Petition — Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co.

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SEP 26 1978

ee,

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UN JR., CLERK

October Term, 1978

" %8-510

WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT

OF REVENUE,

Petitioner,

vw,

MIDWESTERN GAS

TRANSMISSION COMPANY,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE STATE OF WISCONSIN

BRONSON C. LA FOLLETTE

Attorney General of Wisconsin

E. WESTON WOOD

Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Petitioner

P.O. Address:

114 East, State Capitol

Madison, Wisconsin 53702

i

INDEX AND SYNOPSIS OF ARGUMENT

Page

ee vax bea ee Ak 1

a lS ee ee rs re 2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................ 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

es cigs 5 8. : an 2

STATEMENT OF THECASE ...................... 3

REASONS FORGRANTINGTHEWRIT............. 4

The Decision Below Conflicts With

Ee 4

i a ry aR SR Gea 7

CASES CITED

Colonial Pipe Line Company v. Traigle,

Ne ny ekg Side wna ke 5

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,

430 U.S. 274 (1977) ..... OM ace tat aie annie ess aeons 5,6

Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co.

ee eek. ki mac wu meena cn cess 5

Dept. of Rev., Etc. v. Ass'n of Wash.

Steve. Co., 98S.Ct. 1888 (1978) ................ 5,6,7

Helson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,

go er es a aes we a bya ms 4,5,6,7

Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. Revenue

Dept., 84 Wis.2d 261, 267 N.W.2d 253 (1978) ....... 1,6

Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor,

i. aes esl a sb eeanndiaee 5,6

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

STATUTES AND RULES CITED

rn I es A ee wan

Wisconsin Statutes

Sec. 77.51(7)(a)

“Ams S 8 6 Oe ek eee we ee ee ee ee ee

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1978

Na,

WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT

OF REVENUE

Petitioner,

Vv.

MIDWESTERN GAS

TRANSMISSION COMPANY,

Respondent.

PETITION FORA WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF WISCONSIN

The petitioner, Wisconsin Department of Revenue,

respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review

the final judgment and opinion of the Supreme Court of the

State of Wisconsin entered June 30, 1978.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion and judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme

Court is reported as Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v.

Revenue Dept., 84 Wis.2d 261, 267 N.W.2d 253 (1978).

The opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the

unreported opinions of the Circuit Court for Dane County

and the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission appear in the

appendix hereto.

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Circuit Court for Dane County was

dated June 18, 1976, and was entered June 21, 1976. That

judgment held that imposition of the Wisconsin use tax

upon the use by the respondent of certain natural gas,

pursuant to sec. 77.53, Wis. Stats., violates the commerce

clause, U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8. On June 30, 1978, the

Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the lower court judg-

ment, and this petition for a writ of certiorari was filed

within 90 days of that date.

This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. sec.

1257(3).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

When a company operating an interstate natural gas

pipeline from Minnesota into Wisconsin withdraws gas

from the pipeline in Wisconsin, reduces the pressure of

such gas and consumes it in Wisconsin in engines used to

run compressors necessary to keep the gas moving

through the pipeline, is the imposition of the Wisconsin use

tax on the gas consumed in Wisconsin violative of the

commerce clause?

The Wisconsin Supreme Court held in the affirmative.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

AND STATUTES INVOLVED

United States Constitution, art. I:

“SECTION 8. The Congress shall have power

“es ee

“To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and

among the several states... .”

3

Section 77.53, Wis. Stats.:

“Imposition of use tax. (1) An excise tax is

hereby levied and imposed on the storage, use

or other consumption in this state of tangible

personal property or taxable services described

in s. 77.52 purchased from any retailer... .”

Section 77.51, Wis. Stats.:

“(7) ‘Retailer’ includes:

“(a) Every seller who makes any sale of

tangible personal property... .”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The respondent, hereinafter called Midwestern, buys

Canadian natural gas at the Manitoba-Minnesota border

and transports it through Midwestern’s pipeline from that

point to Marshfield, Wisconsin. Some gas is sold to

Wisconsin customers west of Marshfield, for resale, but

the bulk of it is sold and delivered to another pipeline

company at Marshfield.

Some gas is consumed by Midwestern at its two

compressor stations in Wisconsin. These stations are

necessary to increase the pressure of the gas in the pipeline

in order to keep it flowing. At each station some gas is

withdrawn from the pipeline, filtered or strained to

remove foreign particles, metered, reduced in pressure

and used to fuel engines which run the compressors. The

gas withdrawn from the pipeline never comes to rest prior

to being consumed in the engines.

