Petition — Garonzik v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1979

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Text

OCT 30 1978

— DAK, JR., CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1978

no. 78 V8-@1LZ

JARRELL GARONzIK, individually and as executor of the Estate

of Mitpurn Garonzik, Deceased, and as Representative of

That Class of Persons and Legal Enities Who Purchased Horizon

Corporation Stock from SHEarson, HAMMILL & Co. INCORPO-

RATED during that period from February 18, 1971 to Septem-

ber 26, 1972,

Petitioners (Plaintiffs )

VS.

SHEARSON, HAYDEN STONE, INC.,

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Sanpy M. SANDOLOSKI

1800 Republic National Bank Tower

Dallas. Texas 75201 (214) 748-8891

Attorney for Petitioners

Re a te

INDEX

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT ..............

OPINION BELOW AND JURISDICTION ...........

Sor os |

Question One:

What status, if any, does an attorney have as class

representative and class attorney under Rule 23,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? ..............

Question Two:

What status, if any, does a “sophisticated investor”

have as class representative and class attorney under

Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule

eS cay os Ses ad.o.0 9 60-0 a vo 085

Question Three:

In a class action suit wherein an attorney seeks to

represent his class, can a class action be perpetually

destroyed because the class representative and attor-

ney is an attorney, or can the error, if any, be cured by

the attorney resigning and employing other attorneys

to represent the class, as held in the Seventh Circuit? .

Question Four:

Does Rule 23 provide rights which trial courts

must enforce, or does it provide privileges which the

trial court may, or may not, enforce at its undefined

and arbitrary “discretion”? Does the Supreme Court

rule of Rio Grande v. Gildersleeve, 174 U.S. 1102

(1899), which asserts the rule of law, still exist? .. .

Question Five:

In class action suits, can trial judges surmise basic

facts without any hearing, or theorize “reasons” with-

out a factual or logical predicate, thus negating the

established record before the Court and creating a

record contrary to the record established before the

NE ale oe ahd gs a6 Wie-8o¥ 8828 5k oa + 0, 0.8

a |

6

Page

Question Six:

What does “typical” mean in Rule 23? Does it

mean not “in conflict with’? If so, is a sophisticated

investor in conflict with unsophisticated investors and,

if so, why? Is an attorney in conflict with members of

his own class and, if so, why? Can conflict exist merely

because a trial court says so, without evidence or rea-

son to back up the statement? CAN WORDS HAVING

A FACTUAL MEANING BE PLUCKED OUT OF

THE THIN AIR BY TRIAL COURTS SO AS TO

DEFEAT CLASS CERTIFICATION? ............ 6

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES

IWS TE TOO 065 See 6 sce ctecensceves 7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......ccscccscccccccs 7

REASONS AS TO QUESTION ONE ..........c0eeees 12

REASONS AS TO QUESTION TWO ................ 12

REASONS AS TO QUESTION THREE .............. 16

REASONS AS TO QUESTION FOUR .............5. 17

REASONS AS TO QUESTION FIVE ............000: 18

REASONS AS TO QUESTION SIX .........cceceeee 27

THE THREE BASIC REASONS FOR

CER PIEIEEE GRP UI ec cciscescticcnececeses 31

CSR AG CE DURUM 6 cc icccceccesccccccces 32

NOTIFICATION OF MOTION FOR REHEARING

HAVING BEEN OVERRULED, COURT OF APPEALS = 33

OPINION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS,

og eo a eer rer rrr ee rer 34

MEMORANDUM ORDER OF TRIAL COURT,

RAEN 0p AGED occ cise ceccesenceecduesese 38

Page

MEMORANDUM ORDER OF TRIAL COURT,

SNE Ae IE ood db ow ce Coins Gus Oink cebas 42

ORDER OF TRIAL COURT, NOVEMBER 11, 1977... .. 45

ORDER OF TRIAL COURT, NOVEMBER 17, 1977... .. 16

Constitutional Provisions

Amendment Five, Constitution of the United Siates.... . 7

Statutes Involved

Sp Sha, UNS PUTED 6.0 kk ewh esa wedcuarans 4

Rules Involved

Rule 23, Federal Rules

ee FE 0. vinden eeuens 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12,

13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31

Rule 10b(5), Sec. Exch. Act. Rel.

No. 3230, May 31, 1942 ............. 2. 5, 7, 18, 18, 3]

Citations

American Bar Association Antitrust Law Journal,

Wok. OB, Dae B, Pee, FHT a kick ves scceiesees 12

The Business Lawyer, Vol. 23, Number 3, 1968 ....... 13

Carpenter v. Hull, 211 F.S. 1099, (S.D. 1970)... .... 27

First American Corp. v. Foster,

52 F.R.D. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1970) ........ cc eee ees 14

Garonzik v. Shearson Hayden Stone Inc.,

Se ee EN aa eS ka ene Rh eA Read oes cow ees 3

Glenn v. Arkansas Best Corporation,

SOG Fd ISIS (Bk Cle. ISTE) 00 ccc cvcecesecs 1)

6 eee eee ere Tee eS Perry te tee 29

Page

Lamb v. United Co., 57 F.R.D. 551, (S.D. N.Y. 1975)... 14

Philadelphia Housing y. American Corp.,

SF See Ce, Bas BOE h iwsancdeeawckaten 14

Rio Grande v. Gildersleeve,

pe RG re ry ee 6, 17, 18

Susman v. Lincoln American Corporation,

a A Fy ee Eg t eee 3, 16

Sosna v. lowa, 418 U.S. 383, 42 L.Ed.2d 532,

UE Se oc uk w wade chk cwcomea eens 14

Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, 383 U.S.

363, 14 L.Ed. 807. 86 S.Ct. 845 (1966)....... 14, 15, 16

Stein v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205 (Sth Cir. 1973) ...... 15, 28

The Business Lawyer, Vol. 23, Number 3, April, 1968.. 13

Senes Low Review, Vol. 40 2 on cc cc cccacccacecccces 26

iv

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term. 1978

No. 78-

JARRELL Garonzik, individually and as executor of the Estate

of Mirpurn Garonzik, Deceased, and as Representative of

That Class of Persons and Lega! Entities Who Purchased Horizon

Corporation Stock from Suearson, Hamnitt & Co. INcorpPo-

RATED during that period from February 18, 1971 to Septem.

ber 26, 1972.

Petitioners (Plaintiffs )

Ds.

SuHEARSON, HayDEN STONE, INC.

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

To THE HONORABLE, THE Cater Justice AND AssociATE Jus-

TICES OF THE SUPREME Court OF THE UNITED STATES:

“If this Court were shown that, in the Fifth Cireuit, the actual

trial records were supplanted by astrology or numerology as

2

predicates for judgments, the Supreme Court would grant cer-

tiorari without delay to stop this practice.

“The equivalent is taking place. Trial records are supplanted,

not by astrology or numerology, but by something much more

damaging, and that is an inadvertent process and practice

whereby cliches and phraseology misconstrue the record fac-

tually and thus emasculate Rule 23.”

(see page 28 of this Petition)

Petitioners were brothers who purchased over $12,000 of

Horizon Corporation stock from Respondent brokerage house

because of a 19-month long, written campaign by the Respondent

to sell this stock. The stock was recommended without any mean-

ingful research by the brokerage house, unless ten hours of

“work”, including lunches with fellow brokers, constitutes “re-

search’. Proof of the fraud, as customary in these 10-b(5) cases,

had to be produced through the testimony of the defendant.

Respondent contested class certification on the sole grounds

that one plaintiff was an attorney. No attack was made upon this

plaintiff personally or professionally, as he is an old attorney

with an impeccable reputation. The sole contention by the Re-

spondent was that the plaintiff-attorney could not represent the

class as class representative and attorney, and therefore, the

class action had to be dismissed. The disqualification of the

plaintiff-attorney was then imputed to the brother.

The trial court, on this bare bones record alone, refused cer-

iifieation. Thus, a per se ruling was made that an attorney could

not act as class representative and attorney in a securities case

3

involving Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act.

