Petition — Fitzgerald v. Staats

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IN THE OCT S80 1978

Supreme Cart of thy United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

MIGHAE! R@DAK, JR., CLERK

No. 7B -T15

A. ERNEST FITZGERALD.

Petitioner

VS.

ELMER B. STAATS, et al.

Re spond ts

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN BODNER, JR.

LAWRENCE R. VELVEL

1730 Pennsylvania

Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

Attorneus for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

RALPH J. TEMPLE

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION FOUNDATION

1345 E Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

October, 1978

WILSON - EPES PRINTING COo., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C 20001

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

NI LS SS PII se a 1

SR at AEN RES a NA Eee Re 1

NESS TIE BE ec er at Ree 2

a 2

ESS EIST Tis 8 OS ase 3

on ianueubuisiciancte 3

TT ceneaiaein 4

Reasons for Granting a Writ of Certiorari 0... 9

I. This Lawsuit Raises Issues Of Substantial Pub-

NES ES ES re Oe DOE LOT EL AD 9

Il. Sovereign Immunity Is Incompatible With Con-

stitutional Government Existing Under The Rule

SN isadcastnniinnen 12

A. The Decision Of This Court In United States

Nee so cieemmmbonnsiaueees 12

B. This Court Should Return To The Teachings

i oa, lactisaenaliennaonenaas 15

III. Sovereign Immunity Is Inconsistent With Deci-

sions Of This Court Involving Governmental

Immunities And The Awarding Of Remedies,

And, In Light Of Principles Regarding Ancillary

And Traditional Remedies, Is Particularly Inap-

plicable To Awards Of Interest’'On Back Pay.... 20

A. Sovereign Immunity Conflicts With Cases

Which Have Curtailed Governmental Im-

ey aR LR Ee ha A Rr ae OO 20

B. Sovereign Immunity Is In Conflict With De-

cisions Holding That Courts Must Fashion

Appropriate Remedies In Order To Protect

aa aa och a arcreeuandonniticicnbinasininas 22

II

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

C. Because of Principles Established by this

Court Regarding Ancillary and Traditional

Remedies, Sovereign Immunity Is Particu-

larly Inapplicable to Awards of Interest on

ea Ce aE Bi SS ee Cae a ee NI

REA RRURE STS OR 0g ce LER om PN

2. Interest Is A Traditional Remedy .............

III. This Case Illustrates Numerous Of The Reasons

Why Sovereign Immunity Should Be Overruled

Or At Least Should Be Ruled Inapplicable To

Recovery Of Interest On Back Pay ~.....-.........

Re en et pee ae ae

Page

24

27

29

Ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Branzburg Vv. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) 3

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) -........................... 22

Bivens Vv. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,

ee Rie ee Roe 22, 23

Burnet Vv. Coronade Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393

RMS ns en cee re ale 19

Butz v. Economou, 46 L.W. 4952 (1978) . 20, 21, 22, 25, 24

Davis Vv. Jobs For Progress, Inc., 427 F.Supp. 479

rec: I ae 25

Dugan Vv. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) SS ES ties 16, 18

Edelman V. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)... 19, 20, 24, 25

Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (C.A. D.C.,

akc cece ee te ee 3,5

Fitzgerald v. Staats, 429 F.Supp. 933 (D.C. D.C.,

hh Sale cee A ERIN SN a PON y= eR 7 ORO 8

Fitzgerald v. Staats, 578 F.2d 485 (C.A. D.C.,

og RIESE TREN ELD. 1S cb CE CLO a 7 RC 8

Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Service Commis-

sion, Civ. No. 74-686 (D.C. D.C., 1974) 3,6

Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Service Commis-

sion, 554 F.2d 1186 (C.A. D.C., 1977) _....... 3,6

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) _........ 20

Hutto v. Finney, 46 L.W. 4817 (1978) _...20, 21, 24, 25, 26

Jones V. Mayer & Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)... 23

Larson V. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.,

2 ae | _- eee eel ne 16,18

Monell v. Department of Social Services of the

City of New York, 46 L.W. 4569, decided June 8,

I OR 18, 19, 20, 21

NLRB v. American Express Warehouse, 374 F.2d

I 25

Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849)... 19

Pettway V. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 491 F.2d

Be OY SRO STN Pa 25

Rock Island, Arkansas & Louisiana RR. v. United

States, 264 US. 141 (1920) ................................ 26

Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 329 U.S. 229

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

United States vy. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, et al.,

$41 US. 48 (7961) —........ eee 15

United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969) —.............. 15

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)..12, 13, 14, 15,

17, 18, 19

United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) -......... 16

United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941)... 15

United States Vv. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1975) -....... 15

United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel, 329 U.S.

SOS (i967) 00 ee 9,15

Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S.

166 (1972) eee 12

Willet v. Emory & Henry College, 427 F.Supp. 631

(W.D. Va., 1977), Aff’d, 529 F.2d 212 (CA 4,

Ste? Ste sos diheanencestclabeenasletceltnammiee OS eacgaa ene 25

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. Vv. Sawyer, 343

US. 679 (16)... eee 17

Statutes:

U.S. Code

28 U.S.C. See: 2966 20 1

Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5596 ......... 2, 8, 9, 10, 27

Veterans Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7701.... 5, 8,9

31 U.S.C. See. SF ee 8,9

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000 et seq. .... 25

Other:

Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457

CORT). ok cae CRIP a EH 19

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No.

A. ERNEST FITZGERALD,

Petitioner

VS.

ELMER B. STAATS, et al.

Respondents

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Petitioner A. Ernest Fitzgerald respectfully prays that

a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-

bia entered June 2, 1978.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the District Court is reported at 429

F. Supp. 933, and appears in the Appendix at pp. 24-a—

29-a. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at

578 F.2d 435, and appears in the Appendix at pp. l-a—

23-a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

June 2, 1978. Within ninety days of that date, on Au-

gust 9, 1978, the time in which to file a petition for cer-

tiorari was extended by order of Mr. Justice Brennan

until October 30, 1978. Jurisdiction is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1254.

