Jurisdictional Statement — Borough of Fox Chapel v. Friday

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gn the

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1978

No. 72. :

| Pa.

BOROUGH OF FOX CHAPEL.

WILLIAM A. JONES and KATHERINE P. JONES,

HAROLD H. HAMMER and HANNAH R. HAMMER,

Appellants

VS.

JOHN A. FRIDAY,

Respondent

On APPEAL From THE SuPREME Court or PENNSYLVANIA

Jurisdictional Statement

A. Bruce BowpEN

Larry E. Copiorr

BUCHANAN, INGERSOLL.

RODEWALD, KYLE & BUERGER

57th Floor, 600 Grant St.

Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219

Attorneys for Appellants

Financial Press Corporation, Pittsburgh

=

INDEX

Page

Se EO sone can usdlns pouk os eecAZh enue l

ee a oan baud a Geass ok wa ooee cou aA 2

ADDITIONAL GROUNDS OF JURISDICTION ..... 3

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

Peery CTE CPO VE WEED <5 cee ccecvencerevesses 3

APU eeree ee PEED ohisc ic bac ike Convuavecnes 4

Ee E Ce CO Gi oe ceccdcnchesnves 5

HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS WERE

RAISED AND DECIDED BELOW................ 8

THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS ARE

Pe an knonn cea hen pecKee Rekwhae res 10

I. The Lower Court's Order Affirmed on Appeal

Compelling the Zoning Officer of the Borough

of Fox Chapel to Issue a Building Permit to the

Respondent is a Usurpation of the Legislative

Portion of the “Police Power” Sanctioned by

Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §$11011 (Purdon), but

Repugnant to the Constitution of the United

TN ese is ha hn dd ns Kae eke eee eeeee 10)

Il. The Courts of Pennsylvania Held the Zoning

Ordinance of Fox Chapel Borough Unconstitu-

tional Because of an Erroneous Interpretation

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of

the United States Constitution. .............. 15

eR | en ee eee Pree rT es Pres

Appendix

Opinion and Order of the Court of Common Pleas of

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, at S.A. 96 of 1976 on

NE Te I vos. scan sc daccncctsvccusactues la

ii Index

Page

Opinion and Order of the Court of Common Pleas of

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, at $.A. 96 of 1976 on

January 11, 1977, modifying the Order entered Sep-

Sent D FGTO occ cawncctccccvesetaeseaseneusses 12a

Opinion and Order of the Commonwealth Court of

Pennsylvania at Nos. 158 and 303 C.D. 1977 on Jan-

ary DIGITS oc cteirencckovverecsnsesesesccvcens 15a

Order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at No.

1514 Allocatur Docket on July 21, 1978.00... eee 22a

Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United

NUE ace careceeC Asa eesiek the nsepeteasemeeees 23a

TABLE OF CITATIONS iii

Cases

Page

Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 Lg 5 en 13

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)....... 10, 12, 19, 20

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 13 (1971)............... 3

Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765

POE Ay Ci ea Cai cua kaos bas Chak i cs chereccce. 17

Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant,

ee a nn 3

Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US.

MIS wa Bien Sis Se et ese kk o's 6 vk hacen ck. 19

Eller v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 1,

BOO PAM UP TEUED hcccndcnsevnnaniesececccce, 16

Ellick v. Board of Supervisors of Worcester Twyp.,

17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975)...... 13

Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 359 (1926) ..... 11, 16, 17

Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,

425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967) .........ccccccce. 19

Flournoy v. Weiner, 321 U.S. 253 (1944) .............. 3

Frost v. Los Angeles, 181 Cal. 22, 183 Pac. 342

UR aiekin a Ueatec a treet res vie kook vel. ll

Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395

ile eae ee te cer eee: < 9, 15, 16, 17, 19

Gloriso Appeal, 413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668 (1964) ...... 16

Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909) ........... 1]

Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) .........00c cece 17

Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954) ....19

National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Twp.

Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d

MRGUN Sea vet cert er ulate Cou ek aps cin 16

is Table of Citations

In the

Page Supreme Court of the Wnited States

Niemann v. Hewitt, 387 F.Supp. 926

(WD. Pa. FOGG ook ccaccaveses oc4eeneeeeeeea 7 October Term, 1978

Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) 2... cece ee eee 17

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Check, 259 U.S. 530 (1922) ...... 3 No.

Reed vo. Reed. 404 U.S. Ti CUTE) vce ne daudeusesiean 1S ts cea =

Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S, 412 (1920) ....18 BOROUGH OF FOX CHAPEL,

WILLIAM A. JONES and KATHERINE P. JONES,

Surrick ». Zoning Hearing Board of the Twp. of HAROLD H. HAMMER and HANNAH R. HAMMER.

Upper Providence, —— Pa. ——, 382 A.2d 105

(BOTT) . ccc ccccécesbuse suas saanre ene 16, 17 Appellants

Texas & N.O.R.R. Co. v. Miller, VS.

S91 U.S. 468 (IGRT) vc picnsccddavesuceeeuee eee 13 JOHN A. FRIDAY,

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 18, 20 eae

Zacht v. King, 300. U.S. ¥i4 CIGRE) oncccecqesnccancasas i]

STATUTES

On APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME CourRT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellate Jurisdiction Act

$6 U.S.C. ORR) «ic ccnaweebenesesasenaaneaeen 2

$B U.S.C. SISSIES) occu cctcestcetscesecscepasous 3 Jurisdictional Statement

Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code

Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805 Art. I,

$601; Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §10601

(PerGGe) «ov isuccdsvesne sever tenes + aaa 1] OPINIONS BELOW

Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, Art. VI, The following opinions and orders are printed in the

§604; Pa. Stat. ANN, tit. 53, §10604 | Appendix to this statement:

(Purdon) ....eceseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee cette eeenees 12 1. Opinion and Order of the Court of Common Pleas of

8 Act of June 1, 1972, P.L. 333, No. 93, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, at S.A. 96 of 1976 dated

$1011; Pa. Star. Ann. tit. 53, $1101] September 9, 1976.

(PUES «0c cinta coda eee 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14

2. Opinion and Order of the Court of Common Pleas of

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, at S.A. 96 of 1976 dated

January 11, 1977, modifying the Order entered September 9,

1976.

a oon

to

Jurisdiction

3. Opinion and Order of the Commonwealth Court of

Pennsylvania, at Nos. 158 and 303 C.D. 1977 dated January 9,

1978, 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 256, 381 A.2d 504.

4. Order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at No.

i514 Allocatur Docket dated July 21, 1978.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1257(2), this being an appeal which draws into ques-

tion the validity, as applied in this case, of Act of June 1, 1972,

P.L. 333, No. 93, §1011, Pa Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §11011

(Purdon), infra., p. 3, on the grounds that it is repugnant to

the Constitution of the United States.

Respondent sought a building permit to construct a 181-

unit apartment building on his property zoned for single

family residential structures, and sought a declaration that

appellant Fox Chapel’s zoning ordinance was unconstitu-

tional because it zoned no portion of the municipality for

such structures. The court of first instance declared appel-

lant Fox Chapel’s zoning ordinance unconstitutional for that

reason. The Zoning Officer of the appellant, Borough of Fox

Chapel, was thereafter ordered by the court of first instance

to issue a building permit to the respondent. On appeal, the

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania on January 9, 1978,

affirmed the lower court's order, holding that said order was

sanctioned by Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon).

Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

for Allowance of Appeal from Commonwealth Court of

Pennsylvania; however, appellants’ petition was denied

without opinion on July 21, 1978. Timely notice of appeal to

this court was filed in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsy]-

vania on September 25, 1978. As the Commonwealth Court

of Pennsylvania explicitly rejected appellant's challenge to

Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon), this matter is appro-

Additional Crounds of Jurisdiction & 3

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

priately brought to this Court by appeal. Cohen v. Califor-

nia, 403 U.S. 13 (1971); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v.

Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921).

ADDITIONAL GROUNDS OF JURISDICTION

The appellants also contend that the judgment below is

founded on other erroneous interpretations of the United

States Constitution which involve questions not subject to

review by this Court on appeal. In particular, the courts of

Pennsylvania have misconstrued the due process provisions

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution. These errors are included in the state-

ment of the questions presented by the appeal, hereinafter

set forth. If these were the only errors complained of, the

appellants would be limited to a petition for writ of certio-

rari under 28 U.S.C. §1257(3). They are included in this

appeal under the authority of Prudential Insurance Co. v.

