Petition — Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co.
Supreme Court brief1978
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
> Supreme Court, U.S >
rit:
SEP 26 1978
ee,
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UN JR., CLERK
October Term, 1978
" %8-510
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT
OF REVENUE,
Petitioner,
vw,
MIDWESTERN GAS
TRANSMISSION COMPANY,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF WISCONSIN
BRONSON C. LA FOLLETTE
Attorney General of Wisconsin
E. WESTON WOOD
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Petitioner
P.O. Address:
114 East, State Capitol
Madison, Wisconsin 53702
i
INDEX AND SYNOPSIS OF ARGUMENT
Page
ee vax bea ee Ak 1
a lS ee ee rs re 2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................ 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
es cigs 5 8. : an 2
STATEMENT OF THECASE ...................... 3
REASONS FORGRANTINGTHEWRIT............. 4
The Decision Below Conflicts With
Ee 4
i a ry aR SR Gea 7
CASES CITED
Colonial Pipe Line Company v. Traigle,
Ne ny ekg Side wna ke 5
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274 (1977) ..... OM ace tat aie annie ess aeons 5,6
Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co.
ee eek. ki mac wu meena cn cess 5
Dept. of Rev., Etc. v. Ass'n of Wash.
Steve. Co., 98S.Ct. 1888 (1978) ................ 5,6,7
Helson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
go er es a aes we a bya ms 4,5,6,7
Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. Revenue
Dept., 84 Wis.2d 261, 267 N.W.2d 253 (1978) ....... 1,6
Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor,
i. aes esl a sb eeanndiaee 5,6
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
STATUTES AND RULES CITED
rn I es A ee wan
Wisconsin Statutes
Sec. 77.51(7)(a)
“Ams S 8 6 Oe ek eee we ee ee ee ee ee
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1978
Na,
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT
OF REVENUE
Petitioner,
Vv.
MIDWESTERN GAS
TRANSMISSION COMPANY,
Respondent.
PETITION FORA WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF WISCONSIN
The petitioner, Wisconsin Department of Revenue,
respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review
the final judgment and opinion of the Supreme Court of the
State of Wisconsin entered June 30, 1978.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion and judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court is reported as Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v.
Revenue Dept., 84 Wis.2d 261, 267 N.W.2d 253 (1978).
The opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the
unreported opinions of the Circuit Court for Dane County
and the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission appear in the
appendix hereto.
2
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Circuit Court for Dane County was
dated June 18, 1976, and was entered June 21, 1976. That
judgment held that imposition of the Wisconsin use tax
upon the use by the respondent of certain natural gas,
pursuant to sec. 77.53, Wis. Stats., violates the commerce
clause, U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8. On June 30, 1978, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the lower court judg-
ment, and this petition for a writ of certiorari was filed
within 90 days of that date.
This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. sec.
1257(3).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
When a company operating an interstate natural gas
pipeline from Minnesota into Wisconsin withdraws gas
from the pipeline in Wisconsin, reduces the pressure of
such gas and consumes it in Wisconsin in engines used to
run compressors necessary to keep the gas moving
through the pipeline, is the imposition of the Wisconsin use
tax on the gas consumed in Wisconsin violative of the
commerce clause?
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held in the affirmative.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND STATUTES INVOLVED
United States Constitution, art. I:
“SECTION 8. The Congress shall have power
“es ee
“To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states... .”
3
Section 77.53, Wis. Stats.:
“Imposition of use tax. (1) An excise tax is
hereby levied and imposed on the storage, use
or other consumption in this state of tangible
personal property or taxable services described
in s. 77.52 purchased from any retailer... .”
Section 77.51, Wis. Stats.:
“(7) ‘Retailer’ includes:
“(a) Every seller who makes any sale of
tangible personal property... .”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The respondent, hereinafter called Midwestern, buys
Canadian natural gas at the Manitoba-Minnesota border
and transports it through Midwestern’s pipeline from that
point to Marshfield, Wisconsin. Some gas is sold to
Wisconsin customers west of Marshfield, for resale, but
the bulk of it is sold and delivered to another pipeline
company at Marshfield.
Some gas is consumed by Midwestern at its two
compressor stations in Wisconsin. These stations are
necessary to increase the pressure of the gas in the pipeline
in order to keep it flowing. At each station some gas is
withdrawn from the pipeline, filtered or strained to
remove foreign particles, metered, reduced in pressure
and used to fuel engines which run the compressors. The
gas withdrawn from the pipeline never comes to rest prior
to being consumed in the engines.
