Petition — Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.

Supreme Court brief1978

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AUG2 9 197¢

K, JR., CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1978

Ne 88-347

Oreck Corroration, Petitioner

v.

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, |

and

Sears, Roencck & CoMPANY

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

—— |

llowarp ApLer, JR.

LIONEL KESTENBAUM

James W. OLSON

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

Berason, BorKLAND, MARGOLIS & ADLER

11 Dupont Cirele N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

(202) 462-5930

August 29, 1978

Passs or Brron S. ApAms Paintinc, Inc., WASHINGTON, D. C.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EEE A ee i

Tasie or Cases AND AUTHORITIES .................3. Ul

EO 1

Nee LLG snes ccdeeescccee cece: 2

Nt don kesesesccsesecces 2

ees cack webpenccecescces 3

ee ad os cas cieeesccese sence 3

A. The Oreck-Whirlpool Arrangement .......... 3

B. The Sears-Whirlpool Relationship .......... 5

C. Evidence of a Conspiracy ................... 6

D. Proceedings in the Court of Appeals ........ 9

Reasons FoR GRANTING THE WRIT .................5. 11

EE OT Tee ee 21

APPENDIX

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

IE ED ccc cccccscccccccscces la

Opinion of the Court of Appeals on Rehearing

I UID occ tscescccccccees 26a

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

CasEs:

Ackerman, Chillingworth, Etc. v. Pacific Electrical

Contractors Ass’n, 405 F. Supp. 99 (D. Hawaii

1975), aff’d, No. 76-1264 (9th Cir. March 22,1978) 14

Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 85 Fed.

271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) ... 138

ii Table of Cases and Authorities Continued

All Label Record Service, Inc. v. Mr. Wiggs Dept.

Stores, 1978-1 Trade Cas. {62,073 (N.D. Ohio

SE: ons bana aln Roun 6 sino aeewakba eats wa «6 ll

Bernard v. Curtis Circulation, 1978-2 Trade Cas.

f & 9p 8k km | re oe ore eee 11

Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum 4

Chemical Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cas. { 62,064 (3d

NS kas dak kevin ote aa a ea 11

Continental T.V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36

CREE aes vee een wakes 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19

E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour

Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) ........cccccccness 14

Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United

OD, Te GPa, OD CREE nes voccncsdantodenes 12

Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11

a EE vc teat en anes ely cbacwneeweed + 21

FMC vy. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390

ee Se a bck ko 5 05 Ciba ae eae eA Kak 12

Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 447 F.

I Ge UMMM Es, BPE) 00s cncnaciicbseucess 11

Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711

(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff’d per curiam, 417 F.2d 621

ee EE ao Gara den Sab hs sas 00s co's4 eee eee 21

Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211

SN a ths Ca vie Cannas d canwdvetnebetpeta tad 12

Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 US.

OE eet Meee ty eer ee Tee 12, 13, 14, 21

Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.),

cert. dented, 377 U.S. 933 (1964) .......cccceeees

ne, v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir.

NE Valice bute Pitas cakes ob al oP amtaieas 640s

McCarthy v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 156 F.2d 877 (7th

Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 812 (1947) ..... 20

Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir.

FONE. rs chsedeircs eis ts cuienetanintieeins >< 21

Petroleum for Contractors, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., No.

77 Civ. 3079 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 5, 1978) ...... 12

Poller vy. Columbia Broadcasting Co., 368 U.S. 464

to ) er re as Seah ta icts ok 21

Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341

SED s:d akin wee eae ewe ds os sabe we kat nee 12, 13

Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, 85 F.T.C.

BRR Ga cs a ee eee 14, 17

Table of Cases and Authorities Continued iii

Page

Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bankamericard,

Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415

2 eer eer errr errr 14

United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365

ON aonb x skdaen ee anedhebss.0bb06 500.65 5a 5

United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127

es tik ie Ghd ee dancer hewsszedees 12,13

STATUTES:

Sherman Act, Section 1, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970) ........ 3,5

i Pn Sen elie vabatedkese + bs ss 000 93 2

OrHEeR AUTHORITIES:

ABA Antitrust Monograph No. 2, Vertical Restric-

tions Limiting Intrabrand Competition .......... 15

Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Antitrust Laws,

Be i es I, ECD, cvcceccccisevecss: 13

Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (1978) .............5. 13

Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An

Unprecedented Supreme Court—1977, 77 Columbia

Ei, SUITE A ovis p.c6Ny eee s cheeea nce ness 15

Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An

Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal

Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75

Columbia L. Rev. 282 (1975) ..........ceeeceees 15

ON IONE HUES a coca ctccccnccecccesaces 13, 15

Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Report, July, 1978 ....... 11

Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,

ee eae eet abana eeeReaeeke

Wright, Law of Federal Courts ..............00005: 20

ll

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBER TERM, 1978

No.

OrECK CorRPoRATION, Petitioner

a

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,

\

and

SEARS, RoEBuCK & COMPANY

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Oreck Corporation petitions for a writ of certiorari

to review the judgment and opinion of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit en-

tered on May 1, 1978.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals on Rehearing

en banc from which this petition is taken (including

the dissent of Judges Mansfield and Feinberg) is re-

ported at Trade Cas. 1978-1 162,026. The prior court

of appeals panel decision (including the dissent of

2

Judge Mansfield) is reported at 563 F.2d 54. Copies

of the opinions below are reprinted in the appendix.’

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on May 1,

1978. On July 17, 1978, Mr. Justice Marshall extended

the time to petition for certiorari to and including

August 29, 1978. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-

voked under 28 U.S.C. See. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the rule that boycotts are illegal per se

is properly applied to a vertical agreement resulting

in a manufacturer’s refusal to sell, in a situation

where such agreement is not ancillary to an exclusive

distributorship or to any other valid marketing goal

suggested by this Court as possible justification for

vertical restrictions.

2. Whether the district court’s charge to the jury

was proper in the context of the issues and record evi-

dence in this case. More specifically, whether the court

of appeals erred in overturning a jury verdict, which

had found defendants Whirlpool and Sears liable for

conspiring to exclude Oreck from selling ‘‘ Whirlpool”

vacuum cleaners, because of a failure to charge the jury

regarding possible reasonableness, where

(a) no evidence had been presented purporting to

justify a Sears-Whirlpool agreement on the basis of a

* The appendix is cited as ‘‘Pet. App.’’. Proceedings below cited

in the Joint Appendix to the Second Cireuit are cited as ‘‘J.A.’’.

Trial transcript passages are cited as ‘‘Tr.’’; plaintiff’s trial ex-

hibits are identified as ‘‘PX’’ and are cited to their location in

the Book of sees as ‘‘E’’,

aint et ws Ant

3

legitimate business need to eliminate intrabrand com-

petition in Whirlpool vacuum cleaners ;

(b) no benefit to interbrand competition was

claimed ;

(ce) the only defense offered was that Whirlpool had

acted unilaterally to terminate Oreck without any pres-

sure or communication from Sears, or any agreement

with it; and

(d) no objection was made to the charge as given.

3. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that

defendants’ concerted exclusionary conduct could be

defensible on the ground that (a) plaintiff had failed

to show ‘‘an anti-competitive effect in the vacuum

cleaner industry as a whole’’, and (b) defendant

Whirlpool had exercised a contractual right to termi-

nate plaintiff.

STATUTE INVOLVED

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. $1, provides

in pertinent part:

Every contract, combination in the form of trust

or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade

or commerce among the several States, or with for-

eign nations, is declared to be illegal .. .

STATEMENT

A. The Oreck-Whirlpool Arrangement

Whirlpool Corporation (‘‘Whirlpool’’) manufac-

tures a variety of household products, including vac-

uum cleaners since its 1957 acquisition of the Birtman

Electric Company. Birtman had manufactured clean-

ers for Sears, Roebuck & Company (‘‘Sears’’), and

4

Whirlpool continued to do so under the Sears ‘‘Ken-

more’’ brand. It also sold under the Whirlpool label,

using its already-established distribution system. These

latter efforts proved unsuccessful and in 1961, Whirl-

pool discontinued sales under its own label.

During the 1958 to 1961 period, David Oreck, as

Executive Vice President of Bruno, New York, had

headed the sales operations of the most successful of

the Whirlpool brand vacuum cleaner distributors.

(J.A. 50-52, 55, 466-67). When Whirlpool decided to

reestablish the marketing of Whirlpool brand vacuum

cleaners, it determined to do so through a different

method of distribution, that of an exclusive national

distributor. It asked David Oreck to be that distribu-

tor, and the Oreck Corporation (‘‘Oreck’’) was ap-

pointed as the exclusive United States distributor for

Whirlpool brand vacuum cleaners in August, 1963.

(J.A. 56-68, 467-71; PX 3, E 1-9).

Oreck’s original contract with Whirlpool was for a

five year term with automatic one year extensions

thereafter, unless six months prior notice of termina-

tion was given. In 1967, Oreck switched its marketing

technique and began selling through direct mail solici-

tation, with a resultant increase in sales from 8,384

units in 1967, to 15,610 units in 1968, and to 78,203

units in 1971. (PX 106, E 102). The new sales tech-

nique initiated by Oreck displeased Sears, as is dis-

cussed below (pp. 6-7), and on June 17, 1968, Whirlpool

notified Oreck that it was terminating the contract.

After negotiations, including a threat to sue by Oreck,

a new contract was entered into on August 1, 1968,

extending Oreck’s distributorship until December 31,

1971, at which time Whirlpocl terminated Oreck, not-

withstanding the five-fold increase in Oreck’s sales

that occurred between 1968 and 1971.

ee

5

This action was filed by Oreck in September, 1972.

Count I, charging a conspiracy between Whirlpool and

Sears to exclude Oreck from the United States market,

in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.

$1, is the pertinent portion of the complaint for pur-

poses of this petition. The jury found for Oreck on

Counts I and II and on July 13, 1976, judgment was

entered in favor of Oreck in the amount of $2,250,000.*

B. The Sears-Whirlpool Relationship

The jury finding of a conspiracy between Whirlpool

and Sears was based on substantial evidence. An inti-

mate relationship has existed between Sears and

Whirlpool for over fifty years and Sears buys approxi-

mately two-thirds of Whirlpool’s annual production.

(J.A. 340-42). A series of Sears officers have sat on

2Count II charged a conspiracy to exclude Oreck from the

Canadian market. The jury allocated its damage award 90% to

Count I and 10% to Count II. The jury charge for Count IT was

in keeping with the then authoritative United States v. Arnold,

Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Because of the subsequent

overruling of Schwinn, this charge was incorrect and Oreck does

not seek review of the court of appeals’ order of a new trial on

Count IT.

Contrary to the view of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 31a n.

4), however, the error with respect to Count II does not affect the

validity of the 90% of the judgment relating to the domestic

market, The problem with the charge respecting the Canadian

market was that it allowed recovery for unilaterally-imposed re-

strictions; but no similar issue was raised as to the domestic claims,

and the reversal does not undermine the judgment on such claims

in any way. Insofar as the evidence regarding Canada showed a

combination of Whirlpool and Sears to injure Oreck, it was prop-

erly considered by the jury. As we will show, the defense was that

Whirlpool acted entirely on its own in terminating Oreck, without

any pressure, complaint, communication from, or agreement with,

Sears. Evidence contradicting that defense was material and rele-

vant and not improper prejudice. (See dissent, Pet. App. 48a n. 1).

6

Whirlpool’s board or become officers of Whirlpool and

Sears is a large Whirlpool shareholder. (J.A. 322-23,

333-36). In addition, officials of the two companies meet

to discuss marketing and sales plans. At one such 1971

meeting, future plans for vacuum cleaners, to be ef-

fected after Oreck’s termination, were discussed. (J.A.

971-74, 883-84).

Because of contacts such as these, Whirlpool knew

of Sears’ strong interest in how Whirlpool made its

non-Sears sales. A Whirlpool internal memorandum

written in 1961 states that ‘‘Sears becomes very un-

happy if RCA WHIRLPOOL product is retailed for

less than the Sears product manufactured by Whirl-

pool’’, facing Whirlpool with the challenge of selling

‘cleaners in volume at high retail prices.’’ (PX 160;

E 127, 141). Whirlpool made it clear to Oreck from

the outset that Oreck was not to offer low-priced mer-

chandise, (J.A. 73-75; PX 45, E 39-40).

Oreck found, however, that it could not compete with

Sears in the higher-priced line and in 1967 shifted its

method of distribution to sell a lower-priced cleaner,

primarily by direct mail. Oreck’s mail order campaign

proved successful; its sales increased dramatically, as

mentioned above; and, consequently, it was able to

provide more effective competition to Sears. (J.A.

200-12, 303-13).

C. Evidence of a Conspiracy

Sears’ reaction to Oreck’s burgeoning competition

was to attempt to suppress it. As early as 1967, John

Payne, the Whirlpool employee in most frequent direct

contact with Oreck (J.A. 105, 544, 577, 857-58) told

David Oreck not to ‘‘rock the boat’’ and to terminate

the mail order business because the “‘other customer”

LAuclltcis thnk clini te: DD a bghtidhbide se

4 ite lll 5 BB Rai hd ep ok &

Pa” Se .

7

did not like it. (J.A. 207). Two other Whirlpool offi-

cials also told Oreck that selling by mail order was a

‘‘mistake.”? (J.A. 501, 505). When Oreck’s original

contract was terminated the following year, Payne told

David Oreck:

Dave, I hesitate to tell you this because it could

cost me my job, but I think our other customer got

to the head of the company. (J.A. 175)

Sears’ dislike of Oreck’s mail order business is also

shown by a complaint about Oreck’s mail order solici-

tation from J. M. Barker, ‘‘an Honorary Director of

Sears”’ (J.A. 330), which was forwarded to Whirlpool

by Sid Boyar, who was both a Sears vice president and

director and a Whirlpool director. (J.A. 335, 828-31).

Boyar’s communication was sent on by Don Ranum, of

Whirlpool, to Whirlpool president, John Platts. (PX

60, E 53, 54). Another indication that Whirlpool sought

to prevent Oreck from competing with Sears in the

mail order business is Whirlpool’s refusal to create a

mailing package satisfying parcel post and UPS Te-

quirements. (J.A. 601-02, 610). J ohn Payne had origi-

nally told Oreck that there would be no problem doing

this, (J.A. 604) but ’xter advised Marshall Oreck that

[Corporate said] they are not interested in pro-

viding you with a carton and it’s in your best

interest leaving this matter alone. It’s sensitive

with Corporate and do not make any changes

leave this matter alone. (J.A. 609)

Two other incidents also demonstrate the existence

of a Sears-Whirlpool conspiracy to restrain competi-

tion from Oreck. When Oreck desired to distribute

Whirlpool vacuum cleaners in Canada, Whirlpool de-

clined to obtain Canadian Standard Association

8

(CSA) approval for the Oreck unit or to make minor

design changes necessary to meet CSA standards.

(J.A. 130-33, 151, 353, 387). John Payne, who had

encouraged Oreck in its interest in marketing in

Canada, admitted that his superior at Whirlpool told

him not to make the changes necessary for CSA ap-

proval. (J.A. 354, 362-63). In an April 15, 1970 tele-

gram to David Oreck, Payne expressed regret that

‘“‘T am unable to obtain a waiver to the current fran-

chise to permit Canadian marketing.”’ (J.A. 356-57,

PX 34, E 22). Whirlpool sold vacuum cleaners in

Canada to Simpson-Sears Ltd., an affiliate of Sears

which marketed cleaners competitive to that sold by

Oreck, and for which Whirlpool had obtained CSA

approval. (J.A. 134-35, 538-39, 562-63).

Oreck also several times asked Payne to make

vacuum cleaners for private label customers (J.A.

257-58, 264, 634-35; PX 78-79, 81, E 84-49) and Payne

initially was enthusiastic about the idea. (J.A. 626).

However, Payne later advised Marshall Oreck that

‘“‘Corporate had decided . . . not to make a private

label for us’? (J.A. 629) and in response to a later

request from David Oreck to make a private label

vacuum cleaner, Payne responded,

Dave, I want to tell you as a friend, don’t rock

the boat. We have objections here from our cus-

tomer about giving you private label and if you

persist on asking this, it’s only going to cause you

trouble. (J.A. 263)

Oreck persisted in its attempts to have private label

vacuum cleaners made by Whirlpool until September

1971, when Payne told Marshall Oreck that ‘‘another

vacuum cleaner customer’’ told Whirlpool ‘‘they are

not interested in having another competitor in the

9

vacuum cleaner business.’’ (J.A. 637-38). Despite the

close involvement of John Payne with Oreck, defend-

ants did not call him as a witness, although Payne

was present in the court room. (Tr. 1648).

Additional evidence from which the jury could

have inferred a conspiracy was Whirlpool’s eco-

nomically irrational termination of Oreck in 1971,

Oreck’s most successful year, and the admission of

Whirlpool officials that Oreck was ‘‘doing a nice job,

no question about that’’ (J.A. 552) and ‘‘we had no

quarrel with the amounts he was selling”. (J.A. 488).

This seemingly irrational behavior continued even

after Oreck’s termination, when in 1972, Whirlpool

refused to sell Oreck 30,000 units in inventory on a

eash basis at a full unit price of $30. (J.A. 298-99,

491-92, 495-96, 518, 521-22, 544-46). Instead, it sold

them to third parties at only $15.00 per unit (J.A. 546,

555-56), or a total of approximately $450,000 less than

Whirlpool could have realized from a sale to Oreck.

D. Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

The judgment entered for Oreck in the district

court was overturned, two to one, by a three-judge

panel in the court of appeals for the Second Circuit,

563 F.2d 54, and the case remanded for a new trial.

On rehearing en banc, the panel majority’s decision

was affirmed, six to two. Trade Cas. 1978-1 1 62,026.

The majority held that the trial judge’s charge to

the jury invoked a per se standard under which ‘‘the

jury could simply have found an agreement by Sears

and Whirlpool to exclude Oreck from the sale of

Whirlpool vacuum cleaners and on that basis have

found them guilty ... of a per se violation of §1

of the Sherman Act’’ (Pet. App. 30a-3la, court’s

10

emphasis). The issue, as framed by the majority, was

‘“‘whether the per se standard . . . was appropriate in

light of the nature of the alleged Whirlpool/Sears

agreement’’ (Pet. App. 32a). Relying on this court’s

decision in Continental T.V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc.,

433 U.S. 36 (1977), the majority held that vertical

boycott agreements, unlike horizontal restraints, must

be ‘‘examined under the rule of reason standard,”’

since they ‘promote interbrand competition by allow-

ing a manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in

the distribution of its products” (Pet. App. 35a). In

addition, finding that ‘‘Whirlpool’s decision not to

renew Oreck’s distributorship was an exercise of its

contractual rights’? (Pet. App. 39a), the majority

further held that ‘“‘[a]ny alleged inducements by

Sears to Whirlpool to allow the contract with Oreck

to expire” would not violate the antitrust laws “‘with-

out some further showing that . . . there was an anti-

competitive effect in the vacuum cleaner industry as

a whole...’ (Pet. App. 39a-40a).

Judges Mansfield and Feinberg, in dissent, accepted

“the legal issue as framed by the majority’”’ (Pet.

App. 49a), but would have affirmed under decisions

of this Court holding that an “agreement to boy-

cott is sufficiently pernicious in its purpose and ef-

fect to be unreasonable per se...” (Id.). In so hold-

ing, the dissent noted that ‘‘the existence of a con-

tract right to terminate Oreck does not create a

mantle of protection against an anticompetitive agree-

ment’’ (Pet. App. 52a); and it held the majority’s

“heavy reliance on Continental T.V.”’ to be mis-

placed both because this ease “‘involves a boycott,

not a vertical restriction’’ and because there had been

no showing here that elimination of Oreck’s intra-

Po

|

:

11

iti i : tervail-

brand competition had resulted in any ‘coun

ing stimulation of interbrand competition, the usual

saving grace of a vertical restraint.” (Pet. App. 54a-

50a ).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This ease presents questions of fundamental im-

portance under the antitrust laws. Most sharply raised

is the issue that divided the court of appeals: whether

a vertical boycott agreement is illegal per se or must

be tested by the rule of reason under this Court’s 1977

Continental T.V. decision, in a situation where the

agreement was not ancillary to an exclusive distribu-

torship or other valid marketing goal, and no benefit

to interbrand competition was even claimed. Review

by this Court is called for both to correct the error

below and to make clear that, in these circumstances,

a boyeott agreement is subject to the per se rule estab-

lished by this Court’s group boycott decisions, whether

vertical or horizontal. The need for such review 1s

particularly urgent because of the influence an en

bane decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second

Cireuit will inevitably have both within and outside

that Circuit.’

. eadin ntator has noted that the ‘‘Oreck case has

onal = Bigecamel and discussion at each level of am

tion.’”? Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Report, July 1978, at - piece

finding the dissent’s argument ‘‘most persuasive, Von Ka gw

observed that ‘‘ultimately the Supreme Court must reso

issue . . .”’ raised by the majority and dissenting opinions “a

(Id.). The panel or en banc decision in Oreck has og -

cited in at least five antitrust cases: Columbia Metal re “a

Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 1978-1 Tra a “es

7 62,064 (3rd Cir. 1978); Bernard v. Curtis Circulation, 8-

Trade Cas. 962,141 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Al Label Record Servic,

Inc. v. Mr. Wiggs Dept. Stores, 1978-1 Trade Cas. {| 62,07 ( a

Ohio 1978); Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp.,

12

The decision below set aside a jury verdict in favor

of Oreck on the ground that the charge to the jury pre-

sented an improper per se theory of liability—a conten-

tion not urged by the defense at trial.‘ In so holding

the majority misconceived the applicable law on group

boycotts and vertical restraints and erroneously read

Continental T.V. as countenancing a rule of reason de-

fense for vertical boycott agreements that eliminate

intrabrand competition without even an iota of coun-

tervailing benefit to interbrand competition. The ma-

jority further erred in relying on the existence of a

Supposed contractual right to terminate, irrelevant

when antitrust violation is involved, and an ostensible

requirement of general market effect, or ‘public in-

Jury,’’ which this court rejected in Klor’s, Inc. v

Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).

1. Boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal, ‘have long

been held to be in the forbidden category” of per se

illegal restraints under the Sherman Act. Klor’s, Inc

v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212

(1959) ; United States v. General Motors Corp. 384

U.S. 127, 146 (1966); Silver v. New York Stock Ez-

change, 373 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1963).° The majority

F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); and Petrolewm for Contractors,

Inc. v. Mobil Vil Corp., No. 77 Ci

one, p., No Civ. 3079 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 5,

*To the contrary, in a colloquy quoted in Ju ’

dissent (Pet. App. 21a), defense counsel Becton ane

correct statement of the law’’ to instruct the jury that if it ‘‘finds

that we had a conspiracy for the purpose of getting rid of Oreck

that is an unreasonable restraint of trade.’’ (Tr. 1660).

5Cf. FMC v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S.

~ ey ~~ oid tage Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S

, ; Eastern States Retail Lu ; ~ V.

United States, 234 U.S, 600 (1914). ii i a i

13

below found the present case distinguishable on the

ground that it involved a vertical combination. (Pet.

App. 34a-35a). But the per se prohibition of boycotts is

not limited to horizontal arrangements. A leading com-

mentator on boycotts has declared that ‘‘the essential

combination may be horizontal or vertical,’’*® and Pro-

fessor Bork has analyzed the proper dichotomy as

being between ‘‘naked boycotts,”’ which are per se il-

legal, and ‘‘ancillary boycotts”’ which are lawful when

reasonably related to a cooperative endeavor that en-

hances efficiency. This dichotomy applies without re-

gard to whether the combinations at issue are vertical

or horizontal.’

Indeed, one of the leading cases in this Court ex-

pounding the per se boycott rule, Klor’s, Inc. v. Broad-

way-Hale Stores, Inc., involved vertical agreements, be-

® Barber, ‘‘Refusals to Deal Under the Antitrust Laws’’, 103

U. Pa. L. Rev. 847, 875 (1955), cited with approval by this court

in United States v. General Motors Corp., supra, at 146-47 ; see

also, Sullivan, Antitrust, 231 n. 1 (1977) [‘‘But it is conceivable

that only a single firm at the blockaded level may succeed in

coercing or inducing suppliers or customers (or, for that matter,

one important supplier or customer) from dealing with one or

more would-be competitor of the perpetrator. Such an arrange-

ment would display all essential elements of a boycott.’’].

t As Professor Bork notes, the naked-ancillary dichotomy was

first enunciated in the leading decision of Addyston Pipe & Steel

Co. v. United States, 85 Fed. 271, 276 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175

U.S. 211 (1899). Bork, The Antitrust Paradoz, at 26-30 (1978).

See also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 348-49

(1963), which held that the action there challenged would be a

boycott illegal per se, ‘‘absent any justification derived from the

policy of another statute or otherwise. . . .”’ Continental T.V.

propounded a possible justification for a manufacturer’s restriction

of intrabrand competition among his dealers, ancillary to organi-

zation of a distribution system and aimed at enhancing interbrand

competition. Absent such justification, the per se rule applies.

14

tween a major department store and a number of manu-

facturers and distributors, pursuant to which the latter

agreed not to supply a competing store. Subsequent

court cases have recognized that Klor’s was essen-

tially a vertical case,” and in Tysons Corner Regional

Shopping Center, 85 F.T.C. 970, 1010-11 (1975), the

Federal Trade Commission rejected an attempt to dis-

tinguish Klor’s on the ground that veto of a new en-

trant pursuant to a shopping center approval clause

would ‘‘amount to a concerted refusal to deal only on

the part of one competitor (the tenant) and one sup-

plier (the lessor).’’ Noting that the ‘‘ presence of more

than one party at the same distributional level’’ is not

essential to the per se rule fashioned by this Court in

Klor’s and other cases, the Commission held that ex-

clusion of an entrant through ‘‘joint activity’’ of one

tenant and one lessor violates ‘‘the policy of the anti-

trust laws which render group boycotts illegal per se.”’

Thus, whether horizontal or vertical, the issue is

whether a concerted refusal to deal may be justified as

ancillary to a lawful transaction or relationship. If not,

a boycott is properly condemned per se because, as the

court below noted with regard to horizontal restraints,

it is a ‘‘naked restraint of trade with no purpose except

stifling competition’’ (Pet. App. 35a). The teaching of

Continental T.V. is that vertical non-price restrictions,

* While the Klor’s complaint also charged conspiracy among

the suppliers, comment on the decision has recognized its essen-

tially vertical nature. See, e.g., Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v.

National Bankamericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973, cert.

denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974)); B.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Con

solidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186-87 (5th Cir.

1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); Ackerman, Chilling-

worth, Etc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass’n, 405 F. Supp.

99 (D.Hawaii 1975), aff’d, No. 76-1264 (9th Cir. March 22, 1978).

a yea a ees

a

15

including exclusive distributorships, which reduce in-

trabrand competition may nonetheless be justified be-

eause they serve to enhance interbrand competition.

The majority below, erroneously relying on Contt-

nental T.V., held that the Sears-Whirlpool boycott

agreement had to be ‘‘examined under the rule of

reason standard’’ because ‘‘vertical restrictions .. .

promote interbrand competition by allowing a manu-

facturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribu-

tion of its products.’’ (Pet. App. 35a).

The Continental T.V. rationale, however, presup-

poses that the case involves a manufacturer seeking to

achieve efficiencies in the distribution of his branded

product, and thereby enhance interbrand competition.

The court of appeals erred in failing to consider

whether the promotion of ‘‘efficiencies in the distribu-

tion of its products’’ was either the motive or result of

the agreement to terminate Oreck. Such consideration

immediately discloses that the Sears-Whirlpool agree-

ment cannot be justified under any of the grounds dis-

cussed by this Court as possible justifications for ver-

tical restrictions.’ As the dissent aptly observed, ‘‘No

* Among the justifications discussed in Continental T.V. are: to

allow the manufacturer to achieve distribution efficiencies in dis-

tribution of his branded product; to obtain retailer investment in

promotion or in service and repair facilities; to avoid the ‘‘free

rider’’ effect which would discourage such retailer investment and

effort. 433 U.S. at 55. See also, Sullivan, Antitrust, pp. 411-21

(1977) ; Handler, ‘‘Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An

Unprecedented Supreme Court—1977,’’ 77 Columbia L. Rev. 979,

986 n.39 (1977); Posner ,‘‘Antitrust Policy and the Supreme

Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal

Merger and Potential Competition Decisions,’’ 75 Columbia L.

Rev. 282, 283-99 (1975). For a discussion of possible procompeti-

tive benefits and justifications of vertical restrictions, see ABA

Antitrust Monograph No. 2, Vertical Restrictions Limiting Intra-

brand Competition, 67-71 (1977).

16

redeeming virtue has been asserted to justify the con-

spiracy between Whirlpool and Sears to terminate

Oreck, as found by the jury; nor has it ever been sug-

gested that benefits to the market-place will result from

this conspiratorial termination’? (Pet. App. 55a).

The court’s error is vividly demonstrated by its char-

acterization of this case as ‘‘in essence, an exclusive

distributorship controversy” and its heavy reliance on

dealer substitution cases. (Pet. App. 32a, 35a). In fact,

it was no such thing. There was never any issue or de-

fense presented that Whirlpool had selected Sears as

its exclusive distributor, or that the termination of

Oreck was related to any such decision. Thus, there

was no evidence or argument by defendants that Sears’

marketing, service and promotion of ‘‘Kenmore’’ was

affected by Oreck’s development of the market for

‘Whirlpool’? machines. The district court explicitly

held that the two brands were different in appearance,

quality and performance ;” and the panel majority ob-

served that the Whirlpool and Kenmore brands were

not in an intrabrand competitive relationship, stating

that Oreck’s sale ‘‘of vacuum cleaners under the

‘Whirlpool’ label would not, from the point of view of

the public consumer, have any particular effect on com-

petition with machines sold by Sears’’ under the ‘‘Ken-

more’’ brand.”

There was, in sum, no claim that a Sears-Whirlpool

combination aimed at Oreck could be justified as ancil-

*° Tr. 1371-73, in rejecting Oreck’s Robinson-Patman claims on

the ground that the products were not of like grade and quality.

™ Pet. App. Ila. See also Whirlpool counsel’s reference to the

testimony of defendants’ expert ‘‘that Sears and Oreck were in

different businesses’’. (Tr. 1746).

oe -

siti

bot os RE

17

lary to the legitimate needs of Whirlpool’s distribution

system. Cf. Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center,

at 1011. To the contrary, the sole defense through-

out was that there was simply no agreement to elimi-

~ nate Oreck as a seller of Whirlpool cleaners. Accord-

ingly, the defendants’ closing arguments to the jury

will be searched in vain for any contention that

Sears and Whirlpool had an exclusive distributorship,

that termination of Oreck was justified to protect any

such Sears-Whirlpool arrangement, to enhance sales of

Sears’ Kenmore brand, to avoid ‘‘free rider’’ effects,

or, indeed, for any of the reasons recognized in Conti-

nental T.V. as justifications for restricting intrabrand

competition. Instead, the only arguments made, and

repeated again and again, were that Whirlpool had

acted unilaterally and independently of Sears for its

own reasons; that Sears had no interest in the relations

between Whirlpool and Oreck; and that there had

never even been any communication between Sears and

Whirlpool regarding Oreck or his termination, much

less any pressure by Sears.’* The absence of any in-

volvement or communication by Sears was the crux of

the defense presented at trial, and it was rejected by

the jury.

12 For example, in his closing statement Whirlpool’s counsel re-

peatedly stressed the testimony of Sears and Whirlpool officials

denying any communication regarding Oreck: ‘‘And every single

one of them denied receiving complaints or making complaints.

They denied having anything to do with the termination insofar as

Sears is concerned’’ (Tr. 1718-19; see also Tr. 1745-46). The Whirl-

pool official who terminated Oreck was cited as saying ‘that Sears

played no part in his decision—he didn’t consult with Sears, they

hadn’t any complaints from Sears’’ (Tr. 1711). Further, ‘‘there

isn’t one single shred of evidence to tie Sears into the termination’’

(Tr. 1712, see also Tr. 1722).

Whirlpool’s defense may be summed up in this statement:

18

In these circumstances, the case did not present any

possible ground of justification applicable to intra-

brand restrictions, and Continental T.V.’s rule of rea-

son criteria were not applicable. The Sears-Whirlpool

agreement to refuse to supply Oreck was a non-ancil-

lary, ‘‘naked,”’ restraint of trade, a boycott unlawful

per se. Review by this Court is needed to correct the

error below and to dispel promptly the erroneous con-

cept that naked trade restraints, if vertical, are defen-

sible under the rule of reason.

2. In the context of the issues presented by the par-

ties and the record evidence, the district judge prop-

erly presented the case to the jury, and reversal was

erroneous.

This case involved the claim that Whirlpool cut off

plaintiff Oreck, its exclusive distributor of vacuum

cleaners under the tradename ‘‘ Whirlpool,’’ pursuant

to agreement with its major vacuum cleaner customer

Sears, which sold under the brand ‘‘Kenmore’’. As we

have shown, the sole defense was that Whirlpool had

acted entirely unilaterally, because of alleged dissatis-

faction with Oreck’s marketing methods, and that there

had been no pressure, communication, or agreement

with Sears. As the dissent below pointed out, the jury

reasonably rejected this defense in light of Oreck’s

success in selling the Whirlpool product, the evidence

‘‘And I say to you again that unless you find that Sears is

involved in all of this, if this is a decision that Whir]pool

makes on its own, you cannot find for the plaintiff in thi ”

(Tr. 1717). r the plaintiff in this case.

Similarly, Sears’ counsel stated as its essential defense :

‘Sears was not involved in this entire Oreck-Whir!lpool con-

troversy and on that basis you must render a verdict i

of Sears and Whirlpool.’’ (Tr. 1754). verdict in favor

Cheksie ke w

epapeegeistens

a a a or ae

19

of Sears’ pressure on Whirlpool, the defendants’ fail-

ure to call a Whirlpool official to explain or deny his

damaging deposition statements and documents which

attested to Sears’ blatant pressure on Whirlpool first

to limit Oreck’s activities, and then to terminate

Oreck. (Pet. App. 44a-49a).

It is crucial that at trial defendants made no argu-

ment that Whirlpool cut off Oreck in order to obtain

efficiencies of exclusive distribution, avoid ‘‘free rider”’

problems or the other reasons given in Continental T.V.

as possible justification for reducing intrabrand com-

petition in order to promote interbrand competition.

