Opposition — Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 78-280
REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
DOUGLAS M. COSTLE, ADMINISTRATOR
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT NED E. WILLIAMS.
DIRECTOR OF THE
OHIO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
IN OPPOSITION
WILLIAM J. BROWN
Attorney General of Ohio,
E. DENNIS MUCHNICKI
Assistant Attorney General
Environmental Law Section
30 East Broad Street, 17th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
(614) 466-2766
Attorney for Respondent
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF RTT ree Oe o'r 06 0,5:590 Fk sdes cd asnt ans
STATERICT GU COte Cs ov 0d thea eset Sees sk OOS
1. Administrative Proceedings In This Case ...........
2. Judicial Proceedings In This Case...........0000e-
Ce CE Es 9 in hse oes vues tenses shee s
WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF PUBLIC LAW 95-217, THE CLEAN
WATER ACT OF 1977, INDICATES THAT
THE ADMINISTRATOR CORRECTLY
APPLIED THE FEDERAL WATER POLLU-
TION CONTROL ACT OF 1972 IN OBJECT-
ING TO THE STATE NPDES PERMIT
WHICH CONTAINED A_ CONDITION
WHICH AUTHORIZED ATTAINMENT OF
BPT EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS AFTER
JULY 1,1977........00. dee aIME Ree tank we
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT
OP CRU PIPMNE, pois cnc nc dparesereeseekebeueuade
I. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY FOL-
LOWED THIS COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS
ON REMAND TO CONSIDER THE AD-
MINISTRATOR’S OBJECTION TO THE
OHIO NPDES PERMIT FOR PETITIONER
REPUBLIC’S CANTON FACILITY IN
LIGHT OF PUBLIC LAW 95-217, THE
CLEAN WATER ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1977, AND CONCLUDED THAT THE OB-
JECTION SHOULD BE SUSTAINED..............
A. Republic Has Improperly Interpreted The
Decision Below To Require Retroactive
Application Of Requirements Contained
In The Clean Water Act Of 1977...............
TABLE OF CONTENTS Contd.
TABLE OF CONTENTS Contd.
Page
Page :
Section 309 rather than a matter which
B. Pursuant To This Court’s Remand In affects the terms of an NPDES permit a
Republic | The Sixth Circuit Was Di- issued pursuant to Section 402 and 301......
rected To Review Its Decision In Republic
| That The July 1, 1977, Deadline For 3. The legislative history of the Clean
Attaining BPT Is No Longer An Applica- Water Act indicates that in Republic |
ble Requirement Due To The Failure Of the court erroneously overruled the
The Administrator To Promulgate BPT Administrator's objection to Peti- 15
Guidelines In A Timely Manner In Light tioner’s NPDES permit ..........55 5000 ees
Of Public Law 95-217, The Clean Wate:
err rer err aE ee 5 HI. REPUBLIC’S PETITION FAILS TO PRE-
SENT ANY CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
C. The Provisions Of The Clean Water Act WHICH ARE APPROPRIATE FOR REVIEW 16
Concerning The Continuing Validity Of AT THIS TIME... ec cet rere weer ee eee eees
The July 1, 1977 Deadline For Industrial / :
Diacheriaes Not Connecting To A Munici- II], REPUBLIC’S PETITION A gen ngs
pal System Are Based Upon Senate Bill LISH A TRUE CONFLICT BE D NINTH
1952 Which Amended Section 309 Rather DECISIONS OF THE SIXTH AN 18
Than House Bill 3199 Which Would Have CORE c ecb cdc cea ceceaereracenseccascues
Amended Section 301.............000c ce eues 8 20
CE ra a 6c Sra b N45 8 oo 5Ck Nh ee eee c ee es eee
D. The Legislative History Of Section 309 (a)
(5) (B) Indicates That It Is The Sole
Mechanism For Granting Relief To Dis-
chargers Who, Through No Fault Of Their
Own, Are Unable To Comply With The APPENDICES
July 1, 1977 Deadline For Achieving BPT........ 9
1. The July 1, 1977 deadline in Section
301(b) (1) (A) of the FWPCA was to be
treated as inflexible and the failure of APPENDIX A
U.S. EPA to promulgate guidelines did Republic Stee! Corporation v. Costle, ,
not alter that inflexibility. ................ 10 Case No. 76-1557 (August 21, 1978) (Republic //).. . 1a
2. The Clean Water Act is a statutory cod- | APPENDIX B
ification of the Administrator's policy | Order dated August 21, 1978 in Case No. 76-1557,
of treating good faith inability to Republic Steel Corporation v. Costle, (1978)
comply with the July 1, 1977 deadline | Ge Pero eee ret te eee eS errr 12a
as an enforcement matter under
APPENDICES Contd.
Page
APPENDIX C
Republic Steel Corporation v. Train, 557 F.2d 91,
95 (6th Cir., 1977), (Republic /) (June 23, 1977)... 13a
APPENDIX D
Judgment Entry - Republic Stee! Corporation v. Train,
557 F. 2d 91, 95 (6th Cir., 1977) (Republic /)
Fg A gg ae Be ne 24a
APPENDIX E
Order in Republic Steel v. Costle, 434 U.S. 1030,
98 S.Ct. 761 (1978) (Republic /) (January 21,
WORE SVE teee eu ENG COPIA OG eeUN SU a oe Ok 25a
APPENDIX F
Letter from Janes O. McDonald, Director, Enforcement
Division U.S. EPA to Ned E. Williams, Director of
Environmental Protection (March 30, 1976)
APPENDIX G
Relevant Provisions of the Clean Water Act of 1977... .30a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 657 (1977),
cert denied, sub nom., Bethlehem Stee/ Corp. v.
UT, See As ee EY po eC bbc bk ew ae Bow ae 20
Costle v. Republic Steel Corp.,
434 U.S. 1030, 96 S. Ct. 761 (1978)......... ccc ceees 7
Republic Steel Corp. v. Train,
557 F.2d 91, 95 (6th Cir., 1977)
SUN TE 6 ack 2s oa ee ete wk eae ak 3,6, 7, 10, 11, 15
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Contd.
Cases: Page
State Water Control Board v. Train,
GBS F.2d G27 UG Cih., FETT ie ccc ccc ccc vcccccccees 20
Stewart v. O'Neal,
237 ©. GBT, GES Gt Clr., VOUT). . cc cccccccscccsens 7
United States v. Beatrice Foods,
493 F.2d 1259, 1269 (8th Cir., 1947)... . 0... ee eee 18
United States v. General Motors Corp.,
403 F. Supp. 1151(D. Conn. 1975) ..........50 ees 18
United States v. Swingline,
371 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. N.Y. 1974)... .... cece eeeees 18
United States Stee/ Corp. v. Train,
BSS F.2d G22 (Fit Cir, TO77). 00.0 vcevccvcccesecces 20
Washington v. EPA,
673 F.2d SES (Oth Cir., ITE)... cree cvcccrvevvees 19
STATUTES
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 and the
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. Section 1251
PEG ccd ec keen ee cece bener sot beneses's 5,8,10,11
Section 301 (a), 33 U.S.C.A. Section 1311 (a)............ 8
Section 301 (b) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1311
eee Case perc es 5,6,7,8,9, 10, 11, 15, 19
Section 304 (b), 33 U.S.C.A. Section 1314 (b) ........ 6, 11
Section 309 (a), 33 U.S.C.A. Section 1319 (a)......... 8,13
Section 309 (a) (5) (B), 33 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1319
IAS ben ile tas ab be wale wins 9,10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17
Section 402 (a), 33 U.S.C.A. Section 1342 (a)........... 12
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Contd.
Page
Section 402 (b), 33 U.S.C.A. Section 1342 (b) ........... 19
Section 402 (d) (2) (B), 33 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1342 (d) (2) (B)... 19
Section 505, 33 U.S.C.A. Section 1365. ........ccccccues 17
MISCELLANEOUS
Public Law ere; WE OU. WOON hoc kc acevcecccan 9,15,16
House Bill 3199, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). ......-...-. 8
S. 1952, 95th Cong., ist Sess. (1977) ................ 8,12
House Conference Report No. 95-380,
U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News
Sa ieaninias Seieaiie fe 9
Senate Rept. No. 95-370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) . 10, 14
123 Cong. Record (daily ed. April 5, 1977)
123 Cong. Record (daily ed. Aug. 4,1977)........ 13, 16, 18
123 Cong. Record (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977)....... 11, 14, 15
United States Supreme Court Rule 19................ ea ; 20
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM , 1978
No. 78-280
REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
DOUGLAS M. COSTLE, ADMINISTRATOR
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,
Respondents.
————
-——
—————————
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCU'T
——— —_-
— —_—_—_————
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT NED E. WILLIAMS.
DIRECTOR OF THE
OHIO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
IN OPPOSITION
Respondent Ned E. Williams, the Director of the Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency, files this brief in opnasition
to Republic Steel Corporation's petition for a writ of certiorari
to review the judgment herein of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Administrative Proceedings In This Case
This case arises out of the action of the Administrator of
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (‘EPA’)
in disapproving a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (“NPDES”) permit proposed by the Ohio Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (‘Ohio EPA’’) for issuance to Republic
for its steelmaking plant in Canton, Ohio.
On June 10, 1974, the Ohio EPA issued a draft NPDES
permit for the Canton plant. Republic requested an adjudica-
tion hearing on the proposed permit in a timely manner. There-
fore the permit, as originally proposed, never became effective.
Republic and Ohio EPA then engaged in extensive negotia-
tions which culminated in an August 1, 1975, agreement be-
tween them which resolved all issues raised by Republic except
the length of the compliance schedule to be contained in the
permit. The final effluent limitations which were agreed upon
in the stipulation were different from those contained in the
original proposed permit.
An adjudication hearing was held on August 21 and 22 and
September 2, 1975, to resolve the issue of the date for achieving
the final effluent limitations.
After the hearing, the Ohio EPA on January 5, 1976, sub-
mitted to EPA Region V a proposed permit which required
achievement of the agreed-upon final effluent limitations pur-
suant to the schedule of compliance the reasonableness of
which had been the subject of Republic's evidence at the ad-
judication hearing. The hearing record was also submitted to
EPA Region V.
By letter of March 30, 1976, U.S. EPA Region V objected
to the issuance of the permit submitted to it by Ohio EPA on
Juanuary 5, 1976. (App. F. infra). That objection contained
a specific finding that the final effluent limitations contained
in the permit represented BPT effluent limitations for Re-
public’s Canton facility in the absence of such guidelines pro-
mulgated by the Administrator and that the compliance
schedule in the permit was reasonable, but that as a matter of
law compliance with BPT effluent limitations must be achieved
no later than July 1, 1977. Thus, since the compliance
schedule’s authorization of attainment of those effluent limita-
tions after July 1, 1977, violated Section 301 of the FWPCA,
the Administrator objected to the issuance of the permit.
2. Judicial Proceedings In This Case
Republic petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for
the sixth Circuit for review of EPA's disapprov™ which denied
the issuance of the proposed permit to Repusdic. The court of
appeals held that Section 301 (b) (1) (A) did not require
achievement of the final effluent limitations in the proposed
permit by July 1, 1977, overruled the Administrator's Ob-
jection and remanded the case to EPA for further consideration.
Republic Steel Corporation v. Train, 557 F.2d 91 (CA6 1977)
(Republic Steel 1).
U.S. EPA petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to
review Republic Stee/ /. While EPA’s petition was pending, the
FWPCA was amended on December 27, 1977, by the enactment
of Public Law 95-217,91 Stat. 1566 (‘The Clean Water Act of
1977"). Shortly thereafter, this Court granted the petition and
summarily vacated and remanded this case to the court of
appeals “for further consideration in light of Public Law
95-217.”
On remand, the court of appeals upheld EPA's =
of the permit and denied Republic’s petition for review,
Republic Steel Corporation v. Costle, No. 76-1557 (August 21,
1978) ('‘Republic Steel //''), From that decision Republic has
brought its petition to this Court for a writ of certiorari to the
Sixth Circuit to review the decision in Republic //.
QUESTION PRESENTED
WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUB-
LIC LAW 95-217, THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF
1977, INDICATES THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR
CORRECTLY APPLIED THE FEDERAL WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT OF 1972 IN OBJECT-
ING TO THE STATE NPDES PERMIT WHICH CON-
TAiNED A CONDITION WHICH AUTHORIZED
ATTAINMENT OF BPT EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS
AFTER JULY 1, 1977.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Republic’s petition to this Court possesses three significant
defects: (1) an erroneous perception of the Sixth Circuit's
alleged ‘‘retroactive’’ application of the requirements of the
Clean Water Act, (2) premature concern with constitutional
issues; and (3) an unsuccessful attempt to create a conflict be-
tween the holdings of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. The cumu-
lative effect of these defects is a petition which should be
denied. The errors contained in Republic's petition will be dis-
cussed in the order provided above.
|. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY FOLLOWED
THIS COURT’S INSTRUCTIONS ON REMAND TO
CONSIDER THE ADMINISTRATOR'S OBJECTION
TO THE OHIO NPDES PERMIT FOR PETITIONER
REPUBLIC’S CANTON FACILITY IN LIGHT OF
PUBLIC LAW 95-217, THE CLEAN WATER ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1977, AND CONCLUDED THAT
THE OBJECTION SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.
A. Republic Has Improperly Interpreted The Decision
Below To Require Retroactive Application Of Re-
quirements Contained In The Clean Water Act of
1977.
The fatal flaw in Petitioner's analysis is exposed in the lan-
guage used by the Petitioner in the first question presented by
the petition. Republic presents its first question as follows:
Whether the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
as amended on December 27, 1977, establishes an un-
conditional, RETROACTIVELY APPLICABLE JULY
1, 1977, DEADLINE, for achieving effluent limitations
where those limitations were not administratively de-
fined in time to permit achievement by such date,
Petition at 2. (emphasis supplied).
Repeatedly Republic characterizes the decision below as apply-
ing the requirements of the Clean Water Act! retroactively. See
Petition at 2, 7, 8, 13, 14. That characterization, however, is
the result of Republic’s failure to understand that the decision
below aid not rely upon Public Law 95-217 as creating new le-
gal obligations which were then retroactively imposed upon Re-
public, but rather the Republic // decision simply considered
the 1977 amendments and their legislative history as evidence
of the Congressional intent behind the requirement in Section
301 (b) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C. Section 1311 (b) (1) (A), to achieve
best practicable control technology currently achievable
("BPT”) effluent limitations by July 1, 1977, as contained in
the 1972 version of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(“FWPCA”). A review of the history of this case and the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Republic / makes Republic’s misinterpreta-
tion of the decision in Republic // quite evident.