2

QUESTION PRESENTED

Under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, a government

employee who was unlawfully fired has a right to be made

whole for his losses. The employee cannot be made whole

unless he receives interest on back pay which was with-

held from him. Despite the statutory policy that the em-

ployee be made whole, the court below ruled that, pursuant

to decisions of this Court, the doctrine of sovereign im-

munity precludes an award of interest on back pay re-

covered by an illegally terminated employee. In these cir-

cumstances, the question presented is whether this Court

should permit awards of interest on back pay to be barred

by the doctrine of sovereign immunity even though that

doctrine is inconsistent with the statutory policy, is

inconsistent with fundamental precepts underlying a

constitutional republic operating under the rule of law,

is incompatible with decisions of this Court curtailing

governmental immunities and with decisions of the Court

holding that judicial tribunals must fashion remedies

to implement constitutional and statutory rights, and

is particularly inapplicable to an award of interest on

back pay because of principles regarding ancillary and

traditional remedies.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. $ 5596, provides in perti-

nent part:

(b) An employee of an agency who, on the basis of

an administrative determination or a timely ap-

peal, is found by appropriate authority under

applicable law or regulation to have undergone

an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action

that has resulted in the withdrawal or reduc-

tions of all or a part of the pay, allowances, or

differentials of the employee—

(1) is entitled, on correction of the personnel

action, to receive for the period for which

3

the personnel action was in effect an amount

equal to all or any part of the pay, allow-

ances, or differentials, as applicable, that

the employee normally would have earned

during that period if the personnel action

had not occurred, less any amounts earned

by him through other employment during

that period....

STATEMENT

INTRODUCTION

This petition for certiorari is filed by A. Ernest Fitz-

gerald, whose name has become synonymous with govern-

mental retaliation visited upon those who lawfully expose

serious inefficiency or wrongdoing in government pro-

grams. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 at 724

n. 12 (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in the con-

solidated case of United States v. Caldwell) ; Fitzgerald

v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (CADC, 1972); Fitzgerald

v. United States Civil Service Commission, 554 F.2d 1186,

1190, 1188 n. 2 (CADC, 1977); Fitzgerald v. United

States Civil Service Commission, Civ. No. 74-686, de-

cided July 15, 1974, D.C.D.C. Fitzgerald was illegally

fired as one of the Air Force’s chief cost analysts almost

nine years ago, after accurately testifying before the

Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint

Economic Committee (JEC) that the C-5A transport

plane program could well incur approximately $2 billion

in cost overruns. Though in 1973 a Civil Service hearing

examiner ordered that he be reinstated with back pay to

a job with the same or similar qualifications, he has never

in fact been reinstated to a job requiring his expertise.

Instead, of being given a job working oa major weapons

systems—the work he did before he was illegally fired—

he has been placed in such positions as overseeing bowling

alleys in Thailand.

4

In the present petition Fitzgerald seeks to overturn an

order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-

trict of Columbia upholding the government’s refusal to

pay him interest on back pay which was withheld from

him. A large amount of the back pay on which interest

is sought was lengthily withheld from Fitzgerald even

after the government conceded that it was owed to him.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I.

Ernest Fitzgerald is a specialist in cost controls. He

began his career in private industry, where he worked

on cost controls for vital defense projects such as the

Minuteman missile program, and created a new cost con-

trol system now widely known in the military contracting

industry. The excellence of his work brought him to the

attention of high Air Force officials, who prevailed upon

him in 1965 to join the Air Force Secretariat as Deputy

for Management Systems. His work for the Air Force

received an “Outstanding Performance Rating” from his

superiors in 1966 and 1967.

In 1968 Congress became interested in the costs of de-

veloping the huge C-5A transport plane and -the Joint

Economic Committee (JEC) requested Fitzgerald’s testi-

mony on this subject. Fitzgerald testified to the JEC on

November 13, 1968 that there could be a $2 billion cost

overrun on the plane. The Secretary of Defense and Air

Force generals, including the Chief of Staff, subsequently

admitted that Fitzgerald’s figures were accurate.

After Fitzgerald’s testimony, he became ostracized

within the Air Force, had his tenured status taken away,

was subjected to public charges and secret investigations

by Air Force officials, and was fired on November 4, 1969.

5

Il.

On January 20, 1970, Fitzgerald instituted an appeal

before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) for reinstate-

ment, back pay and other relief, on the ground that his

firing was improper and contrary to law. The CSC Ap-

peals Examiner ruled that the hearings before him would

be closed ones, but, in a lawsuit thereupon instituted on

this question by Fitzgerald, the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered that the

hearings be open. In rejecting the government’s plea for

secret hearings, the Court of Appeals, quoting Justice

Douglas, warned of the dangers which can flow from gov-

ernment actions which do not meet standards of fair

dealing. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755, 767-768

(1972).

After open hearings thereafter took place, the Appeals

Examiner ruled that Fitzgerald’s firing had been due to

improper reasons. The Examiner recommended that Fitz-

gerald be restored retroactively to the position from which

he had been separated or to one having the same or simi-

lar qualifications. The Examiner further recommended

an award of back pay and denied an award of attorneys

fees.

III.

Fitzgerald appealed the denial of attorneys fees to the

full Commission, which ruled against him on the ground

that payment of attorneys fees was not authorized by the

relevant statute, Section 14 of the Veterans Preference

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7701. Fitzgerald then instituted a lawsuit

for the fees in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia, which held in his favor but was

overruled by the Court of Appeals. Though the Court of

Appeals agreed with the lower court that a denial of

attorneys fees might work a miscarriage cf justice in

6

this case,’ it held that “attorneys fees are not awardable

under $14 because that section does not contain the

requisite explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.” Fitz-

gerald v. United States Civil Serv. Com’n, 554 F.2d 1186,

1188 (CADC, 1977).

IV.

The Air Force took no appeal to the full Commission

from the Examiner’s ruling that Fitzgerald had been

fired for improper reasons. The Examiner’s recommenda-

tion thus became the final order of the Commission on

October 3, 1973, and Fitzgerald thereupon obtained a

right to reinstatement to an appropriate postion and,

after appropriate deductions, to a considerable amount of

back pay. However, the Air Force refused to reinstate

Fitzgerald to an appropriate position and the CSC denied

Fitzgerald relief on this issue. Fitzgerald therefore

brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia asserting his right to reinstate-

ment.’ The district court vigorously upheld his right, but

to this day the Air Force still has not reinstated Fitz-

gerald to an appropriate position.