Consequently, the issue presented by the parties and

the evidence was not the justification and reasonable-

ness of a vertical agreement in restraint of trade; the

issue presented was only whether there had been a

Sears-Whirlpool agreement to terminate Oreck. It is

for this reason, quite clearly, that defendants’ counsel

did not object to the parts of the charge which the

court of appeals has found defective and why counsel

for Whirlpool in fact explicitly embraced language

that the majority below held to be grounds for reversal

(see note 4, supra). In the unambiguous circumstances;

of this case, the district court’s charge was unexcep-

tionable.”

18 With respect to the defense of unilateral conduct actually

asserted by defendants, the district judge charged as follows

(J.A, 2922) :

‘‘T charge you that a manufacturer has the right to deal with

whom he pleases and to select his customers at will as long as

there is no resultant effect which is violative of the anti-

trust laws. The manufacturer may discontinue an exclusive

distributorship or may refuse to renew an exclusive distri-

butorship for business reasons which are sufficient to the

manufacturer alone and any adverse effect such a decision

20

3. The majority below also erred in holding that a

rule of reason instruction was required because

‘*Whirlpool’s decision not to renew Oreck’s distribu-

torship was an exercise of its contractual rights’’ and

therefore, non-renewal, even in response to ‘‘induce-

ments by Sears to Whirlpool to allow the contract with

Oreck to expire’’ would not violate the Sherman Act

‘‘without some further showing that ... there was an

anticompetitive effect in the vacuum cleaner industry

as a whole...’’ (Pet. App. 40a). This is clear error in

two respects. First, the cases are legion which have

condemned terminations and non-renewals pursuant to

contract terms, when additional circumstances demon-

may have upon the business of the distributor is immaterial

in the absence of any arrangement or conspiracy restraining

trade or competition. ’’

Indeed, in the absence of argument or evidence as to the justifi-

cation for and reasonableness of a Sears-Whirlpool boycott agree-

ment, it might well have been prejudicial error for the trial court

to have charged the jury with respect to those matters. Wright and

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2556 (‘‘Nor should a

charge be given on a matter, whether or not raised in the plead-

ings, if it is not supported by the evidence’’) ; McCarthy v. Penn-

sylvania R. Co., 156 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329

U.S. 812 (1947).

* The court of appeals also took the trial judge to task because

he ‘‘failed to marshal any of the evidence presented by Whirlpool

to show that its refusal to renew Oreck’s distributorship was moti-

vated and that its actions were consistent with the terms of the

1968 contract.’’ (Pet. App. 36a). This statement is unwarranted.

The district judge explicitly told the jury that he was not going

to marshal the evidence on each side, and that the parties’ counsel

had done so. (J.A. 931). There is no requirement that a trial

judge marshal or comment upon the evidence. See Wright & Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2557; see also Wright, Law of

Federal Courts, 416-17.

— "7 a an eee

FN Gane easel Fe

bid Bae,

21

strate antitrust violations, including illegal boycotts.”

Second, by requiring proof of ‘‘anticompetitive effect

in the industry as a whole,’ the majority has resur-

rected a general market effect or ‘‘ public injury”’ re-

quirement in direct conflict with this Court’s decision

in Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., supra.”

The court has thus erected an almost insuperable bar-

rier to recovery in group boycott cases by small busi-

nesses like Oreck—a barrier that becomes greater as

the victim becomes smaller. Review by this Court is re-

quired in order to make clear to businessmen and the

courts that the discredited ‘‘public injury’’ require-

ment has not been reintroduced into the law in the guise

of a rule of reason test.

CONCLUSION

The decision below erroneously overturned a jury

verdict in this antitrust case on the ground of a sup-

posed defect in the charge not raised by defendants.

18 See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Co., 368 US. 464

(1962) ; Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 377 U.S. 933 (1964) ; Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454

F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971) ; Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor

Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co.,

394 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp.,

295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff’d per curiam, 417 F.2d 621

(2d Cir. 1969).

16 In Klor’s, the court of appeals had upheld dismissal of the

complaint for lack of the ‘‘required public injury,’’ since “ ‘there

was no charge or proof that by any act of defendants the price,

quantity, or quality offered the public was affected .. .’’’ (359

U.S. at 210). This Court reversed on the ground that a group

boyeott ‘‘is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just

one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes

little difference to the economy. Monopoly can as surely thrive by

the elimination of such small businessmen, one at a time, as it can

by driving them out in large groups.’’ Jd. at 213.

22

Under the holding of the court of appeals, a naked boy-

cott agreement, if vertical, must be tested under the

rule of reason, even where there is not an iota of busi-

ness justification or of stimulation to interbrand com-

petition, and it will be upheld unless anticompetitive

effect in the overall industry can be shown. The court

of appeals decision is in direct conflict with the deci-

sions of this Court dealing with boycotts and vertical

restrictions, and with a leading Federal Trade Commis-

sion decision. Certiorari should be granted to correct

the errors below and to clarify an important area of

antitrust law.”

Respectfully submitted,

Howarp ADLER, JR.

LIONEL KESTENBAUM

JAMES W. OLSON

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

Berason, BorKLAND, Maracouis & ADLER

11 Dupont Circle N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

(202) 462-5930

August 29, 1978

17 The errors below require reinstatement of the jury verdict and

the judgment based thereon, with the exception of the 10% of that

judgment representing an award of damages caused by Oreck’s

exclusion from the Canadian market. Oreck accepts the necessity

of a new trial on that minor aspect of the case; however, contrary

to the holding of the court of appeals, the introduction of evidence

regarding Canada does not necessitate a new trial on the principal

part of the case. See n. 2 supra and the dissent of Judges Mansfield

and Feinberg. (Pet. App. 43a, n. 1).

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

SECOND CIRCUIT.

Oreck CoRPORATION,

Plaintiff-A ppellee,

WHIRLPOOL CoRPORATION and

Sears, Roepuck anp Co.,

Defendants-A ppellants.

No. 1173, Docket 76-7631.

Argued June 3, 1977.

Decided Sept. 21, 1977.

Rehearing En Banc Granted Dec. 15, 1977.

Before Anderson and Mansfield, Circuit Judges, and

Brient, District Judge.*

* Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

2a

Rosert P. Anprerson, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on July 13,

1976 in favor of Oreck Corporation (Oreck) against de-

fendants Whirlpool Corporation (Whirlpool) and Sears,

Roebuck & Co. (Sears) on two counts of a seven count

complaint charging violations of §1 of the Sherman Act,

15 U.S.C. §1. Oreck was awarded $2,250,000 (after

trebling) in monetary damages. For the reasons set forth

below, we reverse.

The factual basis of this controversy is fairly straight-

forward. Whirlpool is a manufacturer of vacuum cleaners

(as well as other household appliances not relevant here)

and has been in that business since 1957, when it acquired

the Birtman Electric Co. Birtman had previously manu-

factured vacuum cleaners for Sears, under the Kenmore

label. Whirlpool continued this business, and also sought

to sell vacuum cleaners under its own ‘‘RCA-Whirlpool’”’

label. It discontinued the line of sales under this label

for approximately two years after which it re-entered

the field through a designated exclusive distributor,

Oreck, which was appointed in 1963 for an initial term

of five years, with automatic extensions for one year pe-

riods thereafter, absent six months prior notice of termi-

nation by either party. Whirlpool gave Oreck formal

notice of termination of the agreement on June 27, 1968,

but instead, a new agreement, dated August 1, 1968, was

drawn up extending Oreck’s distributorship until Decem-

ber 31, 1971, with no provision for extension. At the ex-

piration of this extension, however, Oreck’s relationship

with Whirlpool, as its exclusive distributor, was not re-

newed or extended, and it terminated completely. The

instant action followed in September of 1972.

This lawsuit and the underlying controversy, are based

on the claimed reasons why Oreck was not afforded an

additional term as Whirlpool’s exclusive distributor of

vacuum cleaners. Oreck’s successful contention below

was that its agreement was not renewed by Whirlpool at

the behest and insistence of Sears, a much larger pur-

3a

chaser of Whirlpool vacuum cleaners than Oreck. Sears’

association with Whirlpool extended back to 1925, when

Sears acquired 750 shares of Whirlpool’s forerunner cor-

poration, the Upton Machine Co.’ By January of 1960,

Sears owned approximately 4% of Whirlpool’s outstand-

ing stock. Oreck also contended that Sears did not want

Oreck to compete with its own line of Kenmore vacuum

cleaners, also manufactured by Whirlpool, and that it

used its influence with Whirlpool to have Oreck’s ex-

elusive distributorship terminated.

Accordingly, Oreck’s complaint charged both Whirl-

pool and Sears with engaging in a contract, combination

or conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade to ex-

clude Oreck from the vacuum cleaner market in the

United States and Canada (counts one and two of the

complaint) and with forcing or persuading potential cus-

tomers of Oreck from refusing to deal with Oreck (count

three). Additionally, count four of the complaint charged

Whirlpool with selling vacuum cleaners, attachments and

parts to Sears at unlawfully discriminatory prices, con-

trary to 15 U.S.C. §$13(a) and count five with Sears’

knowing inducement or receipt of those same discrimina-

tory prices, prohibited by 15 U.S.C. §13(f). Finally,

count six alleged irreparable damage to Oreck as a result

of Sears’ and Whirlpool’s violations of the antitrust

laws and Oreck’s absence of an adequate remedy at law,

and count seven pleaded damage to Oreck in the amount

of $6,500,000 as a result of Sears’ alleged status as a ‘‘con-

trol person’’ over Whirlpool (because of Sears’ stockhold-

ings in Whirlpool) and the close relationship between the

* According to Sears’ answer to one of plaintiff’s interrogatories,

after Sears’ purchase of 750 shares of Upton Machine Co. in 1925,

‘*the Upton Machine Company underwent major corporate changes,

including merger with the Seeger Refrigeration Company in 1955,

and The Birtman Electric Company in 1957. The name of the re-

sulting corporation was changed to Whirlpool Corporation in

1957.’’

4a

two defendants over a period of 50 years. Counts three,

four and seven were voluntarily dismissed on Oreck’s mo-

tion; and the court directed a verdict for defendants on

counts three and four, the alleged Robinson-Patman Act

violations.

The trial testimony therefore centered on counts one

and two, the alleged Sherman Act violations. Plaintiff’s

ease for liability rests largely upon the testimony of Mar-

shall Oreck, its General Manager, and upon the testimony

of its President and founder, David Oreck, who told of his

relationship with Whirlpool over the years and of his be-

lief, derived primarily from communications with one John

Payne, a salesman for Whirlpool, that the reason for the

cancellation was Sears’ desire to end competition from

Oreck. Plaintiff also presented the deposition of Payne,

who did not appear at the trial. Hyman B. Ritchin, an

economic consultant, and Ernest L. Sommer, a certified

public accountant, gave testimony for the plaintiff on the

issue of damages.

By way of defense and explanation of Oreck’s cancella-

tion, Whirlpool presented the testimony of its officers who

dealt with Oreck, showing that the reason for the cancella-

tion was Oreck’s failure to follow an assigned marketing

strategy. Jack D. Sparks, a Vice President and Director of

Whirlpool, who made the decision to terminate Oreck, testi-

fied that the exclusive distributor had failed to market

Whirlpool vacuum cleaners through “major accounts” (de-

partment store chains and the like) and had instead re-

sorted to “commercial-type distribution” (janitorial sup-

ply houses and mail order sales), a strategy which did not

agree with Whirlpool’s desires. Sparks explained that he

accepted a subordinate’s recommendation to terminate

Oreck “because Oreck corporation had failed to reach the

original objective when we first conceived the program in

1963 which was to set up a one-step distribution system

nationally to major accounts on vacuum cleaners with the

hopes that ultimately we would have a system that other

da

specialty-type products could go through.” Sparks denied

being concerned with competing against Sears, pointing out

that “the system we... talked about [distribution to “major

accounts” such as department stores] would be in direct

competition with Sears.” ?

Significantly, however, plaintiff presented no evidence or

testimony that the net economic effect of Oreck’s cancella-

tion was unreasonably to restrain trade in the vacuum

cleaner industry in the United States and/or Canada. In

fact, as to this critical inquiry, David Oreck testified on

direct examination that “[t]he vacuum cleaner industry is,

indeed, a very large one” and that during 1971, when Oreck

sold 78,203 vacuum cleaners, “the vacuum cleaner industry

in 1971 was about 7.8 million purchases.” Basic arithmetic

reveals, therefore, that Oreck had a 1% market share at the

time of the completion of his exclusive distributorship for

Whirlpool. Moreover, David Oreck admitted on cross-exami-

nation that, following this event, the plaintiff obtained an

alternative source of supply and was, at the time of trial,

the world’s largest supplier of “top fill upright vacuum

cleaners.”

The above testimony and the other evidence adduced at

the trial by the plaintiff show nothing more than the refusal

by Whirlpool to renew Oreck’s exclusive distributorship of

Whirlpool vacuum cleaners under the “Whirlpool” label

and the replacement of Oreck, in effect, by Sears, the other

existing distributor, who sold the same manufacturer’s

vacuum cleaner but under the label, “Kenmore.” It is well-

settled that

“[w]hen an exclusive dealership ‘is no part and parcel

of a scheme to monopolize and effective competition

exists at both the seller and buyer levels, the arrange-

2 It is thus difficult to understand the dissent’s view that there

was ‘‘[n]o substantial evidence . . . offered to show that Oreck was

terminated for some possible lawful reason. . .’’ (Emphasis sup-

plied.)

6a

ment has invariably been upheld as a reasonable re-

straint of trade. In short, the rule was virtually one of

per se legality’ until the District Court decided the

present case [which was reversed].” (Cases cited in

footnote omitted.) Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster

Motor Car Co., 100 U.S.App.D.C. 161, 163, 243 F.2d

418, 420, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822, 78 S.Ct. 29, 2 L.Ed.

2d 38 (1957).°

The Supreme Court expressed much the same rationale in

United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 87

° The holdings of Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car

Co., 100 U.S.App.D.C. 161, 243 F.2d 418, cert. denied, 355 U.S.

822, 78 S.Ct. 29, 2 L.Ed.2d 38 (1957), and a similar case, Schwing

Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 188 F.Supp. 899 (D.Md.), aff’d,

239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823, 78 S.Ct.

30, 2 L.Ed.2d 38 (1957), were succinctly summarized in a case

relied on by the dissent, Quality Mercury Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,

542 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976), as follows: ‘‘Both courts [Packard

and Schwing] held that a manufacturer has a right to select his

customers and may agree with one to exclude another, if: (1) the

agreement is not a horizontal one between competitors; (2) the

manufacturer is not using it to establish market dominance; or (3)

the manufacturer is not using it to promote a monopoly.’’ 542 F.2d

at 470. As is made clear in the remainder of this opinion, Whirl-

pool, as the manufacturer of vacuum cleaners, did not engage in a

horizontal agreement between competitors, while Oreck submitted

no substantial proof that Whirlpool’s motive in cancelling Oreck

was to establish market dominance or to promote a monopoly in

the vacuum cleaner business.

The dissent also relies on Quality Mercury, supra, for the prop-

osition that a per se rule under § 1 of the Sherman Act becomes

applicable when ‘‘a horizontal, intrabrand competitor exercises a

veto power over plaintiff’s access to the manufacturer’s goods or

trademark .. ..’’ The result in Quality Mercury, however, involv-

ing the refusal of Ford to grant a Lincoln dealership in the Min-

neapolis area allegedly because a preexisting dealership had veto

power over such a decision, was to remand for trial in order to

allow the plaintiff ‘‘an opportunity to prove the unreasonableness

of the restraint,’’ 542 F.2d at 472, decidedly not a per se approach

to the alleged Sherman Act violation.

7a

S.Ct. 1856, 18 L.Ed.2d 1249 (1967), overruled on other

grounds, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,

— US. —, 97 S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977), where

it held that a manufacturer may choose his own customers

and franchise certain exclusive dealers:

“Tf the restraint stops at that point—if nothing more

is involved than vertical ‘confinement’ of the manufac-

turer’s own sales of the merchandise to selected deal-

ers, and if competitive products are readily available

to others, the restriction, on these facts alone, would

not violate the Sherman Act.” 388 U.S. at 376, 87 S.Ct.

at 1864.

See also, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke

é Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,

396 U.S. 1062, 90 S.Ct. 752, 24 L.Ed.2d 755 (1970) (“it is

well settled that it is not a per se violation of the antitrust

laws for a manufacturer or supplier to agree with a distrib-

utor to give him an exclusive franchise, even if this means

cutting off another distributor [citing cases].”) ; * Bay City-

Abrahams Bros. Inc. v. Estee Lauder Inc., 375 F.Supp.

1206, 1214-16 (S.D.N.Y.1974); Top-All Varieties, Ine. v.

Hallmark Cards, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 703, 704-5 (S.D.N.Y.

1969).

Under these standards, given additional weight by the

Supreme Court’s recent over-ruling of the per se approach

‘United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.

1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125, 93 S.Ct. 938, 35 L.Ed.2d 256

(1973), cited in the dissent as limiting the Hawaiian Oke holding,

was a case where hotels, restaurants and companies supplying those

businesses in Portland, Oregon, organized an association to attract

conventions to their city. The association was financed by contri-

butions from its members. ‘‘To aid collection, hotel members . .

agreed to give preferential treatment to suppliers who paid their

assessments, and to curtail purchases from those who did not.’’

467 F.2d at 1002. (Emphasis supplied.) Hilton Hotels thus in-

volved a horizontal agreement between compeiitors at the same

level, not the situation in Hawatian Oke or the present case.

