Jurisdictional Statement — Borough of Fox Chapel v. Friday
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gn the
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1978
No. 72. :
| Pa.
BOROUGH OF FOX CHAPEL.
WILLIAM A. JONES and KATHERINE P. JONES,
HAROLD H. HAMMER and HANNAH R. HAMMER,
Appellants
VS.
JOHN A. FRIDAY,
Respondent
On APPEAL From THE SuPREME Court or PENNSYLVANIA
Jurisdictional Statement
A. Bruce BowpEN
Larry E. Copiorr
BUCHANAN, INGERSOLL.
RODEWALD, KYLE & BUERGER
57th Floor, 600 Grant St.
Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219
Attorneys for Appellants
Financial Press Corporation, Pittsburgh
=
INDEX
Page
Se EO sone can usdlns pouk os eecAZh enue l
ee a oan baud a Geass ok wa ooee cou aA 2
ADDITIONAL GROUNDS OF JURISDICTION ..... 3
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
Peery CTE CPO VE WEED <5 cee ccecvencerevesses 3
APU eeree ee PEED ohisc ic bac ike Convuavecnes 4
Ee E Ce CO Gi oe ceccdcnchesnves 5
HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS WERE
RAISED AND DECIDED BELOW................ 8
THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS ARE
Pe an knonn cea hen pecKee Rekwhae res 10
I. The Lower Court's Order Affirmed on Appeal
Compelling the Zoning Officer of the Borough
of Fox Chapel to Issue a Building Permit to the
Respondent is a Usurpation of the Legislative
Portion of the “Police Power” Sanctioned by
Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §$11011 (Purdon), but
Repugnant to the Constitution of the United
TN ese is ha hn dd ns Kae eke eee eeeee 10)
Il. The Courts of Pennsylvania Held the Zoning
Ordinance of Fox Chapel Borough Unconstitu-
tional Because of an Erroneous Interpretation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution. .............. 15
eR | en ee eee Pree rT es Pres
Appendix
Opinion and Order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, at S.A. 96 of 1976 on
NE Te I vos. scan sc daccncctsvccusactues la
ii Index
Page
Opinion and Order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, at $.A. 96 of 1976 on
January 11, 1977, modifying the Order entered Sep-
Sent D FGTO occ cawncctccccvesetaeseaseneusses 12a
Opinion and Order of the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania at Nos. 158 and 303 C.D. 1977 on Jan-
ary DIGITS oc cteirencckovverecsnsesesesccvcens 15a
Order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at No.
1514 Allocatur Docket on July 21, 1978.00... eee 22a
Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
NUE ace careceeC Asa eesiek the nsepeteasemeeees 23a
TABLE OF CITATIONS iii
Cases
Page
Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 Lg 5 en 13
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)....... 10, 12, 19, 20
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 13 (1971)............... 3
Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765
POE Ay Ci ea Cai cua kaos bas Chak i cs chereccce. 17
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant,
ee a nn 3
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US.
MIS wa Bien Sis Se et ese kk o's 6 vk hacen ck. 19
Eller v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 1,
BOO PAM UP TEUED hcccndcnsevnnaniesececccce, 16
Ellick v. Board of Supervisors of Worcester Twyp.,
17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975)...... 13
Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 359 (1926) ..... 11, 16, 17
Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,
425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967) .........ccccccce. 19
Flournoy v. Weiner, 321 U.S. 253 (1944) .............. 3
Frost v. Los Angeles, 181 Cal. 22, 183 Pac. 342
UR aiekin a Ueatec a treet res vie kook vel. ll
Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395
ile eae ee te cer eee: < 9, 15, 16, 17, 19
Gloriso Appeal, 413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668 (1964) ...... 16
Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909) ........... 1]
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) .........00c cece 17
Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954) ....19
National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Twp.
Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
MRGUN Sea vet cert er ulate Cou ek aps cin 16
is Table of Citations
In the
Page Supreme Court of the Wnited States
Niemann v. Hewitt, 387 F.Supp. 926
(WD. Pa. FOGG ook ccaccaveses oc4eeneeeeeeea 7 October Term, 1978
Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) 2... cece ee eee 17
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Check, 259 U.S. 530 (1922) ...... 3 No.
Reed vo. Reed. 404 U.S. Ti CUTE) vce ne daudeusesiean 1S ts cea =
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S, 412 (1920) ....18 BOROUGH OF FOX CHAPEL,
WILLIAM A. JONES and KATHERINE P. JONES,
Surrick ». Zoning Hearing Board of the Twp. of HAROLD H. HAMMER and HANNAH R. HAMMER.
Upper Providence, —— Pa. ——, 382 A.2d 105
(BOTT) . ccc ccccécesbuse suas saanre ene 16, 17 Appellants
Texas & N.O.R.R. Co. v. Miller, VS.
S91 U.S. 468 (IGRT) vc picnsccddavesuceeeuee eee 13 JOHN A. FRIDAY,
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 18, 20 eae
Zacht v. King, 300. U.S. ¥i4 CIGRE) oncccecqesnccancasas i]
STATUTES
On APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME CourRT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellate Jurisdiction Act
$6 U.S.C. ORR) «ic ccnaweebenesesasenaaneaeen 2
$B U.S.C. SISSIES) occu cctcestcetscesecscepasous 3 Jurisdictional Statement
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805 Art. I,
$601; Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §10601
(PerGGe) «ov isuccdsvesne sever tenes + aaa 1] OPINIONS BELOW
Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, Art. VI, The following opinions and orders are printed in the
§604; Pa. Stat. ANN, tit. 53, §10604 | Appendix to this statement:
(Purdon) ....eceseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee cette eeenees 12 1. Opinion and Order of the Court of Common Pleas of
8 Act of June 1, 1972, P.L. 333, No. 93, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, at S.A. 96 of 1976 dated
$1011; Pa. Star. Ann. tit. 53, $1101] September 9, 1976.
(PUES «0c cinta coda eee 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14
2. Opinion and Order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, at S.A. 96 of 1976 dated
January 11, 1977, modifying the Order entered September 9,
1976.
a oon
to
Jurisdiction
3. Opinion and Order of the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania, at Nos. 158 and 303 C.D. 1977 dated January 9,
1978, 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 256, 381 A.2d 504.
4. Order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at No.
i514 Allocatur Docket dated July 21, 1978.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1257(2), this being an appeal which draws into ques-
tion the validity, as applied in this case, of Act of June 1, 1972,
P.L. 333, No. 93, §1011, Pa Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §11011
(Purdon), infra., p. 3, on the grounds that it is repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States.
Respondent sought a building permit to construct a 181-
unit apartment building on his property zoned for single
family residential structures, and sought a declaration that
appellant Fox Chapel’s zoning ordinance was unconstitu-
tional because it zoned no portion of the municipality for
such structures. The court of first instance declared appel-
lant Fox Chapel’s zoning ordinance unconstitutional for that
reason. The Zoning Officer of the appellant, Borough of Fox
Chapel, was thereafter ordered by the court of first instance
to issue a building permit to the respondent. On appeal, the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania on January 9, 1978,
affirmed the lower court's order, holding that said order was
sanctioned by Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon).
Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
for Allowance of Appeal from Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania; however, appellants’ petition was denied
without opinion on July 21, 1978. Timely notice of appeal to
this court was filed in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsy]-
vania on September 25, 1978. As the Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania explicitly rejected appellant's challenge to
Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon), this matter is appro-
Additional Crounds of Jurisdiction & 3
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved
priately brought to this Court by appeal. Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 13 (1971); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v.
Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
ADDITIONAL GROUNDS OF JURISDICTION
The appellants also contend that the judgment below is
founded on other erroneous interpretations of the United
States Constitution which involve questions not subject to
review by this Court on appeal. In particular, the courts of
Pennsylvania have misconstrued the due process provisions
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. These errors are included in the state-
ment of the questions presented by the appeal, hereinafter
set forth. If these were the only errors complained of, the
appellants would be limited to a petition for writ of certio-
rari under 28 U.S.C. §1257(3). They are included in this
appeal under the authority of Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Check, 259 U.S. 530, 547 (1922), and Flournoy v. Weiner, 321
U.S. 253, 263 (1944).