4
The petitioner made an assessment of use taxes against
Midwestern for the period from September 1, 1969, to
December 31, 1971, based upon the use of the gas
withdrawn from the pipeline and consumed at the
compressor stations in Wisconsin. A petition for redeter-
mination of that assessment was denied, and Midwestern
appealed to the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission which
affirmed the assessment, holding that imposition of the tax
was not prohibited by the commerce clause. Midwestern
then appealed to the Circuit Court for Dane County, and
the order of the Commission was reversed upon the sole
ground that the assessment violated the commerce clause.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the lower court,
again upon the sole ground that the commerce clause
prohibited the assessment. See p. 12a of appendix hereto.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions
Of This Court.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied upon Helson v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929), and
cases which followed it. The petitioner concedes that if
Helson is still viable, the tax now in issue is
unconstitutional.
Helson held unconstitutional, under the commerce
clause, a Kentucky tax upon the use in Kentucky of fuel
purchased in Illinois to propel an interstate ferry. The
opinion stated, 279 U.S. at 252, that the tax was “exacted
as the price of the privilege of using an instrumentality of
interstate commerce,” and continued: “A tax which falls
directly upon the use of one of the means by which
commerce is carried on directly burdens that commerce.”
5
Several years after Helson, in Coverdale v. Arkansas-
Louisiana Pipe Line Co. , 303 U.S. 604 (1938), a Louisiana
horsepower tax upon the horsepower of engines used to
run compressors to maintain the flow of natural gas
through an interstate pipeline was attacked as violative of
the commerce clause. The tax was sustained, although the
Court regarded it “as one upon the privilege of producing
the power” (303 U.S. at 609).
Colonial Pipeline Company v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100
(1975), sustained yet another Louisiana tax which involved
an exclusively interstate pipeline operation. By the terms
of the statute the tax was imposed upon qualification to do
business in Louisiana or actually doing business there in a
corporate form. The opinion states that the controlling
test, under the commerce clause, “ ‘is whether the State
has exerted its power in proper proportion to appellant's
activities within the State and to appellant’s consequent
enjoyment of the opportunities and protections which the
State has afforded’ ” (421 U.S at 108-109).
Two very recent cases have overruled Spector Motor
Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)— which held that
a tax on the privilege of engaging in an activity within a
state may not be applied to an activity which is part of
interstate commerce—and have established a new test for
determining the validity, under the commerce clause, of
state taxes. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274 (1977), reh. denied 430 U.S. 976 (1977); and Dept.
of Rev., Etc. v. Ass'n of Wash. Steve. Co., 98 S.Ct. 1388
(1978). Washington Stevedoring stated, 98 S.Ct. at 1399:
“. . . The Court repeatedly has sus-
tained taxes that are applied to activity
with substantial nexus with the State,
6
that are fairly apportioned, that do not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce, and
that are fairly related to the services pro-
vided by the State... .”
Complete Auto Transit, supra, states the test in almost
identical language, 430 U.S. at 277.
The opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Cour: refers to
this four-pronged test and continues, 84 Wis.2d at 27
(Appendix p. 11a):
“Under this analysis, the key question
here is whether the activity the dep2:tment
seeks to tax has a substantial nexus with
the state. In this respect, the Helson deter-
mination that property which is used to fuel a
vehicle of interstate commerce may not be
subjected to a use tax remains relevant.
That the Supreme Court has not abandoned
this position is shown by its decision in
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S.
623, 629-30 (1973)... .”
The Wisconsin Court's opinion goes on to say that
although the tax here involved is imposed upon the use of
natural gas in Wisconsin, “this consumption is an integral
part of the process of interstate commerce which does not
have a substantial nexus with the state.” Therefore, the
opinion held, the use of the gas was immune from state
taxation by reason of the commerce clause.
It is submitted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
missed the significance of Complete Auto Transit, supra,
and Washington Stevedoring, supra, which rejected the
reasoning of Helson, supra, and Spector Motor Service,
supra, and frankly sustained a state tax upon an integral
7
part of an interstate commerce operation, where the tax
met the four criteria. The fact that Helson has not been
overruled is irrelevant, because the basis of the Helson
ruling has been rejected.
In Washington Stevedoring the opinion noted, 98 S.Ct. at
1399:
“, . . The record contains nothing that
minimizes the obvious nexus between
Washington and respondents; indeed, re-
spondents conduct their entire stevedoring
operations within the State... .”