Another trial judge created a second grounds for certiorari

in ruling that since the plaintiff-attorney was a sophisticated

investor he was atypical of his class and could not represent any

class, either sophisticated-or unsophisticated investors, as he was

in conflict with both classes. There was no hearing to indicate

that any of the purchasers were unsophisticated, and, if they

were, why the case could not be divided into classes and why the

plaintiff could not represent his class of sophisticated investors.

The plaintiff-attorney, early in the litigation, had requested

permission to resign as class attorney in order to preserve the

class action. The Court refused to take action on this. The plain-

tiff-attorney thereafter did resign as class atiorney, and did

employ other attorneys to represent the class. thus exercising a

power he would have had at the beginning of this suit. Never-

theless, the Court refused certification of the class. thus acting

directly contrary to the Seventh Circuit in the case of Susman v.

Lincoln American Corporation, 561 F. 2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977).

The Fifth Circuit affirmed. It holds that Rule 23 does not

create any definable, clear, enforceable rights. Certification, in

the Fifth Circuit, is a matter of “discretion” of the trial court.

OPINION BELOW AND JURISDICTION

The opinion of the Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit is

appended. It was dated June 12, 1978. Motion for rehearing

was denied on September 13, 1978. The opinion is recorded at

974 F 2d 1220. This petition is being filed within 90 days after

4

rehearing was denied. Attention is particularly invited to the

three trial orders also appended as they constitute exhibits to

support a fifth ground for certiorari, and this is the fact that

trial records in the Fifth Circuit are not inviolate, but are ne-

gated by consistent factual misconstructions of the trial record,

thus creating an inadvertent, but basic violation of the Fifth

Amendment as well as Rule 23 —- a practice that must be

arrested without a delay, as no one is secure in life, liberty, or

property while this practice is allowed to persist.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C., Section 2343(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

QUESTION ONE:

What status, if any, does an attorney have as class represen-

tative and class attorney under Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure?

The basic question presents a number of important corollary

questions illustrated by this case. The Supreme Court, by an-

swering the basic and following corollary questions would

avoid vast amounts of future litigation.

(1) What is the ultimate issue in a hearing on certifica-

tion? Is the ultimate purpose to see that the alleged wrong

is ably presented and prosecuted, or is the ultimate ques-

tion the personality of the class representative and attor-

ney? If the two points should come into conflict, which

should prevail? What governs — the facts of the case or

the personality of the class representative and attorney?

(2) Is ability a qualification or a disqualification for

representing a class?

=

0

_ (3). May the sirong represent the weak in class action

litigation, or is superior knowledge a disqualification as

held in this case?

(4) Is an aitorney disqualified from being class repre-

sentative and attorney on the sole and only record fact that

he is an attorney?

(5) If an attorney is not disqualified, then can a Court.

as here, disqualify the attorney solely because he is an

attorney, on the theory that in some cases the Court will cer-

tify the class and in others it will not do so? In short, can

anarchy exist on this point as admitted by both the trial

court and the Circuit Court in this case?

rT wai e . . .

(6) Where does “discretion” end and anarchy begin?

Must discretion be predicated upon a factual record or may

it be predicated upon assumption? j

(7) Must a hearing precede class certification? If so,

must the findings of the Court be predicated upon the hear-

ing, or may the Court create its own record by surmising

facts or negating facts by theorizing factual assumptions?

QUESTION TWO:

What status, if any, does a “sophisticated investor” have as

class representative and class attorney under Rule 23, Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 10b (5).

Similar corollary questions exist here as in Question One.

QUESTION THREE:

In a class action suit wherein an attorney seeks to represent

his class, can a class action be perpetually destroyed because

the class representative and attorney is an attorney, or can the

error, if any, be cured by the attorney’s resigning and employ-

ing other attorneys to represent the class, as held in the Seventh

Circuit?

QUESTION FOUR:

Does Rule 23 provide rights which trial courts must enforce,

or does it provide privileges which the trial court may, or may

not, enforce at its undefined and arbitrary “discretion”? Does

the Supreme Court rule of Rio Grande v. Gildersleeve, 174

U.S. 1102 (1899), which asserts the rule of law, still exist?

QUESTION FIVE:

In class action suits, can trial judges surmise basic facts

without any hearing, or theorize “reasons” without a factual

or logical predicate, thus negating the established record before

the Court and creating a record contrary to the record estab-

lished before the Court?

While the first four questions provide four important and

obvious reasons, this fifth reason goes to the essence of the

judicial process. If the trial record in Courts of the United

States be not inviolate, as here, then no one can be secure. If

processes of factual misconstruction be permitted, what consti-

tutional safeguards does one have?

QUESTION SIX:

What does “typical” mean in Rule 23? Does it mean not “in

conflict with’? If so, is a sophisticated investor in conflict with

unsophisticated investors and, if so, why? Is an attorney in con-

flict with members of his own class and, if so, why? Can conflict

exist merely because a trial court says so, without evidence or

reason to back up the statement? CAN WORDS HAVING A

FACTUAL MEANING BE PLUCKED OUT OF THE

THIN AIR BY TRIAL COURTS SO AS TO DEFEAT CLASS

CERTIFICATION?

=

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.

STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED

al YT . a . .

The United States Constitution, Amendment Five: “No per-

son shall be... deprived of life, liberty or property. without due

process of law.”

Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “One or more

n ~ © + us « > >

embers of a class may sue... as representative parties on

behalf of all... if... (3) the claims ... of the representative

parties are typical of the claims .. . and (4) the representative

parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class.”

Rule 10b-5. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive

Devices.

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,

by the use of i

se 0 y means struments i

\ f any means or instrumentality of interstate com-

merce, or of the mails, or of any facility of a national securities

exchange.

(1) toemploy any device, scheme or artifice to defraud.

(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact o1

'o omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make

the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under

which they were made, not misleading, or |

(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business

which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon

any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any

— (See SEC Sec. Exch. Act. Rel. No. 3230, May 3).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

S . ae . tie ‘ -9¢ . .

Suit was filed on May 22, 1973, in Judge Eldon Mahon’s

Court. The original complaint allged that Jarrell Garonzik and

8

Milburn Garonzik, who were brothers, purchased 300 shares of

Horizon Corporation from the defendant brokerage house for

$12,450.70 on April 3, 1972, and sold said stock within eight

months for $4,560.74, or a net loss of $7,889.96, (see plain-

tift’s original complaint (R. 2).).

After many months unsuccessfully trying to get the defend:

ant brokerage house to answer two questions: (1) Was the

brokerage house selling Horizon Stock while recommending it

to its customers, and (2) what research was back of a 19-month

selling campaign; the Garonziks filed a class action suit. This

was a classical class action suit, being a securities case predi-

cated upon the rankest type of fraud. (See original complaint,

supra, and First Amended Original Complaint, App. A-1).

On October 23, 1973, the defendant filed a motion to deny

the class action. This motion was predicated upon the sole point

that one of the class representatives, not both, was an attorney.

The Garonziks, on November 12, 1973, filed a motion to

require the defendant to specify two things: (1) any unethical

conduct of the plaintiff-attorney at any time, and (2) how it

was possible for him to be unethical when it was obvious from

the record in the case that there was no solicitation, and no

entrapment by the plaintiff-attorney of the defendant brokerage

house (R. 111)? In short, the Garonziks believed they were en-

titled to nullify all wrongful innuendos raised by the defense,

and have the record aflirmatively reflect that this case was, at

all times, as clean as a case could ever be. The trial court ignored

this motion.

On December 10, 1973, Judge Eldon B. Mahon filed a

memorandum order denying class action status (Page 38). At

+)

the outset of his memorandum, and in his footnote number 1, in

support of his ruling. he pointed out that he persovally had

made an investigation of past securities litigation of the nisin

tiff-attorney. Since there could only be but one inference to this

footnote, and that was that the plaintiff-attorney had }

| een guilty

of something that was wrongful, unethical

ap or odoriferous in this

securities litigation, which was untrue. the plaintiti-attorney

called Judge Mahon io account hy a letter (R. 158) demandine

. on

to hy ; ‘te investigati

know why an ex parte investigation had been made of one

attorney in this litigation without notice or a hearine

g.