8a

to vertical location restrictions of United States v. Arnold,

Schwinn & Co., supra, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE

Sylvania Inc., supra, Oreck was required to show not only

conspiratorial conduct by Sears and Whirlpool in order to

recover under §1 of the Sherman Act, but also credible

proof that the net result and effect of the allegedly con-

spiratorial conduct of the defendants was anticompetitive

in the vacuum cleaner industry as a whole or that the con-

spiracy was designed to drive Oreck out of the vacuum

cleaner business.

In instructing the jury, the trial court quoted the lan-

guage of §1 of the Sherman Act and then further defined

the meaning of the terms within that statute as follows:

“As to the meaning of the term ‘restraint of trade,’ you

are instructed that this general term applies only to

unreasonable restraints and not to all possible re-

straints of trade. Not all restraints of trade are reason-

able. All business affects trade in some way.

The violations alleged by plaintiff are, if you credit

them, unreasonable restraints of trade. If you do not

credit them, Whirlpool’s conduct was not an unreason-

able restraint of trade.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The trial court further instructed the jury with regard to

count one that “[i]f you find there was such an agreement

[between Whirlpool & Sears ‘to exclude Oreck from a mar-

ket in vacuum cleaners or Whirlpool vacuum cleaners any-

where’], then you should go on to consider damages, if any,

flowing from it.” An almost identical charge was given as

regards count two, dealing with Oreck’s alleged exclusion

from the Canadian market. We hold that the above-quoted

portions of the jury instructions constitute plain error

which make necessary a reversal of this judgment. Under

these instructions, the jury could have gone no further than

to find a conspiracy followed by an assessment of damages.

Oreck’s argument that it did show an unreasonable re-

straint of trade because the net effect of its termination

9a

was to provide Sears with a “monopoly position” in the

market for Whirlpool vacuum cleaners is plainly unper-

suasive. Oreck did not demonstrate anything unique about

Whirlpool vacuum cleaners sufficient to establish them as

a separate market apart from all other brands, United

States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,

593, 77 S.Ct. 872, 1 L.Ed2d 1057 (1957) ; George R. Whitten,

Jr., Inc. v. Prddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 550-

52 (1st Cir. 1974). Oreck’s further attempt to characterize

its cancellation as a “group boycott” under the rule of

Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,

79 S.Ct. 705, 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959), and United States v.

General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 86 S.Ct. 1321, 16 L.Ed.

2d 415 (1966), which treats such behavior as a per se viola-

tion of §1 of the Sherman Act, is similarly incorrect. In

Klor’s, the Supreme Court specifically noted that “[t]his is

not a case of ... a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to

an exclusive distributorship,” 359 U.S. at 212, 79 S.Ct. at

709-10. The present case is, in essence, a case involving an

exclusive distributorship controversy, and the “group boy-

eott” doctrine is, therefore, not applicable. Had Sears joined

with other retailers of Whirlpool vacuum cleaners to drive

Oreck out of the vacuum cleaner market, this court would

have been presented with a totally different situation, but

Sears did not do so, and, therefore, Klor’s is not applicable.

Because Sears is a large company presumably selling a

large number of vacuum cleaners does not, ipso facto, con-

vert this case into a horizontal conspiracy warranting per

se treatment.°

’ The dissent attempts to get around these facts by claiming that

‘Sears was the equivalent of many Whirlpool vacuum cleaner

distributors,’’ a novel theory which simply transforms Sears into

something it is not. The implications of applying such a concept

in future cases require the trial court to make legislative determi-

nations. When is a single company ‘‘big’’ enough to be considered

trantamount to a series of ‘‘little’’ companies? The dissent pre-

sumably leaves the determination of what is a ‘‘big’’ company for

this purpose of one case but not ‘‘big’’ for the purpose of another

10a

Any effect on price competition for the sale of Whirl-

pool vacuum cleaners, brought about by the cancellation

of Oreck’s exclusive distributorship, cannot have any legal

or economic significance in the present case. Economically,

the view that the net effect of Oreck’s cancellation will be

to raise the price of Whirlpool vacuums has no significance

absent a showing that consumers cannot substitute for

Whirlpool another type of vacuum cleaner that is as effec-

tive and equally attractive as Oreck’s was in price. In addi-

tion, Oreck has neither charged nor proven a conspiracy to

fix prices for Whirlpool vacuum cleaners. Nowhere in the

complaint does Oreck allege that Whirlpool’s refusal to

deal was aimed at eliminating intrabrand price competition.

The inappropriateness of any claim of price-fixing is made

case, to the wisdom of the trial judge, in the complete absence of

any criteria or standards which the court can apply.

The dissent also charges the majority with looking not to sub-

stance but to form. Perhaps the best rejoinder to such a character-

ization of our opinion is contained in Judge Medina’s fine opinion

in United States v. Morgan, 118 F.Supp. 621 (D.C.1953), an action

under §§ 1, and 2 of the Sherman Act against seventeen investment

banking firms charging a combination, conspiracy and agreement

to restrain and monopolize the securities business in the United

States, in which the court wrote:

‘‘Much of the confusion, especially in the field of antitrust

law, is due to the fact that the breadth and scope of the Sher-

man Act are so general and beneficent that lawyers and even

judges often fail to heed repeated admonitions that each case

must necessarily stand on its own legs, and that the conclu-

sions reached in each depend largely upon the peculiar char-

acteristics of the particular industry involved.’’ 118 F.Supp.

at 688,

In short, the facts and circumstances of this controversy do not call

for the application of the per se rule against price fixing and/or

group boycotts, so that the per se approach must not be dogmatic-

ally followed because it was used in other cases in which those

factors were present. Indeed, the dissent’s attempt to convert this

case into one involving a horizontal price fixing conspiracy itself

might be characterized as looking to form rather than substance.

lla

even more clear by the fact that Sears markets its vacuum

cleaners under the “Kenmore” label. Oreck’s exclusive dis-

tributorship of vacuum cleaners under the “Whirlpool”

label would not, from the point of view of the public con-

sumer, have any particular effect on competition with ma-

chines sold by Sears.

Indeed, to rule otherwise would place intolerable re-

straints on the ability of a manufacturer to award and can-

cel an exclusive distributorship where no public harm has

been shown. Whirlpool would be thereby compelled to con-

tinue Oreck’s exclusive distributorship indefinitely, despite

the manufacturer’s clear intent and desire not to renew it

and in derogation of its express contractual right and power

not to renew it. Blindly protecting Oreck without regard to

the cancellation’s effects on the affected market thus dis-

regards the well-established rule that “[t]he antitrust laws

. were enacted for ‘the protection of competition, not

competitors....’” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,

Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488, 97 S.Ct. 690, 697, 50 L.Ed.2d 701

(1977) (emphasis in original).

The judgment of the district court, based as it is on a

finding of liability on the part of the defendants, is re-

versed and the case is remanded for a new trial. In doing

s0, we express no opinion as to the correctness of those

portions of the trial court’s jury instruction dealing with

the formulation of damages.

MansFIELD, Circuit Judge (dissenting) :

With due respect, I must dissent. This case is governed

by well-settled antitrust law principles governing combina-

tions and conspiracies designed to restrain competition on

the part of a specific competitor—in this case Oreck—

which the majority chooses to disregard.

The evidence, viewed most favorably to plaintiff-appellee

Oreck, as it must be after the jury’s verdict, Continental

Ore Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 696, 82 S.Ct. 1404,

l2a

8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962), reveals a classic per se restraint of

competition of the type condemned by the Supreme Court

in United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 86 S.Ct.

1321, 16 L.Ed.2d 415 (1966). Whirlpool, a large manufac-

turer of appliances, including vacuum cleaners, combined

with Sears, Roebuck, a merchandising giant which for 40

odd years had distributed the lion’s share of Whirlpool’s

entire output, to stop plaintiff-appellee Oreck, the only

other distributor of Whirlpool vacuum cleaners, from com-

peting against Sears in the sale of Whirlpool-made ma-

chines. The motive was clear—to prevent Oreck’s price-

cutting and other competitive practices from interfering

with Sears’ higher prices and its sales of Whirlpool-made

vacuum cleaners. When Oreck refused to knuckle under as

requested, the combination agreed to have Whirlpool cut it

off as a distributor of Whirlpool machines, which was done

even though Oreck had dramatically increased its sales of

Whirlpool vacuum cleaners from 8,384 units to 78,203 units

over the preceding four years. As a result, the public lost

the benefit of Oreck’s competition and particularly of its

lower prices in the sale of Whirlpool vacuum cleaners.

Thereafter, if customers wanted Whirlpool machines they

would have to buy them from Sears and pay Sears’ higher

prices. The principles governing such a case were summar-

ized by the Supreme Court in United States v. General

Motors, 384 U.S. at 146-47, 86 S.Ct. at 1331 (1966) as fol-

lows:

‘‘The principle of these cases is that where business-

men concert their actions in order to deprive others of

access to merchandise which the latter wish to sell to

the public, we need not inquire into the economic moti-

vation underlying their conduct. See Barber, Refusals

to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103

U.Pa.L.Rev. 847, 872-885 (1955). Exclusion of traders

from the market by means of combination or conspir-

acy is so inconsistent with the free-market principles

embodied in the Sherman Act that it is not to be saved

13a

by reference to the need for preserving the collabo-

rators’ profit margins or their system for distributing

automobiles, any more than by reference to the alleg-

edly tortious conduct against which a combination or

conspiracy may be directed—as in Fashion Origina-

tors’ Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n,

supra [312 U.S. 457] at 468 [61 S.Ct. 703, 85 L.Ed.

949].

We note, moreover, that inherent in the success of

the combination in this case was a substantial restraint

upon price competition—a goal unlawful per se when

sought to be effected by combination or conspiracy.

E. g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 US.

29, 47 [80 S.Ct. 503, 513, 4 L.Ed.2d 505] ; United States

v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 [60 S.Ct.

811, 844, 84 L.Ed. 1129]. And the per se rule applies

even when the effect upon prices is indirect. Simpson

v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 18, 16-22 [84 S.Ct. 1051, 1057,

12 L.Ed.2d 98]; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra.’’

The background of the conspiracy is instructive. Since

1925 Sears has been the principal distributor of Whirlpool

products, currently purchasing more than two-thirds of

Whirlpool’s total appliance production and, at the time of

the events here involved, more than 90% of Whirlpool’s

vacuum cleaner output for resale under Sears’ ‘‘ Kenmore’”’

label. In addition Sears, beginning in 1925, purchased a sub-

stantial block of Whirlpool’s common stock and by 1960

became its largest single shareholder, owning 251,192 shares

and usually electing one or more of its executives to Whirl-

pool’s board of directors. Sears, therefore, has been in a

position to exercise considerable leverage power over

Whirlpool’s sales and distribution policies and decisions.

Prior to the formation of Oreck in 1963, Whirlpool had

periodically attempted to broaden the sales of its vacuum

cleaners by marketing them under its own brand name, but

had found that its existing distribution network was inade-

l4a

quate and that Sears’ sales of Whirlpool-manufactured

vacuum cleaners at higher retail prices posed a barrier to

Whirlpool’s entry into price competition against other

brands as long as it was restrained by its arrangement with

Sears from competing price-wide against Sears in the sale

of Whirlpool-made machines. As a result Whirlpool in 1961

discontinued efforts to sell its product independently under

its own name and H. Thomas Stroop, a Whirlpool execu-

tive, prepared a report entitled ‘‘Appraisal of Vacuum

Cleaner Business—RCA Whirlpool’’. He concluded that

‘*Unlike other appliances, Sears sells their [vacuum]

cleaners for as high or higher prices than major brand

competition.

‘‘Sears becomes very unhappy if RCA WHIRLPOOL

product [sic] is retailed for less than the Sears product

manufactured by Whirlpool. For this reason, we under-

stand that it has been decided that the RCA WHIRL-

POOL brand should have retail prices comparable to

Sears.

“Our challenge then ... ‘Can we sell cleaners in

volume at high retail prices ... and if so how?’ ”’ (PI.

Ex. 160)

Thereafter, until the events giving rise to this case, Whirl-

pool-made vacuum cleaners were sold to the public only by

Sears.

In April, 1963, Whirlpool’s interest in selling its vacuum

cleaners under its own brand name was revived. Jack

Sparks, Vice President of Whirlpool, approached David

Oreck, who had prior to 1961 been in charge of Whirlpool

vacuum cleaners sales for Bruno, New York and had been

the most successful distributor of Whirlpool vacuum clean-

ers under its own brand name before Whirlpool discontin-

ued such sales. The result was an agreement to the effect

that the newly-formed Oreck Corporation, plaintiff-appel-

lee, would function as the exclusive United States distrib-

l5a

utor of Whirlpool brand vacuum cleaners. Sparks advised

Oreck that he was ‘‘not to conflict with Sears, Roebuck on

price’’ and that an internal Whirlpool letter confirmed that

Oreck’s prices would ‘‘emphasize specialty [i. e., high-

priced] selling’’.

Oreck soon found that it could not compete with Sears in

selling Whirlpool-made vacuum cleaners at Sears’ prices

and decided that it could distribute them profitably only by

selling at lower prices and through direct mail or institu-

tional supply houses, which would, by reducing or eliminat-

ing the middleman’s mark-up, enable Oreck to sell com-

petitively and profitably at the lower price levels. Accord-

ingly, in 1967 Oreck began a large-scale mail solicitation

campaign which, dramatically increased its sales of Whirl-

pool machines from a low in 1967 of 8,384 units to an all-

time high of 78,203 units in 1971, the year Whirlpool termi-

nated its distributorship. The mail order campaign offered

the vacuum cleaners to carefully selected group of consum-

ers at very low prices. Oreck planned to realize its profit

from the sale of dust bags and accessories over the 10-15

year life of the product. Despite the prospects for increased

sales, three Whirlpool executives, Jack Sparks, Sol Sweet

and Jchn Payne, Whirlpool’s primary contact with Oreck,

all expressed disapproval of the mail order campaign,

Payne advising Oreck that Whirlpool’s unhappiness was

attributable to the company’s ‘‘other customer’’ (Sears),

which did not like the mail solicitation. Payne also told

Oreck that the ‘‘other customer got to the head of the

company [Whirlpool]’’.*

* Payne’s statements were never objected to by defendants as not

within the scope of his employment by Whirlpool and are therefore

admissible under Rule 801(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Judge Owen also instructed the jury, without objection by defend-

ants, that defendants’ failure to call Payne to the stand to explain

or refute these statements, given his clear availability, may be taken

to indicate that if called his testimony would have been unfavor-

able to defendants.

l6a

That a Whirlpool-Sears combination had been formed to

stop Oreck’s competition against Sears is further evidenced

by events during the preceding year, 1966, when David

Oreck sought to obtain Whirlpool’s approval of Oreck’s

plan to market in Canada ,where Sears operated under the

name of Simpson-Sears Ltd. Whirlpool refused to make

the minor changes in the vacuum cleaner necessary to con-

form to Canadian Standards Association requirements, as

they had done for Sears, and Payne later wired Oreck that

it could not market in Canada because Whirlpool could not

‘‘obtain a waiver to the current franchise,’’ meaning ap-

proval by Sears. A concurrent Whirlpool internal memo-

randum criticized Oreck’s emphasis on low-priced sales,

concluding that, ‘‘ Needless to say, we should not consider

for a moment authorizing Oreck to operate in Canada.”’

By 1968 the Whirlpool-Sears combination was continuing

to put the screws on Oreck in an effort to force it to adhere

to Sears’ prices, sales methods, and markets. In that year

Whirlpool refused to manufacture private label vacuum

cleaners for certain of Oreck’s large customers, and Payne

attributed the refusal to ‘‘objections from our other cus-

tomer... .’’ In 1969 and 1970, Whirlpool refused to make

minor changes in Oreck’s shipping carton to meet parcel

post requirements and thereby avoid a penalty charge,

even though Whirlpool had provided Sears with an accept-

able box for its mail orders. Payne, who handled the matter,

attributed the refusal not to engineering difficulties but to a

‘*corporate’’ decision.

On December 31, 1971, despite Oreck’s highest sales level

since it had begun selling Whirlpool vacuum cleaners,

Whirlpool terminated the Oreck distributorship.

The foregoing, together with other evidence and wit-

nesses viewed by the jury, supported the jury’s inference

that Whirlpool terminated Oreck as the result of the com-

bined efforts of Sears and Whirlpool to put an end to

Oreck’s competition against Sears in the sale of Whirlpool

l7a

machines, including mail-order solicitation and low prices,

to which Sears objected because of the possible adverse ef-

fect on its sale of Whirlpool vacuum cleaners under its own

label at higher prices and without any Canadian Whirl-

pool competition. No substantial evidence was offered to

show that Oreck was terminated for some possibly lawful

reason, such as failure to increase Whirlpool sales or Whirl-

pool’s desire to protect its trade name, other than testi-

mony of Jack D. Sparks and John Payne that Oreck had

failed to market to ‘‘major accounts,’’ which was under-

standably rejected by the jury in view of Oreck’s tremen-

dous increase in sale of Whirlpool cleaners from 1967 to

1971.

The law governing the case is clear and well-settled. A

manufacturer may unilaterally choose his customers,

United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 39 S.Ct. 465,

63 L.Ed. 992 (1919), and unilaterally substitute one exclu-

sive distributor for another, Alpha Distributing Co. v. Jack

Daniels Distillery, 454 F.2d 442, 452 (9th Cir. 1972). How-

ever, it is elementary that a combination between a manu-

facturer and one or more of its customers which has as its

sole object the restraint of another customer’s competition

through purchase and resale of the manufacturer’s product

is per se illegal. United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S.