Check, 259 U.S. 530, 547 (1922), and Flournoy v. Weiner, 321

U.S. 253, 263 (1944).

CONSTITUTIONAL and STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

This case also involves Act of June 1, 1972, P.L. 333, No.

93, $1011, Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon) which

states:

(1) In a zoning appeal the court shall have power to

declare any ordinance or map invalid and to set aside or

modify any action, decision or order of the governing

body, agency or officer of the municipality brought up

on appeal.

(2) If the court finds that an ordinance or map or a

decision or order thereunder which has been brought up

tor review unlawfully prevents or restricts a develop-

4 Questions Presented

ment or use which has been described by the landowner

through plans and other materials submitted to the

governing body, agency or officer of the municipality

whose action or failure to act is in question on the

appeal, it may order the described development or use

approved as to all elements or it may order it approved

as to some elements and refer other elements to the

governing body, agency or officer having jurisdiction

thereof for further proceedings, including the adoption

of alternative restrictions, in accordance with the court's

opinion and order.

The court shall retain jurisdiction of the appeal during

the pendency of any such further proceedings and may,

upon motion of the landowner, issue such supplemen-

tary orders as it deems necessary to protect the rights of

the landowner as declared in its opinion and order.

(3) The fact that the plans and other materials

referred to in subsection (1) are not ina form or are not

accompanied by other submissions which are required

for final approval of the development or use in question

or for the issuance of permits shall not prevent the court

from granting the definitive relief authorized in subsec-

tion (2) and the court may act upon preliminary or

sketch plans by framing its decree to take into account

the need for further submissions before final approval is

granted.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the remedy ordered by the courts below

pursuant to Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon) is a judi-

cial usurpation repugnant to the Constitution of the United

States of the legislature’s portion of the “police power.”

2. Whether the courts of Pennsylvania in construing the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution have

erroneously restricted and held unconstitutional the legiti-

mate exercise of the “police power” by a local municipality.

A

Statement of the Case

ut

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Borough of Fox Chapel is located in northeastern

Allegheny County, approximately twelve miles from Pitts-

burgh’s Golden Triangle. The terrain in Fox Chapel Borough

is hilly, made up of slopes, valleys and streams. The

Borough's unique character, and its attractiveness to resi-

dents and prospective residents, stem from its natural rural

character, typified by a watershed contained within the

Borough, winding roads following the contours of the land,

wooded areas, open space (called “parkways”) along major

roads, and low population density. As a green space, the

Borough is an environmental asset to Allegheny County.

Wildlife and vegitation are protected in the Borough's 190-

acre park system. These characteristics of the Borough and

similar areas enhance the ability of the Pittsburgh area to

attract industry and high quality professionals who serve

industry so that the residential and environmental quality of

Fox Chapel Borough is beneficial to the total economy of the

Pittsburgh area.

Fox Chapel’s present zoning is based upon the 1963

Comprehensive Plan prepared by the Pittsburgh Regional

Planning Association. The Plan recommended the protec-

tion and continuation of the Borough’s unique quality result-

ing from its spacious character of development. These

recommendations are reflected in Ordinance No. 319,

enacted in 1971, which states the following objectives:

(1) To preserve the character of Fox Chapel as a

spacious, suburban, residential community.

(2) To preserve land areas of particular scenic, geo-

logical or botanical interest as permanent open space.

(3) To minimize pollution of the environment by

objectional noise, vibrations, smoke, fumes, odors,

harsh lights, solid wastes and liquid borne effluents.

6 - Statement of the Case

(4) To assure that all residential construction meets

adeq: ate standards with respect to light, air, fire protec-

tion, and other desirable qualities to ensure a safe,

wholesome residential environment for every resident

of Fox Chapel.

(5) To assure that institutions in the Borough pro-

vide sufficient off-street parking space to render on-

street parking normally unnecessary.

(6) To create a safe, free-flowing traffic circulation

pattern.

(7) To assure that aH development promotes fire

safety by employing safe practices and by providing

adequate site accessibility to fire equipment.

On March 25, 1974, John A. Friday, Jr., filed an applica-

tion asking the Fox Chapel Borough Zoning Hearing Board

to hear his challenges to Fox Chapel’s Zoning Ordinance.

Mr. Friday challenged the failure of the Ordinance to pro-

vide for multi-family dwellings and the inclusion of his 23

acre tract in the Class A Residence District, providing for sin-

gle family dwellings. As last amended, Mr. Friday’s applica-

tion proposed a five-story building containing 181 “luxury”

apartments with floor areas approximating 1,500 square feet

per unit. y

Fox Chapel Borough's Zoning Hearing Board began to

hear testimony on December 12, 1974, after a three judge

panel denied a request by Mr. and Mrs. Harold Hammer and

others that the Fox Chapel Zoning Board be enjoined from

conducting any proceedings concerning the Friday applica-

tion. The Hammers and their co-plaintiffs argued, inter alia,

that Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon) was unconstitu-

tional because it required the courts to sit as super zoning

boards, but the merits of this argument were not reached

since the panel held that the plaintiffs failed to show “irrep-

Statement of the Case 7

arable injury” in the absence of judicial intervention. Nei-

mann v. Hewitt, 987 F.Supp. 926 (W.D.Pa. 1974). Twenty-

four sessions of the Zoning Hearing Board were held to

consider the Friday applications, and the testimony con-

cluded on November 5, 1975. The Zoning Hearing Board

found that the structure proposed by Mr. Friday would be

incompatible with existing single family use and totally out

of character with the Borough of Fox Chapel from the points

of view of aesthetics, density, environment and planning. In

addition to these concerns, the Zoning Hearing Board noted

the following:

1. The Borough’s roads, and in particular Fairview Road

upon which the Friday property fronts, were not ade-

quate to handle the kind of traffic generated by high-

rise apartments.

2. Fox Chapel’s volunteer firemen have no equipment

which would be adequate to rescue residents from

upper floors of a multi-story apartment building.

3. The Friday tract contains soft impermeable soil

which presents a great risk of landslide. This risk would

be reduced by development of the site in single-family

dwellings.

4. The sewage treatment facilities proposed by Mr. Fri-

day fail to meet either local or state standards.

On January 16, 1976, Mr. Friday took an appeal from

the decision of the Fox Chapel Zoning Hearing Board to the

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Permission to

intervene as appellees was granted to Mr. and Mrs. William

A. Jones and Mr. and Mrs. Hammer in July, 1976, and to the

Borough of Fox Chapel on September 2, 1976.

The Court of Common Pleas decided the matter on the

record made before the Zoning Hearing Board and the

S How the Federal Questions were Raised

and Decided Below

briefs submitted by the parties. On September 9, 1976,

Judge Watson, speaking for the Court, found the Borough of

Fox Chapel’s Zoning Ordinance of 1971 “unconstitutional to

the extent that it prohibits apartment building construction

in the Borough of Fox Chapel” (p. lla), and ordered the

Borough of Fox Chapel to “take immediate steps to revise its

zoning ordinances to provide for apartment buildings” (id).

Petitions to modify the Court's Opinion and Order were

filed by all parties. In an Opinion and Order entered January

11, 1977, Judge Watson vacated his order directing the

Borough of Fox Chapel to amend its Zoning Ordinance, but

ordered “the Zoning Officer of the Borough of Fox Chapel

[to] issue a building permit to [Mr. Friday]” (p. la).

The appellant herein appealed to the Commonwealth

Court of Pennsylvania which filed an Opinion and Order on

January 9, 1978, affirming “the order of the Court of Com-

mon Pleas of Allegheny County made September 9, 1976, as

(p. 20a).

—~—7*>

modified by its order of January 11, 1977

Appellants, thereafter, petitioned the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania for Allowance of Appeal, but the Petition was

denied without opinion on July 21, 1975.

HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS WERE RAISED

AND DECIDED BELOW

On appeal to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylva-

nia from Judge Watson's modified opinion, the appellants

set forth, inter alia, the following positions:

Il. Fox Chapel Borough's zoning ordinance is valid

under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the

United States.