Judge Mahon’s reply letter (R. 1

4) Was unsatisfactory. His

statement that he wanted to advise plaintiffs that they had an

individual cause of action was a reply but no answer

In the meantime. the Honorable Robert W. Porter was ap-

pointed to the bench for the Dallas Division. Judge Porter

advised the plaintiff that this cause had been eneeied to his

Court. Immediately thereafter, the plaintiffs were advised that

Judge Porter had been mistaken: that this case had not been

assigned to Judge Porter with other Dallas Division cases, but

had been retained by Judge Mahon!

The plaintiff-attorney, as a predicate for having an investiga-

tion of Judge Mahon, immediately wrote the clerk to ascertain

what other cases, if any, had been excepted from transfer to the

Dallas Division. Immediately thereafter, on March 14, 1975

(repeat, 1975), this case was released from Judge Mahon’s

Court and assigned to Judge Robert W. Porter’s Court (R. 189).

Since the order denying class status was an interlocutory

order contrary to law and entered under a cloud which per:

1G

sisted, the plaintiff filed a new motion for class status on

March 20, 1975 (R. 198).

Seventeen months later. on September 3, 1975, this case was

transferred to Judge Patrick Higgirbotham’s Court (R. 592).

During the 17 months this case rested in Judge Porter’s Court,

the plaintiffs attempted to obtain the Court's ear, or action by

the Court in six diflerent ways. All efforts to obtain the Court’s

ear, or action by the Court, failed despite the extraordinary

efforts by the plaintiff-attorney. See the Docket Sheet from

March 14, 1975, to September 3, 1976 (R. 189 to 592) — 403

pages (repeat, 403 pages) before a Judge who refused to hear or

act in the case. There was, for all practical purposes, no action

before the third Judge as long as the case was before him, a

period of 17 months, despite over 400 pages of motions, plead-

ings and briefs.

Judge Higginbotham held the case from September 3, 1976,

to September 28, 1976, or 25 days, whereupon the case was

transferred to Judge William M. Taylor, Jr. (R. 632).

On November 26, 1976, the Garonziks, pursuant to Rule 34,

F.R.C.P., requested the right to inspect certain data. The data

produced indicated that during that 19-month interval when the

defendant brokerage house was strongly advising its customers

to buy Horizon Corporation stock less than 10 hours of time was

devoted io checking into this stock, and most of this 10 hours was

spent at luncheons with other securities men! (Tr. 40; R. 809).

On October 17, 1977, Judge Taylor filed an order that class

action status be denied (App. A-41). In the pretrial ef Sep-

tember 2, 1977, it had been pointed out to Judge Taylor that

he had already granted class action status in a securities fraud

case, Glenn v. Arkansas Best Corporation, 525 F.2d 1216 (3th

Cir, 1975), wherein the plaintifl-representative was an attorney,

and, moreover, where the plaintiff-attorney brought not only a

class action suit, but also a derivative lawsuit (Tr. 11). Judge

Taylor's view was that since the class action point “has been

decided apparently by two Judges (which was incorrect) . .

I am not going to reopen that... we're just not Appellate Courts

now, for each other.” (Tr.15, Line 9, 12: 12. Line 1.) Although

motions to correct trial error are addressed to the Court, not to

the individual Judge, Interlocutory orders were not subject to

correction,

Jarrell Garonzik, on November 9, 1977, pursuant to the power

recognized in the Seventh Circuit, but denied in the opinion of

the Fifth Circuit in this case, resigned and withdrew as counsel

for the plaintiffs, and thereafter proceeded as if he had origin-

ally filed this suit individually along with his brother, and em-

ployed other attorneys as attorneys for the class (R. 897), He

then filed a new motien for class action status on November 9,

1977 (R. 896).

On November 17, 1977, Judge Taylor denied this motion for

class action status without any hearing, but did provide for the

right of an immediate appeal of his order (R. 901).

The class found itself in the dilemma of first being denied

status because Jarrell Garonzik was the attorney, and then when

he was not the attorney for the class. Judge Taylor, however, did

volunteer a second “reason”, contrary to the authorities in point

and without the defense even attempting to cite an authority.

Judge Taylor now denied class status becanse Jarrell Garonzik

12

was a “sophisticated investor”. Competency became a disquali-

fication for representation.

The preponderance of facts indicates the class will unques-

tionably prevail on trial. The plaintiff-attorney is the only mem-

ber of the defrauded class who knows about this fraud as the

attorney-plaintiff, pursuant to all ethical requirements, never

communicated with any other member of this class. Therefore,

a refusal to certify him as class representative is the equivalent

of fully exonerating the mass defrauder defendant because of

the sole fact that Jarrell Garonzik is an attorney and/or a sophis-

ticated investor.

REASONS AS TO QUESTION ONE

Page 4 of this Application

Old time lawyers are aware of the old strategy: If one’s client

is guilty, try the prosecuting attorney. It’s not relevant, but it

can confuse a weak Court or jury. The point is stated another

way in the American Bar Association Antitrust Law Journal,

Vol. 44, Issue 1, April, 1975:

“Finally, antitrust discovery in class actions has now been

aimed at plaintiff's counsel. Thus, defendants are asking named

plaintiffs to recite chapter and verse about the initiation of the

lawsuit and arrangements for the payment of costs and ex-

penses. So far, few courts have been receptive to such discovery,

realizing, | suspect, that at bottom this is still another attempt

to nip the class action in the bud for reasons unrelated to

whether the antitrust laws were violated. In prohibiting such

fishing expeditions the courts have indicated that any claim of

ethical impropriety should be relegated, if anywhere, to sep-

arate proceedings. /7 1S SIMPLY IRREVELANT TO THE

APPROPRIATENESS OF CLASS ACTION TREATMENT

UNDER RULE 23. AT A MINIMUM, BEFORE SUCH IN.

13

QUIRING [S PERMITTED TO PROCEED, THERE SHOULD

FIRST BE SOME EVIDENCE OF MISCONDUCT.” (Capitali-

zation and underscoring added.)

The securities industry is probably the most devious segment

of American business, including second-hand car dealers, if one

can judge from the volume of reported securities fraud suits. See

Professor Bromberg’s work on 10b(5) litigation, and annota-

tions to the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. The

violations of law are so frequent that the S.E.C, itself has often

cried ou! for assistance from the private sector. See The Busi-

ness Lawyer, Volume 23, Number 3, page 597, April 1968.

Rule 23 provides a strong deterrent to violations of the securi-

ties laws. Nowhere does it preclude attorneys from acting as

class representatives and attorney. Why should it?

Attorneys are the most qualified and competent to represent

the class. They must, in any and all events, represent the class

as class attorneys. Why, then, should they be disqualified be-

cause they have an added incentive in the litigation, that of a

class representative who has been damaged through no fault

or connivance of his own?

Moreover, a class action wherein the class representative

and class attorney are the same is the most ethical of all actions.

It provides no chance for solicitation. It is only in cases where

the cless attorney is not a party to the cause that solicitation may

occur.

In these cases, the interests of the attorney and the class are

identical, not in conflict. If, however, it could be contended that

there is a conflict because the attorney would also participate in

the recovery because he was a party (what kind of reasoning is

14

this?), the attorney's interest as class attorney would far exceed

his interest as a party litigant.

Moreover, the class attorney is always (repeat, always) sub-

ject to the scrutiny and control of the trial judge. Why should

any competent judge fear a class attorney merely because he

also was a victim of the fraud?

It is only when language is used as a substitute for thought

that the contrary is asserted.