B. Pursuant To This Court’s Remand In Republic | The
Sixth Circuit Was Directed To Review Its Decision In
Republic | That The July 1, 1977, Deadline For Attain-
ing BPT Is No Longer An Applicable Requirement Due
To The Failure Of The Administrator To Promulgate
BPT Guidelines In A Timely Manner In Light Of Public
Law 95-217, The Clean Water Act of 1977.
1 in this brief the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 as
amended in 1977 by Public Law 95-217 shall be referred to as
the Clean Water Act. The pre-1977 version of the Act will be
referenced as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(““FWPCA"’)
The essence of the Sixth Circuits’s holding in Republic / was
that the failure of the Administrator to promulgate BPT efflu-
ent guidelines in a timely manner pursuant to Section 304(b) of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
33 U.S.C. Section 1314(b), rendered unenforceable the man-
date of Section 301(b) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C. Section 1311(b) (1)
(A), to achieve BPT effluent limitations by July 1, 1977.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the July 1, 1977, deadline
contained in Section 301(b) (1) (A) was no longer an applicable
requirement of the FWPCA which could support the Adminis-
trator’s objection to an Ohio EPA NPDES permit. In reaching
this conclusion the court first declared that:
Republic contends that the language of Section 301
(b) (1) (A) (i) expressly conditions adherence to the
July 1, 1977, deadline upon definition BY THE AD-
MINISTRATOR OF BPT effluent limitations and guide-
lines PURSUANT TO SECTION 304(b) OF THE ACT.
Therefore the Administrator's failure to satisfy this con-
dition precedent by publishing final regulations for alloy
and stainless steel manufacturing excuses Republic’s
noncompliance with the July 1 date. We reluctantly
agree. The import of the section is unequivocal: federal
regulations must exist before dischargers can Ue com-
pelled to honor dates for implementing them. Republic
Steel Corp. v. Train, 557 F.2d 91,95 (6th Cir. 1977)
vacated and remanded sub. nom., Costle v. Republic
Stee/ Corp., 98 S. Ct. 761 (1978), 434 U.S. 1030
(emphasis in original)
In addition, the Sixth Circuit also relied upon the following in-
terpretation of the entire statutory framework:
‘
The presence within the Act of successive deadlines
for promulgation of standards, issuance of permits, and
conformance with effluent limitations bespeaks a ra-
tional implementation strategy anticipating a discrete
sequence of events..../d. at 95.
The court then concluded that:
Our holding that Section 301(b) (1) (A) (i) is made
unenforceable by the Administrator's failure to promul-
gate necessary regulations is tantamount to a finding
that the July 1, 1977, deadline is no longer an ‘’applic-
able requirement” of the Act. /d. at 97
In granting U.S. EPA's petition for a writ of certiorari the
Supreme Court vacated the decision in Republic / and re-
manded the case ‘for further consideration in light of Public
Law 95-217" Costle v. Republic Steel Corp., 434 U.S. 1030,
98S. Ct. 761 (1978)2. Thus on remand the Sixth Circuit was
directed by this Court to review its previous conclusion that the
July 1, 1977, deadline for attainment of BPT was no longer an
applicable requirement of the FWPCA due to the Administra-
tor’s failure to promulgate BPT guidelines in a timely manner in
light of Public Law 95-217 from which the Clean Water Act of
1977 resulted.
In performing this review, the Sixth Circuit did not, as Re-
public alleges, retroactively apply the 1977 version of the Act.
Rather, the court, based upon a careful review of the legislative
history of Public Law 95-217, and at the urging of Respondent
Williams,? concluded that, contrary to its decision in Republic
/, the failure of the Administrator to promulgate BPT guidelines
2 The effect of this Court’s order vacating the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Republic / upon that decision was to “annul it, set
it aside, or to render it void’. Stewart v. O'Neal, 237 F. 897,
903, (6th Cir. 1917). Thus when the Sixth Circuit, in Republic
// at 3, stated that the 1977 Act “effectively overruled” the
Republic / decision, it was obviously speaking in a figurative
sense. Since this Court’s order vacating that decision rendered it
void, there was literally nothing left to be overruled. Yet
Republic’s retroactivity interpretation places great emphasis on
that statement.
3 Respondent Williams was in a particularly unique position to
assist the Sixth Circuit in assessing the significance of Public Law
95-217. In Republic /, Respondent Williams concurred with
Petitioner Republic's position that the Administrator's objection
to Respondent Williams’ issuance of the NPDES permit to Re-
public was improper. 557 F.2d at 95, fn. 12. The legislative his-
tory of Public Law 95-217 was so overwhelming in its support of
the Administrator’s interpretation of the law that on remand Re--
spondent Williams urged the Sixth Circuit to sustain the Adminis-
trator’s objection to Respondent Williams’ issuance of the permit.
in a timely manner did not justify the inclusion in an NPDES
permit of a condition authorizing attainment of BPT effluent
limitations subsequent to July 1, 1977. Thus the decision
below involves an interpretation of the 1972 version of the FW
PCA, not a retroactive application of changes made by the 1977
amendments. The provisions of the Clean Water Act’s legisla-
tive history which support the Court’s holding in Republic // as
to the inflexibility as a permit condition of the July 1, 1977,
deadline in Section 301 (b) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C. Section 1311
(b) (1) (A), of both the 1972 and 1977 versions of the Act are
reviewed in subsections IC and ID of this brief.
C. The Provisions Of The Clean Water Act Concerning The
Continuing Validity Of The July 1, 1977 Deadline For
Industrial Dischargers Not Connecting To A Municipal
System Are Based Upon Senate Bill 1952 Which
Amended Section 301.
During the consideration of amendments to the FWPCA
both Houses of Congress demonstrated an awareness of the
need for flexibility within the statute to deal with situations
where the strict application of the July 1, 1977, date could lead
to undue hardship. In Section 13 of H.R. 3199 the House of
Representatives voted to add a new subsection (g) to Section
301 which would have allowed the Administrator to extend the
attainment date in individual NPDES permits up to July 1,
1979. This approach was frequently referred to during the
debates on H.R. 3199 as the ‘case by case extension’’ approach.
123 Cong. Record H. 3027, 3037 (daily ed. April 5, 1977).
In contrast to this approach, however, was the mechanism
adopted by the Senate in S. 1952. Rather than authorizing
case by case extensions of the July 1, 1977 deadline for obtain-
ing BPT pursuant to Seciion 301, the Senate left the July 1,
1977 deadline intact and amended Section 309 (a) to provide
the Administrator with greater flexibility in the enforcement of
the July 1, 1977 deadline. Section 41 of S. 1952 amended
Section 309 (a) of the FWPCA in part as follows:
(5) (B) The Administrator may, if he determines
that such violation is the result of actions or conditions
outside the control of such person and (i) such person
has acted in good faith; (ii) such person had made a
commitment (in the form of contracts or other security)
of necessary resources to achieve compliance at the
earliest possible date after July 1, 1977, but in no event
later than January 1, 1979; (iii) such extension will not
result in imposition of any additional controls on any
other point or nonpoint source; (iv) application for per-
mits under section 401 of this Act was filed prior to
December 31, 1974; and (v) the facilities necessary for
compliance with such requirements are under contruc-
tion, grant an extension of the date referred to in sec-
tion 301 (b) (1) (A) to a date which will achieve com-
pliance at the earliest time possible but not later than
January 1, 1979. 123 Cong. Record S 13625 (daily
ed. Aug. 4, 1977).
Thus while both Houses of Congress were concerned about
the need for flexibility in the application of the July 1, 1977
deadline, each House adopted a different mechanism to deal
with the problem. Therefore the resolution by tixe Conference
Committee of the dispute between the Houses as to the mech-
anism for creating flexibility in the application of the 1977
deadline is the key to understanding the impact of Public Law
95-217 upon a determination of the validity of the Administra-
tor’s objection to Republic’s permit.
As indicated in footnote six (6) of Republic //, at a4, the
"JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMIT-
TEE OF CONFERENCE” contained in House Conference
Rept. No. 95-380, U.S. Code Congressional and Administra-
tive News, 6671-73 (January, 1978), reports that the Confer-
ence Committee adopted a modified version of the Senate ap-
proach, It is therefore appropriate to analyze the legislative
history of the Senate version of Section 309 (a) (5) (B) and con-
sider its impact.
D. The Legislative History Of Section 309 (a) (5) (B)
Indicates That It Is The Sole Mechanism For Granting
Relief To Dischargers Who, Through No Fault Of Their
Own, Are Unable To Comply With The July 1, 1977
Deadline For Achieving BPT.
10
There are three aspects of the legislative history of the Clean
Water Act, particularly the Senate amendments which resulted
in Section 309 (a) (5) (B), which are salient to the issue which
is before this Court: first, the July 1, 1977 deadline in Section
301 (b) (1) (A) for obtaining BPT is inflexible and is not con-
ditioned upon timely promulgation of effluent guidelines by
the administrator; second, good faith inability to comply with
the deadline is a matter of enforcement discretion, not an issue
in a permit proceeding; and third, the Senate version is a codifi-
cation of the Administrator's interpretation of the FWPCA of
1972. Respondent will analyze the first aspect separately, the
second and third together, and then discuss their cumulative
effect on the Sixth Circuit’s rejection in Republic // of its pre-
vious conclusion in Republic /.
1. The July 1, 1977 deadline in Section 301 (b) (1) (A) of
the FWPCA was to be treated as inflexible and the fail-
ure of U.S. EPA to promulgate guidelines did not alter
that inflexibility.
Senate Report No. 95-370 which accompanied S. 1952
from Senate Environment and Public Works Committee to the
full Senate explained the need for Section 309 (a) (5) (B) as
follows:
Under existing law there are no circumstances that
justify a time for compliance extending beyond July 1,
1977. The administrator can only issue an enforcement
order requiring compliance within 30 days or initiate
civil or criminal action. THUS, THE DECISION OF
THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT IN REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION V.
TRAIN ET AL AND WILLIAMS, P aGauun, (6th
CIR. 1977) WAS AN INCORRECT INTERPRETA-
TION OF EXISTING LAW. This amendment responds
to the legitimate concern of dischargers who, despite
good faith efforts, will not comply with the 1977 re-
quirements. To accommodate this objective, the com-
mittee amended section 309 (a) of the act to authorize
the Administrator in his discretion, to pursue one of
two new options with regard to a discharger out of com-
pliance.
11
This modification of the provisions of the act with
respect to enforcement should eliminate the need for
Congress to consider at some later date further case-by-
case extensions, waivers, or other relief. U.S. Code
Congressional and Administrative News, 6593, (January,
1978) (emphasis supplied).
In Republic // at a4-5, the court below specifically noted this
rejection of the conclusion in Repub/ic / that Congress intended
to make the Administrator’s timely performance of his duty
under Section 304 (b), 33 U.S.C. Section 1314 (b) a condition
precedent to Petitioner’s compliance with Section 301 (b) (1)
(A).
Repeatedly the debates in the Senate reflect support for the
amendment to Section 309 (a) (5) (B) because, contrary to the
rationale of Republic /, there was no flexibility in the applica-
tion of the July 1, 1977 date under the FWPCA. For example,
Senator Wallop, while urging adoption of the bill, declared:
The 1972 act requires industrial pollution sources
to install what has been defined by EPA as best practic-
able control technology by 1977, and best available con-
trol technology by 198°. HOWEVER, THE EPA HAD
NOT BEEN GRANTED THE DISCRETION TO PRO-
VIDE FLEXIBILITY IN THESE REQUIREMENTS,
or to take into consideration the costs of compliance,
the quality of the receiving waters, or other special cir-
cumstances. 123 Cong. Record. S 19678 (daily ed.
Dec. 15, 1977). (emphasis supplied).
Thus the legislative history of the Clean Water Act convinced
the Sixth Circuit that it had previously misinterpreted the
FWPCA to include a degree of flexibility which Congress did
not intend to authorize in the 1972 version of the FWPCA.
This conclusion raises no retroactivity problem. It is simply a
matter of recognizing that the intent behind Section 309 (a)
(5) of the Clean Water Act was to provide flexibility because
Section 301 (b) (1) (A) in the 1972 version of the FWPCA was
inflexible. Therefore it would be unlawful to grant to Republic
any extension of time to obtain BPT based upon an interpreta-
tion of the 1972 version of the Act as creating flexibility in the
date for attainment of BPT guidelines. Thus in Republic // the
Sixth Circuit properly concluded that the only relief available
to Republic is that which is provided in the new Section 309
(a) (5) of the Clean Water Act.
12
2. The Clean Water Act is a statutory codification of the
Administrator’s policy of treating good faith inability to
comply with the July 1, 1977 deadline as an enforce-
ment matter under Section 309 rather than a matter
which affects the terms of an NPDES permit issued
pursuant to Section 402 and Section 301.
The persistent theme that runs throughout the legislative
history of the Clean Water Act is that the problems arising from
failure to meet BPT limitations by July 1, 1977, are to be hand-
led as enforcement matters under Section 309 rather than by
providing an extension of the July 1, 1977 deadline in the
permit issuance process pursuant to Section 402 of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Section 13424. When S. 1952 was intro-
duced to the Senate, Senator Muskie, the chairman of the
Senate Committee, explained:
For thoses industrial dischargers not in compliance,
the bill provides the Administrator with yet another
tool by, in effect, SANCTIONING WHAT HAS BEEN
A POLICY OF DUBIOUS LEGALITY WITH RESPECT
TO DELAYS IN COMPLIANCE...
[T] hese amendments allow the Administrator, at
his initiative, to grant a simple extension of 18 months
to a source whose facilities are under construction but
could not have been completed by July 1, 1977. THIS
IS SIMPLY A CODIFICATION OF THE ENFORCE.
MENT COMPLIANCE SCHEDULE LETTER PROCESS
WHICH THE ADMINISTRATOR HAS USED FOR
SOURCES WHICH, IN GOOD FAITH, HAVE TRIED
TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW.
The Environmental Protection Agency has devel-
oped an enforcement strategy under current authority
trant major dischargers. Dischargers who are going to
miss the July 1, 1977, deadline through no fault of their
own will not be subject to enforcement actions; instead,
they will receive enforcement compliance schedule
4 Section 402 (a) (1) requires the terms and conditions of all
NPDES permits to be consistent with the mandate of Section 301
to achieve BPT effluent limitations by July 1, 1977.
to initiate enforcement actions only against recalci-
13
letters, stating a specific date by which they must
comply with a final deadline and an interim compliance
schedule. THE COMMITTEE BILL, ESSENTIALLY,
CODIFIES THIS POLICY. 123 Cong. Record Section
13538 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977) (emphasis supplied).