4

The petitioner made an assessment of use taxes against

Midwestern for the period from September 1, 1969, to

December 31, 1971, based upon the use of the gas

withdrawn from the pipeline and consumed at the

compressor stations in Wisconsin. A petition for redeter-

mination of that assessment was denied, and Midwestern

appealed to the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission which

affirmed the assessment, holding that imposition of the tax

was not prohibited by the commerce clause. Midwestern

then appealed to the Circuit Court for Dane County, and

the order of the Commission was reversed upon the sole

ground that the assessment violated the commerce clause.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the lower court,

again upon the sole ground that the commerce clause

prohibited the assessment. See p. 12a of appendix hereto.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions

Of This Court.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied upon Helson v.

Commonwealth of Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929), and

cases which followed it. The petitioner concedes that if

Helson is still viable, the tax now in issue is

unconstitutional.

Helson held unconstitutional, under the commerce

clause, a Kentucky tax upon the use in Kentucky of fuel

purchased in Illinois to propel an interstate ferry. The

opinion stated, 279 U.S. at 252, that the tax was “exacted

as the price of the privilege of using an instrumentality of

interstate commerce,” and continued: “A tax which falls

directly upon the use of one of the means by which

commerce is carried on directly burdens that commerce.”

5

Several years after Helson, in Coverdale v. Arkansas-

Louisiana Pipe Line Co. , 303 U.S. 604 (1938), a Louisiana

horsepower tax upon the horsepower of engines used to

run compressors to maintain the flow of natural gas

through an interstate pipeline was attacked as violative of

the commerce clause. The tax was sustained, although the

Court regarded it “as one upon the privilege of producing

the power” (303 U.S. at 609).

Colonial Pipeline Company v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100

(1975), sustained yet another Louisiana tax which involved

an exclusively interstate pipeline operation. By the terms

of the statute the tax was imposed upon qualification to do

business in Louisiana or actually doing business there in a

corporate form. The opinion states that the controlling

test, under the commerce clause, “ ‘is whether the State

has exerted its power in proper proportion to appellant's

activities within the State and to appellant’s consequent

enjoyment of the opportunities and protections which the

State has afforded’ ” (421 U.S at 108-109).

Two very recent cases have overruled Spector Motor

Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)— which held that

a tax on the privilege of engaging in an activity within a

state may not be applied to an activity which is part of

interstate commerce—and have established a new test for

determining the validity, under the commerce clause, of

state taxes. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430

U.S. 274 (1977), reh. denied 430 U.S. 976 (1977); and Dept.

of Rev., Etc. v. Ass'n of Wash. Steve. Co., 98 S.Ct. 1388

(1978). Washington Stevedoring stated, 98 S.Ct. at 1399:

“. . . The Court repeatedly has sus-

tained taxes that are applied to activity

with substantial nexus with the State,

6

that are fairly apportioned, that do not dis-

criminate against interstate commerce, and

that are fairly related to the services pro-

vided by the State... .”

Complete Auto Transit, supra, states the test in almost

identical language, 430 U.S. at 277.

The opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Cour: refers to

this four-pronged test and continues, 84 Wis.2d at 27

(Appendix p. 11a):

“Under this analysis, the key question

here is whether the activity the dep2:tment

seeks to tax has a substantial nexus with

the state. In this respect, the Helson deter-

mination that property which is used to fuel a

vehicle of interstate commerce may not be

subjected to a use tax remains relevant.

That the Supreme Court has not abandoned

this position is shown by its decision in

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S.

623, 629-30 (1973)... .”

The Wisconsin Court's opinion goes on to say that

although the tax here involved is imposed upon the use of

natural gas in Wisconsin, “this consumption is an integral

part of the process of interstate commerce which does not

have a substantial nexus with the state.” Therefore, the

opinion held, the use of the gas was immune from state

taxation by reason of the commerce clause.

It is submitted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has

missed the significance of Complete Auto Transit, supra,

and Washington Stevedoring, supra, which rejected the

reasoning of Helson, supra, and Spector Motor Service,

supra, and frankly sustained a state tax upon an integral

7

part of an interstate commerce operation, where the tax

met the four criteria. The fact that Helson has not been

overruled is irrelevant, because the basis of the Helson

ruling has been rejected.

In Washington Stevedoring the opinion noted, 98 S.Ct. at

1399:

“, . . The record contains nothing that

minimizes the obvious nexus between

Washington and respondents; indeed, re-

spondents conduct their entire stevedoring

operations within the State... .”

That same reasoning is applicable here. Wisconsin seeks to

tax only the use of gasoline consumed within Wisconsin,

and there is an obvious nexus between that use and

Wisconsin. No question has been raised in the instant

matter as to whether the tax meets the other three criteria

of the four-pronged test.

