Petition — St. Vincent's Medical Center v. State Human Rights Appeal Board

——

Supreme Court, U, &

FILED

QCT 10 1978

IN THE MIGHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

Supreme Court of the United. States

October Term, 1978

St. Vincent’s Mepica Center or Ricumonpn,

Petitioner,

against

State Human Ricuts Appeau Boarp, Stare Division or

Human Ricurs, Barpara Ann Mackey, and Parricta P.

HaGBeEra,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF NEW YORK, SECOND DEPARTMENT

I'reverick T. Suva

350 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10022

Attorney for St. Vincent’s Medical

Center of Richmond

Keiizy Dave & Warren

Of Counsel

A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions Below ......:::::c::cscscssssseseesssseeesessneesununseenssserseeeen

JUPIGGICHON oo... secsscssrsssscscescssessscerees 2 SRMMRENEA, coscctsiiaiecsessnes

Questions Presented oo... eee

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions Involved...

Statement of the Case on... eens

Reasons for Granting the Writ 0.0... es

The Question Whether The Preemption Provi-

sions Of ERISA Preclude The Application Of

State Employment Discrimination Laws To

Employee Benefit Plans Of Employers In In-

terstate Commerce Is Both A Substantial And

Important One.

Conclusion ............ se csssenscestceess .

APPENDICES

Appendix A—Opinion of the Appellate Division of the

Supreme Court of New York, Second Department,

dated October 18, 1977 ..... SE

Appendix B—Decision of the New York State Human

Rights Appeal Board, dated December 29, 1975

Appendix C—Decision and Order of the Commis-

sioner of the New York State Division of Human

Fights oeesscccssssseccsssesssaescssersesssnesssssssessnnessseesssessiee

Appendix D—Order of the Appellate Division of the

Supreme Court of New York, Second Department,

dated October 31, 1977 ois

14

Al

A2

AT

I!

PAGE

Appendix E—Decision slip of the New York State

Court of Appeals _— leave to — dated

July 11, 1978 .......... Bo raiesy ica:

Appendix F—Sections 4 and 514 of the maria

Retirement Income saad Act, 29 U.S.C.

ei alt i icdcsssstectecisivesssentanee, SO

Appendix G—Analysis of State Fair - Bmployment

Practice Laws ae .. 423

CITATIONS

Cases:

Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human

Rights Appeal Board, 41 NY2d 84 (1976)... 2,14

City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power

v. Manhart, 98 S. Ct. 1370 (1978) |. 12, 13

Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) 00. 14

General Electric Company v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125

(1976) ..... acces sdasiabessesinskesvavesibeoueis 2,14

Constitutional Provision:

Constitution of the United States, Article VI, §2 ....... 3, 4

Statutes Involved:

Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.C. 1257(3) 2

Employees Retirement Income Security

BOE BP US.0. TOOL Ob 909, «0... cscscscsccccssressersecseesees passim

ids crttih cs tvdyeievdanavesessssysasneavveresvevetsees 4,8

Section 1144

ee

111

PAGE

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VIT .

42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. | ee

Section 2000h-4 Rees *

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.

§621 et seq. aiaee’ Le

New York Human Rights Law

Article 15, Executive Law | oo passim

Section 296(1)(a) ..... ‘ ee. a

Other Sources:

120 Cong. Ree. 29197 (1974) | Naha

120 Cong. Ree. 29933 (1974) . a

120 Cong. Ree. 29942 (1974) i esscssixvcoe

H.C.R. No. 93-1280, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted

in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 5038, 5162 9

H.R. Rep. (Education and Labor Committee) No. 93-

533, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1974]

U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4639, 4641 ............ a ae

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1978

Sr. Vincent’s Mepicat Center or RicHMonD,

Petitioner,

against

Strate Human Riontrs Appeat Boarp, State Division oF

Human Riguts, Barsara Ann Mackey, and Patricia P.

HaGBEra,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF NEW YORK, SECOND DEPARTMENT

Petitioner, St. Vincent’s Medical Center of Richmond

(**St. Vincent’s’’), respectfully prays that a Writ of Cer-

tiorari issue to review the judgment of the Appellate Divi-

sion of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Depart-

ment.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the Appellate Division of the Supreme

Court of New York, Second Department, is officially re-

ported at 59 AD2d 778 and is set forth in App. A, infra, p.

Al. The decision of the State Human Rights Appeal Board,

and the decision and order of the Commissioner of the State

Division of Human Rights made in this case are unreported

and are set forth in App. B and ©, respectively, infra,

pp. A2-A6, A7-A16.

Jurisdiction

The final order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme

Court of New York, Second Department (App. D, infra,

pp. A17-A18) was made and entered on October 31, 1977.

By its decision made on July 11, 1978, the New York Court

of Appeals denied without opinion petitioner’s timely ap-

plication for leave to appeal such order (App. E, infra,

p. Al$).

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§1257(3).

Questions Presented

In General Electric Company v. Gilbert, this Court de-

termined that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabil-

ities from an employer’s disability benefits plan did not

violate the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it did

not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex. Two

weeks later the New York Court of Appeals in Brooklyn

1. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).

A srtee comand ea ten Rea

3

Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal

Board,’ decided that such an exclusion did constitute sex-

discrimination and therefore violated the New York State

Human Rights Law. On the authority of that latter deci-

sion the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New

York, Second Department, held that St. Vincent’s dis-

ability benefits plan violated the New York civil rights stat-

ute because it excluded pregnancy-related disabilities. The

New York Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application

for leave to appeal. The questions presented are:

Whether the New York State Human Rights Law, in-

sofar as it has been construed by that state’s highest court

in 1976 to prohibit as sex discrimination the failure of an

employer in interstate commerce to include coverage of

pregnancy-related disabilities in its employee disability

benefits plan, is invalid under Article VI, §2 of the Consti-

tution of the United States, in that it

(a) is pre-empted by the Federal Employee Re-

tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and,

in any event,

(b) is inconsistent with the provisions of the fed-

eral Civil Rights, Act of 1964, as construed by this

Court, and therefore pre-empted by Section 1104 of

that Act.