That same reasoning is applicable here. Wisconsin seeks to
tax only the use of gasoline consumed within Wisconsin,
and there is an obvious nexus between that use and
Wisconsin. No question has been raised in the instant
matter as to whether the tax meets the other three criteria
of the four-pronged test.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore respectfully submitted that certiorari
should be granted or that in the alternative the decision
below should be summarily reversed.
BRONSON C. LA FOLLETTE
Attorney General of Wisconsin
E. WESTON WOOD
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Petitioner
APPENDIX
INDEX TO APPENDIX
Page
DECISION AND ORDER of the Wisconsin Tax
Appeals Commission entered June 17,1975 .... 115-120
JUDGMENT of Circuit Court of Dane County,
Wisconsin, entered June21,1976 ............ 113-114
OPINION of Wisconsin Supreme Court filed
A a ee ee a 101-112
Appendix
la
No. 76-106
August Term, 1977
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
Midwestern Gas Transmission Co.,
Respondent,
FILED: June 30, 1978
Vv.
Wis. Dept. of Revenue,
Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane
county: MICHAELB. TORPHY, Circuit Judge. Affirmed.
This is a state use tax case. The respondent,
Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. (hereinafter taxpayer),
owns and operates a pipeline through which it transports
natural gas. The pipeline begins at the Manitoba-
Minnesota border, and runs in a generally south-
westerly direction to Marshfield, Wisconsin. The taxpayer
purchases natural gas from a Canadian supplier and sells it
to various customers, three of which tap the taxpayer's line
at different points in Wisconsin. One of these is another
pipeline company which takes the bulk of the gas —
into the state by the taxpayer.
’ The taxpayer consumes some gas at two compressor
stations located in Wisconsin. The stations are necessary
to increase the pressure of the gas in the pipeline in order
to keep it flowing. At each station a small amount of gas is
withdrawn from the pipeline, filtered or strained to
Appendix
2a
remove foreign particles, metered, reduced in pressure
and used to fuel engines which run the compressors.
The gas taken from the pipeline never comes to rest before
it is consumed.
In May, 1972, the appellant, Wisconsin Department of
Revenue, issued a notice of sales and use tax assessment
against the taxpayer on the gas consumed at its two
Wisconsin pumping facilities during the period of
September 1, 1969 to December 21, 1971. The value of the
gas was stipulated and the tax, with interest, was set at
$11,972.86. A petition for the redetermination of the
assessment was denied by the department, and affirmed
on appeal to the Commission. The taxpayer appealed to
the circuit court where the Commission's order was
reversed. The department appeals.
HANLEY, J. The sole issue presented on this appeal is
whether natural gas consumed at the taxpayer's Wisconsin
compressor stations is subject to the Wisconsin use tax,
sec. 77.54(1), Stats.
The department seeks to impose a tax on that amount of
natural gas consumed by the taxpayer at its two pumping
stations pursuant to sec. 77.53(1), Stats. This section
provides:
“Imposition of use tax. (1) An excise tax is
hereby levied and imposed on the storage,
use or other consumption in this state of
tangible personal property or taxable serv-
ices described in s. 77.52 purchased from any
retailer on or after February 1, 1962,
at the rate of 3% of the sales price of the
property or taxable services; but beginning
on September 1, 1969 the rate of the tax
hereby imposed shall be 4%.”
Appendix
\ 3a
The department does not claim that the tax is imposed on
the taxpayer's storage of natural gas in this state, but
rather claims that the taxpayer uses or consumes the gas
within the meaning of the statute. Furthermore, neither
party disputes the facial applicability of this taxing section
to the taxpayer's use of natural gas except as it may be
exempt from taxation under sec. 77.54(1), Stats. This
section provides:
“General exemptions. There are exempt-
ed from the taxes imposed by this sub-
chapter:
“(1) The gross receipts from the sale of
and the storage, use or other consumption
in this state of tangible personal property
and services the gross receipts from the
sale of which, or the storage, use or other
consumption of which, this state is pro-
hibited from taxing under the constitution
or laws of the United States or under the
constitution of this state.”
After an administrative hearing to review the
department's refusal to redetermine its assessment, the
Commission concluded, inter alia, that the assessment was
not “prohibited by Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the
United States Constitution” and thus was not “exempt
within the intent and meaning of sec. 77.54(1) of the
Wisconsin Statutes.” The circuit court, however, con-
cluded that the tax violated the Commerce Clause and for
that reason reversed the order of the Commission.
Appendix
4a
(1)
The resolution of the conflict between the constitu-
tional protection of free interstate commerce and the
states’ reserved power to tax must be accomplished on a
case-by-case basis, with the particular facts and statutory
characteristics determining the outcome. Boston Stock
Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318, 329
(1977).
In Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347
U.S. 157, 165 (1954), the Court stated generally, “Under
the Commerce Clause interstate commerce and its instru-
mentalities are not totally immune from state taxation,
absent action by Congress.” Rather, the Court continued,
“It is now well settled that a tax imposed on a local activity
related to interstate commerce is valid if, and only if, the
local activity is not such an integral part of the interstate
process, the flow of commerce, that it cannot realistically
be separated from it.” Michigan- Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.
v. Calvert, Supra at 166.
The department asserts that “the tax imposed is non-
discriminatory and has not been shown to be unreasonable
in its exaction in relation to the benefits granted by the
goverenment [sic] of this state. (A. Brief at 8). This is
essentially true. Nowhere does the taxpayer claim that the
use tax imposed by sec. 77.53, Stats., discriminates
against interstate commerce in favor of local enterprise.
Nor has the taxpayer demonstrated that the tax is
unreasonably disproportionate to benefits derived from
the state. What the taxpayer does claim, however, is that
the tax, as applied to the facts of this case, is an improp-
er burden upon an activity which is an integral and
inseparable part of the interstate flow of its natural gas. In
support of this claim, the taxpayer relies principally on
Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929)
(hereinafter Helson).
Appendix
da
In Helson, the taxpayers, citizens and residents of
Illinois, were in the business of operating a ferry on the
Ohio River between Illinois and Kentucky. The taxpayers
purchased gasoline to fuel the vessel’s engines in Illinois,
although seventy-five percent of it was consumed within
the limits of Kentucky. Kentucky, which taxed all gasoline
sold or used within the state, sought to impose the tax on
that portion of the ferry’s fuel consumed in Kentucky
waters. The Supreme Court found the tax violative of the
Commerce Clause, stating:
“The tax is exacted as the price of the
privilege of using an instrumentality of inter-
state commerce. It reasonably cannot be
distinguished from a tax for using a
locomotive or a car employed in such
commerce. A tax laid upon the use of the
ferry boat, would present an exact parallel.
And is not the fuel consumed in propelling
the boat an instrumentality of commerce
no less that the boat itself? A tax, which falls
directly upon the use of one of the means by
which commerce is carried on, directly
burdens that commerce. If a tax cannot be
laid by a state upon the interstate trans-
portation of the subjects of commerce, as
this Court definitely has held, it is little
more than repetition to say that such a tax
cannot be laid upon the use of a medium by
which such transportation is effected.
‘All restraints by exactions in the form of
taxes upon such transportation, or upon acts
necessary to its completion, are so many
invasions of the exclusive power of Congress
to regulate that portion of commerce
between the States.’ Gloucester Ferry Co. v.
Appendix
6a
Pennsylvania, Supra, p. 214.” Helson and
Randolph v. Kentucky, supra at 252.
In 1936, Helson was expressly followed by the Court in
invalidating a state tax imposed upon the use of motor fuel
to effect the movement of buses in interstate commerce.
Bingamen v. Golden Eagle Western Lines, Inc., 297 U.S.
626 (1936).
State courts have more recently applied the rule in the
Helson case to situations similar to the one presented here.
In Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Benson, 223 Tenn.
279, 444 S.W.2d 137 (1969), the object of the state use tax
was that amount of natural gas diverted from the
taxpayer’s main transmission lines to fuel compressor
engines. Characterizing the taxing statute as imposing tax
liability on goods which are stopped or brought to rest
within the state for sale, use, consumption, distribu-
tion or storage, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that
the fuel gas did not come to rest within the state but was a
part of a continuous flow and “a necessary and integral part
of the [taxpayer's] interstate operation.”’ Texas Gas
Transmission Corp. v. Benson, supra at 139. The court
thereupon applied the Helson rule to hold that the
taxpayer's use of gas was exempt from the use tax. The
same result was also reached by the Michigan Court of
Appeals in Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. State, 58
Mich. App. 318, 227 N.W.2d 334 (1975), wherein the
taxpayer's use of natural gas tapped from a main
transmission line to power compressor engines was held,
under authority of Helson and Texas Gas Transmission
Corp. , to be exempt from a use tax statute which imposed a
levy on the “privilege of using, storing and consuming
tangible property brought from out of the state after it has
come to rest.” Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. State,
227 N.W.2d at 335-37.
-- >
Appendix
Ta
The department concedes that if the Helson case is still
valid, it would require an affirmance in the instant case.
The department, however, argues that the Helson decision
has been modified by subsequent Supreme Court decisions
so as tochange the rule prohibiting the imposition of a state
use tax on a substance used to fuel interstate commerce.
