Appendix — Chambers v. United States

Supreme Court brief1978

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IN THE

Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

no. €87328

JOE HENRY CHAMBERS............... Petitioner

vs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA....... Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX

DALE PRICE

211 Spring Street

Little Rock, Arkansas 72201

Attorney for Petitioner

Pres si De

AUG 25 1978

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

OF APPENDIX

Appendix A:

Di. ccdehueatenesddeieens ees

Appendix B:

Opinion of Original Panel

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Appendix C:

Order denying Rehearing and

Rehearing En Banc.............+000¢:

Appendix D:

Statements as introduced of

Appellants Chambers, Hansell and

DU tuviieuuealecendeakedbeeeeane ee

Appendix E:

Written Statement of Boggess

I 5 deus bu bb.eu bees beeee

Appendix F:

Statements of Chambers, Hansell and

Griffin as read by U.S. Attorney

in opening Statement.................

Appendix G:

Minutes of Lonoke Production

Credit Association. ..........ccceeees

Appendix H:

U.S. v. Bell, No. 77-1894

(8th Circuit. April 19, 1978)............

Appendix I:

U.S. v. Jones, No. 77-1490

(8th Cir. Feb. 16, 1978)............008.

Appendix J:

U.S. v. McClintic, Jr., No. 77-1174

(6th Cir. Jan. 18, 1078)... . cc cccccccccs

Appendix K:

Regulations of Lonoke Production

Credit Association (G) and (H).........

IN THE

Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

NO.

JOE HENRY CHAMBERS............... Petitioner

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA....... Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

(Filed Nov. 1, 1976)

United States of America )

) No. LR-76-CR-154

Vv. )

) Count I-18 U.S.C. §371

Charles Thomas Griffin ) (NMT $10,000; NMT 5 yrs., or

Joe Henry Chambers ) both) Counts II, III and IV -

Bill Hansell ) 18 U.S.C. §1006

) (NMT $10,000; NMT 5 yrs., or

) both) Count V - 18 U.S.C.

) §1014

) (NMT $5,000; 2 yrs., or both)

INDICTMENT

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

COUNT I

1. At all times material to this indictment:

a. The Lonoke Production Credit Association

(PCA) was a federally chartered instrumentality of the

United States with its central office located in Lonoke,

Arkansas, under the supervision of the Federal

Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis,

Missouri and the Farm Credit Administration (FCA),

also instrumenta'ities of the United States.

b. The East Lonoke Branch of the Lonoke PCA

was located in Lonoke, Arkansas; its Branch Office

Manager being BILL HANSELL, the defendant.

3

ec. CHARLES THOMAS GRIFFIN, the

defendant, was the President and a member of the

Executive Committee of the Lonoke PCA.

d. JOE HENRY CHAMBERS, the defendant,

was the Vice President of the Lonoke PCA.

e. O. M. Young was an attorney acting as

trustee for the defendants.

f. Irving Brauer owned a 2,880 acre farm in

Independence County, Arkansas.

g. Harold V. Huntsman was a borrower and

member of the Lonoke PCA.

II. That from on or about the 1st day of June,

1974, and continuously thereafter up to and including

the date of the return of this indictment, in the Eastern

District of Arkansas and elsewhere, CHARLES

THOMAS GRIFFIN, JOE HENRY CHAMBERS, and

BILL HANSELL the defendants, wilfully and

knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and

agree together with each other and with diverse other

persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury to

commit the following offense against the United States

of America, to-wit: to wilfully and unlawfully

participate, share in and directly and indirectly receive

monies, profits and benetits from a purported crop

loan, being officers and employees of the Lonoke

Production Credit Association, a federally chartered

body corporate and instrumentality of the United

d

States of America under the supervision of the Federal

Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis,

Missouri and the Farm Credit Administration, with

intent to defraud said Association, in violation of Title

18, United States Code, Section 1006.

III. It was a part of said conspiracy that the

defendants would cause Harold V. Huntsman to make

a loan application to the Lonoke PCA in which false

statements concerning the purpose of the loan were

made.

IV. It was further part of said conspiracy that

the defendants would cause a specified 2,880 acre farm

in Independence County, Arkansas to be transferred

from Irving Brauer to O. M. Young, acting as trustee

for the defendants.

V. It was further part of said conspiracy that

the defendants would cause Harold V. Huntsman’s loan

application to be approved by the Executive

Committee of the Lonoke PCA only after agreement

by Harold V. Huntsman to buy the said 2,880 acre farm

in Independence County, Arkansas.

VI. It was further part of said conspiracy that

the defendants would cause PCA loan proceeds to be

advanced to Harold V. Huntsman.

VII. It was further part of said conspiracy that

the defendants would cause Harold V. Huntsman to

use part of the PCA loan proceeds to purchase the said

—————ee

5

2,880 acre farm in Independence County, Arkansas,

from O. M. Young, trustee.

VIII. It was further part of said conspiracy that

the defendants would cause O. M. Young, trustee, to

issue checks to each defendant drawn on an escrow

account containing the PCA loan proceeds.

OVERT ACTS

In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect

the object thereof, the defendants performed the

following overt acts:

1. On or abut the 18th day of July, 1974, in the

Eastern District of Arkansas, the defendant BILL

HANSELL, in his capacity as Branch Manager of the

Lonoke Production Credit Association, took an

application from Harold V. Huntsman for a $513,800

crop loan.

2. On or about the 18th day of July, 1974, in the

Eastern District of Arkansas, the defendant

CHARLES THOMAS GRIFFIN, in his capacity as

President and voting member of the Lonoke

Production Credit Association Executive Committee,

approved the aforementioned crop loan.

3. On or about the 24th day of July, 1974, in the

Eastern District of Arkansas, the defendant BILL

HANSELL, in his capacity as Branch Manager of the

Lonoke Production Credit Association, issued an

6

Association check in the amount of $386,600, payable

to Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie Huntsman.

4. On or about the 24th day of July, 1974, in the

Eastern District of Arkansas, the defendant BILL

HANSELL accompanied Harold V. Huntsman to the

First National Bank in Little Rock, Little Rock,

Arkansas.

5. From on or about the 28th day of July, 1974

to on or about the 30th day of July, 1974, in the Eastern

District of Arkansas, the defendant JOE HENRY

CHAMBERS accepted a $20,000 check dated the 26th

day of July, 1974, drawn on the escrow account of O. M.

Young, attorney.

6. From on or about the 28th day of July, 1974 to

on or about the 30th day of July, 1974, in the Eastern

District of Arkansas, the defendant CHARLES

THOMAS GRIFFIN, accepted a $71,000 check dated

the 28th day of July, 1974, drawn on the escrow

account of O. M. Young, attorney.

7. From on or about the 28th day of July, 1974,

to on or about the 30th day of July, 1974, in the Eastern

District of Arkansas, the defendant BILL HANSELL

accepted a $71,000 check dated the 28th day of July,

1974, drawn on the escrow account of O. M. Young,

attorney.

Ali of the above in violation of Title 18, United

States Code, Section 371.

7

COUNT II

I. The Grand Jury realleges the allegations

contained in paragraph I of Count I.

II. That on or about the 28th day of July, 1974,

in the Eastern District of Arkansas, CHARLES

THOMAS GRIFFIN, being President of the Lonoke

Production Credit Association, a federally chartered

body corporate and instrumentality of the United

States of America, under the supervision of the

Federal Intermediate Credit Bank (FICB) of St. Louis,

St. Louis, Missouri, and the Farm Credit

Administration, with intent to defraud said

Association, did participate, share in and directly and

indirectly receive monies, profits and benefits, that is

the sum of $71,000 by means of and through the

disbursement by the said Association of its check No.

60491, in the amount of $386,600, payable to Harold V.

Huntsman and Maudie Huntsman, dated the 24th day

of July, 1974, and purportedly representing proceeds

of crop loan to Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie

Huntsman, thereby violating the provisions of Title 18,

United States Code, Section 1006.

COUNT III

I. The Grand Jury realleges the allegations

contained in paragraph I of Count I.

II. That on or about the 26th day of July, 1974,

in the Eastern District of Arkansas, JOE HENRY

"

8

CHAMBERS, being Vice President of the Lonoke

Production Credit Association, a federally chartered

body corporate and instrumentality of the United

States of America under the supervision of the Federal

Intermediate Credit Bank (FICB) of St. Louis, St.

Louis, Missouri and the Farm Credit. Administration

with intent to defraud said Association did participate,

share in and directly and indirectly receive monies,

profits and benefits, that is the sum of $20,000 by

means of and through the disbursement by the said

Association of its check No. 60491, in the amount of

$386,600, payable to Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie

Huntsman, dated the 24th day of July, 1974, and

purportedly representing proceeds of crop loan to

Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie Huntsman, thereby

violating the provisions of Title 18, United States

Code, Section, 1008.

COUNT IV

I. The Grand Jury realleges the allegations

contained in paragraph I of Count I.

II. That on or about the 26th day of July, 1974,

in the Eastern District of Arkansas, BILL HANSELL,

being Branch Manager of the Lonoke Production

Credit Association, a federally chartered body

corporate and instrumentality of the United States of

America under the supervision of the Federal

Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis,

Missouri and the Farm Credit Administration, with

intent to defraud said Association did participate,

9

share in and directly and indirectly receive monies,

profits and benefits, that is the sum of $71,000 by

means of and through the disbursement by the said

Association of its check No. 60491, in the amount of

$386,600, payable to Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie

Huntsman, dated the 24th day of July, 1974, and

purportedly representing proceeds of crop loan to

Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie Huntsman, thereby

violating the provision of Title 18, United States Code,

Section 1006.

COUNT V

I. The Grand Jury realleges the allegations

contained in paragraph I of Count I.

II. That on or about the 16th day of July, 1974,

in the Eastern District of Arkansas, CHARLES

THOMAS GRIFFIN, JOE HENRY CHAMBERS and

BILL HANSELL knowingly and wilfully did cause to

be made a false statement in an application for a loan

submitted by Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie

Huntsman on said date to the Lonoke Production

Credit Association, a federally chartered body

corporate and instrumentality of the United States of

America under the supervision of the Federal

Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis,

Missouri and the Farm Credit Administration, for the

purpose of influencing the action of said Association to

approve said loan, in that the defendant caused to be

stated and represented in said application that request

10

was being made by Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie

Huntsman for a crop loan in the amount of $513,800,

whereas, in truth and fact, as the defendants -hen and

there well knew, $292,319.18 was to be used to

purchase 2,880 acres of real property in Independence

County, Arkansas, thereby violating the provisions of

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014 and 2.

A TRUE BILL.

/s/ Tate Roberts

FOREMAN

/s) W. H. DILLAHUNTY

W.H. DILLAHUNTY

United States Attorney

/s) SAMUEL A. PERRONI

SAMUEL A. PERRONI

Assistant United States Attorney

11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

United States of America)

v. No. LR-76-CR-154

Joe Henry Chambers )

To' Any United States Marshal or other

authorized Officer

You are hereby commanded to arrest Joe

Henry Chambers and bring him forthwith before the

United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Arkansas in the city of Little Rock, Ark. to answer

to an indictment charging him with Wilfully &

unlawfully participated, share in and directly &

indirectly receive monies, profits & benefits from a

purported crop loan, being an officer & employee of the

Lonoke Production Credit Assn., better described in

the attached indictment.

1.

Insert designation of officer to whom the warrant is issued, e.g., “any

United States Marshal or any other authorized officer”; or “United States

Marshal for __ District of _"; or “any United States Marshal”; or

“any Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation”; or “any United

States Marshal or any Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation”; or “any agent of the Alcohol Tax Unit.”

12

in violation of Sections 371 - 1006 - 1014 of 18 U.S.C.

Dated at Little Rock, Arkansas W.H. McClellan

on November 2nd, 1976 Clerk

By /s/ Paul D. Shuffield

Deputy Clerk

Bail fixed at $5,000

Address: Route #3, Box 33

Carlisle, Arkansas

RETURN

District of ss

Received the within warrant the day of

19 and executed same.

By

13

APPENDIX B

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

No. 77-1597 and No. 77-1601

United States of America, *

°

Appellee, *

*

v. °

* Appeals from the United

Charles Thomas Griffin * States District Court for the

and Joe Henry Chambers,* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Appellants. *

Submitted: March 14, 1978

Filed: June 29, 1978

Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge,

HENLEY, Circuit Judge and LARSON, Senior

*

District Judge.

*The Honorable ‘Earl R. Larson, Senior United States District

Judge, District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

14

VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge.