2. 41 NY2d 84 (1976).

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions Involved

United States Constitution, Article VI, §2:

‘‘This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States

which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties

made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the

United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and

the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any

Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-

trary notwithstanding.”’

The provisions of Sections 4 and 514 of the Employees

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C, §§1008

and 1144 are set forth at App. F, mfra, pp. A20-A22.

Section 1104 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000h-4:

‘‘Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be

construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress

to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the

exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor

shall any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating

any provision of State law unless such provision is incon-

sistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provi-

sion thereof.’’

The relevant portion of Section 296 of the New York

Human Rights Law, Article 15, Executive Law, is set forth

below:

ee ae

5

“8296. Unlawful discriminatory practices

1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:

(a) For an employer or licensing agency because

of the age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex or

disability or marital status of any individual, to re-

fuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from

employment such individual or to discriminate

against such individual in compensation or in terms,

conditions or privileges of employment,’’

Statement of the Case

This consolidated case grows out of the filing of com-

plaints with the New York State Division of Human Rights

by two female employees of St, Vincent’s in November and

December, 1972, Both complaints alleged that St. Vincent's

had discriminated against the employees on the basis of

their sex in violation of the New York State Human Rights

Law by failing to provide them with disability benefits for

the time they were disabled by pregnancy althengh disabil-

ity benefits are paid by St. Vincent’s in the case of other

non-occupational disabilities,

A consolidated hearing was held by the State Division

of Human Rights and in each case, the Commissioner of the

Division of Human Rights found that St. Vincent's, by its

exclusion of pregnancy from its non-occupational sickness

and accident plan, had discriminated against complainants

on the basis of their sex in violation of the New York

Human Rights Law, The Commissioner ordered, inter alia,

that St, Vincent’s provide disability benefits to female em-

ployees for pregnancy-connected disabilities to the same

extent it provides such benefits to employees for other types

a thas physical disabilities (App. ©, infra, pp, A7-

A timely appeal from the Commissioner’s Decision and

Order was filed with and heard by the New York State

Human Rights Appeal Board. By a Decision and Order

dated December 29, 1975, but mailed August 24, 1976, the

Appeal Board affirmed the order of the Commission, (App,

B, infra, pp. A2-A4),

Thereafter, and pursuant to the provisions of the New

York Human Rights Law, St, Vincent's by a petition in-

stituted a special proceeding in the Appellate Division of

the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department, to

review and set aside the decisions and orders of the Appeal]

Board and of the Commissioner on the ground, among

others, that the decisions and orders are not in conformity

with the laws of the United States,

At the hearing on the petition and in briefs submitted to

the court in connection with such hearing both parties ar-

gued the questions raised in the petition whether the New

York Human Rights Law, as interpreted by the New York

Court of Appeals and applied against St. Vincent's in this

consolidated case, violates the Supremacy Clause of the

Constitution because it is preempted by the provisions of

ERISA and by the provisions of the federal Civil Rights

Act of 1964, The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court

of New York, Second Department, rendered an opinion

(App. A, infra, p, Al) expressly rejecting St. Vineent’s

claim of federal preemption and entered its order ( App. D

infra, pp. A17-A18) confirming the orders of the State

7

Human Rights Appeal Board and dismissing St. Vincent's

petition, Thereafter St. Vincent’s filed a timely notice of

appeal as of right to the New York Court of Appeals and

on April 4, 1978 the New York Court of Appeals granted an

order dismissing the appeal on the ground that since ‘no

substantial constitutional question is directly involved,’’

the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules did not author-

ize an appeal as of right in the circumstances. Thereupon

St. Vincent's filed with the New York Court of Appeals a

timely petition for leave to appeal which by its order dated

and entered July 11, 1978 (App. FE, infra, p. A19) the New

York Court of Appeals denied without opinion,

Reasons for Granting the Writ

The decision of the state court below should be reviewed

because it has decided two federal questions of substance

not previously determined by this Court and has decided

each of the two questions in a way that is in direct conflict

with the decisions of courts in other states. The first such

question involves the interpretation of the preemption pro-

visions of ERISA and a determination whether those

provisions prohibit a state from regulating employee bene-

fit plans by applying to them state employment diserimi-

nation laws that differ from the comparable federal laws,

The second federal question, which arises only if ERISA

is construed as permitting such application, requires a de-

termination whether a state law, construed as declaring the

exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from an em-

ployer’s disability benefit plan to be sex discrimination, is

in that respect inconsistent with the federal Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as construed by this Court, and is therefore

preempted,

8

The importance of these federal questions is emphasized

by the time and attention the Congress devoted to the sub-

ject of preemption in fashioning its comprehensive regula-

tion of employee benefit plans in ERISA. Such impor-

tance is heightened by the fact that at least 42 states have

comprehensive employment discrimination laws that po-

tentially could be applied to multi-state employee benefit

plans in ways that differ from federal regulations as well

as from each other.

When the Congress enacted the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq., it made

it abundantly clear that it intended to supersede and ex-

clude any regulation of employee benefit plans—whether

of the pension or welfare variety—by any individual state

law, except in the narrowest or most indirect circumstances.

Thus, Section 514 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §1144(a), expressly

provides:

‘*Except as provided in subsection (b) of this sec-

tion, the provisions of this subchapter shall supersede

any and all State laws insofar as they may now or

hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described

in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under

section 1003(b) of this title.’’

The scope of the preemption Congress intended to ac-

complish regarding employee benefit plans, and the im-

portance it attached to that accomplishment, are made clear

in the Congressional reports and debates that form the

legislative history of the Act.

The Conference Committee Report to the House and

Senate concerning the preemption provisions that became

~ a +o all

9

Section 514 of the Act explained the proposed legislation

in part as follows:

‘‘Under the substitute, the provisions of title I are

to supersede all State laws that relate to any employee

benefit plan that is established by an employer engaged

in or affecting interstate commerce or by an employee

organization that represents employees engaged in or

affecting interstate commerce. (However, following

title I generally, preemption will not apply to govern-

ment plans, church plans not electing under the vesting,

etc., provisions, workmen’s compensation plans, non-

U.S. plans primarily for nonresident aliens, and so-

called ‘excess benefit plans.’).