CONSTITUTIONAL and STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This case involves the Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
This case also involves Act of June 1, 1972, P.L. 333, No.
93, $1011, Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon) which
states:
(1) In a zoning appeal the court shall have power to
declare any ordinance or map invalid and to set aside or
modify any action, decision or order of the governing
body, agency or officer of the municipality brought up
on appeal.
(2) If the court finds that an ordinance or map or a
decision or order thereunder which has been brought up
tor review unlawfully prevents or restricts a develop-
4 Questions Presented
ment or use which has been described by the landowner
through plans and other materials submitted to the
governing body, agency or officer of the municipality
whose action or failure to act is in question on the
appeal, it may order the described development or use
approved as to all elements or it may order it approved
as to some elements and refer other elements to the
governing body, agency or officer having jurisdiction
thereof for further proceedings, including the adoption
of alternative restrictions, in accordance with the court's
opinion and order.
The court shall retain jurisdiction of the appeal during
the pendency of any such further proceedings and may,
upon motion of the landowner, issue such supplemen-
tary orders as it deems necessary to protect the rights of
the landowner as declared in its opinion and order.
(3) The fact that the plans and other materials
referred to in subsection (1) are not ina form or are not
accompanied by other submissions which are required
for final approval of the development or use in question
or for the issuance of permits shall not prevent the court
from granting the definitive relief authorized in subsec-
tion (2) and the court may act upon preliminary or
sketch plans by framing its decree to take into account
the need for further submissions before final approval is
granted.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the remedy ordered by the courts below
pursuant to Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon) is a judi-
cial usurpation repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States of the legislature’s portion of the “police power.”
2. Whether the courts of Pennsylvania in construing the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution have
erroneously restricted and held unconstitutional the legiti-
mate exercise of the “police power” by a local municipality.
A
Statement of the Case
ut
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Borough of Fox Chapel is located in northeastern
Allegheny County, approximately twelve miles from Pitts-
burgh’s Golden Triangle. The terrain in Fox Chapel Borough
is hilly, made up of slopes, valleys and streams. The
Borough's unique character, and its attractiveness to resi-
dents and prospective residents, stem from its natural rural
character, typified by a watershed contained within the
Borough, winding roads following the contours of the land,
wooded areas, open space (called “parkways”) along major
roads, and low population density. As a green space, the
Borough is an environmental asset to Allegheny County.
Wildlife and vegitation are protected in the Borough's 190-
acre park system. These characteristics of the Borough and
similar areas enhance the ability of the Pittsburgh area to
attract industry and high quality professionals who serve
industry so that the residential and environmental quality of
Fox Chapel Borough is beneficial to the total economy of the
Pittsburgh area.
Fox Chapel’s present zoning is based upon the 1963
Comprehensive Plan prepared by the Pittsburgh Regional
Planning Association. The Plan recommended the protec-
tion and continuation of the Borough’s unique quality result-
ing from its spacious character of development. These
recommendations are reflected in Ordinance No. 319,
enacted in 1971, which states the following objectives:
(1) To preserve the character of Fox Chapel as a
spacious, suburban, residential community.
(2) To preserve land areas of particular scenic, geo-
logical or botanical interest as permanent open space.
(3) To minimize pollution of the environment by
objectional noise, vibrations, smoke, fumes, odors,
harsh lights, solid wastes and liquid borne effluents.
6 - Statement of the Case
(4) To assure that all residential construction meets
adeq: ate standards with respect to light, air, fire protec-
tion, and other desirable qualities to ensure a safe,
wholesome residential environment for every resident
of Fox Chapel.
(5) To assure that institutions in the Borough pro-
vide sufficient off-street parking space to render on-
street parking normally unnecessary.
(6) To create a safe, free-flowing traffic circulation
pattern.
(7) To assure that aH development promotes fire
safety by employing safe practices and by providing
adequate site accessibility to fire equipment.
On March 25, 1974, John A. Friday, Jr., filed an applica-
tion asking the Fox Chapel Borough Zoning Hearing Board
to hear his challenges to Fox Chapel’s Zoning Ordinance.
Mr. Friday challenged the failure of the Ordinance to pro-
vide for multi-family dwellings and the inclusion of his 23
acre tract in the Class A Residence District, providing for sin-
gle family dwellings. As last amended, Mr. Friday’s applica-
tion proposed a five-story building containing 181 “luxury”
apartments with floor areas approximating 1,500 square feet
per unit. y
Fox Chapel Borough's Zoning Hearing Board began to
hear testimony on December 12, 1974, after a three judge
panel denied a request by Mr. and Mrs. Harold Hammer and
others that the Fox Chapel Zoning Board be enjoined from
conducting any proceedings concerning the Friday applica-
tion. The Hammers and their co-plaintiffs argued, inter alia,
that Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon) was unconstitu-
tional because it required the courts to sit as super zoning
boards, but the merits of this argument were not reached
since the panel held that the plaintiffs failed to show “irrep-
Statement of the Case 7
arable injury” in the absence of judicial intervention. Nei-
mann v. Hewitt, 987 F.Supp. 926 (W.D.Pa. 1974). Twenty-
four sessions of the Zoning Hearing Board were held to
consider the Friday applications, and the testimony con-
cluded on November 5, 1975. The Zoning Hearing Board
found that the structure proposed by Mr. Friday would be
incompatible with existing single family use and totally out
of character with the Borough of Fox Chapel from the points
of view of aesthetics, density, environment and planning. In
addition to these concerns, the Zoning Hearing Board noted
the following:
1. The Borough’s roads, and in particular Fairview Road
upon which the Friday property fronts, were not ade-
quate to handle the kind of traffic generated by high-
rise apartments.
2. Fox Chapel’s volunteer firemen have no equipment
which would be adequate to rescue residents from
upper floors of a multi-story apartment building.
3. The Friday tract contains soft impermeable soil
which presents a great risk of landslide. This risk would
be reduced by development of the site in single-family
dwellings.
4. The sewage treatment facilities proposed by Mr. Fri-
day fail to meet either local or state standards.
On January 16, 1976, Mr. Friday took an appeal from
the decision of the Fox Chapel Zoning Hearing Board to the
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Permission to
intervene as appellees was granted to Mr. and Mrs. William
A. Jones and Mr. and Mrs. Hammer in July, 1976, and to the
Borough of Fox Chapel on September 2, 1976.
The Court of Common Pleas decided the matter on the
record made before the Zoning Hearing Board and the
S How the Federal Questions were Raised
and Decided Below
briefs submitted by the parties. On September 9, 1976,
Judge Watson, speaking for the Court, found the Borough of
Fox Chapel’s Zoning Ordinance of 1971 “unconstitutional to
the extent that it prohibits apartment building construction
in the Borough of Fox Chapel” (p. lla), and ordered the
Borough of Fox Chapel to “take immediate steps to revise its
zoning ordinances to provide for apartment buildings” (id).
Petitions to modify the Court's Opinion and Order were
filed by all parties. In an Opinion and Order entered January
11, 1977, Judge Watson vacated his order directing the
Borough of Fox Chapel to amend its Zoning Ordinance, but
ordered “the Zoning Officer of the Borough of Fox Chapel
[to] issue a building permit to [Mr. Friday]” (p. la).
The appellant herein appealed to the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania which filed an Opinion and Order on
January 9, 1978, affirming “the order of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Allegheny County made September 9, 1976, as
(p. 20a).
—~—7*>
modified by its order of January 11, 1977
Appellants, thereafter, petitioned the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania for Allowance of Appeal, but the Petition was
denied without opinion on July 21, 1975.
HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS WERE RAISED
AND DECIDED BELOW
On appeal to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylva-
nia from Judge Watson's modified opinion, the appellants
set forth, inter alia, the following positions:
Il. Fox Chapel Borough's zoning ordinance is valid
under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Ill. The requirement by the Court below that Fox
Chapel Borough issue a building permit violates
the Constitution of the United States.