On November 1, 1976, the federal grand jury

returned a five-count indictment against Charles

Thomas Griffin, Joe Henry Chambers and Bill Hansell.

Not guilty pleas were entered. Upon a joint trial to a

jury, commencing on June 20, 1977, defendant Griffin

was found guilty on Counts I, II and V. Defendant

Chambers was found guilty on Counts I and III and not

guilty on Count V.'

Griffin and Chambers have each filed a timely

appeal from their conviction. The defendants were

jointly tried below and their cases are consolidated

upon this appeal. Each defendant has filed separate

briefs. Hansell has not appealed from his conviction.

Count I alleges a conspiracy on the part of the

defendants to violate 18 U.S.C. §1006. Count II charges

Griffin with violation of 18 U.S.C. §1006. Count III

charges Chambers with violation of 18 U.S.C. §1006.

Count IV involves a charge against Hansell not here

material. Count V charges defendants with violation of

18 U.S.C. §§1014 and 2.

Be

Griffin was sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment on each

count, to be served concurrently, and was fined $10,000 on Count I, $5,000

on Count I and $5,000 on Count V. Chambers was sentenced to fifteen

months imprisonment on each of Counts I and III, to be served

concurrently, and was fined $5,000 on Count I and $2,500 on Count IIL.

15

Griffin relies upon the following points for

reversal:

I. Prejudicial conduct of the Assistant United

States Attorney in reading in part of his

opening statement written statements

given to Government investigators.

II. Failure to dismiss Count II as defective.

III. Failure to Dismiss Count V.

IV. Error in admitting evidence of repurchase

of 2,880 acres.

V. Error in admitting evidence of other

transactions.

VI. Error in permitting Boggess to testify.

VII. Failure to produce Brady material and

denial of admission of certain minutes of

Lonoke PCA.

Chambers makes the same contention with

respect to Count III as Griffin does with respect to

Count II. He also relies upon points I, III, IV, V, VI and

VII asserted by Griffin. Such errors will be discussed

jointly with respect to both appeals.

16

Chambers urges the following additional points:

VIII. Refusal to grant a severance.

IX. Error in instructions.

For the reasons hereinafter stated, we reject

each of the contentions made and affirm the

convictions.

The trial was a long one. The record is very

extensive. A complete analysis of the facts and issues

would unduly extend this opinion without serving a

significant useful purpose. We shall summarize some

of the pertinent facts bearing upon the issues raised.

There is a dispute as to some of the material facts.

However, in light of the jury verdict in favor of the

Government, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Government as the prevailing party,

and the facts are stated with this principle in mind.

The Lonoke Production Credit Association (PCA) is a

federally-chartered instrumentality of the United

States under the supervision of the Federal

Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Louis, Missouri, and

the Farm Credit Administration. Griffin was

president and Chambers was vice president of Lonoke

PCA. Hansell was manager of the East Lonoke branch.

In 1973 Huntsman, a large farm operator,

contacted Griffin in an effort to secure financing for his

farming operations. Huntsman was told by Griffin that

Hansell would take care of his needs. Huntsman was

17

unsuccessful in obtaining 1973 crops loans and had no

success with his 1974 application. He was told St. Louis

was fussing about Huntsman’s not having sufficient

farming operations in the Association's territory.

In July 1974 Hansell visited Huntsman and

suggested the purchase of a 2,880 acre tract of land

which Hansell said would make it easier for the PCA to

give him his desired line of credit. Hansell said Griffin

was waiting for a call to him of Huntsman’s decision on

the purchase and that PCA could finance 100% of the

purchase price. Huntsman, with some reluctance,

agreed to buy the land. A loan application for $513,800

was prepared and was signed by Huntsman. The

application states the loan is a crop loan. The loan

application was approved by the PCA loan committee

of which Griffin was an influential member.”

The involved 2,880 acre farm was purchased by

Griffin, Chambers and Hansell for $470,000 in late July

of 1974 with title taken in the name of O. M. Young,

Trustee.’ The Brauer land was encumbered by

existing encumbrances of $341,680 which were

assumed by the purchasers with a balance of $129,000

to be paid in cash at the time of closing. Huntsman’s

9

~~.

Real estate loans could be made by the PCA but the procedures for

such loans differed significantly from those with respect to crop loans.

Appraisals and title examinations were required for real estate loans,

3.

It is not clear from the record whether defendants committed

themselves to purchase the Brauer land prior to obtaining Huntsman's

purchase agreement,

18

purchase price was $634,000, or $164,000 more than

Brauer’s selling price. The beneficial ownership of the

land was not disclosed to Huntsman or to the

supervising Government agencies.

On July 24, 1974, the PCA disbursed the

proceeds of the crop loan, paying $121,433 for the

release of a bank crop lien and issuing a check to

Huntsman for $386,600.

Hansell refused to deliver the check for the loan

proceeds to Huntsman, and at Hansell’s insistence,

Hansell and Huntsman went to the First National

Bank in Little Rock where at Hansell’s direction

Huntsman endorsed and deposited the check for

$386,600 and received a cashier's check made out to

Young, Trustee, for $292,319.18, which was the amount

due on the purchase above the assumption of existing

encumbrances on the land. Hansell took possession of

such check and delivered it to Young. The check was

deposited to Young’s trust account. Shortly thereafter

Young issued a check on the trust account for $20,000

to Chambers and checks for $71,000 each to Griffin and

Hansell. The remaining $2,000 was retained by Young

as a fee. Telephone records were received in evidence

showing numerous phone calls between Griffin and

Young and others interested in the transaction on July

24 and that Young had a telephone conversation with

Chambers on that date. Huntsman, after the payments

hereinabove referred to, received a balance of about

$80,000 to be used for crop loan purposes and had

difficulty in meeting the expenses of his farming

19

operation. Huntsman in August 1974 received an

additional crop loan of $125,000, and repeated efforts

to obtain additional financing were unsuccessful.

On December 1, 1974, a payment on the

indebtedness assumed by Huntsman became due. At

the time of the purchase by Huntsman neither Brauer

nor Huntsman knew that a $164,000 profit had been

made on the sale, and Huntsman was not aware of the

fact that defendants were the equitable owners of the

real estate at such time. On March 7, 1975, Huntsman

learned of the true ownership of the land which he

purchased and the profit that had been made. The

following day Huntsman visited Hansell and

threatened to report the violation by the defendants of

the conflict of interest statute and regulation. Hansell

admitted that a profit had been made on the deal and

that it was unlawful for the PCA officers to do what

they had done, urged Huntsman not to go to the FBI,

and stated that he would comply with anything

Huntsman asked. Shortly thereafter a meeting was

held between Hansell, Huntsman and Boggess wherein

Boggess agreed to buy the farm for $662,000, which

was approximately Huntsman’s purchase _ price.

Boggess brought Huntsman an option agreement and a

$25,000 check drawn on the account of O. M. Young. On

March 25, 1975, the purchase of the farm was

completed with Boggess paying Huntsman and the

PCA $302,000, which was credited on Huntsman’s debt

to PCA. The balance of the repurchase was the

assumption of the existing mortgage indebtedness.

20

The Huntsman-Boggess closing took place in

Young's office with Chambers, Young, Boggess and

Huntsman and his attorney being present. It is

established that Griffin, Chambers and Hansell put up

the money for the Boggess purchase and induced

Boggess to give a false statement. to Government

investigators with respect to his involvement in the

purchase. The PCA loan was paid in full, and no money

was lost by PCA as a result of the Huntsman loan.

Additional facts to the extent necessary will be set out

in the course of the opinion.

We shall now consider the asserted errors in

the order hereinabove stated.

Defendants urge that the Assistant United

States Attorney engaged in improper conduct during

opening argument when he read portions of the signed

statement of each defendant to the jury upon the basis

that any conspiracy which might have existed was

terminated prior to the giving of the statements to the

Government investigator and that consequently the

statements were inadmissible to the extent that they

involved defendants other than the defendant making

the statement. At that point no motions had been made

to suppress the statements. The statements had been

furnished defendants as part of the discovery

procedure. No objection was made at the time the

statements were read nor was a motion for mistrial on

21

that ground made. Such failure precludes raising the

claimed error upon appeal. See United States v.

Lawson, 483 F.2d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 1973); United

States v. DeRosa, 548 F.2d 464, 471-72 (3d Cir. 1977).

Moreover, Griffin's attorney in opening statement

admitted nearly all of the facts referred to in Griffin's

statement concerning the purchase and sale of the

farm but denied criminal intent. The statement of each

defendant admitted the receipt of profits in the

substantial amounts shown in the Young

disbursements hereinabove.

Before defendants’ statements were admitted

in evidence all references to codefendants were

deleted, and the jury was advised that statements of

counsel did not constitute evidence. We are satisfied

that no prejudicial error was committed with respect

to the attorney’s opening statement. See United

States v. Powell, 564 F.2d 256, 259-60 (8th Cir. 1977);

United States v. Killian, 524 F.2d 1268, 1273-75 (5th

Cir. 1975).

II.

The contention of defendants that the

allegations of Count II of the indictment as to Griffin

and Count III as to Chambers, charging violation of 18

U.S.C. §1006, are fatally defective lacks merit. Four

elements are required to be proved in order to

establish a violation of Title 18 U.S.C. §1006. They are:

(1) that the defendant is an officer or employee of a

lending institution organized under the laws of the

22

United States; (2) that the defendant participated,

shared in or received, either directly or indirectly,

money, profit or benefit by and through any

transaction of such institution; (3) that the defendant

did such act or acts with intent to defraud the

association; and (4) that such act or acts were done

knowingly and wilfully. United States v. Hykel, 461

F.2d 721(3d Cir. 1972).

Counts II and III of the indictment tell the

appellants exactly what they were supposed to have

fraudulently received, and the exact transaction

involved, te, the disbursement of an Association

check in the amount of $386,600 payable to Harold and

Maudie Huntsman which purportedly represented the

proceeds of a Huntsman crop loan.

In United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 371

(8th Cir. 1976), we held:

An indictment must set forth in factual

terms the elements of the offense sought to be

charged. It must sufficiently apprise the

defendant of what he must be prepared to meet,

and its generality must not endanger his

constitutional guarantee against double

jeopardy. (Supporting citations omitted.)

The record in our present case clearly reflects

that the defendants were fully aware of the charges

against them and that their double jeopardy rights are

fully protected.

23

III.

Both Griffin and Chambers urge that the court

erred in denying their timely motions for acquittal on

Count V. This count alleges that the defendants

knowingly and wilfully violated 18 U.S.C. §§1014 and 2

in that they caused Huntsman to make a false

statement that the loan applied for was a crop loan

when in fact they knew that a major portion of the loan

was to be used to purchase the 2,880 acres, and that

they thereafter approved the loan, or that they aided

and abetted in such transaction. Our examination of

the record satisfies us that there is substantial

evidence to support the charge. Griffin was convicted

on Count V. Chambers was acquitted on Count V. The

case against Griffin, who was a member of the

committee that approved the loan, is stronger than

that against Chambers.

Chambers further contends that the refusal to

dismiss Couut V permitted the reception of evidence

that would have been excluded if the dismissal motion

had been granted.

We hold that the court committed no error in

submitting Count V to the jury.

IV.

The court committed no error in admitting buy-

back evidence relating to the 2,880 acres with respect

24

to Counts II and III. Admission of evidence is

committed to the broad discretion of the trial court and

the trial judge’s ruling should not be disturbed absent

a clear showing of abuse of discretion. United States v.

Baumgarten, 517 F.2d 1020, 1029 (8th Cir. 1975). The

buy-back evidence was relevant and material on the

issue of knowledge and intent with respect to Counts

II and III. See Rules 401-402, Federal Rules of

Evidence. The court by proper instruction limited

consideration of the buy-back evidence to Counts II

and III. Accordingly, we need not reach the

Government's contention that the evidence was

admissible as to Count I.

V.

Defendants challenge the admission of evidence

concerning other similar transactions. Rule 404(b).

Federal Rules of Evidence, provides:

Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence

of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not

admissible to prove the character of a person in

order to show that he acted in conformity

therewith. It may, however, be admissible for

other purposes, such as proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident.

This court in United States v. Maestas, 554

F.2d 834, 836 (8th Cir. 1977), held:

25

Our task is to assess the relevancy and the

probative value of the challenged evidence; if it

meets the requirements of Rule 404(b) we may

not reverse the ruling of the District Court

unless we also find that the prejudice from

admitting the evidence substantially out-

weighed its probative value. In making that

evaluation, we give great deference to the

district judge, who saw and heard the evidence.

