Opposition — Shannon v. Department of Housing & Urban Development

Supreme Court brief1978

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upreng Court, Uf, Fy |

FILED’

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aoe). CLERK

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

MAURICE SHANNON, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING

AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS

IN OPPOSITION

WapvE H. McCreE, JR.

Solicitor General

BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK

Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM KANTER

Mark H. GALLANT

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-369

MAURICE SHANNON, ET AL., PETITIONERS

2

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING

AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS

IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-AS5) |

is reported at 577 F. 2d 854. The opinion of the district

court (Pet. App. BI-BS) is reported at 433 F. Supp. 249.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of ‘appeals was entered on

June 5, 1978. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed

on September 1, 1978. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act

of 1976 authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees against the

United States.

(1)

2

STATEMENT

Petitioners, who are residents, businessmen and

property owners in the East Poplar area of Philadelphia,

requested the district court to enjoin the Department of

Housing and Urban Development (HUD) trom financing

a housing project in that area. They alleged that the

project would violate various civil rights acts.' The district

court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction and failure

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (305 F.

Supp. 205), but the Third Circuit reversed. 436 F. 2d 809,

The court of appeals held that HUD must suspend

funding the project pending determination whether HUD

could lawfully provide financial assistance, On remand to

the agency, HUD found that federal financing of the

project was barred under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 387

F. Supp. 5, 6. The parties later agreed to the entry of a

consent judgment settling the litigation. 409 F. Supp.

1189, 1190.

In July 1975 petitioners unsuccessfully sought an award

of attorneys’ fees, relying on Section 812(c) of Title VIII,

42 U.S.C. 3612(c).2 After Congress enacted the Civil

Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (“the Act”),

42 U.S.C. 1988, petitioners again moved for an award of

‘Petitioners alleged violations of Section 105(d) of the Housing Act

of 1949, 42 U.S.C. 1455(d): Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. 2000d et seqg.: and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of

1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 er seq.

*28 U.S.C. 2412 proscribes awards of attorneys’ fees against the

federal government “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by

statute.” The district court held that 42 U.S.C, 3612(c) is not such an

exception. 409 F. Supp. 1189. This ruling was not appealed and is not

in issue here.

3

attorneys’ fees.’ The district court rejected petitioners’

renewed motion because the new Act does not “expressly

providfe]” for an award of attorneys’ fees against the

federal sovereign, as required by 28 U.S.C. 2412 and this

Court’s decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. Vv.

Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 267-268 (1975) (Pet.

App. BI-BS5). The court of appeals affirmed, stating that

“the legislative history of the Act convinces us that

Congress did not contemplate a waiver of sovereign

immunity in passing the Act, with the exception of the

clause dealing with Internal Revenue suits” (Pet. App.

A4).

ARGUMENT

Petitioners contend that the Civil Rights Attorney's

Fees Awards Act of 1976 authorizes the award of at-

torneys’ fees against the federal government. The Act,

however, does not expressly waive sovereign immunity,

and its legislative history demonstrates that waiver was

not intended. There is no conflict among the courts of

appeals on this question and, consequently, review by this

Court is not warranted.

It is well established that waivers of federal sovereign

immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally

expressed.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399

(1976); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). This

policy against implied waivers of sovereign immunity is

particularly relevant to awards of attorneys’ fees because

Congress has explicitly declared that the United States ts

not liable for such awards “[e]xcept as otherwise

specifically provided by statute.” 28 U.S.C. 2412; see

‘Respondents opposed this motion on the merits but did not

contend that it was untimely or that the district court abused its

discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) in entertaining the motion,

4

Alveska Pipeline Service Co. \. Wilderness Society, supra,

421 U.S. at 267-268. The Act does not unequivocally or

specifically subject the federal government to awards of

attorneys’ fees, and the court of appeals therefore

correctly held that such awards are not available. Accord,

Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 436 F. Supp.