Thus the Senate amendments to Section 309 (a) were essen-
tially an attempt to codify the existing ‘Enforcement Compli-
ance Schedule Letter’’ (herinafter ‘’"ECSL’”’) policy developed by
U.S. EPA. Thus, as noted in Repub/ic // at a8, the Clean Water
Act involves no retroactive creation of an inflexible deadline,
but rather represents Congressional vindication of the Adminis-
trator’s interpretation of the 1972 version of the Act.
One of the cornerstones of that ECSL policy is that the
issue of post-1977 attainment of BPT due to circumstances be-
yond the discharger’s control is not to be addressed within the
context of the permit issuing process where the discharger
would attain adjudicatory rights to litigate his ‘good faith’
prior to an enforcement action but rather that the adjudication
is to occur at the time of enforcement. As Senator Muskie’s
additional remarks emphasize, it was precisely the intent of
the Senate to have good faith determined within the context
of enforcement rather than permit proceedings:
A case-by-case extension through section 301 for
INDUSTRIAL DISCHARGERS would be a VARI-
ANCE. !T WOULD PLACE A SIGNIFICANT ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE BURDEN ON THE RESOURCES OF THE
AGENCY. EPA WOULD HAVE TO DETERMINE
BAD FAITH BEFORE REJECTING A VARIANCE,
WHICH DETERMINATION WOULD BE SUBJECT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW. BECAUSE THE ACTION FOCUSES ON A
PARTICULAR “PERSON” AND IS THE MODIFICA-
TION OF AN EFFLUENT LIMITATION, IT RE-
QUIRES A FORMAL ADJUDICATION HEARING.
THE DETERMINATION IS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW.
* * .
A GOOD FAITH VARIANCE WOULD CREATE A
NEW LAYER OF REVIEW. IF THE INDUSTRY DID
NOT LIKE THE VARIANCE DECISION, IT WOULD
14
ADJUDICATE IT. During the period of adjudication,
it would seek a stay from the requirement. EPA wou!d
have to prove ‘‘bad faith’’ through every step of a
cumbersome process.
ALTHOUGH THERE OCCASIONALLY ARE
CASES IN WHICH THE DISCHARGER’S INABILITY
TO COMPLY IS CLEARLY DUE TO FACTORS BE-
YOND ITS CONTROL, THE MAJORITY OF CASES
REQUIRE EXTREMELY SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENTS.
IN SUCH CASES, AN AGENCY DENIAL WOULD AL-
MOST CERTAINLY BE FOLLOWED BY AN APPEAL
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, THUS DELAYING
AGENCY ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS. THERE IS
ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY FOR JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS IN AN EN-
FORCEMENT ACTION. THE COMMITTEE BILL
MAINTAINS THIS OPPORTUNITY. Id. at Section
13538-39. (emphasis supplied).
This reliance upon Section 309 (a) (5) (B) as an enforcement
mechanism rather than a case-by-case extension device within
the permit process is repeatedly evident throughout the legis-
lative history. See Senate Report No. 95-370, U.S. Code
Congressional and Administrative News, 6596 (January, 1978);
House Conference Report No. 95-830, U.S. Code Congres-
sional and Administrative News, 6672, (January, 1978); 123
Cong. Record S. 19650-51 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977).
Furthermore, when the Conference Committee's Report
containing the Senate version of Section 309 (a) (5) (B) was
presented to the House for approval, that mechanism was speci-
fically referenced as the method for dealing with dischargers
who were unable to obtain BPT due to the Administrator’s fail-
ure to promulgate BPT guidelines in a timely manner. Con-
gressman Johnson explained that:
[W]e do recognize that some sources may be out of
compliance through no fault of their own, through
equipment manufacturers’ strikes or the unavailability
of certain equipment or FAILURE OF THE EPA TO
PUBLISH EFFLUENT GUIDELINES AND STAN-
DARDS IN TIME. For this reason we have provided an
extension of the July 1, 1977 deadline to April 1, 1979,
15
only in those instances where the discharger can prove
good faith with the law and lack of compliance because
of its circumstances beyond the discharger’s controls.
123 Cong. Record H 12944 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977).
(emphasis supplied).
Based upon this extensive legislative history the Sixth Cir-
cuit correctly concluded that it was the clear intent of Congress
to deal with good faith inability to obtain BPT limitations due
to the failure of the Administrator to promulgate guidelines in
a timely manner solely through the flexible enforcement mech-
anism authorized in Section 309 (a) (5) (B) of the Clean Water
Act rather than in a review of the Administrator's objection to a
state NPDES permit as the same court had attempted to do in
Republic |.
3. The legislative history of the Clean Water Act indicates
that in Republic | the court erroneously overruled the
Administrator's objection to Petitioner's NPDES permit.
At this point it is appropriate to analyze the impact of the
legislative history discussed above in subsections |D-1 and 1D-2
of this brief upon the holding below.
In Republic / the Sixth Circuit perceived compliance with
Section 301 (b) (1) (A) BPT by July 1, 1977, as the last step
in a “discrete sequence of events” in the regulatory process.
557 F.2d at 95. Then the court concluded that since the entire
requiatory sequence had not been completed by EPA, this justi-
fied negating the 1977 deadline for BPT. In Republic //, how-
ever, the Sixth Circuit then concluded that this rationale clearly
did not withstand the repeated references in the legislative his-
tory of the Clean Water Act to the " inflexibility’ of the July
1, 1977 deadline in Section 301 (supra, subsection |D-1 of this
brief). Thus in light of Public Law 95-217, the Clean Water
Act, the Republic // decision correctly perceives that the hold-
ing in Republic / that the failure of the Administrator to prom-
ulgate BPT guidelines in a timely manner negated the require-
ment for a July 1, 1977 deadline in Republic's NPDES permit
was erroneous. Furthermore this does not involve retroactive
legislation but rather a recognition of the fact that the Republic
/ decision was not a correct interpretation of the 1972 version
of the Act.
16
In addition, Republic / equated the unenforceability of the
July 1, 1977 date in a permit issued to Republic with a right
vested in Republic to have a post-1977 compliance date in the
NPDES permit itself. 557 F.2d at 97. As the legislative his-
tory of the Clean Water Act indicates, however, the whole
thrust of Section 309 (a) (5) (b) is to vindicate the Administra-
tor’s interpretation of the 1972 version of the FWPCA and to
explicitly place enforcement considerations under the enforce-
ment section of the Act rather than under those sections
relating to the issuance of permits. Indeed to allow dischargers
to litigate enforceability issues within the context of permit
proceedings is to create another mechanism for the types of lit-
igation related delays which have plagued U.S. EPA’s attempts
to implement the national water pollution abatement program.
As Senator Muskie pointed out, using permit proceedings as
variance proceedings to litigate the enforceability of compliance
dates only creates an additional layer of litigation during which
the clean up program dawdles. 123 Cong. Record 13538-39
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977).
Thus, the vindication of the Administrator’s policy by the
Clean Water Act clearly indicates that it is improper to attempt
to give Republic relief during the administrative permit issuance
process. Instead, the relief must come in the first instance from
the Administrator by means of his exercise of the discretionary
enforcement authority granted to him in Section 309 (a) (5)
(B). Thus, the decision in Republic // correctly concluded that _
Public Law 95-217 supports the Administrator’s interpretation
of the inflexible nature of the July 1, 1977, deadline in Section
301 (b) (1) (A) of both the 1972 and 1977 versions of the Act
which precludes the inclusion insan Ohio NPDES permit of a
condition providing for post July 1, 1977, attainment of BPT
efiluent limitations.
1!. REPUBLIC’S PETITION FAILS TO PRESENT ANY
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS WHICH ARE APPRO-
PRIATE FOR REVIEW AT THIS TIME.
17
The second question presented by Republic’s petition con-
cerns an alleged violation of its constitutional rights because it is
potentially subject to civil and criminal penalties for violation
of the July 1, 1977, deadline date which must be contained in
its permit. (Petition at 2,11, 12, 13). Since the legislative his-
tory of the Clean Water Act clearly indicates that this issue
should be addressed within the context of enforcement pro-
ceedings rather than in administrative permit issuance proceed-
ings, it would not be appropriate for the Court to address the
issue at this time. The inappropriateness of such review at this
time is apparent for several reasons.
First, Section 309 (a) (5) (b) clearly provides a mechanism
for Republic to obtain relief if it has truely made every good
faith effort to comply but has been prevented from so doing by
circumstances beyond its control. Yet Republic has stubbornly
refused to request such relief from the Administrator? and has
insisted that it wants such relief only in the form of a post-1977
compliance date in its NPDES permit. Thus, it would be en-
tirely inappropriate for this Court to address Republic’s alleged
constitutional dilemma while Republic may have in its own
hands a means for resolution of that dilemma.
Second, there has been no serious threat of enforcement
action against Republic by anyone, the United States, the State
of Ohio, or a citizen by means of a citizens’ suit.© If there is
any substance to Republic's protestations that the imposition of
substantial civil or criminal penalties would be a violation of its
constitutional rights, that may be considered by the responsible
agencies in the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion to re-
frain from bringing an enforcement action for such penalties.
Thus Republic’s petition would have this Court address hypo-
thetical violations of constitutional rights when they actually
may never occur.
5 During oral argument in Repub/ic // counsel for Respondent
Costle indicated that Republic would receive such relief if Re-
public submitted an application which showed that it was de-
serving of such relief as measured by the criteria established by
Congress in Section 309 (a) (5) (b).
6 No sixty (60) day notice of intent to file a citizens’ suit against
Republic has been filed with either U.S. EPA or Ohio EPA. See
section 505 (b), 33 U.S.C. Section 1365 (b).
18
Finally, even if an enforcement action were actually
brought, Republic could seek minimization of a penalty on the
grounds of its good faith. As Senator Muskie noted:
The legitimate concerns of those industrial dis-
chargers who cannot comply with their pollution abate-
ment requirements by July 1, 1977, through no fault of
their own, is adequately handled by the Committee bill!
[Section 309 (a) (5)]. Such dischargers are further pro-
tected against any unjustified enforcement action by
their ability to present their good faith as a mitigating
factor to the district court which controls any enforce-
ment action which may be brought. 123 Cong. Record
13539. (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977).
"Good faith” is well-recognized as such a mitigating factor.
United States v. Beatrice Foods, 493 F.2d 1259, 1269 (8th
Cir., 1974), cert, denied, 420 U.S. 961 (1975); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Conn. 1975);
United States v. Swingline, 371 F. Supp. 37 ‘E.D. N.Y.
1974). This would be particularly true under the Clean Water
Act where the legislative history and the statute itself contain a
clear recognition of good faith as a mitigating factor. Thus
while on its face the Clean Water Act itself contains potentially
substantial monetary penalties, they are maximums and do not
control the discretion of a district judge to impose a minimal
penalty if warranted by the circumstances. The seriousness of
the constitutional question presented to this Court by a nomi-
nal penalty of one dollar ($1.00) as in United States v. General
Motors Corp., supra, at 1165, would be entirely different from
a one million dollar ($1,000,000.00) penalty. Yet Republic
would press such an issue upon this Court at this time when it is
clearly not appropriate for this Court to determine the matter.
Therefore the petition should be rejected.
Ill. REPUBLIC’S PETITION FAILS TO ESTABLISH A
TRUE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DECISIONS OF
THE SIXTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS
19
The final basis for Republic’s petition is an alleged conflict
between the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Republic // and the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Washington v. EPA, 573 F.2d 583,
(9th Cir. 1978). That alleged conflict is, however, more appar-
ent than real. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit itself noted the distinc-
tion between Washington v. EPA, supra, and Republic // as
follows:
The Ninth Circuit recently held that the Administra-
tor could not veto a proposed permit for failure to re-
quire attainment of BPT by the discharger, where the
Administrator had not yet promulgated applicable BPT
guidelines. Washington v. EPA, 573 F.2d 583, 589-92
(9th Cir. 1978). The case is distinguishable in that here
the Administrator did not object to the substantive
effluent limitations in the proposed permit for the Can-
ton Mill [as he did in Washington v. EPA] -- the objec-
tion related solely to the compliance schedule. Repub-
lic || at 7, footnote 9.
In its petition Republic dismisses this distinction with the
conclusory charge that it is ‘untenable’ with virtually no
further explanation. Respondent Williams submits that a peti-
tion to this Court for a writ of certiorari should be supported
by more than a conclusory statement.
In fact the Sixth Circuit's distinction between the two cases
is correct. Section 402 (b) (2) (D), 33 U.S.C. Section 1342 (b)
(2) (d) authorizes the Administrator to objection to a state
NPDES permit when its terms and conditions are ‘‘outside
the guidelines and requirements of the Act.’’ In Washington v.
EPA, supra, the Administrator had promulgated no BPT guide-
lines to bring his objection to the effluent limitations in the
state permit within the scope of Section 402 (b) (2) (D). By
contrast, in Republic // the Administrator objected to the com-
pliance schedule in the Ohio NPDES permit, not the effluent
limitations themselves, on the grounds that the compliance
schedule violated the requirement in Section 301 (b) (1) (A) to
achieve BPT effluent limitations no later than July 1, 1977.
This objection was clearly authorized by Section 402 (b) (2)
(D), and accordingly the Sixth Circuit has correctly sustained
the objection. Thus, the distinction recognized by the Sixth
Circuit between Washingtcn v. EPA, supra, and Republic //
is well taken.
20
Furthermore, far from creating a conflict, the Repubiic //
decision restores harmony between the Third, Fourth, Sixth
and Seventh Circuits concerning the inflexibility of the compli-
ance date deadlines in Section 301 (b) of the Clean Water Act.
Compare Republic // with State Water Contro/ Buard v. Train,
559 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1977); United States Stee/ Corp. v.
Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977); and Bethlehem Stee/
Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657 (1977) cert. denied sub. nom.,
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Quarles, 430 U.S. 975 (1977). In
each of these cases four different circuits have reached the same
conclusion, that an NPDES permit must contain an attainment
date for authorized levels of discharge no later than the dates
contained in Section 301 (b) (1). Thus, the decision below
creates no conflict between the circuits which would support
Republic’s petition.
