Petition — Garonzik v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1979
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Text
OCT 30 1978
— DAK, JR., CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1978
no. 78 V8-@1LZ
JARRELL GARONzIK, individually and as executor of the Estate
of Mitpurn Garonzik, Deceased, and as Representative of
That Class of Persons and Legal Enities Who Purchased Horizon
Corporation Stock from SHEarson, HAMMILL & Co. INCORPO-
RATED during that period from February 18, 1971 to Septem-
ber 26, 1972,
Petitioners (Plaintiffs )
VS.
SHEARSON, HAYDEN STONE, INC.,
Respondent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Sanpy M. SANDOLOSKI
1800 Republic National Bank Tower
Dallas. Texas 75201 (214) 748-8891
Attorney for Petitioners
Re a te
INDEX
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT ..............
OPINION BELOW AND JURISDICTION ...........
Sor os |
Question One:
What status, if any, does an attorney have as class
representative and class attorney under Rule 23,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? ..............
Question Two:
What status, if any, does a “sophisticated investor”
have as class representative and class attorney under
Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule
eS cay os Ses ad.o.0 9 60-0 a vo 085
Question Three:
In a class action suit wherein an attorney seeks to
represent his class, can a class action be perpetually
destroyed because the class representative and attor-
ney is an attorney, or can the error, if any, be cured by
the attorney resigning and employing other attorneys
to represent the class, as held in the Seventh Circuit? .
Question Four:
Does Rule 23 provide rights which trial courts
must enforce, or does it provide privileges which the
trial court may, or may not, enforce at its undefined
and arbitrary “discretion”? Does the Supreme Court
rule of Rio Grande v. Gildersleeve, 174 U.S. 1102
(1899), which asserts the rule of law, still exist? .. .
Question Five:
In class action suits, can trial judges surmise basic
facts without any hearing, or theorize “reasons” with-
out a factual or logical predicate, thus negating the
established record before the Court and creating a
record contrary to the record established before the
NE ale oe ahd gs a6 Wie-8o¥ 8828 5k oa + 0, 0.8
a |
6
Page
Question Six:
What does “typical” mean in Rule 23? Does it
mean not “in conflict with’? If so, is a sophisticated
investor in conflict with unsophisticated investors and,
if so, why? Is an attorney in conflict with members of
his own class and, if so, why? Can conflict exist merely
because a trial court says so, without evidence or rea-
son to back up the statement? CAN WORDS HAVING
A FACTUAL MEANING BE PLUCKED OUT OF
THE THIN AIR BY TRIAL COURTS SO AS TO
DEFEAT CLASS CERTIFICATION? ............ 6
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
IWS TE TOO 065 See 6 sce ctecensceves 7
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......ccscccscccccccs 7
REASONS AS TO QUESTION ONE ..........c0eeees 12
REASONS AS TO QUESTION TWO ................ 12
REASONS AS TO QUESTION THREE .............. 16
REASONS AS TO QUESTION FOUR .............5. 17
REASONS AS TO QUESTION FIVE ............000: 18
REASONS AS TO QUESTION SIX .........cceceeee 27
THE THREE BASIC REASONS FOR
CER PIEIEEE GRP UI ec cciscescticcnececeses 31
CSR AG CE DURUM 6 cc icccceccesccccccces 32
NOTIFICATION OF MOTION FOR REHEARING
HAVING BEEN OVERRULED, COURT OF APPEALS = 33
OPINION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS,
og eo a eer rer rrr ee rer 34
MEMORANDUM ORDER OF TRIAL COURT,
RAEN 0p AGED occ cise ceccesenceecduesese 38
Page
MEMORANDUM ORDER OF TRIAL COURT,
SNE Ae IE ood db ow ce Coins Gus Oink cebas 42
ORDER OF TRIAL COURT, NOVEMBER 11, 1977... .. 45
ORDER OF TRIAL COURT, NOVEMBER 17, 1977... .. 16
Constitutional Provisions
Amendment Five, Constitution of the United Siates.... . 7
Statutes Involved
Sp Sha, UNS PUTED 6.0 kk ewh esa wedcuarans 4
Rules Involved
Rule 23, Federal Rules
ee FE 0. vinden eeuens 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12,
13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31
Rule 10b(5), Sec. Exch. Act. Rel.
No. 3230, May 31, 1942 ............. 2. 5, 7, 18, 18, 3]
Citations
American Bar Association Antitrust Law Journal,
Wok. OB, Dae B, Pee, FHT a kick ves scceiesees 12
The Business Lawyer, Vol. 23, Number 3, 1968 ....... 13
Carpenter v. Hull, 211 F.S. 1099, (S.D. 1970)... .... 27
First American Corp. v. Foster,
52 F.R.D. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1970) ........ cc eee ees 14
Garonzik v. Shearson Hayden Stone Inc.,
Se ee EN aa eS ka ene Rh eA Read oes cow ees 3
Glenn v. Arkansas Best Corporation,
SOG Fd ISIS (Bk Cle. ISTE) 00 ccc cvcecesecs 1)
6 eee eee ere Tee eS Perry te tee 29
Page
Lamb v. United Co., 57 F.R.D. 551, (S.D. N.Y. 1975)... 14
Philadelphia Housing y. American Corp.,
SF See Ce, Bas BOE h iwsancdeeawckaten 14
Rio Grande v. Gildersleeve,
pe RG re ry ee 6, 17, 18
Susman v. Lincoln American Corporation,
a A Fy ee Eg t eee 3, 16
Sosna v. lowa, 418 U.S. 383, 42 L.Ed.2d 532,
UE Se oc uk w wade chk cwcomea eens 14
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, 383 U.S.
363, 14 L.Ed. 807. 86 S.Ct. 845 (1966)....... 14, 15, 16
Stein v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205 (Sth Cir. 1973) ...... 15, 28
The Business Lawyer, Vol. 23, Number 3, April, 1968.. 13
Senes Low Review, Vol. 40 2 on cc cc cccacccacecccces 26
iv
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term. 1978
No. 78-
JARRELL Garonzik, individually and as executor of the Estate
of Mirpurn Garonzik, Deceased, and as Representative of
That Class of Persons and Lega! Entities Who Purchased Horizon
Corporation Stock from Suearson, Hamnitt & Co. INcorpPo-
RATED during that period from February 18, 1971 to Septem.
ber 26, 1972.
Petitioners (Plaintiffs )
Ds.
SuHEARSON, HayDEN STONE, INC.
Respondent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
To THE HONORABLE, THE Cater Justice AND AssociATE Jus-
TICES OF THE SUPREME Court OF THE UNITED STATES:
“If this Court were shown that, in the Fifth Cireuit, the actual
trial records were supplanted by astrology or numerology as
2
predicates for judgments, the Supreme Court would grant cer-
tiorari without delay to stop this practice.
“The equivalent is taking place. Trial records are supplanted,
not by astrology or numerology, but by something much more
damaging, and that is an inadvertent process and practice
whereby cliches and phraseology misconstrue the record fac-
tually and thus emasculate Rule 23.”
(see page 28 of this Petition)
Petitioners were brothers who purchased over $12,000 of
Horizon Corporation stock from Respondent brokerage house
because of a 19-month long, written campaign by the Respondent
to sell this stock. The stock was recommended without any mean-
ingful research by the brokerage house, unless ten hours of
“work”, including lunches with fellow brokers, constitutes “re-
search’. Proof of the fraud, as customary in these 10-b(5) cases,
had to be produced through the testimony of the defendant.
Respondent contested class certification on the sole grounds
that one plaintiff was an attorney. No attack was made upon this
plaintiff personally or professionally, as he is an old attorney
with an impeccable reputation. The sole contention by the Re-
spondent was that the plaintiff-attorney could not represent the
class as class representative and attorney, and therefore, the
class action had to be dismissed. The disqualification of the
plaintiff-attorney was then imputed to the brother.
The trial court, on this bare bones record alone, refused cer-
iifieation. Thus, a per se ruling was made that an attorney could
not act as class representative and attorney in a securities case
3
involving Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act.
