

Attorney for Petitioner

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT .......1

CPERION BORON os ose vccccecscvsecneeees3

CUE hin ove an tcdnsnwcecncecesanwed

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ..........4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........cesseeee005

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT: ........15

I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED

TO RESOLVE THE APPARENT INCON-

SISTENCY BETWEEN THE RULING

BELOW AND THIS COURT'S HOLDINGS

IN DOYLE V. OHIO AND UNITED

CORRE Vi. CGI S «is does scene 05 c ee K8

CONCLUSION ee ee ee ee ee eee ee

(ii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) .....15

United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d

994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 404

WiB BES CIST7T) cscvcccescsccseccceovedl

United States v. Hale, 422 U.S.

L71 (1975S) wccccccvccces cceevccceecaePas

United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d

1160 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied

425 U.S. 950 (1976) ..ccccccccccecce lB

United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d

S75 Cth Cis. LPTT) wvciccscevcccecsee if

United States v. Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d

SES COB CES. F9ST) cccveccedsceccerdh, 18

United States v. Williams, 464 F.2d

927 (Sth Cir. 1972) ccccccccceces ooeeedd

IN THE

that a writ of certiorari issue to

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES prays tha r

i jud t of the United States

October Term, 1978 review the judgment o e Un

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

NO. entered in the above case on October 10,

1978, a motion for rehearing having been

BENJAMIN CARR, JR.,

denied on November 28, 1978.

Petitioner,

-VS-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

To the Honorable, the Chief Justice of

the United States, and the Associate

Justices of the Supreme Court of the

United States:

The petitioner, Benjamin Carr, Jr.,

appellant in the court below, respectfully

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit, affir-

ming the Petitioner's conviction in the

United States District Court for the

District of Connecticut, is set forth at

page la of the Appendix.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit, affir-

ming the Petitioner's conviction, was

entered on October 10, 1978, and its order

denying a timely motion for rehearing was

filed on November 28, 1978. The jurisdic-

tion of this Court is invoked pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Does the Government's impeachment

of an important defense witness in a

criminal trial, by showing that the wit-

ness previously exercised his Fifth Amend-

ment right of silence, deprive the defen-

dant of a fundamentally fair trial?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Following a jury trial in the District

of Connecticut, the petitioner was con-

victed of knowingly receiving firearms

which had moved in interstate commerce,

being himself a previously-convicted felon,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(h) (1). The

Government claimed the receiving had

occurred on August 17, 1976, when the

petitioner allegedly picked up the weapons

at a New Haven pawn shop.

The petitioner and several members of

his family had been arrested later that

day by New Haven police officers, while

passengers in an automobile owned and

operated by a girlfriend of the petition-

er's son Dennis. The guns were in the

automobile's locked trunk. All occupants

of the automobile were charged with carry-

ing firearms in a motor vehicle, a felony

under Connecticut law.

All the state charges were nolled the

following winter, although under Connect-

icut law they were subject to being re-

Opened until August 17, 1981. The peti-

tioner was indicted on the federal charges

on September 7, aT ys

James Aiken, the petitioner's nephew,

was arrested by New Haven police along

with the petitioner and his sons on

August 17, 1976, and like them was charged

with carrying in a motor vehicle the fire-

arms which later became the ‘subject of

this prosecution. He testified at trial

in the district court that the defendant's

son, Dennis, had received the guns at the

pawn shop, and that he had helped Dennis

placed them in the trunk of the automobile

in which all later were arrested.

Over defense objections, the Government

was permitted to impeach Mr. Aiken on

cross-examination by showing that after

his arrest he had not made a statement to

the police or to any other law enforce-

ment agency:

Q Did you ever tell the New Haven

Police that it was Dennis that

redeemed the pledges?

A I never talked to the New Haven

Police.

Q You didn't talk to them?

A They didn't talk to me at all.

Q After the day of arrest, did you

come forward --

MR. WILLIAMS: I object to that. I

think that Counsel is straying into

an area, the Fifth Amendment area.

THE COURT: It's overruled.

MR. WILLIAMS: I would like to be

heard at sidebar.

THE COURT: Are you this witness'

lawyer?

WILLIAMS: No.

THE COURT: At recess, then.

Q Did you go to the police and tell

them that Dennis was the one?