Regardless, the importance of the point should be decided

once and for all by the Supreme Court, hopefully contrary to

the Cireuit Court below and consistent with the great weight

of authority and sense. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 42

L. Ed. 24 532, 90 S. Ct. 552, wherein the Supreme Court ap-

proved a class action although the only party who could profit by

the suit was the class attorney (personality is subservient to the

facts of the case) ; Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, 383

U.S. 363, 14 L. Ed. 807, 86 S. Ct. 845 (1966) ; Lamb v. United

Co., 57 F.R.D. 551 (S.D.N.Y., 1975); Philadelphia Housing v

American Corp., 323 F.S. 364 (E.D. Pa., 1970) ; First Ameri-

can Corp. v. Foster, 52 F.R.D. 248 (N.D. Ga., 1970).

AS TO QUESTION TWO

Page 5 of this Application

One of the ploys used by the defense counsel in class

action securities cases is that the class representative, or the

plaintiff in simple litigation, is a “sophisticated investor” and,

therefore, all of the defendant’s frauds are of no consequence.

While the nonsense of this argument has been refuted many times

by the Courts, including the Fifth Circuit (see Stein v. Smith,

15

473 F. 2d 1205 (Sth Cir. 1973), the Fifth Circuit now asserts

the validity of this erroneous contention. The reason given is

that the enforcement of Rule 23 is a matter of discretion to be

enforced at the will of the trial court; Rule 23 creates no duty

of enforcement upon trial courts in the Fifth Circuit.

It is highly important that the Supreme Court state the rules

regarding sophisticated investors, both for Rule 23 purposes

and under Rule 10b(5) of the Exchange Act.

It is believed a correct statement of the law is as follows:

1. Sophisticated investors are within the protection of

both Rule 23 and Rule 10b(5).

2. Ina case of fraudulent misrepresentation under Rules

23 and 10b(5), the ultimate test is materiality rather than

reliance.

3. Even if reliance be the test, a Rule 23 case will lie

as to the issue of liability, and the issue of reliance can then

be treated individually.

4. In a case of material concealment, as in the instant

case, the proof of reliance is not necessary.

5. The Courts will permit a sophisticated investor to act

as class representative and attorney and represent both

sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, because the law

desires the knowledgeable and the strong to represent the

unsophisticated and the weak.

6. Sophisticated investors, like all others, are entitled to

the truth. Stein v. Smith, 473 F. 2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1973).

These rules should be announced (or refuted) without delay

to lessen litigation.

The instant case is directly in conflict with the Supreme

Court case of Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, 383 U. S.

16

363, 15 L. Ed. 807, 86 S. Ct. 845 (1966), for two clear rea-

sons:

1. Surowitz interprets Rule 23a for its substance; it pre-

serves the rule and does not destroy it pursuant to pretext.

2. Surowitz specifically states that insinuation is not the

equivalent of proof, that Rule 23 is interpreted from the trial

record, not the desires of individual judges; that neither con-

flict nor any other material fact, can be assumed or insinuated,

and especially when it is contrary to the trial record and

the truth.

AS TO QUESTION THREE

Page 5 of this Application

Obviously, the rule announced in the Seventh Circuit con-

trary to the ruling below in this case is preferable, and should

be adopted by the Supreme Court. See Susman v. Lincoln

American Corp., 561 F. 2d 86 (7th Cir., 1977).

While the Fifth Circuit cited Susman in its opinion, here is

what Susman actually said:

“As the district judge noted, plaintiffs are free to seek different

counsel and thereby dispel any possibility of conflict.”

The “possibility of conflict” is not the conflict with which

Rule 23 is concerned. Rule 23 is concerned with actual con-

flict. The “possibility of conflict” is a public relations venture

by the Courts. The point is destroyed by the overwhelming

fact that the public will never understand nor approve of

the Court’s dismissing a mass criminal because the class rep-

resentative is a high calibre attorney. The public wants their

champion against fraud protected, not destroyed by the Courts.

17

The simple fact here is that the petitioner has been the sole

champion of the defrauded class and the lower courts have

been the implacable enemy of the defrauded class, and the

advocate for the mass wrongdoer. This fact is not noted below

because the Courts have a policy of erroneously substituting

words for facts, and phraseology for analysis.

AS TO QUESTION FOUR

Page 6 of this Application

In Rio Grande v. Gildersleeve, 174 U. S., 1102 (1899), the

Supreme Court of course held with the rule of law, clearly

holding contrary to the opinion below as follows:

“As no discretionary power was reserved to the trial judge

(by the rule involved) he could not dispense with this rule

of Court. As was said in Thompson v. Hatch, 3 Pick, 512:

‘A duly authorized rule of court has the force of law, and is

binding upon the court as well as upon parties to an action,

and cannot be dispensed with to suit the circumstances of any

particular case . . . The courts may rescind or repeal their

rules without doubt; or in establishing them, may reserve the

exercise of discretion for particular cases. But the rule once

made without any such qualification must be applied in all

cases which come within it, until it is repealed by the authority

which made it.’ ”

The petitioner stated that he never believed that after prac-

ticing law for 45 years he would apply to the Supreme Court

to grant certiorari on such a fundamental point, that he would

have to fight legal anarchy within the judiciary itself. The

judiciary has strayed far from many fundamentals as evidenced

by this one record, but here it goes too far by nullifying the

rule of law under the guise of trial court discretion. This case

is a negation of what American law represents.

18

If the Supreme Court cannot pause on this point, what good

is it to announce rules in other cases, if these rules can be

nullified at the whim or caprice of all the Courts below?

Also see Surowitz, supra, where the Supreme Court asserts

the substance of Rule 23 against those who would destroy it

by the mechanism of attacking the class representative and

diverting attention from the facts of the case.

AS TO QUESTION FIVE

Page 6 of this Application

This application has heretofore noted two unconstitutional

practices: (1) a descent by a trial judge to personally inter-

vene on behalf of a defendant, and (2) a Circuit Court opinion

which has relegated rules of law to the uncontrolled “dis-

cretion” of trial judges for enforcement.

The fifth reason for certiorari embraces a more subtle, but

equally dangerous, procedure accomplished below, and that is,

the factual misconstruction of a trial record.

An Irishman once said, “I do not care who writes a nation’s

laws if I can write its songs.”

The theory below was “I do not care who writes a nation’s

laws if I can misconstrue its trial records to destroy Rule 23.”

The erroneous misconstruction and obfuscation of the record

is not an isolated fact below.

We begin with the basic fact that the only trial record that

actually existed in this case was a bare bones record that

reflected there were two plaintiffs who offered to represent tne

class —- one a layman and one a lawyer. The lawyer had in-

vestigated the fraud, asked the defendant to answer two im-

19

portant questions, and after obtaining no proper response,

filed suit as attorney for the class.

The defendant’s motion against the certification of the class

never attacked the plaintiff-attorney personally or profession-

ally. All the defendant asked for was a per se ruling that an

attorney could never act as class representative and class attor-

ney because he was an attorney. That was all the record before

the Court could ever warrant — that is, a per se ruling as there

were no facts to warrant any other order.

All the Courts below inadvertently concealed the undeniable

fact that they were rendering a per se ruling. This was done

by a constant factual misconstruction of the actual trial record.

The first Court, by its order of December 7, 1973, used two

mechanisms of language:

1. First, the Court stated that it might permit class action

status in some future case where an attorney was class repre-

sentative and class attorney. This was just another way of

saying that the damage inflicted on the class by the per se

ruling here might not be inflicted in a future case. This did

nothing to destroy the per se ruling.

2. Secondly, the Court held that this type of fact situation

created “possibly conflicting interest’. The Court did not rule

that, in actuality, there were any factual or legal conflicts

because (1) there was no evidence of any conflict in the record;

(2) the interests of the plaintiff and his class were identical,

not at variance. Thus, the Court obfuscated a per se ruling by

nothing more than nebulous, meaningless language —- language

that was meaningless in fact and meaningless in law. The simple

truth is that all the Court did was to attempt to justify a per se

20

ruling, which is all the record would allow. Moreover, Rule 23

is not concerned with speculative, nonexistent conflicts destroy-

ing a class; it is concerned with actual conflict. As there was

no actual conflict here, the Court obfuscated its per se ruling

by the use of vague language.