Another trial judge created a second grounds for certiorari
in ruling that since the plaintiff-attorney was a sophisticated
investor he was atypical of his class and could not represent any
class, either sophisticated-or unsophisticated investors, as he was
in conflict with both classes. There was no hearing to indicate
that any of the purchasers were unsophisticated, and, if they
were, why the case could not be divided into classes and why the
plaintiff could not represent his class of sophisticated investors.
The plaintiff-attorney, early in the litigation, had requested
permission to resign as class attorney in order to preserve the
class action. The Court refused to take action on this. The plain-
tiff-attorney thereafter did resign as class atiorney, and did
employ other attorneys to represent the class. thus exercising a
power he would have had at the beginning of this suit. Never-
theless, the Court refused certification of the class. thus acting
directly contrary to the Seventh Circuit in the case of Susman v.
Lincoln American Corporation, 561 F. 2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977).
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. It holds that Rule 23 does not
create any definable, clear, enforceable rights. Certification, in
the Fifth Circuit, is a matter of “discretion” of the trial court.
OPINION BELOW AND JURISDICTION
The opinion of the Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit is
appended. It was dated June 12, 1978. Motion for rehearing
was denied on September 13, 1978. The opinion is recorded at
974 F 2d 1220. This petition is being filed within 90 days after
4
rehearing was denied. Attention is particularly invited to the
three trial orders also appended as they constitute exhibits to
support a fifth ground for certiorari, and this is the fact that
trial records in the Fifth Circuit are not inviolate, but are ne-
gated by consistent factual misconstructions of the trial record,
thus creating an inadvertent, but basic violation of the Fifth
Amendment as well as Rule 23 —- a practice that must be
arrested without a delay, as no one is secure in life, liberty, or
property while this practice is allowed to persist.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C., Section 2343(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
QUESTION ONE:
What status, if any, does an attorney have as class represen-
tative and class attorney under Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure?
The basic question presents a number of important corollary
questions illustrated by this case. The Supreme Court, by an-
swering the basic and following corollary questions would
avoid vast amounts of future litigation.
(1) What is the ultimate issue in a hearing on certifica-
tion? Is the ultimate purpose to see that the alleged wrong
is ably presented and prosecuted, or is the ultimate ques-
tion the personality of the class representative and attor-
ney? If the two points should come into conflict, which
should prevail? What governs — the facts of the case or
the personality of the class representative and attorney?
(2) Is ability a qualification or a disqualification for
representing a class?
=
0
_ (3). May the sirong represent the weak in class action
litigation, or is superior knowledge a disqualification as
held in this case?
(4) Is an aitorney disqualified from being class repre-
sentative and attorney on the sole and only record fact that
he is an attorney?
(5) If an attorney is not disqualified, then can a Court.
as here, disqualify the attorney solely because he is an
attorney, on the theory that in some cases the Court will cer-
tify the class and in others it will not do so? In short, can
anarchy exist on this point as admitted by both the trial
court and the Circuit Court in this case?
rT wai e . . .
(6) Where does “discretion” end and anarchy begin?
Must discretion be predicated upon a factual record or may
it be predicated upon assumption? j
(7) Must a hearing precede class certification? If so,
must the findings of the Court be predicated upon the hear-
ing, or may the Court create its own record by surmising
facts or negating facts by theorizing factual assumptions?
QUESTION TWO:
What status, if any, does a “sophisticated investor” have as
class representative and class attorney under Rule 23, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 10b (5).
Similar corollary questions exist here as in Question One.
QUESTION THREE:
In a class action suit wherein an attorney seeks to represent
his class, can a class action be perpetually destroyed because
the class representative and attorney is an attorney, or can the
error, if any, be cured by the attorney’s resigning and employ-
ing other attorneys to represent the class, as held in the Seventh
Circuit?
QUESTION FOUR:
Does Rule 23 provide rights which trial courts must enforce,
or does it provide privileges which the trial court may, or may
not, enforce at its undefined and arbitrary “discretion”? Does
the Supreme Court rule of Rio Grande v. Gildersleeve, 174
U.S. 1102 (1899), which asserts the rule of law, still exist?
QUESTION FIVE:
In class action suits, can trial judges surmise basic facts
without any hearing, or theorize “reasons” without a factual
or logical predicate, thus negating the established record before
the Court and creating a record contrary to the record estab-
lished before the Court?
While the first four questions provide four important and
obvious reasons, this fifth reason goes to the essence of the
judicial process. If the trial record in Courts of the United
States be not inviolate, as here, then no one can be secure. If
processes of factual misconstruction be permitted, what consti-
tutional safeguards does one have?
QUESTION SIX:
What does “typical” mean in Rule 23? Does it mean not “in
conflict with’? If so, is a sophisticated investor in conflict with
unsophisticated investors and, if so, why? Is an attorney in con-
flict with members of his own class and, if so, why? Can conflict
exist merely because a trial court says so, without evidence or
reason to back up the statement? CAN WORDS HAVING A
FACTUAL MEANING BE PLUCKED OUT OF THE
THIN AIR BY TRIAL COURTS SO AS TO DEFEAT CLASS
CERTIFICATION?
=
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED
al YT . a . .
The United States Constitution, Amendment Five: “No per-
son shall be... deprived of life, liberty or property. without due
process of law.”
Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “One or more
n ~ © + us « > >
embers of a class may sue... as representative parties on
behalf of all... if... (3) the claims ... of the representative
parties are typical of the claims .. . and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.”
Rule 10b-5. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive
Devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of i
se 0 y means struments i
\ f any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails, or of any facility of a national securities
exchange.
(1) toemploy any device, scheme or artifice to defraud.
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact o1
'o omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or |
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
— (See SEC Sec. Exch. Act. Rel. No. 3230, May 3).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
S . ae . tie ‘ -9¢ . .
Suit was filed on May 22, 1973, in Judge Eldon Mahon’s
Court. The original complaint allged that Jarrell Garonzik and
8
Milburn Garonzik, who were brothers, purchased 300 shares of
Horizon Corporation from the defendant brokerage house for
$12,450.70 on April 3, 1972, and sold said stock within eight
months for $4,560.74, or a net loss of $7,889.96, (see plain-
tift’s original complaint (R. 2).).
After many months unsuccessfully trying to get the defend:
ant brokerage house to answer two questions: (1) Was the
brokerage house selling Horizon Stock while recommending it
to its customers, and (2) what research was back of a 19-month
selling campaign; the Garonziks filed a class action suit. This
was a classical class action suit, being a securities case predi-
cated upon the rankest type of fraud. (See original complaint,
supra, and First Amended Original Complaint, App. A-1).
On October 23, 1973, the defendant filed a motion to deny
the class action. This motion was predicated upon the sole point
that one of the class representatives, not both, was an attorney.
The Garonziks, on November 12, 1973, filed a motion to
require the defendant to specify two things: (1) any unethical
conduct of the plaintiff-attorney at any time, and (2) how it
was possible for him to be unethical when it was obvious from
the record in the case that there was no solicitation, and no
entrapment by the plaintiff-attorney of the defendant brokerage
house (R. 111)? In short, the Garonziks believed they were en-
titled to nullify all wrongful innuendos raised by the defense,
and have the record aflirmatively reflect that this case was, at
all times, as clean as a case could ever be. The trial court ignored
this motion.
On December 10, 1973, Judge Eldon B. Mahon filed a
memorandum order denying class action status (Page 38). At
+)
the outset of his memorandum, and in his footnote number 1, in
support of his ruling. he pointed out that he persovally had
made an investigation of past securities litigation of the nisin
tiff-attorney. Since there could only be but one inference to this
footnote, and that was that the plaintiff-attorney had }
| een guilty
of something that was wrongful, unethical
ap or odoriferous in this
securities litigation, which was untrue. the plaintiti-attorney
called Judge Mahon io account hy a letter (R. 158) demandine
. on
to hy ; ‘te investigati
know why an ex parte investigation had been made of one
attorney in this litigation without notice or a hearine
g.