‘“‘The preemption provisions of title I are not to

exempt any person from any State law that regulates

insurance, banking or securities. However, the substi-

tute generally provides that an employee benefit plan

is not to be considered as an insurance company, bank,

trust company, or investment company (and is not to

be considered as engaged in the business of insurance

or banking) for purposes of any State law that regu-

lates insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks,

trust companies, or investment companies. This rule

does not apply to a plan which is established primarily

to provide death benefits; such plans, of course, may

be regulated under the State insurance, ete., laws.

H.C.R. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in

[1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 5038, 5162.’’

Speaking in support of the bill that emanated from the

Senate-House Conference Committee and became the Act,

Congressman Dent stated:

‘Finally, I wish to make note of what is to many

the crowning achievement of this legislation, the reser-

vation to Federal authority of the sole power to regu-

10

late the field of employee benefit plans, With the pre-

emption of the field, we round out the protection af-

forded participants by eliminating the threat of con-

flicting and inconsistent State and loval regulation.

‘‘The conferees, with the narrow exceptions spe-

cifically enumerated, applied this principle im its broad-

est sense to foreclose any non-Federal regulation of

employee benefit plans. Thus, the provisions of sec-

tion 514 would reach any rule, regulation, practice or

decision of any State, ... which would affect any em-

plovee benefit plan as described in section 4(a) and not

exempt under section 4(b).’’ 120 Cong. Rec. 29197

(1974) (emphasis added).

Senator Williams made a similar statement to the Senate:

‘‘It should be stressed that with the narrow excep-

tions specified in the bill, the substantive and enforce-

ment provisions of the conference substitute are in-

tended to preempt the field for Federal regulations,

thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent

State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.

This principle is intended to apply m its broadest

sense to all actions of State or local government, or any

instrumentality thereof, which have the force or effect

of law.’’ 120 Cong. Ree. 29933 (1974) (emphasis

added). —

Senator Javits, a leading sponsor of ERISA, made the

following statement in explaining the preemption provision

and why total preemption, rather than limited preemption,

was adopted by the Conference Committee:

‘‘Both House and Senate bills provided for preemp-

tion of State law, but—with one major exception ap-

pearing in the House bill—defined the perimeters of

preemption in relation to the areas regulated by the

CO se

11

bill, Such a formulation raised the possibility of end-

less litigation over the validity of State action that

might impinge on Federal regulations, as well as open-

ing the door to multiple and potentially conflicting

State laws hastily contrived to deal with some particu-

lar aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans

not clearly connected to the Federal regulatory scheme.

‘Although the desirability of further regulation—

at either the State or Federal level—undoubtedly war-

rants further attention, on balance, the emergence of a

comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the

interests of uniformity with respect to interstate plans

required—but for certain exceptions—the displacement

of State action in the field of private employee benefit

programs.’’ 120 Cong. Ree. 29942 (1974) (emphasis

added).

Viewed against the background of this legislative his-

tory any question concerning the applicability of a partic-

ular state law to the employee benefit plans of employers

in interstate commerce becomes a substantial federal ques-

tion. This is particularly so when, as here, the question in-

volves the applicability to employee benefit plans covered

by ERISA of state employment practices acts, because of

the great proliferation and variety of such state acts and

the manner in which many of them differ from the provi-

sions of the federal anti-discrimination laws and from

each other.

An analysis of state employment practices laws reveals

that many go beyond the federal proscriptions of discrim-

ination in employment on the basis of race, religion, color,

sex and age. As Appendix G, infra (pp. A23-A26) shows,

there are at least 35 states that prohibit discrimination by

private employers on the basis of handicap; 19 states out-

12

law discrimination on the basis of ancestry; and 15 states

make illegal discrimination on the basis of marital status.

Some states also proscribe one or more of the following

as a basis for discrimination in employment: height, weight,

status with regard to public assistance, place of birth, un-

favorable discharge from miltary service, and family rela-

tionship. Further, in dealing with age as a basis for dis-

crimination, at least 20 states include in the protected group

individuals whose ages do not qualify them for protection

under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act,

29 USC $621 et seq. Absent preemption each of these state

statutory provisions has the potential of making illegal in a

particular state a pension or welfare plan covered by and

in full compliance with federal law.

Even with respect to those provisions of state employ-

ment practices laws that do not differ from the correspond-

ing provisions of Title VII there is a great potential for

state rulings that conflict with federal laws on the same

subject. Thus, at least 19 states that proscribe sex dis-

crimination in employment have adopted guidelines that are

inconsistent with this Court’s decision in Gilbert v. General

Electric Company, supra? But the potential for confusion

between state and federal regulation is not limited to the

area of disability benefit plans. For example, the many

thousands of employers in interstate commerce, who by

reason of this Court’s determination in City of Los Angeles,

Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 98 S. Ct. 1370

(1978) must require male employees to contribute to their

3. California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Mas-

sachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,

Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washing-

ton and Wisconsin.

ae

Se RS ee AY i

ads ITCH iat Bie

13

pension plans in the same amounts as female employees,

must now anticipate the possibility that a pension plan so

structured in compliance with Title VII may be found by

one or more state courts to violate their local anti-discrimi-

nation law on the basis of a disparate impact theory that

this Court rejected in the Manhart case. When one consid-

ers that in 1974 almost one-half of the employees in private

non-farm work force were covered by employee benefit

plans of the pension variety* it is clear that the application

of state employment practices laws to employee benefit

plans covered by ERISA presents a substantial and im-

portant question for this Court to determine.

The importance of the second federal question, involv-

ing the interpretation and application of Section 1104 of

the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the circumstances

of this case, depends of course on the final answer to the

first federal question that this case presents. If (as pe-

titioner believes to be unlikely) this Court should construe

ERISA as permitting the application of New York’s anti-

discrimination law to the disability benefits plan of St.