1 The appellate court said that the district court might have been

correct in fearing that a denial of attorneys fees “ ‘would make a

mockery and a sham of the mandate of Congress, and in cases like

the present one would make those rights meaningless.’” 554 F.2d

at 1190.

The Court of Appeals also noted that Fitzgerald “has, on more

than one occasion, been forced to seek judicial relief in order to

insure the integrity of the administrative hearing process.” 554

F.2d at 1188 n.2.

- In upholding Fitzgerald, the court said, per Judge Bryant:

This case, however presents an exceptional history of unseemly

delay and conduct by various agencies of government. This

conduct smacks of harassment and vindictiveness towards an

individual who dared expose the shortcomings of his superiors

and, whether deliberately or not, it will intimidate others who

might feel duty bound to take similar action. Fitzgerald v.

United States Civil Serv. Com'n., Civ. No. 74-686, decided

July 15, 1974, at p. 5.

7

Vv.

Just as the Air Force failed to reinstate Fitzgerald to

a proper position after the Appeals Examiner’s decision,

so too it refused to promptly pay him one dime of the

total amount of money owed to him: it would not even

promptly pay him portions which it conceded were owing

to him. Instead, it delayed payment by asking the Comp-

troller General to rule that large amounts should be de-

ducted from his back pay award, and, while the Comp-

troller’s decision was pending, flatly refusing to pay

Fitzgerald even the amounts conceded to be owing. After

almost eight months of this conduct, the Comptroller Gen-

eral ordered the Air Force to pay Fitzgerald the con-

ceded amounts, which then totalled $34,498.39. Thirteen

months later, on June 19, 1975, the Comptroller General

overruled the Air Force’s erroneous claim for deductions

from the back pay award. Thus 21 months after the

Examiner’s decision, Fitzgerald finally received the re-

maining money owed to him, which was $38,250.23.

VI.

Though the Comptroller General’s decisions resulted in

Fitzgerald finally receiving the amounts of back pay owed

to him, the Comptroller General also ruled on May 6, 1974

that interest was not recoverable on the back pay. Fitz-

gerald thus received no interest on monies which had been

wrongly withheld from him over a span of 514 years—

i.e. from the effective date of the wrongful firing which

denied him a salary, January 6, 1970, to the date of final

payment of back pay, June 19, 1975. He did not even

receive interest on the amounts of back pay which had

concededly been owing subsequent to the decision of the

Appeals Examiner.

After the Comptroller General’s decision denying inter-

est, Fitzgerald brought a lawsuit in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia to recover

interest on the monies which had been withheld. Fitz-

8

gerald claimed an entitlement to interest under the Back

Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. $§ 5596; under the Veterans Preference

Act, 5 U.S.C. $7701; and under 31 U.S.C. § 227, which

provides a method for dealing with final judgments

against the United States when the government claims an

offset on the ground that the judgment creditor is in-

debted to the United States.

The District Court held against Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald

v. Staats, 429 F. Supp. 933 (D.C.D.C., 1977). Citing

precedent from this Court, it ruled that, because the

Back Pay Act does not expressly provide for the payment

of interest, the Act does not contain an explicit waiver of

sovereign immunity and therefore does not authorize the

recovery of interest. It also held that 31 USC § 227 does

not authorize interest in this case because Fitzgerald had

obtained no judgment against the United States.

Fitzgerald then appealed to the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia. The Court of Ap-

peals, per Judges Lumbard (sitting by designation),

McGowan and MacKinnon, was highly sympathetic to

Fitzgerald’s plight, pointing out that this was “‘his latest

skirmish in his struggle” and that “[p]art of the history

of Fitzgerald’s battle” could be found in prior opinions.

Fitzgerald v. Staats, 578 F.2d 435, 4386 n.2 (C.A.D.C.,

1978). The Court was also warmly disposed towards the

merits of Fitzgerald’s case, saying in this regard that he

“undoubtedly deserves to be ‘made whole’ by the govern-

ment, and that it had “sympathy for Fitzgerald’s posi-

tion.” 578 F.2d at 440, 436. Indeed, the court even indi-

cated clearly that its preference would have been to de-

cide the case in Fitzgerald’s favor: in assessing Fitzger-

ald’s argument that the “ ‘make whole’” policy of the

Back Pay Act and the “corrective action” policy of the

Veterans Preference Act show the payability of what the

court termed “so natural and common a remedy as inter-

est,”’ the court said “were we free to decide whether the

policies of these remedial statutes called for the recovery

9

of interest, we might well agree with” Fitzgerald. 578

F.2d at 438.

However, the Court of Appeals believed it was not free

to act in accordance with its view of the justice and

merits of the case. “Despite our sympathy for Fitzger-

ald’s position”, it said, “‘we believe ourselves constrained

to affirm.” 578 F.2d at 436. And though it “might well

agree with” Fitzgerald “[wlere we free to” do so, the

court believed “we are not so free.” 578 F.2d at 438.

In explaining why it felt forced to reject Fitzgerald’s

argument that the Back Pay Act and Veterans Preference

Act authorized the payment of interest, the Court of Ap-

peals relied heavily on decisions of this Court holding

that, unless it is expressly waived, the doctrine of sov-

ereign immunity prevents suit against the United States.

The Court of Appeals relied in particular on this Court’s

ruling in United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel, 329

U.S. 585 (1947), that sovereign immunity bars the recov-

ery of interest against the United States unless a statute

provides for such recovery in express terms.

The Court of Appeals rejected Fitzgerald’s argument

under 31 U.S.C. § 227 on the ground that Fitzgerald was

not a judgment creditor and was not indebted to the

United States. 578 F.2d at 439.

The instant petition for certiorari seeks review of the

Court of Appeals decision. More specifically, review is

sought of the court’s ruling that the doctrine of sovereign

immunity bars the payment of interest under the Back

Pay Act.

REASONS FOR GRANTING A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I. THIS LAWSUIT RAISES ISSUES OF SUBSTAN-

TIAL PUBLIC IMPORTANCE

The Back Pay Act states that a government employee

who has “undergone an unjustified or unwarranted per-

sonnel action that has resulted in the withdrawal or re-

10

ductions of all or part of the pay, allowances or differen-

tials of the employee—(1) is entitled, on correction of the

personnel action, to receive for the period for which the

personnel action was im effect an amount equal to all or

any part of the pay, allowances, or differentials, as ap-

plicable, that the employee normally would have earned

during that period if the personnel action had not oc-

curred. ...” In providing that a wronged employee should

receive what he otherwise would have earned, the Act

evinces a clear congressional policy that an unlawfully

terminated employee should be made whole for any losses

he has suffered because of the wrongful termination.