Judge Mahon’s reply letter (R. 1
4) Was unsatisfactory. His
statement that he wanted to advise plaintiffs that they had an
individual cause of action was a reply but no answer
In the meantime. the Honorable Robert W. Porter was ap-
pointed to the bench for the Dallas Division. Judge Porter
advised the plaintiff that this cause had been eneeied to his
Court. Immediately thereafter, the plaintiffs were advised that
Judge Porter had been mistaken: that this case had not been
assigned to Judge Porter with other Dallas Division cases, but
had been retained by Judge Mahon!
The plaintiff-attorney, as a predicate for having an investiga-
tion of Judge Mahon, immediately wrote the clerk to ascertain
what other cases, if any, had been excepted from transfer to the
Dallas Division. Immediately thereafter, on March 14, 1975
(repeat, 1975), this case was released from Judge Mahon’s
Court and assigned to Judge Robert W. Porter’s Court (R. 189).
Since the order denying class status was an interlocutory
order contrary to law and entered under a cloud which per:
1G
sisted, the plaintiff filed a new motion for class status on
March 20, 1975 (R. 198).
Seventeen months later. on September 3, 1975, this case was
transferred to Judge Patrick Higgirbotham’s Court (R. 592).
During the 17 months this case rested in Judge Porter’s Court,
the plaintiffs attempted to obtain the Court's ear, or action by
the Court in six diflerent ways. All efforts to obtain the Court’s
ear, or action by the Court, failed despite the extraordinary
efforts by the plaintiff-attorney. See the Docket Sheet from
March 14, 1975, to September 3, 1976 (R. 189 to 592) — 403
pages (repeat, 403 pages) before a Judge who refused to hear or
act in the case. There was, for all practical purposes, no action
before the third Judge as long as the case was before him, a
period of 17 months, despite over 400 pages of motions, plead-
ings and briefs.
Judge Higginbotham held the case from September 3, 1976,
to September 28, 1976, or 25 days, whereupon the case was
transferred to Judge William M. Taylor, Jr. (R. 632).
On November 26, 1976, the Garonziks, pursuant to Rule 34,
F.R.C.P., requested the right to inspect certain data. The data
produced indicated that during that 19-month interval when the
defendant brokerage house was strongly advising its customers
to buy Horizon Corporation stock less than 10 hours of time was
devoted io checking into this stock, and most of this 10 hours was
spent at luncheons with other securities men! (Tr. 40; R. 809).
On October 17, 1977, Judge Taylor filed an order that class
action status be denied (App. A-41). In the pretrial ef Sep-
tember 2, 1977, it had been pointed out to Judge Taylor that
he had already granted class action status in a securities fraud
case, Glenn v. Arkansas Best Corporation, 525 F.2d 1216 (3th
Cir, 1975), wherein the plaintifl-representative was an attorney,
and, moreover, where the plaintiff-attorney brought not only a
class action suit, but also a derivative lawsuit (Tr. 11). Judge
Taylor's view was that since the class action point “has been
decided apparently by two Judges (which was incorrect) . .
I am not going to reopen that... we're just not Appellate Courts
now, for each other.” (Tr.15, Line 9, 12: 12. Line 1.) Although
motions to correct trial error are addressed to the Court, not to
the individual Judge, Interlocutory orders were not subject to
correction,
Jarrell Garonzik, on November 9, 1977, pursuant to the power
recognized in the Seventh Circuit, but denied in the opinion of
the Fifth Circuit in this case, resigned and withdrew as counsel
for the plaintiffs, and thereafter proceeded as if he had origin-
ally filed this suit individually along with his brother, and em-
ployed other attorneys as attorneys for the class (R. 897), He
then filed a new motien for class action status on November 9,
1977 (R. 896).
On November 17, 1977, Judge Taylor denied this motion for
class action status without any hearing, but did provide for the
right of an immediate appeal of his order (R. 901).
The class found itself in the dilemma of first being denied
status because Jarrell Garonzik was the attorney, and then when
he was not the attorney for the class. Judge Taylor, however, did
volunteer a second “reason”, contrary to the authorities in point
and without the defense even attempting to cite an authority.
Judge Taylor now denied class status becanse Jarrell Garonzik
12
was a “sophisticated investor”. Competency became a disquali-
fication for representation.
The preponderance of facts indicates the class will unques-
tionably prevail on trial. The plaintiff-attorney is the only mem-
ber of the defrauded class who knows about this fraud as the
attorney-plaintiff, pursuant to all ethical requirements, never
communicated with any other member of this class. Therefore,
a refusal to certify him as class representative is the equivalent
of fully exonerating the mass defrauder defendant because of
the sole fact that Jarrell Garonzik is an attorney and/or a sophis-
ticated investor.
REASONS AS TO QUESTION ONE
Page 4 of this Application
Old time lawyers are aware of the old strategy: If one’s client
is guilty, try the prosecuting attorney. It’s not relevant, but it
can confuse a weak Court or jury. The point is stated another
way in the American Bar Association Antitrust Law Journal,
Vol. 44, Issue 1, April, 1975:
“Finally, antitrust discovery in class actions has now been
aimed at plaintiff's counsel. Thus, defendants are asking named
plaintiffs to recite chapter and verse about the initiation of the
lawsuit and arrangements for the payment of costs and ex-
penses. So far, few courts have been receptive to such discovery,
realizing, | suspect, that at bottom this is still another attempt
to nip the class action in the bud for reasons unrelated to
whether the antitrust laws were violated. In prohibiting such
fishing expeditions the courts have indicated that any claim of
ethical impropriety should be relegated, if anywhere, to sep-
arate proceedings. /7 1S SIMPLY IRREVELANT TO THE
APPROPRIATENESS OF CLASS ACTION TREATMENT
UNDER RULE 23. AT A MINIMUM, BEFORE SUCH IN.
13
QUIRING [S PERMITTED TO PROCEED, THERE SHOULD
FIRST BE SOME EVIDENCE OF MISCONDUCT.” (Capitali-
zation and underscoring added.)
The securities industry is probably the most devious segment
of American business, including second-hand car dealers, if one
can judge from the volume of reported securities fraud suits. See
Professor Bromberg’s work on 10b(5) litigation, and annota-
tions to the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. The
violations of law are so frequent that the S.E.C, itself has often
cried ou! for assistance from the private sector. See The Busi-
ness Lawyer, Volume 23, Number 3, page 597, April 1968.
Rule 23 provides a strong deterrent to violations of the securi-
ties laws. Nowhere does it preclude attorneys from acting as
class representatives and attorney. Why should it?
Attorneys are the most qualified and competent to represent
the class. They must, in any and all events, represent the class
as class attorneys. Why, then, should they be disqualified be-
cause they have an added incentive in the litigation, that of a
class representative who has been damaged through no fault
or connivance of his own?
Moreover, a class action wherein the class representative
and class attorney are the same is the most ethical of all actions.
It provides no chance for solicitation. It is only in cases where
the cless attorney is not a party to the cause that solicitation may
occur.
In these cases, the interests of the attorney and the class are
identical, not in conflict. If, however, it could be contended that
there is a conflict because the attorney would also participate in
the recovery because he was a party (what kind of reasoning is
14
this?), the attorney's interest as class attorney would far exceed
his interest as a party litigant.
Moreover, the class attorney is always (repeat, always) sub-
ject to the scrutiny and control of the trial judge. Why should
any competent judge fear a class attorney merely because he
also was a victim of the fraud?
It is only when language is used as a substitute for thought
that the contrary is asserted.