How the Federal Questions were Raised Y
and Decided Below
Appellants argued that the Pennsylvania decisions hold-
ing zoning ordinances similar to Fox Chapel’s “unconstitu-
tional” were based on the erroneous premise that the police
power as circumscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments does not extend to the preservation of beauty,
spaciousness, aesthetics, and other spiritual values. Further-
more, it was argued if the ordinance were invalid, the order
of the lower court compelling the Borough to issue a permit
without a determination of site suitability was an improper
usurpation of the Borough’s legislative discretion. Since
Judge Watson held Pa. Star. ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon)
required such a remedy, appellants attacked the validity of
the statute.
These contentions of the appellants were rejected in the
opinion of the Commonwealth Court. After first holding
that the total exclusion of apartments rebutted the ordi-
nance’s presumption of validity, the Court continued:
The Borough says that it carried its burden of justifying
its exclusion of apartment use by showing that apart-
ments would cause an increase in population which
would in turn place a strain on municipal services, cause
congestion of its roads and do harm to the aesthetic
nature of the Borough. Similar justifications were spe-
cifically rejected in Girsh Appeal, supra.
In the final paragraph, the Court said:
Finally, we find no merit in the Borough's contention
that the court below improperly usurped the Borough's
legislative discretion by ordering that a building permit
be issued to Friday. Section 1011 of the MPC, [Pxa. Start.
ANN. tit. 53, §$11011 (Purdon),] authorizes courts to give
just such relief upon a successful challenge of a regula-
tion.
10 The Federal Questions are Substantial
These arguments were also presented in appellants’
Petition for Allowance of Appeal from Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania which was filed with the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
however, denied the petition without opinion.
THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL
1. The Lower Court's Order Affirmed on Appeal Com-
pelling the Zoning Officer of the Borough of Fox
Chapel to Issue a Building Permit to the Respondent is a
Usurpation of the Legisl tive Portion of the “Police
Power” Sanctioned by Pa. Star. Ann. tit. 53, $1101]
(Purdon), but Repugnant to the Constitution of the Uni-
ted States.
Appellants submit that the police power is simply the
will of the majority which is exercisable through their
elected representatives and limited only by the rights of indi-
viduals and minorities as embodied in the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendment concepts of Due Process and Equal
Protection. The role of the judiciary in the administration of
the police power is limited to the determination of whether a
particular legislative act interferes with those rights. See Ber-
man v. Parker, infra.
In the original opinion filed in this case on September 9,
1976, Judge Watson directed Fox Chapel Borough to revise
its zoning ordinance (p. Ila). In that opinion, he scru-
pulously avoided making the legislative determination of
whether or not the Friday tract was an appropriate site for an
apartment building. Subsequently convinced that he lacked
the power to compel Fox Chapel Borough to amend its zon-
ing ordinance, Judge Watson directed the issuance of a
building permit (p. 14a). By ordering the issuance of a build-
ing permit, the Court has in effect amended the zoning ordi-
nance of the Borough of Fox Chapel so as to allow multi-
The Federal Questions are Substantial 1]
family residences on the Friday tract. For the reasons set
forth below, appellants submit that this de facto amendment
of the zoning ordinance is contrary to the United States Con-
stitution.
We are concerned here with the zoning question of who
may determine the uses to which a given parcel of land may
be put. When confronted for the first time with review of a
zoning ordinance, in Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 359. 387
(1926), this Court stated:
Vhe ordinance now under review and all similar
laws and regulations. must find their justification in
some aspect of the police power, asserted tor the public
welfare.
Therefore, in this case, the responsibility of the different
branches of government in the exercise of what is commonly
known as the “police power” must be determined.
The police power has been “reserved to the States, for
there is in the Constitution no grant thereof to Congress.”
Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 144 (1909). The ques-
tion of who may exercise the police power has been ans-
wered most succinctly by the Supreme Court of California
in Frost v. Los Angeles, 181 Cal. 22. 183 Pac. 342 (1919):
The legislature is possessed of the entire police
power of the state, except as its power is limited by pro-
visions of the Constitution.
Hlowever, it is well settled that a State may delegate to
municipal legislative bodies the discretion to enact local
ordinances which are supportable by the police power.
Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922). The Pennsylvania
legislature did this in the Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805 Art. I,
$601, Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 53, §10601 (Purdon) which provides:
12 The Federal Questions are Substantial
The governing body of each municipality, in accer-
dance with the conditions and procedures set forth in
this act, may enact, amend and repeal zoning ordi-
nances to implement comprehensive plans and to
accomplish any of the purposes of this act.
Furthermore, the legislature listed among the “purposes” for
which zoning should be enacted the promotion of “proper
density of population” and prevention of “overcrowding of
land.” Act of July 31, 1968, P.L.. S05, Art. VI, §604, Pa. Star.
ANN. tit 53, §10604 (Purdon).
In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954), this Court
commented on the different roles performed by the legisla
ture and the judiciary in the promulgation of laws dependent
upon the police power.
The definition [of the police power] is essentially the
product of legislative determinations addressed to the
purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly
nor historically capable of complete definition. Subject
to specific constitutional limitations, when the legisla-
ture has spoken, the public interest has been declared in
terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature,
not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public
needs to be served by social legislation, ... The role of
the judiciary in determining whether that power is
being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely
narrow one.
Therefore, once the court had determined that Fox Chapel
Borough had failed to exercise the police power for a public
purpose, its function in the administration of the police
power was completed. The Pennsylvania statute which, in
effect, allowed the court to exercise its discretion in deter-
mining that a particular parcel was suitable for a particular
use is Contrary to the rationale of cases barring State legisla-
tures from contracting away their right to exercise the police
power wherein this Court has said:
Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the
extent and boundaries of the police power, and how-
The Federal Questions are Substantial 13
ever difficult it may be to render a satisfactory defini-
tion of it, there seems to be no doubt that it does extend
to the protection of the lives, health, and property of the
citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the
public morals. The legislature cannot, by any contract,
divest itself of the power to provide for these
objects.... [T]hey are to be attained and provided for
by such appropriate means as the legislative discretion
may devise. That discretion can no more be bargained
away than the power itself. Beer Co. v» Massachusetts.
97 U.S. 25 (1877).
Texas & N.O.R.R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U.S. 408 (1911).
The Pennsylvania legislature’s delegation of the discretion
embodied in the police power to another branch of govern-
ment is at least as offensive to the scheme of government
contemplated by the United States Constitution as is the con-
tracting away of the police power discretion.
The Pennsylvania courts have not been blind to the
improper delegation of responsibility provided for in the
statute in question. In Ellick v. Board of Supervisors of Wor-
cester Township, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 414, 333 A.2d 239,
246 (1975), the Commonwealth Court made the following
comments when confronted with a local ordinance which
did not allow the construction of townhouses within the
township's borders.
A reading of section 1011 of the MPC, [Pa. Stat.
ANN. tit. 53, §11011 (Purdon) ], permits one to conclude
that the Legislature, through the 1972 amendments, has
imposed upon the courts of common pleas broad and
burdensome duties and authority. In effect, the Legisla-
ture has directed those courts to act as administrative
bodies (as super zoning boards of adjustment) which
the appellate courts in this Commonwealth have stated
many times is net a proper judicial function.© We
*The traditional view has been that the responsibility for zoning
rests with the municipality involved rather than the courts, and that
therefore courts should not act as super zoning boards of adjustment
or master planners of the last resort. (Cites omitted.) *
l4 The Federal Questions are Substantial
believe that secial and economic problems of society
presented in zoning cases should properly be resolved
by the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment rather than by the courts. Courts are intended to
decide cases on the facts and the law presented, and
were never intended to dictate legislative matters (e.g.
reasonable side- yard dimensions) as may be involved in
challenging landowners’ plans. Nonetheless we may not
disregard the intent of the Legislature which is
expressed in the MPC.
In the present case the Commonwealth Court acknow!-
edged that “[s|ite suitability is an appropriate consideration
going to the type of relief” (p. 19a), but approved the lower
court's order which failed to consider the same. Thus. the
Borough of Fox Chapel and its citizens have been denied the
right to have legislators elected by the majority exercise the
police power, a power reserved to the people by the Tenth
Amendment, and limited only by other Constitutional con-
siderations.