A trial Court cannot, constitutionally, inadvertently change

a record and say that a per se ruling is not a per se ruling

by using vague, diaphanous, meaningless language as was done

here. Certainly, if the constitutional point be not pursued, a

Court cannot destroy Rule 23 by the misconstruction of the

fact record before it; if it could so destroy the Rule, a trial

Court could overrule the Supreme Court at will through the

process of factual misconstruction of a record.

The fourth trial judge in this case begins his order of

October 17, 1977, with the following words: “Four Judges

of this District have now had this case on the docket. Plaintiff

has moved four times that a class be certified.”

The implication is that four Courts seriously considered the

Motion for Certification.

The facts are:

1. The first Judge’s conduct was unconstitutional and uncon-

scionable, and the plaintiff-attorney should have been com-

mended rather than condemned for his fight against a star

chamber inquisition, which proved nothing adverse because

there was nothing adverse in his entire record.

2. The second Judge sat (repeat, sat) on this case for 17

months. Four motions for certification were filed before this

sudge alone, showing a diligence that caused some consterna-

21

tion. The Judge did not enter any order on certification, al-

though various orders for and against certification were pre-

sented to him by the plaintiff.

3. The third Judge would take no cognizance of this case

whatsoever, but immediately transferred it to the fourth Judge.

4. The petitioner’s attempts to serve the class did not sit

well with the fourth Judge. His order, continuing the judicial

obfuscation of the facts, states, “Plaintiff still persists in urging

a class certification”. The fourth Judge then proceeds to volun-

teer a point defense counsei never presented because it was no

good, and that is, “Plaintiff Garonzik admitted in his deposi-

tion which has been fied with the Clerk that he is a sophisti-

cated investor. The Court finds that this defense raises a defense

which would not be typical as to the class he proposes to

represent. The Court, therefore, concludes that this is sufficient

reason to refuse to certify the class proposed by plaintiff under

Rule 23, F.R.C.P.”

The atypicality point was construed out of thin air. There

had been no hearing whatsoever on this point to determine

whether any of the purchasers were unsophisticated investors.

For example, when the plaintiffs purchased their stock, it was

selling above $40 a share as the Court well knew. Very few

purchasers of $40 stock are unsophisticated investors; they

are found mainly among the lower priced stocks, which the

Court knew. In addition, the public generally has been out of

the market for some time. Most of those that remained were

sophisticated investors.

But even if the foregoing were not common knowledge, why

should the petitioner have been denied the right to represent

22

his class of sophisticated purchasers who were defrauded?

Even if the law be so absurd as to hold that the sophisticated

and knowledgeable cannot represent the weak and ignorant,

why can’t they represent their own class? The answer is that

in this Circuit a trial court can do anything he well pleases in

a class action suit unless certiorari be now granted and this

be stopped.

The view of the Court is further evidenced by a needless

caveat in the order which stated:

“Plaintiff has offered to resign as counsel of record in order to

have the proposed class certified. Plaintiff has not resigned as

counsel of record so any ruling as to the effect of his resigna-

tion would be premature. The Court would also point out that

the naming of new counsel would not automatically resolve all

difficulties. Any new counsel would have to be scrutinized by

the Court as to suitability and if in any way found lacking,”

the Court would still refuse to certify a class.”

The plaintiff did resign as counsel for the class and did

employ other counsel to represent the class. Upon motion for

certification being made, the Court, without any hearing, and

certainly without the scrutiny it had indicated, denied class

certification by its order of November 11, 1977.

THE LEGAL RESEARCH BOARD, THE UNIVERSITY OF

TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW, WRITES NON-ADVOCATE

BRIEFS ON THE LAW, STATING ITS UNDERSTANDING

OF THE LAW. IT WILL NOT PRESENT AN ADVOCATE’S

BRIEF. IT RENDERED AN OPINION THAT CLASS AC-

TION STATUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED TO THE

PLAINTIFF-ATTORNEY (R. 357-361).

The reason the Legal Research Board rendered the fore-

od

23

going opinion is that it relied on the actua! record in the case.

It knew the record only warranted a per se ruling.

However, the Circuit Court, in rendering its opinion con-

firming the misconduct and errors described herein, factually

misconstrued the true record. It stated:

“We need not decide whether the application of an automatic

rule would be reversible.”

Why not? That is all the record warranted. It was a bare

bones, per se, record, and nothing else insofar as the attorney

point was involved. The Court had to rule per se or certify.

It “chose not to certify”.

How could the Court of Appeals say, “the district Court

did not abuse its discretion in ruling that plaintiffs were inade-

quate class representatives”? What facts were in the record

other than the fact that petitioner was an attorney? There were

no other facts to prove inadequacy; therefore, the Circuit Court,

in affirming the per se ruling, erroneously concealed the per se

ruling of the trial court. The factual misconstruction continued;

Rule 23 was a shambles because the true facts were erroneously

concealed.

This erroneous, illegal and unconstitutional distortion of the

trial record was combined with the unconstitutional and alien

argument that regardless of what the rules were supposed to

be, the trial court could do as he well pleased. The Court said:

“In a subsequent order, Judge W. M. Taylor additionally held

that the plaintiff's admission that he is a sophisticated investor

raises a defense as to plaintiff's own claim which deprives him

of the typicality of the class required for class represc ntation.

While this characteristic may or may not eventually affect

24

plaintiff's cause of action, see Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F. 2d 2005

(Sth Cir., 1977), and while it might not have prevented class

certification IF THE DISTRICT JUDGE WAS SO INCLINED,

see, e.g. Feder v. Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 183-184 (S.D. N.Y.

1970), /T PRESENTS A SUFFICIENT QUESTION OF

TYPICALITY TO PROTECT THE DISTRICT COURT'S

DECISION FROM REVERSAL ON APPEAL UNDER THE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD OF REVIEW.” (Un-

derlining and capitalization always added in this brief unless

otherwise so stated. )

Rule 23 is a shambles. The Courts have changed a bare

bones factual record, that is, a record which only reflects one

fact, into another factual record.

The first Judge took the bare bones record and spoke in

nebulous terms about the “possibility” of conflict. Even in

barbarian societies, disputes are supposed to be decided on

facts, not on unarticulated, totally unreasonable speculations

and surmises of Judges. Here, there was not one scintilla of

evidence to support this avoidance of a per se ruling.

The second and third Judges took no action.

The fourth Judge changed the bare bones record into some-

thing more. He not only saw a possibility of conflict — he saw

actual conflict. This was a much more serious misconstruction

of facts, not only of degree, but because by then the petitioner

had done over 600 hours of work on the case, and the volumi-

nous file showed it. No fair finder of fact could have held

that this industrious representative was in conflict with his

class. The only enemy of the defrauded class was the Courts.

Basic facts continued to be inadvertently misconstrued, and

thus certification was denied.

The Court of Appeals speculated about what the rules of law

25

may or may not be, and then concluded that it didn’t make an

iota of difference what the law was, the trial court could do

what it pleased “under the abuse of discretion standard of

review’. Now, what is the standard in the Fifth Circuit for

discretion? It is simple — the desire of the trial Judge; and

these desires can be very strong, as evidenced by the first

Judge’s attempt to keep the case on his docket when his Dallas

docket was being taken away from him. In short, what we have,

as blandly and naively admitted by the opinion itself, is a

doctrine of excuses, cliches and nebulous language to support

the expressed desire of the first trial Judge.

There is nothing in the record to even suggest the following

found in the Circuit Court opinion:

1. Any facts to warrant the exercise of discretion.

2. Any facts to warrant the statement, “We need not now

decide whether the application of an automatic rule would be

reversible.”

3. “Judge Mahon. . . did not follow a per se rule that would

disqualify a plaintiff as a class representative just because he

was an attorney representing himself.”

4. “The reasoning in his opinion demonstrates a careful

exercise of his discretion in this regard. . .”

Discretion implies that a factual predicate existed in the

record for its exercise other than the fact that the plaintiff

was an attorney. There just were no other facts before Judge

Mahon, and neither the Circuit Court nor defense counsel have

ever cited any other facts to avoid this being a per se decision.