CONCLUSION
Republic’s petition does not arise from a state court's
determination of a federal question. The petition fails to
correctly estabiish a conflict between the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion below and that of any other circuit. Thus the petition does
not present the type of matters listed in U.S. Supreme Court
Rule 19 governing review on certiorari. Thus Republic’s peti-
tion should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM J. BROWN
Attorney General of Ohio
E. DENNIS MUCHNICKI
Assistant Attorney General
Environmental Law Section
30 East Broad Street, 17th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
(614) 466-2766
Counsel for Respondent
Ned E. Williams, Director
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency
la
APPENDIX A
No. 76-1557
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Republic Steel Corporation,
Petitioner,
Vv.
Douglas M. Costle, Administrator,
U. S. Environmental Protection
Agency, On Remand from the
Supreme Court of the
George R. Alexander, Jr., Regional Uned States.
Administrator, U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency,
Ned E Williams, Director, Ohio
Environmental Pretection Agency,
Respondents.
Decided and Filed August 21, 1978.
Before: Celebrezze, Lively and Keith, Circuit Judges.
Celebrezze, Circuit Judge. This case is before the Court
on remand from the Supreme Court for further consideration
in light of the Clean Water Act of 1977, P.L. 95-217. In our
previous decision we held that the Administrator of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had improperly
vetoed issuance of a water pollution permit to petitioner
Republic Steel Corporation (Republic) for its Canton, Ohio,
2a
mill. Republic Steel Corp. v. Train, 557 F.2d 9] (6th Cir.
1977) (herinafter referred to as Republic Steel /). Contra,
United States Setti/ Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 854-55
(7th Cir. 1977).
The Administrator had objected to the permit, originally
proposed by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency
(OEPA), on the ground that it improperly waived a July 1,
1977, statutory deadline for compliance with federal effluent
standards. Under Section 301 (b) (i) (A) (i)2 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act as amended in 1972 (FWPCA)
industrial dischargers were required to comply “not later than
July 1, 1977” with “effluent limitations for point sources [re-
quiring) the application of the best practicable contro! tech-
nology currently available, as defined by the Administrator
pursuant to Section 304 (b)”’ of the Act. At the time of our
previous decision EPA had not yet promulgated final regula-
tions defining ‘best practicable technology currently available’
(BPT) for categories of dischargers including iron and steel
manufacturing, despite a requirement in Section 304 (b) (1) of
pen that such regulations be published by October 18,
1 The case initially came before us on a petition for review of the
Administrator's action, pursuant to Section 309 (b) (1) (F) of the Federal
Water Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. Section 1369 (b) (1) (F). The particular
action submitted for review was a decision by the Administrator under
Section 402 (d) (2) (B) of the Act to “object to,” and thereby veto,
issuance of a water pollution permit for the Canton mill as proposed by
the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency. We note that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has since ruled that Section
509 (b) (1) (F) does not convey jurisdiction on the courts of appeals to
review permit vetoes by the Administrator under Section 402 (d) (2) (B).
Washington v. E.P.A., 573 F.2d 583, 586-87 (9th Cir. 1978). This Court
has already ruled contra, however, Ford Motor Co. v. E.P.A., 567 F.2d
661, 668 (6th Cir. 1977), and we adhere to our earlier view. See a/so
Mianus River Preservation Comm. yv. Administrator, E.P.A., 541, F.2d
899, 909 (2d Cir. 1976).
2 33US.C. Section 1311 (b) (1) (A) (i).
3 33 U.S.C. Section 1314 (b) (1).
4 (Contd. on next page).
3a
We reluctantly concluded that EPA’s failure to timely de-
fine BPT precluded the Administrator from imposing a July 1,
1977, compliance deadline, since Congress had apparently es-
tablished promulgation of regulations under Section 304 (b) as
a necessary precondition for imposition of the deadline in Sec-
tion 301 (b) (1) (A) (i). Our decision was designed ’’to relieve
the discharger of the unfair consequences” of being forced to
comply with the deadline in the absence of applicable standards
for guidance. 557 F.2d at 97.
This Court stayed its mandate in Republic Stee/ / pending
the EPA's petition for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme
Court. Shortly after EPA filed its petition for certiorari, Con-
gress enacted the Clean Water Act of 1977, which substan-
tially revised FWPCA. in the wake of that enactment, the
Supreme Court granted EPA's petition, vacated our judgment
in Republic Steel |, and remanded the case to this Court for
further consideration in light of the new law, Costle v.
Republic Steel Corp., -——U.S.——, 46 U.S.L.W. 3452 (1978).
We have reviewed the 1977 Act and conclude that its pro-
visions have effectively overruled our previous decision. Al-
though neither Section 301 (b) (1) (A) (i), requiring industrial
dischargers to achieve BPT no later than July 1, 1977, nor
Section 304 (b), requiring EPA to define BPT by October 18,
1973, were amended by the 1977 Act, Congress did add a new
Section 309 (a) (5) (B)~ providing as follows:
(B) The Administrator may, if he determines (i) that
any person who is a violator of, or any person who is
otherwise not in compliance with, the time require-
ment under this Act or in any permit issued under this
4 As of oral argument in this case (June 1978), EPA had still not
promulgated final BPT guidelines for iron and steel manufacturing. In the
absence of general standards, BPT has been determined on a case-by-case
basis, either by the Administrater or by the responsible state agency.
See, e.g., OEPA regulation EP-31-04 (B) (1) (b) (1974).
5 33US.C. Section 1319 (a) (5) (B).
4a
Act, has acted in good faith, and has made a commit-
ment in the form of contracts or other securities) of
necessary resources to achieve compliance by the
earliest possible date after July 1, 1977, but not later
than April 1, 1979; (ii) that any extension under this
provision will not result in the imposition of any addi-
tional controls on any other point or nonpoint source;
(ii) that an application for a permit under section 402
of this Act was filed for such person prior to December
31, 1974; and (iv) that the facilities necessury for com-
pliance with such requirements are under construction,
grant an extension of the deate referred to in section
301 (b) (1) (A) to a date which will achieve compliance
at the earliest time possible but not later than April 1,
1979.
The legislative history of this provision makes it abundantly
clear that Congress intended the procedure outlined therein to
be the exclusive avenue of relief from the dictates of a manda-
tory and unconditional July 1, 1977, deadline. The Senate Re-
port expressly rejected the rationale of Republic Steel /:
Under existing law there are no circumstances that
justify a time for compliance extending beyond July 1,
1977. The Administrator can only issue an enforce-
ment order requiring compliance within 30 days or initi-
ate civil or criminal action. Thus, the decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Republic
Steel Corporation v. Train et al and Williams, —— F.2d,
(6th Cir. 1977) was an incorrect interpretation of ex-
isting law. This amendment responds to the legitimate
concern of dischargers who, despite good faith efforts,
will not comply with the, 1977 requirements. To
accommodate this objective, the committee amended
section 309 (a) of the act to authorize the Administra-
tor in his discretion, to pursue one of two new options
with regard to a discharger out of compliance.
* . *
6 The Senate version of Section 3u9 (a) (5) (B) was adopted by the con-
ference committee with only minor revision. H. R. Rep. No, 95-830,
95th Cong. Ist Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong, & Admin
News 4424, 4463.
5a
The committee believes that a case has been made in
our hearings on this bill that some relief from penalties
must be granted for those sources which have made a
good faith attempt to comply with the deadlines in the
statute but for justifiable reasons have been unable to
do so. The committee considered but rejected the
alternative of providing a case-by-case extension of the
deadline set out in the statute. That alternative was re-
jected because the committee felt that such a case-by-
case extension would .not only burden the administra-
tive process but that it would provide further opportu-
nity for delay for those sources which are otherwise un-
able to make a legitimate case for additional time. Con-
sequently, decisions by the Administrator pursuant to
this new provision of law should not be the subject of
administrative hearings and appeals but rather, if the
Administrator feels he cannot determine that a source
meets the requirements of section 309 (a) (5) (B) that
he will immediately proceed under any of the other en-
forcement options set out in section 309. This authori-
zation of limited flexibility granted to the Administra-
tor will maintain the pressure for compliance while at
the same time enabling the Administrator to use his
discretion to grant any justifiable extension.
Sen. Rep. 95-370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in
1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin, News 4326, 4385,
4387.
The import of the statute is now plain: the July 1, 1977, dead-
line cannot be waived by the courts. To the extent that non-
compliance occurs despite good faith efforts as defined in Sec-
tion 309 (a) (5) (B), relief is available only via discretionary ex-
tension
of the deadline by the Administrator.”
Republic urges that mere addition of a new remedial pro-
cedure
does not change the operation of the rest of the Act
as we construed it in Republic Stee/ /. We are bound, however,
to read
the Act
the amendment together with the original provisions of
“as parts of an integrated whole.’’ Markham v. Cabell,
7 QEPA, which supported Republic’s petition in Republic Steel /,
now takes the position that the 1977 Act requires that we uphold EPA's
position,
326 U.S. 404, 411 (1945). The unchanged sections and the
amendment must generally be given ‘‘the most harmonious,
comprehensive meaning possible’ so that they do not conflict.
Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U.S. 480, 488 (1947).
See also 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction Section 22.35
(1972). To insist on adherence to our earlier view would not
only render Section 309 (a) (5) (B) largely meaningless, but also
would defeat Congress’ clearly expressed intent in enacting
that section.
Moreover, the 1977 Act effectively responds to the concern
we expressed in Republic Stee/ / that a discharger might suf-
fer “unfair consequences’ from EPA's failure to timely promul-
gate relevant BPT regulations. Under prior law, the Adminis-
trator had no clear statutory authority to extend the July 1,
1977, deadline and a discharger could be subjected to liability
without any consideration for the reasons for his noncompli-
ance.8 The new Section 309 (a) (5) (B) clearly permits the
Administrator to extend the deadline where noncompliance was
caused solely by the lack of BPT guidelines.9
8 Prior to the 1977 Act, EPA did provide relief from the 1977 dead-
line on an informal basis. Under the “Enforcement Compliance Sched-
ule Letter’’ (ECSL) program, the Administrator would agree to refrain
from enforcement of the statutory deadline against certain dischargers
who made good faith attempts at compliance, See Beth/ehem Stee/ Corp.
v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 659-60 (3d Cir, 1976), cert. den., 430 US.
975 (1977),
9 The Senate Report indicates that Section 309 (a) (5) (B) was directed,
in part, at dischargers whose noncompliance was caused by their inability
to ascertain applicable standards, despite good faith attempts:
The limited discretion granted to the Administrator by section
309 (a) (5) (B) may only be exercised where the Administrator is
able to determine that a discharger acted in good faith. The term
“good faith’ is generally understood to mean a reasonable at-
tempt to comply with the mandates of law. Did the discharger
attempt to determine what the applicable requirements were?
When the required technology was generally known in the in-
dustry, but the discharger had some legitimate disagreements
with the Agency on other points, did the discharger begin on an
abatement program or conversely did the discharger delay the
(contd. on next page).
7a
We conclude, then, that the Administrator can properly
object under Section 402 (d) (2) (B) of the Act to a proposed
permit for a point source governed by Section 301 (b) (1) (A)-
(i) if that permit does not require attainment of BPT by July 1,
1977, unless the Administrator has determined that a time ex-
tension is warranted pursuant to Section 309 (a) (5) (B).
This does not, however, end our inquiry. We must decide
whether the 1977 Act may be applied in the context of this
case, which was pending before the Supreme Court at the
time the new law took effect.
The general rule is that ‘’a court is to apply the law in
effect at the time of its decision, unless doing so would result
in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legisla-
tive history to the contrary.” Bradley v. Richmond School
Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974). This principle applies with
full force to an appellate court in reconsidering a decision that
has been vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court in light
of an intervening change in the law. See Fruehauf Corp. v.
Internal Revenue Service, 566 F.2d 574, 577-79 (6th Cir.
1977).
(9 Contd.)
abatement program pending the outcome of lengthy administra:
tive procedures? When the required technology was the sub-
ject of a legitimate dispute with the Agency, did the discharger
take all other measures that it was capable of (such as segre-
gating waste streams, necessary site preparation, and outfall
construction) or did it delay these practices pending the outcome
of lengthy administrative procedures?
S. Rep. 95-370, 95th Cong., Ist Session, 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin,
News 4326, 4386 (emphasis supplied).
The Ninth Circuit recently held that the Administrator could not
veto a proposed permit for failure to require attainment of BPT by the
discharger, where the Administrator had not yet promulgated applicable
BPT guidelines. Washington v. EPA, 573 F.2d 583, 589-92 (9th Cir.
1978). The case is distinguishable in that here the Administrator did not
object to the substaftive effluent limitations in the proposed permit for
the Canton mill — the objection related solely to the compliance schedule,
In any event, the Ninth Circuit holding failed to consider the possible
impact of the 1977 Act on the Administrator's veto power under Section
402 (d) (2) (B).
8a
The Clean Water Act of 1977 contains no ‘‘statutory direc-
tion or legislative history’’ militating against application of
Section 309 (a) (5) (B) to pending cases.10 To the contrary,
the statute is applicable to “any person who /s a violator of, or
any person who /s otherwise not in compliance with the time
requirements” of the Act. Section 309 (a) (5) (B) (emphasis
supplied). Moreover, the Senate Report indicates that the Sec-
tion 309 procedure was intended to codify” the informal EPA
practice already in existence, under which the Administrator
stood firm behind the 1977 deadline, but delayed enforcement
where the discharge showed the requisite good faith efforts at
compliance.11 See Sen. Rep. No. 95-370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4326, 4386.
The Conference Report likewise indicates that under the 1977
Act “'the existing enforcement policy of the EPA is continued.”
H. R. Rep. No. 95-830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
1977 U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4424, 4464.
Nor do we think that application of current law would
result in manifest injustice. If Republic has made good faith
efforts at compliance with the law that have been delayed
only by EPA's failure to timely promulgate BPT standards,
10 The conference report contains language regarding “existing ad-
ministrative and court orders”:
It is the intent of the conferees that under the provision which
allows the Administrator to establish a reasonable time in which
to comply with an enforcement order, existing administrative
and court orders which provide for attainment dates beyond
April 1, 1979, continue in effect unless modified under these
amendments. Therefore, the existing enforcement policy of the
EPA is continued.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U. S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4424, 4464.
This language has no application to the instant case, since there are no
“existing” administrative or court orders providing for attainment dates
beyond April 1, 1979, for the Canton mill.