In summary, since zoning is an exercise of the police
power and because the police power must be exercised
through a legislative body, it logically follows that a change
in zoning can only be effected by the appropriate legislative
assembly having jurisdiction of the particular property. The
present order rezones a tract of land in Fox Chapel Borough
without any opportunity for the Borough’s legislators to con-
sider the suitability of the site. Upona finding of abuse of the
police power by the legislative branch, a constitutionally
permissible remedy would be for a court to retain jurisdic-
tion (as is already provided for in Pa. Stat. ANw. tit. 53,
§11011 (Purdon) ) and require the legislative body to correct
any deficiency in the ordinance. The remedy would be sim-
ilar to court orders in desegregation cases and election redis-
tricting cases. An order which only requires compliance by
the respondent with valid building controls in effect on the
date of respondent's original application for a building per-
The Federal Questions are Substantial 15
mit (p. 4a) unfairly denies the Borough of Fox Chapel’s
right to promulgate building controls, for the controls in
effect at the date of original application were not promul-
gated with the expectation that said controls would govern
the erection of multi-family dwellings.
Il. The Courts of Pennsylvania Held the Zoning Ordinance
of Fox Chapel Borough Unconstitutional Because of an
Erroneous Interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.
The order of the Court of Common Pleas which appel-
lants have beretofore disputed as being repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States was predicated upon the
same court's holding that “Fox Chapel Borough's Ordinance
No. 319 is unconstitutional to the extent that it provides for
only single family dwellings and not for apartment build-
ings’ (p. Ya-10a). On appeal, the Commonwealth Court
accepted the lower court's holding that “the Zoning Ordi-
nance was exclusionary and therefore unconstitutional”
(16a-17a). Neither opinion makes any reference to the Uni-
ted States Constitution or the Pennsylvania Constitution.
much less any specific section of either constitution. Both
courts relied primarily upon the decision of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237. 263 A.2d
395 (1970), to arrive at their determinations that Fox Chape!
Borough's zoning ordinance was unconstitutional.
The facts of Girsh are strikingly similar to those of the
present case. In Girsh, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reviewed the zoning ordinance of Nether Providence Town-
ship which did not expressly provide for the construction of
multi-unit apartment buildings anywhere within the borders
of the township. The Court concluded that a zoning scheme
that makes no reasonable provision for apartment uses could
not be “constitutionaliy” sustained. The only reference to
either the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions is
found in footnote 3 wherein the Court said:
16 The Federal Questions are Substantial
We must start with the basic proposition that absent
more, an individual should be able to utilize his own
land as he sees fit. U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV.
Although zoning is, in general, a proper exercise of
police power which can permissibly limit an individu-
al’s property rights, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926), it goes without
saving that the use of the police power cannot be unreas-
onable. E.g., Eller v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 1,198
A.2d 863 (1964).
Fortunately, further clarification of the basis for the Girsh
decision is found in Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board of the
Township of Upper Providence, Pa. 382 A.2d 105
(1977). The dispositive issue in Surrick was again “whether
the township ordinance unconstitutionally exclude[d] multi-
family dweilings”. 382 A.2d 106. Before examining the facts
of the Suriick case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
stated:
Article I Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution pro-
tects the citizen’s right to the enjoyment of private prop-
erty, and governmental interference with this right is
circumscribed by the due process provisions of the
Fitth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV: Pa. Const.
art. 1, $1: Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 241 n. 3, 263 A.2d
395, 397 n. 3 (1970). In reviewing zoning ordinances, this
Court has stated that an ordinance must bear a substan-
tial relationship to the health, safety, morals, or general
welfare of the community. National Land and Invest-
ment Co. v. Eastiown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa.
304, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965), citing, inter alia. Glo-
rioso Appeal, 413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668 (1964). Thus,
without expressly labelling it as such, this Court has
employed a substantive due process analysis in review-
ing zoning schemes and has concluded implicitly that
exclusionary or unduly restrictive zoning techniques do
The Federal Questions are Substantial 17
not have the requisite substantial relationship to the
public welfare. See Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466,
268 A.2d 765 (1970); Girsh Appeal, supra.
This Court recently reminded the States that “a State may
not impose such greater restrictions [on police activity] as a
matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifi-
caly refrains from imposing them”. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714, 719 (1975). This Court was confronted with a state
court's interpretation of the breadth of protection provided
by the self-incrimination clause of the federal Constitution in
Oregon v. Hass, but the same concept forbids the Pennsylva-
nia courts from placing greater restrictions as a matter of
federal constitutional law on the use of the police power than
are mandated by the decisions of this Court. In reliance upon
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, the courts of Pennsylvania in Girsh and its pro-
geny, including the case herein appealed, have placed upon
the exercise of the police power by legislative bodies far
greater restrictions than are required by this Court's state-
ments of federal constitutional law.
Initially, it is not clear that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court is applying the correct test of substantive due process.
In Surrick, the Court said that a zoning ordinance must bear
a substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals, or gen-
eral welfare of the community. The very same test was ap-
plied by this Court in determining the constitutionality of the
concept of zoning in Euclid v. Ambler Co.. supra, at 395.
However, this Court's view of the proper scope of judicial
review of economic and social legislation has changed dras-
tically since Euclid was decided in 1926. If Euclid were to be
decided today on substantive due process grounds this
Court would, in all probability, apply a “minimal rational-
ity” test as it did in Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247-248
(1976), wherein a police officer complained that a local regu-
IS The Federal Questions are Substantial
lation limiting the length of policemen’s hair violated his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment which this Court
noted “protects substantive aspects of liberty against uncon-
stitutional restrictions by the State”. Id. at 244. This Court's
predilection towards applying a “minimal rationality” test to
a zoning ordinance is evidenced by its decision in Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) where this Court
noted:
We deal with economic and social legislation where
legislatures have historically drawn lines which we
respect against the charge of violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause if the law be“ ‘reasonable. not arbitrary’ ”
(quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412.
415) and bears a “rational relationship toa [permissible]
state objective”. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71. 76.
Absent the involvement of a suspect classification or a fun-
damental right which requires the application of a strict
scrutiny test, it appears that this Court presently applies sub-
stantially the same test in Fourteenth Amendment cases
whether the Due Process or the Equal Protection Clause is
involved.
Regardless of whether a “substantial” or a “rational”
relationship is required, said relationship must be to the
health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community.
The Pennsylvania courts provided appellants the opportun-
ity to establish the requisite relationship, but in assessing the
evidence offered to support the constitutionality of the ordi-
nance under attack, the state courts committed an error of
constitutional magnitude.
The trial court noted that the findings made by the Zon-
ing Hearing Board contained objections which “were gen-
eral attacks on the apartment building as not fitting into the
aesthetic setting of Fox Chapel” (p. 9a). Judge Watson dis-
The Federal Questions are Substantial 19
missed these findings based on the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's statement in Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 226, 104
A.2d 118, 122 (1954), that “neither aesthetic reasons nor con-
servation of property values or the stabilization of economic
values in a township are, singly or combined. sufficient to
promote the health or the morals or the safety or the general
welfare of the township or its inhabitants or property
owners’.
At the appellate level, the Commonwealth Court noted
that one reason given by the Borough to justify the exclusion
of apartments was potential “harm to the aesthetic nature of
the Borough” (p. 18a). The Court’s only comment on that jus-
tification was that a similar argument had been specifically
rejected in Girsh. The Court was correct in its holding to the
extent that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Girsh did
affirm its prior position that “protecting the character —
really the aesthetic nature — of the municipality is not suffi-
cient justification for an exclusionary zoning technique”,
Girsh Appeal, supra, at 244. “Exclusionary” as defined by the
Pennsylvania appellate courts refers to the exclusion of a
particular use from a municipality rather than an exclusion of
any group or Class, discrimination against whom is constitn-
tionally proscribed. See Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning
Board of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967); Girsh
Appeal, supra.