Ill. The requirement by the Court below that Fox

Chapel Borough issue a building permit violates

the Constitution of the United States.

How the Federal Questions were Raised Y

and Decided Below

Appellants argued that the Pennsylvania decisions hold-

ing zoning ordinances similar to Fox Chapel’s “unconstitu-

tional” were based on the erroneous premise that the police

power as circumscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments does not extend to the preservation of beauty,

spaciousness, aesthetics, and other spiritual values. Further-

more, it was argued if the ordinance were invalid, the order

of the lower court compelling the Borough to issue a permit

without a determination of site suitability was an improper

usurpation of the Borough’s legislative discretion. Since

Judge Watson held Pa. Star. ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon)

required such a remedy, appellants attacked the validity of

the statute.

These contentions of the appellants were rejected in the

opinion of the Commonwealth Court. After first holding

that the total exclusion of apartments rebutted the ordi-

nance’s presumption of validity, the Court continued:

The Borough says that it carried its burden of justifying

its exclusion of apartment use by showing that apart-

ments would cause an increase in population which

would in turn place a strain on municipal services, cause

congestion of its roads and do harm to the aesthetic

nature of the Borough. Similar justifications were spe-

cifically rejected in Girsh Appeal, supra.

In the final paragraph, the Court said:

Finally, we find no merit in the Borough's contention

that the court below improperly usurped the Borough's

legislative discretion by ordering that a building permit

be issued to Friday. Section 1011 of the MPC, [Pxa. Start.

ANN. tit. 53, §$11011 (Purdon),] authorizes courts to give

just such relief upon a successful challenge of a regula-

tion.

10 The Federal Questions are Substantial

These arguments were also presented in appellants’

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from Commonwealth

Court of Pennsylvania which was filed with the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

however, denied the petition without opinion.

THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL

1. The Lower Court's Order Affirmed on Appeal Com-

pelling the Zoning Officer of the Borough of Fox

Chapel to Issue a Building Permit to the Respondent is a

Usurpation of the Legisl tive Portion of the “Police

Power” Sanctioned by Pa. Star. Ann. tit. 53, $1101]

(Purdon), but Repugnant to the Constitution of the Uni-

ted States.

Appellants submit that the police power is simply the

will of the majority which is exercisable through their

elected representatives and limited only by the rights of indi-

viduals and minorities as embodied in the Fifth and Four-

teenth Amendment concepts of Due Process and Equal

Protection. The role of the judiciary in the administration of

the police power is limited to the determination of whether a

particular legislative act interferes with those rights. See Ber-

man v. Parker, infra.

In the original opinion filed in this case on September 9,

1976, Judge Watson directed Fox Chapel Borough to revise

its zoning ordinance (p. Ila). In that opinion, he scru-

pulously avoided making the legislative determination of

whether or not the Friday tract was an appropriate site for an

apartment building. Subsequently convinced that he lacked

the power to compel Fox Chapel Borough to amend its zon-

ing ordinance, Judge Watson directed the issuance of a

building permit (p. 14a). By ordering the issuance of a build-

ing permit, the Court has in effect amended the zoning ordi-

nance of the Borough of Fox Chapel so as to allow multi-

The Federal Questions are Substantial 1]

family residences on the Friday tract. For the reasons set

forth below, appellants submit that this de facto amendment

of the zoning ordinance is contrary to the United States Con-

stitution.

We are concerned here with the zoning question of who

may determine the uses to which a given parcel of land may

be put. When confronted for the first time with review of a

zoning ordinance, in Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 359. 387

(1926), this Court stated:

Vhe ordinance now under review and all similar

laws and regulations. must find their justification in

some aspect of the police power, asserted tor the public

welfare.

Therefore, in this case, the responsibility of the different

branches of government in the exercise of what is commonly

known as the “police power” must be determined.

The police power has been “reserved to the States, for

there is in the Constitution no grant thereof to Congress.”

Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 144 (1909). The ques-

tion of who may exercise the police power has been ans-

wered most succinctly by the Supreme Court of California

in Frost v. Los Angeles, 181 Cal. 22. 183 Pac. 342 (1919):

The legislature is possessed of the entire police

power of the state, except as its power is limited by pro-

visions of the Constitution.

Hlowever, it is well settled that a State may delegate to

municipal legislative bodies the discretion to enact local

ordinances which are supportable by the police power.

Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922). The Pennsylvania

legislature did this in the Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805 Art. I,

$601, Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §10601 (Purdon) which provides:

12 The Federal Questions are Substantial

The governing body of each municipality, in accer-

dance with the conditions and procedures set forth in

this act, may enact, amend and repeal zoning ordi-

nances to implement comprehensive plans and to

accomplish any of the purposes of this act.

Furthermore, the legislature listed among the “purposes” for

which zoning should be enacted the promotion of “proper

density of population” and prevention of “overcrowding of

land.” Act of July 31, 1968, P.L.. S05, Art. VI, §604, Pa. Star.

ANN. tit 53, §10604 (Purdon).

In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954), this Court

commented on the different roles performed by the legisla

ture and the judiciary in the promulgation of laws dependent

upon the police power.

The definition [of the police power] is essentially the

product of legislative determinations addressed to the

purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly

nor historically capable of complete definition. Subject

to specific constitutional limitations, when the legisla-

ture has spoken, the public interest has been declared in

terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature,

not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public

needs to be served by social legislation, ... The role of

the judiciary in determining whether that power is

being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely

narrow one.

Therefore, once the court had determined that Fox Chapel

Borough had failed to exercise the police power for a public

purpose, its function in the administration of the police

power was completed. The Pennsylvania statute which, in

effect, allowed the court to exercise its discretion in deter-

mining that a particular parcel was suitable for a particular

use is Contrary to the rationale of cases barring State legisla-

tures from contracting away their right to exercise the police

power wherein this Court has said:

Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the

extent and boundaries of the police power, and how-

The Federal Questions are Substantial 13

ever difficult it may be to render a satisfactory defini-

tion of it, there seems to be no doubt that it does extend

to the protection of the lives, health, and property of the

citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the

public morals. The legislature cannot, by any contract,

divest itself of the power to provide for these

objects.... [T]hey are to be attained and provided for

by such appropriate means as the legislative discretion

may devise. That discretion can no more be bargained

away than the power itself. Beer Co. v» Massachusetts.

97 U.S. 25 (1877).

Texas & N.O.R.R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U.S. 408 (1911).

The Pennsylvania legislature’s delegation of the discretion

embodied in the police power to another branch of govern-

ment is at least as offensive to the scheme of government

contemplated by the United States Constitution as is the con-

tracting away of the police power discretion.

The Pennsylvania courts have not been blind to the

improper delegation of responsibility provided for in the

statute in question. In Ellick v. Board of Supervisors of Wor-

cester Township, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 414, 333 A.2d 239,

246 (1975), the Commonwealth Court made the following

comments when confronted with a local ordinance which

did not allow the construction of townhouses within the

township's borders.

A reading of section 1011 of the MPC, [Pa. Stat.

ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon) ], permits one to conclude

that the Legislature, through the 1972 amendments, has

imposed upon the courts of common pleas broad and

burdensome duties and authority. In effect, the Legisla-

ture has directed those courts to act as administrative

bodies (as super zoning boards of adjustment) which

the appellate courts in this Commonwealth have stated

many times is net a proper judicial function.© We

*The traditional view has been that the responsibility for zoning

rests with the municipality involved rather than the courts, and that

therefore courts should not act as super zoning boards of adjustment

or master planners of the last resort. (Cites omitted.) *

l4 The Federal Questions are Substantial

believe that secial and economic problems of society

presented in zoning cases should properly be resolved

by the legislative and executive branches of govern-

ment rather than by the courts. Courts are intended to

decide cases on the facts and the law presented, and

were never intended to dictate legislative matters (e.g.

reasonable side- yard dimensions) as may be involved in

challenging landowners’ plans. Nonetheless we may not

disregard the intent of the Legislature which is

expressed in the MPC.