In the courts below, Fitzg:rald argued that this make

whole policy of the Back Pay Act entitled him to receive

interest on the back pay which had been withheld from

him heeause he was wrongfully fired by the Air Force.

This legal argument is premised on the simple proposition

that, having lost the use of the monies over a span of

years, Fitzgerald cannot truly receive what he otherwise

would have earned and cannot be made whole unless he is

compensated by interest. The proposition that interest is

necessary to compensate for the lost use of monies and to

make a party whole is universally accepted in the Ameri-

can economy. It is obviously followed by the United States

Government itself, which demands that interest be paid to

it by persons who have withheld monies from it, such as

persons who have not paid the appropriate amount of

taxes or have paid them late. The validity of Fitzgerald’s

argument, and its plain basis, was not denied by the dis-

trict court, was not denied by the Court of Appeals—

which called interest “so natural and common a remedy”

—and was not even denied by the government. Rather,

Fitzgerald lost his argument for one reason only: the

doctrine of sovereign immunity. As previously indicated,

both lower courts held that, pursuant to precedents of this

Court, sovereign immunity blocks an award of interest

against the United States unless a statute provides in

express terms for the payment of interest.

A A een ne

11

The question which therefore arises is whether this

Court should continue to permit the judicially-created doc-

trine of sovereign immunity to prevent an award of in-

terest against the United States in cases where a statute

does not provide in express terms for the payment of

interest. It is Fitzgerald’s contention that the answer to

this question must necessarily be in the negative for three

reasons which are of such fundamental importance to

this nation that they inherently demonstrate that this

case raises issues of enormous consequence for the law

and the country.

The first reason is that, because it destroys the possi-

bility of recovery by citizens who have been grievously

and wrongfully injured by the government, sovereign

immunity is wholly incompatible with the most basic

concepts of a constitutional government operating under

the rule of law. In view of its inconsistency with basic

concepts underlying our structure of government, sov-

ereign immunity should no longer be allowed to bar such

recoveries.

Second, sovereign immunity is highly inconsistent with

decisions of this Court curtailing governmental immuni-

ties and decisions of the Court holding that courts must

fashion remedies to implement constitutional and statu-

tory rights. For this reason, also, sovereign immunity

should not be allowed to bar recoveries.

Third, even if the doctrine of sovereign immunity were

not to be wholly disposed of by this Court, the doctrine

is particularly inapplicable to the payment of interest on

statutory awards of back pay which has been wrongfully

withheld by government. This pronounced inapplicability

exists due to principles established by this Court regard-

ing ancijlary and traditional remedies. Thus sovereign

immunity should not bar the recovery of interest on back

pay even if the doctrine were to continue to bar recoveries

in other contexts.

12

II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS INCOMPATIBLE

WITH CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT EXIST-

ING UNDER THE RULE OF LAW

A. The Decision of This Court in United States v. Lee

Almost 100 years ago, in its “classic opinion” * in

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), this Court

recognized that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is

wholly inconsistent with fundamental concepts of Ameri-

can government. Sovereign immunity, said the Court,

was derived from England, where it had existed at

least from the time of King Edward I. 106 U.S. at 205.

Although it had been asserted in America, it “has never

been discussed or the reasons for it given.” 106 U.S. at

207. In analyzing the reasons for it, the Court pointed

out that the grounds which justified the doctrine in

England were entirely inapplicable to the United States

because of the “vast difference in the essential character

of the two governments as regards the source and the

depositories of power.” 106 U.S. at 208. England, said

the Court, is a “king-loving nation”, where “|t}he

crown remains the fountain of honor,” and “the monarch

is looked upon with too much reverence to be subjected

to the demands of law, as ordinary persons are.” But the

United States (which fought a revolution against rule by

a king) is entirely different:

Under our system the people, who are there called

subjects, are the sovereign. Their rights, whether

collective or individual, are not bound to give way to

a sentiment of loyalty to the person of a monarch.

The citizen here knows no person, however near to

those in power, or however pewerful himself, to

whom he need yield the rights which the law secures

to him when it is well administered. When he, in

* Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 165 at 178.

(Dissent of Rehnquist, J., discussing the opinion of Justice Miller

in the Slaughter House Cases.)

13

one of the courts of competent jurisdiction, has

established his right to property, there is no reason

why deference to any person, natural or artificial, not

even the United States, should prevent him from us-

ing the means which the law gives him for the pro-

tection and enforcement of that right. 106 U.S. at

208.

In England, where the courts are the king’s courts,

a suit against the government would involve “the ab-

surdity of the king’s sending a writ to himself to com-

mand the king to appear in the king’s court.” But, said

the Court, “[N]jo such reason exists in our government.”

106 U.S. at 206. “Nor can it be said the government is

degraded by appearing as a defendant.” Jd. And if it be

argued that suit against the government “would be in-

consistent with the very idea of supreme executive power,

and would endanger the performance of the publie duties

of the sovereign,” id., the clear answer is that “fa]s ne

person in this government exercises supreme executive

power, or performs the public duties of a sovereign, it is

difficult to see on what solid foundation of principle the

exemption from liability to suit rests.” 106 U.S. at 206.

Just as the Court believed the differences between Eng-

land and the United States militated heavily against’ the

doctrine of sovereign immunity, so too the Court believed

that sovereign immunity cannot be justified by any argu-

ment that evils will befall the nation if the government

is subject to suit. The history of the country was against

any such argument. Though the United States govern-

ment had existed “for now nearly a century under the

present constitution,” with the “principle and practice”

of judicial action against unlawful conduct by the United

States government being “well established,” “no injury

from it has come to that government.” 106 U.S. at 221.

Indeed, no harm from the judicial check against unlawful

conduct had befallen the government even though the

principle and practice of a such a check had existed over

14

a lengthy period during which the nation had been in-

volved in “at least two wars, so serious as to call into

exercise ali the powers a‘ all the resources of the gov-

ernment ... One of them was a great civil war, such

as the world has seldom known ....” Ibid. at 221-222.