CONCLUSION

It is therefore respectfully submitted that certiorari

should be granted or that in the alternative the decision

below should be summarily reversed.

BRONSON C. LA FOLLETTE

Attorney General of Wisconsin

E. WESTON WOOD

Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Petitioner

APPENDIX

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Page

DECISION AND ORDER of the Wisconsin Tax

Appeals Commission entered June 17,1975 .... 115-120

JUDGMENT of Circuit Court of Dane County,

Wisconsin, entered June21,1976 ............ 113-114

OPINION of Wisconsin Supreme Court filed

A a ee ee a 101-112

Appendix

la

No. 76-106

August Term, 1977

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

Midwestern Gas Transmission Co.,

Respondent,

FILED: June 30, 1978

Vv.

Wis. Dept. of Revenue,

Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane

county: MICHAELB. TORPHY, Circuit Judge. Affirmed.

This is a state use tax case. The respondent,

Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. (hereinafter taxpayer),

owns and operates a pipeline through which it transports

natural gas. The pipeline begins at the Manitoba-

Minnesota border, and runs in a generally south-

westerly direction to Marshfield, Wisconsin. The taxpayer

purchases natural gas from a Canadian supplier and sells it

to various customers, three of which tap the taxpayer's line

at different points in Wisconsin. One of these is another

pipeline company which takes the bulk of the gas —

into the state by the taxpayer.

’ The taxpayer consumes some gas at two compressor

stations located in Wisconsin. The stations are necessary

to increase the pressure of the gas in the pipeline in order

to keep it flowing. At each station a small amount of gas is

withdrawn from the pipeline, filtered or strained to

Appendix

2a

remove foreign particles, metered, reduced in pressure

and used to fuel engines which run the compressors.

The gas taken from the pipeline never comes to rest before

it is consumed.

In May, 1972, the appellant, Wisconsin Department of

Revenue, issued a notice of sales and use tax assessment

against the taxpayer on the gas consumed at its two

Wisconsin pumping facilities during the period of

September 1, 1969 to December 21, 1971. The value of the

gas was stipulated and the tax, with interest, was set at

$11,972.86. A petition for the redetermination of the

assessment was denied by the department, and affirmed

on appeal to the Commission. The taxpayer appealed to

the circuit court where the Commission's order was

reversed. The department appeals.

HANLEY, J. The sole issue presented on this appeal is

whether natural gas consumed at the taxpayer's Wisconsin

compressor stations is subject to the Wisconsin use tax,

sec. 77.54(1), Stats.

The department seeks to impose a tax on that amount of

natural gas consumed by the taxpayer at its two pumping

stations pursuant to sec. 77.53(1), Stats. This section

provides:

“Imposition of use tax. (1) An excise tax is

hereby levied and imposed on the storage,

use or other consumption in this state of

tangible personal property or taxable serv-

ices described in s. 77.52 purchased from any

retailer on or after February 1, 1962,

at the rate of 3% of the sales price of the

property or taxable services; but beginning

on September 1, 1969 the rate of the tax

hereby imposed shall be 4%.”

Appendix

\ 3a

The department does not claim that the tax is imposed on

the taxpayer's storage of natural gas in this state, but

rather claims that the taxpayer uses or consumes the gas

within the meaning of the statute. Furthermore, neither

party disputes the facial applicability of this taxing section

to the taxpayer's use of natural gas except as it may be

exempt from taxation under sec. 77.54(1), Stats. This

section provides:

“General exemptions. There are exempt-

ed from the taxes imposed by this sub-

chapter:

“(1) The gross receipts from the sale of

and the storage, use or other consumption

in this state of tangible personal property

and services the gross receipts from the

sale of which, or the storage, use or other

consumption of which, this state is pro-

hibited from taxing under the constitution

or laws of the United States or under the

constitution of this state.”

After an administrative hearing to review the

department's refusal to redetermine its assessment, the

Commission concluded, inter alia, that the assessment was

not “prohibited by Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the

United States Constitution” and thus was not “exempt

within the intent and meaning of sec. 77.54(1) of the

Wisconsin Statutes.” The circuit court, however, con-

cluded that the tax violated the Commerce Clause and for

that reason reversed the order of the Commission.

Appendix

4a

(1)

The resolution of the conflict between the constitu-

tional protection of free interstate commerce and the

states’ reserved power to tax must be accomplished on a

case-by-case basis, with the particular facts and statutory

characteristics determining the outcome. Boston Stock

Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318, 329

(1977).

In Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347

U.S. 157, 165 (1954), the Court stated generally, “Under

the Commerce Clause interstate commerce and its instru-

mentalities are not totally immune from state taxation,

absent action by Congress.” Rather, the Court continued,

“It is now well settled that a tax imposed on a local activity

related to interstate commerce is valid if, and only if, the

local activity is not such an integral part of the interstate

process, the flow of commerce, that it cannot realistically

be separated from it.” Michigan- Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.

v. Calvert, Supra at 166.

The department asserts that “the tax imposed is non-

discriminatory and has not been shown to be unreasonable

in its exaction in relation to the benefits granted by the

goverenment [sic] of this state. (A. Brief at 8). This is

essentially true. Nowhere does the taxpayer claim that the

use tax imposed by sec. 77.53, Stats., discriminates

against interstate commerce in favor of local enterprise.

Nor has the taxpayer demonstrated that the tax is

unreasonably disproportionate to benefits derived from

the state. What the taxpayer does claim, however, is that

the tax, as applied to the facts of this case, is an improp-

er burden upon an activity which is an integral and

inseparable part of the interstate flow of its natural gas. In

support of this claim, the taxpayer relies principally on

Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929)

(hereinafter Helson).

Appendix

da

In Helson, the taxpayers, citizens and residents of

Illinois, were in the business of operating a ferry on the

Ohio River between Illinois and Kentucky. The taxpayers

purchased gasoline to fuel the vessel’s engines in Illinois,

although seventy-five percent of it was consumed within

the limits of Kentucky. Kentucky, which taxed all gasoline

sold or used within the state, sought to impose the tax on

that portion of the ferry’s fuel consumed in Kentucky

waters. The Supreme Court found the tax violative of the

Commerce Clause, stating:

“The tax is exacted as the price of the

privilege of using an instrumentality of inter-

state commerce. It reasonably cannot be

distinguished from a tax for using a

locomotive or a car employed in such

commerce. A tax laid upon the use of the

ferry boat, would present an exact parallel.

And is not the fuel consumed in propelling

the boat an instrumentality of commerce

no less that the boat itself? A tax, which falls

directly upon the use of one of the means by

which commerce is carried on, directly

burdens that commerce. If a tax cannot be

laid by a state upon the interstate trans-

portation of the subjects of commerce, as

this Court definitely has held, it is little

more than repetition to say that such a tax

cannot be laid upon the use of a medium by

which such transportation is effected.

‘All restraints by exactions in the form of

taxes upon such transportation, or upon acts

necessary to its completion, are so many

invasions of the exclusive power of Congress

to regulate that portion of commerce

between the States.’ Gloucester Ferry Co. v.

Appendix

6a

Pennsylvania, Supra, p. 214.” Helson and

Randolph v. Kentucky, supra at 252.

In 1936, Helson was expressly followed by the Court in

invalidating a state tax imposed upon the use of motor fuel

to effect the movement of buses in interstate commerce.

Bingamen v. Golden Eagle Western Lines, Inc., 297 U.S.

626 (1936).

State courts have more recently applied the rule in the

Helson case to situations similar to the one presented here.

In Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Benson, 223 Tenn.

279, 444 S.W.2d 137 (1969), the object of the state use tax

was that amount of natural gas diverted from the

taxpayer’s main transmission lines to fuel compressor

engines. Characterizing the taxing statute as imposing tax

liability on goods which are stopped or brought to rest

within the state for sale, use, consumption, distribu-

tion or storage, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that

the fuel gas did not come to rest within the state but was a

part of a continuous flow and “a necessary and integral part

of the [taxpayer's] interstate operation.”’ Texas Gas

Transmission Corp. v. Benson, supra at 139. The court

thereupon applied the Helson rule to hold that the

taxpayer's use of gas was exempt from the use tax. The

same result was also reached by the Michigan Court of

Appeals in Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. State, 58

Mich. App. 318, 227 N.W.2d 334 (1975), wherein the

taxpayer's use of natural gas tapped from a main

transmission line to power compressor engines was held,

under authority of Helson and Texas Gas Transmission

Corp. , to be exempt from a use tax statute which imposed a

levy on the “privilege of using, storing and consuming

tangible property brought from out of the state after it has

come to rest.” Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. State,

227 N.W.2d at 335-37.

-- >

Appendix

Ta

The department concedes that if the Helson case is still

valid, it would require an affirmance in the instant case.

The department, however, argues that the Helson decision

has been modified by subsequent Supreme Court decisions

so as tochange the rule prohibiting the imposition of a state

use tax on a substance used to fuel interstate commerce.