In the present case the Commonwealth Court acknow!-

edged that “[s|ite suitability is an appropriate consideration

going to the type of relief” (p. 19a), but approved the lower

court's order which failed to consider the same. Thus. the

Borough of Fox Chapel and its citizens have been denied the

right to have legislators elected by the majority exercise the

police power, a power reserved to the people by the Tenth

Amendment, and limited only by other Constitutional con-

siderations.

In summary, since zoning is an exercise of the police

power and because the police power must be exercised

through a legislative body, it logically follows that a change

in zoning can only be effected by the appropriate legislative

assembly having jurisdiction of the particular property. The

present order rezones a tract of land in Fox Chapel Borough

without any opportunity for the Borough’s legislators to con-

sider the suitability of the site. Upona finding of abuse of the

police power by the legislative branch, a constitutionally

permissible remedy would be for a court to retain jurisdic-

tion (as is already provided for in Pa. Stat. ANw. tit. 53,

§11011 (Purdon) ) and require the legislative body to correct

any deficiency in the ordinance. The remedy would be sim-

ilar to court orders in desegregation cases and election redis-

tricting cases. An order which only requires compliance by

the respondent with valid building controls in effect on the

date of respondent's original application for a building per-

The Federal Questions are Substantial 15

mit (p. 4a) unfairly denies the Borough of Fox Chapel’s

right to promulgate building controls, for the controls in

effect at the date of original application were not promul-

gated with the expectation that said controls would govern

the erection of multi-family dwellings.

Il. The Courts of Pennsylvania Held the Zoning Ordinance

of Fox Chapel Borough Unconstitutional Because of an

Erroneous Interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution.

The order of the Court of Common Pleas which appel-

lants have beretofore disputed as being repugnant to the

Constitution of the United States was predicated upon the

same court's holding that “Fox Chapel Borough's Ordinance

No. 319 is unconstitutional to the extent that it provides for

only single family dwellings and not for apartment build-

ings’ (p. Ya-10a). On appeal, the Commonwealth Court

accepted the lower court's holding that “the Zoning Ordi-

nance was exclusionary and therefore unconstitutional”

(16a-17a). Neither opinion makes any reference to the Uni-

ted States Constitution or the Pennsylvania Constitution.

much less any specific section of either constitution. Both

courts relied primarily upon the decision of the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania in Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237. 263 A.2d

395 (1970), to arrive at their determinations that Fox Chape!

Borough's zoning ordinance was unconstitutional.

The facts of Girsh are strikingly similar to those of the

present case. In Girsh, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

reviewed the zoning ordinance of Nether Providence Town-

ship which did not expressly provide for the construction of

multi-unit apartment buildings anywhere within the borders

of the township. The Court concluded that a zoning scheme

that makes no reasonable provision for apartment uses could

not be “constitutionaliy” sustained. The only reference to

either the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions is

found in footnote 3 wherein the Court said:

16 The Federal Questions are Substantial

We must start with the basic proposition that absent

more, an individual should be able to utilize his own

land as he sees fit. U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV.

Although zoning is, in general, a proper exercise of

police power which can permissibly limit an individu-

al’s property rights, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty

Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926), it goes without

saving that the use of the police power cannot be unreas-

onable. E.g., Eller v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 1,198

A.2d 863 (1964).

Fortunately, further clarification of the basis for the Girsh

decision is found in Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board of the

Township of Upper Providence, Pa. 382 A.2d 105

(1977). The dispositive issue in Surrick was again “whether

the township ordinance unconstitutionally exclude[d] multi-

family dweilings”. 382 A.2d 106. Before examining the facts

of the Suriick case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

stated:

Article I Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution pro-

tects the citizen’s right to the enjoyment of private prop-

erty, and governmental interference with this right is

circumscribed by the due process provisions of the

Fitth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV: Pa. Const.

art. 1, $1: Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 241 n. 3, 263 A.2d

395, 397 n. 3 (1970). In reviewing zoning ordinances, this

Court has stated that an ordinance must bear a substan-

tial relationship to the health, safety, morals, or general

welfare of the community. National Land and Invest-

ment Co. v. Eastiown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa.

304, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965), citing, inter alia. Glo-

rioso Appeal, 413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668 (1964). Thus,

without expressly labelling it as such, this Court has

employed a substantive due process analysis in review-

ing zoning schemes and has concluded implicitly that

exclusionary or unduly restrictive zoning techniques do

The Federal Questions are Substantial 17

not have the requisite substantial relationship to the

public welfare. See Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466,

268 A.2d 765 (1970); Girsh Appeal, supra.

This Court recently reminded the States that “a State may

not impose such greater restrictions [on police activity] as a

matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifi-

caly refrains from imposing them”. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.

714, 719 (1975). This Court was confronted with a state

court's interpretation of the breadth of protection provided

by the self-incrimination clause of the federal Constitution in

Oregon v. Hass, but the same concept forbids the Pennsylva-

nia courts from placing greater restrictions as a matter of

federal constitutional law on the use of the police power than

are mandated by the decisions of this Court. In reliance upon

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, the courts of Pennsylvania in Girsh and its pro-

geny, including the case herein appealed, have placed upon

the exercise of the police power by legislative bodies far

greater restrictions than are required by this Court's state-

ments of federal constitutional law.

Initially, it is not clear that the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court is applying the correct test of substantive due process.

In Surrick, the Court said that a zoning ordinance must bear

a substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals, or gen-

eral welfare of the community. The very same test was ap-

plied by this Court in determining the constitutionality of the

concept of zoning in Euclid v. Ambler Co.. supra, at 395.

However, this Court's view of the proper scope of judicial

review of economic and social legislation has changed dras-

tically since Euclid was decided in 1926. If Euclid were to be

decided today on substantive due process grounds this

Court would, in all probability, apply a “minimal rational-

ity” test as it did in Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247-248

(1976), wherein a police officer complained that a local regu-

IS The Federal Questions are Substantial

lation limiting the length of policemen’s hair violated his

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment which this Court

noted “protects substantive aspects of liberty against uncon-

stitutional restrictions by the State”. Id. at 244. This Court's

predilection towards applying a “minimal rationality” test to

a zoning ordinance is evidenced by its decision in Village of

Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) where this Court

noted:

We deal with economic and social legislation where

legislatures have historically drawn lines which we

respect against the charge of violation of the Equal Pro-

tection Clause if the law be“ ‘reasonable. not arbitrary’ ”

(quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412.

415) and bears a “rational relationship toa [permissible]

state objective”. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71. 76.

Absent the involvement of a suspect classification or a fun-

damental right which requires the application of a strict

scrutiny test, it appears that this Court presently applies sub-

stantially the same test in Fourteenth Amendment cases

whether the Due Process or the Equal Protection Clause is

involved.

Regardless of whether a “substantial” or a “rational”

relationship is required, said relationship must be to the

health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community.

The Pennsylvania courts provided appellants the opportun-

ity to establish the requisite relationship, but in assessing the

evidence offered to support the constitutionality of the ordi-

nance under attack, the state courts committed an error of

constitutional magnitude.

The trial court noted that the findings made by the Zon-

ing Hearing Board contained objections which “were gen-

eral attacks on the apartment building as not fitting into the

aesthetic setting of Fox Chapel” (p. 9a). Judge Watson dis-

The Federal Questions are Substantial 19

missed these findings based on the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court's statement in Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 226, 104

A.2d 118, 122 (1954), that “neither aesthetic reasons nor con-

servation of property values or the stabilization of economic

values in a township are, singly or combined. sufficient to

promote the health or the morals or the safety or the general

welfare of the township or its inhabitants or property

owners’.

At the appellate level, the Commonwealth Court noted

that one reason given by the Borough to justify the exclusion

of apartments was potential “harm to the aesthetic nature of

the Borough” (p. 18a). The Court’s only comment on that jus-

tification was that a similar argument had been specifically

rejected in Girsh. The Court was correct in its holding to the

extent that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Girsh did

affirm its prior position that “protecting the character —

really the aesthetic nature — of the municipality is not suffi-

cient justification for an exclusionary zoning technique”,

Girsh Appeal, supra, at 244. “Exclusionary” as defined by the

Pennsylvania appellate courts refers to the exclusion of a

particular use from a municipality rather than an exclusion of

any group or Class, discrimination against whom is constitn-

tionally proscribed. See Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning

Board of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967); Girsh

Appeal, supra.