11 See note 8, supra.
9a
then the company will be eligible for an extension under Sec-
tion 309 (a) (5) (B).12 There is nothing fundamentally unfair
in predicating relief from the deadline on a showing to the re-
sponsible agency that the polluter has made a “‘reasonable
attempt to comply with the mandates of the law.’’ Sen. Rep.
95-370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U. S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4326, 4386. Indeed, to require anything
less would work an injustice on the overwhelming majority
of the nation’s major industrial dischargers who followed the
law as best they could and met the statutory timetable.13 It
‘
‘would also flaunt the national commitment to attainment of
water quality capable of supporting fish, wildlife and recreation
by 1983, and the total elimination of pollutant discharges by
1985. 33 U.S.C. Section 1251 (a) (1) & (2). Application of
current law is particularly favored where such matters of great
national concern are at stake. Bradley, supra, 416 U.S. at 719-
20.
The situation might be different if Republic could claim
that its noncompliance was induced by administrative or judi-
cial construction of Section 301 (b) (1) (A) (i) to the effect tinat
the July 1, 1977, deadline was waived by EPA's failure to prom-
ulgate BPT guidelines. See generally United States v. Pennsy!-
vania Ind. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 670-75 (1973). But in
the years following enactment of FWPCA, EPA consistently
took the official position that the statutory compliance date
12 We assume, as we must, that the Administrator will make the
necessary determination with regularity and fairness. See United States
v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941); United States v. Chemical Founda-
tion, 272 US. 1, 14-15 (1926); K. C. Davis, Administative Law Treatise
Section 11.06. Cf. Withrowyv. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47,55 (1975).
13 According to the Senate Report, ninety percent of the nation’s
major industrial dischargers were expected to meet the 1977 deadline.
Sen. Rep. No. 95-370, 95th Cong. Ist Sess., reprinted in 1977 U. S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4326, 4333.
10a
was absolute and that it was not waived by the absence of BPT
guidelines.14 The first draft permit for the Canton mill issued
by OEPA in June 1974 required compliance by September
1976. EPA's position as to the Act's time requirement was not
challenged by a court of appeals until our decision in Republic
Stee/ / on June 23, 1977 — only days before the July 1, 1977,
deadline.15 Republic can hardly claim that its noncompliance
was induced by that decision, since by even the most conserva-
tive estimates the necessary equipment would take many
months to construct.16 Nor can the company maintain that it
ever had a vested right in the result ordered in Repubiic Steel /,
since our mandate there never took effect, and since the
Supreme Court later vacated the judgment altogether. Cf.
Bradley, supra, 416 U.S. at 270.
14 See, e.g., United States Environmental Protection Agency, Decision of
the General Counsel No. 4, in 1 Decisions of the Administrator and
Decisions of the General Counsel [hereinafter "DGC”] 177, 181 (4-4-75),
aff‘d, Decision of the Administrator No. 75-5, 1 DGC 136, 144 (12-5-75);
Decision of the General Counsel No. 11, 1 DGC 209, 210-11 (5-7-75);
Decision of the General Counsel No. 23, 1 DGC 305, 314 (7-3-75);
Decision of the General Counsel No. 26, 1 DGC 327, 328, 330-31 (7-24-
75), aff‘d, Decision of the Administrator No. 75-9, 1 DGC 106, 108-09
(9-30-75); Decision of the General Counsel No. 45, 2 DGC 27 (8-10-76).
See also United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 853-55
(7th Cir. 1977); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F. 2d 657, 660
(3d Cir. 1976); 40 C.F.R. Section 125.11 (c) (promulgated 5-22-73).
15 Similar considerations would preclude any possible applicability
of the ex post facto clause to this case. The existence of the July 1,
1977, deadline, as construed by EPA was an “operative fact’’ sufficient
to provide fair warning to Republic. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,
297-98 (1977). -
16 The same rationale precludes any claim that noncompliance with
the deadline was induced by OEPA's agreement to a 42 month compliance
schedule in the fall of 1975. Republic concedes that its duty to
commence compliance measures attached prior to that agreement. See
Republic Steel 1,557 F.2d at 94.
lla
In any event, Republic does not seriously claim that its non-
compliance with the July 1, 1977, deadline is the result of an
honest belief that the deadline was invalid. Rather the com-
pany maintains that it was unable to meet the deadline, despite
good faith efforts, because of the absence of BPT guidelines
from EPA. If this is true, then the new Section 309 (a) (5)
(B) procedure can provide any justified relief. 17
The petition for review is dismissed.
17. We do not mean to suggest that Republic may in any sense be entitled
to an extension as a matter of law. The decision on whether or not to
grant an extension is committed to the Administrator's discretion, based
on his assessment of the factors listed in Section 309 (a) (5) (B). Sen.
Rep. 95-370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U. S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 4326, 4386-87. See Quarles, /mpact of the 1977 Clean
Water Act Amendments on Industrial Dischargers, Env. Rep. Monograph
No. 25 at 2 (1978). See generally Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. NRDC, ~-—U.S.——, 46 U.S.L.W. 4301 (1978).
12a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 76-1557
[Filed August 21, 1978]
Republic Steel Corporation,
Petitioner,
Vv,
Douglas M. Costle, Administrator,
U. S. Environmental Protection
Agency,
George R. Alexander, Jr., Regional
Administrator, U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency,
Ned E. Williams, Director, Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency,
Respondents.
Before: Celebrezze, Lively and Keith, Circuit Judges.
Pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court of the
United States, and upon consideration of the further briefs and
oral argument of counsel,
It is ordered that the petition to review an order of the
Environmental Protection Agency be and it is hereby dismissed.
Each party will bear its own costs on this appeal.
Entered by Order of the Court.
John P. Hehman, Clerk
By Grace Keller
(Chief Deputy Clerk)
Issued as Mandate: October 3, 1978
Costs: None
13a
APPENDIX C
No. 76-1557
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Republic Steel Corporation,
Petitioner,
Vv,
Petition to review
Russell E. Train, Administrator, action of the Admin-
U. S. Environmental Protection jstrator of the United
Agency, States Environmental
Protection Agency.
and
Ned E. Williams, Director, Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency,
Respondents.
Decided and Filed June 23, 1977.
Before: Celebrezze and Lively, Circuit Judges, and Rubin,”
District Judge.
Celebrezze, Circuit Judge. This case of first impression
arises under the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act, P.L. 92-500.1 The question presented is
whether failure of the Administrator of the United States En-
* The Honorable Car! B. Rubin, Judge, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
1 33USC. Section 1251 et seq. (Supp. II! 1973).
14a
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) to define interim ef-
fluent limitations reflecting a given level of pollution control
technology, as required by the Act, frees an authorized state
agency to issue a discharge permit which sanctions noncom-
pliance with the statutory deadline for achieving that degree
of effluent abatement.
The jaw in the case consists of three interdependent pro-
visions of the Act which are at the crux of the regulatory
scheme to control point sources of water pollution. Section
301 (b)2 defines an inflexible schedule for achieving two
interim levels of effluent abatement in furtherance of ‘’the na-
tional goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters be eliminated by 1985.’ Section 101 (a) (1). Key to
this litigation is the subsection 301 (b) (1) (A) (i) requirement
of conformity by July 1, 1977 with “effluent limitations for
point sources * * * which shall require the application of the
best practicable contro! technology currently available [BPT]
as defined by the Administrator pursuant to section [304 (b)]
of [the Act] * * *.”. Section 304 (b) (1),3 in turn, obligates
the Administrator to publish by October 18, 1973, regulations
establishing effluent guidelines reflecting BPT for categories
of dischargers Ere iron and steel manufacturing. See
section 306 (b) (1) (A).
Pollution control standards promulgated pursuant to sec-
tions 301 and 304 are implemented nationally through a de-
centralized permit granting mechanism defined in section
4025 as the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES). Subsection 402 (a) (1) empowers EPA in the normal
course to issue permits which impose industry-wide effluent
limitations which it has already defined. In addition, EPA
may define these limitations on a case by case basis ‘‘prior to
the taking of necessary implementing actions relating to all such
requirements” (i.e., while rule making is still in progress). /d.
2 33U.S.C. Section 1311 (b).
3 33US.C. Section 1314 (b) (1),
4 33 U.S.C. Section 1316 (b) (1) (A) lists the minimum industry cate-
gories of pollution sources for which regulations must be promulgated.
5 33US.C. Section 1342.
15a
Subsection 402 (b) directs the Administrator to delegate
permit granting authority to states which have proposed self-
regulatory programs which are operationally compatible with
uniform administration of the Act. To ensure that qualifying
state environmental agencies apply effluent limitations even-
handedly, subsection 402 (d) (2) (B) empowers the Adminis-
trator to block issuance of any proposed NPDES permit which
he deems to be ‘outside the guidelines and requirements of
[the Act]... /d. Whether federal or state in origin, all NPDES
permits must ensure compliance with ‘‘applicable require-
ments’ of six enumerated provisions of the Act including sec-
tion 301. In addition, all permits must issue on or before Dec-
ember 31, 1974, pursuant to subsection 402 (k).6
In July, 1972, Republic Steel Corporation (Republic) ap-
plied for a federal permit to continue discharging effluents
from its Canton, Ohio Steel mill into Nimishillen Creek. The
Canton mill is an integrated steel manufacturing operation
engaged primarily in the processing of alloy and stainless steel.
In March, 1974, Ohio received approval from EPA under
section 402 (b) to begin issuing NPDES permits, and Republic
immediately commenced to negotiate with the Ohio Environ-
mental Protection Agency (Ohio EPA).
In June, 1974, Ohio EPA issued a draft permit” for the
Canton mill which incorporated state defined effluent limi-
tations under state estimates of BPT. The permit provided
for a 24 month compliance schedule compatible with the Act’s
July 1, 1977 interim implementation deadline. At that time
EPA had failed to promulgate any section 304 (b) effluent
limitation guidelines for iron and steel manufacturing.8 As of
the present date no final regulations exist covering alloy and
stainless steel operation.9
6 This deadline is not expressly mandated by the Act, but may be
inferred from the fact thai 33 U.S.C. Section 1342 (k) states that con-
tinuation of effluent discharge without a permit after December 31,
1974 will violate the Act unless a permit application is pending and
disposition has been delayed for reasons other than the discharger’s own
negligence. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510
F.2d 692, 707 (D.C. Cir, 1975).
7 NPDES permit No. D 300*AD. (8 and 9 contd. next page)
16a
Understandably, in the absence of controlling federa! regu-
lations, Republic sought to exploit availiable state administra-
tive procedures to secure the most favorable permit terms and
conditions. Prolonged hearings and negotiations with Ohio
EPA resulted in redefinition of the originally proposed effluent
limitations. On August 1, 1975, eight months after the last
date envisioned by Congress for routine issuance of NPDES
permits, final agreement was reached and the implementation
period commenced to run. However, Republic continued to
assert that full compliance within 24 months was physically
impossible.19 This prompted further adjudication hearings at
which Republic presented unchallenged engineering and pro-
curement data which convinced Ohio EPA to modify the permit
to allow 42 months for development and installation of anti-
pollution devices. Ohio EPA was aware that this change
extended compliance beyond the July 1, 1977, date imposed by
section 301 (b) (1) (A) (i). However, the state administrator
believed that the special circumstances of the case legally justi-
fied this deviation.
In January, 1976, Ohio EPA transmitted the final NPDES
permit to EPA’s Region V office as required by section 402
(d) (1). Within 90 days the Director of the Enforcement
Division of Region V objected to its issuance, exercisirig his
authority under section 402 (d) (2) (B). He did not expressly
question the reasonableness of the state’s BPT effluent stan-
dards or the 42 month implementation schedule. Rather, he
concluded that the permit violated section 301 because full
8 Regulations defining BPT effluent limitations for primary opera-
tions in carbon steel manufacturing were promulgated in 39 Fed. Reg.
24114 (June 28, 1974). However, these regulations were subsequently
remanded in their entirety to the Administrator for revision in accordance
with the decision in American /ron and Stee/ Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d
1027 (3rd Cir. 1975). As of the date of oral argument in the instant case,
no revised regulations had been promulgated.
9 “Interim final’ guidelines covering alloy and stainless steel oper-
ations were published in 41 Fed. Reg. 12990 (March 29, 1976).
10 Had Republic’s permit been issued before the statutory deadline
mandated by 33 U.S.C. Section 1342 (k), the company would have had
30 months to achieve BPT effluent levels.
17a
compliance would not be achieved until after July 1, 1977.
Republic filed a timely petition for judicial review, pursuant
to section 509 (b) (1) (F),11 challenging this determination.
We do not question EPA’s good faith in attempting to dis-
charge the ambitious and often ambiguous duties imposed
upon it by a “poorly drafted and astonishingly imprecise
statute.” E./. du Pont de Nemours & Company v. Train, 541
F.2d 1018, 1026 (4th Cir. 1976). Many factors, some ad-
mittedly beyond EPA's control, have conspired to frustrate
its legitimate compliance efforts. In particular, virtually every
exercise of the agency’s discretion has precipitated protracted
litigation challenging the legitimacy of its authority or the
substance of its ‘’final’’ regulations. See American Petroleum
Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 540 F.2d 1023,
1027 (10th Cir. 1976) (thirteen relevant cases cited).
The fact remains, however, that the imperative nature of
EPA’s rule making responsibilities under the Act has been con-
firmed through litigation. In 1975, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the authority
of a federal district court to compel the agency to adhere to
a remedial court imposed timetable for the publication of
guidelines for all point source effluent discharges. Natura/
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F. 2d 692
(D.C. Cir. 1975). Unfortunarely, judicial intervention did not
avert the regrettable situation which confronts us here. The
inability of EPA to meet its statutory obligations has distorted
the regulatory scheme and imposed additional burdens which
must be equitably distributed. This task is a difficult one
because of the nature of the available options. Either the
affected discharger must be compelled to risk potential en-
forcement proceedings in spite of an abbreviated compliance
schedule, or society must tolerate slippage of an interim pollu-
tion abatement deadline.
Republic contends that the language of section 301 (b) (1)
(A) (i) expressly conditions adherence to the July 1, 1977,
deadline upon definition by the Administrator of BPT effluent
limitations and guidelines pursuant to section 304 (b) of the
Act. Therefore, the Administrator's failure to satisfy this con-
dition precedent by publishing final regulations for alloy and
stainless steel manufacturing excuses Republic’s noncompliance
with the July 1 date. We reluctantly agree. The import of the
11 33 U.S.C. Section 1369 (b) (1) (F).
18a
section is unequivocal: federal regulations must exist before
dischargers can be compelled to honor dates for implementing
them. See United States v. GAF Corporation, 389 F. Supp.