I was working. I never had any

other, anymore time. After they

dismissed the cases, I thought it

was long over.

How long after the arrest was this

that they were dismissed?

It was a while. Maybe five or six

months.

During that time, did you go to the

New Haven Police or to the Prosecu-

tor or anyone and say it was Dennis?

No.

You never did?

No.

Q Didn't you ever go to anyone in the

Bureau Of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms --

MR. WILLIAMS: If your Honor, please,

I think it inconceivable to permit

this to continue. It involves the

most substantial problems of my

client's right to presumption of

innocence.

THE COURT: Your objection is over-

ruled.

Would you like the question again?

A Say it again.

Q Did you ever go to anyone in the

Bureau Of Alcohol, Tobacco or Fire-

arms and tell them that it was

Dennis who redeemed these guns?

A But I never knew that the Bureau of

Tobacco or whatever it's called was

involved. This is the first time I

A

10

ever heard that,

Did you ever tell any law enforce-

ment officer prior to today that it

was Dennis that redeemed those guns?

No.

At that point, the testimony of the

witness ended and the jury was excused.

The court and counsel then engaged in the

following colloquy regarding the Govern-

ment's cross-examination of Mr. Aiken:

THE COURT: Do you have anything, Mr.

Williams?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, I move for a mis-

trial, or, if your Honor decides not

to grant that, then, as a signifi-

cantly less adequate alternative,

to strike the objectionable portions

of the Government's cross-examina-

tion of James Aiken, as a remedy to

that testimony. Because Aiken was

ll

a codefendant in the State firearms

prosecution with Carr, it was impro-

per for the Government, which was,

Over my timely objections, permitted

to let the witness go on and impeach

himself by showing that he had exer-

cised his Fifth Amendment right to

remain silent, during that prosecu-

tion, to refuse to speak to the

police about the case. Such impeach-

ment of a witness offered by the

Defense, especially one related to

the Defendant, according to the evi-

dence before the jury, is grossly

unfair and deprives the Defendant

of a fundamentally fair trial, of

his right to present witnesses on

his own behalf, and of due process

of law.

MR. HARTMERE: May I be heard briefly?

12

How Mr. Carr can be deprived of

calling witnesses after the cross-

examination of another witness is a

little incomprehensible. I believe

it was perfectly proper examination,

Mr. Williams does not represent Mr.

Aiken. Mr. Aiken gave up no consti-

tutional rights. He still had his

Fifth Amendment right and could have

invoked it, if he wanted to. His

testimony boomeranged. The rights

of Mr. Carr being violated by Mr.

Aiken's exercise of his rights do

not apply to any law I know of. Mr.

Aiken took the witness stand. And

ours was a proper line of question-

ing. He came up with a totally new

story, up to the dismissal of the

charges. And it was totally proper

to ask him if he ever told the story

13

before.

MR. WILLIAMS: It's never proper to

impeach a witness by showing that,

on a prior occasion, the witness

invoked a constitutional right and

that such impeachment infringes the

right of the witness. Such an

infringement results in injury to

the person on trial who certainly

has a right to object.

THE COURT: I don't believe any injury

has been done. A motion for mis-

trial is denied, and the motion to

strike is denied.

MR. WILLIAMS: You've denying the

motion as to the witness relating

to his invocation of his rights?

THE COURT: I didn't hear the witness

say he had invoked any rights, and

your request is denied.

14

Affirming the trial court's rulings,

the Court of Appeals purported to distin-

guish this witness's failure to volunteer

information to the police from a witness's

prior express invocation of his Fifth

Amendment privilege before a grand jury

(App. p. 10a). Impeachment on the latter

facts has long been held to constitute

reversible error. E.g., United States v.

Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1957).

The Court of Appeals also attempted to

distinguish impeachment of a defendant by

showing his failure to volunteer informa-

tion to the police, United States v. Hale,

422 U.S. 171 (1975), from similar impeach-

ment of a defense witness (App. p. 10a).

15

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO

RESOLVE THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY

BETWEEN THE RULING BELOW AND THIS

COURT'S HOLDINGS IN DOYLE V. OHIO

AND UNITED STATES V. HALE,

Noting that "every post-arrest silence

is insolubly ambiguous," 426 U.S. at 617,

this Court held in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.