127, 146-47, 86 S.Ct. 1321, 16 L.Ed.2d 415 (1966); United

States v. Parke-Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 47, 80 S.Ct. 503,

4 L.Ed.2d 505 (1960); Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale

Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212, 79 S.Ct. 705, 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959) ;

E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Man-

ual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186-7 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. den.,

409 U.S. 1109, 93 S.Ct. 912, 34 L.Ed.2d 690 (1973) ; Barber,

Refusals to Deal Under The Federal Antitrust Laws, 103

U.Pa.L.Rev. 847, 875 (1955).

In United States v. General Motors, supra, the manufac-

turer and a group of its Los Angeles area dealers agreed to

discontinue selling Chevrolets through discount houses ad-

vertising discount prices and lower financing costs. The

18a

Court characterized the arrangement as a ‘‘classic conspir-

acy in restraint of trade,’’ explaining the application of the

per se rule as follows:

‘‘'T]nherent in the success of the combination . .. was

a substantial restraint upon price competition—a goal

illegal per se when sought to be effected by combination

and conspiracy... . And the per se rule applies even

when the effect upon prices is indirect.’’ 384 U.S. at

147, 86 S.Ct. at 1331.

General Motors represented one more application of the

basic principle established long ago in United States v.

Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24, 60 S.Ct. 811,

844-45, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940) to the effect that

‘‘Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for

the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing,

fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity

in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se... .

Where the means for price-fixing are purchases or sales

of the commodity in a market operation or, as here,

purchases of a part of the supply of the commodity for

the purpose of keeping it from having a depressive

effect on the markets, such power may be found to

exist though the combination does not control a sub-

stantial part of the commodity. . .. Price-fixing agree-

ments may have utility to members of the group

though the power possessed or exerted falls far short

of domination and control. Monopoly power (United

States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 [33 S.Ct. 141, 57 L.Ed.

333]) is not the only power which the Act strikes down,

as we have said. Proof that a combination was formed

for the purpose of fixing prices and that it caused them

to be fixed or contributed to that result is proof of the

completion of a price-fixing conspiracy under § 1 of the

Act.”’

19a

Moreover, such a combination by agreement to restrain

price competition or through refusal to deal with a custo-

mer is per se illegal whether it is horizontal, vertical or

embraces participants from both levels. See, e. g., United

States v. Arnold, Schwinn € Co., 388 U.S. at 375-76, 87 S.Ct.

1856, where the Supreme Court observed that a conspiracy

embracing both levels is illegal per se, when it is ‘‘ancillary

to price fixing’’ or ‘‘price fixing is ‘an integral part of the

whole distribution system’,’’ 388 U.S. at 375, 87 S.Ct. at

1864, even if the effect on prices is ‘‘indirect,’’ United

States v. General Motors, supra, 384 U.S at 147, 86 S.Ct.

1321.

The majority further errs in stating that Oreck’s com-

plaint fails to allege that ‘‘Whirlpool’s refusal to deal was

aimed at eliminating intrabrand price competition.’’ The

complaint alleges clearly an agreement between Sears and

Whirlpool to restrain Oreck’s competition against Sears in

the sale and distribution of Whirlpool-made vacuum clean-

ers. Plaintiff Oreck alleged, at {] 14-15 of the First Claim

of its complaint, that when Oreck began ‘‘to compete seri-

ously with Sears’’ in the sale and distribution of Whirlpool

products—specifically ‘‘sales of ‘Kenmore’ vacuum clean-

ers’’ made by Whirlpool—Whirlpool terminated its distrib-

utorship to ‘‘eliminate any serious competition to Sears,

Roebuck from Oreck.’’ These allegations were clearly broad

enough to embrace restraint of price competition by Oreck

against Sears in the sale of Whirlpool-made vacuum clean-

ers, an issue that was actually tried without objection. Par.

21 of the complaint, moreover, alleges that improvements in

Whirlpool’s vacuum cleaner were withheld ‘‘with the intent

and effect of ... reducing Oreck’s competition with Sears,

Roebuck.’’ Although the complaint also alleged that the

purpose and effect of the combination was to exclude Oreck

generally from the vacuum cleaner market—a type of alle-

gation not unusual in civil antitrust cases—the record, in-

cluding the examinations of witnesses, summations of coun-

sel and the court’s instructions, show that the case was tried

20a

and submitted to the jury on the claim that Whirlpool and

Sears combined to restrain Oreck from competing against

Sears, particularly on prices, in the sale of Whirlpool-made

machines, as a result of which Oreck was ultimately cut off

as a distributor of such machines. At trial and prior to the

jury’s verdict, the court and counsel had no disagreement

as to the applicable legal principles, as the following collo-

quy with respect to the Court’s proposed charge shows:

‘‘The Court: I understand that, but it seems to me

that if the jury were to conclude that Sears and Whirl-

pool had conspired to terminate Oreck to rid Sears of

a competitor, they have gone all the farther that they

need to go.

‘‘Mr. Turoff [Whirlpool’s counsel]: I see now your

Honor’s argument. I think what you are saying is that

if the jury finds that we had a conspiracy for the pur-

pose of getting rid of Oreck, that is an unreasonable

restraint of trade. That is, I think, a correct statement

of the law.”’

Thus the evidence presented at trial to the effect that the

termination culminated a Sears-Whirlpool conspiracy to

eliminate Oreck’s competition against Sears, and particu-

larly its price competition, established a per se violation of

§ 1 of the Sherman Act.’

2The proof of a conspiracy between Whirlpool and Sears was

more than sufficient. Indeed, a manufacturer may be held to violate

§ 1 of the Sherman Act ‘‘irrespective of monopoly or conspiracy,”’

when he refuses to deal with a distributor and thereby creates an

‘‘arrangement’’ in restraint of trade. Osborn v. Sinclair Co., 324

F.2d 566, 573 (4th Cir. 1963). The existence of a conspiracy

and Sears’ membership and participation could also be inferred

from the totality of the course and conduct engaged in by the

defendants, United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,

80 S.Ct. 503, 4 L.Ed.2d 505 (1960) ; United States v. A. Schrader’s

Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 40 S.Ct. 251, 64 L.Ed. 471 (1920). The

jury was entitled to rely, among other things, upon (1) Sears’

purchase of 90 per cent of Whirlpool’s annual production of

vacuum cleaners and two-thirds of its production of all appliances,

2la

: Since a refusal to deal for the purpose of eliminating

intrabrand price competition is thus per se unlawful, the

majority errs in holding that plaintiff Oreck was required

also to prove a restraint of trade in the relevant market

In General Motors, where the Supreme Court found per me

unlawful a similar combination to restrain intrabrand price

competition by refusing to deal with ‘‘discounters”’ of

Chevrolet cars, the Court deemed it unnecessary to consider

the effect of the intrabrand competition on the relevant

market or the availability of alternative sources of supply

to the discounters. Indeed, as early at FTC v. Beech-Nut

Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42 8.Ct. 150, 66 L.Ed. 307 (1922)

the court condemned the boycott of price cutters, without

regard to the availability of alternative products. See also

Ford Motor Co. v. Webster’s Auto Sales Inc., 361 F.2d 874

( Ist Cir. 1966) (per se rule applied without regard to alter-

native sources of supply available to plaintiff).

The dealer-termination cases relied upon by the majority,

see, e. ., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke

& Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,

396 U.S. 1062, 90 S.Ct. 752, 24 L.Ed.2d 755 (1972), Alpha

Distributing Co. v. Jack Daniels Distillery, 454 F.2d 442,

452 (9th Cir. 1972), and Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster

Motor Car Co., 100 U.S.App.D.C. 161, 243 F.2d 418, cert.

denied, 355 U.S. 822, 78 S.Ct. 29, 2 L.Ed.2d 38 (1957), are

all clearly distinguishable and do not govern the facts of

this case. They stand simply for the proposition that a

(2) Sears’ position on the Whirlpool board, (3) its use of its own

brand name (which decreased its reliance on Whirlpool as a source)

and (4) Sears’ traditional high price structure. This evidence of a

motive to maintain high prices and leverage over Whirlpool coin-

cided with Whirlpool’s irrational termination of an increasingly

successful distributor, Oreck’s entry into Sears’ mai] order domain

at discount prices, the fact that ‘‘an honorary director of Sears’’

placed Oreck’s mail order solicitation before the Whirlpool board,

and Payne ’s statemerts to David Oreck admitting that Sears had

applied pressure on Whirlpool. Viewed as a whole the evidence

clearly supported the jury’s finding of conspiracy.

22a

manufacturer may unilaterally terminate or replace an

exclusive distributor for legitimate business purposes with-

out violating §1 of the Sherman Act. The critical distinc-

tion is that in the cases relied upon by appellants, unlike

the present case or General Motors, there was no evidence

that the cutoff or substitution was pursuant to a combina-

tion to restrain competition by the victim against the con-

spirators in the sale of the product. Indeed, each of the

dealer termination cases finding no violation of § 1, includ-

ing the carefully reasoned opinion in Hawatan Oke, recog:

nize that a per se rule would apply to a dealer termination

where the manufacturer had the ‘‘anticompetitive objec-

tive’’ of excluding ‘‘one or more so-called ‘discounters’ or

‘price cutters’ ’’. 416 F.2d at 76. In Hawaiian Oke no such

evidence of anticompetitive reason or effect was offered by

the plaintiffs and the Court of Appeals understandably

found reversible error in the district court’s instruction

that a per se violation is made out by any agreement which

‘ig hound to reduce another businessman’s opportunity to

compete in the same market.’’ 416 F.2d at 75. However, the ©

court was careful to distinguish the case from those, like the

present case, where an objective was to restrain competi-

tion, stating: ;

‘‘In other cases, there was concerted action by one

group to put one or more of their competitors out of

business, or to impair their ability to compete with the

conspirators. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,

1963, 373 U.S. 341, 347, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 10 L.Ed.2d 389 ;

Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,

1960, 364 U.S. 656, 81 S.Ct. 365, 5 L.Ed.2d 358 ; Asso-

ciated Press. v. United States, supra [326 U.S. 1, 65

S.Ct. 1416, 89 L.Ed. 2013]... . In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.

Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 1951, 340 U.S. 211, 71

S.Ct. 259, 95 L.Ed. 219, there was an agreement be-

tween sellers to refuse to sell to wholesalers who would

not agree to abide by maximum resale prices fixed by

the sellers. Thus the boycott of the plaintiff to that case

was part of a price-fixing scheme. .. .

23a

“Here, plaintiff presented no evidence whatever that

either Seagram or Barton had any antitcompetitive

motive for terminating plaintiff as their distributor.

There were no price fixing or other similar motives or

demands or activities.’ Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,

Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d at 77-78.

The limitations of the Hawaiian Oke decision were fur-

ther made clear by the Ninth Circuit in United States v.

Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1972),

cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125, 93 S.Ct. 938, 35 L.Ed.2d 256

(1973), where the court held that a refusal to deal in order

to coerce competitors or to exclude them from competition

(which is the case here) is illegal per se. Hawaiian Oke

was distinguished as a case in which the manufacturer’s

“primary purpose” and “direct effect” was to achieve a

“legitimate business objective.” * A similar line of cases has

held that, although a manufacturer may unilaterally termi-

nate a distributorship or for his own legitimate business

reasons refuse to grant an exclusive distributorship, when

a horizontal, intrabrand competitor exercises a veto power

over plaintiff’s access to the manufacturer’s goods or trade-

mark, as Sears did here, an inference of anticompetitive

motive and effect is available and the per se rule becomes

applicable. Quality Mercury Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542

* See also Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 119 (9th Cir.

1972) (per se rule applies to refusals to deal to eliminate price

cutters) ; Bay-City Abrahams Bros. Inc. v. Estee Lauder Inc., 375

F.Supp. 1206, 1216 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (refusal to deal is per se

illegal if the result is price fixing or the elimination of competi-

tion) ; Ace Beer Distributors Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283, 286

(6th Cir.), cert. den., 375 U.S. 922, 84 S.Ct. 267, 11 L.Ed.2d 166

(1963) (same); E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air

Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186-7 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.

den., 409 U.S. 1109, 93 S.Ct. 912, 34 L.Ed.2d 690 (1973) (combi-

nations among traders at different marketing levels to exclude a

competitor of some member of the combination is illegal per se) ;

Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103

U.Pa.L. Rev, 847, 875 (1955).

24a

F.2d 466, 470 (8th Cir. 1976) ; American Motor Inns v. Holi-

day Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1242 (3rd Cir. 1975).

Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 100

U.S.App.D.C. 161, 243 F.2d 418, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822,

78 S.Ct. 29, 2 L.Ed.2d 38 (1957), relied upon by the major-

ity, is the typical dealer termination case in which evidence

was presented to show that the survival of Packard’s larg-

est area franchise depended, in the business judgment of

the company, upon its being given an exclusive franchise.

No evidence was presented, as in General Motors and the

present case, to show that the dealer was terminated be-

cause he was a price cutter or in order to maintain high in-

trabrand prices.

Similarly, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Conti-

nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., —— U.S. ——, 97

S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977), relied on by the majority,

has no application to this case. Although the Court over-

ruled a portion of United States v. Arnold Schwinn €& Co.,

not involved here, it did not change any of the foregoing

principles regarding price restraints. On the contrary, it

reaffirmed them, restricting its application of the “rule

of reason” to exclude vertically-imposed price restraints,

US. , 97 S.Ct. 2549 n.18, and General Motors-type

conspiracies, —— U.S. ——, 97 S.Ct. 2549 n.28.

The majority vainly seeks to get around General Motors

and other Supreme Court decisions holding similar combi-

nations to restrain competition illegal per se by pointing

to the fact that more than one competing dealer was in-

volved in the General Motors conspiracy and by suggesting

that, if Sears had joined with another distributor rather

than with Whirlpool to restrain Oreck’s price competition,

perhaps General Motors might apply. The attempted dis-

tinction has no legal significance and ignores the substan-

tive fact that Sears was not only the sole other distributor

of Whirlpool machines but handled some 90% of the vacuum

cleaners made by Whirlpool. Sears was the equivalent of

many Whirlpool vacuum cleaner distributors. The effect

25a

of its combining with Whirlpool to stop Oreck’s price com-

petition was just as harmful to Oreck and to the public as

would be a combination between two small distributors to

eliminate a discounter, which under the majority’s dis-

tinction would be per se illegal under General Motors. A

combination to restrain intrabrand price competition can-

not be condoned simply because it consists solely of the

manufacturer of the product and its only distributor, a

huge merchandising chain, without participation by a sec-

ond distributor. The law looks to substance, not form, and

condemns as per se illegal any combination or conspiracy

of 2 or more persons to restrain price competition or to

eliminate a competitor.

For the foregoing reasons I would affirm the judgment

of the district court.‘ The majority has in my view seriously

erred in its concept of the antitrust principles that govern

this case. The decision departs from basic principles estab-

lished in numerous decisions of the Supreme Court. It will

have mischievous results, since it will be seized upon by

those who would otherwise be bound by established prece-

dent to demand similar treatment. It weakens the private

enforcement of the antitrust laws, upon which the Execu-

tive Branch heavily depends. I therefore dissent.

*I would also find that Oreck’s proof of damages was sufficient

to meet its burden of proof and to support the jury’s verdict since

‘damage issues in these cases are rarely susceptible of the kind of

concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available in other con-

texts,’’ Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123,

89 S.Ct. 1562, 1576, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969), and that in the absense

of precise damage calculations ‘‘the wrongdoer should bear the risk

of uncertainty that his own conduct has created.’’ Autowest, Inc.

v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556, 565 (2d Cir 1970). Here plaintiff’s

evidence of profit structure and sales performance over the years

prior to termination and its projections by an expert witness as to

future performance, clearly afforded the jury ‘‘a reasonable basis

of computation.’’ Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials

Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379, 47 S.Ct. 400, 71 L.Ed, 684 (1929).

26a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 76-7631

SEPTEMBER TERM, 1977

Oreck Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WuirLpooL CoRPORATION AND

Sears, Roesuck anv Co., Defendants-Appellants.

Before: ANpEeRSON, Frrnperc, MANSFIELD, MuLuican, TiM-

BERS, GuRFEIN, VAN GRAAFEILAND, Meskiu, Circuit

Judges.

Fitep May 1, 1978

On Renearinc En Banco

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27a

[Opinion ]

AnpersoN, Cir. J.: The appellants, Whirlpool Corpora-

tion (Whirlpool) and Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Sears), ap-

pealed from a judgment entered on July 13, 1976, on a jury

verdict against them and in favor of Oreck Corporation

(Oreck), on two counts of a seven count complaint charging

violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. On ap-

peal, a divided panel of this court reversed and remanded

the case for a new trial. Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.

[1977-2 Trape Caszs {| 61,641], 563 F. 2d 54 (2d Cir. 1977).

Appellee’s petition for a rehearing en banc was granted on

December 15, 1977. The hearing of the appeal en banc was

submitted on briefs by all of the parties and without fur-

ther oral argument. On reconsideration we concur in the

judgment of the panel majority, reverse the judgment of

district court, and remand the case for a new trial.

[Termination of Distributor]

The material facts of this dispute have been set forth in

the opinion of the panel majority and will be reviewed here

only briefly. Whirlpool has been in the vacuum cleaner

business since 1957 when it acquired the Birtman Electric

Co. and began manufacturing vacuum cleaners for Sears,

te be sold under the ‘‘Kenmore’’ label. Whirlpool also

sought to sell vacuum cleaners under its own tradename.