The department first relies on several Supreme Court
decisions to support its contention that the Court has
moved away from the Helsonrule. Coverdale v. Arkansas-
Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938); Mc-
Goldrick v. Berwind-White Coa! Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33
(1940); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100
(1975). We think, however, that the department's reliance
on these cases is misplaced.
In Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co.,
supra, the taxpayer was engaged in the business of
producing and buying, transporting and selling natural
gas. The gas was obtained in Louisiana and over ninety -six
per cent of it was delivered to customers outside the state.
To move the gas through the pipeline, the taxpayer
maintained a compressor statiun in Louisiana. Louisiana
sought to impose a tax on the compressor under a statute
which required a license tax to be paid by everyone within
the state in the business of manufacturing or generating
power for use in the conduct of business. Specifically, the
statute imposed a tax of one dollar per annum per
horsepower generated by a taxpayer in the state. The
Supreme Court, characterizing “the tax as one imposing
upon the privilege of producing . . .power,” concluded that
the statute was a valid exercise of the state’s authority to
impose a tax on the privilege of “carrying on a local
business.” Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line
Co., supra at 609-10.
Appendix
8a
The Court, relying on the distinction between taxes
imposed on operations integral to and reasonably
inseparable from the interstate movement of goods and
those imposed upon operations related to but distin-
guishable from interstate commerce, concluded that the
state statute which specifically taxed only the generation
of power was not violative of the Commerce Clause. In
reaching this result the Court did not overrule the Helson
decision, however, but distinguished it as belonging “to the
category of cases which construe the state tax acts
involved as taxes on interstate commerce and its
instrumentalities rather than on operations closely
connected with but distinct from that commerce.”
“Likewise, in the Helson case, this Court
concluded that the tax on gasoline brought
into the state and used on an interstate
ferry was analogous to a tax on the use of
the ferry itself in transit and therefore with-
in the rule prohibiting state taxes on com-
merce. A narrow distinction in fact exists
between the tax held invalid in the Helson
case and the valid tax considered in
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace,
288 U.S. 249, where a tax on gasoline
brought into the state, stored and then used
to drive engines in interstate transporta-
tion, was held valid. The storage and with-
drawal was an intrastate, taxable event.”
Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line
Co., supra at 611-12.
Because the taxing statute in the instant case bears a
stronger resemblance to the gasoline tax invalidated in
Helson than it does to the mechanically specific taxing
———
Appendix
9a
statute upheld in Coverdale, we think that it would not be
appropriate for this court to rely on the analysis in
Coverdale to uphold the department's use tax assessment
upon the natural gas used to fuel the taxpayer's
compressor engines. Coverdale clearly indicates that the
Supreme Court was not abandoning the rule of Helson.
In McGoldrick v. Berwind- White Coal Mining, supra, a
divided Supreme Court upheld a New York sales tax
imposed upon coal mined in Pennsylvania, stored in New
Jersey and delivered in New York. The majority,
reasoning that interstate commerce should pay its fair
share of the tax burden, concluded that the sales tax did
not discriminate against interstate commerce and that it
was imposed upon a local activity distinct from commerce:
“Its [the tax’s] only relation to the commerce arises from
the fact that immediately preceding transfer of possession
to the purchaser within the state, which is the taxable
event regardless of the time and place of passing title, the
merchandise has been transported in interstate commerce
and brought to its journey’s end.” McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Mining Co., supra at 49. But again, the Court's
decision in McGoldrick to view the transfer of title to goods
which have crossed state lines as an event distinct from
commerce and taxable by the state does not vitiate the
Court’s earlier conclusion that the consumption of fuel to
move goods in interstate commerce was indistinguishable
from that commerce and not subject to a state use tax.
In Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, supra, the Court
upheld a Louisiana franchise tax imposed upon “the
privilege of carrying on or doing business in the state in a
corporate form.” The Court emphasized the fact that the
statute has been amended “purposely to remove any basis
of alevy upon the privilege of carrying on an intrastate [sic]
business and narrowly to confine the impost to one
Appendix
10a
related to appellant's activities within the state in
the corporate form.” Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle,
supra at 113-14. (Emphasis supplied.) Noting that al-
though it was not required to do so, the taxpayer
voluntarily qualified under Louisiana law to conduct its
business in that state in the corporate form and thereby
derived numerous benefits provided by the state, the
Court concluded that the tax was not improperly imposed
“merely or solely for the privilege of doing interstate
business in Louisiana.” Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle,
supra at 113-14. Again, the taxable event in Colonial
Pipeline is readily distinguishable from that which was
sought to be taxed in Helson and that which is sought to be
taxed here.