610 (1976), that "it would be fundamenta-

lly unfair and a deprivation of due pro-

cess to allow the arrested person's silen-

ce to be used to impeach an explanation

subsequently offered at trial. Id. at 618.

In United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171

(1975), analyzing "the probative value of

Silence before police interrogators," 422

U.S. at 177, this Court held that "[iJn

most circumstances silence is so ambiguous

16

that it is of little probative force. Id.

at 176. The Court continued: "Not only is

evidence of silence at the time of arrest

generally not very probative of a defen-

dant's credibility, but it also has a sig~-

nificant potential for prejudice. The

danger is that the jury is likely to ass-~

ign much more weight to the defendant's

previous silence than is warranted. And

permitting the defendant to explain the

reasons for his silence is unlikely to

Overcome the strong negative inference..."

Id. at 180.

The only factual distinction between

the present case and Doyle and Hale is

that in this case James Aiken was a defen-

se witness rather than the defendant him-

self. Aiken was more than an eye-witness,

however. He was intimately associated

with the petitioner himself. He was the

17

petitioner's nephew, his companion through-

out the events at issue in the trial, and

his co-defendant in the related state court

prosecution. Thus, the prejudicial impact

noted in Hale was particularly likely to

spill over onto the defendant hmself.

Like the defendants in Doyle and Hale,

James Aiken was attacked by evidence of

post-arrest silence. Moreover, his silence

was with respect to the precise issue for

which he was then being prosecuted --

knowingly having firearms in a motor vehi-

cle. The testimony he offered at the pet-

itioner's trial could have convicted him

of the state charges. He was impeached

for having failed to volunteer this infor-

mation to the police after his arrest, to

the prosecutors in state court during the

several months his case was pending, and

to any law-enforcement official during the

18

later period when his case was no longer

pending but was subject to being reopened.

In many of its earlier cases, the

Second Circuit itself had recognized that

no realistic distinction can be drawn bet-

ween defendants like those in Doyle and

Hale and important defense witnesses like

James Aiken in this case. United States v.

Tomaiolo, Supra; United States v. Glasser,

443 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 404

U.S. 854 (1971); United States v. Natale,

526 F.2d 1160 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied

425 U.S. 950 (1976). The Fifth Circuit

and Eighth Circuit have made similar rul-

ings. United States v. Williams, 464 F.2d

927 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v.

Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977).

The important issue presented by the

present case needs to be resolved by this

Court. The decision below places the

19

Second Circuit in conflict with itself,

as well as in conflict with at least two

Other circuits. More importantly, the

ruling below would limit the scope of this

Court's holdings in both Doyle and Hale in

a manner wholly inconsistent with their

reasoning.

20

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, it is respect-

fully requested that this Honorable Court

issue a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Respectfully submitted:

JOHN R. WILLIAMS

Attorney for Petitioner

APPENDIX

la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For tHe Seconp Cmcurr

->—

No. 76—August Term, 1978.

(Argued September 12, 1978 Decided October 10, 1978.)

Docket No. 78-1168

—

Usrrep States or Amenica,

Appellee,

—against—

Benzamin Caan, Jn.,

Appellant.

—o

Before:

Smrra, Furmpero and Mansrre.p,

Circuit Judges.

um

Appeal from a judgment of the District of Connecticut,

'T. F. Gilroy Daly, Judge, convicting defendant of his re-

ceipt as a convicted felon of firearms that had been shipped

in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. §922(h) (1).

Affirmed. |

iaaas

Jomw R. Wrt1Ms, Esq., New Haven, CT (Wil-

liams, Wynn & Wise, New Haven, CT, of

counsel), for Appellant.

Micuart Haatwers, Assistant United States

Attorney, New Haven, CT (Richard Blu-

menthal, United States Attorney for the

District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT, of

counsel), for Appellee.

\

2a

MansFrELp, Circuit Judge:

Benjamin Carr, Jr. appeals from a judgment of the

District of Connecticut, entered after a jury trial before

Judge T. F. Gilroy Daly, convicting him of one count

charging him with receipt as a convicted felon of firearms

that had been shipped in interstate commerce, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §922(h)(1),* for which he was sentenced to a

term of 36 months pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §924(a). He con-

tends that the judgment should be reversed on several

grounds, including inadequate inquiry of jurors to deter-

mine possible bias or prejudice, erroneous evidentiary

rulings, failure to give a “missing witness” instruction,

and the denial of a motion to suppress certain firearms

_ seized from an automobile in which appellant was a pas-

senger. Finding no merit in these contentions, we affirm.