The holdings of the Pennsylvania courts on the question
of whether the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments allow the
police power to be exercised to preserve the aesthetic quali-
ties of a community are the exact opposite of this Court's
statements on the subject. In Berman v. Parker, supra, the
appellant challenged the District of Columbia Redevelop-
ment Act of 1945 as being contrary to the Fifth Amendment's
due process and eminent domain clauses. This Court said:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclu-
sive. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.
20 The Federal Questions are Substantial
421, 424. The values it represents are spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the commun-
ity should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its auth-
orized agencies have made determinations that take
into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to
reappraise them. If those who govern the District of
Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be
beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth
Amendment that stands in the way.
If the Fifth Amendment allows the governing body of the
District of Columbia to determine that their community
should be beautiful, then obviously the Pennsylvania courts
have erred in holding that the Fifth Amendment as applied
to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
governing body of Fox Chapel Borough from deciding that
Fox Chapel Borough shall be beautiful and spacious.
Furthermore, this Court's view has not changed since
the Berman case was decided in 1954. While reviewing a
zoning ordinance challenged on equal protection grounds in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, supra, at 9, this Court again
supported “aesthetic” zoning when it said:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and
motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a
land use project addressed to family needs. This goalisa
permissable one within Berman v. Parker, supra. The
police power is not confined to elimination of filth.
stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones
Where family values, youth values, and blessings of
quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary
for people.
A comparison of Berman and Belle Terre to the Pennsyl-
vania Court's refusal to accept aesthetic concerns asa proper
Conclusion 2
justification for the exercise of the police power in this case
compels the conclusion that Pennsylvania has imposed
greater restrictions on the police power as a matter of federal
constitutional law than this Court imposed on the police
power under similar circumstances. Theretore, this case
merits review and reversal.
CONCLUSION
For the Foregoing Reasons, Probable Jurisdiction
Should Be Noted.
Respectfully submitted,
A. Bruck Bowpren
Larry Kk. Coptorr
BUCTIANAN, INGERSOLL. RODEW ALD,
KYLE & BUERGER
oth Floor, 600 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
Counsel for Appellants
October 19, 1978
Appendix la
IN THE
Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania
Civil Division
IN Re: Application Of John A. Friday,
Jr.. Et Ux. Requesting Fox
Chapel Borough Zoning Hear-
ing Board To Hear Applicants’ S.A. 96
Challenges To The Fox Chapel p of 1976
Zoning Ordinance And Map
And Make Findings Of Fact
And Divisions Based Thereon.
OPINION
Watson, J.
This matter comes before the Court upon the Petition
and Appeal of John A. Friday, Jr., from the decision of the
Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Fox Chapel,
Allegheny County.
The petitioner had applied to the Fox Chapel Borough
officials for permission to construct an apartment building
or multiple-family dwellings on a tract of land owned by the
petitioner situated within the Borough of Fox Chapel. The
building permits were denied. Following the refusal by the
Borough to issue the building permit, the petitioner chal-
lenged the validity of the zoning ordinance cited by the
Borough as grounds for the denial. The Zoning Ordinance of
1971 (Ordinance No. 319, Borough of Fox Chapel) permits,
in relevant part, only one single family dwelling per lot in the
Borough of Fox Chapel.
The Municipalities Planning Code in Sections 910 and
1004 (53 P.S. 10101, et seq.) provides the legislative authority
for an aggrieved individual to challenge the constitutionality
2a Appendix
of a zoning ordinance. The Fox Chapel Zoning Hearing
Board heard the petitioner's appeal, and dismissed his con-
stitutional objections. From the dismissal of his constitu-
tional challenges to the ordinance the petitioner has
appealed to this Court.
The Court has the burden of analyzing zoning ordi-
nances for constitutional defects. It is important to note that
a zoning ordinance is presumed to be valid and constitu-
tional and anyone challenging an ordinance has a heavy
burden of proving otherwise. In the present case Ordinance
No. 319 authorizes only single family dwellings (with certain
exceptions for churches, municipal buildings. fire house,
post office and school—none of which are involved here).
The petitioner has sought building permits to construct an
apartment building. In cases where a municipality attempts
to totally prohibit an otherwise lawful use of land througha
zoning ordinance the Commonwealth Court has stated:
“When an individual challenging a zoning ordi-
nance provides [sic] a total prohibition of an otherwise
lawful use, the burden shifts to the municipality to
prove that such prohibition bears a relationship to the
public health, safety, morals and general welfare. See
Beaver Gasoline Com pany, supra; Amerada Hess Cor-
poration vs. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 11 Pa.
Comm. 115, 313 A.2d 787 (1973).”
Ellick vs. Board of Supervisors of Warchester [sic]
Township, 333 A.2d 239 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1975)
The Pennsylvania Suoreme Court has dealt with zoning
ordinances which totally prohibit a legitimate use of land,
such as apartment building construction in the Girsh Appeal,
437 Pa. 237 (1970). In Girsh. supra, Nether Providence
Township was zoned approximately 75% for single family
dwelling units. The petitioner-appellant requested building
~
Appendix 3a
permits for a high rise apartment building. The permits were
denied by the Township Board of Commissioners. Appel-
lant then challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance
which did not explicitly prohibit multi-unit apartment build-
ings, but were not provided for in the ordinance. except by
way of variance. The Zoning Board of Appeal upheld the
constitutionality of the ordinance. An appeal was taken and
the Supreme Court stated:
“Just as we held in Exton Quarries'!, Ammon R.
Smith?, and Norate® that the governing bodies must
make some provision for the use in question, we today
follow those cases and hold that appellee cannot have a
zoning scheme that makes no reasonable provision for
apartment uses.”
(1. Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,
425 Pa. 43 (1967). Supreme Court struck down an
ordinance which did not allow quarrying anywhere
in the municipality.
- Ammon R. Smith Auto Co. Appeal, 423 Pa. 493
(1966). Supreme Court struck down an ordinance
which placed a total ban on flashing signs.
bo
3. Norate Corp. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 417
Pa. 397 (1965). Supreme Court struck down an ordi-
nance prohibiting billboards everywhere in the
municipality. |
After a lengthy admonition of Nether Providence
Township for attempting “to avoid the increased responsi-
bilities and economic burdens which time and natural
growth invariably bring”, the Supreme Court went further
to state:
“Thus, the suburbs, which at one time were merely
‘bedrooms’ for those who worked in the urban core, are
now becoming active business areas in their own right
da Appendix
... In light of this, Nether Providence Township may
not permissibly choose to only take as many people as
can live in single-family housing, in effect freezing the
population at near present levels. Obviously, if every
municipality took that view, population spread would
be completely frustrated. Municipal services must be
provided somewhere, and if Nether Providence is a log-
ical place for development to take place, it should not
be heard to say that it will not bear its rightful part of the
burden. Certainly it can protect its attractive character
by requiring apartments to be built in accordance with
(reasonable) set-back, open space, height, and other
light-and-air requirements, but it cannot refuse tomake
any provision for apartment living. The simple fact that
someone is anxious to build apartments is strong indica-
tion that the location of this township is such that people
are desirous of moving in, and we do not believe Nether
Providence can close its doors to those people.
It is not true that the logical results of our holding
today is that a municipality must provide for all types of
land use. This case deals with the right of people to‘live
on land’, a very different problem than whether appel-
lee must allow certain industrial uses within its borders.
Apartment living is a fact of life that communities like
Nether Providence must learn to accept.” (emphasis
added)
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is perfectly clear in its
denunciation of zoning ordinances which totally prohibit
certain types of activities. When a zoning ordinance
attempts to prohibit apartment houses, or by practical effect
to exclude them by making no provision therefor or authori-
zation therefor, the Court is even more damning in its denun-
ciation, since it deals with the rights of people to “live on
land”. This Court is not unmindful of Fox Chapel’s desire to
preserve the character of its community. But to totally
Appendix 5a
exclude apartment buildings is unreasonableon its face. The
municipality has the burden of demonstrating to the Court's
satisfaction that its ordinance bears a relationship to the pub-
lic health, safety, morals and general welfare.
II.
