Petition — Shannon v. Department of Housing & Urban Development

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IN THE SEP : 1978

Supreme Court of the United Statestoorx. te. cree |

October Term, 1978

No. 78-369

MAURICE SHANNON , et al.,

Petitioners

U.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, et al.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

~ SAYRE

ROBERT W. 8*#e4&R

3800 Centre Square West

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102

(215) 972-7709

MICHAEL CHURCHILL

THOMAS K. GILHOOL

Public Interest Law Center of

Philadelphia

1315 Walnut Street, Suite 1600

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107

(215) 735-7200

Attorneys for Petitioners

THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, 66 NORTH JUNIPER STREET, PHILA., PA. 19107 (215) 561-4050

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I i ee he Sa oes 1

a daa Po ke Kas Sk aoe cub kd cae abbr OREN 1

EN cS ape ce CAs cane hcemwabels bee 2

ce ST REIT PES ARR EE FR 2

SE Gr ED NO oe ald bw so finned. vine whannweeles 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ ................... 4

ME ewireca., . oc. ok sinces ws na wena ne a 14

Appendix:

A. Opinion of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Third Circuit, June 5, 1978 . Al

B. Opinion and Order of the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Eastern District of Penn-

ee ee UE oc lo Ata Gass cack Bl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Adams v. Califano, Civ. A. No. 3095-70 (D.D.C.,

Se PD ccs k Sunde ndecedeesae ace 11

Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.

eR 9S CGR OCR em SESE MIT U | ema ER 7

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,

ee te SP COUN wn ccm dc tcp sivcuaewosncaeec 7,8

Andrulis, et al. v. United States of America, et al.,

Civ. A. No. 77-1936 (D.D.C. 1978) ........... 5

Hilis v. Gautreaux, — U.S. —, 96 S.Ct. 1538 (April

RA RPM GG oh i ban wearer eee et re ok 7

Hutto v. Finney, — U.S. —, 98 S.Ct. 2565 (June 23,

SSE se apa Ui: ioe rents reenter ee 5, 6, 7, 8, 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES~—(Continued )

Cases: Page

Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974) ........ 13

NAACP v. Bell, Civ. A. No. 75-1317 (D.D.C. 1978) 12

Women’s Equity Action League v. Califano, Civ. A.

No. 74-1720 (D.D.C., May 3, 1978) .......... 11

Statutes and Rules:

eS visi chs oe haledee ewes oie «i 13

Ee ci cay ib cee se yew ODA me on's 0.69 7

EE ES Was vy 5 rake cls e bans'e see oepinat 1

og A ETS a nn ae 2, 4, 6, 13

NO Noa Sonne by Geass as ache de benas 2,12

ae SID sock os cco nreeetevestevnetes 6, 7

i on kip onde ose eke ree 6, 7

ree 2

eT Ss Fakes ccd avsusseeuns 6,7

i EE OE RS i he ccen be astancecdncee 3

Ova y heap ee dsdtaveneecewe vee 6

eR SO nd Loe bh Ran Gwe hha och b i's ee 9008 6

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, P.L. 95-95,

Net ae” Se 4 SE a a 6

Legislative Materials:

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.

EN ile ETS ae RRS RS Re ee 7,13

H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.(1977) 7

S. Rep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) 7

122 Cong. Rec. H 12159 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) . 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—(Continued)

122 Cong. Rec. H 12163-4 (daily ec Oct. 1, 1976) 10

“Awarding of Attorney’s Fees’’, Hearings before the

House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil

Liberties and the Administrative of Justice,

ae A et PAE ee ee 1]

ili

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1978

No.

MAURICE SHANNON, et al.,

Petitioners

Uv.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, et al.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Petitioners, plaintiffs below, respectfully pray that

a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in

this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (Appendix A,

infra) is reported at 577 F.2d 854. The opinion and order

of the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-

sylvania (Appendix B, infra) are reported at 433

F.Supp. 249.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) to review the order of the Court cf

Appeals entered on June 5, 1978.

1

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards

Act of 1976, P.L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (42 U.S.C.A.

§1988) authorizes fees to be awarded to a plaintiff pre-

vailing against the United States in a suit under Title

VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000d et

seq.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of

1976, 42 U.S.C.A. §1988 (Supp. 1974-1977) provides as

follows:

“$1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights

... Inany action or proceeding to enforce a provision

of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this

title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil

action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United

States of America, to enforce, or charging a viola-

tion of, a provision of the United States Internal

Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the

prevailing party, other than the United States, a

reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. As

amended Pub. L. 94-559, §2, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat.