1379, 1386 (S.D. Tex. 1975). The presence within the Act
of successive deadiines for promulgation of standards, issuance
of permits, and conformance with effluent limitations bespeaks
a rational implementation strategy anticipating a discrete
sequence of events:
The Act's text and its legislative history make clear
that as a general matter the section 304 (b) (1) guide-
lines and the section 301 (b) (1) limitations were to be
developed prior to the issuance of permits. Sections
402 (a) and 402 (b) require that permits issued by the
Administrator and by the states assure compliance with
the effluent limitations of section 301, The Senate
Report confirms the interdependence of the three pro-
visions. That report states that ‘’[s] ubsection (b) of this
section [304] requires the Administrator, within one
year after enactment, to publish guidelines for setting
effluent limitations reflecting the mandate of section
301, which will be imposed as conditions of permits
issued under section 402." Another portion of the
Senate Report indicates that at least 30 months lead
time is required to afford industries an opportunity to
complete construction and modifications necessary to
comply with the phase one effluent limitation deadline.
Under the final version of the Act, effluent limitations
and permits would be required by December 31, 1974,
in order to provide polluters 30 months to comply with
the July 1, 1977, deadline.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F, 2d
692, 707-708 (D.C. Cir, 1975) (footnotes omitted),
The crucial role of federa! rule making in achieving mean.
ingful pollution control on a national scale is revealed by the
Third Circuit’s analysis in American /ron and Steel Institute v.
EPA:
[W]e reconcile sections 301 and 304 in the follow:
ing manner: the section 301 limitations represent both
the base level or minimum degree of effluent contro/
permissible and the ceiling (or maximum amount of
19a
effluent discharge) permissible nationwide within a
given category, and the section 304 guidelines are in-
tended to provide precise guidance to the permit-
issuing authorities in establishing a permissible level of
discharge that is more stringent than the ceiling.
526 F. 2d, 1027, 1045 (3rd Cir. 1975). (emphasis added),
If no federal standards exist, any state limitations on discharge,
no matter how insignificant, become more stringent than non-
existent ceilings imposed by the Act. See section 301 (b) (1)
(C), Surely Congress did not intend for the Act to be construed
to foster token, ad hoc, clean up efforts which would artes
defeat achievement of the goal of zero pollution by 1985,1
EPA answers Republic's argument by exhorting us to accept
the “plain meaning” of section 301 (b) (1) (A), The agency
contends that the language of the section admits to no other
interpretation than that July 1, 1977 is to be a “uniform dead-
line on all industrial dischargers, * * * plain, unequivocal and
mandatory.”” Unfortunately, EPA’s argument is persuasive only
if we accept an expurgated version of the section which omits
reference to the duty owed by the Administrator to publish
regulations by a fixed date,
12 The Director of Ohio EPA, a respondent in the case whose position
is aligned with that of Republic, arques that he issued Republic's NPDES
permit under the authority of 33 U.S.C, Section 1°11 (b) (1) (C) whieh
allows states to impose more stringent limitations than those applicable
under the Act, If we follow this strained rationale, we would have to
approve any state permit which authorized dischargers to maintain current
effluent levels because any standard is more stringent than a nonexistent
federal ceiling. This we refuse to do because it would be inimical to
achieving meaningful pollution abatement on a national scale,
20a
EPA correctly points out that the Act is devoid of language
countenancing exceptions to the July 1, 1977, deadline under
any condition. The Act's legislative history is replete with
statements attesting to the inflexible nature of the adminis-
trative timetable.13 In addition, Congress rejected a provision
in the House version of the measure which would have allowed
dischargers a discretionary extension of time in the face of
impending noncompliance due to physical or legal impossi-
bility.14 Nevertheless, nothing cited to us by EPA suggests
that Congress anticipated the ‘Catch 22” situation inherent in
the facts of this case. The language of the Act and its legis-
lative history make clear that Congress expected EPA to define
the rules before subjecting dischargers to potential civil and
criminal penalties, Natura/ Resources Defense Council, Inc,
v. Train, supra.
EPA attempts to bolster its position by emphasizing its
authority under section 402 (a) (1), in advance of formally
promulgated regulations, to issue and enforce NPDES permits
imposing ‘such conditions as the Administrator determines
are necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act.”’ /d. From
this, it would have us conclude that the duty of the discharger
to achieve BPT by July 1, 1977 must be independent . f EPA's
obligation to promulgate the necessary guidelines by October
18, 1973, EPA cites Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. Train,
544 F. 2d 657 (3rd Cir. 1976), and United States v. Cutter
Laboratories, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Tenn. 1976),
in support of this position, 15
13 For a comprehensive review of this legislative history, see Beth/ehem
Stee/ Corporation v. Train, 544 F, 2d 657, 661-662 (3rd Cir, 1976),
14 See proposed section 301 (b) (3), A Legis/ative History of the Water
Polution Control Act Amendents of 1972, 93rd Cong, 965 (Jan, 1973),
15 EPA also draws our attention to State Water Contro/ Board v. Train,
8 E.R.C. 1609 (E.D. Va, 1976) which upheld the inflexibility of a
different section 301 deadline where noncompliance was due to the failure
of Congress to appropriate sufficient money for public works (in this case,
the construction of municipal sewage treatment plants), This case is
readily distinguished from the present situation where noncompliance is
linked to derelection by EPA of duties imposed by the Act itself as a
condition precedent to compliance,
21a
A careful reading of both opinions confirms that EPA's
reliance upon them is misplaced. The Third Circuit correctly
categorizes EPA’s authority under section 402 (a) (1) to issue
NPDES permits on a case by case basis as a temporary ex-
pedient to ensure immediate progress during the year of rule
making contemplated by section 402 (b):
As a result [of the nonexistence of section 304 and 301
quidelines and limitations for iron and stee! manufactur.
ing as of the date of the opinion] , permits have been
issued to iron and steel manufacturers under a clause
of section 402 (a) (1) that empowers the EPA to qrant
permits, on an interim basis, before formal quidelines
are promulgated,
Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. Train, 544 F, 2d at 659 (em
phasis added), In the Bethlehem Stee/ case EPA granted the
permit on December 31, 1974, the last day mandated by
Congress for routine issuance of NPDES permits. Therefore,
Bethlehem Steel enjoyed a 30 month compliance schedule, the
minimum period possible under the statutory scheme assuming
no administrative slippage. In contrast, Republic's permit was
issued by a state agency eight months after expiration of the
permit granting deadline, affording Repubiic only 24 months
for compliance. This factual difference was not overlooked
by the Third Circuit which carefully excludes Republic's situ
ation from the purview of its holding in the Beth/ehem Stee/
case, 16
We read the Bethlehem Stee/ and Cutter Laboratory de-
cisions as standing for the limited proposition that a July 1,
1977, deadline, written into an NPDES permit issued by EPA
on or before December 31, 1974, is enforceable despite the
absence of BPT federal guidelines, Although we may share
16 See 544 F. 2d at 660 n, 20, Republic appeared as amicus curiae
in that case on behalf of Bethlehem Steel, United States Stee/ Corpo-
ration v. Train, Nos. 76-1425 and 76-1616 (7th Cir. May 13, 1977), a
case in which EPA issued the NPDES permit in October, 1974, while
federal BPT standards existed for iron and carbon steel manufacturing,
is distinguishable from our decision here on the same ground,
22a
this view, we find no persuasive authority for extending its
application to permits issued by EPA after 1974.17 In addition,
we are convinced that the Act expressly forecloses this result
when the permit issuing authority is a state agency. Section
‘402 (1) (A) empowers states to issue NPDES permits which
“apply, and insure compliance with, any applicable require-
ments of sections 301, * * * of [the Act] .’” /d. Our holding
that section 301 (b) (1) (A) (i) is made unenforceable by the
Administrator’s failure to promulgate necessary regulations is
tantamount to a finding that the July 1, 1977, deadline is no
longer an “applicable requirement’ of the Act. Therefore,
. in this case, Ohio EPA was not bound to apply it and EPA was
without authority to object to the proposed permit on this
ground, 18
EPA’s final contention is that it complied with the rule
making requirements of section 304 (b) by implicitly ratifying
the effluent limitations defined by Ohio EPA. EPA ignores the
actual language of section 301 (b) (1) (A) (i) which demands
that BPT guidelines be promulgated pursuant to the procedure
set forth in section 304 (b). Ohio EPA did not follow that
procedure for the obvious reason that section 304 (b) is ex-
clusively addressed to the Administrator of EPA. We reject
the notion that state acts can be federalized sub si/entio by the
mere acquiescence of an administrative agency in the absence
of clear statutory provisions to that effect.
17 The difficulty is dramatized by a hypothetical case in which EPA
issues an NPDES permit in 1977 requiring compliance with the July 1,
1977 completion date. Under such circumstances compliance may well be
foreclosed by constitutional objections. See United States Stee! Corpora-
tion v. Train, Nos. 76-1425 and 76-1616, at 51 (7th Cir. May 13, 1977).
18 We expressly exclude from our holding situations in which state
agencies may have issued NPDES permits in the absence of federal
- guidelines prior to December 31, 1974.
23a
Republic urges us to remand the case to EPA with direc-
tions that the agency unconditionally approve immediate issu-
ance of Republic’s NPDES permit in its original form. However,
the record suggests a more appropriate remedy. If we assume
that the Administrator satisfactorily performed all the tasks
incumbent upon him under sections 301 and 304, Republic
could not have received its permit any earlier than September 1,
1974.19 This would have afforded no more than 34 months
to achieve final BPT effluent limitations. The actual permit
provides 42 months, eight more than Republic would have been
entitled to had there been no distortion of the Act's timetable.
Our disposition of this case is intended to relieve the discharger
of the unfair consequences flowing from EPA’s administrative
shortcomings. It is not intended to bestow special benefits
not enjoyed by other permittees.
EPA is not foreclosed from objecting to Republic’s permit
on grounds other than the termination date of its compliance
schedule. Under the special circumstances of this case, we
believe that EPA must be granted a second opportunity to
scrutinize the balance of the permit for consistency with the
Act.20 Perhaps the inherent reasonableness of the proposed
42 month period is amenable to administrative review under ex-
isting regulations or sections cther than 301. That is for EPA
to determine in the first instance.
To guard against the possibility that situations such as this
will prompt state agencies to propose extravagant compliance
schedules, we remand the case to EPA with directions i at
the agency acquiesce to issuance by Ohio EPA of Republic’s
NPDES permit unless, within 30 days, it specifies persuasive
new grounds for objection under section 402 (d) (2) (B).
Remanded.
19 This date approximately reflects the date upon which Republic's
permit was first issued by Ohio EPA (prior to extensive renegotiations and
modification of terms) plus the maximum period reserved for the filing
of objections by EPA.
20 The obviousness of the permit’s putative section 301 violation may
have prompted EPA to bypass an exhaustive review of its other substantive
provisons.
24a
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 76-1557
[Filed June 23, 1977]
Republic Steel Corporation, Petitioner
Vv.
Russell E. Train, Administrator, United States
Environmental Protection Agency,
George R. Alexander, Jr. Regional Administrator,
United States Environmental Protection Agency,
and
Ned E. Williams, Director, Ohio Environmental
Protection Agency, Respondents
Before: Celebrezze and Lively, Circuit Judges,
and Rubin, District Judge.
On petition to review an action of the Administrator of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency,
This cause came on to be heard on the brief and record of
proceedings before the Environmental Protection Agency and
was argued by counsel.
On consideration whereof, it is now ordered, adjudged and
decreed by this Court that the case be and it is hereby
remanded to the Environmental! Protection Agency with
directions.
Each party will bear its own costs on this appeal.
Entered by Order of the Court.
/s/ John P. Hehman
Clerk
25a
APPENDIX E
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543
January 16, 1978
E. Dennis Muchnicki, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General of Ohio
30 East Broad Street, 17th Floor
Columbus, OH 43215
RE: Douglas M. Costle, Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
v. Republic Steel Corporation, et al.
No. 77-631
Dear Mr. Muchnicki:
The Court today entered the following order in the above-
entitled case:
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judg-
ment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration
in light of Public Law 95-217.
Very truly yours,
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., Clerk
26a
APPENDIX F
Mr. Ned Williams, Director
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency
P.O. Box 1049
Columbus, Ohio 43216
RE: Republic Steel Corporation
Canton, Ohio Facility
OEPA Permit No. D 300*AD
Dear Mr. Williams:
On January 5, 1976, the Ohio Environmental Protection
Agency (OEPA) submitted for United States Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) consideration pursuant to g402(d)
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended,
(FWPCA) and the OEPA - USEPA Memorandum of Agreement,
a stipulation and proposed permit for the referenced facility.
The transmittal letter noted that the schedule of compliance for
BPT effluent limitations in this permit extended beyond July 1,
1977. A 45-day period was specified for this Agency's re-
sponse. Subsequently, the response time was entended to April
1, 1976 by mutual agreement of our respective agencies.
Because of the legal and policy implications involved in ex-
tending the statutory requirement for achievement of BPT by
July 1, 1977, (Section 301 of the FWPCA), Region V asked
USEPA Headquarters for review and comment. The recom-
mendation of the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Water
Enforcement is attached to this letter.
We have also engaged in numerous extended discussions of this
permit and the problems it poses, most recently a conference
call on March 29, 1976, among Region V staff, a representa-
tive of the Ohio Attorney-General, and counsel and others for
Republic Steel Corporation.
Based on the record presented, the transcript of proceedings,
the proposed NPDES permit, and the Stipulation of the parties,
Region V, USEPA, hereby makes the following findings:
27a
Permit No. D 300*AD was issued to Republic Steel
Corporation for its Canton, Ohio facility on June 10,
1974. Final effluent guidelines for the Iron & Steel
Industry had not been promulgated as of the date of
permit issuance.
The final effluent limitations specified in the proposed
permit represent BPT as stipulated by the OEPA and
Republic in the absence of promulgated guidelines. By
letter of February 24, 1976 from A. H. Manzardo to
Ned Williams, Region V concurred in the appropriate-
ness of the final limitations.
An adjudicatory hearing was held to consider the
Schedule of Compliance for achieving the final limita-
tions specified in the permit.
As a result of said hearing, it was stipulated by the
parties (OEPA and Republic Steel) that the Schedule
of Compliance specified in the proposed permit. is
reasonable for achieving the final limitations in the
permit.
The reasonableness of the Schedule of Compliance is
not questioned by USEPA.