It is the position of this Court that the appellant has
established that Ordinance No. 319 provides for exclusion-
ary zoning, and its practical effect is to exclude apartment
buildings from the borough. It was pointed out extensively
above that our Supreme Court held a zoning ordinance
which failed to provide for multi-family housing, in that case
apartment structures, to be unconstitutional. Girsh Appeal,
supra, Appeal of FPA Corporation, 360 A.2d 85] (Pa.
CmwIlth, June 18, 1976). In Camp Hill Development Co..
Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Dauphin, 13 Pa.
CmwIth. 519 (1973), the court held that the Girsh principle
applied equally to townhouses.
The burden has shifted to the municipality to prove that
the prohibition of apartment houses bears a relationship to
the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of the
citizens of the municipality.
The borough oi Fox Chapel, as intervenor, and the Zon-
ing Hearing Board counsel have responded by alleging that:
1. The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
Zoning Hearing Board should not be disturbed by the
Court;
2. The petitioner has not met his burden of proving that
Ordinance No. 319 is unconstitutional:
3. The Ordinance No. 319 is not exclusionary;
4. The proposals of the applicants would adversely
affect the health, safety and welfare of the residents
of Fox Chapel and the community.
6a Appendix
A.
The first point raised by the Borough is that the Zoning
Hearing Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of lew
should not be disturbed by the reviewing Court. It was
argued that the applicant presented no affirmative testi-
mony as to the need for the development the applicant
sought, nor was there testimony presented that the appli-
cant’s proposed apartment buildings would cure the ill gen-
erally associated with exclusionary zoning, i.e. denial of
housing to the poor and lower middle income groups, and
minorities. It was further argued that Fox Chapel is part ofa
regional system with four other contiguous municipalities
which, taken together, give a regional plan of development
which encompass the multi-family dwelling units proposed
by the applicants.
From the Court’s reading of the Girsh Appeal the basis
of the decision was not the denial of housing to the poor, dis-
advantaged or minorities. The basis of the case was to force
municipalities to accept the fact of population spread, and
not to permit a municipality to zone out the right of people to
“live on land”. This Court, of course. recognizes that a
municipality has the right to set reasonable regulations to
protect the attractive quality of the community and to
require apartment houses to conform to reasonable height.
space, light-and-air type requirements.
The Supreme Court in Girsh did not examine surround-
ing communities to determine if Nether Providence Town-
ship was part of a regional scheme of development. The
Court looked to the zoning ordinance in effect in that com-
munity and made a decision on the constitutionality of that
ordinance alone. Even if, by an historical accident. that Fox
Chapel and the surrounding municipalities comprise an area
which, taken as a whole, provides a reasonable development
plan, the fact remains that there is a zoning ordinance in
Appendix 7a
existence which totally excludes apartment houses from one
municipality. There is no guarantee in the future that the Fox
Chapel region will develop as it has in the past. There is no
legally binding regional plan.
B.
The second issue raised is whether Friday met his
burden in establishing the unconstitutionality of Ordinance
No. 319.
The Court has already dealt with this issue in the first
part of its Opinion. The law is clear and precedent is set.
Zoning ordinances cannot totally exclude multi-family
dwellings from a municipality.
ce
The third argument advanced is that the zoning ordi-
nance of Fox Chapel is not exclusionary. It is argued that it is
not sufficient for the applicant to show or to argue that the
zoning is exclusionary. He must also show that it is exclusion-
ary as to his property.
Once again the appellees refer to the regional grouping
of communities surrounding Fox Chapel. Fox Chapel was
apparently intended to be the green haven for the region.
Testimony stated that Fox Chapel is well planned for the use
for which it was intended. However, this begs the real issue.
Fox Chapel, itself, does exclude multi-family dwellings. The
fact that neighboring municipalities do provide for multi-
family dwellings is of little consequence. The appellees go
further to distinguish the situations in Philadelphia which
puts a population pressure on its suburban communities. It is
acknowledged that no such pressure exists on the Fox
Chapel region. However, in Girsh, supra, it was stated:
“The simple fact that someone is anxious to build
apartments is strong indication that the location of this
CS SSESSSS'SS 3) ae
Sa Appendix
township is such that people are desirous of moving in,
and we do not believe Nether Providence can close its
doors to those people.”
The question in the present case is not one of population
pressure, but of rights. The right of an individual to use his
land v. the right of the municipality to preserve what it con-
ceives to be its character. The Court is not faced with the
rights of the landowner. Rather, the rights of the municipal-
ity are before the Court. The Court is not saying that the
landowner has a right to build an apartment house on the
specific parcel of land he owns. As was mentioned above.
the municipality can reasonably regulate the location, size.
acreage, light-and-air, frontage, etc. of apartment houses.
Likewise, the Court is not unmindful of its responsibility to
the community, and does not take lightly its task of ruling
upon a municipality’s zoning ordinance. Aesthetic. scenic
and ecological values are important. In this regard the Court
is guided by the case of National Land and Investment Co. v.
Easttown Twp. Board of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504 (1965).
Therein, the Court held that protecting the character —
really the aesthetic nature — of the municipality is not suffi-
cient justification for an exclusionary zoning technique.
In a footnote to the Girsh case. supra, the Court suc-
cinctly stated:
“But as long as we allow zoning to be done com-
munity by community, it is intolerable to allow one
municipality (or many municipalities) to close its doors
at the expense of surrounding communities and the cep-
tral city.”
D.
The issue raised by the Borough and by counsel for the
Zoning Hearing Board is that the proposal of the applicant
(Friday) would adversely affect the health. safety and wel-
fare of the residents of Fox Chapel.
Appendix 9a
Many of the 226 Findings of Fact by the Zoning Hearing
Board dealt with testimony charging that the proposed
apartment building would have severe negative results on
the community. Road conditions, traffic volume, soil ero-
sion, possible ruptured gas lines, blind driveways, fire
hazards were all reasons cited to exclude apartment build-
ings. The Findings of Fact were extensive, albeit, totally
shaded to the positions taken by the Borough.
In situations where a municipality has totally banned a
legitimate use of land, the applicant has met his burden of
overcoming the presumption of constitutionality by show-
ing the total ban, Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Borough of
Osborne, 445 Pa. 571 (1971). Thereafter, if the municipality
is to sustain the validity of the ban, it must present evidence
to establish the public purpose served by the regulation.
The Court's review of the Zoning Hearing Board's Find-
ings of Fact reveals that most of the findings adverse to the
applicant are grounded upon objections to the apartment
building at its particular proposed location. The remaining
objections were general attacks on the apartment building as
not fitting into the aesthetic setting of Fox Chapel. In relation
to the municipalities’ objections the Supreme Court has
stated:
“We therefore hold that neither aesthetic reasons
nor the conservation of property values or the stabiliza-
tion of economic values in a township are, singly or
combined, sufficient to promote the health or the mor-
als or the safety or the general welfare of the township
or its inhabitants or property owners.” Medinger
Appeal, 377 Pa. 217 (1954)
III.
CONCLUSION
It is the opinion and hoiding of this Court that Fox
Chapel Borough’s Ordinance No. 319 is unconstitutional to
10a Appendix
the extent that it provides for only single family dwellings
and not for apartment buildings. This Court is not holding
that a building permit must be issued to Friday. Nor does the
Court hold that Friday is entitled to build an apartment
building on his property. The Court is ordering Fox Chapel
Borough to redesign its zoning ordinance to provide for
apartment buildings. Apartment buildings themselves are
not, per se, violative of the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the municipality.
Footnote No. 4 in the Girsh case, supra, indicates that
planning and zoning, “in an ideal world,” would be done ona
regional basis. This Court heartily agrees. However, the
present state of the law requires the Court to examine each
challenge to the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance ona
community to community basis. Each municipality in Penn-
sylvania is viewed as a separate and distinct unit, with lee-
way for the particular characteristics of the area.
Large-scale comprehensive planning which crosses
municipal boundaries and encompasses whole geographical
regions is an ideal for which, unfortunately, the legislature of
our State has not provided mandatory legislation. What that
leaves the Courts with is a case by case examination of each
municipality. This is the only method approved by our
appellate courts.