Regardless, the importance of the point should be decided
once and for all by the Supreme Court, hopefully contrary to
the Cireuit Court below and consistent with the great weight
of authority and sense. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 42
L. Ed. 24 532, 90 S. Ct. 552, wherein the Supreme Court ap-
proved a class action although the only party who could profit by
the suit was the class attorney (personality is subservient to the
facts of the case) ; Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, 383
U.S. 363, 14 L. Ed. 807, 86 S. Ct. 845 (1966) ; Lamb v. United
Co., 57 F.R.D. 551 (S.D.N.Y., 1975); Philadelphia Housing v
American Corp., 323 F.S. 364 (E.D. Pa., 1970) ; First Ameri-
can Corp. v. Foster, 52 F.R.D. 248 (N.D. Ga., 1970).
AS TO QUESTION TWO
Page 5 of this Application
One of the ploys used by the defense counsel in class
action securities cases is that the class representative, or the
plaintiff in simple litigation, is a “sophisticated investor” and,
therefore, all of the defendant’s frauds are of no consequence.
While the nonsense of this argument has been refuted many times
by the Courts, including the Fifth Circuit (see Stein v. Smith,
15
473 F. 2d 1205 (Sth Cir. 1973), the Fifth Circuit now asserts
the validity of this erroneous contention. The reason given is
that the enforcement of Rule 23 is a matter of discretion to be
enforced at the will of the trial court; Rule 23 creates no duty
of enforcement upon trial courts in the Fifth Circuit.
It is highly important that the Supreme Court state the rules
regarding sophisticated investors, both for Rule 23 purposes
and under Rule 10b(5) of the Exchange Act.
It is believed a correct statement of the law is as follows:
1. Sophisticated investors are within the protection of
both Rule 23 and Rule 10b(5).
2. Ina case of fraudulent misrepresentation under Rules
23 and 10b(5), the ultimate test is materiality rather than
reliance.
3. Even if reliance be the test, a Rule 23 case will lie
as to the issue of liability, and the issue of reliance can then
be treated individually.
4. In a case of material concealment, as in the instant
case, the proof of reliance is not necessary.
5. The Courts will permit a sophisticated investor to act
as class representative and attorney and represent both
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, because the law
desires the knowledgeable and the strong to represent the
unsophisticated and the weak.
6. Sophisticated investors, like all others, are entitled to
the truth. Stein v. Smith, 473 F. 2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1973).
These rules should be announced (or refuted) without delay
to lessen litigation.
The instant case is directly in conflict with the Supreme
Court case of Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, 383 U. S.
16
363, 15 L. Ed. 807, 86 S. Ct. 845 (1966), for two clear rea-
sons:
1. Surowitz interprets Rule 23a for its substance; it pre-
serves the rule and does not destroy it pursuant to pretext.
2. Surowitz specifically states that insinuation is not the
equivalent of proof, that Rule 23 is interpreted from the trial
record, not the desires of individual judges; that neither con-
flict nor any other material fact, can be assumed or insinuated,
and especially when it is contrary to the trial record and
the truth.
AS TO QUESTION THREE
Page 5 of this Application
Obviously, the rule announced in the Seventh Circuit con-
trary to the ruling below in this case is preferable, and should
be adopted by the Supreme Court. See Susman v. Lincoln
American Corp., 561 F. 2d 86 (7th Cir., 1977).
While the Fifth Circuit cited Susman in its opinion, here is
what Susman actually said:
“As the district judge noted, plaintiffs are free to seek different
counsel and thereby dispel any possibility of conflict.”
The “possibility of conflict” is not the conflict with which
Rule 23 is concerned. Rule 23 is concerned with actual con-
flict. The “possibility of conflict” is a public relations venture
by the Courts. The point is destroyed by the overwhelming
fact that the public will never understand nor approve of
the Court’s dismissing a mass criminal because the class rep-
resentative is a high calibre attorney. The public wants their
champion against fraud protected, not destroyed by the Courts.
17
The simple fact here is that the petitioner has been the sole
champion of the defrauded class and the lower courts have
been the implacable enemy of the defrauded class, and the
advocate for the mass wrongdoer. This fact is not noted below
because the Courts have a policy of erroneously substituting
words for facts, and phraseology for analysis.
AS TO QUESTION FOUR
Page 6 of this Application
In Rio Grande v. Gildersleeve, 174 U. S., 1102 (1899), the
Supreme Court of course held with the rule of law, clearly
holding contrary to the opinion below as follows:
“As no discretionary power was reserved to the trial judge
(by the rule involved) he could not dispense with this rule
of Court. As was said in Thompson v. Hatch, 3 Pick, 512:
‘A duly authorized rule of court has the force of law, and is
binding upon the court as well as upon parties to an action,
and cannot be dispensed with to suit the circumstances of any
particular case . . . The courts may rescind or repeal their
rules without doubt; or in establishing them, may reserve the
exercise of discretion for particular cases. But the rule once
made without any such qualification must be applied in all
cases which come within it, until it is repealed by the authority
which made it.’ ”
The petitioner stated that he never believed that after prac-
ticing law for 45 years he would apply to the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari on such a fundamental point, that he would
have to fight legal anarchy within the judiciary itself. The
judiciary has strayed far from many fundamentals as evidenced
by this one record, but here it goes too far by nullifying the
rule of law under the guise of trial court discretion. This case
is a negation of what American law represents.
18
If the Supreme Court cannot pause on this point, what good
is it to announce rules in other cases, if these rules can be
nullified at the whim or caprice of all the Courts below?
Also see Surowitz, supra, where the Supreme Court asserts
the substance of Rule 23 against those who would destroy it
by the mechanism of attacking the class representative and
diverting attention from the facts of the case.
AS TO QUESTION FIVE
Page 6 of this Application
This application has heretofore noted two unconstitutional
practices: (1) a descent by a trial judge to personally inter-
vene on behalf of a defendant, and (2) a Circuit Court opinion
which has relegated rules of law to the uncontrolled “dis-
cretion” of trial judges for enforcement.
The fifth reason for certiorari embraces a more subtle, but
equally dangerous, procedure accomplished below, and that is,
the factual misconstruction of a trial record.
An Irishman once said, “I do not care who writes a nation’s
laws if I can write its songs.”
The theory below was “I do not care who writes a nation’s
laws if I can misconstrue its trial records to destroy Rule 23.”
The erroneous misconstruction and obfuscation of the record
is not an isolated fact below.
We begin with the basic fact that the only trial record that
actually existed in this case was a bare bones record that
reflected there were two plaintiffs who offered to represent tne
class —- one a layman and one a lawyer. The lawyer had in-
vestigated the fraud, asked the defendant to answer two im-
19
portant questions, and after obtaining no proper response,
filed suit as attorney for the class.
The defendant’s motion against the certification of the class
never attacked the plaintiff-attorney personally or profession-
ally. All the defendant asked for was a per se ruling that an
attorney could never act as class representative and class attor-
ney because he was an attorney. That was all the record before
the Court could ever warrant — that is, a per se ruling as there
were no facts to warrant any other order.
All the Courts below inadvertently concealed the undeniable
fact that they were rendering a per se ruling. This was done
by a constant factual misconstruction of the actual trial record.
The first Court, by its order of December 7, 1973, used two
mechanisms of language:
1. First, the Court stated that it might permit class action
status in some future case where an attorney was class repre-
sentative and class attorney. This was just another way of
saying that the damage inflicted on the class by the per se
ruling here might not be inflicted in a future case. This did
nothing to destroy the per se ruling.
2. Secondly, the Court held that this type of fact situation
created “possibly conflicting interest’. The Court did not rule
that, in actuality, there were any factual or legal conflicts
because (1) there was no evidence of any conflict in the record;
(2) the interests of the plaintiff and his class were identical,
not at variance. Thus, the Court obfuscated a per se ruling by
nothing more than nebulous, meaningless language —- language
that was meaningless in fact and meaningless in law. The simple
truth is that all the Court did was to attempt to justify a per se
20
ruling, which is all the record would allow. Moreover, Rule 23
is not concerned with speculative, nonexistent conflicts destroy-
ing a class; it is concerned with actual conflict. As there was
no actual conflict here, the Court obfuscated its per se ruling
by the use of vague language.