Both parties cite Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274 (1977) and Washington v. Association of
Washington Stevedoring Companies, —U.S.—, 98 S. Ct.
1388 (1978) as authority sustaining their respective
positions on the issue involved.
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra,
Mississippi levied a gross receipts tax on the privilege of
doing business within the state. It applied the tax to the
appellant, a Michigan corporation transporting within the
state motor vehicles manufactured elsewhere. The appel-
lant’s sole argument against the tax was that it was the
same type of direct taxation on the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce as was previously invalidated in
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602
(1951). The Court, viewing the appellant's activity as
being within interstate commerce, determined that
because no absolute immunity from state taxation existed
for interstate commerce, “a state tax on the ‘privilege of
doing business’ is [not] per se unconstitutional when it is
applied to interstate commerce. . . ." Complete Auto
Appendix
lla
Transit, Inc, v. Brady, supra at 289. Consequently,
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, supra, was
overruled, In Washington v. Association of Washington
Stevedoring Companies, supra, the Court rejected the rule
of previous decisions that the constitutionality of a state
tax depended solely on whether it amounted to direct or
indirect taxation on interstate commerce,
In these cases, the Court abandoned two tests which
looked primarily to the language of the taxing statute in
favor of an analysis of the economic consequence the tax
would have on interstate commerce, The Court also
indicated four criteria which a taxing statute must satisfy
to be valid under this analysis: (1) the activity taxed must
have a substantial nexus with the state; (2) the tax must be
fairly apportioned; (3) the tax must not discriminate
against interstate commerce; and (4) the tax must be fairly
related to services provided by the state. Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra at 277, 287; Washington v.
Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, supra
at 1399-1400,
Under this analysis, the key question here is whether
the activity the department seeks to tax has a substantial
nexus with the state. In this respect, the Helson
determination that property which is used to fuel a vehicle
of interstate commerce may not be subjected to a use tax
remains relevant. That the Supreme Court has not
abandoned this position is shown by its decision in United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 629-30 (1973),
where the Court, in upholding an Illinois storage tax on
aviation fuel consumed by the taxpayer's aircraft in
interstate flights, stated:
Appendix
12a
“The line drawn between an impermis-
sible tax on mere consumption of fuel, as in
Helson, and a permissible tax on storage of
fuel before loading, as in Edelman and
Nashville, continues to serve rational
purposes. Retaining the line at this point
minimizes the danger of double taxation and
yet provides a source of revenue having a
relation to the event taxed. Double taxation
is minimized because the fuel cannot be
taxed by States through which it is trans-
ported, under Michigan- Wisconsin Pipe Line
Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S, 107 (1954), nor by
the State in which it is merely consumed,
under Helson. A fair result is achieved
because a State in which preloading storage
facilities are maintained is likely to provide
substantial services to those facilities,
including police protection and the mainte-
nance of public access roads,”
[2]
Here, the department seeks to impose a use tax on that
amount of natural gas consumed in engines which provide
the pressure necessary to propel the great bulk of the
taxpayer's gas through interstate commerce. Although
this activity takes place within the state, we are satisfied
that this consumption is an integral part of the process of
interstate commerce whict: does not have a substantial
nexus to the state. Thus, ‘t remains immune from state
taxation by reason of the Commerce Clause.
By the Court. —Judgment affirmed.
DAY, J., took no part.
se ee
Appendix
13a
STATE OF WISCONSIN
CIRCUIT COURT DANE COUNTY
te ee a ee —s
ee
Entered June 21, 1976
MIDWESTERN GAS TRANSMISSION
COMPANY,
Petitioner, JUDGMENT
vs. Case No, 147-345
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Respondent,
The above-entitled proceeding for review, under
Chapter 227, Wisconsin Statutes, of a Decision and Order
of the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission, dated June 17,
1975, in proceedings before said Commission designated as
Docket No, S-4085, having come on before the Court, the
Honorable Michael B. Torphy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
presiding, upon the record made before the said
Commission; and Wheeler, Van Sickle, Anderson, Norman
& Harvey, S.C. appearing for the petitioner, and Bronson
C. LaFollette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, by E.
Weston Wood, Assistant Attorney General, appearing for
the respondent; and the Court having read the briefs and
being fully advised in the premises and having rendered a
written Decision dated June 1, 1976;
NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion of the attorneys for
the petitioner,
ITIS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
Decision and Order of the Wisconsin Tax Appeals
Commission, dated June 17, 1975, in the proceedings before
it designated as Docket No. S-4085, be and the same is
Appendix
lda
hereby reversed and the record herein is remanded to the
said Commission for further proceedings not inconsistent
with the decision of the Court entered herein; and
IT ISHEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that if no appeal
be taken from this Judgment within 30 days after service of
notice of entry thereof, or in the event of such appeal and
remittitur of affirmance, the Clerk of this Court is directed
to transmit to the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission the
records of the proceedings before said Commission which
was transmitted to this Court in accordance with Section
227.18, Wisconsin Statutes, together with a copy of this
Judgment; and
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that no costs be
taxed to any party herein.