The record reflects that the trial court held

three hearings on the admissibitity of the other

transactions evidence and was advised, as was defense

counsel, of the general facts surrounding each

transaction. The defense had several months to meet

the proposed evidence. The court limited the

prosecution to similar transactions which involved

land deals in which Griffin and Chambers were

involved, where loan proceeds were used in whole or in

part to buy land in which Griffin and Chambers had an

interest and where deception and concealment were

involved. Our examination of the record satisfies us

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting the challenged evidence.

VI.

Boggess was a straw man used by the

defendants to re-purchase the 2,880 acres from

Huntsman. Boggess had refused to testify before the

grand jury on the basis of self-incrimination. He was

ultimately granted immunity by appropriate

proceedings. Defendants contend Boggess should not

be allowed to testify since he had attended several

26

meetings of defendants with their counsel. At such

time Boggess was represented by the same attorney

who represented Hansel] and he attended the

meetings at the attorney's request. The court, upon

the basis of substantial evidence at an in camera

evidentiary hearing, found Boggess was not a

Government informer or spy and that he did not

disclose any defense strategy to the Government. Both

Boggess and the Government specifically denied any

disclosure of defense strategy to the Government.

Defendants further complain that th. y did not

learn of the grant of immunity until the fifth day of the

trial and that such information should have been

disclosed earlier in order to enable defendants to

propose questions on voir dire as to whether they

would consider the granting of immunity in

determining the credibility of a witness. We find such

contention lacks merit. Defendants knew for a

considerable time that Boggess had been subpoenaed

by the Government as a witness. Defendants had an

opportunity to argue to the jury the bearing of the

immunity on Boggess’ credibility. Boggess’ testimony

was very damaging to the defendants. He stated that

he had had several conferences with Griffin, Chambers

and Hansell and that he was their friend. He said that

he acted as purchaser at defendants’ request and that

all the money for the repurchase was provided by the

defendants. We disagree with defendants’ contention

that Boggess’ testimony, which was admitted only

with respect to Counts II and III, had no relevancy to

such charges. We also disagree with the claim that the

27

relevancy is substantially outweighed by danger of

unfair prejudice.

VI.

Defendants at several stages filed motions for

disclosure of material favorable to the defense. The

claimed favorable material is contained in the PCA

minute book and reads as follows:

Gentlemen, Mr. McGuire explained that an FCA

investigation team had _ discovered that

violations of FCA rules and regulations

apparently have been committed and that the

employment of Charles Griffin and Bill Hansell

had been terminated. He was direct, emphatic

and explicit that criminal violations were not

involved.

Mr. McGuire was the president of the Federal

Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Louis. The record

reflects that neither the Government nor its

investigators had possession or knowledge of such

minutes and that they were discovered when the

minute books were produced on the fifth day of the

trial. The minutes disclose information unfavorable to

the defendants in that Griffin had been discharged for

violation of association rules. The favorable portion of

the minutes was that McGuire expressed the bald

assertion that criminal violation was not involved. The

tender of the quoted minutes was denied upon the

ground that it constituted an inadmissible conclusion

28

of the witness. It is doubtful whether the expression of

an expert opinion on guilt or innocence can be given by

a witness. Such issue is appropriately determined by

the jury under appropriate instructions by the court.

In any event, the statement was made some

three months before the indictment. McGuire was not

shown to be in possession of all the facts nor was he

shown to be an expert qualified to pass on the criminal

guilt issue. The court committed no error in

determining that there was no Brady violation and did

not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the

tendered extract from the minutes. The trial continued

for nine days after the defendants’ knowledge of the

minutes and a four-day recess intervened. The court

properly denied a continuance as ample time remained

for the defendants to make any desired investigation

as to the subject matter of the minutes.

VII.

Chambers complains of the court's denial of a

severance. Chambers participated in the same

transactions as his co-defendants. Joinder was proper

under Rule 8b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In United States v. King and United States v. Lewis,

567 F.2d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 1977), we held no abuse of

discretion arose from the denial of Lewis’ motion for

severance. We stated:

Even if joinder is proper under Rule 8,

Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 authorizes the trial court to

29

grant relief from joinder “{iJf it appears that a

defendant or the government is prejudiced by

[the] joinder ....” The court “may order...

separate trials of courts, grant a severance of

defendants or provide whatever other relief

justice requires.” See United States v. Sanders,

563 F.2d 379, at 382 (8th Cir. 1977). A district

court in determining whether to grant relief

under Rule 14 has wide discretion and the

court's ruling is rarely disturbed on review.

We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the

trial court in denying Chambers’ motion for severance.

IX.

Chambers contends the court's instructions on

intent to defraud the association are inadequate and

erroneous. Chambers also contends the court erred in

refusing to instruct on his theory of defense. We have

reviewed the court's instructions on intent to defraud

as a whole and find no prejudicial error was

committed. As stated in United States v. Hykel, 461,

F.2d 721, 724 (3d Cir. 1972), quoting with approval from

Beaudine v. United States, 368-F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1966):

[T}his part of 18 U.S.C. §1006: “is intended to do

much more than forbid unsophisticated

embezzlement, larceny or theft. And that part of

the statute with which we are concerned is a

typical conflict of interests prohibition. As such

it is a congressional recognition of the principle

so well grounded in morality and equity that the

servant cannot serve two masters and that

when this is done without complete disclosure,

30

the law considers that the master-principal's

interests either will, or are apt to, suffer.”

Chambers complains of that part of the

instructions which states that the evidence need not

show that the PCA suffered any financial loss and that

a showing that the accused acted with intent to

defraud is sufficient. The Government suffered no

financial loss as the loan was repaid. As stated in

Hykel, supra at 725:

The fact that Havertown and the United

States may have suffered no loss through the

transaction does not preclude a finding of intent

to defraud.

The court's instructions in the present case

clearly place the burden on the Government to show an

intent to defraud beyond a _ reasonable doubt.

Defendants had signed statements that they were

familiar with the applicable regulations relating to

conflict of interest. The evidence here clearly shows a

conflict of interest and supports a finding of intent to

defraud a Government agency’ by _ not

revealing the conflicting interests to the supervising

agencies. Defendant's contention that the court erred

in failing to submit his theory of the case lacks merit.

The tendered defense that Chambers is a licensed real

estate agent and that the $20,000 received on the sale

was a commission finds no support in the evidence. The

evidence reflects that the sale was negotiated by

Hansell and that Chambers had nothing to do with the

selling except to acquiesce in the sale and accept his

share of the profits.

31

The extensive record developed at a lengthy

trial and the numerous errors asserted make it

impractical to discuss all facts and issues in greater

detail. No useful purpose would be accomplished by

a more detailed discussion of the facts and issues. We

have fully considered all of defendants’ contentions

including those not discussed and are convinced that

the defendants had a fair trial, that substantial

evidence supports the jury verdicts, and that no

prejudicial error was committed by the trial court nor

did it abuse its discretion upon issues lying within its

discretion.

The convictions are affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS,

EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

32

APPENDIX C.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

77-1597 September Term, 1977

United States of America, )

Appellee, )

vs. )

Charles Thomas Griffin, )

Appellant. )

77-1601 Appeals from the United States

District Court for the

Eastern District of Arkansas

United States of America, )

Appellee,

)

Joe Henry Chambers, )

Appellant. )

The Court having considered petitions for

rehearing en banc filed by counsel for appellants and,

being fully advised in the premises, it is ordered that

the petitions for rehearing en banc be, and they are

hereby, denied.

33

Considering the petitions for rehearing en banc

as petitions for rehearing, it is ordered that the

petitions for rehearing also be, and they are hereby,

denied.

July 28, 1978

34

APPENDIX D.

“I, Charles Griffin, make the following

statement freely and voluntarily to John J. Hickey

who has identified himself to me as an examiner, Farm

Credit Administration, knowing that it may be used in

evidence.

“Tam 47 years old and live at 517 Northwest 3rd

Street, Lonoke, Arkansas. I was employed by the

Lonoke Production Credit Association, PCA, in 1952

and became its president in 1958. I discussed

purchasing a 2,880 acre farm in Independence County,

Arkansas, and decided I would be interested. It was

agreed that I would share in the venture. This was an

oral agreement. Contact was made with a local

insurance company to borrow enough money to

purchase the property. In the meantime Mr. Harold

Huntsman, a PCA borrower, had become interested in

purchasing the farm and he agreed to buy it for an

acceptable price.

“The contract for the sale and purchase of real

estate was drawn up whereby Irving Brauer sold the

2,880 acres to O. M. Young, trustee. This contract

shows that it was entered into on July 24th, 1974, by

Irving Brauer and QO. M. Young, trustee. Mr. Young

acted as our attorney. I don’t know who negotiated the

contract with Mr. Brauer. I was not familiar with the

terms of this contract except that I knew the purchase

price was $470,000.00.

35

“A contract was drawn up on July 25, 1974,

whereby O. M. Young, acting as trustee for Mr.

Boggess as well as the rest of our group, sold the farm

to Harold Huntsman for $634,000.00. Here again I was

not familiar with the terms of this contract.

“Since we had a buyer for the property soon

after. it was purchased from Mr. Brauer, we did not

have to put up any money on the purchase from Mr.

Brauer. There were debts on the property which our

group assumed from Mr. Brauer. Accordingly, Mr.

Huntsman assumed the same debts on the sale of the

property to him. Examiner Hickey has shown me

where Mr. Huntsman made a cash payment of

$292,319.18 which was turned over to Mr. Young for

disbursement. I don’t recall the exact amount Mr.

Huntsman paid in cash, but that figure looks about

right. Mr. Haley can furnish a complete breakdown of

the $128,319.18. However, the disbursements to me are

correct and represent the percentage of the profit

previously agreed upon. Mr. Boggess was entitled to

his share, but said he did not need the funds right then

and was willing to wait for his share until a later date.

“At this point we had no cash invested in the

property above debt assumption and had received the

above distribution of profits on the sale of the farm to

Mr. Huntsman.

“T have never had any direct dealings with Mr.

Huntsman until last Friday when he came to the PCA

office to discuss a new loan he needed. Under our

36

operating procedures, the branch office manager

servicing a particular area serves as the direct contact

with borrowers.

“IT had no discussion with Mr. Huntsman

concerning the purchase of the 2,880 acres in July

1974. In early 1975 I learned that Mr. Huntsman was

not satisfied with the purchase of the farm. It was

agreed to buy the property back from Mr. Huntsman

for $327,000.00 cash and assume debts, giving him a

profit. I talked to Franklin Collier about the property

and he agreed to provide interim financing of

$187,000.00 for six months or less. This amount was

insufficient to buy the property back. I, therefore,

provided $70,000.00, Boggess provided $40,000.00. Our

checks and the money obtained from Mr. Collier were

turned over to Mr. Haley for handling and

disbursement. Mr. Haley then issued his escrow check

to Mr. Huntsman and the PCA for $302,000.00 which

was applied against his loan. Mr. Huntsman had

previously been paid $25,000.00 by Mr. Boggess on an

option agreement entered into when it was decided to

buy the farm back from Mr. Huntsman. Mr. Haley has

the exact receipt and distribution of the funds

involved. Mr. Collier's loan was for only a short term. I

put up additional collateral to secure Mr. Collier.

“The 2,880 acres of land was later sold to Dr.

James Weber in the fall of 1975. I am not sure how this

sale was handled or how the funds received from Dr.

Weber were disbursed. Mr. Haley can furnish this

37

information. As I recall, the farm was sold to Dr.

Weber for about $680,000.00. I have not received any

distribution of any funds from this sale. $120,000.00 in

additional funds borrowed from Travelers Insurance

Company were required to close the sale and hae

sufficient funds to pay Collier. In connection with this

sale, Mr. Weber and I entered into a written

agreement whereby if the farm sold for more than Dr.

Weber paid for it, the profits would be divided as

shown in a memorandum of agreement dated

October—no specific date—'75. At this point, Mr.

Boggess was out of the picture with respect to any

ownership although I still owe him his portion of the

profits.

“IT am familiar with the $513,800.00 crop loan to

Mr. Huntsman applied for on July 16, 1974, as a

member of the Executive Committee. I have no

knowledge of how Mr. Huntsman used the funds

disbursed on this loan and assume he used them for the

purpose stated on the application.

“To my knowledge, Mr. Huntsman was not

coerced into purchasing the 2,880 acre farm but I don't

believe he was aware that we had an equity interest in

the farm.