2641.”

28 U.S.C. §2412 (1976) provides as follows:

“Except as otherwise specifically provided by

statute, a judgment for costs, as enumerated in

section 1920 of this title but not including the fees

and expenses of attorneys may be awarded to the

prevailing party in any civil action brought by or

against the United States or any agency or official

of the United States acting in his official capacity,

in any court having jurisdiction of such action ....

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 973; July 18,

1966, Pub. L. 89-507, §1, 80 Stat. 308.)”

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a petition for certiorari from the denial of an

attorney’s fee to the prevailing plaintiffs in an action

brought, inter alia, under Title VI of the 1964 Civil

Rights Act against the Department of Housing and

Urban Development and several of its officials.

Plaintiffs’ action to enjoin approval by the De-

partment of financing for a subsidized housing project

known as Fairmount Manor in Philadelphia was origi-

nally dismissed by the District Court in an opinion re-

ported at 305 F.Supp. 205 (E.D. Pa. 1969). In the ab-

sence of a stay, construction of the project was com-

pleted pending the appeal. The Circuit Court of Ap-

peals reversed, holding that the Department had vio-

lated certain civil rights laws, including Title VI and

the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq.), by failing to consider

racial impact in approving the location of subsidized

housing, 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970), and remanded

for further proceedings.

Extended negotiations and hearings ensued. The

District Court, at the urging of Plaintiffs, ordered the

Department to retain experts to prepare an analysis of

the impact of the illegally approved project and a re-

medial program. Defendants contested the right of the

Plaintiffs to any remedy and a hearing on the scope of

relief was held prior to a settlement being agreed upon

and the entry of a judgment for Plaintiffs in May 1975.

As a consequence of Plaintiffs’ action the Depart-

ment promulgated Site Selection Criteria regulations,

found at 24 CFR 200.700 et seq.; contributed $500,000

to subsidize construction and sale of 42 new units of

homeownership housing in the affected community

and approved mortgage insurance for such houses;

contributed $150,000 for physical improvements to

Fairmount Manor; and approved subsidized financing

and mortgage insurance for 150 additional units of

senior citizen housing in the affected community.

3

Plaintiffs, pursuant to the settlement, moved for

an award of attorney’s fees under Title VIII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1968, which was denied on March 1, 1976

on the grounds that the attorney’s fee provision of 42

U.S.C. §3612 did not apply to Section 3608(d) on which,

inter alia, relief had been predicated. 409 F.Supp. 1189.

No appeal was taken.

Plaintiffs’ bill of costs, filed on November 13, 1975,

was still pending before the District Court on appeal

from the Clerk’s ruling at the time of the enactment of

the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 on

October 19, 1976. Plaintiffs thereafter timely renewed

their petition for attorney’s fees on the ground that fees

were permitted as part of the costs under the Act, that

it governed pending matters, and that as parties prevail-

ing under Title VI Plaintiffs met all the criteria of the

Act.

In an opinion dated June 16, 1977 (Appendix B,

infra) the District Court held the issue was properly

before it, but denied any award solely on the ground

that 28 U.S.C. §2412 “stands as an explicit assertion of

sovereign immunity” barring awards of fees against

the United States in the absence of ‘‘unequivocal”

statutory authorization and that the Fees Awards Act

did not constitute such statutory authorization. It en-

tered an order denying fees and awarding other costs.

The Circuit Court, in an opinion filed June 5, 1978

(Appendix A, infra), affirmed the District Court’s de-

nial of attorney’s fees, holding that the Fees Awards

Act did not contain ‘‘clear statutory authority” for

waiver of sovereign immunity and imposition of attor-

ney’s fees against the United States in connection with

the civil rights actions included in the Act.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This Court should review and reverse the Court of

Appeals decision in this case because it decides an im-

4

portant question of federal law with wide applicability

in a manner inconsistent with a recent interpretation

of the same statute by this Court in Hutto v. Finney,

__. U.S. ___., 98 S.Ct. 2565 (June 23, 1978), and con-

trary to the legislative history of the Fees Awards Act

and to the intended effect of the same language em-

ployed by Congress in another recent statute autho-

rizing attorney’s fees to be awarded against the United

States. The decision is also in conflict with administra-

tive interpretations of the Fees Awards Act adopted by

the Department of Justice both before and after enact-

ment.

The decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be

reviewed has been rejected by the District Court for the

District of Columbia (Gesell, J.) which ordered the

United States to pay $19,874.03 in attorney’s fees and

out-of-pocket expenses under the Fees Awards Act

after the Government submitted the same brief as it

filed with the Third Circuit in this case and had drawn

the Third Circuit’s opinion to the attention of the Dis-

trict Court. Andrulis, et al. v. United States of

America, et al., Civil Action 77-1936 (Mem. Opinion of

June 12, 1978, clarified, July 13, 1978).

Tiie opinion of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent

with this Court’s subsequent interpretation of the Fees

Awards Act in Hutto v. Finney, supra, at 2575:

“The Act itself could not be broader. It applies to

‘any’ action brought to enforce certain civil

rights laws. It contains no hint of an exception

for States defending injunction actions: ...”

Similarly, there is no “hint of any exception” for

the federal government. Indeed, one clause of the Act,

referring to awards to any party (except the United

States) prevailing in enforcement proceedings under

the Internal Revenue Code can only apply to awards

against the United States.

In Hutto v. Finney the Court held that such “plain

indication of legislative intent” (bolstered by “equally

plain” legislative history) was sufficient to set aside

5

sovereign immunity of the States, and rejected a claim

that ‘‘Congress must enact express statutory lan-

guage.” Id. at 2576.

By contrast, in this case, the Third Circuit adopted

the District Court’s view that the 1976 Act was not

sufficiently clear statutory authority because it did not

contain the same express language found in Titles II,

III and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

Section 2000a-3(b), 2000b-1, 2000e-5(k).'

Not only does this view conflict with the principle

expressed in Hutto v. Finney, but Congress in the

legislative history of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amend-

ments, Aug. 7, 1977, P.L. 95-95, Sec. 305(f), 91 Stat.

777, explicitly stated that the general authorization of

attorney’s fees contained in the amendment enacted to

Section 307(f), 42 U.S.C.A. §7607 (Supp. 1977),? which

does not contain any express reference to the United

States was intended to waive sovereign immunity and

constitute authorization under 28 U.S.C. Section 2412:

“In adopting this provision concerning fees,

the committee intended to meet the require-

ment for specific authorization imposed by 28

U.S.C. sec. 2412 and by the Supreme Court’s

1. Title II provides, for example:

“In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter,

the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,

other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as

part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for

costs the same as a private person.” 42 U.S.C. Section

2000a-3(b).

2. 42 U.S.C.A. §7607(f) provides:

“In any judicial proceeding under this section, the court

may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney

and expert witness fees) whenever it determines that such

award is appropriate.”

This language is identical to the attorney's fee provision included

in the citizen suit provisions of the 1970 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A.

$7604 and is similar to the broad lanugage of the Civil Rights

Attorney's Fees Awards Act.

6

ruling in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.

Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240(1975).” H.R.

Rep. No. 95-294, at p.337; 8 U.S. Code Congres-

sional and Administrative News, 1977, p.2546.

The very same portion of legislative history of the

Fees Awards Act in the House Report which is cited in

Hutto v. Finney, supra, at 2575-6 to show sufficient

legislative intention to award fees against state gov-

ernments explicitly refers in the same paragraph to a

suit against tederal officials, Hills v. Gautreaux as one

of three examples of cases to which the Act would ap-

ply.’ Reference is also made to that case, sub nom,

Hills v. Gautreaux, __. U.S. ___., 96 S.Ct. 1538 (April

20, 1976) and to another case against federal officials,

Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973)

in the House Report at page 5 when identifying the

scope of the civil rights cases encompassed by the bill.

The Third Circuit’s decision ignores the repeated

statements throughout House Report 94-1558 and

Senate Report 94-1011 that the purpose of the legisla-

tion was to promote enforcement of the civil rights

laws by “private attorneys general,” ‘to achieve uni-

formity in the remedies provided by Federal laws

guaranteeing civil and constitutional rights’ and to

“remedy anomalous gaps” in the civil rights laws.

Every other civil rights act which might apply to the

United States and which permits the award of fees

against any party waives sovereign immunity to permit

fee awards against the United States.‘ No other attor-

3. “... it should further be noted that government officials are

frequently the defendants in cases brought under the statutes

covered by H.R. 15460 [the bill which was enacted]. See, e.g... .

Hills v. Gautreaux, supra. ... The greater resources available to

governments provide an ample base from which fees can be

awarded to the prevailing plaintiff in suits against governmental

officials or entities.’"” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p.7 (1976).