The holdings of the Pennsylvania courts on the question

of whether the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments allow the

police power to be exercised to preserve the aesthetic quali-

ties of a community are the exact opposite of this Court's

statements on the subject. In Berman v. Parker, supra, the

appellant challenged the District of Columbia Redevelop-

ment Act of 1945 as being contrary to the Fifth Amendment's

due process and eminent domain clauses. This Court said:

The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclu-

sive. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.

20 The Federal Questions are Substantial

421, 424. The values it represents are spiritual as well as

physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the

power of the legislature to determine that the commun-

ity should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as

well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully

patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its auth-

orized agencies have made determinations that take

into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to

reappraise them. If those who govern the District of

Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be

beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth

Amendment that stands in the way.

If the Fifth Amendment allows the governing body of the

District of Columbia to determine that their community

should be beautiful, then obviously the Pennsylvania courts

have erred in holding that the Fifth Amendment as applied

to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the

governing body of Fox Chapel Borough from deciding that

Fox Chapel Borough shall be beautiful and spacious.

Furthermore, this Court's view has not changed since

the Berman case was decided in 1954. While reviewing a

zoning ordinance challenged on equal protection grounds in

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, supra, at 9, this Court again

supported “aesthetic” zoning when it said:

A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and

motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a

land use project addressed to family needs. This goalisa

permissable one within Berman v. Parker, supra. The

police power is not confined to elimination of filth.

stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones

Where family values, youth values, and blessings of

quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary

for people.

A comparison of Berman and Belle Terre to the Pennsyl-

vania Court's refusal to accept aesthetic concerns asa proper

Conclusion 2

justification for the exercise of the police power in this case

compels the conclusion that Pennsylvania has imposed

greater restrictions on the police power as a matter of federal

constitutional law than this Court imposed on the police

power under similar circumstances. Theretore, this case

merits review and reversal.

CONCLUSION

For the Foregoing Reasons, Probable Jurisdiction

Should Be Noted.

Respectfully submitted,

A. Bruck Bowpren

Larry Kk. Coptorr

BUCTIANAN, INGERSOLL. RODEW ALD,

KYLE & BUERGER

oth Floor, 600 Grant Street

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Counsel for Appellants

October 19, 1978

Appendix la

IN THE

Court of Common Pleas of

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania

Civil Division

IN Re: Application Of John A. Friday,

Jr.. Et Ux. Requesting Fox

Chapel Borough Zoning Hear-

ing Board To Hear Applicants’ S.A. 96

Challenges To The Fox Chapel p of 1976

Zoning Ordinance And Map

And Make Findings Of Fact

And Divisions Based Thereon.

OPINION

Watson, J.

This matter comes before the Court upon the Petition

and Appeal of John A. Friday, Jr., from the decision of the

Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Fox Chapel,

Allegheny County.

The petitioner had applied to the Fox Chapel Borough

officials for permission to construct an apartment building

or multiple-family dwellings on a tract of land owned by the

petitioner situated within the Borough of Fox Chapel. The

building permits were denied. Following the refusal by the

Borough to issue the building permit, the petitioner chal-

lenged the validity of the zoning ordinance cited by the

Borough as grounds for the denial. The Zoning Ordinance of

1971 (Ordinance No. 319, Borough of Fox Chapel) permits,

in relevant part, only one single family dwelling per lot in the

Borough of Fox Chapel.

The Municipalities Planning Code in Sections 910 and

1004 (53 P.S. 10101, et seq.) provides the legislative authority

for an aggrieved individual to challenge the constitutionality

2a Appendix

of a zoning ordinance. The Fox Chapel Zoning Hearing

Board heard the petitioner's appeal, and dismissed his con-

stitutional objections. From the dismissal of his constitu-

tional challenges to the ordinance the petitioner has

appealed to this Court.

The Court has the burden of analyzing zoning ordi-

nances for constitutional defects. It is important to note that

a zoning ordinance is presumed to be valid and constitu-

tional and anyone challenging an ordinance has a heavy

burden of proving otherwise. In the present case Ordinance

No. 319 authorizes only single family dwellings (with certain

exceptions for churches, municipal buildings. fire house,

post office and school—none of which are involved here).

The petitioner has sought building permits to construct an

apartment building. In cases where a municipality attempts

to totally prohibit an otherwise lawful use of land througha

zoning ordinance the Commonwealth Court has stated:

“When an individual challenging a zoning ordi-

nance provides [sic] a total prohibition of an otherwise

lawful use, the burden shifts to the municipality to

prove that such prohibition bears a relationship to the

public health, safety, morals and general welfare. See

Beaver Gasoline Com pany, supra; Amerada Hess Cor-

poration vs. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 11 Pa.

Comm. 115, 313 A.2d 787 (1973).”

Ellick vs. Board of Supervisors of Warchester [sic]

Township, 333 A.2d 239 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1975)

The Pennsylvania Suoreme Court has dealt with zoning

ordinances which totally prohibit a legitimate use of land,

such as apartment building construction in the Girsh Appeal,

437 Pa. 237 (1970). In Girsh. supra, Nether Providence

Township was zoned approximately 75% for single family

dwelling units. The petitioner-appellant requested building

~

Appendix 3a

permits for a high rise apartment building. The permits were

denied by the Township Board of Commissioners. Appel-

lant then challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance

which did not explicitly prohibit multi-unit apartment build-

ings, but were not provided for in the ordinance. except by

way of variance. The Zoning Board of Appeal upheld the

constitutionality of the ordinance. An appeal was taken and

the Supreme Court stated:

“Just as we held in Exton Quarries'!, Ammon R.

Smith?, and Norate® that the governing bodies must

make some provision for the use in question, we today

follow those cases and hold that appellee cannot have a

zoning scheme that makes no reasonable provision for

apartment uses.”

(1. Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,

425 Pa. 43 (1967). Supreme Court struck down an

ordinance which did not allow quarrying anywhere

in the municipality.

- Ammon R. Smith Auto Co. Appeal, 423 Pa. 493

(1966). Supreme Court struck down an ordinance

which placed a total ban on flashing signs.

bo

3. Norate Corp. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 417

Pa. 397 (1965). Supreme Court struck down an ordi-

nance prohibiting billboards everywhere in the

municipality. |

After a lengthy admonition of Nether Providence

Township for attempting “to avoid the increased responsi-

bilities and economic burdens which time and natural

growth invariably bring”, the Supreme Court went further

to state:

“Thus, the suburbs, which at one time were merely

‘bedrooms’ for those who worked in the urban core, are

now becoming active business areas in their own right

da Appendix

... In light of this, Nether Providence Township may

not permissibly choose to only take as many people as

can live in single-family housing, in effect freezing the

population at near present levels. Obviously, if every

municipality took that view, population spread would

be completely frustrated. Municipal services must be

provided somewhere, and if Nether Providence is a log-

ical place for development to take place, it should not

be heard to say that it will not bear its rightful part of the

burden. Certainly it can protect its attractive character

by requiring apartments to be built in accordance with

(reasonable) set-back, open space, height, and other

light-and-air requirements, but it cannot refuse tomake

any provision for apartment living. The simple fact that

someone is anxious to build apartments is strong indica-

tion that the location of this township is such that people

are desirous of moving in, and we do not believe Nether

Providence can close its doors to those people.

It is not true that the logical results of our holding

today is that a municipality must provide for all types of

land use. This case deals with the right of people to‘live

on land’, a very different problem than whether appel-

lee must allow certain industrial uses within its borders.

Apartment living is a fact of life that communities like

Nether Providence must learn to accept.” (emphasis

added)

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is perfectly clear in its

denunciation of zoning ordinances which totally prohibit

certain types of activities. When a zoning ordinance

attempts to prohibit apartment houses, or by practical effect

to exclude them by making no provision therefor or authori-

zation therefor, the Court is even more damning in its denun-

ciation, since it deals with the rights of people to “live on

land”. This Court is not unmindful of Fox Chapel’s desire to

preserve the character of its community. But to totally

Appendix 5a

exclude apartment buildings is unreasonableon its face. The

municipality has the burden of demonstrating to the Court's

satisfaction that its ordinance bears a relationship to the pub-

lic health, safety, morals and general welfare.