“The only other land transaction I was involved

in was about five years ago when I purchased a tract of

land in Yell County, Arkansas, from a party who was

not at that time a PCA borrower. I do not recall his

name. I later sold the property to a non-PCA member

38

who later became one of our borrowers. I found out

about this farm being available through James

McCann, a PCA member.

“The only discussions I recall having with

Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, FIBC, personnel

concerning Mr. Huntsman pertained to his loans with

PCA. There was never any discussion concerning the

2,880 acre farm in Independence County or whether

any PCA personnel were involved in that property.

“I don’t know where Mr. Huntsman obtained

the funds to purchase the 2,880 acre farm and do not

feel I violated any rules or regulations by having

financial dealings with PCA members.

“I have read this statement consisting of four

typewritten pages and it is true and correct. I have

been given the opportunity to make any corrections

and have signed or initialed each page.”

It contains the signature of Charles Griffin,

dated 7/23/76 with a handwritten addendum by Mr.

Griffin.

“To my knowledge, I received no down payment

on the property sold to Dr. Weber and no PCA funds

were involved.”

>

39

APPENDIX D-2

“I, Bill Hansell, make the following statement

freely and voluntarily to R. H. Whitman and John J.

Hickey who have identified themselves to me as

examiners, Farm Credit Administration, knowing that

it may be used in evidence.

“IT am 39 years old and reside at 303 Southeast

9th Street, England, Arkansas. I was employed by the

Lonoke Production Credit Association—PCA_ in

brackets—as fieldman in June 1973 and later became

branch office manager stationed in the Lonoke office.

“Jimmie Boggess, a PCA borrower, told me he

knew of a farm that could be purchased in

Independence County, Arkansas, and wanted to know

if I was interested in going in on the deal with him. Mr.

Boggess did not say who he was buying the farm from

and I didn't know who the seller was until quite some

time later. I don’t recall how I learned who the seller

was. I have known Mr. Boggess for a long time and

respect his judgment, so when he recommends

something like this I go along with him.

“Tam not familiar with the contract for sale and

purchase of real estate dated July 24, 1974, in which

Irving Brauer sold 2,880 acres of land in Independence

County to O. M. Young, trustee. I assume Mr. Young

was acting as trustee for Mr. Boggess. I never

discussed this with Mr. Boggess.

40

“This was the land that the four of us entered

into as a joint venture. Mr. Boggess interested Mr.

Huntsman in the purchase of the property and the two

of them agreed on a price. I had no contact whatsoever

with Mr. Huntsman to purchase the 2,880 acres that

Mr. Boggess had acquired. The only knowledge I had of

the contract between O. M. Young, trustee, as seller,

and Harold V. Huntsman, as buyer, was that I

notarized the form. This contract is dated either July

24th or July 25, 1974.

“All I knew about the selling price to Mr.

Huntsman was from information shown on the

contract. Mr. Young was acting as trustee for Mr.

Boggess on the sale to Mr. Huntsman and he, Mr.

Young, handled the receipt and disbursement of funds.

Mr. Huntsman was never told that I had an equity in

the property that he purchased. As far as Mr.

Huntsman was concerned Mr. Boggess was in the deal

alone.

“I took Mr. Huntsman’s loan application dated

July 16, 1974 and the entries made thereon are in my

handwriting. This application is for $513,800.00 for a

crop loan. I disbursed two checks to Mr. Huntsman on

July 24, 1974. One was for $121,433.33 issued jointly to

Mr. Huntsman and the Bank of McCrory. The other

check was issued to Harold and Maudie Huntsman for

$386,600.00. I handed the checks to Mr. Huntsman and

do not know how the proceeds were used. Approval of

this loan was subject to assignment of the contract on

the 2,880 acres. Such an assignment was subsequently

41

received from Mr. Huntsman. Although an assignment

was obtained, I don’t recal] getting it. I have never

heard of no trouble in getting the assignment.

“I have been in the First National Bank, Little

Rock, a couple of times with Mr. Huntsman, but do not

recall the circumstances. I have no recollection of

accompanying Mr. Huntsman to the First National

Bank so he could obtain a cashier's check from his loan

proceeds so he could make a payment on the 2,880

acres he had acquired. I don’t know what funds Mr.

Huntsman used to purchase the property.

“Because Mr. Boggess had found a buyer so

soon, I had no money invested in it. I did receive a

check for $71,000.00 on July 26, 1974, which

represented my share of the profits on the sale of the

farm to Mr. Huntsman. I don't know how the other

shares were divided. My check came from Mr. Young.

Frankly, I was surprised to receive so much.

“In the winter of 1974 or early spring 1975, Mr.

Huntsman called me and said he had a buyer for the

farm in Independence County who was willing to pay

about $800,000.00 and wanted to know if the PCA

would finance the buyer. Mr. Huntsman offered to co-

sign the note along with the buyer if a loan was made. I

told Mr. Huntsman that there was no way the PCA

could make the loan because his endorsement of the

note would jeopardize his line of credit. Mr.

Huntsman was angry. The reported buyer, whose

name I do not recall, then called me and asked about

—s

42

financing. I told him that the farm was out of our

territory, but he could bring his papers over to the

office and I would discuss the loan with the executive

committee. The man never showed up and did not

make application for a loan with the PCA.

“After this incident, or about the spring of 1975,

Mr. Huntsman called me and told me to get in touch

with that boy in Coy, Arkansas—who was Mr.

Boggess —to see if he would buy the 2,880 acre farm

back. Mr. Huntsman told me all he wanted was his

money back, but that I should not tell Mr. Boggess

that. I called Mr. Boggess and told him that Mr.

Huntsman wanted to sell it back but did not state what

Mr. Huntsman wanted. I had no other contact with Mr.

Huntsman concerning the sale of the farm until a

meeting was set up in a restaurant in Beebe, Arkansas.

I don’t recall the date of this meeting, but it was in the

spring of 1975.

“Present at the restaurant besides myself were:

Messrs. Boggess and Huntsman, Mrs. Huntsman and

their son, and another party whom I do not know. At

this meeting Boggess and Huntsman’ excused

themselves and went out to the car. I believe Mr.

Huntsman’s son also went to the car. I joined them

p briefly i in their discussions in the car. Messrs. Boggess

and Huntsman entered into an option agreement for

Mr. Boggess to repurchase the farm. Mr. Boggess later

paid Mr. Huntsman $25,000.00 in connection with the

option. Mr. Huntsman still wanted to sell the farm

because he needed the money.

43

“I told Mr. Boggess a few days after the

meeting that we had done wrong in dealing with a PCA

member and we had better buy the farm back and give

Mr. Huntsman a profit. As far as I know, Mr. Boggess

borrowed the necessary funds to repurchase the farm

from Franklin Collier, but I do not know what

arrangements were made with Mr. Collier or how

much was borrowed from him.

“Mr. Huntsman was given a _ check for

$302,000.00 through John Haley, an attorney, who was

handling the paper work for Mr. Boggess. Mr.

Huntsman brought the check to the PCA and wanted

me to release the funds to him. The check had been

issued jointly to Mr. Huntsman and the PCA. I told Mr.

Huntsman I could not release the funds because the

PCA had a mortgage on the place. The proceeds were

applied on Mr. Huntsman’s loan.

“After the property was purchased from Mr.

Huntsman, I backed out of the joint venture and was

no longer involved. I understood the property was

subsequently sold by Mr. Boggess to Dr. James

Weber. Although I had not returned any of the

$71,000.00 I had received on the sale of the property to

Mr. Huntsman, I considered that I had returned it

because I did not share in any further profits from the

sale of the land te Dr. Weber. I know that it was wrong

in having financial dealings with borrowers and have

learned a valuable lesson. I would not want to disgrace

the PCA.

44

“T have read this statement consisting of four

typewritten pages and it is true and correct. I have

been given the opportunity to make any additions or

corrections and have signed and initialed each page.

“Signed: Bill Hansell, July 22, 1976.”

APPENDIX D-3

“I, Henry Chambers, make the following

statement freely and voluntarily to R. H. Whitman and

John J. Hickey who have identified themselves to me

as examiners, Farm Credit Administration, knowing

that it may be used in evidence.

“Tam 39 years old, married, and live on Route 3,

Box 33, Carlisle, Arkansas 72024. I was employed in

June 1961 by the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank,

FICB, St. Louis, Missouri, as a fieldman under an

apprenticeship program and served in four production

credit associations, PCA, before being assigned

permanently to the Lonoke PCA. I was a credit man at

the PCA and my title was later changed from assistant

secretary-treasurer to vice president in charge of

credit. My employment with the PCA was recently

terminated. I farm approximately 1,000 acres of land.

| “I became involved in the purchase of a 2,880

acre farm in Independence County, Arkansas, in 1974.

It was my understanding that Jimmie Boggess had

found some land for sale and asked if I wanted to go in

45

with him on the purchase. In my opinion the land was a

bargain as far as land values go. About 60 to 70 days

elapsed between the time the land was available and

the date we purchased it. The land was purchased on a

contract for sale and purchase of real estate dated July

24, 1974, with Irv ine | rauer the seller and O. M. Young

acting as truste. . the buyer. Mr. Brauer does not

have a PCA loan and I did not know him personally.

My interest in the property at the time it was

purchased from Mr. Brauer was about twelve and-a-

half percent.

“The 2,880 acres was purchased from Mr.

Brauer for $470,000.00 and we were to assume the

outstanding debts on the property of $341,680.82. This

left about $129,000.00 that had to be paid to Mr.

Brauer. We did not have to come up with any money at

the time because somebody found a buyer for the farm

in Mr. Huntsman. The property was sold to Mr.

Huntsman for $634,000.00 on a contract for sale and

purchase of real estate dated July 25, 1974. Mr. Young

acted as trustee for our group on the sale of the

property to Mr. Huntsman. I am sure Mr. Huntsman

did not know that PCA employees had an interest in

the property he purchased. Mr. Huntsman assumed

the same debts that were on the property we had

assumed from Mr. Brauer. The proceeds collected from

Mr. Huntsman were used to pay the balance due Mr.

Brauer and I received $20,000.00 for my approximately

twelve and-a-half percent interest. I did not see a

c! sing statement and do not know how much each of

the others received.

46

“Later on Mr. Huntsman became displeased

with his purchase and called and expressed his

displeasure, and it was decided that Mr. Boggess

should offer to repurchase the 2,880 acres from Mr.

Huntsman. This was done at the agreed price of

$662,000.00 with our group to again assume the

outstanding debts on the property at the time of

repurchase. I don’t recall the exact amount our group

had to put up to repurchase the property, but it was

around $327,000.00. It was my understanding that Mr.

Boggess initially entered into an option agreement

with Mr. Huntsman whereby Mr. Boggess paid Mr.

Huntsman $25,000.00 for the option. I saw a copy of the

option agreement. In order to repurchase the

property, I put up $30,000.00 which I borrowed from

the Citizens Bank of Carlisle and the balance from the

funds I had on hand. These checks were turned over to

Mr. Haley for distribution from his escrow account.

Mr. Haley paid the interest due on the debts we had

assumed and issued a check jointly to Mr. Huntsman

and the PCA for $302,000.00.

“Mr. Huntsman had obtained a crop loan from

the PCA in July of 1974 and had obtained other

advances and had assigned his purchase contract as

partial security. He had nothing to do—I had nothing

to do with this loan and do not know how Mr.

Huntsman used the funds. When we repurchased the

property from Mr. Huntsman in March of 1975, Mr.

Haley called and asked me to bring PCA'S RELEASE

OF ASSIGNMENT TO HIS OFFICE. I then took the

release to Mr. Young's office. I don’t remember if I

47

picked up the check for $302,000.00, but it was applied

to his PCA loan. To my knowledge I visited with Mr.

Huntsman only twice. One time I inspected his farm on

one of his loans and the other time was when I saw him

at the closing in Mr. Young’s office. I had no discussion

with Mr. Huntsman on the purchase or sale of the 2,880

acres.

“Dr. James Weber is active in farming and is

always looking for farm land as an investment. He was

interested in purchasing the 2,880 acres from us. Dr.

Weber agreed to pay about $700,000.00 for land, less

closing costs. Dr. Weber was also to assume the

remaining debts on the property. At the time

negotiations were being made to sell the farm to Dr.

Weber, I visited with him. We had an oral agreement

at this time that should Dr. Weber sell the property at

more than his purchase price, he, Dr. Weber, would get

one-third of the profits, I would get one-third of the

remaining two-thirds of the profits. Should the farm

sell at a loss, we would share the loss in like

proportions. However, in my opinion the property is

worth about a million dollars and that someday Dr.