The department first relies on several Supreme Court

decisions to support its contention that the Court has

moved away from the Helsonrule. Coverdale v. Arkansas-

Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938); Mc-

Goldrick v. Berwind-White Coa! Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33

(1940); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100

(1975). We think, however, that the department's reliance

on these cases is misplaced.

In Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co.,

supra, the taxpayer was engaged in the business of

producing and buying, transporting and selling natural

gas. The gas was obtained in Louisiana and over ninety -six

per cent of it was delivered to customers outside the state.

To move the gas through the pipeline, the taxpayer

maintained a compressor statiun in Louisiana. Louisiana

sought to impose a tax on the compressor under a statute

which required a license tax to be paid by everyone within

the state in the business of manufacturing or generating

power for use in the conduct of business. Specifically, the

statute imposed a tax of one dollar per annum per

horsepower generated by a taxpayer in the state. The

Supreme Court, characterizing “the tax as one imposing

upon the privilege of producing . . .power,” concluded that

the statute was a valid exercise of the state’s authority to

impose a tax on the privilege of “carrying on a local

business.” Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line

Co., supra at 609-10.

Appendix

8a

The Court, relying on the distinction between taxes

imposed on operations integral to and reasonably

inseparable from the interstate movement of goods and

those imposed upon operations related to but distin-

guishable from interstate commerce, concluded that the

state statute which specifically taxed only the generation

of power was not violative of the Commerce Clause. In

reaching this result the Court did not overrule the Helson

decision, however, but distinguished it as belonging “to the

category of cases which construe the state tax acts

involved as taxes on interstate commerce and its

instrumentalities rather than on operations closely

connected with but distinct from that commerce.”

“Likewise, in the Helson case, this Court

concluded that the tax on gasoline brought

into the state and used on an interstate

ferry was analogous to a tax on the use of

the ferry itself in transit and therefore with-

in the rule prohibiting state taxes on com-

merce. A narrow distinction in fact exists

between the tax held invalid in the Helson

case and the valid tax considered in

Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace,

288 U.S. 249, where a tax on gasoline

brought into the state, stored and then used

to drive engines in interstate transporta-

tion, was held valid. The storage and with-

drawal was an intrastate, taxable event.”

Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line

Co., supra at 611-12.

Because the taxing statute in the instant case bears a

stronger resemblance to the gasoline tax invalidated in

Helson than it does to the mechanically specific taxing

———

Appendix

9a

statute upheld in Coverdale, we think that it would not be

appropriate for this court to rely on the analysis in

Coverdale to uphold the department's use tax assessment

upon the natural gas used to fuel the taxpayer's

compressor engines. Coverdale clearly indicates that the

Supreme Court was not abandoning the rule of Helson.

In McGoldrick v. Berwind- White Coal Mining, supra, a

divided Supreme Court upheld a New York sales tax

imposed upon coal mined in Pennsylvania, stored in New

Jersey and delivered in New York. The majority,

reasoning that interstate commerce should pay its fair

share of the tax burden, concluded that the sales tax did

not discriminate against interstate commerce and that it

was imposed upon a local activity distinct from commerce:

“Its [the tax’s] only relation to the commerce arises from

the fact that immediately preceding transfer of possession

to the purchaser within the state, which is the taxable

event regardless of the time and place of passing title, the

merchandise has been transported in interstate commerce

and brought to its journey’s end.” McGoldrick v. Berwind-

White Coal Mining Co., supra at 49. But again, the Court's

decision in McGoldrick to view the transfer of title to goods

which have crossed state lines as an event distinct from

commerce and taxable by the state does not vitiate the

Court’s earlier conclusion that the consumption of fuel to

move goods in interstate commerce was indistinguishable

from that commerce and not subject to a state use tax.

In Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, supra, the Court

upheld a Louisiana franchise tax imposed upon “the

privilege of carrying on or doing business in the state in a

corporate form.” The Court emphasized the fact that the

statute has been amended “purposely to remove any basis

of alevy upon the privilege of carrying on an intrastate [sic]

business and narrowly to confine the impost to one

Appendix

10a

related to appellant's activities within the state in

the corporate form.” Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle,

supra at 113-14. (Emphasis supplied.) Noting that al-

though it was not required to do so, the taxpayer

voluntarily qualified under Louisiana law to conduct its

business in that state in the corporate form and thereby

derived numerous benefits provided by the state, the

Court concluded that the tax was not improperly imposed

“merely or solely for the privilege of doing interstate

business in Louisiana.” Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle,

supra at 113-14. Again, the taxable event in Colonial

Pipeline is readily distinguishable from that which was

sought to be taxed in Helson and that which is sought to be

taxed here.