Even aside from the history of the nation, the Court

was unwilling to countenance any argument positing that

calamities would arise if sovereign immunity were struck

down. For such arguments would destroy the system

of law.

Hypothetical cases of great evils may be suggested

by a particularly fruitful imagination in regard to

almost every law upon which depend the rights of

the individual or of the government, and if the ex-

istence of laws is to depend upon their capacity to

withstand such criticism, the whole fabric of the law

must fail.

To the Court in Lee, the evils to be feared were not

those imagined from an absence of sovereign immunity,

but the destruction of rights which accompanies sovereign

immunity.

Looking at the question upon principle, and apart

from the authority of adjudged cases, we think it

still clearer that this branch of the defence cannot

be maintained. It seems to be opposed to all the prin-

ciples upon which the rights of the citizen, when

brought in collision with the acts of the government,

must be determined. In such cases there is no safety

for the citizen, except in the protection of the

judicia] tribunals, for rights which have been in-

vaded by the officers of the government, professing

to act in its name... 106 U.S. at 219.

These provisions for the security of the rights of

the citizen stand in the Constitution in the same con-

nection and upon the same ground, as they regard

his liberty and his property. It cannot be denied that

both were intended to be enforced by the judiciary

15

as one of the departments of the government estab-

lished by that Constitution .... 106 U.S. at 220.

Courts of justice are established, not only to decide

upon the controverted rights of the citizens against

each other, but also upon rights in controversy be-

tween them and the government; and the docket of

this court is crowded with controversies of the latter

class.

Shall it be said, in the face of all this, and of the

acknowledged right of the judiciary to decide in

proper cases, statutes which have been passed by

both branches of Congress and approved by the Presi-

dent to be unconstitutional, that the courts cannot

give a remedy when the citizen has been deprived of

his property by force, his estate seized and converted

to the use of the government without lawful author-

ity, without process of law, and without compensa-

tion, because the President has ordered it and his

officers are in possession?

If such be the law of this country, it sanctions a

tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies

of Europe, nor in any other government which has a

just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protec-

tion of personal rights. 106 U.S. at 220-221.

B. This Court Should Return To the Teachings of Lee

The opinion in Lee was clearly correct, but in subse-

quent years, its teachings largely fell into desuetude. Sov-

ereign immunity was repeatedly invoked by the govern-

ment and upheld by this Court. E.g. United States v.

Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) ; United States v. Thayer-

West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585 (1947); United

States v. Alcea Band of Tiilamooks, et al., 341 U.S. 48

(1951); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969);

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1975). Rarely

were any reasons given for upholding it: rather, it usually

Was sustained as an ipsi dixit. It became, to borrow a

memorable phrase used by Justice Warren, a “talismanic

16

incantation [used] to support any exercise of . + + power

which can be brought within its ambit.” * United States

v. Robel, 389 US 258, 263 (1967).

Only on relatively infrequent occasions did the Court

depart from the doctrine. The Court did once acknowl-

edge that there could be substance In the argument that

sovereign immunity is an archaic hangover which should

be limited wherever possible in connection with suits for

damages, that Congress itself had increasingly permitted

damage suits, and that the Court should be hospitable to

this trend. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce

Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703-704 (1949). And Justice Frank-

furter did point out on various occasions that justice and

democratic notions of moral responsibility require that

the sovereign not be free of ordinary legal responsibility.

E.g. Larson Vv. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.,

ibid., at 708-709, 723-724, 723 n.13 (dissenting opinion

of Justice Frankfurter). But for the most part, though

sovereign immunity is a judge-made doctrine which could

be curbed by judges, the Court left it entirely to the Con-

gress to make inroads upon the doctrine. Perhaps the

only broad inroad made by this Court itself was its hold-

ing in Dugan v. Rank, 372 US 609 (1963), that sov-

ereign immunity will not apply when an official’s action

is in excess of his statutory powers or, though within his

statutory powers, the powers themselves, or the manner

of their exercise, are constitutionally void. However,

while this inroad has the estimable virtue of at least re-

moving the bar of sovereign immunity where an official

has no power or the Constitution is violated, it does not

touch the host of cases in which government wrongly in-

jures citizens by actions which are within statutory

powers and not constitutionally void. The present litiga-

‘ The invocation and upholding of the doctrine became so routine

that, as is known to any lawyer having much experience with the

doctrine, the go. ernment long has used virtual “canned briefs” when

invoking it.

17

tion, in which government has denied interest to Fitz-

gerald, is one example of such cases.

Fitzgerald submits that the time has come when this

Court should no longer permit the invocation of sovereign

immunity, but should instead return to the wisdom of

United States v. Lee, and extend the inroad of Dugan Vv.

Rank, by ruling that sovereign immunity cannot bar suit

against unlawful governmental action regardless of

whether or not the illegal action happens to fit the cate-

gory of being in excess of statutory powers or constitu-

tionally void. The desirability of returning to Lee and

extending Dugan is made manifest by the kinds of his-

torical experiences which led to efforts to create a consti-

tutional government under the rule of law, and which

have never ceased to occur in this nation or in the world

at large. Historical experience has shown, time and time

again, and no less in the last fifteen years than at other

times, that the preservation of liberty and democracy

depends upon the existence of checks against the illegal

use of governmental power. History has shown the con-

tinuing soundness, in Justice Frankfurter’s words, of the

views of the “long-headed statesmen” who framed the

Constitution with “no illusion that our people enjoyed

biological or psychological or sociologica! immunities from

the hazards” of illegal power. Youngstown Sheet and Tube

Co. Vv. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1950) (Justice Frank-

furter concurring). History has shown and continues

to show the wisdom of the Lee case in ruling that “there

is no safety for the citizen, except in the protection of the

judicial tribunals, for rights which have been invaded by

officers of the government, professing to act in its name.”

106 U.S. 219.

This Court is, of course, free to implement the wisdom

of Lee. Precedents upholding sovereign immunity do not

bar the Court from doing so. As the Court recently said

in overruling the mistaken doctrine of municipal im-

munity from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C.