Therefore, the follwoing [sic]:
lla
Appendix
ORDER OF COURT
Watson, J.
AnD Now, to wit, this 9 day of September, 1976, It Is
HreREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DecREED:
1.) that Zoning Ordinance of 1971 (Ordinance No. 319)
Borough of Fox Chapel is unconstitutional to the
extent that it prohibits apartment building construc-
tion in the Borough of Fox Chapel;
2.) that the Borough of Fox Chapel take immediate steps
to revise its zoning ordinances to provide for apart-
ment buildings; and
3.) that the decision of the Zoning Hearing Board is re-
versed to the extent that it held Ordinance No. 319 to
be constitutional.
12a Appendix
OPINION
Watson, J.
This matter comes before the Court upon the Petition of
John A. Friday, Jr., et ux, to modify the Opinion and Order
of Court rendered by this Court on September 9, 1976 in the
above-captioned case.
In the Opinion of September 9, 1976 the Court held that
Zoning Ordinance No. 319 of the Borough of Fox Chapel
was unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibits apartment
building construction in the Borough of Fox Chapel. The
Court further ordered the Borough of Fox Chapel to take
immediate steps to revise its zoning ordinances to provide
for apartment buildings. The Court also reversed the deci-
sion of the Zoning Hearing Board to the extent that it held
Ordinance No. 319 to be constitutional.
The petitioner has requested the Court to modify its
prior Order in four particulars: 1. vacate its direction to the
Borough of Fox Chapel to revise its zoning ordinances to
provide for apartment buildings; 2. to fully reverse the deci-
sion of the Zoning Hearing Board; 3. to direct the Borough of
Fox Chapel to issue the petitioners a building permit for the
petitioners development plan upon compliance by the peti-
tioners with valid building controls in effect on the date of
the original application; 4. for the Court to retain jurisdiction
over this case to ensure that the rights of the petitioners are
not frustrated or denied.
The Borough of Fox Chapel also requests the Court to
modify and/or vacate its prior Opinion and Order and hold
Ordinance No. 319 to be constitutional.
Appendix 13a
The Court has reviewed the case law submitted to it and
finds merit in the petitioners’ requests. The Court finds that
it may not order the municipality to amend its zoning ordi-
nance, because amendment of a zoning ordinance is purely a
legislative matter, Ellick v. Board of Supervisors of Worces-
ter Township, Pa. Comm. —_, 333 A.2d 239 (1975).
The Court should have gone further than merely invali-
dating the Borough’s Ordinance No. 319. Definitive relief
should have been granted. As the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated in Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board of Warwick
Township, 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974):
“Obviously, if judicial review of local zoning action
is to result in anything more than a farce, the courts must
be prepared to go beyond mere invalidation and grant
definitive relief. To forsake a challenger’s reasonable
development plans after all the time, effort and capital
invested in such a challenge is grossly inequitable.”
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has placed a
burden upon the lower courts. Once the lower court has con-
cluded that the zoning ordinance unlawfully prohibits the
landowner’s proposed development, the landowner should
be permitted to proceed with his proposed development,
and the court below is required to retain jurisdiction during
the pendency of further proceedings, and, upon motion of
the landowner, to issue such supplementary orders as it
deems necessary to protect the rights of the landowner,
Appeal of Olson, Pa. Comm. —_, 338 A.2d 748 (1975).
The petitioner must comply with all administrative require-
ments of the zoning ordinance in effect on the date of the
petitioner's original application which are not inconsistent
with the present Opinion and Order, and the prior Opinion
and Order of September 9, 1976.
Therefore, the following:
l4a Appendix
ORDER OF COURT
Watson, J.
ANb Now, to wit, this 1] day of January, 1977, It Is
HerreBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND Decreep as follows:
|. that the Order of Court dated September 9, 1976 in
the above-captioned case be vacated to the extent that it
ordered the Borough of Fox Chapel to take immediate steps
to revise its zoning ordinances to provide for apartment
buildings:
2. that the Zoning Officer of the Borough of Fox Chapel
issue a building permit to the petitioners for the petitioners’
development plan upon compliance by the petitioners with
valid building controls in effect on the date of the petitioners’
original application for a building permit; and,
3. that this Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter
to ensure that the prompt resolution of any future problems.
Appendix
IN THE
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
IN Re: Application of
John A. Friday, Jr., Et Ux.
Requesting Fox Chapel Borough
Zoning Hearing Board To Hear
Applicants’ Challenges To The
Fox Chapel Zoning Ordinance And
Map And Make Findings Of Fact
And Divisions Based Thereon
Borough Of Fox Chapel, Appellant
IN Re: Application of
John A. Friday, Jr., Et Ux.
Requesting Fox Chapel Borough
Zoning Hearing Board To Hear
Applicants’ Challenges To The
Fox Chapel Zoning Ordinance And
Map And Make Findings Of Fact
And Divisions Based Thereon
William A. Jones, Katherine P.
Jones, Harold H. Hammer And,
Hannah R. Hammer, Appellants
BEFORE:
No. 158
C.D. 1977
No. 303
C.D. 1977
HONORABLE JAMES S. Bowman, President Judge
HoNoRABLE JaAMeEs C. Crumusu, Jr., Judge
HONORABLE Roy WILKINSON, JR., Judge
HONORABLE THEODORE QO. Rocers, Judge
HONORABLE GENEVIEVE BuiattT, Judge
ARGUED: November 2, 1977 — Pittsburgh
16a Appendix
OPINION
OPINION BY JUDGE ROGERS _ Filed: January 9, 1978
The Borough of Fox Chapel has appealed an order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County reversing a
decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Fox
Chapel dismissing a challenge by John A. Friday, Jr. to the
validity of the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance of 1971. William
A. Jones and Katherine P. Jones, his wife, ard Harold H.
Hammer and Hannah R. Hammer, his wife, who intervened
below on the side of the Borough have also appealed.
The Borough Zoning Ordinance does not provide for
multi-family dwelling use anywhere in the Borough. The
oniy permitted residential use of land is for single faimily
homes on one, two or three acre lots. Friday owns a 22.85
acre tract located in a Class A Residential District where the
minimum lot size is three acres. Pursuant to Section 1004 (1)
(a) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
(MPC)! ,53 P.S. §11004 (1) (a), Friday submitted a challenge
to the constitutional validity of the use provisions of the Zon-
ing Ordinance to the Zoning Hearing Board. The submission
included plans for a single six-story, 215 unit apartment
building proposed to be constructed on Friday’s land. Fri-
day later filed an amended plan for eleven three-story build-
ings containing a total of 121 units. During evidentiary
hearings conducted by the Zoning Hearing Board, Friday
further modified his plan by finally proposing to construct
one five-story building containing 181 units. The Zoning
Hearing Board made extensive findings of facts; concluded
that the Zoning Ordinance was valid; and dismissed Friday’s
challenge.
Without taking additional evidence, the court below
reversed the Zoning Hearing Board’s order and held that the
Zoning Ordinance was exclusionary and therefore unconsti-
Appendix l7a
tutional. The court directed the Borough to enact curative
amendments providing for apartment use. Friday filed a
petition in the court below requesting a modification of its
order, citing Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board of Warwick
Township, 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974). The court below
properly vacated its first order in part and entered a second
directing the Borough to issue a building permit to Friday
upon his compliance with valid building controls in effect on
the date of Friday's original application for a building per-
mit. We affirm.
The Borough first says that because ordinances enjoy a
presumption of validity, Friday had the burden of proving
that the Fox Chapel Ordinance was not related to public
health, safety and welfare. With this we agree. The Borough
then says that Friday did not carry this burden by simply
showing that the ordinance totally excluded apartment use.