4. 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title II], 42 U.S.C. §2000a-3(b); 1964

Civil Rights Act, Title III, 42 U.S.C. §2000b-1; 1964 Civil Rights

Act, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(k); Education School Aid Act of

1972, 20 U.S.C. $1617.

7

ney’s fee provision in a civil rights act distinguishes

between private and state defendants on the one hand

and federal defendants on the other. Instead of creat-

ing “uniformity” and “consistency” the Third Circuit’s

decision merely creates a different anomaly, between

the civil rights acts covered by the Fees Awards Act

and all other civil rights acts with attorney’s fee provi-

sions. Furthermore, it fails to apply the rule of con-

struction which this Court utilized in Alyeska, supra,

421 U.S. at 267:

“If, as respondents argue, one of the main

functions of a private attorney general is to call

public officials to account and to insist that they

enforce the law, it would follow in such cases

that attorney’s fees should be awarded against

the Government of the officials themselves.”

The Third Circuit’s ruling thus vitiates the only ar-

ticulated purposes of the Congressional action.”

Although the legislative debates were complex, the

Court of Appeals erred when it stated at footnote 2 that

“Congressman Drinan, a House sponsor of the bill,

noted that the Allen Amendment [inserting the clause

concerning tax enforcement proceedings] was the only

provision in the bill which would involve expenditures

by the United States.” A careful reading of the passage

referred to indicates the Congressman was comment-

ing on the effects of the Allen Amendment and was

stating that the costs to the government under it would

5. The frequently made statements in the legislative reports

and debates that a purpose was to reverse Alyeska Pipeline Service

Company v. Wilderness Society, et ai., 421 U.S. 240 (1975), is not

contrary, for Alyeska clearly stated, although in dictum, that fees

could not be awarded against the United States as well as against

private parties. 42] U.S. at 267-268. There is no statement by any

member of Congress that they intended to preserve part of Alyeska

and the decision in Hutto v. Finney, supra, establishes that the

1976 Act did more than merely reverse the “American Rule” for

private parties.

be “‘negligible’’ because it would award fees “only in

special circumstances,”’ i.e. if the United States

brought a tax suit to harass a taxpayer or if such suit

was frivolous and vexatious. 122 Cong. Rec. H 12159

(daily ed., Oct. 1, 1976).

Much more to the point, and also ignored by the

Court of Appeals, was the statement made three times

by Congressman Railsback, ranking minority member

of the Subcommittee which reported the bill, in re-

sponse to questions by Rep. Quie, that the United

States would be potentially liable for fees not only to

prevailing defendants in tax cases under the Allen

Amendment, but to defendants prevailing in civil

rights cases.

“MR QUIE. First I would like to ask if the

U.S. Government is the plaintiff in a civil rights

case against an individual or corporation, can

that individual or corporation as the prevailing

party be awarded attorney’s fees against the

U.S. Government?

* * * *

MR. RAILSBACK. Mr. Speaker, as I read

the bill before us, my answer would be yes. What

we dois limit the United States from recovering

but we do not limit the rights of other prevailing

parties to recover in the event the United States

would be the plaintiff in an action such as

described in the bill.

MR. QUIE. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman

will yield, would the gentleman from Mas-

sachusetts agree with that answer? Does the

gentleman agree with that answer?

MR. DRINAN. I am not entirely certain be-

cause the statutes covered by this bill are not

9

ordinarily used by the United States to initiate

civil rights cases.

*x * x *

MR. RAILSBACK. What my answer is, as I

read the bill before us, we limit the right of

the U.S. Government to recover, we do not limit

itin acase where the United States would be the

plaintiff suing a defendant, we do not limit the

defendant’s right to recover. Where the judge

might decide that a prevailing defendant should

recover, we do not limit the defendant from re-

covering from the United States in civil rights

cases.

* * * *

MR. QUIE. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman

will yield further, the next question I have on the

IRS is if the United States is the plaintiff and

loses a civil rights case against a school district

or college, can that school district or college as

the prevailing party be awarded attorneys fees

against the U.S. Government?

MR. RAILSBACK. Mr. Speaker, if the gen-

tleman will yield further, again it would bein the

discretion of the court and nowhere in the bill do

we prevent a school district or college from re-

covering reasonable attorneys fees, even in a

case where the United States is a party plain-

tiff.”’