18

$1983, even when “Congress can correct our mistakes

through legislation . . . we have never applied stare

decisis mechanically to prohibit overruling an earlier de-

cision. . . Nor is this a case where we should place on

the shoulders of Congress the burden of the Court’s own

error’. Monell v. Department of Social Services of the

City of New York, 46 L.W. 4569, decided June 8, 1978,

O.T. 1977, at p. 4579. This teaching is as applicable here

as it was in Monell, as is shown by the many parallels

between the two cases on matters which were controlling

in Monell on the question whether prior precedent should

be overruled. Those parallels on controlling matters in-

clude the following:

Here, as in Monell, the doctrine at issue is judge-made

and therefore can properly be overruled by judges. In

both cases, the doctrine was a departure from precedent

‘i.e., from Lee in the present case). In both cases, Con-

gress refused to extend the doctrine and in fact enacted

legislation to diminish it. Indeed, in the present case,

Congressional inroads are broader than in Monell, since

here the federal tort claims act waives sovereign im-

munity and permits recovery for a variety of actions,

whereas in Monell Congress had merely legislated to

provide for recovery of attorneys fees.

Here, as in Monell, the government can claim no

absolute immunity and cannot arrange its affairs on the

assumption that it can violate rights at will, since not

only has Congress made inroads on sovereign immunity,

but this Court itself has made an important departure

from it in Dugan v. Rank. Here, as in Monell, Con-

gressional history clearly indicates that Congress does

not favor the doctrine at issue, as illustrated by Con-

gressional inroads, and as was effectively acknowledged

by the Court in Larson when it pointed out that Con-

gress had increasingly allowed damage suits against the

United States. And here, as was true in Monell, the

doctrine at issue conflicts with other important lines of

19

precedent established by this Court, as will be showa

below.

Finally, not only is this Court free to return to the

wisdom of Lee, but principles of sound decision-making

clearly indicate that it should do so. In a concurring

opinion in Monell, Justice Powell said, quoting in part

from a famous comment made by Justice Holmes, that

“the law has recognized the necessity of change, lest

rules ‘simply persist from blind imitation of the past.’ ”

46 L.W. 4583 n.6. Holmes’ full comment, of course, was

that “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule

of law than that so it was laid down in the time of

Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds

upon which it was laid down have vanished long since

and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the

past. Holmes’ The Path of The Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev.

457, 459 (1897). The doctrine of sovereign immunity

continues to exist only because “so it was laid down in

the time of” King Edward I, and only because of “imita-

tion of the past.” Its original grounds “have vanished

long since” and it cannot be justified on any ground that

will withstand analysis. To the contrary, it is condemned

by the lessons of history and the fundamental precepts of

our government. Thus, because the Court’s decisions are

open to discussion when . . . supposed to have been founded

in error, and... its judicial authority should hereafter

depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by

which it is supported,” Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7

How.) 283, 470 (1849) (per Taney, C.J.), and because

“(t]he Court bows to the lessons of experience and

the force of better reasoning,’ ” Edelman v. Jordan, 415

U.S. 651, 671 n.14, quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil and

Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 408 (1932) (dissenting opinion

of Justice Brandeis), the Court should consign sovereign

immunity to the discard heap of history, where it belongs.

20

III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS INCONSISTENT WITH

DECISIONS OF THIS COURT INVOLVING GOV-

ERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES AND THE AWARDING

OF REMEDIES, AND, IN LIGHT OF PRINCIPLES

REGARDING ANCILLARY AND TRADITIONAL

REMEDIES, IS PARTICULARLY INAPPLICABLE

TO AWARDS OF INTEREST ON BACK PAY

A. Sovereign Immunity Conflicts with Cases Which

Have Curtailed Governmental Immunities

In a series of cases decided in recent years, this Court

has repeatedly struck down or greatly restricted im-

munities which protected governments and governmental

officials from suits alleging violations of statutory and

constitutional rights. Butz v. Economou, 46 U.W. 4952,

decided June 29, 1978, O.T. 1977; Hutto v. Finney, 46

L.W. 4817. decided June 23, 1978, O.T. 1977; Monell v.

Department of Social Services, supra; Fitzpatrick Vv.

Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Edelman V. Jordan, 415

U.S. 651 (1974). The continued existence of sovereign

immunity for the federal government is inconsistent with

this line of decisions.

Three of the cases actually involved sovereign im-

munity: they dealt with the sovereign immunity of

states. Hutto v. Finney, supra; Fitzpatrick. v. Bitzer,

supra, Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The states’ sovereign

immunity, unlike that of the federal government, is

possessed by virtue of a specific constitutional clause, the

Eleventh Amendment, rather than by virtue of mere ju-

dicial creation. But though the Court was dealing with

sovereign immunity existing under an express provision

of the Constitution, in all three cases it ruled that the

immunity could not bar recovery. In Edelman vy. Jordan

the Court held that the claimed sovereign immunity did

not preclude the recovery of prospective damages from

state government for a violation of rights existing under

a federal statute and regulations. In Fitzpatrick v.

21

Bitzer, where Congress had enforced the Fourteenth

Amendment by enacting a statute granting substantive

rights, providing for suit, and providing for attorneys

fees, the Court held that the claimed sovereign immunity

did not bar the recovery of prospective damages and

attorneys fees for a violation of the rights existing under

the statute. And in Hutto v. Finney the Court held that

the alleged sovereign immunity could not bar the recovery

of attorneys fees from state government for district

court litigation in which state officials had in bad faith

failed to follow court orders enforcing constitutional

rights, and for appellate court litigation as to which the

attorneys fees were authorized by Congress.

: A fourth case, Monell v. Department of Social Serv-

ices, struck down a claim of municipal immunity from

damages for violations of federal statutory rights. The

fifth case, Butz v. Economou, curtailed the absolute im-

munity of federal officials, when not acting in a judicial

or prosecutorial capacity, for knowing and deliberate

violations of constitutional rights.

These cases, in which governmental immunities were

abolished or restricted, demonstrate that the continued

existence of sovereign immunity for the federal govern-

ment is in conflict with the clear trend of authority in

this Court. Moreover, it is difficult to grasp why federal

sovereign immunity should continue to stand when state

sovereign immunity repeatedly falls. Principles appli-

cable to the governmental immunities of states are ap-

plicable as well to the governmenta! immunities of the

federal government, as was made explicitly clear by

numerous statements of the Court in Butz v. Economou.’

s In Butz v. Economou, the Court said that decisions on state im-

munities are “instructive” on federal! immunities, and relied heavily

on such decisions in determining federal immunities. 49 L. W. at

4957. It said that it could “see no sense” in holding state officials

liable, but immunizing their exact federal counterparts. 46 L. W. at

4958, 4958-59. It pointed out that any relevant problems facing state

22

Thus it is evident that, since state sovereign immunity

has had to fall in order to insure “ ‘the very essence of

civil liberty, [which] consists in the right of every in-

dividual to claim the protection of the laws,’” so too

federal sovereign immunity must also fall. Butz v. Econo-

mou, supra, at 4954.