A trial Court cannot, constitutionally, inadvertently change
a record and say that a per se ruling is not a per se ruling
by using vague, diaphanous, meaningless language as was done
here. Certainly, if the constitutional point be not pursued, a
Court cannot destroy Rule 23 by the misconstruction of the
fact record before it; if it could so destroy the Rule, a trial
Court could overrule the Supreme Court at will through the
process of factual misconstruction of a record.
The fourth trial judge in this case begins his order of
October 17, 1977, with the following words: “Four Judges
of this District have now had this case on the docket. Plaintiff
has moved four times that a class be certified.”
The implication is that four Courts seriously considered the
Motion for Certification.
The facts are:
1. The first Judge’s conduct was unconstitutional and uncon-
scionable, and the plaintiff-attorney should have been com-
mended rather than condemned for his fight against a star
chamber inquisition, which proved nothing adverse because
there was nothing adverse in his entire record.
2. The second Judge sat (repeat, sat) on this case for 17
months. Four motions for certification were filed before this
sudge alone, showing a diligence that caused some consterna-
21
tion. The Judge did not enter any order on certification, al-
though various orders for and against certification were pre-
sented to him by the plaintiff.
3. The third Judge would take no cognizance of this case
whatsoever, but immediately transferred it to the fourth Judge.
4. The petitioner’s attempts to serve the class did not sit
well with the fourth Judge. His order, continuing the judicial
obfuscation of the facts, states, “Plaintiff still persists in urging
a class certification”. The fourth Judge then proceeds to volun-
teer a point defense counsei never presented because it was no
good, and that is, “Plaintiff Garonzik admitted in his deposi-
tion which has been fied with the Clerk that he is a sophisti-
cated investor. The Court finds that this defense raises a defense
which would not be typical as to the class he proposes to
represent. The Court, therefore, concludes that this is sufficient
reason to refuse to certify the class proposed by plaintiff under
Rule 23, F.R.C.P.”
The atypicality point was construed out of thin air. There
had been no hearing whatsoever on this point to determine
whether any of the purchasers were unsophisticated investors.
For example, when the plaintiffs purchased their stock, it was
selling above $40 a share as the Court well knew. Very few
purchasers of $40 stock are unsophisticated investors; they
are found mainly among the lower priced stocks, which the
Court knew. In addition, the public generally has been out of
the market for some time. Most of those that remained were
sophisticated investors.
But even if the foregoing were not common knowledge, why
should the petitioner have been denied the right to represent
22
his class of sophisticated purchasers who were defrauded?
Even if the law be so absurd as to hold that the sophisticated
and knowledgeable cannot represent the weak and ignorant,
why can’t they represent their own class? The answer is that
in this Circuit a trial court can do anything he well pleases in
a class action suit unless certiorari be now granted and this
be stopped.
The view of the Court is further evidenced by a needless
caveat in the order which stated:
“Plaintiff has offered to resign as counsel of record in order to
have the proposed class certified. Plaintiff has not resigned as
counsel of record so any ruling as to the effect of his resigna-
tion would be premature. The Court would also point out that
the naming of new counsel would not automatically resolve all
difficulties. Any new counsel would have to be scrutinized by
the Court as to suitability and if in any way found lacking,”
the Court would still refuse to certify a class.”
The plaintiff did resign as counsel for the class and did
employ other counsel to represent the class. Upon motion for
certification being made, the Court, without any hearing, and
certainly without the scrutiny it had indicated, denied class
certification by its order of November 11, 1977.
THE LEGAL RESEARCH BOARD, THE UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW, WRITES NON-ADVOCATE
BRIEFS ON THE LAW, STATING ITS UNDERSTANDING
OF THE LAW. IT WILL NOT PRESENT AN ADVOCATE’S
BRIEF. IT RENDERED AN OPINION THAT CLASS AC-
TION STATUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED TO THE
PLAINTIFF-ATTORNEY (R. 357-361).
The reason the Legal Research Board rendered the fore-
od
23
going opinion is that it relied on the actua! record in the case.
It knew the record only warranted a per se ruling.
However, the Circuit Court, in rendering its opinion con-
firming the misconduct and errors described herein, factually
misconstrued the true record. It stated:
“We need not decide whether the application of an automatic
rule would be reversible.”
Why not? That is all the record warranted. It was a bare
bones, per se, record, and nothing else insofar as the attorney
point was involved. The Court had to rule per se or certify.
It “chose not to certify”.
How could the Court of Appeals say, “the district Court
did not abuse its discretion in ruling that plaintiffs were inade-
quate class representatives”? What facts were in the record
other than the fact that petitioner was an attorney? There were
no other facts to prove inadequacy; therefore, the Circuit Court,
in affirming the per se ruling, erroneously concealed the per se
ruling of the trial court. The factual misconstruction continued;
Rule 23 was a shambles because the true facts were erroneously
concealed.
This erroneous, illegal and unconstitutional distortion of the
trial record was combined with the unconstitutional and alien
argument that regardless of what the rules were supposed to
be, the trial court could do as he well pleased. The Court said:
“In a subsequent order, Judge W. M. Taylor additionally held
that the plaintiff's admission that he is a sophisticated investor
raises a defense as to plaintiff's own claim which deprives him
of the typicality of the class required for class represc ntation.
While this characteristic may or may not eventually affect
24
plaintiff's cause of action, see Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F. 2d 2005
(Sth Cir., 1977), and while it might not have prevented class
certification IF THE DISTRICT JUDGE WAS SO INCLINED,
see, e.g. Feder v. Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 183-184 (S.D. N.Y.
1970), /T PRESENTS A SUFFICIENT QUESTION OF
TYPICALITY TO PROTECT THE DISTRICT COURT'S
DECISION FROM REVERSAL ON APPEAL UNDER THE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD OF REVIEW.” (Un-
derlining and capitalization always added in this brief unless
otherwise so stated. )
Rule 23 is a shambles. The Courts have changed a bare
bones factual record, that is, a record which only reflects one
fact, into another factual record.
The first Judge took the bare bones record and spoke in
nebulous terms about the “possibility” of conflict. Even in
barbarian societies, disputes are supposed to be decided on
facts, not on unarticulated, totally unreasonable speculations
and surmises of Judges. Here, there was not one scintilla of
evidence to support this avoidance of a per se ruling.
The second and third Judges took no action.
The fourth Judge changed the bare bones record into some-
thing more. He not only saw a possibility of conflict — he saw
actual conflict. This was a much more serious misconstruction
of facts, not only of degree, but because by then the petitioner
had done over 600 hours of work on the case, and the volumi-
nous file showed it. No fair finder of fact could have held
that this industrious representative was in conflict with his
class. The only enemy of the defrauded class was the Courts.
Basic facts continued to be inadvertently misconstrued, and
thus certification was denied.
The Court of Appeals speculated about what the rules of law
25
may or may not be, and then concluded that it didn’t make an
iota of difference what the law was, the trial court could do
what it pleased “under the abuse of discretion standard of
review’. Now, what is the standard in the Fifth Circuit for
discretion? It is simple — the desire of the trial Judge; and
these desires can be very strong, as evidenced by the first
Judge’s attempt to keep the case on his docket when his Dallas
docket was being taken away from him. In short, what we have,
as blandly and naively admitted by the opinion itself, is a
doctrine of excuses, cliches and nebulous language to support
the expressed desire of the first trial Judge.
There is nothing in the record to even suggest the following
found in the Circuit Court opinion:
1. Any facts to warrant the exercise of discretion.
2. Any facts to warrant the statement, “We need not now
decide whether the application of an automatic rule would be
reversible.”
3. “Judge Mahon. . . did not follow a per se rule that would
disqualify a plaintiff as a class representative just because he
was an attorney representing himself.”
4. “The reasoning in his opinion demonstrates a careful
exercise of his discretion in this regard. . .”
Discretion implies that a factual predicate existed in the
record for its exercise other than the fact that the plaintiff
was an attorney. There just were no other facts before Judge
Mahon, and neither the Circuit Court nor defense counsel have
ever cited any other facts to avoid this being a per se decision.