Vincent’s, there would arise the substantial and important

question whether the New York anti-discrimination law, in

outlawing as sex discrimination the exclusion of pregnancy

disability benefits from an employee disability benefits plan,

is inconsistent with (and therefore preempted by) the fed-

eral Civil Rights Act of 1964 which declares such exclu-

sion not to be sex discrimination at all.

This Court has twice dealt with the exclusion of preg-

nancy disabilities from coverage under employee disability

benefits plans, and both times it expressly held that such an

exclusion does not constitute sex discrimination at all.

4. H.R. Rep. (Education and Labor Committee) No. 93-533,

93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.

News, 4639, 4641.

14

Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); General Electric

Company v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Notwithstanding

the federal law on the subject, in at least 19 states the em-

ployment discrimination laws either expressly or by inter-

pretation characterize such exclusion of pregnancy disabili-

ties as sex discrimination and proscribe the exclusion on

that basis.» In the case of New York the Court of Appeals

in Brooklyn Unicn Gas Co. v. New York State Human

Rights Appeal Board, 41 NY2d 84 (1976), considered and

expressly refused to follow this Court ruling in General

Electric Company v. Gilbert, supra, even though it admitted

that the pertinent parts of Title VII that this Court con-

strued ‘‘are substantially identical’’ to those of the New

York Human Rights Law then before that court. Since

most of the 50 states have laws that prohibit ‘‘sex dis-

crimination,’’ the question whether each of them is free

to apply the term to employers in interstate commerce in a

manner that conflicts with federal law on the subject is of

great importance to every multi-state employer in the na-

tion.

Conclusion

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

FREDERICK T. SHEA

350 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10022

Attorney for St. Vincent’s Medical

Center of Richmond

Ke.iitey Dryer & WaRREN

Of Counsel

5. See footnote 3, supra.

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APPENDIX A

Opinion of the Appellate Division of the

Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Dated October 18, 1977

A—October 18, 1977

2138 E St. Vincent’s Medical Center of

Richmond, petitioner, v. State

Human Rights Appeal Board

et al., respondents.

Kelley Drye & Warren, New York, N.Y. (Roger J. Karle-

bach and Frederick T. Shea of counsel), for petitioner.

Beverly Gross, New York, N.Y. (Ann Thacher Anderson of

counsel), for respondent State Division of Human

Rights.

Proceeding pursuant to section 298 of the Executive

Law to review an order of the State Human Rights Appeal

Board, dated December 29, 1975, which affirmed an order

of the State Division of Human Rights, dated May 2, 1975,

which found, mter alia, that the petitioner had discrim-

inated against the complainants on the basis of their sex

with respect to the terms, conditions and privileges of

employment.

Determinaticn confirmed and proceeding dismissed on

the merits, without costs or disbursements.

The disallowance of pregnancy-related disabilities vio-

lated section 296 (subd. 1, par. [a]) of the Human Rights

Law (Executive Law, art. 15) (see Brooklyn Union Gas Co.

v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 NY2d 84).

We have considered the petitioner’s other arguments and

have found them to be without merit.

Horxins, J.P., Conauan, Marcerr and Hawkins, JJ.,

concur.

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A2

APPENDIX B

Decision of the New York State Human Rights

Appeal Board, Dated December 29, 1975

STATE OF NEW YORK:

Executive DEPARTMENT

Strate Human Ricuts AppeaLt Boarp

Case Nos. CSF-28662-72 & CS-28917-72

Appeal No. 2819

— ee

Barpaka Ann Mackey,

Complainant-Respondent,

vs.

Sr. Vincent’s Mepicat Center or Ricumonp, Respondent-

Appellant & Benerictan Nationat Lire Insurance Co.,

Respondent.

State Division or Human Ricuts oN THE COMPLAINT OF

Parricia P. Hacsere,

Complainant-Respondent,

vs.

St. Vincent’s Mepicau Center or Richmonp,

Respondent-Appellant,

James Doran, Dir. of Personnel, FLorence Zarnick, Dir. of

Nurses; & Benericiau Nationau Lire Ins. Co.,

Respondents.

———

A8

Appendia B

This is an appeal from a Decision and Order of the

Commissioner of the State Division of Human Rights,

dated May 2, 1975, finding that the above named respond-

ents had committed an unlawful discriminatory act relating

to employment because of their sex in violation of the

Human Rights Law of the State of New York. The re-

spondent-appellant is St. Vincent’s Medical Center of

Richmond.

The record shows that respondent, St. Vincent’s Medical

Center of Richmond discriminated against the complain-

ants because of their sex, in the terms, conditions and priv-

ileges of employment, in violation of the Human Rights

Law.

The facts of these consolidated cases are undisputed on

this appeal.

The sole legal question presented on this appeal is

whether the New York State Human Rights Law mandates

that an employer must provide its employees with the same

insurance coverage for disabilities due to pregnancy which

the Workman’s Compensation Law of the State requires

the employer to provide to its employees for disabilities

arising from other causes.

It is the decision of this Board, that an employer cannot

administer contractual benefits in a way which materially

differentiates between maternity related disabilities and

other non-occupational disabilities.

A4

Appendia B

The record taken as a whole substantially supports the

findings and decision of the Commissioner, and they are,

accordingly, in all respects affirmed.

Dated: December 29, 1975

Mailed: August 24, 1976

Strate Human Ricuts AppeaL Boarp

By: Epwarp Morrison

Epwarp Morrison

Presiding Member

The following members concur in the foregoing decision

and opinion:

Hon. Irma Vidal Santaella (separate concurring

opinion)

Hon. Thomas A. Conniff

A5

Appendia B

STATE OF NEW YORK

EXeEcutive DEPARTMENT

Strate Human Ricuts Apprat Boarp

Concurring Opinion

Case Nos. CSF-28662-72 & CS-28917-72

Appeal No. 2819

EE

Strate Division or Human Ricuts on the Complaint of

Barpara ANN Mackey,

Complainant-Respondent,

vs.