891, 893 (D. Ore. 1977); contra, Andrulis v. United States,

No. 77-1936 (D. D.C. June 12, 1978), appeal docketed,

No. 78-2039 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 1978).4

The portion of the Act on which petitioners rely

provides only that “[iJn any action or proceeding to

enforce a provision of * * * Title VI of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the

prevailing party * * * a reasonable attorney's fee as part

of the costs.” 42° U.S.C. 1988. This language does not

mention awards against the United States, and it does not

authorize awards by necessary implication.’ It may be

compared with the statutes concerning attorneys’ fees that

‘Petitioners suggest (Pet. 11-12) that the Department of Justice has

taken a position contrary to the one espoused here in several recent

actions. This is incorrect. In both Women’s Equality Action League

v. Califano, Civ, No, 74-1720 (D. D.C, May 3, 1978), and Adams vy.

Califano, Civ. No, 3095-70 (D. D.C, May 3, 1978), the government

acquiesced in an award of attorneys’ fees that) was explicitly

authorized by 20 U.S.C, 1617, the cases did not require an

interpretation of the statute involved here. NAACP y, Bell, No, 78-

1639 (D.C, Cir, filed July 10, 1978), another case upon which

petitioners rely, is pending on the government's appeal, And, as the

text indicates, Andrulis \. United States, which held that the Act

authorizes the award of attorneys’ fees against the United States, is

similarly pending on the government's appeal.

‘A statute might authorize awards of attorneys’ fees against the

United States by necessary implication if the United States were the

only possible defendant in the suits mentioned in the fees statute,

That is one of the rationales on which the Act was held to authorize

awards of fees against the states. See Hutto v. Finney, No, 76-1660

(June 23, 1978). But the United States is not a necessary defendant,

und indeed may not even be a proper delendant, in a suit to entorce

5

were cited by this ‘Court in A/lveska as examples of

express congressional waivers of sovereign immunity;

these statutes explicitly state that awards against the

federal government are permissible. 421 U.S. at 268. For

example, Title Il of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. 2000a-3(b), provides that “the court, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the

United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the

costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the

same as a private person,” See also, ¢.g., Privacy Act of

1974, 5 U.S.C, 552a(g)(2)(B) (“The court may assess

against the United States reasonable attorney fees * * *");

Consumer Product Safety Act, IS U.S.C. 2059 (e)(4),

2060(c) (“attorneys’ fees may be awarded against the

United States * * *"); Title IIL of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000b-1 (“United States shall be liable for

costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee * * *"),

The internal structure of the Act further demonstrates

Congress’ intent. The Act was amended at the eleventh

hour to allow awards of attorneys’ fees out of the federal

treasury in tax cases brought by the United States in bad

faith. See Aparacor, Inc. v. United States, 571 F. 2d 552

(Ct, Cl. 1978); 122 Cong. Rec. S17049 (daily ed. Sept. 29,

1976) (remarks of Sen. Allen); 122 Cong. Rec. $17050

(daily ed. Sept 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Tunney); 122

Cong. Rec, $17050-S17051 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976)

(remarks of Sen. Kennedy). Congress must have recogniz-

ed that the bill did not generally authorize awards of fees

against the United States, or it would not have felt the

need to insert such an explicit authorization with regard

to tax cases. The portion of the Act explicitly authorizing

fees against the United States in certain tax cases

litle VI. See Mr, Justice Stevens’ opinion in Regents of the

University of California \, Bakke, No. 76-811 (June 28, 1978), slip op.

12 n.26,

6

demonstrates that such awards are not authorized in the

other categories of cases mentioned by the Act. Cf. Ford

v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 611 (1927).

The legislative history of the Act also demonstrates that

Congress did not intend to subject the federal fise to

awards of attorneys’ fees under this provision. Both the

House and Senate Reports accompanying the Act

specifically stated that the government would incur no

additional costs as a result of this legislation. S. Rep. No.

94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 94-

1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1976).° Similarly, the

relevant legislative debates are replete with indications

that Congress affirmatively elected not to create a

“startling new remedy” against the federal sovereign. E.g.,

122 Cong. Rec. S16431 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976) (remarks

of Sen. Hathaway); 122 Cong. Rec. S17052 (daily ed.

Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Abourezk); 122 Cong.