Both parties cite Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,

430 U.S. 274 (1977) and Washington v. Association of

Washington Stevedoring Companies, —U.S.—, 98 S. Ct.

1388 (1978) as authority sustaining their respective

positions on the issue involved.

In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra,

Mississippi levied a gross receipts tax on the privilege of

doing business within the state. It applied the tax to the

appellant, a Michigan corporation transporting within the

state motor vehicles manufactured elsewhere. The appel-

lant’s sole argument against the tax was that it was the

same type of direct taxation on the privilege of engaging in

interstate commerce as was previously invalidated in

Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602

(1951). The Court, viewing the appellant's activity as

being within interstate commerce, determined that

because no absolute immunity from state taxation existed

for interstate commerce, “a state tax on the ‘privilege of

doing business’ is [not] per se unconstitutional when it is

applied to interstate commerce. . . ." Complete Auto

Appendix

lla

Transit, Inc, v. Brady, supra at 289. Consequently,

Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, supra, was

overruled, In Washington v. Association of Washington

Stevedoring Companies, supra, the Court rejected the rule

of previous decisions that the constitutionality of a state

tax depended solely on whether it amounted to direct or

indirect taxation on interstate commerce,

In these cases, the Court abandoned two tests which

looked primarily to the language of the taxing statute in

favor of an analysis of the economic consequence the tax

would have on interstate commerce, The Court also

indicated four criteria which a taxing statute must satisfy

to be valid under this analysis: (1) the activity taxed must

have a substantial nexus with the state; (2) the tax must be

fairly apportioned; (3) the tax must not discriminate

against interstate commerce; and (4) the tax must be fairly

related to services provided by the state. Complete Auto

Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra at 277, 287; Washington v.

Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, supra

at 1399-1400,

Under this analysis, the key question here is whether

the activity the department seeks to tax has a substantial

nexus with the state. In this respect, the Helson

determination that property which is used to fuel a vehicle

of interstate commerce may not be subjected to a use tax

remains relevant. That the Supreme Court has not

abandoned this position is shown by its decision in United

Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 629-30 (1973),

where the Court, in upholding an Illinois storage tax on

aviation fuel consumed by the taxpayer's aircraft in

interstate flights, stated:

Appendix

12a

“The line drawn between an impermis-

sible tax on mere consumption of fuel, as in

Helson, and a permissible tax on storage of

fuel before loading, as in Edelman and

Nashville, continues to serve rational

purposes. Retaining the line at this point

minimizes the danger of double taxation and

yet provides a source of revenue having a

relation to the event taxed. Double taxation

is minimized because the fuel cannot be

taxed by States through which it is trans-

ported, under Michigan- Wisconsin Pipe Line

Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S, 107 (1954), nor by

the State in which it is merely consumed,

under Helson. A fair result is achieved

because a State in which preloading storage

facilities are maintained is likely to provide

substantial services to those facilities,

including police protection and the mainte-

nance of public access roads,”

[2]

Here, the department seeks to impose a use tax on that

amount of natural gas consumed in engines which provide

the pressure necessary to propel the great bulk of the

taxpayer's gas through interstate commerce. Although

this activity takes place within the state, we are satisfied

that this consumption is an integral part of the process of

interstate commerce whict: does not have a substantial

nexus to the state. Thus, ‘t remains immune from state

taxation by reason of the Commerce Clause.

By the Court. —Judgment affirmed.

DAY, J., took no part.

se ee

Appendix

13a

STATE OF WISCONSIN

CIRCUIT COURT DANE COUNTY

te ee a ee —s

ee

Entered June 21, 1976

MIDWESTERN GAS TRANSMISSION

COMPANY,

Petitioner, JUDGMENT

vs. Case No, 147-345

WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

Respondent,

The above-entitled proceeding for review, under

Chapter 227, Wisconsin Statutes, of a Decision and Order

of the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission, dated June 17,

1975, in proceedings before said Commission designated as

Docket No, S-4085, having come on before the Court, the

Honorable Michael B. Torphy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

presiding, upon the record made before the said

Commission; and Wheeler, Van Sickle, Anderson, Norman

& Harvey, S.C. appearing for the petitioner, and Bronson

C. LaFollette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, by E.

Weston Wood, Assistant Attorney General, appearing for

the respondent; and the Court having read the briefs and

being fully advised in the premises and having rendered a

written Decision dated June 1, 1976;

NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion of the attorneys for

the petitioner,

ITIS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the

Decision and Order of the Wisconsin Tax Appeals

Commission, dated June 17, 1975, in the proceedings before

it designated as Docket No. S-4085, be and the same is

Appendix

lda

hereby reversed and the record herein is remanded to the

said Commission for further proceedings not inconsistent

with the decision of the Court entered herein; and

IT ISHEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that if no appeal

be taken from this Judgment within 30 days after service of

notice of entry thereof, or in the event of such appeal and

remittitur of affirmance, the Clerk of this Court is directed

to transmit to the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission the

records of the proceedings before said Commission which

was transmitted to this Court in accordance with Section

227.18, Wisconsin Statutes, together with a copy of this

Judgment; and

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that no costs be

taxed to any party herein.