St. Vincent’s Mepicat Center or Ric Monn, Respondent-

Appellant & Benerictan Natrona Lire Insurance Co.,

Respondent.

State Division or Human Ricuts on THE COMPLAINT OF

Patricia P, Hacpera,

Complainant-Respondent,

Vs.

St. Vincent’s Mepicay CENTER oF RicHMonp,

Respondent-Appellant,

James Doran, Dir. of Personnel, FLoreNcr ZARNICK, Dir. of

Nurses; & Benericran Nationar Lirg Tus. Co.,

Respondents,

a ——__.

With respect io the basic issue before this Board on

whether the Order of the Commissioner of the State Divi-

A6

Appendix B

sion of Human Rights is supported by substantial evidence

on the whole record, examination of the record indicates

that the evidentiary facts elicited by the Division amply

supports the findings of fact on which the Order of the

Commissioner is based. Accordingly, the Order appealed

from is binding and conclusive on this Board (Matter of

Kindt v. State Commission of Human Rights, 44 Mise. 2d

896, mod. on other grounds, 23 AD 2d 809, aff’d 16 N.Y. 2d

1001; Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc. v. Arbury, 2 N.Y. 2d 296

[1957] and Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38), and it should

be affirmed in all respects.

Dated: December 29, 1975

Mailed: August 24, 1976

/s/ Trama Vipau SaNTAELLA

InMA VipaL SANTAELLA

The following member concurs in the foregoing opinion:

Hon. Tuomas A. ConnIFF

—

A7

APPENDIX C

Decision and Order of the Commissioner of the

New York State Division of Human Rights

STATE OF NEW YORK

ExecvuTiIvE DEPARTMENT

Strate Division or Human Ricuts

Case Nos. CSF-28662-72; CS-28917-72

Oe

Strate Division or Human Ricuts

on the complaint of

Barpara ANN Mackey,

Complainant,

against

Sr. Vincent’s MepicaL CENTER oF RICHMOND;

anp BenerictaL Nationau Lire [Insurance CoMPANY,

Respondents.

Strate Diviston or Human Ricuts

on the complaint of

Patricia P. HacBErG,

Complainant,

against

Sr. Vincent’s Mepicat CENTER oF RicHMOND;

James Doran, Director oF PERSONNEL,

FLorencE ZARNICK, DrrEcTOR oF NURSES;

anp Benericiay NationaL Lire INsurRANcE CoMPANy,

Respondents.

A8

Appendia C

PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE

On the 14th day of November, 1972, Complainant Bar-

bara Ann Mackey and on the 27th day of December, 1972,

Complainant Patricia P. Hagberg, each filed a verified com-

plaint, thereafter amended, with the State Division of

Human Rights (hereinafter the ‘‘Division’’) charging the

above-named Respondents with unlawful discriminatory

practices relating to employment in violation of the Human

Rights Law (Executive Law, Article 15) of the State of

New York.

After investigation, the Division found that it had juris-

diction over the complaints and that probable cause existed

to believe that Respondents had engaged in unlawful dis-

criminatory practices. The Division thereupon referred

the cases to public hearing.

After due notice, the cases came on for a consolidated

hearing before Jose Ramon Torres, Esq., a Hearing Exam-

iner of the Division. Sessions of the hearing were held on

March 14, and April 23, 1973. Thereafter, the hearing was

concluded on February 1, 1974, before Mathew Foner, Esq.,

another Hearing Examiner of the Division.

At the hearing Complainants and Respondents appeared.

Respondents St. Vincent’s Medical Center of Richmond,

James Doran and Florence Zarnick were represented by

Kelley, Drye, Warren, Clark, Carr & Ellis, Esqs., by Joel

A. Forkosch, Esq., of Counsel. Respondent Beneficial Life

Insurance Company was represented by Bobroff, Olonoff &

Scharf, Esqs., Herbert L. Scharf, Esq., of Counsel. The

Division was represented by Henry Spitz, Esq., General

Counsel, by Elaine Berger, Esq., of Counsel.

A9

Appendix C

Finpinc or Facts

1. Complainant Barbara Ann Mackey, a female, has

been employed as a registered nurse by Respondent St. Vin-

cent’s Medical Center of Richmond (hereinafter ‘‘St. Vin-

cent’s’’) since September, 1964.

2. Complainant Patricia P. Hagberg, a female, has been

employed as a registered nurse by Respondent St. Vin-

cent’s since October, 1970.

3. At all times herein pertinent, Respondent James

Doran was Director of Personnel, and Respondent Florence

Zarnick was Director of Nursing Services of Respondent

St. Vincent’s.

4. At all times herein pertinent, Respondent Beneficial

National Life Insurance Company, a New York insurance

carrier, (hereinafter ‘‘Beneficial’’) insured Respondent

St. Vincent’s as required by the New York State Work-

men’s Compensation Law.

5. Complainant Mackey became pregnant and volantar-

ily commenced a maternity leave on April 17, 1972, to ex-

tend to October, 1972. Her child was born May 9, 1972. She

was advised by her obstetrician that she shouid be examined

by him six weeks post partum. Her examination was on

July 7, 1972 and she was told that she was physically fit to

return to work.

6. Complainant Hagberg became pregnant and volun-

tarily commenced a maternity leave on December 1, 1972.

A10

Appendia C

Her child was born February 12, 1973. She was advised

by her obstetrician that she should be examined by him six

weeks post partum. Her examination was on April 18, 1972

and she was told that she was physically fit to return to

work. 7

7. Each Complainant received all her accrued fringe

benefits, including accrued sick leave, when she took her

maternity leave of absence.

8. Respondent St. Vincent’s carries insurance with Re-

spondent Beneficial, covering disabilities sustained by em-

ployees in consequence of illness or involuntary injury, as

set forth in its disability benefits insurance policy. Such

insurance coverage excludes benefits for any period of dis-

ability caused by or arising in connection with a pregnancy,

except any such period occurring after return to employ-

ment, as provided.