The record, viewed most favorably to the Government

at this stage, reveals overwhelming evidence of appellant’s

guilt. On August 17, 1976, he went to a pawn shop in

New Haven, Connecticut, known as De Simone’s Jewelers

or the Chapel Loan Company, where he redeemed and took

. delivery of four shotguns and two rifles previously pawned

by him. Later that day, John Nilsson, an appliance re-

pairman in the vicinity, advised the New Haven police

that he had observed three black men, one of them carrying

an armful of rifles and another what appeared to be a

musical instrument case, leave a building on Chapel Street,

New Haven, with a black woman and dump the guns into

1 Title 18 U.S.C. §922(h) provides in pertinent part:

“It ahall be unlawful for any persoo—

‘ (1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in

SS ee ee ee ee

exceeding ome year,.... = «.

to receive any firearm ee ammunition which has been shipped or

transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”

\

26

q

‘

3a

the trunk of a dark reddish-brown automobile bearing

Connecticut license No. HE 1229. These facts, including

a description of the car and its occupants, were then broad-

cast in an alert to New Haven police cars. Earlier that

day New Haven police had been told by their Department

that appellant and his son were wanted for participating

in a shooting on the previous evening and that warrants

for their arrest were being requested.

New Haven Police Officer George Mingione spotted the

automobile described in the alert, which was double-parked

on Chapei Street. Police then closed in on the car, arrested

appellant and his son on charges of reckless endangerment

based on the previous night’s suooting, removed the car

keys from the ignition switch, opened the trunk and re-

moved four shotguns and two rifles, The other occupants

of the car were then arrested.

Appellant thereupon volunteered to Officer Mingione that

the weapons belonged to him and that the others should

not be arrested. After being advised not to make any

further statement until he received Miranda warnings,

which were then given to him, Carr stated that he under-

‘ stood his rights. He repeated that he was the owner of

the firearms and had just taken delivery of them from

De Simone’s, which he asked the police to verify by taking

him there. Appellant was again advised of his constitu-

tional rights and taken at his request to De Simone’s

where Ernest Fiedler, an attendant in the pawn shop,

confirmed appellant’s statement that appellant had just

taken the firearms out of pawn.

Upon being brought to New Haven police headquarters,

where he read and signed a waiver-of-rights form, appel-

lant again stated, this time to Detective De Nuzzo, that his

companions should not be arrested since the guns belonged

to him. Questioning was terminated when appellant asked

\

27

4a

to talk with his lawyer. However, about an hour later

appellant asked to see Officer Edward J. Fasano, whom

appellant had on an earlier occasion assisted in recover-

ing a gun, and volunteered that he (appellant) was the

owner of the guns and had picked them up at a pawn shop

before being arrested.

All six weapons seized from the automobile trunk had

moved in interstate commerce and were operational. One

of the shotguns, a Browning, bore the same serial number

as one that had been redeemed by appellant at De Simone’s,

and one of the rifles, like one of those on was a .22

caliber. :

The indictment, filed on September 7, 1977, charged

appellant in one count with unlawful possession of four of

the six weapons in violation of §922(h)(1). Following an

evidentiary hearing upon appellant’s motion to suppress

the weapons and his inculpatory statements made to the

police, Judge Daly on March 9, 1978, filed an opinion deny-

ing the motions. United States v. Carr, 445 F. Supp. 1383

(D. Conn, 1978). Judge Daly concluded that although the

police did not have probable cause to arrest appellant for

the previous evening’s shooting incident, they did have

probable cause to arrest him for unlawful receipt of fire-

arms in violation of 18 U.S.C. $922(h)(1) and to search

the car in which he was riding for firearms. Accordingly,

he ruled that the arrest and search were valid on the latter

basis, regardless of the inadequacy of the former, citing

LaBelle v. LaVallee, 517 F.2d 750, 754 (2d Cir. 1975), and

thus rejected appellant’s claim that the inculpatory ad-

missions were tainted by an unlawful arrest or search.

Judge Daly further held that since the admissions were

either volunteered or given after full Miranda warnings,

they did not violate appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights and

\

5a

that they were given after waiver by appellant of his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel.