Dated this 18th day of June, 1976.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Michael B. Torphy, Jr.

Circuit Judge

The above Judgment is approved as to form prior to

signature, and Notice of Application for entry thereof is

hereby waived.

Dated this 17th day of June, 1976.

BRONSON C. LAFOLLETTE

Attorney General of Wisconsin

By /s/ E. Weston Wood

E. Weston Wood, Assistant

Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

Appendix

i5a

STATE OF WISCONSIN

TAX APPEALS COMMISSION

Entered June 17, 1975

MIDWESTERN GAS TRANSMISSION CO.,

Petitioner, DOCKET NO, S-4085

VS. DECISION AND ORDER

WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT

OF REVENUE, (Drafted by

Commissioner Timken)

Respondent.

The above-entitled matter having come on to be heard

before this Commission; the petitioner, Midwestern Gas

Transmission Co., having appeared by its assistant

secretary, A. L. Santi, and by its attorneys, Wheeler, Van

Sickle, Day & Anderson, by Roland Day, and by Attorney

John G, Brendel; the respondent, Wisconsin Department

of Revenue, having appeared by Stanley C. Fruits, its

Senior Tax Counsel; being fully advised in the premises

and having considered all of the testimony, evidence and

briefs of counsel, this Commission hereby finds and decides

as

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. During the period involved herein and thereafter, the

petitioner, Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., owned and

operated a natural gas pipeline system which originated at

the border between the United States and Canada at a

point east of Emerson, Manitoba, where it connected with

Appendix

16a

Trans-Canada Pipeline Co., Ltd. From said point it

extends southeasterly through Minnesota and into

Wisconsin where it interconnects with the Michigan-

Wisconsin Pipeline Co., at Marshfield, Wisconsin.

2. From the Canadian border to Marshfield, Wisconsin,

the natural gas involved herein moves through petitioner's

pipeline, having an outside diameter of 24 inches. Said

natural gas isin motion at all times, from the time it leaves

Canada until it is delivered at Marshfield.

3. During the period involved herein, the petitioner

served three customers in Wisconsin through nine or ten

outlets. Said sales were sales for resale which are exempt

to the petitioner under Wisconsin sales and use tax law.

4. During the period involved herein and thereafter, the

petitioner owned and operated eight compressor stations

along its pipeline system described above. Two of the eight

compressor stations are located in Wisconsin, one at St.

Croix Falls and one at Chippewa Falls.

5. In order to keep the natural gas in motion, it is

necessary to keep same under pressure to propel it

through the petitioner's pipeline system., Said gas enters

each of the two Wisconsin compressor stations specified

above at a pressure of about 590 pounds per square inch

and leaves the two stations at the increased pressure of

about 800 to 877 pounds per square inch.

6. Increasing the pressure in the pipeline in Wisconsin is

accomplished by compressors at the stations located at St.

Croix Falls and Chippewa Falls which are operated by

engines which use natural gas for fuel. The station at St.

Croix Falls has three two-cycle reciprocating engines, each

rated at 1,600 horsepower with each engine powering four

Appendix

17a

compressors. The station at Chippewa Falls has one solar

turbine engine, rated at 2,710 horsepower, which powers

one centrifugal compressor. It is the function of the

compressors to increase the pressure of the gas flowing

through the line. Said stations are and were during the

period involved herein owned and operated by the

petitioner.

7. In addition to using natural gas as fuel in the engines

powering the compressors, the petitioner uses natural gas

at its Wisconsin stations to heat and air condition the

stations.

8. At the Chippewa Falls station, natural gas is drawn

from the main pipeline through two taps, one tap serving

the compressor engines and the other tap serving the

heating, air conditioning and other functions located at said

station.

9. At the St. Croix Falls station, natural gas is drawn

from the pipeline through one tap. The line from the tap

has two branches, one serving the compressor engine and

the other serving heating, air conditioning and other

functions at said station.