Weber will be able to sell the property at this figure.

No one in the area can afford to pay that much for the

farm, but outside investors are always looking for farm

land to buy. I have no doubt that we will make a nice

profit on the subsequent sale of this property.

“There were no profits distributed on the sale

of the property to Dr. Weber. Additional interest had

accrued on debts on the property which had to be paid

48

and Mr. Collier was repaid for his loan. I borrowed

$40,000.00 from the Travelers Life Insurance Company

at the time Dr. Weber purchased the property. This

money was paid into Mr. Haley’s escrow account as a

further investment.

“I have read this statement consisting of three

typewritten pages and it is true and correct. I have

been given the opportunity to make any additions or

corrections and have signed or initialed each page.”

49

APPENDIX E

I, Jimmie H. Boggess, make the following

statement freely and voluntarily to R. H. Whitman,

who has identified himself to me as an Examiner, Farm

Credit Administration, knowing that it may be used in

evidence.

- I live in England, Arkansas, and raise cotton,

soybeans, and rice. I have been a member of the

Lonoke Production Credit Association, Lonoke,

Arkansas (PCA) for many years.

In 1974 I learned that a Mr. Irvin Brauer was

asking $470,000 for a 2880 acre farm located in

Independence County, Arkansas. Although I had not

been on the farm, I thought from its location it was

worth a great deal more that he was asking. I knew

that Mr. Harold V. Huntsman of Bald Knob, Arkansas,

was always looking for land to purchase, so I called

him. I told him I knew of a farm in Independence

County that could be purchased for $650,000 and asked

him if he was interested. After looking at it, he called

me back and said he thought it was worth no more than

$634,000. After talking it over, we agreed on a price of

$634,000. I then had my attorney, Mr. O. M. Young

draw up a trust agreement whereby I authorized him

to act for me as trustee in connection with the

purchase of the farm from Brauer for $470,000, and the

sale the following day to Mr. Huntsman for $634,000

for a net profit before expenses of $164,000. I did not

have to pay down any money in connection with the

50

purchase because I was reselling it at a profit. To the

best of knowledge I did not give or receive a warranty

deed to the property. Both transactions were handled

by sales contracts. I do not remember how much

money I received from Mr. Young, the escrow agent,

but his records would show the disposition of the

funds, and I would have to ask him about it.

In 1975 I learned that Mr. Huntsman was not

satisfied with the farm. I do not remember if he called

me and told me or if I learned from Bill Hansell of. the

PCA. Anyway, Mr. Hansell and I drove to Beebe,

Arkansas, one evening, and met Mr. and Mrs.

Huntsman at a restaurant. After talking about the

matter, I told Mr. Huntsman that I would repurchase

the 2880 acres for $662,000, if he would give me a

$25,000 purchase option. I then drew up a handwritten

option to this effect, and gave him a $25,000 check

drawn payable to Harold V. Huntsman by Mr. O. M.

Young, my attorney. I felt the farm was worth much

more than I was paying for it, and would be able to

again sell it at a profit. I called it my “million dollar

farm”.

In connection with the repurchase of the farm

from Huntsman, I borrowed $302,000 from Mr.

Franklin Collier, of Augusta, Arkansas. I believe he

took a second mortgage on the place to secure the

debt. I later on sold the place in the fall of 1975 to Dr.

James R. Weber, M.D. of Jacksonville, Ar. for

$700,000. Attorney John Haley handled the details of

the sale to Weber, and I do not know how he financed

it.

51

No PCA employees’ were involved in

connection with the above transactions, and had no

interest in the property.

I never offered to lend Mr. Huntsman any

money on his 17,000 acre farm for 90 days in return for

a deed to his property. I am not in the lending business.

I have to borrow money to run my farming business. I

applied for a $200,000 PCA loan on February 26, 1975,

to purchase a farm in Lonoke County, Arkansas, that

Roy and Orlan Roper were farming. However, they

later exercised their option to purchase the property,

and I did not get the PCA loan.

I have read this statement consisting of two

typewritten pages and it is true and correct. I have

been given the opportunity to make and additions or

corrections and have initialed or signed each page.

Witness: /s/ Jimmie H. Boggess

/s/ RR. H. Whitman, Examiner Box 9

Farm Credit Administration Coy, Arkansas 72051

St. Louis, Mo. 63141

52

APPENDIX F

(Opening Statements)

(T. 23-30)

Hansell then called the investigators later on

that day and told them he couldn't make it, but an

appointment was set up for July 21, 1976. Thereafter,

Hansell signed a statement which stated, among other

things, these things: Hansell stated that he, Boggess

and Griffin and Chambers decided to take shares in the

purchase of this farm in Independence County,

Arkansas; that Boggess, Griffin and Hansell were to

take about 29 percent interest and that Chambers was

to take about a four percent interest, and that these

percentages were based upon the risk they were going

to take. They had some risks involved, and these

percentages were based upon the risks.

He was not familiar with the contract of sale

between Brauer and Young and he

assumed — assumed — that Young was acting as trustee

for Boggess. He then stated that Boggess interested

Huntsman in the purchase of the property and the two

of them—that is, Boggess and Huntsman—agreed

upon a price. He stated that he had no contact

whatsoever with Mr. Huntsman to purchase this land

and that the only knowledge that he had on the

contract between O. M. Young and Harold Huntsman

was that he had notarized that contract.

a

53

He also stated that Huntsman was never told

that he, Griffin, and Chambers had an equity in the

property that Huntsman purchased. Hansell stated

that he took care of Huntsman’s loan applications and

disbursed the checks which made up the $513,800.00.

Hansell stated he did not know how the

proceeds were used. Hansell stated he had no

recollection of accompanying Huntsman to the First

National Bank so he could obtain a cashier’s check from

the Huntsman PCA loan proceeds in order to make the

down payment on the property.

Hansell added again that he did not know what

funds Huntsman used to purchase the property.

Hansell stated that because Boggess found a buyer for

the property so soon, that he, Hansell, had no money

invested in the land whatsoever but that he did receive

a check for $71,000.00, which represented his share of

the profits on the sale of the farm to Huntsman.

Hansell stated he did not know how the other

shares were divided. Hansell further stated that in the

spring of 1975 Huntsman called and told him to get in

touch with Boggess to see if Boggess would buy back

the land. Hansell stated that Huntsman told him all he

wanted was his money back. Hansell called Boggess,

told him that Huntsman wanted to sell the farm back

to him but did not state what Huntsman wanted for the

farm. Hansell then stated he had no other contact with

Huntsman concerning the sale of the farm until a

meeting was set up between Huntsman and Boggess.

54

It was during this meeting that Huntsman and

Boggess entered into the option agreement. Hansell

stated later that Boggess paid Huntsman $25,000.00 in

connection with this option. Thereafter Hansell told

Boggess that, “We had done wrong in dealing with a

PCA member and that we had better buy the farm

back and give Mr. Huntsman a profit.”

Hansell stated that as far as he knew, Boggess

borrowed the funds to repurchase the farm from

Huntsman. After the property was purchased back

from Huntsman, Hansell stated that he backed out of

the venture and was no longer involved.

Finally, Hansell ended his statement by saying

he knew it was wrong to have financial dealings with

PCA borrowers and that he had learned a valuable

lesson.

After being advised of his constitutional rights,

Chambers stated in his statement, which was signed

on July 23, 1974 (sic.) among other things these things:

that he became involved in the purchase of the

Independence County farm when Griffin and

Hansell invited him to join in the purchase.

It was his understanding in talking to Griffin and

Hansell that Boggess had found some land for sale and

asked if they wanted to go in with him, Boggess, on the

purchase.

The land was purchased on a contract of sale

dated July 24, 1974, with Irving Brauer selling and O.

55

M. Young acting as trustee for all of the buyers. His

interest in the profit at that time it was purchased

from Brauer was about 12 and a half percent. The

other three buyers held equal shares.

They had only an oral agreement with regard to

the sharing of the profit, and his interest was less than

the others because, and I quote, “He could not stand a:

greater financial exposure at the time.”

He said further they didn't have to put any

money into the property because somebody found a

buyer in Harold Huntsman. The property was then

sold to Huntsman for $634,000.00 on July 25, 1974.

He again stated that Huntsman (sic.) acted as

trustee for all of them on the sale of the property to

Huntsman. Proceeds, he stated, were collected for

Huntsman and used to pay the balance to Mr. Brauer,

and he received $20,000.00 for his approximate 12 and

a half percent interest. He didn't know, he stated, what

the other people received.

Chambers then stated Huntsman became

displeased with his purchase and called one of the

three individuals to express his displeasure. The group

decided Huntsman —excuse me, Boggess should offer

to repurchase the 2,880 acres of land from Huntsman.

He stated that the repurchase’ was

accomplished and the group had to put approximately

$337,000.00 and assume the outstanding debts on the

56

property. Chambers stated it was his understanding

that Boggess initially entered into an _ option

agreement for the $25,000.00.

Chambers also stated that he put up $30,000.00

for the repurchase and Griffin put up $70,000.00.

Chambers also stated that Griffin and Boggess made

arrangements with a man by the name of Franklin

Collier to borrow the balance making up _ the

repurchase of $187,000.00. Chambers states further

that Huntsman obtained a crop loan from the PCA in

July of '74 and he didn’t know how Huntsman used the

funds.

Chambers had no discussions with Huntsman

regarding the purchase or the sale of the 2,880 acres.

After the purchase by the group, the land was

transferred to Dr. James Weber at a price of

$700,000.00 and at the time of the negotiations he and

Griffin and Weber entered into an agreement whereby

Chambers—the defendant Chambers and_ the

defendant Griffin would receive one-third of the profit

if the farm was sold for an amount exceeding what Dr.

Weber paid for it and would also share in one-third of

the losses if the property was sold for an amount less

than what Dr. Weber paid for it.

Now with regard to the defendant Charles

Griffin. he gave a signed statement and also gave oral

information to the investigators, and that signed

statement is dated July 23, 1976. His statement

a

57

reflects, among other things, that he, Chambers,

Hansell, and Boggess discussed purchasing a farm in

Independence County and that it was agreed that

Boggess, Hansell and Griffin would share the venture

and that Chambers would have about a 15 percent

interest. This was all done orally; nothing in writing.

While they were attempting to borrow enough

money to purchase the property, Mr. Harold

Huntsman became interested in purchasing the farm

and agreed to purchase it for a “acceptable price”. The

contract of sale was drawn up whereby Brauer sold the

farm to Young as trustee on July 24, 1974, and Young

was acting as their attorney.

Griffin stated that he did not know who

negotiated the contract with Irving Brauer.

Thereafter, Griffin stated that a contract was drawn

up on July 25, '74, whereby Young, acting as trustee

for he, Boggess, Chambers and Hansell, sold the farm

to Harold Huntsman for $634,000.00.

Griffin stated he was not familiar with the

terms of the contract. Griffin stated that the

disbursements from Young's account were correct and

represented the percentage of profits they had

previously agreed upon.

Griffin further stated that Boggess was entitled

to his share — was entitled to his share, but that he did

not need the funds right then and was willing to wait

for his share until a later date.

58

Griffin further stated that he talked to Franklin

Collier about a $187,000.00 ioan and believed that

Boggess and Chambers obtained the loan from Collier.

In addition, Griffin provided $70,000.00. he stated

Boggess provided $40,000.00, and the balance of

$30,000.00 came from Chambers to repurchase this

farm.

Griffin stated further that Boggess paid

Huntsman $25,000.00 for an option agreement entered

into when it was decided to buy the farm back from

Huntsman, and then he stated later that the land was

later sold to Weber and the same agreement was in

effect when Mr. Chambers stated in effect about the

sharing of profits and the sharing of losses.

Griffin then stated he had no knowledge of how

Huntsman used the funds disbursed on the loan and

assumed he used them for the purpose stated on the

application. |

He then added this—which was in a signed

statement that he prepared. You will hear testimony

that he prepared the statement. —that the only other

land transaction that he was involved in was about five

years before the time of the interview when he

purchased a tract of land in Yell County from a party

who was not a PCA borrower. Griffin stated that he

found out about the Yell County farm from James

McCann who was a PCA member.

i. St ae

_ ai Rene ee ee

ns i a ie Re Dt

—_——o

SE Ee a Sa

—

59

Finally, Griffin stated that he did not know

where Huntsman obtained the funds to purchase the

Independence County farm and did not feel he violated

any rules or regulations by having financial dealings

with PCA members.