122 Cong. Rec. H 12163-4 (daily ed., Oct. 1, 1976).

Finally, it is important to note that when the

spokesman for the Department of Justice, Assistant At-

torney General of the Civil Division, Rex E. Lee, tes-

tified “in principle” in support of the bill as then

drafted before the House Judiciary Subcommittee, he

interpreted it as applying to the federal government.

10

“H.R. 8220 would authorize the awarding of

attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiffin actions

brought under certain civil rights statutes. Ac-

tions under the statutes involved have been

brought against both Federal officers and

private individuals.’”®

H.R. 8220 was identical to H.R. 9552 except award

of fees was mandatory under the former and discre-

tionary under the latter. The Department of Justice fa-

vored discretionary fees, supporting H.R. 9552. Ac-

cording to footnote 4 of the House Report:

“Apart from the addition of Title IX of Public

Law 92-318, the only difference between H.R.

9552 and the clean bill (H.R. 15460) [the bill as

enacted, except for the addition of the tax en-

forcement clause by the Allen Amendment] are

technical, not affecting the substance, made on

advice of the House Parliamentarian and staff

and legislative counsel.”

This contemporaneous interpretation of the Act as

applying to federal officials is consistent with the ac-

tions of the two divisions of the Department of Justice

through their respective Assistant Attorneys General

consenting to substantial awards being entered

against the United States by district court judges for

attorney’s fees pursuant to the Fees Awards Act. Or-

ders issued in Adams v. Califano, Civil Action No.

3095-70 (D.D.C., May 3 and 5, 1978) and Women’s

Equity Action League v. Califano, Civil Action No.

74-1720 (D.D.C., May 3, 1978) awarded plaintiffs ap-

proximately $310,000 in attorney’s fees pursuant to a

December 29, 1977 decree signed by Judge Pratt and

consented to by the Civil Division of the Department of

6. “Awarding of Attorneys’ Fees,” Hearings before the House

Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Ad-

ministration of Justice, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 176.

11

Justice through its Assistant Attorney General which

settled litigation brought under Title VI and Title IX

(both covered by Section 1988) against the Secretaries

of HEW and Labor. Part V of that order provided that

the

“{pjlaintiffs and intervenors are also entitled

under... 42 U.S.C. 1988 to the award of rea-

sonable attorneys’ fees.”

On October 25, 1977, a separate order relating to set-

tlement of another aspect of the Adams case resulted in

an award of $107,914.95, again consented to by the

Justice Department and approved by Judge Pratt pur-

suant to Section 1988.

In a wholly separate matter, NAACP v. Bell, Civil

Action No. 75-1317 (D.D.C.), the Civil Rights Division

conceded in an October 14, 1977 brief signed by its

Assistant Attorney General that Section 1988 applied

to the federal government by failing to counter the

NAACP’s lengthy arguments to that effect. Judge

Parker therefore concluded in an April 3, 1978 decision

that the ‘“[djefendants do not contest the validity of ap-

plying this act ... to obtain an award from the gov-

ernment,” slip op. at 2, and awarded $26,300.00 against

the Department of Justice. (Appeal filed June 2, 1978,

No. 78-1639.)

These interpretations by the Assistant Attorneys

General charged with advising the Congress of the

Department’s views on the impact of proposed legisla-

tion and with the actual implementation of the Act are

entitled to significant weight in assessing legislative

intent.

Finally, the decision below to narrowly construe

the Fees Awards Act in order to protect sovereign im-

munity in an ancillary matter such as fees and costs is

utterly inconsistent with the nearly simultaneous

enactment of P.L. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 amending the

Administrative Procedure Act, which was approved by

12

the House the same day as the Fees Awards Act and

which was signed into law two days later. Section 1 of

that act, 5 U.S.C. §702 (1976) eliminates the defense of

sovereign immunity as to any action in federal court

seeking relief other than money damages and stating a

claim, like the claim in this case, based on the asser-

tion of unlawful official action.’ The House Report on

the Fees Awards Act emphasized that fees awarded

under Section 1988 are not damages and stressed that

counsel fees are ‘‘particularly important” in cases

where damages are barred by immunity doctrines.

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558 at 8-9. In Hutto v. Finney,

supra, at 2576, n.24 this Court reaffirmed the long-

standing principle that attorney’s fees are very differ-

ent from damages:

“Unlike ordinary ‘retroactive’ relief such as

damages or restitution, an award of costs does

not compensate the plaintiff for the injury that

first brought him into court. Instead, the award

reimburses him for a portion of the expenses he

incurred in seeking prospective relief.”