At trial, in response to the overwhelming proof of his

unlawful receipt of the firearms taken from the trunk of

the car, appellant, testifying in his own defense, asserted

that he neither touched nor took possession of the fire-

arms but that they were taken from the pawn shop to the

car by his son and nephew. He further denied making

the incriminating admissions attributed to him by various

witnesses. Appellant’s son Dennis and his nephew, James

Aiken, corroborated his version by testifying that the

weapons had been received by Dennis, not appellant, on

August 17, 1976. The jury, however, returned a verdict of

guilty.

Discussion

Appellant first contends that the trial judge committed

reversible error in refusing, after all of the defendant’s

peremptory challenges had been exhausted, to conduct a

further inquiry of one juror, Mrs. Rhoda Podany, the wife

of a Bridgeport Police Department detective, regarding

her possibly having received information from her husband

about the defendant, who had apparently been the sub-

ject of publicity years earlier arising out of a 1973 trial

for bribery of a police officer and was known as “Fat

Daddy.” Appellant’s suggestion that Mrs. Podany might

have heard about the defendant from her husband was

based on nothing but speculation. No publicity about the

case or the defendant, much less any evidence that her

husband knew anything about the defendant, was called

to the court’s attention.

When the jury was selected no members of the venire

(which, having been drawn from Fairfield County, did not

include anyone from New Haven, where appellant resides

‘\

29

6a

and where the crime occurred) recognized appellant, either

in person or by name. Moreover, Mrs. Podany unequivo-

cally stated in response to questioning by the court that

her husband’s position would not influence her thinking

and that she could decide the case fairly and impartially

in accordance with the court’s instructions as to applicable

law. The court, after the jury had been impanelled and

sworn, gave the usual instruction that jurors were not to

read anything about the case, not to discuss it with anyone

and that they were to report to the court any attempted

discussion with them by others.

Following a five-day delay before commencement of

trial, defense counsel suggested tv the trial judge that Mrs.

Podany be excused on the ground that her husband might

have disclosed prejudicial information about appellant.

Judge Daly denied this motion but did inquire of the jurors

generally whether anyone had tried te approach any of

them since they had been selected, to which no juror re-

sponded.

Appellant now contends that in response to his request

the court should have further interrogated Mrs. Podany

’ individually or the jury as a group as to whether she or

other jurors had recently heard anything about the case

or the defendant. As appellant concedes, however, Mrs.

Podany “was not presumptively disquailfied” from the jury

because of her status as the wife of a police detective.’

2 The mere fact that a prospective juror is the spouse of a law

enforcement official does not establish bias or disqualification from

service, Mikuse v. United States, 433 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1970) (former

police officer, wife of a state police officer); United States v. Hurd,

549 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1977) (husband of IRS employee in prose-

cution for tax evasion); United States v. Griemore, 546 F.2d 844

(10th Cir. 1976) (wife of police officer); United States ez rel. Cooper

v. Beincke, 219 F. Supp. 733 (D. Conn. 1963), affd., 333 F.2d 608

(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964) (wife of police com-

missioner).

*

30

7a

As to the conduct of voir dire, this is a matter lying within

the discretion of the trial court, F.R.Cr.P. 24(a), and the

trial court enjoys wide latitude in determining what ques-

tions to put to the veniremen. United States v. Taylor,

562 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 909,

434 U.S. 853 (1977); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d

1087 (2d Cir.), 423 U.S. 832 (1975); Aldridge v. United

States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931). This discretion is “sub-

ject to the essential demands of fairness,” 283 U.S. at

310. Although the trial court might have permitted Carr

to seek evidence from Mrs. Podany in an effort to find a

basis for disqualifying her for cause, United States v. Jack-

son, 542 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1976), or the trial judge might

himself have inquired into possible sources of bias, United

States v. Zane, 495 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1974), we cannot say

that the court’s failure to do so constituted an abuse of dis-

cretion. See United States v. Perry, 550 F.2d 524 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977); United States v.

Grant, 494 F.2d 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849

(1974). Judge Daly had warned the jurors against dis-

cussing the case with anyoue, and he did ask them, after

-the five-day interval, whether anyone had approached them

about the case. He could reasonably have concluded that

under the circumstances this interrogation was adequate

to uncover any improper communications about the case,

especially since he could personally observe the jurors, in-

cluding Mrs. Podany.