Dated this 18th day of June, 1976.
BY THE COURT:
/s/Michael B. Torphy, Jr.
Circuit Judge
The above Judgment is approved as to form prior to
signature, and Notice of Application for entry thereof is
hereby waived.
Dated this 17th day of June, 1976.
BRONSON C. LAFOLLETTE
Attorney General of Wisconsin
By /s/ E. Weston Wood
E. Weston Wood, Assistant
Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
Appendix
i5a
STATE OF WISCONSIN
TAX APPEALS COMMISSION
Entered June 17, 1975
MIDWESTERN GAS TRANSMISSION CO.,
Petitioner, DOCKET NO, S-4085
VS. DECISION AND ORDER
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT
OF REVENUE, (Drafted by
Commissioner Timken)
Respondent.
The above-entitled matter having come on to be heard
before this Commission; the petitioner, Midwestern Gas
Transmission Co., having appeared by its assistant
secretary, A. L. Santi, and by its attorneys, Wheeler, Van
Sickle, Day & Anderson, by Roland Day, and by Attorney
John G, Brendel; the respondent, Wisconsin Department
of Revenue, having appeared by Stanley C. Fruits, its
Senior Tax Counsel; being fully advised in the premises
and having considered all of the testimony, evidence and
briefs of counsel, this Commission hereby finds and decides
as
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. During the period involved herein and thereafter, the
petitioner, Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., owned and
operated a natural gas pipeline system which originated at
the border between the United States and Canada at a
point east of Emerson, Manitoba, where it connected with
Appendix
16a
Trans-Canada Pipeline Co., Ltd. From said point it
extends southeasterly through Minnesota and into
Wisconsin where it interconnects with the Michigan-
Wisconsin Pipeline Co., at Marshfield, Wisconsin.
2. From the Canadian border to Marshfield, Wisconsin,
the natural gas involved herein moves through petitioner's
pipeline, having an outside diameter of 24 inches. Said
natural gas isin motion at all times, from the time it leaves
Canada until it is delivered at Marshfield.
3. During the period involved herein, the petitioner
served three customers in Wisconsin through nine or ten
outlets. Said sales were sales for resale which are exempt
to the petitioner under Wisconsin sales and use tax law.
4. During the period involved herein and thereafter, the
petitioner owned and operated eight compressor stations
along its pipeline system described above. Two of the eight
compressor stations are located in Wisconsin, one at St.
Croix Falls and one at Chippewa Falls.
5. In order to keep the natural gas in motion, it is
necessary to keep same under pressure to propel it
through the petitioner's pipeline system., Said gas enters
each of the two Wisconsin compressor stations specified
above at a pressure of about 590 pounds per square inch
and leaves the two stations at the increased pressure of
about 800 to 877 pounds per square inch.
6. Increasing the pressure in the pipeline in Wisconsin is
accomplished by compressors at the stations located at St.
Croix Falls and Chippewa Falls which are operated by
engines which use natural gas for fuel. The station at St.
Croix Falls has three two-cycle reciprocating engines, each
rated at 1,600 horsepower with each engine powering four
Appendix
17a
compressors. The station at Chippewa Falls has one solar
turbine engine, rated at 2,710 horsepower, which powers
one centrifugal compressor. It is the function of the
compressors to increase the pressure of the gas flowing
through the line. Said stations are and were during the
period involved herein owned and operated by the
petitioner.
7. In addition to using natural gas as fuel in the engines
powering the compressors, the petitioner uses natural gas
at its Wisconsin stations to heat and air condition the
stations.
8. At the Chippewa Falls station, natural gas is drawn
from the main pipeline through two taps, one tap serving
the compressor engines and the other tap serving the
heating, air conditioning and other functions located at said
station.
9. At the St. Croix Falls station, natural gas is drawn
from the pipeline through one tap. The line from the tap
has two branches, one serving the compressor engine and
the other serving heating, air conditioning and other
functions at said station.