B. Sovereign Immunity Is In Confiict With Decisions

Holding That Courts Must Fashion Appropriate

Remedies In Order To Protect Rights

In addition to being incompatible with the line of au-

thority curtailing governmental immunities, sovereign

immunity conflicts with a line of decisions holding that

courts must fashion remedies necessary to protect citizens’

rights. These decisions establish that

where federally protected rights have been invaded,

it has been the rule from the beginning that courts

will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant

the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that

where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal

statute provides for a general right to sue for such

invasion, federal courts may use any available rem-

edy to make good the wrong done. Bell v. Hood, 327

US 678 at 684 (1946), quoted in Sullivan v. Little

Hunting Park, 329 US 229 at 239 (1969).

The line of cases enunciating this rule include well known

decisions implementing constitutional rights, Bell V.

Hood, supra, Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics

officials “are little if at all different from those affecting federal offi-

cials”. 46 L. W. at 4958. It said that in the absence of contrary direc-

tions from Congress, it was “untenable to draw a distinction for

purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state

officials under $ 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-

tion against federal officials.” 46 L. W. at 4959. And it ruled that

“To create a system in which the Bill of Rights more closely moni-

tors the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials

is to stand the constitutional design on its head.” 46 L. W. at 4959.

23

Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and other well known de-

cisions implementing rights granted by statute, Jones

v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414 n. 13 (1968); Sullivan

v. Little Hunting Park, supra. In these decisions, this

Court has not shied away from allowing monetary re-

covery since “|hJistorically damages have been regarded

as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal in-

terests in liberty.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal

Narcotics Agents, supra, 403 U.S. at 395. See also

Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, supra. And the Court

has been cognizant that remedies must be provided for

violations of law because “[a]n agent acting—albeit

unconstitutionally—in the name of the United States

possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an in-

dividual trespasser exercising no authority other than

his own. Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. at 392.

It is clear that sovereign immunity runs athwart of

the foregoing line of cases, since the cases are intended

to protect rights by awarding a remedy, whereas sover-

eign immunity denies protection of rights by denying a

remedy. The existence of precisely this type of confli :

was addressed by the Court in Butz v. Economou, when

it pointed out that “the cause of action recognized in

Bivens . . . would similarly be ‘drained of meaning’ if

federal officials were entitled to absolute immunity for

their constitutional transgressions,’ 46 L.W. at 4959,

and consequently refused to uphold absolute - immunity

lest a lawsuit “provide no redress to the injured citizen,

nor... in any degree deter federal officials from com-

mitting constitutional wrongs.” 46 L.W. at 4959-60. As

in Butz v. Economou, the Court in the present case should

address the conflict between a line of authority holding

that courts should fashion remedies to uphold rights,

and a doctrine of immunity which nullifies rights by

denying remedies. And, as it also did in Butz v. Econo-

24

moi, the Court should strike down the immunity in order

to provide redress and deter wrongdoing.*

C. Because of Principles Established by this Court

Regarding Ancillary and Traditional Remedies,

Sovereign Immunity Is Particularly Inapplicable to

Awards of Interest on Back Pay

1. Interest On Back Pay Is An Ancillary Remedy

Sovereign immunity is not only inconsistent with the

cases discussed above, but, under principles of this Court

regarding ancillary and traditional remedies, is particn-

larly inapplicable to awards of interest on back pay. In

curtailing the doctrine of state sovereign immunity in the

Edelman and Hutto cases, supra, this Court held that sov-

ereign immunity will not bar a particular remedy which

is ancillary to another remedy whose grant is within the

power of a court. Hutto v. Finney, 46 L.W. at 4820-21;

Edeiman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 667-669. Moreover, while

the consequences to the governmental fise have been of

6 There are. of course, numerous rights whose vindication is still

barred by sovereign immunity even though Congress has made in-

roads upon the doctrine and the Court itself made an inroad in

Duganv. Rank. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 46 L. W. 4959 n. 31.

Statutory rights as to which Congress has not expressly waived

sovereign immunity are a major category of rights which receive

no vindication against governmental invasion. Indeed this major

category is exemplified by this very case, since here government has

refused, on the basis of sovereign immunity, to pay Fitzgerald the

interest necessary to fulfill his statutory right to be made whole.

It is also possible that even some constitutional rights may be

jeopardized by sovereign immunity, since the specific reach and

application of Dugan v. Rank has not been sufficiently if at all

delineated in litigation.

It should be noted that lawsuits against government officials

themselves do not provide redress for the rights jeopardized by

sovereign immunity. For even when federal officials have no per-

sonal immunity, they will lack the personal means necessary to pay

damage awards. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 673; opinion of

Justice Rehnquist, concurring in part and dissenting in part in

Butz v. Economou, 46 L. W. at 4963.

25

concern to the Court in determining whether a remedy is

permissible despite sovereign immunity, Hutto v. Fin-

ney, 46 L.W. at 4821 n. 11; Edelman v. Jordan, 415

U.S. at 665-667; the Court specifically noted in Hutto

that permissible “‘[a]ncillary costs may be very large

indeed,” having exceeded $6 million in one case decided

by the Court. Hutto v. Finney, 46 L.W. at 4820, n.17.

The Court also stressed in Hutto that an ancillary remedy

is appropriate, despite sovereign immunity, when the

government has acted in bad faith. For in such a case,

the ancillary award is necessary to insure compliance

with law and to compensate for bad faith non compliance.