26
The attitude of the Circuit Court is further evidenced by the
following:
“... We direct the district court to proceed with the case as
an individual action if the plaintiff cares to pursue it, and to
sunimarily dismiss any further attempts to convert this case
into a class action, whether by pleading amendment, counsel
substitution, motion, discovery, or any other means which
might otherwise have been available . . .”
The fourth Judge never held any hearing whatsoever after
the petitioner resigned and employed counsel to represent the
class. No hearing was ever held as to whether the purchasers
were sophisticated or unsophisticated investors —— the fact that
some purchasers were unsophisticated investors was assumed
by the trial court, and from this assumption the trial Judge
ruled that the petitioner could not represent either sophisticated
or unsophisticated investors. The record was not only miscon-
strued, it was created by the ipse dixit of the trial Judge and
thus Rule 23 was effectively nullified.
In 40 Texas Law Review 1, “The Judiciary and the Bar —
Socialist Legality vs. The Rule of Law”, it is pointed out that
the rationale of Soviet law is to enferce the intentions of the
state. Here, in class action cases the rationale of the law is to
enforce the intentions of the trial Judges, as inconsistent and
as diverse as they may be. Regardless of the fact that directly
conflicting results are obtained under the same facts, the cases
are approved because each Judge has exercised his unfettered
discretion. One does not even have to read between the lines —-
it is all set out in black and white in the Court of Appeals
opinion in this case. The rule of law, as we know it, is dead in
Rule 23 cases. Rule 23 is dead if the trial Judge so elects.
27
The fact that this process of misconstruing basic facts was
unintentional and inadvertent does not lessen the damages in-
flicted by the policy nor does it immunize this policy of nullifica-
tion (of Rule 23) from constitutional attack. In addition to the
constitutional grounds involving the record, these errors create
grounds for certiorari because this process emasculates Rule
23.
Nonexistent possibilities of conflict, nonexistent conflicts,
nonexistent impermissible discretion, evidence this process of
factual distortion and misconstruction which effectively nullifies
Rule 23.
The damages are the same as if done intentionally. Rule 23
is as efficiently nullified by the process of factual misconstruc-
tion as by predetermined, malevolent intention (which did not
exist).
AS TO QUESTION SIX
Page 6 of this Application
The Supreme Court should also clear the air on another
point that clouds class actions and 10b(5) cases, and that is
the meaning of “typical” in Rule 23.
In Carpenter v. Hull, 311 F. S. 1099 (S.D. Tex. 1970), the
Court quotes Charles Alan Wright, who says:
“The requirement in Rule 23(a) (2) that the claims or de-
fenses of the representative must be typical of those of the class
is probably no more than a cryptic way of saying that the
representative must not have interests that conflict with those
he purports to represent.”
It is not encugh to define “typical”. The Supreme Court must
see that the lower courts do not avoid class actions, as here, by
28
ipse dixit language stating there is conflict when the record,
the facts, and common sense show identity of interests rather
than conflict.
The fictitious creation of a nonexistent conflict is proven by
the fact that the Fifth Circuit in Stein v. Smith, 473 F. 2d 1205
(Sth Cir. 1973) held that “sophisticated investors, like all others,
are entitled to the truth”. What conflict, then, could there pos:
sibly be in this type of case? A conflict that cannot be articulated
does not exist.
In short, the Supreme Court must see that lower courts do not
inadvertently misconstrue the record by erroneously articulat-
ing a nonexistent conflict when an identity of interest actually
exists. This dangerous policy of inadvertently contradicting
facts must be stopped now.
[f this Court were shown that, in the Fifth Circuit, the actual
trial records were supplanted by astrology or numerology as
predicates for judgments and appellate opinions, the Supreme
Court would grant certiorari without delay.
The equivalent is taking place. Trial records are supplanted,
not by astrology or numerology, but by something much more
effective, and that is, an inadvertent process whereby phrase-
ology and cliches misconstrue the record factually and thus
evade certification under Rule 23.
Inconsistent rulings among the judges mean nothing in this
Circuit. One trial judge ruled one way in this case on the class
action point, and another way in another case having the same
identical point, wherein the same authority was cited (the Lamb
case). The Court of Appeals, in an opinion which must have
29
touched the nadir in the annals of American jurisprudence,
applauds, encourages and validates diversity of results in the
same fact situation. A Court “may or may not” rule a certain
way according to the Court of Appeals. A Court could, in this
case, have certified the class action “if the district Judge was so
inclined”. How can the Supreme Court even hesitate to grant
certiorari?
If gossamers of unwarranted insinuations are to supplant
trial records in the Fifth Conflict, we should dispense with the
expense and time devoted to discovery proceedings and have
Al Capp’s Mammy Yoakum whomp up a vision as the record
of the case.
Analysts, thinkers and scholars perceive the menace. Alfred
E. Kahn, the new Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, in
a speech before the American Bar Association last August,
stated as follows:
“*T cannot help feeling that some among you, determined to
resist our present policies with all the weapons at your
command, have seized upon procedural arguments because you
really can’t refute our new policies substantively.’ ”
Kahn described the procedures by which, over the decades,
new routes had been assigned.
“The chairman .. . would then pick up the telephone and call
the general counsel and tel! him who the lucky winner was,
and nothing more; then a lawyer on the general counsel's staff,
amply supplied with blank legal tablets and general selection of
cliches — some, like “beyond-area benefits”, “route strength-
ening” or ‘subsidy-need reduction”, tried and true, others the
desperate product of a feverish wunagination — would construct
a work of fiction that would then be published as the board’s
opinion.”
30
“My highly publicized preoccupation with the style of our
orders and our opinions is not merely aesthetic; it also goes to
the very heart of what we do. All too often, the use in opinions
of such pomposities as “we reject the proposed course of action
because we deem it in appropriate” — which means no more
than “we're not going to do it because we don’t want to! ”
The foregoing process exists in the Fifth Circuit. Is there
more important cause for certiorari? The Supreme Court of
the United States should write one of its greatest opinions in
this case concerning the rule of law and the need to protect it
from all mechanisms of attack. This opinion should make it
clear that the rule of law is not to be tampered with at the
discreiion of every trial judge.
At a recent ceremony wherein a new federal judge was
elevated to the bench, one of the judges told about a United
States Judge who concluded his prayers each night with “Oh,
Lord, please don’t send me any class action suits”.
The fact is that if Rule 23 is going to be enforced in the
Fifth Circuit, it will have to be done by virtue of direct orders
of the Supreme Court, not only to recognize the Rule, but to
enforce it without the unconstitutional and illegal destruction
of trial records.
If certiorari be not granted in this case, the Supreme Court
might just as well shut up shop. What good does it do for the
Supreme Court to announce rules of law if they can be evaded
at the whim or caprice of any trial judge, as the opinion below
clearly states, and as the record overwhelmingly proves?
Aiter all, trial courts of the United States are supposed to
be administered by Judges, not conjurers of imaginative trial
records which inadvertently evade Rule 23.
31
There are three basic and fundamental reasons for certiorari
to issue:
1. In order that the application of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act may be uniformly and properly interpreted
throughout the United States Judiciai system.
2. In order that the Fifth Circuit may not interpret Rule 23
out of existence.
3. In order that this nation may be governed by
(a) the rule of law
and not by
(b) gibberish.
It is, therefore, respectfully requested that the Supreme
Court of the United States issue its Writ of Certiorari to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordering the record in
this case to be delivered to the Supreme Court of the United
States for review.
Respectfully submitted,
Sanpy M. SANDOLOSKI
Attorney for Petitioner
1800 Republic National Bank Tower
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 748-8891
32
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that three copies of this applica-
tion have been mailed to Mr. C. Taylor Ashworth and Mr.
John A. Gilliam, attorneys for the respondent, 2200 First
National Bank Building, Dallas, Texas 75202, by certified
mail, return receipt requested.