60

APPENDIX G

MINUTES OF THE LONOKE PRODUCTION

CREDIT ASSOCIATION DATED JULY 26, 1976

(DEFENDANTS’ EXHIBIT aa)

“Gentlemen, Mr. McGuire explained that an

FCA investigation team had discovered that violations

of FCA rules and regulations apparently have been

committed and that the employment of Charles Griffin

and Bill Hansell had been terminated. He was direct,

emphatic and explicit that criminal violations were not

involved.” (Vvi, T. 127)

61

APPENDIX H

UNITED STATES v. BELL No. 1894

(8th Cir. April 19, 1978)

Submitted: February 13, 1978

Filed: April 19, 1978

Before MATTHES, Senior Circuit Judge, LAY,

Circuit Judge, and HANSON, * District Judge.

MATTHES, Senior Circuit Judge.

Michael Bell, appellant, and Mario Burkhalter,

apparently a friend or at least an acquaintance of

appellant, were jointly indicted for transferring two

sawed-off shotguns without paying the transfer tax

required by 26 U.S.C. §5811,' in violation of 26 U.S.C.

*The Honorable William C. Hanson, Senior District Judge for the

Southern District of lowa, sitting by designation.

3.

27 U.S.C. §5811 provides in pertinent part:

There shall be levied, collected, and paid on firearms

transferred a tax at the rate of $200 for each firearm

transferred ... . The tax imposed .. . shall be paid by the

transferor.

62

§5861° and 18 U.S.C. §2.° Bell was tried alone, found

guilty by a jury, and committed to custody under the

Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §5010(b),

until discharged by the United States Parole

Commission, as provided by 18 U.S.C. §5017(c). On

appeal, Bell contends that the district court erred in

declining to propound requested voir dire questions;

admitting certain testimony; commenting on the

evidence; and omitting requested instructions. We

affirm.

A brief resume of the background facts will

serve to place the contentions of appellant in proper

perspective. On February 22, 1977, two federal

undercover agents were taken by Mario Burkhalter to

appellant's apartment for the purpose of purchasing

illegal firearms. Appellant testified that before the

agents and Burkhalter arrived, Burkhalter had the

2

26 U.S.C. §5861 provides in pertinent part:

It shall be unlawful for any person —

(e) to transfer a firearm in violation of the provisions of

this chapter... .

3.

18 U.S.C. §2(a) provides:

Whoever commits an offense against the United States or

aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its

commission, is punishable as a principal.

63

same day “dropped the rifles off in a multi-colored

blanket all wrapped,” and that appellant “threw” them

into his closet. However, appellant informed the

agents that he did not have the guns there, but that

they would probably “be here later on tonight.” He

also testified that he had “sort of whispered” in

Burkhalter’s ear to come back alone.

Later that evening, Burkhalter, accompanied

by the agents, returned to appellant's apartment.

According to the agents, appellant removed two

sawed-off shotguns from a closet and displayed them

on a bed. After satisfying themselves that the guns

were in working order, the agents paid appellant a

total of $110 for them. Appellant denied receiving any

money from the agents. Burkhalter was paid $40 as a

“finder’s fee” by the agents.

Appellant attempted to persuade the jury by

his testimony to find, in effect, that Burkhalter induced

him to participate in the sale of the guns as a

precondition to Burkhalter’s payment of a debt of $45

owed to appellant. Thus, it is apparent that because of

the differing versions of what transpired, the jury, of

necessity, was required to pass upon the credibility of

the testimony of the agents vis-a-vis the credibility of

appellant as delineated in his testimony.

It is undisputed that appellant did not pay a

transfer tax on the weapons. he claimed that he had no

knowledge about the $200 transfer tax, and that he

was willing to pay the tax “at the present time.”

64

I

Appellant is a black man. The jury before which

he was tried was white. On voir dire, the district court

asked the prospective jurors the following questions:

Do any of you have any prejudices about giving

a fair trial to a person of a minority race?

Have any of you had any untold experiences

with black people, any experiences that would

be unusual of any kind that might shade your

thinking in a situation of this kind?

Do any of you think that you might give more

credibility to the testimony of a witness who

was white than toa witness who was black?

Appellant requested that the voir dire include

nineteen additional questions, all but one of which

concerned race. The district court denied appellant's

request. Appellant contends that the district court's

refusal to ask the requested voir dire questions was

reversible error. We disagree.

Voir dire questions concerning race are not

constitutionally required unless the circumstances in

the case “suggest a significant likelihood that racial

prejudice might infect [the defendant's] trial.” Ristaino

v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 598 (1976). Ristaino involved the

trial of a black man for violent crimes against a white

security guard. Because race was not an issue at trial,

the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to

c

~< oT» Ge Sate ae e

65

voir dire potential jury members concerning their

racial attitudes.

In the present case, as in Ristaino, the issue of

race was not “inextricably bound up with the conduct

of the trial.” Jd. at 597. Consequently, the district court

was under no constitutional obligation to probe

prospective jurors for signs of racism.

Of course, a federal court does have a non-

constitutional duty to inquire as to possible racial bias

on the jury panel when the defendant is a member of a

racial minority group. Aldridge v. United States, 283

U.S. 308 (1931); United States v. Powers, 482 F.2d 941,

944 (8th Cir. 1973), cert denied 415 U.S. 923 (1974). That

duty was fulfilled in the case at bar, however. The

questions concerning race which the district court

propounded demonstrated a proper exercise of

discretion. See United States v. Hamling, 418 U.S. 87,

140 (1974); United States v. Thompson, 490 F.2d 1218,

1222 (8th Cir. 1974).

II

A. Coconspirator’s Statements.

At trial, the undercover agents, over

appellant’s objection, related the substance of

telephone conversations with Mario Burkhalter during

which the sale of the shotguns was arranged.

Appellant contends that the agents’ testimony was

hearsay and therefore improperly admitted. The

66

government urges that the statements were

admissible as declarations of a coconspirator under

FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2) (EF).

It is well-established that an out-of-court

declaration of a coconspirator is admissible against a

defendant if the government demonstrates (1) that a

conspiracy existed; (2) that the defendant and the

declarant were members of the conspiracy; and (3) that

the declaration was made during the course and in

furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v.

Lambros, 564 F.2d 26, 30 (8th Cir. 1977); United States

v. Frol, 518 F.2d 1134, 1136-37 (8th Cir. 1975); United

States v. Sanders, 463 F.2d 1086, 1088 (8th Cir. 1972);

FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2) (E). The new Federal Rules of

Evidence have caused subtle but significant changes in

the way that rule is applied, however. See United

States v. Petroziello, 548 F.2d 20, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1977).

In particular, the admissibility of an alleged

coconspirator’s statement is now a_ preliminary

question for the judge, not the jury, to decide. FED. R.

EVID. 104; United States v. Petroziello, supra; but

4.

FED. R. EVID. 104 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary

questions concerning ... the admissibility of evidence shall be

determined by the court, subject to the provisions of sub-

division (b), In making its determination it is not bound by the

rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.

(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy

of evidence depends on the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the

court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of

evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the

condition,

‘ Rimi nat el at

67

see Kessler, The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of

Fact in Conspiracy Litigation: Putting the Conspiracy

Back Into the Coconspirator Rule, 5 Hofstra Law

Review 77 (1976). This shift in the relative functions of

the judge and jury has occasioned a reevaluation of the

level and type of proof necessary to demonstrate a

defendant's involvement in a conspiracy sufficiently to

admit a coconspirator’s statement. See 1

WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE 4104 [05] at 104-39-44

(1977); Bergman, The Coconspirator’s Exception:

Defining the Standard of the Independent Evidence

Test Under the New Rules of Evidence, 5 Hofstra Law

Review 99 (1976).

Previous cases in this circuit required that the

conspiracy be proved by “substantial independent

evidence... .” United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109,

1117 (8th Cir. 1977); See United States v. Frol, supra at

1136. Other decisions spoke in terms of a “prima facie

case of conspiracy... .” United States v. Anthony, 565

F.2d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Lambros,

supra at 30 n. 4. These formulations were appropriate

“when the jury ha{d] the last word... .” United States

v. Petroziello, supra at 23. But because the district

court’s determination of the admissibility of a

coconspirator’s statement is final under FED. R.EVID.

104, we have concluded that a different standard of

proof is now required. See id. at 22-23; see generally

United States v. Lambros, supra. It is not necessary,

however, that a defendant's complicity ina conspiracy

be proved beyond a reasonable doubt for a statement

68

to be admissible under FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2) (E).

United States v. Petroziello, supra at 23. The ordinary

civil standard of preponderance of the evidence is

sufficient since the district court is ruling on

admissibility rather than ultimate guilt. /d.

It has been suggested that the new Federal

Rules of Evidence have altered the requirement that

the admissibility of a coconspirator's statement be

determined on evidence exclusive of the statement

itself. See, e.g., United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1,

11-12 (1st Cir.), rehearing denied, 561 F.2d 406, 408-09

(1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 21,

1978) (No. 77-603); Bergman, supra at 105. We believe

that the requirement of independent evidence is an

important safeguard, however, and therefore adhere

to our traditional rule. See Glasser v. United States,

315 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942); United States v. Lambros,

supra. Accordingly, we hold that an out-of-court

statement is not hearsay and is admissible if on the

independent evidence the district court is satisfied

that it is more likely than not that the statement was

made during the course and in furtherance of an illegal

association to which the declarant and the defendant

were parties.

For the purpose of providing guidance to the

district courts in future trials, we submit that the

following procedural steps should be utilized when the

admissibility of a coconspirator's statement is at issue,

regardless of the nature of the charge or charges:

69

(1) If the prosecutor propounds a question which

obvious!y requires a witness to recount an out-of-court

declaration of an alleged coconspirator, the court, upon

a timely and appropriate objection by the defendant,

may conditionally admit the statement. At the same

time, the court should, on the record, caution the

parties (a) that the statement is being admitted subject

to defendant's objection; (b) that the government will

be required to prove by a preponderance of the

independent evidence that the statement was made by

a coconspirator during the course and in furtherance of

the conspiracy; (c) that at the conclusion of all the

evidence the court will make an explicit determination

for the record regarding the admissibility of the

statement; and (d) that if the court determines that the

government has failed to carry the burden delineated

in (b) above, the court will, upon appropriate motion,

declare a mistrial, unless a cautionary instruction to

the jury to disregard the statement would suffice to

cure any prejudice. See United States v. Stanchich,

550 F.2d 1294, 1298 (2d Cir. 1977). The foregoing

procedural steps should transpire out of the hearing of

the jury. See FED. R. EVID. 104(e),

(2) After a ruling on the record that the out-of.

court declaration is admissible under Rule

801(d) (2) (E), the court may submit the case to the jury.

The court should not charge the jury on the

admissibility of the coconspirator’s statement, but

should, of course, instruct that the government is

required to prove the ultimate guilt of the defendant

beyond a reasonable doubt. An appropriate instruction

70

on credibility should be given, and the jury should be

cautioned with regard to the weight and credibility to

be accorded a coconspirator’s statement.

In the present case, appellant complains that

the district court never made _ the _ requisite

determination on the record that Burkhalter's

statements were admissible under FED. R. EVID.

801(d)(2)(E). An explicit, on-the-record finding of

admissibility has never previously been required in

this circuit, however. See United States v. Kelley, 526

F.2d 615, 619 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S,

914 (1976). Moreover, appellant failed to request the

finding he now contends was necessary. Given the

dearth of appellate guidance on point, the absence of a

formal finding of admissibility was not plain error. See

United States v. Martorano, supra, 557 F.2d at 11;

FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). There was compelling

independent evidence that appellant and Burkhalter

conspired to sell firearms without payment of the

required transfer tax. The agents testified that

Burkhalter, for a fee, introduced them to appellant and

arranged for appellant to sell them the shotguns, They

further testified that both appellant and Burkhalter

were present when the purchase price and a portion of

the “finder's fee" were paid. In addition, the

statements admitted against appellant were clearly

made during the course and in furtherance of the

71

conspiracy.” In short, the government unquestionably

met its burden of demonstrating the admissibility of

Burkhalter’s statements. Consequently, the lack of an

on-the-record determination of admissibility did not

affect any substantial rights of appellant. See FED. R.

CRIM. P. 52(b).

B. Testimony on the Purpose of the Gun

Control Act.