This case is clearly distinguishable from those relied

upon by the appellant, where the court ruled that the trial

judge was obligated to poll the jury about its exposure to

prejudicial communications, since there was no actual evi-

dence that prejudicial communications had occurred out-

side the courtroom. See, e.g., United States v. Lord, 565

F.2d 831, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1977).

31

8a

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in

restricting his cross-examination of Fiedler, the employee

of the pawn shop (De Simone’s) who testified that on

August 17, 1976, appellant redeemed and picked up the

previously-pawned firearms, some of which became the sub-

ject of the indictment, and of Officer Fasano, who testified

regarding one of appellant’s post-arrest incriminating

statements. We find no merit in this contention. Although

defense counsel is entitled to reasonably wide latitude in

testing a witness’ credibility by cross-examination, Davis

v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974), the trial judge is also

entitled to exercise sound discretion in determining the

scope of such cross-examination in a specific case, Rule

611, Fed. R. of Evid.; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.

60, 83 (1942); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694

(1931). |

Defense counsel’s effort in the present case to induce

Fiedler to characterize his own memory in a conclusionary

fashion as not “good” was clearly objectionable. This was

an ultimate issue to be resolved by the jury. Likewise it

was improper to ask Fasano whether Carr’s admitting pos-

session of the guns “would be highly relevant. to the case

pending against him in the Court of Common Pleas” since

this called for a legal conclusion. When the objection was

sustained, defense counsel did not attempt to rephrase the

question to avoid this problem. Moreover, Carr was not

prejudiced by the exclusion of answers to these conclusory

questions, since defense counsel had in previous questions

eilcited the information that formed the basis for the de-

sired inferences, and later in summation he asked the

jury to draw the same conclusion from these relevant facts.

Whether or not the trial court acted improperly in termi-

nating as irrelevant further cross-examination of Fasano

regarding his failure to inform state prosecutors about

" a

PAGINATION IS INCORRECT,

BUT TEXT IS COMPLETE.

10a

Carr’s admission, we believe that “the total cross-examina-

tion was sufficient to afford the jury a basis to evaluate the

defense theory.” United States v. Ong, 541 F.2d 331, 342

(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).

Appellant next argues that the Government’s efforts to

impeach a defense witness by eliciting that he had re-

mained silent about certain evidence prior to trial was

improper. After appellant introduced the testimony of

James Aiken, who was arrested with appellant and his son

on August 17, 1976, to the effect that appellant’s son Den-

nis, rather than appellant, was the person who redeemed

the pledged firearms on that date, the Government upon

cross-examination sought to impeach Aiken’s credibility

by eliciting from him that during the 19-month period fol-

lowing his arrest with appellant, Aiken had failed to volun-

teer this information to the authorities. Appellant contends

that this line of questioning was prejudicial to him, since

it in effect asked the jury to draw an adverse inference

from the invocation of Fifth Amendment rights. See United

States v. Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683, 690-92 (2d Cir. 1957).

. We disagree, a

The issue raised by the appellant’s contention, however,

is not whether this line of questioning infringed the right

of Aiken, or of appellant, to avoid self-incrimination. See

United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) ; Minor v. Black,

527 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1975). Aiken, not having invoked the

Fifth Amendment privilege, was never questioned about

invoking it. Moreover, appellant had testified at trial, so

there was no danger that cross-examination of Aiken re-

garding his silence would suggest to the jury that the de-

fendant was invoking his privilege. The trial court’s deci-

sion to allow the cross-examination of Aiken, therefore,

was not a constitutional error.

~.

: 33

lla

Whether or not the cross-examination of Aiken violated

appellant’s constitutional rights, he argues that it amounted

to an evidentiary error, since Aiken’s silence was inadmis-

sible as a prior inconsistent statement. Rule 613, Fed. R.

Evid. Some courts have recognized a witness’ prior silence

as an “inconsistent statement” for impeachment purposes.