10. The natural gas drawn off the petitioner's main
pipeline for heating, air conditioning and sundry purposes,
while substantial in amount, constitutes approximately
only .486 to .768 of 1% of the total gas drawn off the
pipeline by the petitioner for use at the stations.
11. After said natural gas is drawn off the main pipeline
for use by the petitioner at its two stations, it is metered,
the pressure reduced, cleaned and compietely consumed.
No portion of said gas is returned to the main pipeline.
Appendix
18a
12. During the period September 1, 1969 through
December 31, 1971, the petitioner used natural gas taken
from its pipeline for the purposes specified above as
follows:
Year Quarter Period Natural Gas Cost
1969 Sept.—Dec. $17,194
1970 Jan.—March $15,874
1970 April—June $18,968
1970 July—Sept. $20,010
1970 Oct.—Dec. $28,007
1971 Jan.—March $42,788
1971 April—June $41,622
1971 July—Sept. $45,520
1971 Oct.— Dec. $49,867
Both parties agree on the amount of and the cost of the
natural gas used by the petitioner at the stations for the
said purposes for the period involved herein. The
petitioner did not pay any Wisconsin use tax on any portion
thereof, contending that the imposition of a tax on the gas
consumed in the manner specified above contravenes the
Interstate Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution Article I, Section 8, CL 3.
13. Under date of May 12, 1972, the respondent,
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, issued a notice of sales
and use tax assessment against the petitioner, Midwestern
Gas Transmission Co., covering the period of September 1,
1969 to December 31, 1971 in the total amount of
$11,972.86 taxing the natural gas specified in Finding No.
12 above.
Appendix
19a
14. On June 15, 1972 the petitioner filed a timely petition
for redetermination of said May 12, 1972 assessment, and
on August 4, 1972 the respondent denied same. Petitioner
has appealed said action to this Commission.
15. The assessment in issue herein did not attempt to
impose a sales or use tax on the natural gas flowing through
the petitioner's two compressor stations in Wisconsin and
natural gas delivered to the petitioner's customers.
WISCONSIN STATUTES INVOLVED
Section 77.53 Imposition of use tax.
“CL) An excise tax is hereby levied and
imposed on the storage, use or
other consumption in this state of
tangible personal property or tax-
able services described in s. 77.52
purchased from any retailer on 0:
after February 1, 1962, at the rate
of 3% of the sales price of the
property or taxable services; but
beginning on September 1, 1969
the rate of the tax hereby imposed
shall be 4%.”
Section 77.51 Definitions. Except where the
context requires otherwise, the definitions
given in this section govern the construction
of terms in this subchapter.
(5) ‘Tangible personal property’ means
all tangible personal property of
every kind and description and
includes electricity, natural gas,
steam and water and also leased
Appendix
20a
property affixed to realty if the
lessor has the right to remove the
property upon breach or termina-
tion of the lease agreement, unless
the lessor of the property is also the
lessor of the realty to which the
property is affixed. The term also
includes coins and stamps of the
United States sold or traded as
collectors’ items above their face
value.”
Section 77.54 General exemptions. There
are exempted from the taxes imposed by this
subchapter:
“(1)
The gross receipts from the sale of
and the storage, use or other
consumption in this state of tan-
gible personal property and serv-
ices the gross receipts from the sale
of which, or the storage, use or
other consumption of which, this
state is prohibited from taxing
under the constitution or laws of the
United States or under the consti-
tution of this state.”
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.
Section 8. The Congress shall have power
** *
To regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states, and with
Indian tribes.
Appendix
21a
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Sections 77.53(1) and 77.51(5) of the Wisconsin
Statutes impose a 4% use tax on the cost of the natural gas
used by the petitioner at its two compressor stations
during the period in question.
2. The tax assessed by the respondent on the use of
natural gas by the petitioner in Wisconsin is not prohibited
by Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States
Constitution.
3. The tax assessed by the respondent on the use of
natural gas by the petitioner in Wisconsin is not exempt
within the intent and meaning of Section 77.54(1) of the
Wisconsin Statutes.
Note: McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Mining Co.,
309 U.S. 33.
Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line
Co., 303 U.S. 604.
Therefore,
ITISORDERED
That respondent's action on petitioner's petition for
redetermination be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 17th day of June,
1975.
WISCONSIN TAX APPEALS COMMISSION
/s/ R. J. Smrz
R. J. Smrz, Chairman
/s/ Thomas R. Timken
Thomas R. Timken, Commissioner
/s/ John P. Morris
John P. Morris, Commissioner
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.