26

The attitude of the Circuit Court is further evidenced by the

following:

“... We direct the district court to proceed with the case as

an individual action if the plaintiff cares to pursue it, and to

sunimarily dismiss any further attempts to convert this case

into a class action, whether by pleading amendment, counsel

substitution, motion, discovery, or any other means which

might otherwise have been available . . .”

The fourth Judge never held any hearing whatsoever after

the petitioner resigned and employed counsel to represent the

class. No hearing was ever held as to whether the purchasers

were sophisticated or unsophisticated investors —— the fact that

some purchasers were unsophisticated investors was assumed

by the trial court, and from this assumption the trial Judge

ruled that the petitioner could not represent either sophisticated

or unsophisticated investors. The record was not only miscon-

strued, it was created by the ipse dixit of the trial Judge and

thus Rule 23 was effectively nullified.

In 40 Texas Law Review 1, “The Judiciary and the Bar —

Socialist Legality vs. The Rule of Law”, it is pointed out that

the rationale of Soviet law is to enferce the intentions of the

state. Here, in class action cases the rationale of the law is to

enforce the intentions of the trial Judges, as inconsistent and

as diverse as they may be. Regardless of the fact that directly

conflicting results are obtained under the same facts, the cases

are approved because each Judge has exercised his unfettered

discretion. One does not even have to read between the lines —-

it is all set out in black and white in the Court of Appeals

opinion in this case. The rule of law, as we know it, is dead in

Rule 23 cases. Rule 23 is dead if the trial Judge so elects.

27

The fact that this process of misconstruing basic facts was

unintentional and inadvertent does not lessen the damages in-

flicted by the policy nor does it immunize this policy of nullifica-

tion (of Rule 23) from constitutional attack. In addition to the

constitutional grounds involving the record, these errors create

grounds for certiorari because this process emasculates Rule

23.

Nonexistent possibilities of conflict, nonexistent conflicts,

nonexistent impermissible discretion, evidence this process of

factual distortion and misconstruction which effectively nullifies

Rule 23.

The damages are the same as if done intentionally. Rule 23

is as efficiently nullified by the process of factual misconstruc-

tion as by predetermined, malevolent intention (which did not

exist).

AS TO QUESTION SIX

Page 6 of this Application

The Supreme Court should also clear the air on another

point that clouds class actions and 10b(5) cases, and that is

the meaning of “typical” in Rule 23.

In Carpenter v. Hull, 311 F. S. 1099 (S.D. Tex. 1970), the

Court quotes Charles Alan Wright, who says:

“The requirement in Rule 23(a) (2) that the claims or de-

fenses of the representative must be typical of those of the class

is probably no more than a cryptic way of saying that the

representative must not have interests that conflict with those

he purports to represent.”

It is not encugh to define “typical”. The Supreme Court must

see that the lower courts do not avoid class actions, as here, by

28

ipse dixit language stating there is conflict when the record,

the facts, and common sense show identity of interests rather

than conflict.

The fictitious creation of a nonexistent conflict is proven by

the fact that the Fifth Circuit in Stein v. Smith, 473 F. 2d 1205

(Sth Cir. 1973) held that “sophisticated investors, like all others,

are entitled to the truth”. What conflict, then, could there pos:

sibly be in this type of case? A conflict that cannot be articulated

does not exist.

In short, the Supreme Court must see that lower courts do not

inadvertently misconstrue the record by erroneously articulat-

ing a nonexistent conflict when an identity of interest actually

exists. This dangerous policy of inadvertently contradicting

facts must be stopped now.

[f this Court were shown that, in the Fifth Circuit, the actual

trial records were supplanted by astrology or numerology as

predicates for judgments and appellate opinions, the Supreme

Court would grant certiorari without delay.

The equivalent is taking place. Trial records are supplanted,

not by astrology or numerology, but by something much more

effective, and that is, an inadvertent process whereby phrase-

ology and cliches misconstrue the record factually and thus

evade certification under Rule 23.

Inconsistent rulings among the judges mean nothing in this

Circuit. One trial judge ruled one way in this case on the class

action point, and another way in another case having the same

identical point, wherein the same authority was cited (the Lamb

case). The Court of Appeals, in an opinion which must have

29

touched the nadir in the annals of American jurisprudence,

applauds, encourages and validates diversity of results in the

same fact situation. A Court “may or may not” rule a certain

way according to the Court of Appeals. A Court could, in this

case, have certified the class action “if the district Judge was so

inclined”. How can the Supreme Court even hesitate to grant

certiorari?

If gossamers of unwarranted insinuations are to supplant

trial records in the Fifth Conflict, we should dispense with the

expense and time devoted to discovery proceedings and have

Al Capp’s Mammy Yoakum whomp up a vision as the record

of the case.

Analysts, thinkers and scholars perceive the menace. Alfred

E. Kahn, the new Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, in

a speech before the American Bar Association last August,

stated as follows:

“*T cannot help feeling that some among you, determined to

resist our present policies with all the weapons at your

command, have seized upon procedural arguments because you

really can’t refute our new policies substantively.’ ”

Kahn described the procedures by which, over the decades,

new routes had been assigned.

“The chairman .. . would then pick up the telephone and call

the general counsel and tel! him who the lucky winner was,

and nothing more; then a lawyer on the general counsel's staff,

amply supplied with blank legal tablets and general selection of

cliches — some, like “beyond-area benefits”, “route strength-

ening” or ‘subsidy-need reduction”, tried and true, others the

desperate product of a feverish wunagination — would construct

a work of fiction that would then be published as the board’s

opinion.”

30

“My highly publicized preoccupation with the style of our

orders and our opinions is not merely aesthetic; it also goes to

the very heart of what we do. All too often, the use in opinions

of such pomposities as “we reject the proposed course of action

because we deem it in appropriate” — which means no more

than “we're not going to do it because we don’t want to! ”

The foregoing process exists in the Fifth Circuit. Is there

more important cause for certiorari? The Supreme Court of

the United States should write one of its greatest opinions in

this case concerning the rule of law and the need to protect it

from all mechanisms of attack. This opinion should make it

clear that the rule of law is not to be tampered with at the

discreiion of every trial judge.

At a recent ceremony wherein a new federal judge was

elevated to the bench, one of the judges told about a United

States Judge who concluded his prayers each night with “Oh,

Lord, please don’t send me any class action suits”.

The fact is that if Rule 23 is going to be enforced in the

Fifth Circuit, it will have to be done by virtue of direct orders

of the Supreme Court, not only to recognize the Rule, but to

enforce it without the unconstitutional and illegal destruction

of trial records.

If certiorari be not granted in this case, the Supreme Court

might just as well shut up shop. What good does it do for the

Supreme Court to announce rules of law if they can be evaded

at the whim or caprice of any trial judge, as the opinion below

clearly states, and as the record overwhelmingly proves?

Aiter all, trial courts of the United States are supposed to

be administered by Judges, not conjurers of imaginative trial

records which inadvertently evade Rule 23.

31

There are three basic and fundamental reasons for certiorari

to issue:

1. In order that the application of Rule 23 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities

Exchange Act may be uniformly and properly interpreted

throughout the United States Judiciai system.

2. In order that the Fifth Circuit may not interpret Rule 23

out of existence.

3. In order that this nation may be governed by

(a) the rule of law

and not by

(b) gibberish.

It is, therefore, respectfully requested that the Supreme

Court of the United States issue its Writ of Certiorari to the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordering the record in

this case to be delivered to the Supreme Court of the United

States for review.

Respectfully submitted,

Sanpy M. SANDOLOSKI

Attorney for Petitioner

1800 Republic National Bank Tower

Dallas, Texas 75201

(214) 748-8891

32

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that three copies of this applica-

tion have been mailed to Mr. C. Taylor Ashworth and Mr.

John A. Gilliam, attorneys for the respondent, 2200 First

National Bank Building, Dallas, Texas 75202, by certified

mail, return receipt requested.