Sandy M. Sandoloski _
33
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Fifth Cireuit
Office of the Clerk
September 13, 1978
Edward W. Wadsworth Tel 504-589-6514
Clerk 600 Camp Street
New Orleans, La. 70130
TO ALL PARTIES LISTED BELOW:
NO. 77-3396 Jarrell Garonzik, Et Al v.
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. Et Al
Dear Counsel:
This is to advise that an order has this day been entered
denying the petition( ) for rehearing,* and no member of
the panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court
having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en
banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local
Fifth Circuit Rule 12) the petition( ) for rehearing en banc
has also been denied.
See Rule 4], Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for
issuance and stay of the mandate.
Very truly yours,
EDWARD W. WADSWORTH, Clerk
By BRENDA HAUCK
Deputy Clerk
*On Behalf of Jarrell Garonzik Et Al
CC: Messrs. Sandy Sandoloski
Michael W. McManus
Messrs. C. Taylor Ashworth
John A. Gilliam
+1
JARRELL GARONZIK and
MILBURN GARONZIK, ete..
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SHEARSON HAYDEN STONE, INC.,,
et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 77-3396
Summary Calendar. *
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
June 12, 1978.
Appeal was taken from a denial of class certification by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, William M. Taylor, Ir.. J., in action alleging security
fraud. The Court of Appeals held that under circumstances
of case, trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to certify plaintiff as class representative since plaintiff was
both jivestor and an attorney and since plaintiff’s admission
that he was sophisticated investor raised defense as to his
own claim resulting in his being deprived of typicality of
class required for class representation.
Affirmed with directions.
Federal Civil Procedure 187
Under circuimstances of case. district court hearing security
fraud action did aot abuse its discretion in refusing to certify
plaintiff as class representative since plaintiff was both investor
)-
oo
and an attorney and since plaintiffs admission that he was
sophisticated investor raised defense as to his own claim
resulting in his being deprived of typicality of class required
for class representation. Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. rule 23(a) (4).
28 U.S.C.A.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas.
Before RONEY, GEE and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from a denial of class certification in a
case alleging 10(b)(5) security fraud in the sales campaign
of defendant stockbroker concerning the stock in Horizons,
Inc. For the purposes of this appeal, the merits of the cause
of action are assumed. Although we often refuse to accept
an appeal of the denial of class certification, even when, as in
this case, the district court certified the issue as controlling
under Rule 54(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., we iake this appeal on the
meriis in order to finally resolve the question. Inasmuch as we
affirm the denial of class certification, in order to fully imple-
ment the purpose of taking this appeal, we direct the district
court to proceed with the case as an individual action if the
plaintiff cares to pursue it, and to summarily dismiss any
further attempts to convert this case into a class action, whether
by pleading amendment, counsel substitution, motion, dis-
covery, or any other means which might otherwise have been
available had we not been asked to take the appeal of this
interlocutory order.
Although no application was properly made to this Court
26
under 28 U.S.C.A, § 1292(b), we treat the filing of plaintiff's
notice of appeal as such application, the filing of defendant's
brief as a stipulated waiver of formality and time require-
ments, and grant the appeal as if the plaintiff had properly
followed the statute and the rules in the prosecution of this
appeal,
A careful review of the briefs and appendix filed in this
case reveal no abuse of discretion in the refusal of three dis-
trict judges over a period of four years to certify the plaintiff
asa class representative,
In his initial order on December 7, 1973. Judge Eldon
Mahon, contrary to plaintiffs argument on appeal, did not
follow a per se rule that would disqualify a plaintiff as 2
class representative just because he was an attorney represent:
ing himself. He did, however, give that fact due consideration
as to whether the plaintiff could fairly represent the purported
class." The reasoning in his opinion demonstrates a carefal
exereise of his discretion in this regard, rather than an abuse
thereof,
We need not now decide whether the application of an
automatic rule would be reversible. We align ourselves with
the comprehensive treatment of this matter in Susman. v,
Lincola American Corp., 501 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing
cases allowing and disallowing a plaintiff-attorney to represent
the class), where the court, declining to adopt a per se rule,
found that in the circumstances of that case the district court
did not abuse its discretion in ruling that plaintiffs were inade-
quate class representatives.
"Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co.
of New York et al., 5 Cir. 1970, 431 F 2d 409, Part I.
37
In a subsequent order, Judge W. M. Taylor additionally
held that the plaintiffs admission that he is a sophisticated
investor raises a defense as to plaintiffs own claim which
deprives him of the typicality of the class required for class
representation. While this characteristic may or may not
eventually affect plaintiffs cause of action, see Dupuy v. Dupuy,
551 F.2d 1005 (Sth Cir. 1977). and while it might not have
prevented class certification if the district judge was so in-
clined, see, e. g., Feder v. Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 178, 183-184
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), it presents a sufficient question of typicality
to protect the district court’s decision from reversal on appeal
under the abuse of discretion standard of review.
AFFIRMED WITH DIRECTIONS.
‘This court does not seek to enunciate a belief that there are no cir-
cumstances in which it would be appropriate for an attorney to represent
a class of individuals both as a member thereof and as counsel. I do
not, however, believe that the circumstances wherein such a dual
participation by the attorney would be warranted are present in the
case at bar. In reaching this conclusion, | have given considerable
weight to those matters that relate to the possibly conflicting in-
terests of Garonzik the plaintiff, Garonzik the attorney, and the remain-
ing members of the class. While the Court imputes no base motives to
the attorney with whom these questions are herein concerned, it is
strongly felt that the circumstances here present militate against a
holding that the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) can be satisfied by
allowing one of the plaintiffs to participate as a member of the class
and as its attorney, Pathe, it is noted that the Court’s action today
in nq way divests any plaintiff of his individual rights in the cause of
action alleged in the complaint. (footnote omitted ).
36
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NOKTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JARRELL GARONZIK And
MILBURN GARONZIK,
Individually and As
CIVIL ACTION
NO. CA 3-7220-F
Representative of a Class
Vs.
SHEARSON, HAMMILI. & CO..
INCORPORATED
MEMORANDUM ORDER
In their complaint, plaintiffs Jarrell and Milburn Garonzik
contend that representatives of defendant corporation have
undertaken to act in violation of the Securities Act of 1933,
IS U.S.C. § 77a et seg. (1970), the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970), and in violation
of the Rules and Regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.
lv C.F.R. Parts 230 and 240.' The matter is now befare the
Court for consideration of plaintitf’s motion to allow this
cause to proceed as a class action. Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P.
(1970).
Raper ram Jorrell Garonzik and Milburn Garonzik, in company with
cares br exit i gas sane cheer ea
> in earl ging s violations of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. $77a et seg. (1970), and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C, 878a et seq. (1970) (CA 3-4402-R. N.D. Tex.
fled January 5, 1971). The volume of instruments filed therein
reflect that the matter was pursued with some vigor until April of
1972. That cause of action was thereafter concluded by a judgment
entered July 12, 1972, pursuant to a settlement reached by the varties
Phe case at bar was filed May 22. 1073. . si
es
39
Jarrell Garonzik, a practicing attorney, together with his
brother Milburn Garonzik, purchased and retained stock in
the Horizon Corporation upon the recommendation of one of
defendant's representatives while, during the same time period,
defendant was allegedly divesting itself of its shares in the
corporation. Jarrell Garonzik seeks to represent the class as
a member and as its attorney. Defendant Shearson, Hammell
& Co., Inc., urges, inter alia, that plaintiffs “will not fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class” as is required by
Rule 23(a) (4), Fed. R. Civ. P. (1970). The Court agrees.
In Shields v. Valley National Bank of Arizona, 56 F.R.D.
448 (D. Ariz. 1971), objection was made to Shields repre-
senting the class as plaintiff and as attorney “because he
may lack the objectivity to represent the class by virtue of
his closeness to the action as a plaintiff and thus may become
emotionally and financially involved in the outcome of the
case.” There it was said:
“The Court further feels that Shields has not demon-
strated competence to represent the class because he seeks
to be not only the attorney for the class and be awarded a
fee for his representation, he seeks in the same action, per-
sonal relief. The practice involved does not seem to the Court
to comport with the high quality of objectivity, duty and
integrity required of lawyers practicing in this Court or
elsewhere. This case seems to involve a questionable method
of soliciting legal business and such solicitation should not
be encouraged.” 56 F.R.D. at 450."