In August, 1963, Whirlpool entered into an agreement with

Oreck, by which the latter was appointed the exclusive dis-

tributor of vacuum cleaners under the name of ‘‘ Whirlpool”’

for an initial term of five years, with automatic extensions

28a

for one-year periods thereafter, absent six months prior

notice of termination of the agreement by either party.

Whirlpool gave Oreck formal notice of termination of the-

agreement on June 27, 1968; but after further negotiations,

Whirlpool and Oreck entered into a substituted contract,

dated August 1, 1968, which extended Oreck’s distributor-

ship through December 31, 1971; it did not, however, con-

tain any provision for an extension. On May 14, 1971, Whirl-

pool informed Oreck that it intended to allow the sales

agreement to expire according to its terms and, on Decem-

ber 31, 1971, Oreck’s exclusive distributorship of “Whirl-

pool” products ended. The instant action followed in Sep-

tember of 1972.

This lawsuit is based on Oreck’s claim that it was not

afforded the opportunity for an additional period of time

as Whirlpool’s exclusive distributor at the behest and in-

sistence of Sears, a much larger purchaser of Whirlpool

products. Accordingly, Oreck’s complaint charged both

Whirlpool and Sears with engaging in a contract, com-

bination, or conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade

to exclude Oreck from the vacuum cleaner market in the

United States and Canada.’

At trial, Oreck’s case for liability rested principally upon

the testimony of Marshall Oreck, its General Manager, and

of David Oreck, its President. It was their contention that

the reason for Whirlpool’s failure to renew the contract

was Sears’ desire to end competition from Oreck. By way of

defense and explanation of its action, Whirlpool presented

the testimony of its officers who dealt with Oreck to show

that, among other reasons, the contract was not renewed

* At no time in the course of this litigation has Oreck alleged

that either its 1963 or its 1968 contract with Whirlpool in and of

itself violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. Neither was alleged to be

an agreement which attempted to fix prices or eliminate resale price

competition, nor did it attempt to impose unreasonable geographi-

eal or customer restraints on Oreck’s ability to compete.

29a

after December, 1971, because of Oreck’s failure to follow

the original marketing strategy contemplated by Whirlpool.’

[Economic Effects]

Oreck presented no evidence that the net economic effect

of the non-renewal of its contract was to restrain trade un-

reasonably in the vacuum cleaner industry in the United

States and/or Canada.‘ Nor did it show that alternative

sources of supply were unavailable and that it was, there-

fore, excluded from competition in the vacuum cleaner busi-

ness. David Oreck admitted that Oreck had been able to

obtain vacuum cleaners from another manufacturer and

was, at the time of trial, the world’s largest supplier of

“top fill upright vacuum cleaners.”

Despite the lack of mention or reference to any evidence

of an anticompetitive purpose or effect in connection with

the alleged Whirlpool/Sears agreement, the trial court in-

structed the jury that,

The violations alleged by plaintiff are, if you credit

them, unreasonable restraints of trade ... If you find

* According to their testimony, it was Whirlpool’s intention that

Oreck’s distributorship would serve as an avenue to the sale of

‘*Whirlpool’’ vacuum cleaners to department stores and other spe-

cial retail accounts. There was further testimony that by 1965,

Oreck had abandoned this marketing strategy and had resorted to

sales to janitorial supply houses, and that Oreck further departed

from Whirlpool’s original plan by adopting, in 1967, a technique

for making sales of ‘‘Whirlpool’’ machines through direct mail

orders It was undisputed that by 1970, mail order sales comprised

over 90% of Oreck’s business.

* David Oreck testified that the vacuum cleaner industry is a

large one and that during 1971, when Oreck sold 78,203 vacuum

cleaners, consumers purchased about 7.8 million cleaners. Oreck,

therefore, had no more than a 1% market share at the time of the

completion of its exclusive distributorship for Whirlpool. More-

over, there was, at all relevant times, an abundance of vacuum

eleaners available in the marketplace which were reasonably inter-

changeable with those manufactured by Whirlpool.

30a

there was such an agreement [between Whirlpool and

Sears “to exclude Oreck from a market in vacuum

cleaners or Whirlpool vacuum cleaners anywhere”),

then you should go on to consider damages. (Emphasis

added.)

[Per Se Violation]

An almost identical charge was given with respect to

count two, dealing with Oreck’s alleged exclusion from the

Canadian market.‘ Under such instructions, the jury could

‘Count 2 of the complaint charged that Whirlpool and Sears

unlawfully conspired to exclude Oreck from the vacuum cleaner

market in Canada. (Counts 3 through 7 were dismissed.) At trial,

Oreck contended that Whirlpool’s refusal to grant its request that

Whirlpool procure Canadian Standards Association approval for

the ‘‘Whirlpool’’ vacuum cleaners it desired to sell in Canada,

provided substantial evidence of the unlawful conspiracy to remove

Oreck’s competition against Sears, selling its ‘‘Kenmore’’ ma-

chinery through its subsidiary, Simpson-Sears Ltd., the sole dis-

tributor of Whirlpool-made products in Canada.

The 1963 and 1968 agreements between Whirlpool and Oreck

both specifically stated that Whirlpool was appointing Oreck its

exclusive distributor of certain ‘‘Whirlpool’’ products ‘‘for the

United States of America and its possessions.’’ The parties agree

that this provision placed no restriction on the territory in which

Oreck might sell goods purchased from Whirlpool. Whirlpool con-

cedes that it refused to obtain Canadian Standards Association

approval for the cleaners that Oreck was seeking to market in

Canada, but argues that such approval was not a prerequisite to

selling in Canada and that, in any event, Oreck sold vacuum

cleaners in Canada during the period of its distributorship.

On this count, the trial judge instructed the jury that,

‘* Arrangements . . . restricting the territory in which a product

may be resold are unreasonable restraints of trade in and of them-

selves .. . You need not determine whether such arrangements are

reasonable, or whether they have an impact upon the market place,

nor need you be concerned with the business or supposed economic

justification for such arrangements... .”’

In light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in

Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. [1977-1 TrapE Cases

3la

simply have found an agreement by Sears and Whirlpool

to exclude Oreck from the sale of Whirlpool vacuum clean-

ers and, on that basis, have found them guilty (as it in fact

did) of a per se violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. Yet

the very same conduct can constitute the granting of a

perfectly legal exclusive distributorship or one, at least,

whose legality must be judged under the rule of reason

f 61,488], 433 U. S. 36 (1977), this instruction was incorrect.

Efforts by a manufacturer to restrict the territory in which a

distributor of its products operates are to be examined under

the rule of reason standard. See Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild

Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc. [1978-1 Trape Cases 61,926], ——

F. 2d ——, 46 U.S. L. W. 2492 (1st Cir. March 17, 1978).

It is undisputed that Whirlpool was not required to obtain Ca-

nadian Standards Association approval for its vacuum cleaners as

requested by Oreck. That its refusal to do so may have been

based on an agreement with its existing Canadian distributor does

not, of itself, create a violation of the antitrust laws. It must fur-

ther be found that this agreement was anticompetitive in purpose

or effect. See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., supra;

Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. [1976-2 TrapE CasEs

7] 61,086], 542 F. 2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, sub nom.

Prestige Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Quality Mercury, Inc., 433 U. S.

914 (1977); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.

[1957 Trape Cases { 68,682], 243 F. 2d 418 (D. C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 355 U. S. 822 (1957) ; Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales

Corp. [1956 Trape Csazs { 68,292], 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.),

aff’d [1956 Trape Cases { 68,564], 239 F. 2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956),

cert. denied, 355 U. S. 823 (1957).

The trial judge’s failure to instruct the jury on this point was

plain error. Moreover, it inevitably prejudiced the jury’s consid-

eration of the first count even though the matter of sales in the

Canadian market was set out in the second count. In the evidence,

in the arguments, and in the district court’s charge, this incident

was used as an example of the claimed unlawful activity by Whirl-

pool and Sears to keep Oreck from selling more vacuum cleaners

and to destroy Oreck’s competitive activities. Throughout the trial,

Whirlpoo!’s refusal to procure Canadian Standards Association ap-

proval for the vacuum cleaners Oreck desired to sell in Canada

was characterized as a major part of the alleged Whirlpool/Sears

conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws.

32a

standard. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car

Co. [1957 Trape Cases § 68,682], 243 F. 2d 418 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); see also, United States v.

Arnold, Schwinn & Co. [1967 Trape Cases { 72,126], 388

U.S. 365 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Continental

T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. [1977-1 Trapve Cases

7 61,488], 433 U.S. 36 (1977) ; Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford

Motor Co. [1976-2 Trape Cases { 61,086], 542 F. 2d 466

(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Prestige Lincoln-

Mercury, Inc. v. Quality Mercury, Inc., 433 U.S. 914 (1977) ;

Joseph E. Seagram € Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,

Ltd. [1969 Trape Cases § 72,914], 416 F. 2d 71 (9th Cir.

1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Bay City-Abra-

ham Bros., Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc. [1974-1 Trapr Cases

7 75,095], 375 F. Supp. 1206 (S. D .N. Y. 1974). On the in-

stant reconsideration en banc, the issue is whether the per

se standard, under which the trial judge charged the jury,

was appropriate in light of the nature of the alleged Whirl-

pool/Sears agreement.

[Price Competition; Boycott]

Oreck’s argument that the district court was correct in

instructing the jury to apply the per se standard in this

case, rests principally on two assertions: first, that Whirl-

pool’s decision not to renew Oreck’s distributorship was

motivated by a desire to eliminate the price competition

which Oreck was offering to Sears; and second, that this

effort by Sears and Whirlpool to restrain competition con-

stituted a group boycott expressly forbidden by the ho.d-

ings of the United States Supreme Court in United States

v. General Motors Corp. [1966 Trapg Cases { 71,750], 384

U.S. 127 (1966); and Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,

Inc. [1959 Trapr Cases { 69,316], 359 U.S. 207 (1959).

With regard tc the first of these points, it is undisputed

that, at all times relevant, Sears was selling its “Kenmore”

vacuum cleaners at prices below those charged by Oreck

for comparable “Whirlpool” models. The complaint did not

33a

allege, the evidence at the trial did not show, and counsel in

summation did not argue, that Whirlpool was attempting

to maintain high resale prices for its products by conspir-

ing with its distributors or that its actions toward Oreck

were an effort to chastise a dealer for refusing to cooperate

in a scheme to fix or maintain prices. Cf. United States v.

Parke, Davis € Co. [1960 Trape Cases { 69,611], 362 U.S.

29 (1960). The contracts entered into by Oreck and Whirl-

pool in 1963 and 1968 clearly stated that Oreck had the

sole right to determine its selling prices.

[Edge Effect]

Oreck concedes that there was no Sears/Whirlpool agree-

ment to fix prices, but argues that the elimination of its

distributorship amounted to tampering with the price

structure for vacuum cleaners, equally a per se violation.'

See, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. [1940-1943

Trade Cases { 56,031], 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). In its brief

on rehearing en banc, Oreck refers to a so-called “edge

effect,” that is, that by continuing to lower its prices and

thereby come closer to those of Sears, Oreck’s price oper-

ated as a ceiling against any increases by Sears. Cf. United

States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Company [1964 Trapve Cases

| 71,147], 378 U.S. 158 at 173-74 (1964) ; Bork, The Rule of

Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market

Division [II], 75 Yale L. J. 373, 405-410 (1966). This claim

* Oreck introduced no evidence at trial to show that the purpose

of Whirlpool’s refusal to renew Oreck’s distributorship was to give

Sears the power to maintain the prices of its ‘‘Kenmore’’ machines

at an artificially high level. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum

Oil Co. [1940-19438 Trape Cases { 56,031], 310 U. S. 150, 224-26

n. 59 (1940). Neither did Oreck submit evidence to show that

Whirlpool machines had a sufficient share of the vacuum cleaner

market to permit any of its dealers to exploit a dealer monopoly

without feeling the pinch of interbrand competition. See the Su-

preme Court, 1976 Term, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 237 n. 57 (1977).

It appears from the record that there was effective competition in

the vacuum cleaner business at the manufacturer level. When in-

34a

is unavailing in the present posture of this case. Because

of the trial judge’s incorrect instructions to the jury, it can-

not be said that the issue of whether Oreck’s distributor-

ship was allowed to lapse in order to protect Sears from

price competition was fairly submitted to the jury or de-

cided by its verdict. Rather, because the trial judge failed

to instruct the jury that it must find that the purpose or the

effect of these agreements was to enable Sears to raise or

to maintain its prices for “Kenmore” vacuum cleaners, the

jury’s verdict that Sears and Whirlpool violated § 1 of the

Sherman Act is of no effect.

[Boycott]

Oreck alleged that its cancellation, by agreement of

Whirlpool and Sears, was a “group boycott” under the rule

of Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., supra, and

of United States v. General Motors Corp., supra, which

treat such behavior as a per se violation of § 1 of the Sher-

man Act. This case, however, cannot be fitted into the

category of group boycott cases. “While the boycott con-

cept is infinitely expandable, the per se doctrine ought not

to be.” Sullivan, Antitrust 256 (1977), quoted in Drayer v.

Krasner, — F. 2d — (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 1978), slip op. at

terbrand competition exists, it provides a significant check on the

exploitation of intrabrand market power because of the ability of

consumers to substitute a different brand of the same product. See

Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., supra, at 52 n. 19.

In order to prove a violation of §1 of the Sherman Act, Oreck

would have had to show that Whirlpool’s agreement with Sears to

eliminate Oreck’s competition either promoted a Whirlpool mo-

nopoly in the vacuum cleaner industry, see Quality Mercury, Inc.

v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at 470; Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.

Distillers Co. Ltd. [1975-1 Trape Cases { 60,337], 395 F. Supp.

221 (S. D. N. Y. 1975); or gave Sears a market position from

which it could raise retail prices even in the face of interbrand

competition. See, ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 2, Ver-

tical Restrictions Limiting Intrabrand Competition (1977), at 93

n. 380. The Whirlpool/ Sears agreement should, therefore, have

been examined under the rule of reason standard.

35a

1253, 1265. It is important to distinguish between “horizon-

tal” restraints, t.e. agreements between competitors at the

same level of market structure, and “vertical” restraints,

1.e. combinations of persons at different levels of the mar-

ket structure, such as manufacturers and distributors. See

United States v. Topco Associates [1972 Trapge Cases

| 73,904], 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). Horizontal restraints

alone have been characterized as “naked restraints of trade

with no purpose except stifling competition,” White Motor

Co. v. United States [1963 Trapr Cases J 70,679], 372 U.S.

253, 263 (1963); and, therefore, per se violations of the

Sherman Act. On the other hand, while vertical restric-

tions may reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the

number of sellers of a particular product, competing for

a given group of buyers, they also promote interbrand com-

petition by allowing a manufacturer to achieve certain effi-

ciencies in the distribution of its products, see Continental

T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., supra, at 54. They are

therefore, to be examined under the rule of reason stand-

ard. See Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines:

An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term—1977, 77 Colum.

L. Rev. 979 at 985-87 (1977).

In Klor’s, the Supreme Court specifically noted that “this

is not a case of ... a manufacturer and... [its] dealer

agreeing to an exclusive distributorship,” 359 U.S. at 212.

The present case, involving as it does an alleged agreement

between a single manufacturer and a single dealer, is, in

essence, an exclusive distributorship controversy, and the

“group boycott” doctrine, is, therefore, not applicable. Be-

cause Sears is a large company presumably selling a large

number of vacuum cleaners does not, ipso facto, convert

this case into a horizontal conspiracy warranting per se

treatment.’ Cf. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,

Inc., supra, at 58 n. 28.

* Oreck seeks to distinguish the line of cases upholding the le-

gality of agreements by which a manufacturer substitutes one ex-

clusive distributor for another or terminates a distributor in order

36a

[Legitimate Business Concerns]

Moreover, in his instructions to the jury, the trial judge

failed to marshal any of the evidence presented by Whirl-

pool to show that its refusal to renew Oreck’s distributor-

to afford another exclusive selling rights, see, e.g., Quality Mercury,

Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., supra; Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Fed-

erated Dept. Stores, Inc. [1972 Trape Cases {| 73,918], 459 F. 2d

138 (6th Cir. 1972); Alpha Distributing Co. of Calif. v. Jack

Daniel Distillery [1972 Trape Cases { 73,798], 454 F. 2d 442 (9th

Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842 (1974) ; Packard Motor Car

Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., supra; on the ground that Sears

did not replace Oreck as the distributor of ‘‘Whirlpool’’ vacuum

cleaners; and, therefore, competition of both an interbrand and

intrabrand nature was eliminated.

While it is true that, because of its unique facts, this case does

not fit exactly into the dealer substitution line of cases, appellee’s

argument does not persuade us that it therefore comes within the

rule of per se illegality. It may be argued that there were alterna-

tive sources of supply available to Oreck and that the net effect

of Whirlpool’s decision to allow Oreck’s distributorship to lapse

was to add an interbrand competitor to Whirlpool-made machines

in the upright vacuum cleaner market. Moreover, it appears from

the record that, while Sears sold several models of Whirlpool-made

vacuum cleaners under its ‘‘Kenmore’’ label, Oreck was allowed to

market only one model under the terms of the 1968 agreement,

thereby reducing the potential for intrabrand competition in Whirl-

pool-made machines In the absence of a showing of an anticom-

petitive purpose or effect, the fact that Sears may have asked to

be made the sole distributor of a certain line of products (in this

case, Whirlpool-made vacuum cleaners), does not render Whirl-

pool’s subsequent action in refusing to renew Oreck’s distributor-

ship illegal. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros.-

Clark Co., 263 U. S. 565 (1924) ; Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster

Motor Car Co., supra.