Sandy M. Sandoloski _

33

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Fifth Cireuit

Office of the Clerk

September 13, 1978

Edward W. Wadsworth Tel 504-589-6514

Clerk 600 Camp Street

New Orleans, La. 70130

TO ALL PARTIES LISTED BELOW:

NO. 77-3396 Jarrell Garonzik, Et Al v.

Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. Et Al

Dear Counsel:

This is to advise that an order has this day been entered

denying the petition( ) for rehearing,* and no member of

the panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court

having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en

banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local

Fifth Circuit Rule 12) the petition( ) for rehearing en banc

has also been denied.

See Rule 4], Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for

issuance and stay of the mandate.

Very truly yours,

EDWARD W. WADSWORTH, Clerk

By BRENDA HAUCK

Deputy Clerk

*On Behalf of Jarrell Garonzik Et Al

CC: Messrs. Sandy Sandoloski

Michael W. McManus

Messrs. C. Taylor Ashworth

John A. Gilliam

+1

JARRELL GARONZIK and

MILBURN GARONZIK, ete..

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SHEARSON HAYDEN STONE, INC.,,

et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 77-3396

Summary Calendar. *

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

June 12, 1978.

Appeal was taken from a denial of class certification by

the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Texas, William M. Taylor, Ir.. J., in action alleging security

fraud. The Court of Appeals held that under circumstances

of case, trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing

to certify plaintiff as class representative since plaintiff was

both jivestor and an attorney and since plaintiff’s admission

that he was sophisticated investor raised defense as to his

own claim resulting in his being deprived of typicality of

class required for class representation.

Affirmed with directions.

Federal Civil Procedure 187

Under circuimstances of case. district court hearing security

fraud action did aot abuse its discretion in refusing to certify

plaintiff as class representative since plaintiff was both investor

)-

oo

and an attorney and since plaintiffs admission that he was

sophisticated investor raised defense as to his own claim

resulting in his being deprived of typicality of class required

for class representation. Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. rule 23(a) (4).

28 U.S.C.A.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the North-

ern District of Texas.

Before RONEY, GEE and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a denial of class certification in a

case alleging 10(b)(5) security fraud in the sales campaign

of defendant stockbroker concerning the stock in Horizons,

Inc. For the purposes of this appeal, the merits of the cause

of action are assumed. Although we often refuse to accept

an appeal of the denial of class certification, even when, as in

this case, the district court certified the issue as controlling

under Rule 54(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., we iake this appeal on the

meriis in order to finally resolve the question. Inasmuch as we

affirm the denial of class certification, in order to fully imple-

ment the purpose of taking this appeal, we direct the district

court to proceed with the case as an individual action if the

plaintiff cares to pursue it, and to summarily dismiss any

further attempts to convert this case into a class action, whether

by pleading amendment, counsel substitution, motion, dis-

covery, or any other means which might otherwise have been

available had we not been asked to take the appeal of this

interlocutory order.

Although no application was properly made to this Court

26

under 28 U.S.C.A, § 1292(b), we treat the filing of plaintiff's

notice of appeal as such application, the filing of defendant's

brief as a stipulated waiver of formality and time require-

ments, and grant the appeal as if the plaintiff had properly

followed the statute and the rules in the prosecution of this

appeal,

A careful review of the briefs and appendix filed in this

case reveal no abuse of discretion in the refusal of three dis-

trict judges over a period of four years to certify the plaintiff

asa class representative,

In his initial order on December 7, 1973. Judge Eldon

Mahon, contrary to plaintiffs argument on appeal, did not

follow a per se rule that would disqualify a plaintiff as 2

class representative just because he was an attorney represent:

ing himself. He did, however, give that fact due consideration

as to whether the plaintiff could fairly represent the purported

class." The reasoning in his opinion demonstrates a carefal

exereise of his discretion in this regard, rather than an abuse

thereof,

We need not now decide whether the application of an

automatic rule would be reversible. We align ourselves with

the comprehensive treatment of this matter in Susman. v,

Lincola American Corp., 501 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing

cases allowing and disallowing a plaintiff-attorney to represent

the class), where the court, declining to adopt a per se rule,

found that in the circumstances of that case the district court

did not abuse its discretion in ruling that plaintiffs were inade-

quate class representatives.

"Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co.

of New York et al., 5 Cir. 1970, 431 F 2d 409, Part I.

37

In a subsequent order, Judge W. M. Taylor additionally

held that the plaintiffs admission that he is a sophisticated

investor raises a defense as to plaintiffs own claim which

deprives him of the typicality of the class required for class

representation. While this characteristic may or may not

eventually affect plaintiffs cause of action, see Dupuy v. Dupuy,

551 F.2d 1005 (Sth Cir. 1977). and while it might not have

prevented class certification if the district judge was so in-

clined, see, e. g., Feder v. Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 178, 183-184

(S.D.N.Y. 1970), it presents a sufficient question of typicality

to protect the district court’s decision from reversal on appeal

under the abuse of discretion standard of review.

AFFIRMED WITH DIRECTIONS.

‘This court does not seek to enunciate a belief that there are no cir-

cumstances in which it would be appropriate for an attorney to represent

a class of individuals both as a member thereof and as counsel. I do

not, however, believe that the circumstances wherein such a dual

participation by the attorney would be warranted are present in the

case at bar. In reaching this conclusion, | have given considerable

weight to those matters that relate to the possibly conflicting in-

terests of Garonzik the plaintiff, Garonzik the attorney, and the remain-

ing members of the class. While the Court imputes no base motives to

the attorney with whom these questions are herein concerned, it is

strongly felt that the circumstances here present militate against a

holding that the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) can be satisfied by

allowing one of the plaintiffs to participate as a member of the class

and as its attorney, Pathe, it is noted that the Court’s action today

in nq way divests any plaintiff of his individual rights in the cause of

action alleged in the complaint. (footnote omitted ).

36

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NOKTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

JARRELL GARONZIK And

MILBURN GARONZIK,

Individually and As

CIVIL ACTION

NO. CA 3-7220-F

Representative of a Class

Vs.

SHEARSON, HAMMILI. & CO..

INCORPORATED

MEMORANDUM ORDER

In their complaint, plaintiffs Jarrell and Milburn Garonzik

contend that representatives of defendant corporation have

undertaken to act in violation of the Securities Act of 1933,

IS U.S.C. § 77a et seg. (1970), the Securities Exchange Act

of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970), and in violation

of the Rules and Regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.

lv C.F.R. Parts 230 and 240.' The matter is now befare the

Court for consideration of plaintitf’s motion to allow this

cause to proceed as a class action. Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P.

(1970).

Raper ram Jorrell Garonzik and Milburn Garonzik, in company with

cares br exit i gas sane cheer ea

> in earl ging s violations of the Securities

Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. $77a et seg. (1970), and the Securities Exchange

Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C, 878a et seq. (1970) (CA 3-4402-R. N.D. Tex.

fled January 5, 1971). The volume of instruments filed therein

reflect that the matter was pursued with some vigor until April of

1972. That cause of action was thereafter concluded by a judgment

entered July 12, 1972, pursuant to a settlement reached by the varties

Phe case at bar was filed May 22. 1073. . si

es

39

Jarrell Garonzik, a practicing attorney, together with his

brother Milburn Garonzik, purchased and retained stock in

the Horizon Corporation upon the recommendation of one of

defendant's representatives while, during the same time period,

defendant was allegedly divesting itself of its shares in the

corporation. Jarrell Garonzik seeks to represent the class as

a member and as its attorney. Defendant Shearson, Hammell

& Co., Inc., urges, inter alia, that plaintiffs “will not fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class” as is required by

Rule 23(a) (4), Fed. R. Civ. P. (1970). The Court agrees.

In Shields v. Valley National Bank of Arizona, 56 F.R.D.

448 (D. Ariz. 1971), objection was made to Shields repre-

senting the class as plaintiff and as attorney “because he

may lack the objectivity to represent the class by virtue of

his closeness to the action as a plaintiff and thus may become

emotionally and financially involved in the outcome of the

case.” There it was said:

“The Court further feels that Shields has not demon-

strated competence to represent the class because he seeks

to be not only the attorney for the class and be awarded a

fee for his representation, he seeks in the same action, per-

sonal relief. The practice involved does not seem to the Court

to comport with the high quality of objectivity, duty and

integrity required of lawyers practicing in this Court or

elsewhere. This case seems to involve a questionable method

of soliciting legal business and such solicitation should not

be encouraged.” 56 F.R.D. at 450."