Rec. $1625! (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (remarks of Sen.

Kennedy); 122 Cong. Rec. S$16490 (daily ed. Sept. 23,

1976) (letter from Rep. Rodino to Sen. Kennedy). The

Senate rejected an amendment, offered by Senator Helms

of North Carolina, that would have imposed the cost of

attorneys’ fees on the federal government. See 122 Cong.

Rec. $16257-S16259 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (exchange

of Sen. Helms and Sen. Mathias); 122 Cong. Rec. $17053

(daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Morgan); 122

Cong. Rec. S$16260 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (letter from

Assistant Attorney General Uhlmann read by Sen.

Mathias). Finally, on still another occasion the Senate

6Because the amendment authorizing fees in tax cases was added as

a last-minute compromise, the legislative reports and early debates

not reflect the amendment’s potential costs to the federal government.

Rep. Drinan, the floor manager of the bill in the House, commented

that, in contrast to the original bill, “the [tax] amendment might

involve an expense to the United States. However, since awards of

counsel fees under that amendment will occur only in the special

a

7

rejected a second Helms’ amendment that would have

“afford[ed] protection to financially pressed State and

local governments by including them within the bill’s

exemption from liability granted to the Government of

the United States.” 122 Cong. Rec. $16431 (daily ed.

Sept. 22, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Helms); see also id. at

S$ 16432.’

Petitioners’ further contention (Pet. 5-7) that the court

of appeals’ decision here conflicts with Hutto v. Finney,

No. 76-1660 (June 23, 1978), is also incorrect. Hutto

relied on unequivocal legislative history, and the civil

rights acts’ primary focus on state action, in holding that

the Act authorized attorneys’ fees awards against the

States. Slip op. 13-15. The legislative history is equally

explicit that Congress did not intend to authorize awards

of fees against the United States. See pages 6-7, supra.

The decisions thus are quite consistent.*

circumstances | have described, it is fair to say that the total costs to

the Government for fiscal year 1977 would be negligible.” 122 Cong.

Rec. H12159 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976). .

’Petitioners rely (Pet. 9-10) on some interchanges between members -

of the House immediately preceding the House vote on the amended

bill. 122 Cong. Rec. H12163-H12164 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976). But the

comments of Rep. Railsback, who was confused by the effect of the

tax amendment, do not support petitioners’ position. Even Rep.

Railsback thought only that attorneys’ fees could be awarded against

the United States as plaintiff; here, of course, the United States was

a defendant. In any event, Rep. Drinan corrected Rep. Railsback’s

misunderstanding of the tax amendment. 122 Cong. Rec. H12164

(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976). Petitioners’ invocation (Pet. 6-7) of the

legislative history of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.

No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 777, is simply irrelevant.

‘Petitioners also contend (Pet. 12-14) pet Congress impliedly

waived the prohibition against attorneys’ fées found in 28 U.S.C.

2412 by amending the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 702,

shortly after enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's fees Awards Act of

1976. See Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721. This contention was

8

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

WapeE H. McCrer, Jr.

Solicitor General

BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK

Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM KANTER

MARK H. GALLANT

Attorneys

NOVEMBER 1978

not made be'ow and cannot be raised in this Court for the first time.

See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788 n.7 (1977); Adickes

V. SH. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n. 2 (1970). In any event, there

is NO support for petitioners’ position in either the legislative history

or the language of the amendment. In conjunction with a parallel

amendment of 28 U.S.C. 1331(a), the Administrative Procedure Act

was amended for the narrow purpose of “withdrawing the defense of

sovereign immunity in actions [against federal agencies] seeking relief

other than money damages * * *.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656, 94th

Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976¥% emphasis added) The amendment itself

provides that “(nJothing “herein (1) affe¢ts other limitations on

** * the power or duty of the court to * * * deny relief on any other

appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to

grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or

impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” Pub. L. No. 94-574,

Section 702, 90 Stat. 2721. Accordingly, petitioners’ argument that

this legislation repealed the express provisions of Section 2412 to

allow an award of money (attorney's fees) is wrong.

DOJ-1978-11

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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