It has long been observed that related statutes must be

read in conjunction with each other. See, e.g.

Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).

In light of that sweeping policy waiving sovereign

immunity there exists no support for a policy re-

quiring extraordinarily express language above and

beyond that normally needed to establish legisla-

tive intent in order to comply with the requirement of

28 U.S.C. §2412. The House Report’s position in con-

nection with the adequacy of the language of Section

305(f) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,

supra, is consistent with such a revised policy. Simi-

larly, the 1976 Fees Awards Act is a statutory provision

7. “An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other

than money damages .. . shall not be dismissed nor relief therein

be denied on the ground that it is against the United States... .”

13

authorizing fees in “all” proceedings covered thereby,

and the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which has

been waived except in damage cases, should not create

any bar to effectuating the Congressional purpose of

promoting private attorneys general and creating uni-

form remedies in our civil rights laws.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

ROBERT W. SAYRE

3800 Centre Square West

Philadelphia, Pennsylvnaia 19102

MICHAEL CHURCHILL

THOMAS K. GILHOOL

Public Interest Law Center of

Philadelphia

1315 Walnut Street, Suite 1600

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107

Attorneys for Petitioners

14

Al

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 77-2255

MAURICE SHANNON, CAROLYN BECK, BASIL H.

LOSTEN, IRENE SISK, THOMASENE MACK,

MILDRED BATES, LUCILLE WEEKS, TYRONE

BEAL, BRENDA PARKER, FRANCES

McCARTHY, CATHERINE M. P. TAYLOR,

JAMES W. WILLIAMS, JUANITA WILLIAMS,

CHARLES JOHNSON, SAMUEL D. BROG,

LIBERYPLACE CIVIC ASSOCIATION, FRIENDS

NEIGHBORHOOD GUILD, FRIENDS HOUSING

COOPERATIVE, THE GERMAN SOCIETY OF ~-

PENNSYLVANIA, for themselves and all others

similarly situated,

Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING

AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; GEORGE

ROMNEY, Secretary of Department of Housing

and Urban Development; WARREN P. PHELAN,

Regional Administrator, Region II, Department of

Housing and Urban Development; a:.4 THOMAS

J. GALLAGHER, Regional Administrator; Federal

Housing Administration, Department of Housing

and Urban Development,

Appellees.

A2

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

D.C. No. 69-197.

Before HUNTER, WEIS, Circuit Judges, and

LAYTON, District Judge.*

OPINION

(Filed June 5, 1978)

PER CURIAM

This appeal raises the question whether the Civil

Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.

94-599, 90 Stat. 2641, permits an award of fees against

the United States in a suit under Title VI of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. Since we

agree with the district court that the Attorney’s Fees

Act does not operate as a waiver of sovereign immunity

in this context, we affirm.

Plaintiffs filed suit in 1969 challenging approval by

the Department of Housing and Urban Development of

a rent supplement program known as Fairmount

Manor in the East Poplar neighborhood of

Philadelphia. The district court originally dismissed the

complaint, 305 F.Supp. 205 (E.D. Pa. 1969), but was

reversed by this court, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). We

held that the Department had violated certain civil

rights laws including Title VI, and remanded for

further proceedings. During the pendency of the

* Honorable Caleb Rodney Layton, 3rd, United States District

Judge for the District of Delaware, sitting by designation.

A3

remand, the parties agreed upon a settlement, and the

district court entered judgment for plaintiffs in May,

1975. Plaintiffs then moved for an award of attorneys

fees, which the district court denied. 409 F. Supp. 1189

(E.D. Pa. 1976).

Plaintiffs renewed their request for counsel fees,

based on the newly enacted Civil Rights Attorney’s

Fees Awards Act, in their appeal of the Clerk’s taxation

of costs. The district court agreed to reopen the matter,

but held that the award of fees, despite the new Act,

was still barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

The court reasoned that 28 U.S.C. § 2412' was an

express assertion of sovereign immunity prohibiting

the award of counsel fees against the United States

absent statutory authority. Noting that a waiver of

sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, the

court ruled that the new Act did not authorize an

award of attorneys fees against the United States in a

suit under Title VI. The court contrasted the explicit

waivers of immunity found in Titles II, III, and VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2200a-3(b),

2000b-1, 2000e-5(k).

We agree with the analysis of the district court.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, attorneys fees may not be

awarded against the United States absent clear

Statutory authority. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S.