On redirect examination by the prosecutor, one

of the undercover agents testified concerning the

statutory purpose of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18

U.S.C, §921 et seg. Over repeated defense objections,

the following was elicited:

5.

One agent testified as follows:

[Burkhalter] inquired as to whether I would be interested

in purchasing two sawed off shotguns and discussed the fee that

he would receive for lining up the sale,

It was agreed that he would receive twenty dollars for

each firearm if | were allowed—or if I were introduced to the

party that had them for sale,

[Burkhalter] said that when he had finally lined the sale up he

would contact me again or contact us, my partner and myself,

The other agent testified concerning a second phone conversation:

[Burkhalter] indicated to me that he was in contact with the

person that had two sawed off shotguns for sale and wished] to

sell them to us,

72

[Sawed-off shotguns] are considered

gangster type weapons, sir, because of their

concealability and their use in impact upon

persons.

[T]hey are readily concealable, but at the same

time they afford the person carrying the firearm

a great amount of fire power, and as they are

five shot weapons, and they do fire shotgun shell

which is a very good antipersonnel type

projectile.

[Blecause of the shortened barrel, the shot

pattern, when the shot is fired, and the shotgun

shell pellets go down the barrel they tend to

spread out at a very fast rate so they can cover a

very large area and strike a great many objects

in a wide area at short range.

This testimony had little or no probative value

on any issue at trial. See United States v. Williams,

545 F.2d 47, 50-51 (8th Cir. 1976). Since the prejudicial

impact of the testimony substantially outweighed its

probativeness, the district court erred in admitting it.

FED. R. EVID. 403; see United States v. Mejia, 529

F.2d 995, 996 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). In view of the

strength of the case against appellant, however, we

hold that the district court’s error was harmless. See

FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); FED. R. EVID. 103(a); see

generally Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,

764-65 (1946).

73

ITI

Appellant next contends that the district court

erroneously instructed the jury on aiding and abetting

a violation of 26 U.S.C. §5861(e) by omitting any

reference to specific intent. We find no merit in

appellant’s argument.

Specific intent is not required for a violation of

26 U.S.C. §5861(e). United States v. Thomas, 531 F.2d

419, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1976; United States v. DeBartolo,

482 F.2d 312, 314-17 (1st Cir. 1973); see United States v.

Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971). It would be anomalous

to hold that specific intent was a necessary element of

aiding and abetting a crime, but not of the crime itself.

In the present case, it was enough that appellant

knowingly participate in the sale of the shotguns, and

the district court so instructed the jury.’ See Nye &

Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949); ef.

United States v. Kelton, 446 F.2d 669, 670 (8th Cir.

1971) (similar instructions).

The district court instructed the jury as follows:

[T]he law is in order to find a person guilty of a crime you need

not find that he did every single thing about the crime. If he

aided or assisted in some knowing way and participated in it as

something he wanted to do, then he, too, is involved in the crime.

If you are in on the act vou are in on the crime, and I think that's

the government's second bow there that even if you didn't

believe that the actual transfer was made by this defendant to

the two agents, he was still acting as an aider and abettor in the

crime.

74

Finally, appeliant complains of prejudicial

comments by the district court in the charge to the

jury. Specifically, appellant contends that the district

court improperly mentioned the reasons for

Burkhalter’s absence from the trial. Appellant also

asserts that the district court’s comments on the

evidence of appellant's failure to pay a transfer tax

effectively directed the verdict on that issue. We have

carefully reviewed the district court’s comments and

find no error affecting the substantial rights of

appellant.

Appellant's conviction is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS,

EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

75

APPENDIX I

UNITED STATES v. JONES No. 1490

(8th Cir. Feb. 16, 1978)

Submitted: October 10, 1977

Filed: February 16, 1978

Before GIBSON, Chief Judge; BRIGHT, Circuit Judge;

and TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge.*

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Augustin Jones, a physician practicing in St.

Louis, Missouri, appeals a conviction for intentionally

distributing Quaalude, a Schedule II controlled

substance,! in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a) (1) (1970).”

*TALBOT SMITH, United States Senior District Judge, Eastern

District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

a.

A drug or other substance listed in Schedule II has “a high

potential for abuse,” has “a currently accepted medical use in treatment

in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe

restrictions,” and is a drug or substance the abuse of which “may lead to

severe psychological or physical dependence.” 21 U.S.C. §812 (b) (2) (1970).

21 C.F.R. §1308.12(e) (1977) provides that drugs containing specified

depressant substances are listed under Schedule II. No dispute exists

that Quaalude is a depressant-type drug listed under Schedule II.

21 U.S.C. §841 (a) (1) 1970) provides in pertinent part:

(a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be

unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally —

(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense * * * a

controlled substancef.|

76

Dr. Jones was charged with two counts of prescribing

Quaalude without a legitimate medical purpose and

outside the usual course of professional practice: count

I related to a prescription written by Dr. Jones on

January 10, 1977, and count II related to a second

prescription written on February 9, 1977. The jury

acquitted Dr. Jones on count I but convicted him on

count II. We reverse the conviction.

On this appeal, Dr. Jones contends that the

district court erred in admitting evidence of alleged

similar acts in prescribing Quaalude, and, in addition,

Tuinal, Preludin, Desoxyn, and Dilaudid, other

Schedule II drugs. Dr. Jones also contends that the

prosecution did not produce sufficient expert medical

evidence on which to base a conviction.

We hold that the district court erred in

permitting the Government to introduce evidence

concerning 478 prescriptions for Schedule II drugs,

allegedly issued by Dr. Jones to his patients, as

evidence of other crimes bearing upon Dr. Jones’

knowledge and unlawful intent in prescribing drugs as

charged in the indictment.

I. The Evidence at Trial.

In order to place the admission of the contested

evidence in appropriate context, we summarize the

evidence introduced at the two-day trial. The

indictment stemmed from the efforts of St. Louis

policemen who, posing as patients, visited Dr. Jones

77

in order to obtain prescriptions of Schedule II drugs,

specifically Quaalude, a depressant, or Preludin, an

amphetamine sometimes used for the purpose of

facilitating weight loss. In late November or the early

part of December 1976, officer Antone Wagner of the

St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, who

worked as an undercover agent in the Narcotics

Division, went to Dr. Jones’ office. In the waiting room

of the office he observed five other persons between

the ages of twenty and thirty-five. Officer Wagner

asked Dr. Jones for a prescription for Preludin, which

Wagner indicated he needed for weight control. Dr.

Jones asked Wagner for his reference, and Wagner

responded with the name of Linda Couch. Stating that

he did not recail Linda Couch, Dr. Jones declined to

prescribe Preludin for Wagner.

On January 10, 1977, the St. Louis Police

Department made a further effort to obtain Schedule

II drugs from Dr. Jones. On that date, Larry Wells, a

police officer on assignment to the Drug Enforcement

Administration, went to Dr. Jones’ office under the

assumed name of Tony Ventimiglia and told the

physician that one Ricky Feldman had said that he

(Wells) could obtain a prescription for Quaalude from

Dr. Jones. Officer Wells testified that Dr. Jones took

some information from him and then gave him a

prescription for thirty Quaalude tablets. Wells paid

ten dollars for this medical service and was told by Dr.

Jones to try Gross Drugs in St. Louis if he had any

trouble getting the prescription filled. In fact, Gross

78

Drugs would not fill the prescription, but Wells

obtained the medication from another pharmacy in St.

Louis. Dr. Jones’ version of the session, while

substantially in accord with the testimony of officer

Wells, added that Wells had stated that he worked on

the production line at the Chrysler plant, that the

work was tiring, and that he needed something for

sleep. Count I of the indictment rests upon this

January 10th incident. As we have already noted, the

jury returned a not guilty verdict on this count.

Officer Wells returned to Dr. Jones’ office on

February 9, 1977.2 He identified himself by his

assumed name and was escorted by Dr. Jones into the

latter’s office. In the conversation that ensued, Dr.

Jones commented on Wells’ apparant Italian heritage.

Wells mentioned that he had obtained the new job that

he had mentioned during his previous office visit on

January 10th. Dr. Jones wrote a prescription for thirty

Quaalude tablets and gave the prescription to Wells;

Wells again paid Dr. Jones ten dollars. Wells testified

that he had not requested the prescription and that Dr.

Jones did not make any inquiry into his medical history

or make any kind of physical examination. Wells also

told Dr. Jones that his wife had taken and benefited

from some of the Quaalude tablets. Wells requested a

prescription for his wife, but Dr. Jones refused, stating

3.

On this occasion, officer Wells carried a concealed microphone that

transmitted his conversation with Dr. Jones to a receiver-recorder

operated by officer Wagner, who was stationed in an automobile outside.

The Government introduced the taped record of the conversation into

evidence. The recording was of poor quality and partly inaudible.

=) alieS =

79

that she would have to come to the office for a

prescription. Wells filled his prescription at King

Pharmacy in St. Louis. These events formed the basis

for count II of the indictment, on which the jury

returned its guilty verdict.

In order to buttress its case against Dr. Jones,

the prosecution introduced 478 prescriptions issued by

Dr. Jones to patients over an approximate twenty-

month period between August 9, 1975, and April 26,

1977. These prescriptions had been filled by Gross

Drugs in St. Louis. An agent of the Drug Enforcement

Agency also testified about prescriptions issued by Dr.

Jones that had been filled at other St. Louis

pharmacies. The agent indicated that in a three-month

period from November 1976, through January 1977,

Dr. Jones’ prescriptions for Schedule II drugs

accounted for forty-seven percent of Gross Drugs’ total

volume of Schedule II drug prescriptions.

An investigator for the Missouri Division of

Health, Bureau of Narcotics, testified that he visited

Dr. Jones in January of 1976 and warned Dr. Jones

about prescribing large quantities of Schedule II drugs

to certain types of people. The investigator declared

that after their conversation Dr. Jones cancelled the

rest of his appointments scheduled for that cay.

The Government then called police officers

associated with the Drug Enforcement Division of the

St. Louis Police Department, who identified thirteen

individuals named as patients on some of the 478

80

prescriptions written by Dr. Jones and filled at Gross

Drugs. The police officers testified that all of these

individuals have recognizable “track marks,” which

are scars or discolorations indicative of drug addiction,

on their arms or hands, and that some were “slender.”

A pharmacist testified that in February of 1977 he had

filled about a dozen prescriptions for Quaalude issued

by Dr. Jones; he described the recipients as young

people around twenty years of age.

The introduction of this evidence, over

objection by the defendant Dr. Jones, placed Dr. Jones

in a posture of having to explain not only a proper

medical purpose for prescribing Quaalude for pseudo-

patient officer Wells, but also his medical treatment

for the thirteen individuals identified as probable drug

addicts by police officers. In addition, Dr. Jones was

required to attempt to rebut the suggestion of

wrongful conduct in prescribing Schedule II narcotics

for the scores of persons listed as patients in the 478

prescriptions seized by the prosecution and introduced

in evidence. Indeed, the transcript of the trial

establishes that most of the trial time, including

examination and cross-examination of Dr. Jones, dwelt

not on matters covered by the indictment but on Dr.

Jones’ conduct in issuing the 478 other prescriptions.

II. Other Crimes Evidence.

Appellant argues that the trial court committed

prejudicial error in admitting into evidence testimony

relating to the 478 other prescriptions issued by Dr.

81

Jones for Schedule II drugs and in permitting St. Louis

police officers to identify several of the patients named

in these prescriptions as known or recognizable drug

addicts. The Government, citing United States v.

Calvert, 523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424

U.S. 911 (1976), and Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),‘

argues that evidence of other crimes or similar acts is

admissible to show intent, knowledge, plan, or absence

of mistake when those matters are at issue in the trial.

That Dr. Jones issued a great number of

prescriptions for Schedule II drugs demonstrates

familiarity, i.e, knowledge, concerning the usages of

Quaalude. But the Government clearly did not

introduce that evidence for such limited and proper

purpose. By obtaining testimony from various police

officers that some of the patients named _ in

prescriptions for Schedule II drugs were narcotics

addicts, the prosecution sought to imply that some, if

not all, of these 478 prescriptions had been issued by

Dr. Jones outside the legitimate and proper scope of

medical practice. The prosecution did not introduce

any evidence concerning the doctor-patient

relationship existing with respect to these

prescriptions, nor did it present other proof that the

4.

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) reads:

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character

of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity

therewith, It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,

such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

82

prescriptions had not been issued for a proper medical

purpose,

In United States v. Clemons, 503 F.2d 486, 489

(8th Cir. 1974), we said that evidence of alleged other

crimes must be “clear and convincing.” That case arose

prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,

which became effective on July 1, 1975. Subsequent to

the adoption of the Federal Rules, in United States v.