The rule of reason provides a more discriminating way of dif-

ferentiating true exclusive dealerships from two-firm vertical com-

binations to exclude a distributor from supply. Although Oreck

asserts that Whirlpool’s refusal to renew its distributorship was

against Whirlpool’s own economic interests, the trial court’s in-

structions to the jury, under the per se rule, did not require the

jury to balance the anticompetitive evils and pro-competitive vir-

37a

ship was motivated by legitimate business concerns’ and

that its actions were consistent with the terms of the 1968

contract. It is the contractual nature of the dealings between

Oreck and Whirlpool which distinguish this case from the

holding of United States v. General Motors Corp., supra,

relied upon by Oreck. In General Motors, the Court focused

on the eztra-contractual and price-fixing aspects of Gen-

eral Motors’ activities in eliciting from dealers in the Los

Angeles area agreements, substantially interrelated and in-

terdependent, that none of them would do business with

price discounters. 384 U.S. at 144. The Court pointed out

that what resulted from the activities of General Motors

was “a fabric interwoven by many strands of joint action

to eliminate the discounters from participation in the mar-

ket, to inhibit the free choice of franchised dealers to select

their own methods of trade and to provide multilateral sur-

veillance and enforcement,” id. at 144; and that these activi-

ties could hsrdly be described as “unilateral” or merely

“parallel.” Jd. at 145. It was this same concerted action by

tues of the alleged vertical Sears/Whirlpool agreement, as would

have been done under the rule of reason. See Continental T. V.,

Inc. v. GTZ Sylvania, Inc., supra, at 57 n. 27; Handler Changing

Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court

Term—1977, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 979 at 983 (1977). ‘‘Per se rules

of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that

is manifestly anticompetitive,’’ Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE

Sylvania, Inc., supra, at 49-50; and where the conduct involved is

an agreement between a single manufacturer and a single dis-

tributor whicn results in a sole distributorship for the manufac-

turer’s products, a careful inquiry into the business justifications

for the agreement is required.

* The evidence presented at trial by both parties revealed several

instances of Oreck’s alleged disregard for the terms of its contract,

e.g., refusal to modify advertising campaigns in accordance with

Whirlpool’s wishes, sales to private label customers, and failure to

abide by the original marketing strategy of distribution to major

retail accounts; anyone of which could have justified Whirlpool’s

refusal to renew Oreck’s distributorship. In addition, the 1968

contract itself contained no provision for renewal.

38a

businessmen to boycott other traders and thereby deprive

them of access to all sources of merchandise which they

wished to sell to the public, which led to the results

reached in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra; and

Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., supra. Cf. Beck-

man v. Walter Kidde & Company [1970 Trape Cases

1 73,347], 316 F. Supp. 1321, 1327 (E. D. N. Y. 1970), aff'd

[1971 Trape Cases { 73,768], 451 F. 2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971),

cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972).

[Contractual Rights]

What is crucial here is to consider those actions which

General Motors could have taken, but did not, to discourage

the sale of cars to discounters, which the Court character-

ized as being “wholly unilateral conduct, the validity of

which under the antitrust laws was assumed, without being

decided, in Parke, Davis, supra.” United States v. General

Motors, supra, at 144. After describing the efforts of the

Losor Chevrolet Dealers Association to enlist the aid of

General Motors, the meetings between General Motors

personnel and local dealers at which General Motors elicited

from each dealer a promise not to do business with the

discounters, and the collaboration among the dealers and

with General Motors to enforce these promises, the Court

went on to state,

Nor did General Motors confine its activities to the

contractual boundaries of its relationships with indi-

vidual dealers. As the court found (Finding 39),

General Motors at no time announced that it would

terminate the franchise of any dealer which furnished

cars to the discounters. The evidence indicates that it

had no intention of acting in this unilateral fashion. On

the contrary, overriding corporate policy with respect

to proper dealer relations dissuaded General Motors

from engaging in this sort of wholly unilateral con-

duct, the validity of which under the antitrust laws ©

was assumed, without being decided, in Parke, Davis,

39a

supra. (Emphasis added and footnotes omitted.) 384

U.S. at 143-144.

The General Motors Dealer Selling Agreement provided

that a dealer’s franchise could be terminated if the dealer

attempted to establish a second and unauthorized sales out-

let or location. Without deciding the question, the Court

indicated that had General Motors considered that the con-

duct of a dealer selling to price discounters violated the

terms of the Dealer Selling Agreement, it could lawfully

have terminated the franchise. The Court nowhere sug-

gests that action by General Motors in accordance with this

contract would have been any less unilateral, or any less

lawful, because it was taken in response to complaints by

competing dealers. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Ray-

mond Bros.-Clark Company, 263 U.S. 565 (1924). Unlike

General Motors, the parties in this case introduced no proof

that Whirlpool took any action that was not in accord with

the terms of its 1968 contract. Whirlpool contends that

Oreck was fully aware that its distributorship would cease

in December, 1971, regardless of whether or not its efforts

to compete against Sears and other vacuum cleaner dealers

were successful. The principle that unilateral refusals to

deal do not per se suppress competition is not altered by

the fact that the cut-off distributor has been a “successful

dealer” or that its business is damaged. See Bay City-

Abraham Bros, Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., supra; Top-All

Varieties, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc. [1969 Trape Cases

{ 72,850], 301 F'. Supp. 703 (S. D. N. Y. 1969).

And yet, the trial court made no attempt to balance its

charge on the effect of the alleged Whirlpool/Sears con-

spiracy with a reference to the evidence introduced at trial

that Whirlpool’s decision not to renew Oreck’s distributor-

ship was an exercise of its contractual rights. It has always

been the prerogative of a manufacturer to decide with

whom it will deal. See United States v. Colgate é Co., 250

U.S. 300 (1919). Any alleged inducements by Sears to

40a

Whirlpool to allow the contract with Oreck to expire may

have amounted to tortious interference; but, without some

further showing that from this course of conduct there was

an anticompetitive effect in the vacuum cleaner industry as

a whole, it is inconsistent with the sanctity of contractual

arrangements to allow the antitrust laws to inject a provi-

sion into the agreement which would require Whirlpool to

renew Oreck’s distributorship for as long as it is able to

compete successfully with Sears. In this case, therefore,

something more than an agreement between Whirlpool and

Sears to eliminate Oreck must be shown. The agreement

becomes violative of §1 of the Sherman Act only if it is

anticompetitive in purpose or effect—in sum, it must be

tested by the rule of reason. Without any consideration of

the anticompetitive purpose or effect, arbitrarily seeking

to protect Oreck simply because Whirlpool refused to re-

new a contract with Oreck which had terminated by its

own terms, even though this refusal was in whole or in

part, due to persuasion by Sears, disregards the well

established rule that “the antitrust laws ... were enacted

for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors...”

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. [1977-1

Trape Cases {] 61,255], 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977). (Emphasis

in original.)

The judgment of the district court, based as it is on a

finding of liability on the part of Whirlpool and Sears, is

reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. In so

doing, we express no opinion as to the correctness of those

portions of the trial court’s instructions dealing with the

formulation of damages.

[Dissenting Opinion]

Mansrietp, Cir. J., dissenting in an opinion in which

Judge Feinberg concurs:

This antitrust appeal turns on two major interlocking

issues, one factual and the other legal: (1) Did Whirlpool

4la

and Sears combine and conspi

pire to oust Oreck as a com-

petitor of Sears in the sale of Whirlpool-made berm

cleaners? (2) If so, should the conspiracy be treated as

per se illegal? In my view both questions m

ust b

affirmatively. Therefore, I dissent. e answered

The majority opinion is based on certain materially mis-

taken premises. It assumes (1) that the complaint charges

only a general conspiracy “to exclude Oreck from the

vacuum cleaner market in the United States and Canada”

(Maj. Opin. p. 6690, supra), (2) that Oreck’s case rested

solely upon Whirlpool’s failure to renew its agreement for

distributorship of Whirlpool vacuum cleaners and parts

possibly as the result of “inducements by Sears” which

may have amounted to tortious interference” (Maj. Opin.

p. 6701), and (3) that the jury credited the testimony of

one or two Whirlpool officers regarding Whirlpool’s rea-

sons for termination of its agreement with Oreck rather

ne the evidence offered by Oreck (Maj. Opin. p. 6690;

n. 2).

Only on the basis of these erroneous assumptions is the

majority able to conclude that the termination of the

Whirlpool-Oreck distributorship agreement did not con-

stitute a per se violation of 41 of the Sherman Act, and

that there could be no violation of that Act in the absence

of proof of a restraint of “trade unreasonably in the vac-

uum cleaner industry in the United States and/or Canada.”

However, when the case is viewed in the light of (1) the

issues framed by the pleadings, (2) the evidence presented

at trial (including the inferences which the jury could

reasonably have drawn from that evidence), and (3) the

applicable principles of antitrust law as charged by the

trial judge, the reversal is unwarranted.

Turning first to the complaint, the First Claim alleges

essentially a conspiracy between Whirlpool and Sears to

restrain Oreck from competing against Sears in the sale of

Whirlpool-made vacuum cleaners, attachments and parts.

42a

It is claimed that pursuant to a written Whirlpool-Oreck

distributorship agreement dated August 7, 1963, Oreck in-

vested substantial funds, time and effort in building up a

successful sales and service organization for the distribu-

tion of Whirlpool vacuum cleaners and that Oreck’s suc-

cess enabled it ‘‘to compete seriously’’ with Sears, the pre-

existing and only other distributor of Whirlpool-made vac-

uum cleaners, which sold the cleaners under the ‘‘Ken-

more’’ label. (Compl. {| 14). The complaint further alleges

that as a result of Oreck’s successful competition against

Sears, Whirlpool was induced by Sears, its major distrib-

utor, to ‘‘eliminate any serious competition to Sears, Roe-

buck from Oreck’’ (| 15) and to combine and conspire with

Sears ‘‘to deprive Oreck of its market for the sale of vac-

uum cleaners, attachments and parts under the Whirlpool

name and label’’ ({[ 25). The conspiracy was allegedly car-

ried out by (1) forcing Oreck in 1968 to reduce its distribu-

torship to ‘‘two Whirlpool products, one vacuum cleaner

and one set of attachments to a different vacuum cleaner,”’

(2) limiting or cutting off from Oreck replacement parts,

tools, drawings, improvements and modifications for Whirl-

pool vacuum cleaners, and (3) forcing or persuading sup-

pliers not to furnish vacuum cleaner components to Oreck,

all ‘‘with the intent and effect of foreclosing Oreck from

numerous customers and potential customers and reducing

Oreck’s competition with Sears, Roebuck.’’ ({[ 21). The pur-

pose and effect of the alleged conspiracy is then stated as

follows:

25. The purpose and effect of such contracts, combi-

nations or conspiracies, and each of them, have been

to deprive Oreck of its market for the sale of vacuum

cleaners, attachments and parts under the Whirlpool

name and label, and Oreck has substantially lost such

market as a result of the actions referred to above.

26. The purpose and effect of such contracts, combi-

nations or conspiracies, and each of them, have also

been substantially to exclude Oreck from the market

43a

for vacuum cleaners, attachments and parts in the

United States and its possessions, and to lessen compe-

tition in such market. (Emphasis added).

Thus, although the complaint includes allegations of re-

straint of trade in vacuum cleaners generally in the United

States and Canada, it charges primarily a conspiracy to

deprive Oreck of the sale of Whirlpool cleaners in competi-

tion with Sears. The case was tried on the latter basis and

if the plaintiff succeeded in proving a conspiracy limited

to the objective alleged in {| 25, it would be entitled to re-

cover without proving the broader claim in { 26, that it was

excluded from the sale of vacuum cleaners of any kind in

the United States. United States v. General Motors [1966

Trave Cases { 71,750], 384 U. S. 127 (1966) ; Klor’s, Inc. v.

Broadway-Hale Stories [1959 Trape Cases {] 69,316], 359

U. S. 207 (1959); Stlver v. N. Y. Stock Exchange [1963

Trape Cases { 70,787], 373 U.S. 341, 348, n. 5 (1963).

The Second Claim of the complaint (the only other perti-

nent claim for present purposes) adds to the foregoing alle-

gations the charge that Sears and Whirlpool also conspired

**to prevent Oreck from selling vacuum cleaners and other

Whirlpool products in Canada.’’*

‘Insofar as the claim alleged in Count Two was presented to

the jury as charging the defendants with an unlawful vertical loca-

tion restriction, I agree with the majority that Continental T. V.,

Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. [1977-1 Trape Cases { 61,488], 433

U. S. 36 (1977), which was not decided until almost a year after

Judge Owen instructed the jury in this case, now requires trial

courts to make a preliminary determination of whether a particular

challenged restraint warrants per se treatment or should be judged

according to the rule of reason.

Judge Owen did not make this preliminary determinatiun. How-

ever, I do not agree with the majority that Judge Owen’s charge

on this point necessarily prejudiced the jury’s consideration of

the evidence relating to Count One, since the jury verdict on that

Count was supported by abundant evidence independent of the

proof concerning Whirlpool’s resistance to Oreck’s desire to enter

the Canadian market.

44a

From the outset it was recognized that Oreck could not

establish an unreasonable restraint in the distribution of

vacuum cleaners generally in the United States, since

Whirlpool cleaners represent but a small percentage of the

entire market. As a practical matter, therefore, the issue

tried was whether Sears and Whirlpool had combined to

restrain Oreck’s competition against Sears by precluding

Oreck from selling Whirlpool-made vacuum cleaners, at-

tachments and parts. The record, which must at this stage

be viewed most favorably to Oreck, Continental Ore Co. v.

Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. [1962 Traps Cases {| 70,361],

370 U. S. 690 (1962), discloses more than ample evidence to

establish this specific and limited conspiracy. Since 1925

Sears has been the principal distributor of Whirlpool prod-

ucts, currently purchasing more than two-thirds of Whirl-

pool’s total appliance production and, at the time of the

events here involved, more than 90% of Whirlpool’s vac-

uum cleaner output for resale under Sears’ ‘‘Kenmore’”’

label. In addition Sears, beginning in 1925, purchased a

substantial block of Whirlpool’s common stock and by 1960

became its largest single shareholder, owning 251,192

shares and usually electing one or more of its executives

to Whirlpool’s board of directors. Senior officers of Sears

sometimes became Whirlpool executives. Sears, therefore,

has been in a position to exercise considerable leverage over

Whirlpool’s sales and distribution policies and decisons.

Prior to the formation of Oreck in 1963, Whirlpool had

periodically attempted to broaden the sales of its vacuum

cleaners by marketing them under its own brand name, but

had found that its existing distribution network was inade-

quate and that Sears’ sales of Whirlpool-manufactured vac-

uum cleaners at high retail prices posed a barrier to Whirl-

pool’s entry into price competition against other brands as

long as its relationship with Sears deterred it from compet-

ing against Sears in the sale of Whirlpool-made machines.

As a result, Whirlpool in 1961 discontinued efforts to sell

its products independently under its own name and H.

Thomas Stroop, a Whirlpool executive, prepared a report

45a

entitled ‘‘Appraisal of Vacuum Cleaner Business—RCA

Whirlpool.’’ He concluded that:

Unlike other appliances, Sears sells their [vacuum }

cleaners for as high or higher prices than major brand

competition. ...

Sears becomes very unhappy if RCA Whirlpool

product is retailed for less than Sears product manu-

factured by Whirlpool. For this reason, we under-

stand that it has been decided that the RCA Whirlpool

brand should have retail prices comparable to Sears.

Our challenge then .. . ‘‘Can we sell cleaners in vol-

ume at high retail prices ... and if so how?”’ (Pl. Ex.

160.)

Thereafter, until the events giving rise to this case, Whirl-

pool-made vacuum cleaners were sold to the public only by

Sears.

In April, 1963, Whirlpool’s interest in selling its vacuum

cleaners under its own brand name was revived. Jack

Sparks, Vice President of Whirlpool, approached David

Oreck, who prior to 1961 had been in charge of Whirlpool

vacuum cleaner sales for ‘‘Bruno New York’’ and had been

the most successful distributor of Whirlpool vacuum clean-

ers under its own brand name before Whirlpool discon-

tinued such sales. Sparks and Oreck agreed that the newly-

formed Oreck Corporation, plaintiff-appellee, would func-

tion as the exclusive United States distributor of Whirlpool

brand vacuum cleaners. Sparks advised Oreck that he was

‘*not to conflict with Sears, Roebuck on price’’ and an in-

ternal Whirlpool letter confirmed that Oreck’s prices would

‘*emphasize specialty [i. e., high-priced] selling.’’

Oreck soon found that it could operate profitably only by

selling Whirlpool-made vacuum cleeners through direct

mail or institutional supply houses, which would, by re-

ducing or eliminating the middleman’s mark-up, enable

Oreck to sell competitively. Accordingly, in 1967 Oreck be-

gan a large-scale mail solicitation campaign which dramat-

46a

ically increased its sales of Whirlpool machines from a low

in 1967 of 8,384 units to an all-time high of 78,203 units in

1971, the year Whirlpool terminated its distributorship.