A similar determination was made in Kovadii v. First Na-
tional Bank of Chicago, 57 F.R.D. 545, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1972),
wherein it was stated: “Since the named plaintiff is also
2Accord, Shields v. First National Bank of Arizona, 56 F.R.D. 442
(D. Ariz. 1972).
40
acting as co-counsel for the class, his interest in legal fees
clearly outweighs his interest as a plaintiff and creates a
conflict of interest. He cannot therefore be considered a fair
and adequate representative of the class.”
In the case at bar Plaintiff! Garonzik asks if it is right that
he should have to “donate the fruits of his labor to another
attorney?” In attempting to respond to that inquiry, the Court
wishes to indicate that it is not unmindful of he problems
inherent in class action suits in general, not the least of which
is reflected in the statement that “Obviously the only persons
to gain from a class suit are not potential plaintiffs, but the
attorneys who will represent them.” Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
lin (Kisen 1), 391 F.2d 555 at 571 (2nd Cir. 1968) (Lum-
bard, C. J., dissenting). One commentator has noted that,
“the most serious long-range consequence of the indiscrimi-
nate use of class actions [is] of the undermining of public
confidence in the judicial system and the integrity of the
bar. Attorneys are members of an honorable profession and
are duty-bound to put their clients’ interest above their own.
The spectacle of lawyers reaping enormous profits from
lawsuits which do not benefit their clients must be a source
of embarrassment to both the judiciary and the bar. As one
Court recently warned, both courts and attorneys must avoid
the criticism implicit in the Italian proverb that ‘A lawsuit
is a fruit tree planted in a lawyer's garden.’ [Illinois v.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.. 55 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. Il.
1972).]
The judiciary should not participate in encouraging attor-
neys to become entrepreneurs who create business oppor-
tunities from which they reap large profits.”
Miia: Via Actions — Useful Toot or Engine of Des
F.R.D. 375 at 390-391 (1972) cialis ction
4]
If the cause for concern reflected in the above observations
has any foundation, it would seemingly be even more applicable
to class action proceedings wherein the attorney was also a
party. This Court does not seek to enunciate a belief that
there are no circumstances in which it would be appropriate
for an attorney to represent a class of individuals both as a
member thereof and as counsel. I do not, however, believe
that the circumstances wherein such a dual participation by
the attorney would be warranted are present in the case at bar.
In reaching this conclusion, I have given considerable weight
to those matters that relate to the possibly conflicting interests
of Garonzik the plaintiff, Garonzik the attorney, and the re-
maining members of the class. While the Court imputes no
base motives to the attorney with whom these questions are
herein concerned, it is strongly felt that the circumstances
here present militate against a holding that the requirements
of Rule 23(a)(4) can be satisfied by allowing one of the
plaintiffs to participate as a member of the class and as its
attorney.‘ Further, it is noted that the Court’s action today
in no way divests any plaintiff of his individual rights in the
cause of action alleged in the complaint.
The motion to permit this matter to proceed as a class action
is denied.
Entered this 7th day of December, 1973.
ELDON B. MAHON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4Nor am I inclined to believe the problems would be alleviated by
allowing one of the Garonzik brothers to proceed as named party-
plaintiff and the other as counsel for the class. See Shields v. First
National Bank of Arizona, 56 F.R.D. 442, n.1 (D. Ariz. 1972).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JARRELL GARONZIK and
MILBURN GARONZIK,.
Individually and as
ip edaenaaeien of a CA 3.7290
Class
Vs.
SHEARSON HAYDEN
STONE INC.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Four Judges of this District have now had this case on the
docket. Plaintiff has moved four times that a class be certified.
Judge Eldon Mahon, the first Judge to sit in this case, refused
to certify a class principally because plaintiff Jarrell Garonzik
is also the attorney of record. Judge Robert W. Porter, the
next Judge to sit in this case, refused to vacate the earlier
order and certify a class. Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham, the
third Judge, recused himself before ever ruling on a class
certification motion. Plaintiff still persists in urging a class
certification, Plaintiff Garonzik admitted in his deposition
which has been filed with the Clerk that he is a sophisticated
investor. The Court finds that this admission raises a defense
available to defendant as to plaintiff's own claim that would
not be typical as to the elass that he has proposed to represent.
be
43
The Court, therefore, concludes that this is sufficient reason
to refuse to certify the class proposed by plaintiff under Rule
23, F.R.C.P.
Plaintiff has offered to resign as counsel of record in order
to have the proposed class certified. Plaintiff has not resigned
as counsel of record so any ruling as to the effect of his resig-
nation would be premature. The Court would also point out
that the naming of new counsel by plaintiff would not auto-
matically resolve all difficulties. Any new counsel would have
to be scrutinized by the Court as to suitability and if in any
way found lacking, the Court would still refuse to certify a
class even if the problem discussed in the preceding paragraph
was gotten around in some manner by plaintiff.
Therefore, treating plaintiff's subsequent Motions to Certify
a Class as a Motion to Vacate the prior Order refusing to
certify a class, it is
ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion is denied.
Plaintiff has filed six sets of Interrogatories, Requests for
Production, Requests for Admission and numerous Motions to
Compel. At the pretrial conference held in this case on Sep-
tember 2, 1977, the Court announced that it believed that dis-
covery could best proceed by the taking of depositions. It
announced that it would review the interrogatories and answers
thereto and then make an appropriate order. The Court after
reviewing the discovery on file with the Court believes that
plaintiff wants a confession from defendant in its answers and
that its impression at the pretrial was correct; discovery at this
point would best proceed by the taking of depositions, includ-
ing plaintiff’s. It is, therefore,
44.
ORDERED that plaintiff's Motions to Compel Discovery and
for Summary Judgment are denied, and that discovery proceed
by the taking of depositions at this time, including the deposi-
tion of the plaintiff, Jarrell Garonzik.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE _
Oct. 17, 1977
45
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JARRELL GARONZIK,
ET AL
vs, — CA 3-7220-C
SHEARSON HAYDEN STONE,
INC.
ORDER
Came on for consideration Plaintiffs’ “Motion That Class
Action Status Be Granted,” and the Court having heretofore
entered Memorandum Opinion and Order on October 17, 1977,
denying certification of this cause as a class action, and therein
having pointed out that three judges of this district, to wit,
Judge Mahon, Judge Porter, and the Judge of this Court, have
heretofore denied certification of class action status, and being
of the same opinion, it is, accordingly,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court that
class action status in this case be, and it is hereby, DENIED.
SIGNED and ENTERED this 11th day of November, 1977.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ee
46 47
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT this Court as such final judgment, thus permitting the Plain-
tiffs to appeal this Order as a final judgment to the Fifth Court
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
of Appeals.
SIGNED AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 1977.
JARRELL GARONZIK, ET AL iets Ce
am vetaeee UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SHEARSON HAYDEN STONE, INC.
ORDER
Came on for consideration Plaintiffs’ “‘Motion That Class
Action Status Be Granted,” and the Court having heretofore
entered Memorandum Opinion and Order on October 17, 1977,
denying certification of this cause as a class action, and therein
having pointed out that three judges of this district, to wit,
Judge Mahon, Judge Porter, and the Judge of this Court, have
heretofore denied certification of class action status, and being
of the same opinion, it is, accordingly.
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court that
class action status in this case be, and it is hereby, DENIED.
in compliance with and in fulfillment of Rule 54(b), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedures, the Court hereby DIRECTS, OR-
DERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES that this Order is, and
shall be, a final judgment insofar as the maintenance of this
case as a class action is concerned, and there is no just reason
for delay. and so ceriifies to such fact; and the Court hereby
expressly directs that this Order be entered by the Clerk of
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