II.

It is the position of this Court that the appellant has

established that Ordinance No. 319 provides for exclusion-

ary zoning, and its practical effect is to exclude apartment

buildings from the borough. It was pointed out extensively

above that our Supreme Court held a zoning ordinance

which failed to provide for multi-family housing, in that case

apartment structures, to be unconstitutional. Girsh Appeal,

supra, Appeal of FPA Corporation, 360 A.2d 85] (Pa.

CmwIlth, June 18, 1976). In Camp Hill Development Co..

Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Dauphin, 13 Pa.

CmwIth. 519 (1973), the court held that the Girsh principle

applied equally to townhouses.

The burden has shifted to the municipality to prove that

the prohibition of apartment houses bears a relationship to

the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of the

citizens of the municipality.

The borough oi Fox Chapel, as intervenor, and the Zon-

ing Hearing Board counsel have responded by alleging that:

1. The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the

Zoning Hearing Board should not be disturbed by the

Court;

2. The petitioner has not met his burden of proving that

Ordinance No. 319 is unconstitutional:

3. The Ordinance No. 319 is not exclusionary;

4. The proposals of the applicants would adversely

affect the health, safety and welfare of the residents

of Fox Chapel and the community.

6a Appendix

A.

The first point raised by the Borough is that the Zoning

Hearing Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of lew

should not be disturbed by the reviewing Court. It was

argued that the applicant presented no affirmative testi-

mony as to the need for the development the applicant

sought, nor was there testimony presented that the appli-

cant’s proposed apartment buildings would cure the ill gen-

erally associated with exclusionary zoning, i.e. denial of

housing to the poor and lower middle income groups, and

minorities. It was further argued that Fox Chapel is part ofa

regional system with four other contiguous municipalities

which, taken together, give a regional plan of development

which encompass the multi-family dwelling units proposed

by the applicants.

From the Court’s reading of the Girsh Appeal the basis

of the decision was not the denial of housing to the poor, dis-

advantaged or minorities. The basis of the case was to force

municipalities to accept the fact of population spread, and

not to permit a municipality to zone out the right of people to

“live on land”. This Court, of course. recognizes that a

municipality has the right to set reasonable regulations to

protect the attractive quality of the community and to

require apartment houses to conform to reasonable height.

space, light-and-air type requirements.

The Supreme Court in Girsh did not examine surround-

ing communities to determine if Nether Providence Town-

ship was part of a regional scheme of development. The

Court looked to the zoning ordinance in effect in that com-

munity and made a decision on the constitutionality of that

ordinance alone. Even if, by an historical accident. that Fox

Chapel and the surrounding municipalities comprise an area

which, taken as a whole, provides a reasonable development

plan, the fact remains that there is a zoning ordinance in

Appendix 7a

existence which totally excludes apartment houses from one

municipality. There is no guarantee in the future that the Fox

Chapel region will develop as it has in the past. There is no

legally binding regional plan.

B.

The second issue raised is whether Friday met his

burden in establishing the unconstitutionality of Ordinance

No. 319.

The Court has already dealt with this issue in the first

part of its Opinion. The law is clear and precedent is set.

Zoning ordinances cannot totally exclude multi-family

dwellings from a municipality.

ce

The third argument advanced is that the zoning ordi-

nance of Fox Chapel is not exclusionary. It is argued that it is

not sufficient for the applicant to show or to argue that the

zoning is exclusionary. He must also show that it is exclusion-

ary as to his property.

Once again the appellees refer to the regional grouping

of communities surrounding Fox Chapel. Fox Chapel was

apparently intended to be the green haven for the region.

Testimony stated that Fox Chapel is well planned for the use

for which it was intended. However, this begs the real issue.

Fox Chapel, itself, does exclude multi-family dwellings. The

fact that neighboring municipalities do provide for multi-

family dwellings is of little consequence. The appellees go

further to distinguish the situations in Philadelphia which

puts a population pressure on its suburban communities. It is

acknowledged that no such pressure exists on the Fox

Chapel region. However, in Girsh, supra, it was stated:

“The simple fact that someone is anxious to build

apartments is strong indication that the location of this

CS SSESSSS'SS 3) ae

Sa Appendix

township is such that people are desirous of moving in,

and we do not believe Nether Providence can close its

doors to those people.”

The question in the present case is not one of population

pressure, but of rights. The right of an individual to use his

land v. the right of the municipality to preserve what it con-

ceives to be its character. The Court is not faced with the

rights of the landowner. Rather, the rights of the municipal-

ity are before the Court. The Court is not saying that the

landowner has a right to build an apartment house on the

specific parcel of land he owns. As was mentioned above.

the municipality can reasonably regulate the location, size.

acreage, light-and-air, frontage, etc. of apartment houses.

Likewise, the Court is not unmindful of its responsibility to

the community, and does not take lightly its task of ruling

upon a municipality’s zoning ordinance. Aesthetic. scenic

and ecological values are important. In this regard the Court

is guided by the case of National Land and Investment Co. v.

Easttown Twp. Board of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504 (1965).

Therein, the Court held that protecting the character —

really the aesthetic nature — of the municipality is not suffi-

cient justification for an exclusionary zoning technique.

In a footnote to the Girsh case. supra, the Court suc-

cinctly stated:

“But as long as we allow zoning to be done com-

munity by community, it is intolerable to allow one

municipality (or many municipalities) to close its doors

at the expense of surrounding communities and the cep-

tral city.”

D.

The issue raised by the Borough and by counsel for the

Zoning Hearing Board is that the proposal of the applicant

(Friday) would adversely affect the health. safety and wel-

fare of the residents of Fox Chapel.

Appendix 9a

Many of the 226 Findings of Fact by the Zoning Hearing

Board dealt with testimony charging that the proposed

apartment building would have severe negative results on

the community. Road conditions, traffic volume, soil ero-

sion, possible ruptured gas lines, blind driveways, fire

hazards were all reasons cited to exclude apartment build-

ings. The Findings of Fact were extensive, albeit, totally

shaded to the positions taken by the Borough.

In situations where a municipality has totally banned a

legitimate use of land, the applicant has met his burden of

overcoming the presumption of constitutionality by show-

ing the total ban, Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Borough of

Osborne, 445 Pa. 571 (1971). Thereafter, if the municipality

is to sustain the validity of the ban, it must present evidence

to establish the public purpose served by the regulation.

The Court's review of the Zoning Hearing Board's Find-

ings of Fact reveals that most of the findings adverse to the

applicant are grounded upon objections to the apartment

building at its particular proposed location. The remaining

objections were general attacks on the apartment building as

not fitting into the aesthetic setting of Fox Chapel. In relation

to the municipalities’ objections the Supreme Court has

stated:

“We therefore hold that neither aesthetic reasons

nor the conservation of property values or the stabiliza-

tion of economic values in a township are, singly or

combined, sufficient to promote the health or the mor-

als or the safety or the general welfare of the township

or its inhabitants or property owners.” Medinger

Appeal, 377 Pa. 217 (1954)

III.

CONCLUSION

It is the opinion and hoiding of this Court that Fox

Chapel Borough’s Ordinance No. 319 is unconstitutional to

10a Appendix

the extent that it provides for only single family dwellings

and not for apartment buildings. This Court is not holding

that a building permit must be issued to Friday. Nor does the

Court hold that Friday is entitled to build an apartment

building on his property. The Court is ordering Fox Chapel

Borough to redesign its zoning ordinance to provide for

apartment buildings. Apartment buildings themselves are

not, per se, violative of the health, safety, morals or general

welfare of the municipality.

Footnote No. 4 in the Girsh case, supra, indicates that

planning and zoning, “in an ideal world,” would be done ona

regional basis. This Court heartily agrees. However, the

present state of the law requires the Court to examine each

challenge to the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance ona

community to community basis. Each municipality in Penn-

sylvania is viewed as a separate and distinct unit, with lee-

way for the particular characteristics of the area.