The FWPCA mandates compliance with BPT no later
than July 1, 1977
The Schedule of Compliance runs for 41 months and
would result in achievement of BPT subsequent to July
1, 1977.
The Administrator of the USEPA, in NPDES Appeal
No. 75-9, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, dated Septem-
ber 30, 1975, and the USEPA General Counsel in
Decision No. 26, Bethlehem Stee! Corporation, dated
July 24, 1975 have held that compliance with BPT
limitations must be achieved no later than July 1, 1977.
28a
Based upon the foregoing findings, Region V, USEPA, has
determined that the stipulation and proposed permit for
Republic Steel Corporation, Canton, Ohio facility, would vio-
late Section 301 of the FWPCA in that the Schedule of Compli-
ance for BPT extends beyond July 1, 1977, and for that reason,
Region V, USEPA, objects to the issuance of said permit.
If the proposed permit can be revised to conform with the
requirements of the FWPCA, this objection will be withdrawn.
Very truly yours,
James O. McDonald, Director
Enforcement Division
Attachment
cc: Mr. John Daniel
Office of the Attorney Generai
State of Ohio
29a
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL.
PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20460
February 25, 1976
OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT
Memorandum
TO: Director, Enforcement Division, Region V
FROM: Deputy Assistant Administrator for Water
Enforcement
SUBJECT: Republic Steel Corporation Canton, Ohio
Stipulation and Proposed NPDES Permit
This is in response to your letter of January 22, 1976,
regarding the Ohio EPA proceedings on the above-identified
permit.
We have reviewed the Ohio EPA letter to your office dated
January 5, 1976, the ’’Stipulation’”’ between the State of Ohio
and Republic Steel bearing a filing date of January 2, 1976,
the proposed OEPA permit, No. D 300 *AD, bearing a filing
date of January 2, 1976, and the transcript of proceedings in
the Ohio adjudicatory hearing.
In our opinion, U.S. EPA must object to the schedule of
compliance in the proposed Ohio permit on the ground that it
is outside the requirements of section 301 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act.
Jeffrey G. Miller
—
31a
30a
economically achievable for such category or class, which
will result in reasonable further progress toward the na-
tional goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants, as
determined in accordance with regulations issued by the
Administrator pursuant to section 304 (b) (2) of this Act,
which such effluent limitations shall require the elimination
of discharges of all pollutants if the Administrator finds, on
tne basis of information available to him (including informa-
tion developed pursuant to section 315), that such elim-
ination is technologically and economically achievable for
category or class of point sources as determined in ac-
cordance with regulations issued by the Administrator
pursuant to section 304 (b) (2) of this Act or (ii) in the case of
the introduction of a pollutant into a publicly owned treat-
APPENDIX G
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977
Section 301 (a) and (b)
Sec. 301. (a) Except as in compliance with this section and
sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and 404 of this Act, the dis-
charge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful. ment works which meets the requirements of subparagraph
(b) In order to carry out the objective of this Act there shall (B) of this paragraph, shall require compliance with any
be achieved— applicable pretreatment requirements and any other re-
(1) (A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limitations for
point sources, other than publicly owned treatment works,
(i) which shall require the application of the best practicable
control technology currently available as defined by the
Administrator pursuant to section 304 (b) of this Act, or (ii) in
the case of a discharge into a publicly owned treatment
works which meets the requirements of subparagraph (B) of
this paragraph, which shall require compliance with any
applicable pretreatment requirements and any requirements
under section 307 of this Act; and
(B) for publicly owned treatment works in existence on
July 1, 1977, or approved pursuant to section 203 of this Act
prior to June 30, 1974 (for which construction must be com-
pleted within four years of approval), effluent limitations
based upon secondary treatment as defined by the Adminis-
trator pursuant to section 304 (d) (1) of this Act; or,
(C) not later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent limita-
tion, including t! »se necessary to meet water quality stan-
dards, treatment standards, or schedule of compliance,
established pursuant to any State law or regulations, (under
authority preserved by section 510) or any other Federal law
or regulation, or required to implement any applicable water
quality standard established pursuant to this Act.
(2) (A) [not later than July 1, 1983] for pollutants iden-
tified in subparagraphs (C), (D), and (F) of this paragraph,
effluent limitations for categories and classes of point
sources, other than publicly owned treatment works, which
(i) shall require application of te best available technology
ee
quirement under section 307 of this Act; [and]
(B) not later than July 1, 1983, compliance by all publicly
owned treatment works with the requirements set forth in
section 201 (g) (2) (A) of this Actf.];
(C) not later than July 1, 1984, with respect to all toxic
pollutants referred to in table 1 of Committee Print Num-
bered 95-30 of the Committee on Public Works and Trans-
portation of the House of Representatives compliance with
effluent limitations in accordance with subparagraph (A) of
this paragraph;
(D) for all toxic pollutants listed under paragraph (1) of
subsection (a) of section 307 of this Act which are not
referred to in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph com-
pliance with effluent limitation in accordance with subpara-
graph (A) of this paragraph not later than three years after
the date such limitations are established;
(E) not later than July 1, 1984, effluent limitations for
categories and classes of point sources, other than publicly
owned treatment works, which in the case of pollutants
identified pursuant to section 304 (a) (4) of this Act shall
require application of the best conventional pollutant con-
tro! technoiogy as determined in accordance with regula-
tions issued by the Administrator pursuant to section 304 (b)
(4) of this Act; and
(F) for all pollutants (other than those subject to sub-
paragraphs (C), (D), or (E) of this paragraph) compliance
32a
with effluent limitations in accordance with subparagraph
(A) of this paragraph not later than 3 years after the date
such limitations are established, or not later than July 1,
1984, whichever is later, but in no case later than July 17,
1987.
Section 304 (b)
(b) For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent lim-
itations under this Act the Administrator shall, after consultation
with appropriate Federal and State agencies and other in-
terested persons, publish within one year of enactment of this
title, regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations,
and, at least annually thereafter, revise, if appropriate, such
regulations. Such regulations shall-—
(1) (A) identify, in terms of amounts of constituents and
chemical, physical, and biological characteristics of pollut-
ants, the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the
application of the best practicable control technology cur-
rently available for classes and categories of point sources
(other than publicly owned treatment works); and
(B) specify factors to be taken into account in determin-
ing the control measures and practices to be applicable to
point sources (other than publicly owned treatment works)
within such categories or classes. Factors relating to the
assessment of best practicable control technology currently
available to comply with subsection (b) (1) of section 301 of
this Act shall include consideration of the total cost of ap-
plication of technology in relation to the effluent reduction
benefits to be achieved from such application, and shall
also take into account the age of equipment and facilities
involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of
the application of various types of control techniques, pro-
cess changes, non-water quality environmental impact (in-
cluding energy requirements), and such other factors as the
Administrator deems appropriate;
(2) (A) identify, in terms of amounts of constituents
and chemical, physical, and biological characteristics of
pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction attainable
through the application of the best control measures and
practices achievable including treatment techniques, pro-
cess and procedure innovations, operating methods, and
other alternatives for classes and categories of point
sources (other than publicly owned treatment works); and
33a
(B) specify factors to be taken into account in determin-
ing the best measures and practices available to comply
with subsection (b) (2) of section 301 of this Act to be
applicable to any point source (other than publicly owned
treatment works) within such categories of classes. Factors
relating to the assessment of best available technology shall
take into account the age of equipment and facilities in-
volved, the process empi»yed, the engineering aspects of
the application of various types of control techniques, pro-
cess changes, the cost of achieving such 9offluent reduction,
non-water quality environmental impact (including energy
requirements), and such other factors as the Administrator
deems appropriate; [and]
(3) identify control measures and practices available to
eliminate the discharge of pollutants from categories and
classes of point sources, taking into account the cost of
achieving such elimination of the discharge of poliutants[. }:
and
(4) (A) identify, in terms of amounts of constituents and
chemical, physical, and biological characteristics of pollut-
ants, the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the
application of the best conventional pollutant control
technology (including measures and practices) for classes
and categories of point sources (other than publicly owned
treatment works): and
(B) specify factors to be taken into account in determin-
ing the best conventional pollutant contro! technology mea-
sures and practices to comply with section 301 (b) (2) (E) of
this Act to be applicable to any point source (other than
publicly owned treatment works) within such categories or
classes. Factors relating to the assessment of best conven-
tional pollutant control technology (including measures and
practices) shall include consideration of the reasonableness
of the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduc-
tion in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits derived,
and the comparison of the cost and level of reduction of
such pollutants from the discharge from publicly owned
treatment works to the cost and level of reduction of such
pollutants from @ class or category of industrial sources,
and shall take into account the age of equipment and
facilities involved. the process employed, the engineering
34a
aspects of the application of various types of control tech-
niques, process changes, non-water quality environmental
impact (including energy requirements), and such other fac-
tors as the Administrator deems appropriate.
Section 309
Sec. 309. (a) (1) whenever, on the basis of any information
available to him, the Administrator finds that any person is in
violation of any condition or limitation which implements sec-
tion 301, 302, 306, 307, [or] 308, 378, or 405 of this Act in a permit
issued by a State under an approved permit program under
section 402 or 404 of this Act, he shall proceed under his author-
ity in paragraph (3) of this subsection or he shall notify the
person in alleged violation and such State of such finding. If
beyond the thirtieth day after the Administrator's notification the
State has not commenced appropriate enforcement action, the
Administrator shall issue an order requiring such person to
comply with such condition or limitation or shall bring a civil
action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
(2) Whenever, on the basis of information available to him,
the Administrator finds that violations of permit conditions or
limitations as set forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection are so
widespread that such violations appear to result from a failure of
the State to enforce such permit conditions or limitations effec-
tively, he shall so notify the State. If the Administrator finds such
failure extends beyond the thirtieth day after such notice, he
shall give public notice of such finding. During the period be-
ginning with such public notice and ending when such State
satisfies the Administrator that it will enforce such conditions
and limitations (hereafter referred to in this section as the period
of ‘federally assumed enforcement’), except where an exten-
sion has been granted under paragraph (5) (8B) of this subsec-
tion, the Administrator shall enforce any permit condition or
limitation with respect to any person—
(A) by issuing an order to comply with such condition or
limitation, or
(B) by bringing a civil action under subsection (b) of this
section.
(3) Whenever on the basis of any information available to
him the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of
section 301, 302, 306, 307, [or] 308, 378, or 405 of this Act, or isin
violation of any permit condition or limitation implementing any
ect
35a
of such sections in a permit issued under section 402 of this Act
by him or by a State or in a permit issued under section 404 of
this Act by a State, he shall issue an order requiring such person
to comply with such section or requirement, or he shall bring a
civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section,
(4) Acopy of any order issued under this subsection shall be
sent immediately by the Administrator to the State in which the
violation occurs and other affected States. [Any order issued
under this subsection shall be by personal service and shall
state with reasonable specificity the nature of the violation,
specify a time for compliance, not to exceed thirty days, which
the Administrator determines is reasonable, taking into account
the seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts to
comply with applicable requirements.] In any case in which an
order under this subsection (or notice to a violator under para-
graph (1) of this subsection) is issued to a corporation, a copy of
such order (or notice) shall be served on any appropriate corpo-
rate officers. An order issued under this subsection relating to a
violation of section 308 of this Act shall not take effect until the
person to whom it is issued has had an opportunity to confer
with the Administrator concerning the alleged violation.
(5) (A) Any order issued under this subsection shall be by
personal service, shall state with reasonable specificity the na-
ture of the violation, and shall specify a time for compliance not
to exceed thirty days in the case of a violation of an interim
compliance schedule or operation and maintenance require-
ment and not to exceed a time the Administrator determines to
be reasonable in the case of a violation of a fina! deadline, taking
into account the seriousness of the violation and any good faith
efforts to comply with applicable requirements.
(B) The Administrator may, if he determines (i) that any per-
son who is a violator of, or any person who is otherwise not in
compliance with, the time requirements under this Act or in any
permit issued under this Act, has acted in good faith, and has
made a commitment (in the form of contracts or other securities)
of necessary resources to achieve compliance by the earliest
possible date after July 1, 1977, but not later than April 1, 1979; (ii)
that any extension under this provision will not result in the
imposition of any additional controls on any other point or non-
point source; (iii) that an application for a permit under section
402 of this Act was filed for such person prior to December 31,
1974; and (iv) that the facilities necessary for compliance with
such requirements are under construction, grant an extension
of the date referred to in section 301 (b) (1) (A) to a date which
will achieve compliance at the earliest time possible but not later
than April 1, 1979.
(6) Whenever, on the basis of information available to him,
the Administrator finds (A) that any person is in violation of
section 301 (b) (1) (A) or (C) of this Act, (B) that such person
cannot meet the requirements for a time extension under sec-
tion 301 (i) (2) of this Act, and (C) that the most expeditious and
appropriate means of compliance with this Act by such person is
to discharge into a publicly owned treatment works, then, upon
request of such person, the Administrator may issue an order
requiring such person to comply with this Act at the earliest date
practicable, but not later than July 1, 1983, by discharging into a
publicly owned treatment works if such works concur with such
order. Such order shall include a schedule of compliance.
(b) The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil ac-
tion for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary
injunction, for any violation for which he is authorized to issue a
compliance order under subsection (a) of this section. Any ac-
tion under this subsection may be brought in the district court of
the United States for the district in which the defendant is lo-
cated or resides or is doing business, and such court shall have
jurisdiction to restrain such violation and to require compliance.
Notice of the commencement of such action shall be given
immediately to the appropriate State.
(c) (1) Any person who willfully or negligently violates sec-
tion 301, 302, 306, 307, or 308 of this Act, or any permit condition
or limitation implementing any of such actions in a permit is-
sued under section 402 of this Act by the Administrator or by a
State, or in a permit issued under section 404 of this Act by a
State, shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor
more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for
not more than one year, or by both. If the conviction is for a
violation committed after a first conviction of such person under
this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than
$50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more
than two years, or by both.
(2) Any person who knowingly makes any false statement,
representation, or certification in any application, record, re-
port, plan, or other document filed or required to be maintained
under this Act or who falsifies, tampers with, or knowingly ren-
ders inaccurate any monitoring device or method required to be
maintained under this Act, shall upon conviction, be punished
PA GINATION
BUT TEXT
IS INCORRECT,
iS COMPLETE.
er
by a fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for not
more than six months, or by both.
(3) For the purposes of this subsection, the term “person”
shall mean, in addition to the definition contained in section 502
(5) of this Act, any responsible corporate officer.