9. Respondent St. Vineent’s provides no benefits to

any employee for temporary disability other than those pro-

vided by its insurance policy with Respondent Beneficial.

10. Complainant Mackey filed with Respondents St. Vin-

cent’s and Beneficial for disability benefits for the period

April 14, 1972 to July 7, 1972. She testified that she was

disabled ‘‘from April 17, ... to about four to six weeks”’

following delivery.

11. Complainant Hagberg filed with Respondent St. Vin-

cent’s for disability benefits for the period December 1,

All

Appendix C

1972 to May 1, 1973. She testified that she was disabled

from January 3, 1973 until six weeks following delivery.

12. The Complainants’ claims were rejected. Neither

Complainant received disability benefits from her employer,

for any of the aforesaid time period.

13. Under the Human Rights Law, employers must

treat disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy,

miscarriage, abortion, childbirth and recovery therefrom,

as temporary disabilities under any health or temporary

disabiltity insurance or sick leave plan available in connec-

tion with employment.

14. The exclusion of disability benefits for pregnancy-

connected disability in the Workmen’s Compensation Law,

Section 200 et seq., relates to payment of benefits pursuant

to that statute, and does not preclude the equal treatment

of women in the terms, conditions and privileges of employ-

ment established under the Human Rights Law.

15. Respondent St. Vincent’s Medical Center unlaw-

fully discriminated against the Complainants because of

their sex, in the terms, conditions and privileges of their

employment, by failing to pay them disability benefits for

any portion of the time they were temporarily disabled

from work by reason of pregnancy to the same extent it

provides such paid sick leave and disability benefits to other

employees for non-pregnaney connected disabilities.

16. Respondent St. Vincent’s Medical Center unlawful-

ly discriminates against its female employees in the terms,

Al2

Appendix C

conditions and privileges of their employment, by failing to

provide benefits to employees who are unable to work be-

cause of pregnancy or pregnancy-related disability to the

same extent it provides such benefits to employees unable to

work because of non-pregnancy connected disabilities.

17. There is insufficient medical evidence to establish

that Complainant Mackey was physically unable to work

on and beyond April 17, 1972, the date she commenced her

maternity leave. Upon the instant record, said Complain-

ant could have continued working until the day before her

child was born, May 9, 1972.

18. There is insufficient medical evidence to establish

that Complainant Mackey was physically unable to resume

work prior to her post partum examination. Upon the

instant record, said Complainant could have resumed her

work, without physical disability, on or about June 6, 1972.

19. There is insufficient medical evidence to establish

that Complainant Hagberg was physically unable to work

on and beyond December 1, 1972, the date she commenced

her maternity leave. Upon the instant record, said Com-

plainant could have continued working until the day before

her child was born, February 12, 1973.

20. There is insufficient medical evidence to establish

that Complainant Hagberg was physically unable to resume

work prior to her post partum examination. Upon the

instant record, said Complainant could have resumed her

work, without physical disability, on or about March 13,

1973.

1 ease ase oneal

A13

Appendix C

21. Complainant Hagberg, who named James Doran

and Florence Zarnick as Respondents in her verified com-

plaint, acknowledged that said Respondents did not unlaw-

fully discriminate against her. Complainant Mackey did

not file charges against said persons. There is no evidence

that said Respondents, or either of them, discriminated

against either Complainant.

22. There is insufficient evidence that Respondent Bene-

ficial aided and abetted Respondent St. Vincent’s in its

discriminatory policy of not providing disability benefits to

the Complainants for their pregnancy-related disabilities.

DEcIsIon

On the basis of the foregoing, I find that Respondent

St. Vincent’s Medical Center of Richmond discriminated

against the Complainants because of their sex, in the terms,

conditions and privileges of employment, in violation of

the Human Rights Law.

On the basis of the foregoing, I further find that Re-

spondent St. Vincent’s Medical Center of Richmond dis-

criminates against its female employees, because of their

_ Sex, in the terms, conditions and privileges of their employ-

ment, in violation of the Human Rights Law.

On the basis of the foregoing, I further find that the

awarding of compensatory damages iv ihe aggrieved Com-

plainants will effectuate the purposes of the Human Rights

Law.

Cn the basis of the foregoing, I further find that Re-

spondent Beneficial National Life Insurance Company did

Al4

Appendia C

not aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce Respondent St. Vin-

cent’s Medical Center of Richmond to discriminate against

the Complainants or its female employees, because of their

sex, in the terms, conditions and privileges of their employ-

ment, in violation of the Human Rights Law.

On the basis of the foregoing, I further find that Re-

spondents James Doran and Florence Zarnick did not dis-

criminate against the Complainants because of their sex,

in the terms, conditions and privileges of their employment,

in violation of the Human Rights Law.

ORDER

On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and

pursuant to the Human Rights Law, it is hereby

OrpereD, that the instant complaints as to Respondent

Beneficial National Insurance Company, be and the same

are hereby dismissed, and it is further

OrpereD, that the instant complaints as to Respondents

James Doran and Florence Zarnick, be and the same are

hereby dismissed, and it is further

Orperep, that the Respondent St. Vincent’s Medical

Center of Richmond, its agents, representatives, employees,

successors and assigns shall cease and desist from discrim-

inating against any employee or individual in the terms,

conditions and privileges of employment because of the sex

of such person, and it is further

OrperEp, that the Respondent St. Vincent’s Medical

Center of Richmond, its agents, representatives, employees,

ihn wnctaanict nll

Ald

Appendix C

successors and assigns shall take the following affirmative

action which will effectuate the purposes of the Human

Rights Law:

1. The Respondent shall within 30 days from the date

this Order becomes effective, pay to Complainant Barbara

Ann Mackey disability benefits for the period May 8, 1972

through June 5, 1972, to the same extent such payments are

made to its other employees for non-pregnancy connected

temporary physical disabilities, plus interest at the rate of

six percent per annum from May 22, 1972, a reasonable

intermediate date in accordance with Section 5001(b) of

the CPLR. Respondent shall restore to Complainant all

other rights, benefits and privileges to which she would

have been entitled had she been granted disability benefits

for the above-stated period. Respondent shall furnish proof

of such payment within ten days thereof to the State Divi-

sion of Human Rights, 270 Broadway, New York, New

York 10007, Attention Legal Bureau.