Oreck planned to realize its profits principally from the sale

of dust bags and accessories over the 10-15 year life of the

product. Despite the prospects for increased small order

sales, which actually developed, three Whirlpool executives

—Jack Sparks, Sol Sweet and John Payne, Whirlpool’s

primary contact with Oreck—all expressed disapproval of

Oreck’s mail order campaign, Payne advising Oreck that

Whirlpool’s unhappiness was attributable to the company’s

‘‘other customer’’ (Sears), which did not like the mail so-

licitation. Indeed, Sid Boyar, a Sears vice-president and

director who was also a director of Whirlpool, forwarded

to Whirlpool an Oreck mail solicitation for sale of Whirl-

pool machines, with a note advising that this ‘‘type of

selling gave Whirlpool a bad name.’’ Payne also told Oreck

that the ‘‘other customer [Sears] got to the head of the

company [ Whirlpool].’’ As a mail order house, Sears might

be adversely affected by Oreck’s solicitation of mail order

business for vacuum cleaners made by the same company

(Whirlpool), which were similar in appearance and design

to those sold by Sears.? Moreover, although Oreck had

originally concentrated on sale of the higher-priced ‘‘top-

of-the-line’’ Whirlpool machines, after it shifted to mail

order sales and sales to institutional supply houses, its

prices for the Whirlpool upright units (which it sold in

these markets) were lowered.

That a Whirlpool-Sears combination had been formed to

stop Oreck’s competition against Sears was further evi-

denced by events during the preceding year, 1966, when

David Oreck sought to obtain Whirlpool’s approval of

Oreck’s plan to market in Canada, where Sears operated

under the name of Simpson-Sears Ltd. Whirlpool refused

2 Indeed, despite minor differences, the machines sold by Oreck

were so similar to those sold by Sears that they were characterized

by an expert as ‘‘the same.”’

47a

to make the minor changes in the Whirlpool vacuum

cleaner necessary to conform to Canadian Standard Asso-

ciation requirements, as Whirlpool had done for Sears, and

Payne later wired Oreck that it could not market in Canada

because Whirlpool could not ‘‘obtain a waiver to the cur-

rent franchise,’’ meaning approval by Sears.

By 1968 the Whirlpool-Sears combination was putting

pressure on Oreck to force it to lessen its competition

against Sears. In that year Whirlpool refused to manufac-

ture private label vacuum cleaners for certain of Oreck’s

large customers, and Payne attributed the refusal to ‘‘ob-

jections from our customer ...’’, which could be interpreted

by the jury as obviously referring to Whirlpool’s only

other customer, Sears. When Oreck persisted, Payne even-

tually advised him that ‘‘another vacum cleaner customer’’

had informed Whirlpool that ‘‘they are not interested in

having another competitor in the vacuum cleaner busi-

ness.’’ In 1969 and 1970, Whirlpool refused to make minor

changes in Oreck’s shipping carton to meet par | post re-

quirements and thereby avoid a penalty charge, even though

Whirlpool had provided Sears with an acceptable box for

its mail orders. Payne, who handled the matter, attributed

the refusal not to engineering difficulties but to a ‘‘corpo-

rate’’ decision.

On December 31, 1971, despite Oreck’s highest sales level

since it had begun selling Whirlpool vacuum cleaners,

Whirlpool terminated the Oreck distributorship. Whirlpool

witnesses conceded at trial that Oreck was ‘‘doing a nice

job, no question about that’’ and ‘‘we had no argument with

the amounts he was selling.’’ Yet, immediately following

the termination, Whirlpool refused to sell Oreck 30,000

units in inventory at $30 each on a cash basis but sold them

instead to third parties at $15 per unit.

The foregoing, together with other evidence and wit-

nesses viewed by the jury, supported the jury’s conclusion

that Whirlpool terminated Oreck as the result of the com-

bined efforts of Sears and Whirlpool to put an end to Or-

48a

eck’s competition against Sears in the sale of Whirlpool

machines, including mail-order solicitation, to which Sears

objected because of the possible adverse effect on its sale of

Whirlpool vacuum cleaners under its own label in the

United States and Canada. No substantial evidence was

offered te show that Oreck was terminated for some pos-

sibly lawful reason, such as failure to increase Whirlpool

sales or Whirlpool’s desire to protect its trade name, other

than testimony of Jack D. Sparks and John Payne that

Oreck had failed to market to ‘‘major accounts.’’ This pur-

ported rationale for the termination was understandably

rejected by the jury in view of the tremendous increase in

Oreck’s sales of Whirlpool cleaners from 1967 to 1971.

With the foregoing allegations and evidence before him,

the trial judge instructed the jury

[T]hat in order to recover under Count I Orec« has

the burden of proving each of the following proposi-

tions:

That Whirlpool and Sears combined or conspired to

exclude Oreck from the market for Whirlpool vacuum

cleaners, or from the vacum cleaner market generally

in the United States and its possessions and to lessen

the competition in either of these markets.

Two. That as a result of said combination or conspir-

acy Oreck was partially or wholly excluded from the

vacuum cleaner market as I have described above.

Three. That as a proximate result of said exclusion

Oreck in fact suffered damage. (Emphasis supplied).°

*It is noteworthy that no objection was made to these jury in-

structions at trial, nor did the defendants claim that the charge

was erroneous in their appeal from the jury’s verdict.

The majority contends that Judge Owen’s charge was defective

in that it allowed the jury to find antitrust liability on evidence

that amounted to no more than ‘‘a perfectly legal exclusive dis-

49a

On the evidence and this instruction the jury could have

found that Oreck had by a preponderance of the evidence

established the more specific and limited conspiracy alleged

in its First Claim, namely, a combination between Whirl-

pool and Sears to eliminate Oreck as a competitor of Sears

in the distribution of Whirlpool vacuum cleaners, parts and

attachments. Indeed, the majority virtually concedes this

stating:

Under such instructions, the jury could simply have

found an agreement by Sears and Whirlpool to exclude

Oreck from the sale of Whirlpool vaccum cleaners and,

on that basis, have found them guilty (as it in fact did)

of a per se violation of §1 of the Sherman Act....

On the instant reconsideration en banc, the issue is

whether the per se standard, under which the trial

judge charged the jury, was appropriate in light of the

nature of the alleged Whirlpool/Sears agreement.

{Maj. Opin. pp. 6691-93) (Emphasis in original).

Accepting the legal issue as framed by the majority, the

answer is furnished in clear and unmistakable terms by a

long line of Supreme Court decisions consistently holding

that where two or more competitors agree to cut off supplies

to a third, such a combination or agreement to boycott is

sufficiently pernicious in its purpose and effect to be unrea-

sonable per se and hence illegal without the necessity of

inquiring into the precise economic harm in the market

caused by the agreement or into the amount of commerce

affected. United States v. General Motors [1966 Trane

tributorship.’’ (Maj. Opin. p. 5). Judge Owen properly instructed

the jury on this point. His charge states:

‘‘The manufacturer may discontinue an exclusive distributor-

ship or may refuse to renew an exclusive distributorship for busi-

ness reasons which are sufficient to the manufacturer alone and

any adverse effect such a decision may have upon the business of

the distributor is immaterial in the absence of any arrangement or

conspiracy restraining trade or competition.’’ (Tr. 1839) (em-

phasis supplied).

50a

Caszs {| 71,750], 384 U. S. 127, 145-46 (1966) (agreement

between GM and its Chevrolet dealers to cut off supply to

price-discounters selling Chevrolets) ; Klor’s, Inc. v. Broad-

way-Hale Stores [1959 Trape Casgs { 69,316], 359 U.S. 207

(1959) (conspiracy between one merchant and suppliers to

deprive competing merchants of goods); United States v.

Topco Associates, Inc. [1972 Trapg Cases { 73,904], 405

U. S. 596 (1972); Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States

[1958 Trape Cases { 68,961], 356 U. S. 1 (1958); Fashion

Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC [1940-1943 Trape

Cases § 56,101], 312 U. S. 457 (1941). Such a combination

‘tis not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one

merchant whose business is so small that his destruction

makes little difference to the economy,’’ Klor’s supra, 359

U.S. at 213 (footnote omitted).

|W |here businessmen concert their actions in order

to deprive others of access to merchandise which the

latter wish to sell to the public, we need not inquire

into the economic motivation underlying their conduct.

See Barber, Refusals To Deal Under the Federal Anti-

trust Laws, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 847, 872-885 (1955).

Exclusion of traders from the market by means of

combination or conspiracy is so inconsistent with the

free-market principles embodied in the Sherman Act

that it is not to be saved by reference to the need for

preserving the collaborators’ profit margins or their

system for distributing automobiles, any more than by

reference to the allegedly tortious conduct against

which a combination or conspiracy may be directed—as

in Fashion Originators’ Guild of America, Inc. v. Fed-

eral Trade Comm’n, supra, at 468. United States v.

General Motors, supra, 384 U. S. at 146-47.

The present case is governed by these basic principles.

The jury found that Whirlpool, a large manufacturer of ap-

pliances, including vacuum cleaners, combined with Sears,

Roebuck, a merchandising giant that depended on mail or-

dla

der business and had for 40-odd years distributed the lion’s

share of Whirlpool ’s entire output, to stop Oreck, the only

other distributor of Whirlpool-made vacuum cleaners, from

competing against Sears in the sale of Whirlpool-made

machines.

Before Oreck was terminated by the Sears-Whirlpool

combination as a competing distributor, the public had the

benefit of Oreck’s competition, including price competition,

in the marketing of Whirlpool cleaners, the sales of which

had been dramatically increased by Oreck from 8,384 units

to 78,203 units in the preceding four years, resulting in

profits to Whirlpool and Oreck.‘ After the termination the

public could buy Whirlpool machines only from Sears at

such prices as Sears might decide, unaffected by any Oreck

competition.

The majority’s legalization of this Whirlpool-Sears con-

spiracy on the theory that “something more than an agree-

ment between Whirlpool and Sears to eliminate Oreck must

be shown” (Maj. Opin. p. 6701), and that Whirlpool could

lawfully have accomplished the same result by unilaterally

* Although my view of this case does not rest on Oreck’s ability

to compete with Sears pricewise, one aspect of the issue of price

competition merits discussion. Oreck’s initial brief on appeal

strongly suggested in numerous places that the Sears-Whirlpool

conspiracy was partly motivated by Sears’ desire to eliminate

Oreck because of the competition on prices that Oreck provided.

These suggestions were not disputed by the defendants until the

en banc briefs were filed.

My panel dissent mistakenly referred to Oreck’s prices for

Whirlpool-made vacuum cleaners as ‘‘lower’’ than the Sears prices

for its Kenmore version of the same cleaners. The important point,

however, is not which cleaners were higher-priced, but whether

Sears encountered serious competition from Oreck that motivated

it to prevail upon Whirlpool to terminate Oreck. The evidence

showed that Oreck was a vigorous competitor, especially in the

last years of its distributorship, when its sales rose dramatically.

Also, it is undisputed that by 1970, 90% of Oreck’s sales were

from mail order solicitations, a traditional preserve of Sears.

52a

exercising its contract right to terminate or not to renew,

simply is unsupportable, either by logic or by precedent.

Had Whirlpool not agreed with Sears to oust Oreck, as the

jury found, Whirlpool not only could have, but probably

would have, continued to distribute its product through

Oreck, in view of the latter’s outstanding success in selling

Whirlpool cleaners during the four years immediately pre-

ceding the 1971 termination. As the jury found, the cutoff

was directly attributable to the Sears-Whirlpool combina-

tion, not to any unilateral exercise by Whirlpool of its rights

under its distribution contract with Oreck. The existence of

a contract right to terminate Oreck does not create a mantle

of protection against an anticompetitive agreement be-

tween a manufacturer and a distributor to terminate the

distributor’s sole competitor.

No one questions the right of a manufacturer unilaterally

to terminate a distributorship, whether it be to maximize

profits, improve a distribution system, or for some other

legitimate reason, see, e.g., United States v. Colgate, 250

U.S. 300 (1919), and a manufacturer is not precluded from

acting on his own to substitute one exclusive distributor

for another. Alpha Distributing Co. v. Jack Daniels Dv-

stillery [1972 Trape Cases {| 73,798], 454 F. 2d 442, 452

(9th Cir. 1972); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Ine. v. Ha-

waiian Oke & Liquors Ltd. [1969 Trape Cases 1 72,914],

416 F. 2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062

(1970); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.

(1957 Trape Cases { 68,682], 243 F. 2d 418 (D. C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 355 U. S. 822 (1957); Elder-Beerman Stores

Corp. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. [1972 Trape

Cases J 73,918], 459 F. 2d 138 (6th Cir. 1972). The jury was

so instructed.’ But when the manufacturer agrees with one

or more existing competitors of its distributor to cut off

the distributor, as the jury found her, the resulting termi-

nation is unlawful, United States v. General Motors Corp.,

5 See note 3, supra.

53a

supra; Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, supra; E. A.

McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual

Comm. [1972 Trapg Caszs {| 74,125], 467 F. 2d 178, 186-87

(5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) ; Barber,

Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103

U. Pa. L. Rev. 847, 875 (1955), and cannot be saved by

using an otherwise lawful means of termination to carry

out an anticompetitive agreement. See Poller v. Columbia

Broadcasting System [1962 TravE Cases { 70,228], 368 U.S.

464, 468-69 (1962).

These basic principles were accepted at trial by Whirl-

pool’s counsel in a recorded exchange with Judge Owen re-

garding the instructions to be given by him to the jury:

The Court: I understand that, but it seems to me

that if the jury were to conclude that Sears and Whirl-

pool had conspired to terminate Oreck to rid Sears of

a competitor, they have gone all the farther that they

need to go.

Mr. Turoff [Whirlpool’s counsel]: I see now your

Honor’s argument. I think what you are saying is that

if the jury finds that we had a conspiracy for the pur-

pose of getting rid of Oreck, that is an unreasonable

restraint of trade. That is, I think, a correct statement

of the law.

In view of the jury’s finding of just such a conspiracy, no

basis exists for Judge Anderson’s statement (Maj. Opin.

pp. 6700-01) that “Any alleged inducements by Sears to

Whirlpool to allow the contract with Oreck to expire” may

have amounted merely to “tortious interference,” and that

_ it would therefore be “inconsistent with the sanctity of con-

tractual arrangements” to require Whirlpool to renew

Oreck’s distributorship. The Whirlpool-Sears agreement

to “terminate Oreck’s to rid Sears of a competitor” was

not only a “tortious interference” but also a per se unrea-

sonable restraint of competition. United States v. General

54a

Motors Corp., supra; Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores

Inc., supra.

Nor can the boycott here be legalized on the technicality

that it is “vertical” because only one horizontal competitor,

Sears, was a member of the conspiracy. It is the participa-

tion of this competitor, incidentally one of the country’s

merchandising giarits, with some 2,800 stores and sales of-

fiees, that renders illegal the boycott of Oreck by establish-

ing that the Whirlpoo!-Sears agreement was anti-competi-

tive and designed to benefit Sears at the expense of its com-

petitor, Oreck. Once that objective was shown, the number

of the conspirators and their posture—whether vertical or

horizontal—has no legal significance. See, e.g., General

Motors, supra, where the boycott depended for its success

upon vertical conspiratorial efforts by one manufacturer,

as here. Moreover, the harmful effect on the victim of the

boyeott—in this case Oreck—does not depend on the exist-

ence of more than one competitor but upon the anticompeti-

tive agreement between the competitor and the supplier.*

Finally, the majority places heavy reliance on Continen-

tal T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. [1977-1 Traps Cases

{| 61,488], 433 U.S. 36 (1977), which was decided approxi-

mately one year after the jury rendered its verdict in this

cuse. In Sylvania the Supreme Court held that the potential

harm from nonprice vertical restrictions is insufficient to

warrant as a general rule their classificat#on as per se ille-

gal, and that the legality of such commercial practices must

be judged by a “rule of reason,” unless the particular chal-

lenged practice is shown to have a “pernicious effect on

* As Professor Sullivan observed in his discussion of the per se

approach to group boycotts, ‘‘it is conceivable that only a single

firm at the blockaded level [Sears] may succeed in coercing or

inducing . . . one important supplier [Whirlpool] . . . from deal-

ing with one or more would-be competitors [Oreck]... . Such an

arrangement would display all essential elements of a boycott.’’

Sullivan, Antitrust, 231, n. 1 (1977).

55a

competition” and to lack “any redeeming virtue.” North-

ern Pac. R. Co. v. United States [1958 Trape Cases

§ 68,961], 356 U. S. 1, 5 (1958).

While the Sylvania holding indicates that the trend in

antitrust doctrine may be toward increasing application of

the rule of reason over the per se approach, the decision

is largely irrelevant to this case, which involves a boycott,

not a vertical restriction.

Sylvania leaves intact the justification and standard for

the creation of per se rules, as articulated in Northern Pa-

cific, swpra, and the boycott in this case meets that stand-

ard. No redeeming virtue has been asserted to justify the

conspiracy between Whirlpool and Sears to terminate

Oreck, as found by the jury; nor has it ever been sug-

gested that benefits to the marketplace will result from this

conspiratorial termination.. Moreover, the harm to intra-

brand competition in the sale of Whirlpool-made vacuum

cleaners is both immediate and apparent, with no counter-

vailing stimulation of interbrand competition, the usual

saving grace of a vertical restraint.

Until the Supreme Court decides that a boycott ought not

to be evaluated according to the per se rule, I would hold

that a combination or conspiracy of two or more persons

or entities to eliminate a competitor is per se illegal ugder

§1 of the Sherman Act. The jury’s conclusion that such a

conspiracy existed in this case is supported by the evidence.

Therefore, I would affirm. |

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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