(d) Any person who violates section 301, 302, 306, 307, [or]
308, 318 or 405 of this Act, or any permit condition or limitation
implementing any of such sections in a permit issued under
section 402 of this Act by the Administrator, or by a State, or ina
permit issued under section 404 of this Act by a State, and any
person who violates any order issued by the Administrator under
subsection (a) of this section, shall be subject to a civil penalty
not to exceed $10,000 per day of such violation.
(c) Whenever a municipality is a party to a civil action
brought by the United States under this section, the State in
which such municipality is located shall be joined as a party.
Such State shall be liable for payment of any judgment, or any
expenses incurred as a result of complying with any judgment,
entered against the municipality in such action to the extent that
the laws of that State prevent the municipality from raising
revenues needed to comply with such judgment.
(f) Whenever, on the basis of an information available to him,
the Administrator finds that an owner or operator of any source
is introducing a pollutant into a treatment works in violation of
subsection (d) of section 307, the Administrator may notify the
owner or operator of such treatment works and the State of such
violation. If the owner or operator of the treatment works does
not commence appropriate enforcement action within 30 days
of the date of such notification, the Administrator may com-
mence a civil action for appropriate relief, including but not
limited to, a permanent or temporary injunction, against the
owner or operator of such treatment works. In any such civil
action the Administrator shall join the owner or operator of such
source as a party to the action. Such action shall be brought in
the district court of the United States in the district in which the
treatment works is located. Such court shall have jurisdiction to
restrain such violation and to require the owner or operator of
the treatment works and the owner or operator of the source to
take such action as may be necessary to come into compliance
with this Act. Notice of commencement of any such action shall
be given to the State. Nothing in this subsection shall be con-
strued to limit or prohibit any other authority the Administrator
may have under this Act.
39a
Section 402 (a) - (k)
SEC. 402. (a) (1) Except as provided in sections 318 and 404 of
this Act, the Administrator may, after opportunity tor public
hearing, issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or
combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section 301 (a),
upon condition that such discharge will meet either all applica-
ble requirements under sections 301, 302, 306, 307, 308, and 403
of this Act, or prior to the taking of necessary implementing
actions relating to all such requirements, such conditions as the
Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of this Act.
(2) The Administrator shall prescribe conditions for such
permits to assure compliance with the requirements of para-
graph (1) of this subsection, including conditions on data and
information collection, reporting, and such other requirements
as he deems appropriate.
(3) The permit program of the Administrator under para-
graph (1) of this subsection, and permits issued thereunder,
shall be subject to the same terms, conditions, and requirements
as apply to a State permit program and permits issued thereun-
der under subsection (b) of this section.
(4) All permits for discharges into the navigable waters is-
sued pursuant to section 13 of the Act of March 3, 1899, shall be
deemed to be permits issued under this title, and permits issued
under this title shall be deemed to be permits issued under
section 13 of the Act of March 3, 1899, and shall continue in force
and effect for their term unless revoked, modified, or suspended
in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(5) No permit for a discharge into the navigable waters shall
be issued under section 13 of the Act of March 3, 1899, after the
date of enactment of this title. Each application for a permit
under section 13 of the Act of March 3, 1899, pending on the date
of enactment of this Act shall be deemed to be an application for
a permit under this section. The Administrator shall authorize a
State, which he determines has the capability of administering a
permit program which will carry out the objective of this Act, to
issue permits for discharges into the navigable waters within the
jurisdiction of such State. The Administrator may exercise the
authority granted him by the preceding sentence only during the
period which begins on the date of enactment of this Act and
ends either on the ninetieth day after the date of the first prom-
ulgation of guidelines required by section 304 (h) (2) of this Act,
or the date of approval by the Administrator of a permit program
~
40a
for such State under subsection (b) of this section, whichever
date first occurs, and no such authorization to a State shall
extend beyond the last day of such period. Each such permit
shall be subject to such conditions as the Administrator deter-
mines are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. No
such permit shall issue if the Administrator objects to such
issuance.
(b) At any time after the promulgation of the guidelines re-
quired by subsection (h) (2) of section 304 of this Act, the Gover-
nor of each State desiring to administer its own permit program
for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction may
submit to the Administrator a full and complete description of
the program it proposes to establish and administer under State
law or under an interstate compact. In addition, such State shall
submit a statement from the attorney general (or the attorney for
those State water pollution control agencies which have inde-
pendent legal counsel), or from the chief legal officer in the case
of an interstate agency, that the laws of such State, or the
interstate compact, as the case may be, provide adequate au-
thority to carry out the described program. The Administrator
shall approve each such submitted program unless he deter-
mines that adequate authority does not exist:
(1) To issue permits which—
(A) apply, and insure compliance with, any applicable
requirements of sections 301, 302, 306, 307, and 403;
(B) are for fixed terms not exceeding five years; and
(C) can be terminated or modified for cause including,
but not limited to, the following:
(i) violation of any condition of the permit;
(ii) obtaining a permit by misrepresentation, or failure
to disclose fully all relevant facts;
(iii) change in any condition that requires either a
temporary or permanent reduction or elimination of the
permitted discharge;
(D) control the disposal of pollutants into wells;
(2) (A) To issue permits which apply, and insure com-
pliance with, all applicable requirements of section 308 of this
Act, or
(B) To inspect, monitor, enter, and require reports to at least
the same extent as required in section 308 of this Act;
(3) To insure that the public, and any other State the waters
of which may be affected, receive notice of each application for
41a
a permit and to provide an opportunity for public hearing before
a ruling on each such application;
(4) To insure that the Administrator receives notice of each
application (including a copy thereof) for a permit;
(5) To insure that any State (other than the permitting State),
whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a permit may
submit written recommendations to the permitting State (and
the Administrator) with respect to any permit application and, if
any part of such written recommendations are not accepted by
the permitting State, that the permitting State will notify such
affected State (and the Administrator) in writing of its failure to
so accept such recommendations together with its reasons for
so doing;
(6) To insure that no permit will be issued if, in the judgment
of the Secretary of the Army acting through the Chief of En-
gineers, after consultation with the Secretary of the department
in which the Coast Guard is operating, anchorage and naviga-
tion of any of the navigable waters would be substantially im-
paired thereby;
(7) To abate violations of the permit or the permit program,
including civil and criminal penalties and other ways and means
of enforcement.
(8) To insure that any permit for a discharge from a publicly
owned treatment works includes conditions to require the iden-
tification in terms of character and volume of pollutants of any
significant source introducing pollutants subject to pretreat-
ment standards under section 307 (b) of this Act into such works
and a program to assure compliance with such pretreatment
standards by each such source, in addition to adequate notice to
the permitting agency of (A) new introductions into such works
of pollutants from any source which would be a new source as
defined in section 306 if such source were discharging pollu-
tants, (B) new introductions of pollutants into such works from a
source which would be subject to section 301 if it were discharg-
ing such pollutants, or (C) a substantial change in volume or
character of pollutants being introduced into such works by a
source introducing pollutants into such works at the time of
issuance of the permit. Such notice shall include information on
the quality and quantity of effluent to be introduced into such
treatment works ana any anticipated impact of such change in
the quantity or quality of effluent to be discharged from such
publicly owned treatment works; and
42a
(9) To insure that any industrial user of any publicly owned
treatment works will comply with sections 204 (b), 307, and 308.
(c) (1) Not later than ninety days after the date on which a
State has submitted a program (or revision thereof) pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section, the Administrator shall suspend
the issuance of permits under subsection (a) of this section as to
those navigable waters subject to such program unless he de-
termines that the State permit program does not meet the re-
quirements of subsection (b) of this section or does not conform
to the guidelines issued under section 304 [(h)] (/) (2) of this Act.
If the Administrator so determines, he shall notify the State of
any revisions or modifications necessary to conform to such
requirements or guidelines.
(2) Any State permit program under this section shall at all
times be in accordance with this section and guidelines promul-
gated pursuant to section 304 (h) (2) of this Act.
(3) Whenever the Administrator determines after public
hearing that a State is not administering a program approved
under this section in accordance with requirements of this sec-
tion, he shall so notify the State and, if appropriate corrective
action is not taken within a reasonable time, not to exceed
ninety days, the Administrator shall withdraw approval of such
program. The Administrator shall not withdraw approval of any
such program unless he shall first have notified the State, and
made public, in writing, the reasons for such withdrawal.
(d) (1) Each State shall transmit to the Administrator a copy
of each permit application received by such State and provide
notice to the Administrator of every action related to the consid-
eration of such permit application, including each permit pro-
posed to be issued by such State.
(2) No permit shall issue (A) if the Administrator within ninety
days of the date of his notification under subsection (b) (5) of
this section objects in writing to the issuance of such permit, or
(B) if the Administrator within ninety days of the date of transmit-
tal of the proposed permit by the State objects in writing to the
issuance of such permit as being outside the guidelines and
requirements of this Act. Whenever the Administrator objects to
the issuance of a permit under this paragraph such written
objection shall contain a statement of the reasons for such
objection and the effluent limitations and conditions which such
permit would include if it were issued by the Administrator.
43a
(3) The Administrator may, as to any permit application,
waive paragraph (2) of this subsection.
(4) In any case where, after the date of enactment of this
paragraph, the Administrator, pursuant to paragraph (2) of this
subsection, objects to the issuance of a permit, on request of the
State, a public hearing shall be held by the Administrator on
such objection. If the State does not resubmit such permit re-
vised to meet such objection within 30 days after completion of
the hearing, or, if no hearing is requested within 90 days after
the date of such objection, the Administrator may issue the
permit pursuant to subsection (a) of this section for such source
in accordance with the guidelines and requirements of this Act.
(e) In accordance with guidelines promulgated pursuant to
subsection (h) (2) of section 304 of this Act, the Administrator is
authorized to waive the requirements of subsection (d) of this
section at the time he approves a program pursuant to subsec-
tion (b) of this section for any category (including any class,
type, or size within such category) of point sources within the
State submitting such program.
(f) The Administrator shall promulgate regulations establish-
ing categories of point sources which he determines shall not be
subject to the requirements of subsection (d) of this section in
any State with a program approved pursuant to subsection (b) of
this section. The Administrator may distinguish among classes,
types, and sizes within any category of point sources.
(g) Any permit issued under this section for the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters from a vessel or other float-
ing craft shall be subject to any applicable regulations promul-
gated by the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast
Guard is operating, establishing specifications for safe trans-
portation, handling, carriage, storage, and stowage of pollu-
tants.
(h) In the event any condition of a permit for discharges from
a treatment works (as defined in section 212 of this Act) which is
publicly owned is violated, a State with a program approved
under subsection (b) of this section or the Administrator, where
no State program is approved or where the Administrator de-
termines pursuant to section 309 (a) of this Act that a State with
an approved program has not commenced appropriate en-
forcement action with respect to such permit, may proceed ina
court of competent jurisdiction to restrict or prohibit the intro-
duction of any pollutant into such treatment works by a source
44a
not utilizing such treatment works prior to the finding that such
condition was violated.
(i) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the
authority of the Administrator to take action pursuant to section
309 of this Act.
(j) A copy of each permit application and each permit issued
under this section shall be available to the public. Such permit
application or permit, or portion thereof, shall further be avail-
able on request for the purpose of reproduction.
(k) Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section
shall be deemed compliance, for purposes of sections 309 and
505, with sections 301, 302, 306, 307, and 403, except any stan-
dard imposed under section 307 for a toxic pollutant injurious to
human health. Until December 31, 1974, in any case where a
permit for discharge has been applied for pursuant to this sec-
tion, but final administrative disposition of such application has
not been made, such discharge shall not be a violation of (1)
section 301, 306, or 402 of this Act, or (2) section 13 of the Act of
March 3, 1899, unless the Administrator or other plaintiff proves
that final administrative disposition of such application has not
been made because of the failure of the applicant to furnish
information reasonably required or requested in order to pro-
cess the application. For the 180-day period beginning on the
date of enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, in the case of any point source discharg-
ing any pollutant or combination of pollutants immediately prior
to such date of enactment which source is not subject to section
13 of the Act of March 3, 1899, the discharge by such source shall
not be a violation of this Act if such a source applies for a permit
for discharge pursuant to this section within such 180-day
period.
Section 505
Sec. 505. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, any citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf—
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States,
and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to
the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this Act or (B) an order
45a
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a
failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under
this Act which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to en-
force such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order,
or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the
case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under
section 309 (d) of this Act.
(b) No action may be commenced—
(1) under subsection (a) (1) of this section—
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given
notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii)
to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii)
to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order,
or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and
is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a
court of the United States, or a State to require com-
pliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any
such action in a court of the United States any citizen may
intervene as a matter of right.
(2) under subsection (a) (2) of this section prior to sixty
days after the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the
Administrator.
except that such action may be brought immediately after such
notification in the case of an action under this section respect-
ing a violation of sections 306 and 307 (a) of this Act. Notice
under this subsection shall be given in such manner as the
Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.
(c) (1) Any action respecting a violation by a discharge
source of an effluent standard or limitation or an order respect-
ing such standard or limitation may be brought under this sec-
tion only in the judicial district in which such source is located.
(2) In such action under this section, the Administrator, if not
a party, may intervene as a matter of right.
(d) The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought
pursuant to this section, may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party,
whenever the court determines such award is appropriate. The
Se re
court may, if a temporary restraining order or preliminary in-
junction is sought, require the filing of a bond or equivalent
en in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
ure.
(c) Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or
common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or
limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the
Administrator or a State agency). >
(f) For purposes of this section, the term “effluent standard
or limitation under this Act” means (1) effective July 1, 1973, an
unlawful act under subsection (a) of section 301 of this Act; (2)
an effluent limitation or other limitation under section 301 or 302
of this Act; (3) standard or performance under section 306 of
this Act; (3) prohibition, effluent standard or pretreatment stan-
dards under section 307 of this Act: (5) certification under sec-
tion 401 of this Act; or (6) a permit or condition thereof issued
under section 402 of this Act, which is in effect under this Act
(including a requirement applicable by reason of section 313 of
this Act).
(g) For the purposes of this section the term ‘citizen’ means
a person or persons having an interest which is or may be
adversely affected.
(h) A Governor of a State may commence a civil action under
subsection (a), without regard to the limitations of subsection
(b) of this section, against the Administrator where there is
alleged a failure of the Administrator to enforce an effluent
standard or limitation under this Act the violation of which is
occurring in another State and is causing an adverse effect on
the public health or welfare in his State, or is causing a violation
of any water quality requirement in his State.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.