Under these principles, the doctrine of sovereign im-

munity cannot bar the recovery of interest on back pay

which has been wrongfully withheld.’ The recovery of in-

terest is merely ancillary to the award of back pay itself,

whose grant is within the power of the appropriate tri-

bunals because Congress has created a statutory right to

it. The recovery of interest, moreover, will not injure

the federal fise because, in the usual case, by far the

preponderant portion of the overall award will consist of

the back pay expressly authorized by Congress, with the

interest being only a smal! part of the award.” And even

if an improbable case were to arise in which interest

were to have mounted to the point where it overshadowed

7 It may be noted that, because of the make whole policy of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 72 Stat. 253, as amended, 42

U.S.C. 2000e et seq.—-the same policy implemented by the Back

Pay Act—inteerst is granted as a matter of course on awards

of back pay under Title VII. Willett v. Emory and Henry College,

427 F.Supp. 631 (1977) (W.D. Va.), aff’d 529 F.2d 212 (C.A. 4,

1978); Davis v. Jobs For Progress, Inc., 427 F.Supp. 479 (1976);

Tidweli.v. American Oil Co., 332 F.Supp. 424 (1971); see Pettway

v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 491 F.2d 211 (1974) (C.A. 5);

peso American Express Warehouse, 274 F.2d 573 (1967)

te This is true in the present case even though the government

withheld back pay from Fitzgerald for many years.

26

the amount of back pay itself, this would likely be due

to a very lengthy course of bad faith conduct by which

officials long refused to pay an employee the monies due

him.”

2. Interest Is A Traditional Remedy

In Hutto v. Finney this Court, speaking of an award

of costs of suit, pointed out that state sovereign im-

munity granted by the Eleventh Amendment does not bar

a form of recovery which has “traditionally been

awarded.” 46 L.W. at 4821. Like costs of suit, interest

is a form of recovery which has “traditionally been

awarded.” It was indeed called “so natural and common

a remedy” by the Court of Appeals. The government it-

self demands interest on monies owed to it, and can

hardly complain if it must in turn pay interest on money

which it owes to citizens,'’ especially citizens who have

been denied a living by the wrongful withholding of their

pay. If the government can refuse with impunity to pay

interest to citizens whose pay has been wrongly with-

held, then in practical effect it has received an interest

free loan from these citizens by illegally denying them

the monies necessary to support themselves and their

* During the course of this bad faith conduct, moreover, as well as

where there was no bad faith, the government would have had the

use of the money at statutory rates of interest which are normally

much less than the rate of interest the government would have had

to pay in the open market.

0In a famous comment quoted by the Court of Appeals in this

case, this Court, per Justice Holmes, said that citizens ‘“‘must turn

square corners when they deal with the Government.” Rock Island,

Arkansas & Louisiana RR v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).

Since in this nation the government was instituted and exists for

the benefit of the citizens, instead of the other way ‘round, it is hard

to understand why the government should not equally have to turn

square corners when dealing with citizens. If citizens must pay

interest to government on monies they owe to it, but government

need not pay interest to citizens on money it owes to them, then it is

obvious the government is not turning square corners when dealing

with the citizens.

dm eee me

27

families. For the government, as a practical matter, to

secure an interest free loan in this way is wholly repre-

hensible if not worse, and it can hardly be thought that

Congress intended to authorize such conduct when it

passed the Back Pay Act. Rather, the more logical (not

to say moral) reading of the act is that it represents a

Congressional waiver of any sovereign immunity which

might otherwise bar the payment of interest."

Ill. THIS CASE ILLUSTRATES NUMEROUS OF THE

REASONS WHY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY SHOULD

BE OVERRULED OR AT LEAST SHOULD BE

RULED INAPPLICABLE TO RECOVERY OF IN-

TEREST ON BACK PAY

The foregoing discussion makes clear that there are

numerous reasons why this Court should grant this pe-

tition for certiorari and either overrule the doctrine of

sovereign immunity in its entirety or at least rule it

inapplicable to the recovery of interest on back pay. The

appropriateness of granting this petition is further en-

hanced because the facts of this case provide a paradigm

illustration of so many of the reasons for ruling that

sovereign immunity can no longer bar recoveries or at

least cannot bar recovery of interest on awards of back

pay.

First, this case presents an unfortunately classic ex-

ample of governmental efforts to lawlessly destroy the

rights of a citizen. Fitzgerald, an outstanding employee

who was performing exemplary publie service, was sub-

jected to governmental ostracism and was fired for rea-

sons which were illegal. After he was unlawfully fired,

This reading of Congress’ intent is also supported by the fact

that Congress’ ability to carry out its constitutional functious will

be hampered if the government can visit illegal retribution upon em-

ployees who lawfully give Congress information it needs to carry

out its functions, and can then invoke sovereign immunity to bar

recoveries by these employees.

28

a government agency sought to suppress information

about his case by holding closed hearings in violation of

due process. After judicially ordered open hearings were

held and a decision was rendered, the government re-

fused to follow a lawful order to reinstate Fitzgerald to

an appropriate position, and also refused for a long

period to pay him money which was owed to him, even

money which concededly was owed to him. The govern-

ment also refused to pay him attorneys fees or interest,

and has forced him to fight a legal battle which is al-

ready over eight years old in order to obtain justice.

The government has been rebuked on several occasions

by federal district courts and federal courts of appeal,

but this has not dissuaded it from its course of resist-

ance to law—a course of action during which it has in-

voked sovereign immunity to bar various forms of

recovery.

Second, the claim of immunity being made here not

only conflicts with the teaching of recent cases on gov-

ernmental immunities, but is being used to deny a remedy

necessary to enforce the Congressionally granted right

of an unlawfully fired employee to be made whole for

his losses.

Third, the remedy of interest being sought here is

ancillary to the main remedy of back pay, is a traditional

remedy, is a remedy obtained by the government itself,

and will work no harm to the fise. Indeed, it will aid the

fisc because it will be a step towards insuring that gov-

ernment employees will be able to lawfully inform Con-

gress of enormous wastes of money * without fearing dev-

astating retaliation that will jeopardize their livelihood.

12 Fitzgerald warned Congress of a $2 billion cost overrun. Since

it is often pointed out that the work of the federal judiciary would

be greatly facilitated if the courts were allotted an extra amount of

money equal to the cost of a single destroyer, the mind staggers at

the beneficial results which could arise if the government were to

save $2 billion by avoiding an unnecessary cost overrun.

29

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this petition for certiorari

should be granted.

JOHN BODNER, JR.

LAWRENCE R. VELVEL

1730 Pennsylvania

Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

RALPH J. TEMPLE

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION FOUNDATION

1345 E Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

October, 1978

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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