This proposition is clearly erroneous. When it is demon-
strated that an ordinance entirely excludes a facially legiti-
mate use, the presumption of validity is rebutted; and the
municipality must then present evidence to establish that its
regulation bears a relationship to the public health, safety
and welfare. Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Osborne Borough, 445
Pa. 571, 285 A.2d 501 (1971). Friday’s proposed apartment
house is a legitimate use of land, absent the Zoning Ordi-
nance; the Zoning Ordinance’s failure to provide for this use
is tantamount to its exclusion. Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263
A.2d 395 (1970); Dublin Properties v. Board of Commission-
ers of Upper Dublin Township, 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
54, 342 A.2d 821 (1975). Friday clearly met his burden of
overcoming the presumption of the validity of the Fox
Chapel ordinance.
The rule as to burdens enunciated in Beaver Gasoline
Co. v. Osborne Borough, supra, has been applied in cases
challenging the validity of zoning ordinances prohibiting
18a Appendix
business uses? and those prohibiting various kinds of residen-
tial uses.’ In Girsh Appeal, supra, Mr. Justice Roberts, with
the apparent approval of three other justices, declared that a
prohibition of apartment use has more critical implications
than a prohibition of an industrial or commercial use because
the former restricts the right of people to live on land, and
further that municipalities “cannot have...zoning
scheme[s]| that make no reasonable provision for apartment
uses.” 437 Pa. at 243, 263 A.2d at 398.
The Borough says that it carried its burden of justifying
its exclusion of apartment use by showing that apartments
would cause an increase in population which would in turn
place a strain on municipai services, cause congestion of its
roads and do harm to the aesthetic nature of the Borough.
Similar justifications were specifically rejected in Girsh
Appeal, supra.
The Borough next contends that its ordinance is not
exclusionary because the Borough is not located within the
path of onrushing population expansion and that there is no
demand or need for apartment ‘uses within its boundaries.
The argument was rejected in Girsh Appeal, supra, by the
following phrases:
“The simple fact that someone is anxious to build apart-
ments is strong indication that the location of this [ munici-
pality] is such that people are desirous of moving in, and
we do not believe [the municipality] can close its doors to
those people.” 437 Pa. at 245, 267 A.2d at 399.
The Borough says that Friday’s site cannot support
apartments without endangering the public health, safety
and welfare because of soil conditions unsuitable for the
proper disposition of sewage and subject to landslides. The
Borough misapprehends its burden of proof. The suitability
of Friday’s site is not relevant to an inquiry into the constitu-
Appendix 19a
tional validity of a municipality-wide prohibition of apart-
ment uses. See Girsh Appeal, supra note 6, 437 Pa. at 246, 263
A.2d at 399. Site suitability is an appropriate consideration
going to the type of relief, if any, that should be given to a
landowner after he has successfully challenged an ordi-
nance. See Ellick v. Board of Supervisors of Worcester
Township, 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 404, 333 A.2d 239
(1975).
The Borough next says that its membership in a regional
planning effort cures the otherwise exclusionary and uncon-
stitutional nature of its ordinance. In Nicholas Heim & Kis-
singer v. Township of Harris, Pa. Commonwealth Ct. ;
375 A.2d 1383, 1385 (1977), we addressed and rejected a
similar argument made by a municipality in defense of a
zoning ordinance excluding mobile homes:
“The only defense of the zoning regulation which
requires mention is one based on the Township's mem-
bership in a regional planning effort. Harris Township
contends that this membership, together with an
approved regional comprehensive plan, entitled it to
credit for more substantial provision for mobile home
parks by the zoning ordinances of the other members of
the regional planning group. As we have said on a
number of occasions, a comprehensive plan does not
have the legal effect of a zoning ordinance; the former is
recommendatory and only the latter is regulatory.
Saenger v. Berks County, 9 Pa. Cmwlth. 499, 308 A.2d
175 (1973); Morelli v. Borough of St. Marys, 1 Pa.
Cmwilth. 612, 275 A.2d 889 (1971). Obviously, Harris
Township has no contrel over the future zoning practi-
ces of other municipalities in the region. The exclusion-
ary zoning decisions hereinabove referred to and cited
suggest that it might be a very good thing for the Gen-
eral Assembly to empower municipalities to enter into
binding regional zoning arrangements. Some munici-
Appendix
palities, by reason of size, present land use and physical
conditions, are no doubt inappropriate places for every
Appendix 2la
FOOTNOTES
: 1. Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended.
kind of residential use. If the regional zoning ordinance Jul
should provide the regions’ ‘fair share’ of housing needs, 2. Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Osborne Borough, supra, (pro-
each constituent municipality could then be developed hibition of gasoline stations); General Battery Corp. v.
in accordance with best planning principles applied Zoning Hearing Board of Alsace Township, 29 Pa.
purely and not with an eye to what might pass constitu- Commonwealth Ct. 498, 371 A.2d 1030 (1977). (prohi-
tional muster. However, there is now no such enabling bition of waste disposal plants).
legislation and regional comprehensive planning pro-
vides no justification for a municipality's exclusionary 3. Waynesborough Corp. v. Easttown Township Zoning
zoning practices.” Hearing Board, 23 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 137, 350
% a . ; A.2d 895 (1976), (prohibition of condominiums);
Finally, we find no merit in the Borough’s contention . recy ae
; Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 514, 338
that the court below improperly usurped the Borough’s 9.4 748 (107% et ae ia
cae ; ee A.2d 748 (1975): (prohibition of townhouses); Ellick v.
legislative discretion by ordering that a building permit be > ae , ae ee ae
ssued to Friday. Section 1011 of the MPC. 33 PS. 811011 Board of Supervisors of Worcester Township, 17 Pa.
wap ee Priel eg Yeates paige at aisle S ; Commonwealth Ct. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975), (prohibi-
authorizes courts to give just such relief upon a successft.l mo ma : ;
hall f Lesion Biieks Meaanane E tion of townhouses); Camp Hill Development Co., Inc.
ne ie ~ 7 Sere went: 7 v. Board of Supervisors of v. Zoning Board of Adjustinent, 13 Pa. Commonwealth
Te Ct. 519, 319 A.2d 197 (1974), (prohibition of town-
Order affirmed. : houses).
__ /s/ Turopore ©. Rocers, J... 4. The Borough and the intervenors have additionally
‘Theodore O. Rogers, J.
ORDER
argued that the Court’s order is unconstitutional as vio-
lating the separation of powers doctrine and as depriv-
ing Fox Chapel residents of property without due
process. These contentions are clearly without merit.
AND Now, this 9th day of January, 1978, the order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County made Sep-
tember 9, 1976 as modified by its order of January 11, 1977 is
affirmed.
/s/ THeopore O. Rocers
Theodore O. Rogers, J.
IN Re:
Appendix
IN THE
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
WesTER™N DisTRICT
Application Of John A.
Friday, jr., Et Ux.
Requesting Fox Chapel
Borough Zoning Hearing
Board To Hear
Applicants’ Challenges
To The Fox Chapel
Zoning Ordinance And
Map And Make Findings
Of Fact And Divisions
Based Thereon.
>
No. 1514
Allocatur Docket
APPEAL OF BOROUGH OF FOX CHAPEL.
JONES, ET AL.
ORDER
PETITION DENIED this 21st day of July, 1978.
Per Curiam
Appendix 23a
IN THE
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
IN Re: Application Of John A. :
Friday, Jr. Et Ux.,
Requesting Fox Chapel
Borough Zoning Hearing
Board To Hear Nos. 158 and 303
Applicants’ Challenges Commonwealth
To The Fox Chapel Docket 1977
Zoning Ordinance And
Map And Make Findings
Of Fact And Divisions
Based Thereon ;
NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
Notice is hereby given that the Borough of Fox Chapel,
William A. Jones, Katherine P. Jones, Harold H. Hammer,
and Hannah R. Hammer, the appellants in the above-
captioned matter, hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States from the final judgment of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania denying appellants’ Petition for Allo-
wance of Appeal from Commonwealth Court of Pennsylva-
nia entered in this case on July 21, 1978.
This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257(2).
/s/ A. Bruce BOwDEN
A. Bruce Bowden
/s/ Larry E. CopLorr
Larry E. Coploff
BUCHANAN, INGERSOLL,
_ RODEWALD, KYLE & BUERGER
Attorneys for the Appellants
57th Floor—600 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
(412) 562-8800
Filed: September 25, 1975
~~
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