Large-scale comprehensive planning which crosses

municipal boundaries and encompasses whole geographical

regions is an ideal for which, unfortunately, the legislature of

our State has not provided mandatory legislation. What that

leaves the Courts with is a case by case examination of each

municipality. This is the only method approved by our

appellate courts.

Therefore, the follwoing [sic]:

lla

Appendix

ORDER OF COURT

Watson, J.

AnD Now, to wit, this 9 day of September, 1976, It Is

HreREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DecREED:

1.) that Zoning Ordinance of 1971 (Ordinance No. 319)

Borough of Fox Chapel is unconstitutional to the

extent that it prohibits apartment building construc-

tion in the Borough of Fox Chapel;

2.) that the Borough of Fox Chapel take immediate steps

to revise its zoning ordinances to provide for apart-

ment buildings; and

3.) that the decision of the Zoning Hearing Board is re-

versed to the extent that it held Ordinance No. 319 to

be constitutional.

12a Appendix

OPINION

Watson, J.

This matter comes before the Court upon the Petition of

John A. Friday, Jr., et ux, to modify the Opinion and Order

of Court rendered by this Court on September 9, 1976 in the

above-captioned case.

In the Opinion of September 9, 1976 the Court held that

Zoning Ordinance No. 319 of the Borough of Fox Chapel

was unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibits apartment

building construction in the Borough of Fox Chapel. The

Court further ordered the Borough of Fox Chapel to take

immediate steps to revise its zoning ordinances to provide

for apartment buildings. The Court also reversed the deci-

sion of the Zoning Hearing Board to the extent that it held

Ordinance No. 319 to be constitutional.

The petitioner has requested the Court to modify its

prior Order in four particulars: 1. vacate its direction to the

Borough of Fox Chapel to revise its zoning ordinances to

provide for apartment buildings; 2. to fully reverse the deci-

sion of the Zoning Hearing Board; 3. to direct the Borough of

Fox Chapel to issue the petitioners a building permit for the

petitioners development plan upon compliance by the peti-

tioners with valid building controls in effect on the date of

the original application; 4. for the Court to retain jurisdiction

over this case to ensure that the rights of the petitioners are

not frustrated or denied.

The Borough of Fox Chapel also requests the Court to

modify and/or vacate its prior Opinion and Order and hold

Ordinance No. 319 to be constitutional.

Appendix 13a

The Court has reviewed the case law submitted to it and

finds merit in the petitioners’ requests. The Court finds that

it may not order the municipality to amend its zoning ordi-

nance, because amendment of a zoning ordinance is purely a

legislative matter, Ellick v. Board of Supervisors of Worces-

ter Township, Pa. Comm. —_, 333 A.2d 239 (1975).

The Court should have gone further than merely invali-

dating the Borough’s Ordinance No. 319. Definitive relief

should have been granted. As the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court stated in Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board of Warwick

Township, 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974):

“Obviously, if judicial review of local zoning action

is to result in anything more than a farce, the courts must

be prepared to go beyond mere invalidation and grant

definitive relief. To forsake a challenger’s reasonable

development plans after all the time, effort and capital

invested in such a challenge is grossly inequitable.”

The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has placed a

burden upon the lower courts. Once the lower court has con-

cluded that the zoning ordinance unlawfully prohibits the

landowner’s proposed development, the landowner should

be permitted to proceed with his proposed development,

and the court below is required to retain jurisdiction during

the pendency of further proceedings, and, upon motion of

the landowner, to issue such supplementary orders as it

deems necessary to protect the rights of the landowner,

Appeal of Olson, Pa. Comm. —_, 338 A.2d 748 (1975).

The petitioner must comply with all administrative require-

ments of the zoning ordinance in effect on the date of the

petitioner's original application which are not inconsistent

with the present Opinion and Order, and the prior Opinion

and Order of September 9, 1976.

Therefore, the following:

l4a Appendix

ORDER OF COURT

Watson, J.

ANb Now, to wit, this 1] day of January, 1977, It Is

HerreBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND Decreep as follows:

|. that the Order of Court dated September 9, 1976 in

the above-captioned case be vacated to the extent that it

ordered the Borough of Fox Chapel to take immediate steps

to revise its zoning ordinances to provide for apartment

buildings:

2. that the Zoning Officer of the Borough of Fox Chapel

issue a building permit to the petitioners for the petitioners’

development plan upon compliance by the petitioners with

valid building controls in effect on the date of the petitioners’

original application for a building permit; and,

3. that this Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter

to ensure that the prompt resolution of any future problems.

Appendix

IN THE

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

IN Re: Application of

John A. Friday, Jr., Et Ux.

Requesting Fox Chapel Borough

Zoning Hearing Board To Hear

Applicants’ Challenges To The

Fox Chapel Zoning Ordinance And

Map And Make Findings Of Fact

And Divisions Based Thereon

Borough Of Fox Chapel, Appellant

IN Re: Application of

John A. Friday, Jr., Et Ux.

Requesting Fox Chapel Borough

Zoning Hearing Board To Hear

Applicants’ Challenges To The

Fox Chapel Zoning Ordinance And

Map And Make Findings Of Fact

And Divisions Based Thereon

William A. Jones, Katherine P.

Jones, Harold H. Hammer And,

Hannah R. Hammer, Appellants

BEFORE:

No. 158

C.D. 1977

No. 303

C.D. 1977

HONORABLE JAMES S. Bowman, President Judge

HoNoRABLE JaAMeEs C. Crumusu, Jr., Judge

HONORABLE Roy WILKINSON, JR., Judge

HONORABLE THEODORE QO. Rocers, Judge

HONORABLE GENEVIEVE BuiattT, Judge

ARGUED: November 2, 1977 — Pittsburgh

16a Appendix

OPINION

OPINION BY JUDGE ROGERS _ Filed: January 9, 1978

The Borough of Fox Chapel has appealed an order of

the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County reversing a

decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Fox

Chapel dismissing a challenge by John A. Friday, Jr. to the

validity of the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance of 1971. William

A. Jones and Katherine P. Jones, his wife, ard Harold H.

Hammer and Hannah R. Hammer, his wife, who intervened

below on the side of the Borough have also appealed.

The Borough Zoning Ordinance does not provide for

multi-family dwelling use anywhere in the Borough. The

oniy permitted residential use of land is for single faimily

homes on one, two or three acre lots. Friday owns a 22.85

acre tract located in a Class A Residential District where the

minimum lot size is three acres. Pursuant to Section 1004 (1)

(a) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code

(MPC)! ,53 P.S. §11004 (1) (a), Friday submitted a challenge

to the constitutional validity of the use provisions of the Zon-

ing Ordinance to the Zoning Hearing Board. The submission

included plans for a single six-story, 215 unit apartment

building proposed to be constructed on Friday’s land. Fri-

day later filed an amended plan for eleven three-story build-

ings containing a total of 121 units. During evidentiary

hearings conducted by the Zoning Hearing Board, Friday

further modified his plan by finally proposing to construct

one five-story building containing 181 units. The Zoning

Hearing Board made extensive findings of facts; concluded

that the Zoning Ordinance was valid; and dismissed Friday’s

challenge.

Without taking additional evidence, the court below

reversed the Zoning Hearing Board’s order and held that the

Zoning Ordinance was exclusionary and therefore unconsti-

Appendix l7a

tutional. The court directed the Borough to enact curative

amendments providing for apartment use. Friday filed a

petition in the court below requesting a modification of its

order, citing Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board of Warwick

Township, 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974). The court below

properly vacated its first order in part and entered a second

directing the Borough to issue a building permit to Friday

upon his compliance with valid building controls in effect on

the date of Friday's original application for a building per-

mit. We affirm.

The Borough first says that because ordinances enjoy a

presumption of validity, Friday had the burden of proving

that the Fox Chapel Ordinance was not related to public

health, safety and welfare. With this we agree. The Borough

then says that Friday did not carry this burden by simply

showing that the ordinance totally excluded apartment use.