2. The Respondent shall within thirty (30) days from

the date this Order becomes effective, pay to Complainant

Patricia P. Hagberg disability benefits for the period Feb-

ruary 11, 1973 through March 13, 1973, to the same extent

such payments are made to its other employees for non-

pregnancy connected temporary physical disabilities, plus

interest at the rate of six percent per annum from February

26, 1973, a reasonable intermediate date in accordance with

Section 5001(b) of the CPLR. Respondent shall restore to

Complainant all other rights, benefits and privileges to

which she would have been entitled had she been granted

Al6

Appendia C

disability benefits for the above-stated period. Respondent

shall furnish proof of such payment within ten days thereof

to the State Division of Human Rights, 270 Broadway, New

York, New York 10007, Attention Legal Bureau.

3. The Respondent shall provide disability benefits to

female employees for pregnancy-connected disabilities to

the same extent it provides such benefits to employees for

other types of temporary physical disabilities.

4. The Respondent shall send a memorandum to all

supervisory employees, agents, officers and to all recog-

nized unions instructing them that it has a policy of non-

discrimination because of sex in the treatment of em-

ployees; and that such supervisory employees, agents and/

or representatives are required to implement said policy.

5. The Respondent shall make available to the duly-

authorized representatives of this Division such documents

and information as may be necessary for the Division to

ascertain whether there is compliance with this Order.

Dated: May 2, 1975

New York, New York

Strate Division oF Human RicGuHts

/s/ Werner H. KRaAMARSKY

Werner H. Kramarsky, Commissioner

Al7

APPENDIX D

P Order of the Appellate Division of the

Supreme Court of New York, Second Department,

Dated October 31, 1977

At a Term of the Appellate Division of the

Supreme Court of the State of New York,

Second Judicial Department, held in Kings

County on October 31, 1977.

Hon. James D. Horxins, Justice Presiding,

Hon. Joun P. Conanan, Jr.,

Hon. CHartes Marcett,

Hon. Joseru F. Hawkins, Associate Justices.

rT OO

St. Vincent’s Medical Center of Richmond,

Petitioner,

Vv.

State Human Rights Appeal Board et al.,

Respondents.

A proceeding having been instituted in this court, pur-

suant to section 298 of the Executive Law by petition of

St. Vincent’s Medical Center of Richmond, verified Sep-

tember 23, 1976, to review an order of the State Human

Rights Appeal Board, dated December 29, 1975, which af-

firmed an order of the State Division of Human Rights,

dated May 2, 1975, which found, inter alia, that the peti-

A18

Appendix D

tioner had discriminated against the complainants on the

basis of their sex with respect to the terms, conditions and

privileges of employment; the respondent State Division

of Human Rights having filed an answer thereto ;

Now, upon the said petition; the brief of petitioner;

the said answer and brief of the respondent State Division

of Human Rights; and upon all the papers filed herein; and

the proceeding having been argued by Roger J. Karlebach,

Esq., of counsel for the petitioner and argued by Ann

Thacher Anderson, Esq., of counsel for the respondent

State Division of Human Rights, due deliberation having

been had thereon; and upon this court’s opinion and de-

cision slip heretofore filed and made a part hereof, it is

unanimously

Orperep that the determination is hereby confirmed and

the proceeding dismissed on the merits, without costs or

disbursements.

Enter:

Irvine N. SevKin

Clerk of the Appellate Division

A19

APPENDIX E

Decision slip of the New York State Court of

Appeals Denying Leave to Appeal,

Dated July 11, 1978

3 Mo. No, 491

QS

St. Vincent’s Medical Center of Richmond,

Appellant,

vs.

State Human Rights Appeal Board, State Division of

Human Rights, Barbara Ann Mackey, and Patricia P.

Hagberg,

Respondents.

Westinghouse Electrie Corporation,

Appellant,

vs.

State Human Rights Appeal Board and State Division of

pong Rights on the Complaints of Donna J. Sterling

ors.,

Respondents.

rr fii

Motion for leave to appeal &e. denied with twenty

dollars costs and necessary reproduction disbursements.

Fuchsberg, J., taking no part.

DECISION COURT OF APPEALS

JUL 11 1978

A20

APPENDIX F

Sections 4 and 514 of the Employees Retirement

Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§1003 and 1144

Section 4 of the Employees Retirement Income Security

Act, 29 U.S.C. §1003, contains the following provisions:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section

and in sections 1051, 1081, and 1101 of this title, this sub-

chapter shall apply to any employee benefit plan if it is

established or maintained—

(1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any

industry or activity affecting commerce; or

(2) by any employee organization or organizations rep-

resenting employees engaged in commerce or in any indus-

try or activity affecting commerce; or

(3) by both.

(b) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply

to any employee benefit plan if—

(1) such plan is a governmental plan (as defined in

section 2003(32) of this title) ;

(2) such plan is a church plan (as defined in section

1002(33) of this title) with respect to which no election has

been made under section 410(d) of Title 26;

(3) such plan is maintained solely for the purpose of

complying with applicable workmen’s compensation laws

or unemployment compensation or disability insurance

laws;

A21

Appendia F

(4) such plan is maintained outside of the United

States primarily for the benefit of persons substantially

all of whom are nonresident aliens; or

(5) such plan is an excess benefit plan (as defined in

section 1002(36) of this title) and is unfunded.

Section 514 of the Employees Retirement Income Secur-

ity Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1144, contains the following pro-

visions :

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this sec-

tion, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter Ill

of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws inso-

far as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee

benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and

not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This sec-

tion shall take effect on January 1, 1975.

(b)(1) This section shall not apply with respect to any

eause of action which arose, or any act or omission which

occurred, before January 1, 1979.