392, 399 (1976); Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.

Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 265-68 (1975);

Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Service

Commission, 554 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1977); cf.

Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 925 (3d Cir. 1977)

(denying award of interest on claim against United

States). The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act

amends 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to provide:

1. 28 U.S.C. §2412(a) provides:

The United States shall be liable for fees and costs only

when such liability is expressed provided for by Act of

Congress.

A4

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provi-

sion of sections 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, and

1981 of the Revised Statutes [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,

1982, 1982, 1985, 1986], title IX of Public Law

92-318, orin any civil action or proceeding, by or

on behalf of the United States of America, to en-

force, or charging a violation of, a provision of

the United States Internal Revenue Code, or

title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court,

in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,

other than the United States, areasonable attor-

ney’s fee as part of the costs.

With the exception of certain suits under the Internal

Revenue code, see Aparacor, Inc. v. United States,

No. 139-73 (Ct. Cl. Feb. 22, 1978), the Act does not

explicitly waive the sovereign immunity of the United

States. It contains none of the language usually used to

indicate a waiver of immunity. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(E) (Freedom of Information Act) (‘‘The

court may assess against the United States reasonable

attorney fees... .’’); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (Title II of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (‘‘. . . the United States

shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.”’);

15 U.S.C. §§ 2059 (e)(4), 2060(c) (Consumer Product

Safety Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1 (Title III of Civil

Rights Act of 1964); id. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII of Civil

Rights Act of 1964). Further, our reading of the

legislative history of the Act convinces us that

Congress did not contemplate a waiver of sovereign

immunity in passing the Act, with the exception of the

clause dealing with Internal Revenue suits.? See

2. The Allen Amendment, dealing with tax suits, was added late

in the consideration of the bill from the floor of the Senate. See 122

Cong. Rec. S$17049-51 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976). Congressman

Drinan, a House sponsor of the bill, noted that the Allen

Amendment was the onlv provision in the bill which would involve

expenditures by the United States. 122 Cong. Rec. H12159-60 (daily

ed. Oct. 1, 1976).

AS

Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 436 F.

Supp. 891, 893 (D. Ore. 1977). Accordingly, we hold

that the Attorney’s Fees Act does not permit an award

of counsel fees against the United States in a suit

brought under Title VI.

The order of the district court denying counsel fees

will be affirmed.

The legislative history also clarifies an ambiguity in the statute

caused by the Allen Amendment. The phrase “by or on behalf of the

United States of America” was meant to modify only the phrase “to

enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States

Internal Revenue Code,” and not the phrase “or Title VI of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964.” See 122 Cong. Rec. $17049-53 (daily ed., Sept.

29, 1976); id. H12151-52, 12161 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976).

Bl

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Civil Action No. 69-197.

MAURICE SHANNON, et al.

Vv.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

HOUSING AND URBAN

DEVELOPMENT, et al.

June 16, 1977.

OPINION

JOSEPH S. Lorp, III, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal by plaintiffs from the Clerk’s

taxation of costs. We have previously considered and

denied plaintiffs’ motion for counsel fees under Title

VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et

seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). See

Shannon v. U. S. Department of Housing & Urban

Development, 409 F.Supp. 1189 (£.D.Pa.1976).

Plaintiffs now ask that we award counsel fees

pursuant to “The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards

Act of 1976”, (“Fees Awards Act’’), an amendment to

42 U.S.C. §1988, adopted on October 19, 1976. The

amendment provides, inter alia, for the award of

counsel fees as part of the costs in an action, as this

suit is, to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964.

B2

[1] We must first consider whether the finality of

our previous decision and plaintiffs’ failure to appeal

prevents us from considering the present petition. We

think not. In our last opinion, we considered only the

recoverability of attorneys’ fees under Title VIII, which

did allow them in certain actions under that Title. We

held that this was not one of those actions. Here, on the

other hand, we are faced with a question of whether

attorneys’ fees are recoverable as part of costs in an

action to enforce Title VI. Since we still have before us

plaintiffs’ exceptions to the Clerk’s ruling on other

costs, and since the Fees Awards Act was promulgated

after we originally considered attorneys’ fees, we

believe there is ‘treason justifying relief from the

operation” of the order denying attorneys’ fees. See

F.R. Civ.P. 60(b)(6).