This proposition is clearly erroneous. When it is demon-

strated that an ordinance entirely excludes a facially legiti-

mate use, the presumption of validity is rebutted; and the

municipality must then present evidence to establish that its

regulation bears a relationship to the public health, safety

and welfare. Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Osborne Borough, 445

Pa. 571, 285 A.2d 501 (1971). Friday’s proposed apartment

house is a legitimate use of land, absent the Zoning Ordi-

nance; the Zoning Ordinance’s failure to provide for this use

is tantamount to its exclusion. Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263

A.2d 395 (1970); Dublin Properties v. Board of Commission-

ers of Upper Dublin Township, 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.

54, 342 A.2d 821 (1975). Friday clearly met his burden of

overcoming the presumption of the validity of the Fox

Chapel ordinance.

The rule as to burdens enunciated in Beaver Gasoline

Co. v. Osborne Borough, supra, has been applied in cases

challenging the validity of zoning ordinances prohibiting

18a Appendix

business uses? and those prohibiting various kinds of residen-

tial uses.’ In Girsh Appeal, supra, Mr. Justice Roberts, with

the apparent approval of three other justices, declared that a

prohibition of apartment use has more critical implications

than a prohibition of an industrial or commercial use because

the former restricts the right of people to live on land, and

further that municipalities “cannot have...zoning

scheme[s]| that make no reasonable provision for apartment

uses.” 437 Pa. at 243, 263 A.2d at 398.

The Borough says that it carried its burden of justifying

its exclusion of apartment use by showing that apartments

would cause an increase in population which would in turn

place a strain on municipai services, cause congestion of its

roads and do harm to the aesthetic nature of the Borough.

Similar justifications were specifically rejected in Girsh

Appeal, supra.

The Borough next contends that its ordinance is not

exclusionary because the Borough is not located within the

path of onrushing population expansion and that there is no

demand or need for apartment ‘uses within its boundaries.

The argument was rejected in Girsh Appeal, supra, by the

following phrases:

“The simple fact that someone is anxious to build apart-

ments is strong indication that the location of this [ munici-

pality] is such that people are desirous of moving in, and

we do not believe [the municipality] can close its doors to

those people.” 437 Pa. at 245, 267 A.2d at 399.

The Borough says that Friday’s site cannot support

apartments without endangering the public health, safety

and welfare because of soil conditions unsuitable for the

proper disposition of sewage and subject to landslides. The

Borough misapprehends its burden of proof. The suitability

of Friday’s site is not relevant to an inquiry into the constitu-

Appendix 19a

tional validity of a municipality-wide prohibition of apart-

ment uses. See Girsh Appeal, supra note 6, 437 Pa. at 246, 263

A.2d at 399. Site suitability is an appropriate consideration

going to the type of relief, if any, that should be given to a

landowner after he has successfully challenged an ordi-

nance. See Ellick v. Board of Supervisors of Worcester

Township, 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 404, 333 A.2d 239

(1975).

The Borough next says that its membership in a regional

planning effort cures the otherwise exclusionary and uncon-

stitutional nature of its ordinance. In Nicholas Heim & Kis-

singer v. Township of Harris, Pa. Commonwealth Ct. ;

375 A.2d 1383, 1385 (1977), we addressed and rejected a

similar argument made by a municipality in defense of a

zoning ordinance excluding mobile homes:

“The only defense of the zoning regulation which

requires mention is one based on the Township's mem-

bership in a regional planning effort. Harris Township

contends that this membership, together with an

approved regional comprehensive plan, entitled it to

credit for more substantial provision for mobile home

parks by the zoning ordinances of the other members of

the regional planning group. As we have said on a

number of occasions, a comprehensive plan does not

have the legal effect of a zoning ordinance; the former is

recommendatory and only the latter is regulatory.

Saenger v. Berks County, 9 Pa. Cmwlth. 499, 308 A.2d

175 (1973); Morelli v. Borough of St. Marys, 1 Pa.

Cmwilth. 612, 275 A.2d 889 (1971). Obviously, Harris

Township has no contrel over the future zoning practi-

ces of other municipalities in the region. The exclusion-

ary zoning decisions hereinabove referred to and cited

suggest that it might be a very good thing for the Gen-

eral Assembly to empower municipalities to enter into

binding regional zoning arrangements. Some munici-

Appendix

palities, by reason of size, present land use and physical

conditions, are no doubt inappropriate places for every

Appendix 2la

FOOTNOTES

: 1. Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended.

kind of residential use. If the regional zoning ordinance Jul

should provide the regions’ ‘fair share’ of housing needs, 2. Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Osborne Borough, supra, (pro-

each constituent municipality could then be developed hibition of gasoline stations); General Battery Corp. v.

in accordance with best planning principles applied Zoning Hearing Board of Alsace Township, 29 Pa.

purely and not with an eye to what might pass constitu- Commonwealth Ct. 498, 371 A.2d 1030 (1977). (prohi-

tional muster. However, there is now no such enabling bition of waste disposal plants).

legislation and regional comprehensive planning pro-

vides no justification for a municipality's exclusionary 3. Waynesborough Corp. v. Easttown Township Zoning

zoning practices.” Hearing Board, 23 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 137, 350

% a . ; A.2d 895 (1976), (prohibition of condominiums);

Finally, we find no merit in the Borough’s contention . recy ae

; Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 514, 338

that the court below improperly usurped the Borough’s 9.4 748 (107% et ae ia

cae ; ee A.2d 748 (1975): (prohibition of townhouses); Ellick v.

legislative discretion by ordering that a building permit be > ae , ae ee ae

ssued to Friday. Section 1011 of the MPC. 33 PS. 811011 Board of Supervisors of Worcester Township, 17 Pa.

wap ee Priel eg Yeates paige at aisle S ; Commonwealth Ct. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975), (prohibi-

authorizes courts to give just such relief upon a successft.l mo ma : ;

hall f Lesion Biieks Meaanane E tion of townhouses); Camp Hill Development Co., Inc.

ne ie ~ 7 Sere went: 7 v. Board of Supervisors of v. Zoning Board of Adjustinent, 13 Pa. Commonwealth

Te Ct. 519, 319 A.2d 197 (1974), (prohibition of town-

Order affirmed. : houses).

__ /s/ Turopore ©. Rocers, J... 4. The Borough and the intervenors have additionally

‘Theodore O. Rogers, J.

ORDER

argued that the Court’s order is unconstitutional as vio-

lating the separation of powers doctrine and as depriv-

ing Fox Chapel residents of property without due

process. These contentions are clearly without merit.

AND Now, this 9th day of January, 1978, the order of the

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County made Sep-

tember 9, 1976 as modified by its order of January 11, 1977 is

affirmed.

/s/ THeopore O. Rocers

Theodore O. Rogers, J.

IN Re:

Appendix

IN THE

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

WesTER™N DisTRICT

Application Of John A.

Friday, jr., Et Ux.

Requesting Fox Chapel

Borough Zoning Hearing

Board To Hear

Applicants’ Challenges

To The Fox Chapel

Zoning Ordinance And

Map And Make Findings

Of Fact And Divisions

Based Thereon.

>

No. 1514

Allocatur Docket

APPEAL OF BOROUGH OF FOX CHAPEL.

JONES, ET AL.

ORDER

PETITION DENIED this 21st day of July, 1978.

Per Curiam

Appendix 23a

IN THE

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

IN Re: Application Of John A. :

Friday, Jr. Et Ux.,

Requesting Fox Chapel

Borough Zoning Hearing

Board To Hear Nos. 158 and 303

Applicants’ Challenges Commonwealth

To The Fox Chapel Docket 1977

Zoning Ordinance And

Map And Make Findings

Of Fact And Divisions

Based Thereon ;

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

Notice is hereby given that the Borough of Fox Chapel,

William A. Jones, Katherine P. Jones, Harold H. Hammer,

and Hannah R. Hammer, the appellants in the above-

captioned matter, hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of

the United States from the final judgment of the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania denying appellants’ Petition for Allo-

wance of Appeal from Commonwealth Court of Pennsylva-

nia entered in this case on July 21, 1978.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257(2).

/s/ A. Bruce BOwDEN

A. Bruce Bowden

/s/ Larry E. CopLorr

Larry E. Coploff

BUCHANAN, INGERSOLL,

_ RODEWALD, KYLE & BUERGER

Attorneys for the Appellants

57th Floor—600 Grant Street

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

(412) 562-8800

Filed: September 25, 1975

~~

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