(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), noth-

ing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or re-

lieve any person from any law of any State which regulates

insurance, banking or securities.

(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in sec-

tion 1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt under section

1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily

for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust

established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an

A22

Appendia F

insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company,

or investment company or to be engaged in the business of

insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any

State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insur-

ance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment com-

panies.

(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to pro-

hibit use by the Secretary of services or facilities of a

State agency as permitted under section 1136 of this title.

(4) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any

generally applicable criminal law of a State.

(c) For purposes of this section:

(1) The term ‘‘State law”’ includes all laws, decisions,

rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect

of law, of any State. A law of the United States applicable

only to the District of Columbia shall be treated as a State

law rather than a law of the United States.

(2) The term ‘‘State’’ includes a State, any political

subdivisions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of

either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly,

the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered

by this subchapter.

(d) Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to

alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any

law of the United States (except as provided in sections

1031 and 1137(b) of this title) or any rule or regulation

issued under any such law.

A23

APPENDIX G

Analysis of State Fair Employment Practice Laws

[All citations are to the Fair Employment Practices

Manual published by the Bureau of National Affairs, Vol-

ume 8A]

1. States Proscribing Discrimination on

the Basis of Handicap

Alaska—Page 453 :205 et seq., §18.80.220

California—Page 453 :805 et seq., $1420

Colorado—Page 453 :1005 et seq., §24-34-306

Connecticut—Page 453 :1205 et seq., §31.126

Florida—Page 453 :1805 et seq., §13.261

Hawaii—Page 453 :2205 et seq., §378-2

Illinois—Page 453 :2605 et seq., §3

Indiana—Page 453 :2805 et seq., §22-9-1-2

Iowa—Page 453 :3005 et seq., §601A.6

Kansas—Page 453 :3201 et seq., §44-1009

Kentucky—Page 455 :51 et seq., §207.130 et seq.

Maine—Page 455 :405 et seq., §4572

Maryland—Page 455 :605 et seq., §16

Massachusetts—Page 455 :805 et seq., §4

Michigan—Page 455 :1005 et seq., Article 2, $202

Minnesota—Page 455 :1205 et seq., §363.03

Montana—Page 455 :1805 et seq., §64-304

Nebraska—Page 455 :2005 et seq., §48-1104

Nevada—Page 455 :2205 et seq., §613.330

New Hampshire—Page 455 :2405 et seq., §354-A :2

New Jersey—Page 455 :2605 et seq., §10 :5-4.1

New Mexico—Page 455 :2805 et seq., §4-33-7

New York—Page 455 :3005 et seq., §296

A24

Appendix G

' North Carolina—Page 455 :3205 et seq., §143-416.2

Ohio—Page 457 :205 et seq., (4112.02

Oregon—Page 457 :605 et seq., §659.400

Pennsylvania—Page 457 :805 et seq., §955

Rhode Island—Page 457 :1205 et seq., §28-5-7

Tennessee—Page 457 :1855 et seq., §1

Texas—Page 457 :2015 et seq., §1 et seq.

Vermont—Page 457 :2405 et seq., §498

Virginia—Page 457 :2651, §40.1-28.7

Washington—Page 457 :2805 et seq., §49.60.180

West Virginia—Page 457 :3005 et seq., §5-11.9

Wisconsin—Page 457 :3205, §111.32

2. States Proscribing Discrimination on

the Basis of Ancestry

California—Page 453 :805 et seq., 61420

Colorado—Page 453 :1005 et seq., §24-34-306

Connecticut—Page 453 :1205 et seq., (31-126

Illinois—Page 453 :2205 et seq., (378-2

Kansas—Page 453 :320 et seq., (44-1009

Maine—Page 455 :405 et seq., §4572

Maryland—Page 455 :605 et seq., §16

Massachusetts—Page 455 :805 et seq., 4

Missouri—Page 455 :1605 et seq., §296.020

New Jersey—Page 455 :2605 et seq., §10:15-12

New Mexico—Page 455 :2805 et seq., §4-33-7

New York—Page 455 :3005 et seq., §291

Ohio—Page 457 :205 et seq., §4112.02

Pennsylvania—Page 457 :805 et seq., §955

A25

Appendix G

Rhode Island—Page 457 :1205 et seq., §28-5-7

South Dakota—Page 457 :1605 et seq., §20-13-10

Vermont—Page 457 :2405 et seq., §495

West Virginia—Page 457 :3005 et seq., §5-11.9

Wyoming—Page 457 :3405 et seq., §27-261

3. States Proscribing Discrimination on the

Basis of Marital Status

Alaska—Page 453 :205 et seq., §18.80.220

California—Page 453 :805 et seq., §1420

Connecticut—Page 453 :1205 et seq., §31-26

Florida—Page 453 :1805 et seq., §13.261

Hawaii—Page 453 :2205 et seq., §378-2

Maine—Page 455 :405 et seq., §4572

Maryland—Page 455 :605 et seq., §16

Michigan—Page 455 :1005 et seq., Article 2, §202

Minnesota—Page 455 :1205 et seq., 363.03

Nebraska—Page 455 :2005 et seq., §48-1104

New Hampshire—Page 455 :2405 et seq., §354-A :2

New Jersey—Page 455 :2605 et seq., §10:15-12

New York—Page 455 :3005 et seq., §296

Oregon—Page 457 :605 et seq., §659.010(14)

Washington—Page 457 :2805 et seq., $49.60

4. States Proscribing Miscellaneous

Discriminatory Practices

Height and Weight

Michigan—Page 455 :1005 et seq., Article 2, §202

A26

Appendix G

Status With Regard to Public Assistance

Minnesota—Page 455 :1205 et seq., §363.03

Place of Birth

Vermont—Page 457 :2405 et seq., §495

Unfavorable Discharge From Military Service

Illinois—Page 453 :2205 et seq., §378-2

Family Relationship

Oregon—Page 457 :605 et seq., {659.400

PO Eel tena

PO Aare a TI