{2} Turning to the merits of plaintiffs’ petition, we

have concluded that the award of attorneys’ fees is

barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Before

1966, the United States was liable for fees and costs

only when such liability was expressly provided for by

an act of Congress, 28 U.S.C. §2412. That section was

amended in 1966, to permit the recovery of costs unless

specifically forbidden by statute. However, Congress

explicitly excluded ‘‘the fees and expenses of

attorneys” from the costs recoverable under §2412.

Thus, Section 2412 stands as an explicit assertion of

sovereign immunity as respects the fees and expenses

of attorneys. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v.

Wilderness Society et al., 421 U.S. 240, 268 n. 42, 95

S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 168 U.S.App.D.C. 111, 512 F.2d 1351 (1975).

In Alyeska, speaking of the allowance of attorneys’

fees against the government, the Court said, 421 U.S. at

pages 267-268, 95 S.Ct. at page 1626:

“. . . But §2412 on its face, and in light of its

legislative history, generally bars such awards,

B3

which, if allowable at all, must be expressly

provided for by statute, as, for example, under

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§2000a—3(b).”’

Title II to which the Court referred provides:

“(b) In any action commenced pursuant to this

subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may

allow the prevailing party, other than the United

States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the

costs, and the United States shall be liable for

costs the same as a private person.” 42 U.S.C.

§2000a—3. (Emphasis added).

There are other instances of Congress’ awareness

of the necessity of clear language to waive sovereign

immunity. Title 42 U.S.C. §2000b—1 provides:

“In any action or proceeding under this sub-

chapter the United States shall be liable for

costs, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, the

same as a private person.”

Title 42 U.S.C. §2000e—5(k) states:

“In any action or proceeding under this subchapter

the court, in its discretion, may allow the

prevailing party, other than the Commission or the

United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of

the costs, and the Commission and the United

States shall be liable for costs the same as a

private person.” (Emphasis added).

The unequivocal language to which the Court

adverted in Alyeska and that contained in the statutes

quoted above is in stark contrast to the silence of the

Fees Awards Act. It may be that the lack of specificity

was a Congressional oversight or it may have been

deliberate. If the former, the correction must be made

by Congress. It cannot be made by the court. If the

latter. we are bound by it.

B4

Plaintiffs’ claim the following expenses:

Venturi & Rauch-report and testimony $3,051.00

Postage, phone, attorneys’

travel & miscellaneous 277.23

Copies of documents 790.00

Copies of briefs & appendix 710.00

Allowed by Clerk 35.75

Total $4,863.98

[3, 4] The only expenses which may be allowed are

those for which sovereign immunity has been waived.

Any waiver of sovereign immunity must be construed

strictly within its terms. The softening 1966

amendment to 28 U.S.C. §2412 limits the costs and

expenses made recoverable from the United States to

those allowed by 28 U.S.C. §1920. That Section

provides:

“A judge or clerk of any court of the United States

may tax as costs the following:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;

(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part

of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained

for use in the case;

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and

witnesses;

(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of

papers necessarily obtained for use in the case;

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title.

A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon

allowance, included in the judgment or decree.”

[5] The Clerk found that the $790.00 claimed for

copies of documents were for copies given to plaintiffs

and therefore are not recoverable under §1920(4).

However, we believe the $710.00 ciaimed for briefs

and appendix submitted to the Court of Appeals is

allowable either under §1920(3) or (4). The remaining

claims are clearly without §1920.

BS

[6] We recognize that in exceptional private party

cases, the courts may exercise their equitable powers

to allow costs not covered by § 1920. However, the cases

in which this power was invoked did not involve the

bar of sovereign immunity. And in §2412, the waiver of

sovereign immunity was firmly bounded by the

limitations of §1920. Furthermore, to make it even

more explicit, the “fees and expenses of attorneys”

were specifically excluded.

Nor is the Fees Awards Act of any avail to

plaintiffs. Its only reference to costs is the allowance of

attorneys’ fees as costs against a losing private party.

Plaintiffs’ recovery of costs and expenses, therefore,

remain confined by the boundaries of §1920.

B6

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil Action

No. 69-197

MAURICE SHANNON, et al.

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

HOUSING AND URBAN

DEVELOPMENT, et al.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 16th day of June, 1977, it is

ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ request for counsel fees is DENIED.

2. The plaintiffs’ exception to the Clerk’s denial of

the amount of $710.00 for costs of printing is

SUSTAINED; in all other respects the plaintiffs’

exceptions are overruled.

By the Court

JOSEPH S. Lorp, III, Chief Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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