10. The natural gas drawn off the petitioner's main

pipeline for heating, air conditioning and sundry purposes,

while substantial in amount, constitutes approximately

only .486 to .768 of 1% of the total gas drawn off the

pipeline by the petitioner for use at the stations.

11. After said natural gas is drawn off the main pipeline

for use by the petitioner at its two stations, it is metered,

the pressure reduced, cleaned and compietely consumed.

No portion of said gas is returned to the main pipeline.

Appendix

18a

12. During the period September 1, 1969 through

December 31, 1971, the petitioner used natural gas taken

from its pipeline for the purposes specified above as

follows:

Year Quarter Period Natural Gas Cost

1969 Sept.—Dec. $17,194

1970 Jan.—March $15,874

1970 April—June $18,968

1970 July—Sept. $20,010

1970 Oct.—Dec. $28,007

1971 Jan.—March $42,788

1971 April—June $41,622

1971 July—Sept. $45,520

1971 Oct.— Dec. $49,867

Both parties agree on the amount of and the cost of the

natural gas used by the petitioner at the stations for the

said purposes for the period involved herein. The

petitioner did not pay any Wisconsin use tax on any portion

thereof, contending that the imposition of a tax on the gas

consumed in the manner specified above contravenes the

Interstate Commerce Clause of the United States

Constitution Article I, Section 8, CL 3.

13. Under date of May 12, 1972, the respondent,

Wisconsin Department of Revenue, issued a notice of sales

and use tax assessment against the petitioner, Midwestern

Gas Transmission Co., covering the period of September 1,

1969 to December 31, 1971 in the total amount of

$11,972.86 taxing the natural gas specified in Finding No.

12 above.

Appendix

19a

14. On June 15, 1972 the petitioner filed a timely petition

for redetermination of said May 12, 1972 assessment, and

on August 4, 1972 the respondent denied same. Petitioner

has appealed said action to this Commission.

15. The assessment in issue herein did not attempt to

impose a sales or use tax on the natural gas flowing through

the petitioner's two compressor stations in Wisconsin and

natural gas delivered to the petitioner's customers.

WISCONSIN STATUTES INVOLVED

Section 77.53 Imposition of use tax.

“CL) An excise tax is hereby levied and

imposed on the storage, use or

other consumption in this state of

tangible personal property or tax-

able services described in s. 77.52

purchased from any retailer on 0:

after February 1, 1962, at the rate

of 3% of the sales price of the

property or taxable services; but

beginning on September 1, 1969

the rate of the tax hereby imposed

shall be 4%.”

Section 77.51 Definitions. Except where the

context requires otherwise, the definitions

given in this section govern the construction

of terms in this subchapter.

(5) ‘Tangible personal property’ means

all tangible personal property of

every kind and description and

includes electricity, natural gas,

steam and water and also leased

Appendix

20a

property affixed to realty if the

lessor has the right to remove the

property upon breach or termina-

tion of the lease agreement, unless

the lessor of the property is also the

lessor of the realty to which the

property is affixed. The term also

includes coins and stamps of the

United States sold or traded as

collectors’ items above their face

value.”

Section 77.54 General exemptions. There

are exempted from the taxes imposed by this

subchapter:

“(1)

The gross receipts from the sale of

and the storage, use or other

consumption in this state of tan-

gible personal property and serv-

ices the gross receipts from the sale

of which, or the storage, use or

other consumption of which, this

state is prohibited from taxing

under the constitution or laws of the

United States or under the consti-

tution of this state.”

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.

Section 8. The Congress shall have power

** *

To regulate commerce with foreign nations,

and among the several states, and with

Indian tribes.

Appendix

21a

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Sections 77.53(1) and 77.51(5) of the Wisconsin

Statutes impose a 4% use tax on the cost of the natural gas

used by the petitioner at its two compressor stations

during the period in question.

2. The tax assessed by the respondent on the use of

natural gas by the petitioner in Wisconsin is not prohibited

by Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States

Constitution.

3. The tax assessed by the respondent on the use of

natural gas by the petitioner in Wisconsin is not exempt

within the intent and meaning of Section 77.54(1) of the

Wisconsin Statutes.

Note: McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Mining Co.,

309 U.S. 33.

Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line

Co., 303 U.S. 604.

Therefore,

ITISORDERED

That respondent's action on petitioner's petition for

redetermination be and the same is hereby affirmed.

Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 17th day of June,

1975.

WISCONSIN TAX APPEALS COMMISSION

/s/ R. J. Smrz

R. J. Smrz, Chairman

/s/ Thomas R. Timken

Thomas R. Timken, Commissioner

/s/ John P. Morris

John P. Morris, Commissioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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