United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.

denied, 434 U.S. 954 (1977); United States v. Standard Oil

Co., 316 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1963). Appellant, on the other

hand, cites decisions holding that silence is ordinarily so

ambiguous as to lack probative force. See, e.g., Hale, supra;

Tomaiolo, supra; see also Victory v. Bombard, 570 F.2d 66,

70 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Hale that “in most circum-

stances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative

force”). These cases, however, involve situations where,

as in Hale, the witness was the defendant and had refused

to speak in the exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights, or

where, as in Tomaiolo, the witness was specifically ques-

tioned about an express assertion of his right against self-

incrimination. In such cases the good faith assertion by

a witness of his Fifth Amendment rights would ordinarily

‘ preclude an inference of inconsistency.

Applying these principles here, although an objection

to Aiken’s silence during the five or six months prior to

dismissal of charges against him may have been upheld

on the ground that it was not inconsistent with his will-

ingness to testify at trial, it was not error under the cir-

cumstances to admit his silence thereafter as possibly in-

consistent therewith and therefore relevant to his credi-

bility. Moreover, aside from Aiken’s volunteering at trial

that he had no reason to believe that the matter with re-

spect to Carr was being investigated further, defense

counsel made no effort to mitigate whatever damage the

questioning did to Aiken’s credibility. Counsel could, pre-

sumably, have ‘elicited from Aiken a further explanation

34

l2a

for his failure to volunteer his version of the facts prior

to trial. Had counsel done so, we see no reason why the

jury would not have assessed fairly the import of Aiken’s

silence and thus have rendered a reasoned decision as to

his credibility. In short, the error, if any, was harmless.

We also find no merit in appeilant’s contention *hat

the defendant was entitled to a “missing witness” instruc-

tion based on the Government’s failure to call New Haven

Police Officer Mingione, who arrested Carr on state charges

on August 17, 1976. Since Mingione was not under the

Government’s control, was equally available to both sides,

and his testimony would have been cumulative, the re-

quested instruction was properly denied. See United States

v. DeLutro, 435 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,

402 U.S. 983 (1971). Moreover, the defense was aware on

the first day of trial that Mingione would not be called by

the Government.

Lastly, we find no merit, substantially for the reasons

stated by Judge Daly, 445 F. Supp. 1383, in appellant’s

argument that the weapons should have been suppressed

on the ground that the warrantless arrest of appellant on

’ August 17, 1976, and the search of the automobile in which

he was a passenger violated his constitutional rights. In

considering the issue we proceed on the now well-established

premise that the search of an automobile represents an ex-

ception to the general presumption against warrantless

searches, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-

55 (1971), and may be conducted upon a less stringent

showing of probable cause than would the warrantless

search of a home, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.

364, 367 (1976); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Cady

v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973); Chambers v.

Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970); United States ex rel.

LaBelle v. LaVallee, 517 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1975),

cert. denied, 423. U.S. 1062 (1976), principally because of

l3a

the car’s easy mobility and the lesser expectation of privacy

on the part of the owner with respect to it than a home

or office.

In the present case there was ample probable cause,

even applying an “exigent circumstances” standard, for the

search and arrest. Nilsson, a disinterested by-stander

whose eye-witness account was first verified by a personal

police interview, provided a detailed account of his obser-

vation of three black men and one black woman loading

firearms into the trunk of the automobile on Chapel Street,

which he identified in detail. The car was spotted by the

police within a short time, double-parked only three blocks

from the location where the guus had been loaded, under

conditions reasonably justifying a suspicion that a robbery

may have been in progress. Two occupants, one of whom,

known to the local police, had been convicted of at least

two felonies, were wanted for alleged participation in a

previous evening’s shooting.

These circumstances provided sufficient grounds for the

reasonable belief that appellant, a convicted felon, had

possession of firearms in the car and for the search of the

- automobile. Unless the car was searched immediately and

appellant arrested, both might disappear. The legality of

the seizure and arrest is not affected by the officer’s failure

to name the correct offense, United States ex rel. LaBelle

v. LaVallee, supra, at 754, or the fact that the felony was

a federal rather than a state one. United States v. Danesi,

342 F. Supp. 889, 892, n.l (D. Conn. 1972). Since the

search and arrest were lawful, appellant’s various admis-

sions made thereafter were properly received in evidence.

Indeed at least some of them would have been independently

admissible as volunteered by Carr after being fully advised

of his Miranda rights. United whales v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295,

298-99 (2d Cir. 1973).

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

530—10-11-78 e UBCA—4391

ee cee ae ae ee ee NEW YORK, N. Y. 10014, (212) 243-5775

“> 33

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