A similar determination was made in Kovadii v. First Na-

tional Bank of Chicago, 57 F.R.D. 545, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1972),

wherein it was stated: “Since the named plaintiff is also

2Accord, Shields v. First National Bank of Arizona, 56 F.R.D. 442

(D. Ariz. 1972).

40

acting as co-counsel for the class, his interest in legal fees

clearly outweighs his interest as a plaintiff and creates a

conflict of interest. He cannot therefore be considered a fair

and adequate representative of the class.”

In the case at bar Plaintiff! Garonzik asks if it is right that

he should have to “donate the fruits of his labor to another

attorney?” In attempting to respond to that inquiry, the Court

wishes to indicate that it is not unmindful of he problems

inherent in class action suits in general, not the least of which

is reflected in the statement that “Obviously the only persons

to gain from a class suit are not potential plaintiffs, but the

attorneys who will represent them.” Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-

lin (Kisen 1), 391 F.2d 555 at 571 (2nd Cir. 1968) (Lum-

bard, C. J., dissenting). One commentator has noted that,

“the most serious long-range consequence of the indiscrimi-

nate use of class actions [is] of the undermining of public

confidence in the judicial system and the integrity of the

bar. Attorneys are members of an honorable profession and

are duty-bound to put their clients’ interest above their own.

The spectacle of lawyers reaping enormous profits from

lawsuits which do not benefit their clients must be a source

of embarrassment to both the judiciary and the bar. As one

Court recently warned, both courts and attorneys must avoid

the criticism implicit in the Italian proverb that ‘A lawsuit

is a fruit tree planted in a lawyer's garden.’ [Illinois v.

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.. 55 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. Il.

1972).]

The judiciary should not participate in encouraging attor-

neys to become entrepreneurs who create business oppor-

tunities from which they reap large profits.”

Miia: Via Actions — Useful Toot or Engine of Des

F.R.D. 375 at 390-391 (1972) cialis ction

4]

If the cause for concern reflected in the above observations

has any foundation, it would seemingly be even more applicable

to class action proceedings wherein the attorney was also a

party. This Court does not seek to enunciate a belief that

there are no circumstances in which it would be appropriate

for an attorney to represent a class of individuals both as a

member thereof and as counsel. I do not, however, believe

that the circumstances wherein such a dual participation by

the attorney would be warranted are present in the case at bar.

In reaching this conclusion, I have given considerable weight

to those matters that relate to the possibly conflicting interests

of Garonzik the plaintiff, Garonzik the attorney, and the re-

maining members of the class. While the Court imputes no

base motives to the attorney with whom these questions are

herein concerned, it is strongly felt that the circumstances

here present militate against a holding that the requirements

of Rule 23(a)(4) can be satisfied by allowing one of the

plaintiffs to participate as a member of the class and as its

attorney.‘ Further, it is noted that the Court’s action today

in no way divests any plaintiff of his individual rights in the

cause of action alleged in the complaint.

The motion to permit this matter to proceed as a class action

is denied.

Entered this 7th day of December, 1973.

ELDON B. MAHON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4Nor am I inclined to believe the problems would be alleviated by

allowing one of the Garonzik brothers to proceed as named party-

plaintiff and the other as counsel for the class. See Shields v. First

National Bank of Arizona, 56 F.R.D. 442, n.1 (D. Ariz. 1972).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

JARRELL GARONZIK and

MILBURN GARONZIK,.

Individually and as

ip edaenaaeien of a CA 3.7290

Class

Vs.

SHEARSON HAYDEN

STONE INC.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Four Judges of this District have now had this case on the

docket. Plaintiff has moved four times that a class be certified.

Judge Eldon Mahon, the first Judge to sit in this case, refused

to certify a class principally because plaintiff Jarrell Garonzik

is also the attorney of record. Judge Robert W. Porter, the

next Judge to sit in this case, refused to vacate the earlier

order and certify a class. Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham, the

third Judge, recused himself before ever ruling on a class

certification motion. Plaintiff still persists in urging a class

certification, Plaintiff Garonzik admitted in his deposition

which has been filed with the Clerk that he is a sophisticated

investor. The Court finds that this admission raises a defense

available to defendant as to plaintiff's own claim that would

not be typical as to the elass that he has proposed to represent.

be

43

The Court, therefore, concludes that this is sufficient reason

to refuse to certify the class proposed by plaintiff under Rule

23, F.R.C.P.

Plaintiff has offered to resign as counsel of record in order

to have the proposed class certified. Plaintiff has not resigned

as counsel of record so any ruling as to the effect of his resig-

nation would be premature. The Court would also point out

that the naming of new counsel by plaintiff would not auto-

matically resolve all difficulties. Any new counsel would have

to be scrutinized by the Court as to suitability and if in any

way found lacking, the Court would still refuse to certify a

class even if the problem discussed in the preceding paragraph

was gotten around in some manner by plaintiff.

Therefore, treating plaintiff's subsequent Motions to Certify

a Class as a Motion to Vacate the prior Order refusing to

certify a class, it is

ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion is denied.

Plaintiff has filed six sets of Interrogatories, Requests for

Production, Requests for Admission and numerous Motions to

Compel. At the pretrial conference held in this case on Sep-

tember 2, 1977, the Court announced that it believed that dis-

covery could best proceed by the taking of depositions. It

announced that it would review the interrogatories and answers

thereto and then make an appropriate order. The Court after

reviewing the discovery on file with the Court believes that

plaintiff wants a confession from defendant in its answers and

that its impression at the pretrial was correct; discovery at this

point would best proceed by the taking of depositions, includ-

ing plaintiff’s. It is, therefore,

44.

ORDERED that plaintiff's Motions to Compel Discovery and

for Summary Judgment are denied, and that discovery proceed

by the taking of depositions at this time, including the deposi-

tion of the plaintiff, Jarrell Garonzik.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE _

Oct. 17, 1977

45

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

JARRELL GARONZIK,

ET AL

vs, — CA 3-7220-C

SHEARSON HAYDEN STONE,

INC.

ORDER

Came on for consideration Plaintiffs’ “Motion That Class

Action Status Be Granted,” and the Court having heretofore

entered Memorandum Opinion and Order on October 17, 1977,

denying certification of this cause as a class action, and therein

having pointed out that three judges of this district, to wit,

Judge Mahon, Judge Porter, and the Judge of this Court, have

heretofore denied certification of class action status, and being

of the same opinion, it is, accordingly,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court that

class action status in this case be, and it is hereby, DENIED.

SIGNED and ENTERED this 11th day of November, 1977.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ee

46 47

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT this Court as such final judgment, thus permitting the Plain-

tiffs to appeal this Order as a final judgment to the Fifth Court

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

of Appeals.

SIGNED AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 1977.

JARRELL GARONZIK, ET AL iets Ce

am vetaeee UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SHEARSON HAYDEN STONE, INC.

ORDER

Came on for consideration Plaintiffs’ “‘Motion That Class

Action Status Be Granted,” and the Court having heretofore

entered Memorandum Opinion and Order on October 17, 1977,

denying certification of this cause as a class action, and therein

having pointed out that three judges of this district, to wit,

Judge Mahon, Judge Porter, and the Judge of this Court, have

heretofore denied certification of class action status, and being

of the same opinion, it is, accordingly.

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court that

class action status in this case be, and it is hereby, DENIED.

in compliance with and in fulfillment of Rule 54(b), Federal

Rules of Civil Procedures, the Court hereby DIRECTS, OR-

DERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES that this Order is, and

shall be, a final judgment insofar as the maintenance of this

case as a class action is concerned, and there is no just reason

for delay. and so ceriifies to such fact; and the Court hereby

expressly directs that this Order be entered by the Clerk of

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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