Maestas, 554 F.2d 834, 837 n.2 (8th Cir. 1977), we

commented that “evidence [of other crimes] which is

vague and speculative is not competent proof and

should not be admitted into evidence.”

The other prescriptions of Schedule II drugs by

Dr. Jones to his patients constituted crimes or

unlawful acts similar to the crimes charged in the

indictment only if Dr. Jones issued those prescriptions

outside the bounds of professional medical practice.

United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124, 142 (1975).

Absent any evidence bearing upon Dr. Jones’

treatment of the patients in question, issuance of the

prescriptions without more does not show that Dr.

Jones acted unprofessionally in issuing these

prescriptions. Therefore, the district court erred in

admitting these prescriptions as evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or similar acts under Federal Rule of

Evidence 404(b).

Moreover, the evidence, even though relevant

for some purpose, should have been excluded under

Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which reads as follows:

83

Exclusion of Relevant Evidence

on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or

Waste of Time

Although relevant, evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,

or by considerations of undue delay, waste of

time, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence.

The evidence in question was relevant in part to

establish the nature of Dr. Jones’ practice and his

knowledge of restrictions on prescribing Quaalude as a

sleeping tablet. However, the Government sought to

imply wrongdoing on the physician's part from the

quantity of the prescriptions and the “quality” of some

patients. The evidence lacked substantial probative

force upon the issue of improper medical practice in

the transactions charged, yet it could have led the jury

to speculate that the quantity of prescriptions alone

established wrongful conduct by Dr. Jones.

The trial transcript indicates that the

Government spent more time in its case-in-chief

dealing with alleged wrongful conduct not covered by

the indictment than it spent dealing with the incidents

for which Dr. Jones was charged. When Dr. Jones took

the witness stand to present his defense, he was

required to respond to some 478 instances of allegedly

improper practice in issuing medical prescriptions,

matters not set forth in the indictment, and was

subject to vigorous cross-examination relating to these

84

other claims of wrong-doing. This case calls for the

application of the exclusionary principle of Rule 403,

for the probative value of the evidence in question was

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading of

the jury.

III. Motion for Acquittal.

Appellant urges as error the district court's

failure to sustain a motion for acquittal. We do not

know the grounds on which the motion was based, for

the motion is not included in the record on appeal. We

have only these two statements from appellant's brief

to guide us:

The Court committed prejudicial error in

failing to sustain Defendant's Motion for

Judgment of Acquittal at the Close of All the

Evidence for the Government and at the Close

of All the Evidence in the case for the reason

that there was no expert witness testimony that

the prescriptions [sic] issued by defendant were

not for a legitimate medical purpose and not

issued in the usual course of professional

practice.

Lastly, it needs to be said that the

evidence is insufficient to convict the defendant

because Dr. Burton merely testified, and

remember he was an associate professor of

Pharmacology at Washington University

Medical School only, that, “. . . we teach our

85

medical students that they must take a proper

history and complete history, and they must do

a physical examination and then prescribe the

appropriate drug for the diagnosis they arrive.”

And in answer to the question, “Do you feel in

any prescribing situation a proper history and

physical should be taken?” He answered, “Yes,

sir,

Appellant appears to be arguing either that the

Government failed to establish a medical standard for

prescribing Quaalude or that the Government, though

establishing a medical standard, failed to prove by the

testimony of medical experts that Dr. Jones did not

comply with the standard.

We reject both of these arguments. The

testimony of Dr. Robert Burton, called by the

prosecution, as well as that of Dr. Charles Jost, called

by appellant, substantially agreed that a physician

should inquire as to a patient's general condition

before prescribing Quaalude or other Schedule II

drugs. Dr. Burton testified that before prescribing any

drug, a physician must take a medical history and

make some physical examination. Witness Burton

possesses a Ph.D. in pharmacology. Although not an

M.D., his twenty years of teaching at the Washington

University Medical School qualifies him as an expert

entitled to express an opinion as to medical

procedures in prescribing drugs such as those listed

under Schedule II. Thus, the Government adequately

proved a medical standard. The question of whether

Dr. Jones’ procedures met that standard was for the

86

jury to determine, not expert witnesses. See United

States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062, 1073 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975).

Thus, the trial judge did not err in denying the

motion for acquittal on the narrow grounds asserted on

appeal. Although our decision on appeal does not

require a dismissal of the conviction on count II against

Dr. Jones, from our review of the record, we believe

that this court’s comment in United States v. Garvin,

565 F.2d 519, 523 (8th Cir. 1977), apropos:

We view the evidence of record in this

case as extremely marginal. However, * * * we

find nothing to preclude a re-trial if the

Government chooses that course * * *.

Reversed and remanded.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS,

EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

87

APPENDIX J

UNITED States v. McClintie, Jr.

No. 77-1174

(8th Cir. Jan. 18, 1978)

Before HEANEY jand BRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and

TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge.

TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge.

The defendant appeals from a jury verdict of

guilty on five counts of a six-count indictment. We

affirm.

Count I charged the defendant, Scott Voeltz,

and Robert Braumann with violating 18 U.S.C. §371 by

conspiring to commit wire and mail fraud, and

interstate transportation and receiving of stolen

property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 2314,

and 2315. Counts II, III, and V charged the defendant

with receiving stolen property transported in

interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and

2315. Count IV charged the defendant with interstate

transportation of stolen property in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 2 and 2314. The jury acquitted the defendant

of the sixth count, which charged an extortionate

*TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge, Eastern District of

Michigan, sitting by designation.

88

extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. §892. The

defendant was sentenced to five years imprisonment

on count I and ten years on count II, to run

concurrently. He was sentenced to ten years

imprisonment on count III, to run consecutively to the

terms on counts I and II. He received prison terms of

ten years on each of counts IV and V, to run

concurrently with counts I, II, and III.

After filing notice of appeal, defendant filed a

motion for a new trial on the ground of newly

discovered evidence. This Court remanded to the

District Court! for disposition and defendant's motion

was subsequently denied. On appeal, the defendant

challenges the adequacy of the indictment, the trial

court's refusal to sever counts I, II, and III from counts

IV and V, several evidentiary rulings, and the denial of

his new trial motion based on newly discovered

evidence.

Counts I, II and III arise out of the defendant's

involvement in the so-called Mount Vernon scheme.

Pursuant to this scheme the defendant initially loaned

money to Susan Dvorak. She in turn transferred part

of the money to Scott Voeltz and Robert Braumann to

operate a food concession in Florida. Unable to collect

the loan from Ms. Dvorak, the defendant attempted to

collect directly from Voeltz and Braumann, without

success. Agreeing that they could pay in merchandise,

l.

The Honorable Edward J. McManus, Chief United States District

Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.

89

Voeltz and Braumann, with defendant's knowledge,

operated two business fronts, Star Sales and Mount

Vernon Sales, on premises in Mount Vernon, Iowa.

Using false financial statements and alternating their

“companies” as credit references, they placed orders

by mail and telephone with a variety of wholesale

suppliers. When the suppliers checked the

“references” by telephone, the false information was

confirmed. Quick Products, a local sales company

owned by the defendant and his brother, was also used

as a credit reference; false credit reference

confirmations were provided through the cooperation

of the defendant and Timothy Morrissey, a Quick

Products employee.

When Voeltz and Braumann received

merchandise in late May, 1975, the defendant took

items valued at about $14,000 in repayment of the loan

and sold them in his own name. Morrissey helped

transfer the goods to the defendant’s residence. When

the initial sales of the merchandise did not satisfy the

defendant, he returned to Voeltz, who furnished him

with more merchandise later in June, 1975.

Counts IV and V arise out of the defendant's

involvement in the so-called “Paper Place” scheme in

Denver, Colorado. In August or early September, 1975,

Morrissey approached the defendant with an outline

for a novel which Morrissey had entitled “Paper

Place.” The outline detailed a check-kiting scheme in

which persons would set up a bogus company and open

90

bank * accounts using false documents’ and

identification. Payroll checks written on the accounts

would be cashed in supermarkets and retail stores on a

weekend, while the banks were closed; the rest of the

scheme would be closed up by the end of the weekend.

After discussion of the scheme, the defendant loaned

money to Morrissey to try the plan out in Minnesota.

This attempt, and another, executed in Salt Lake City

and similarly financed by a loan from defendant, were

economically unsuccessful.

Anxious to pay back his loans, Morrissey met

with defendant later in September and discussed a trip

to execute the Paper Place scheme in Denver.

Defendant again loaned money to Morrissey to finance

the trip. The operation of the Denver scheme was

successful, netting several thousand dollars worth of

merchandise, which Morrissey and an accomplice

brought back to Iowa for resale.

Morrissey and his accomplice removed some of

the serial numbers from the goods and shortly

thereafter, the defendant and Morrissey began to sell

the merchandise locally, for cash. They were

unsuccessful in recouping the amount of the loans

outstanding to Morrissey, so a few weeks later, the

Paper Place scheme was attempted in Rockford,

Illinois, at defendant's suggestion. After two or three

days in Rockford, the sham was detected, and

Morrissey and his accomplice were arrested.

Defendant McClintic was apprehended later.

91

Defendant contends that the trial court erred

by refusing to dismiss counts II, III, and V of the

indictment as fatally defective for failing to charge a

violation of 18 U.S.C. §2315.” Defendant complains that

by charging him with receipt of stolen merchandise

which he knew “to have been stolen, unlawfully

converted and taken by fraud,” (emphasis supplied),

counts II, III, and V added an element not contained in

the statute. The defendant argues that the addition of

this descriptive element had the effect of charging acts

which are not proscribed by 18 U.S.C § 2315.

The defendant’s argument is defective in three

particulars. First, the addition of the descriptive

element did not mislead the accused; rather it merely

described in greater detail “the elements of the offense

charged and fairly inform{ed] [him] of the charge

2.

18 U.S.C. §2315 provides in relevant part:

Whoever receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or

disposes of any goods, wares or merchandise, securities, or

money of the value of $5,000 or more, or pledges or accepts as

security for a loan any goods, wares, or merchandise, or

securities, of the value of $500 or more, moving as, or which are a

part of, or which constitute interstate or foreign commerce,

knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or

taken;

Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not

more than ten years, or both. (Emphasis supplied.)

92

against which he must defend.” Hamling v. United

States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974).

Second, the accepted construction of the term

“stolen,” as used in the present codification of the

National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and

2315, as well as the “Dyer Act,”” includes “all felonious

takings ... with intent to deprive the owner of the

rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of

whether or not the theft constitutes common-law

larceny.” United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417

(1957). See also United States v. Frakes, 563 F.2d 803,

805 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d

988, 995 (1977); Lyda v. United States, 279 F.2d 461,

464 (5th Cir. 1960); Bergman v. United States, 253 F.2d

933, 935 (6th Cir. 1958). A taking “by fraud,” fits

accurately within the expansive definition of “stolen”

above.

Third, the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. §2315

shows that the type of taking referred to in the

scienter clause was a taking by fraud. Section 4 of the

National Stolen Property Act, ch. 333, 48 Stat. 795

(1934), the precursor to 18 U.S.C. §2315, provided

originally as follows:

Whoever shall receive, conceal, store,

barter, sell, or dispose of any goods, wares, or

merchandise, securities, or money, of the value

3.

The Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. §2312, prohibits the interstate

transportation of “stolen” vehicles.

93

of $5,000 or more, or whoever shall pledge or

accept as security for a loan any goods, wares,

or merchandise, or securities of the value of

$500 or more which, while moving in or

constituting a part of interstate or foreign

commerce, has been stolen or taken feloniously

by fraud or with intent to steal or purloin,

knowing the same to have been stolen or taken,

shall be punished by a fine of not more than

$10,000 or by imprisonment of not more than ten

years, or both. (Emphasis supplied.)

Subsequent simplifying amendments of this language

in later codifications reveal no hint that Congress

thereby intended to restrict the statute's reach. We

agree with the Fifth Circuit in Lyda v. United Stats,

supra, that the class of deprivations of property which

Congress sought to prohibit in the National Stolen

Property Act includes “a forcible taking or a taking

without ... permission, by false pretense, by fraud, by

swindling, or by a conversion by one rightfully in

possession.” 279 F.2d at 464. The _ indictment

accurately spelled out the elements of the offense

charged.

II.

The defendant claims that the trial court erred

by refusing to sever counts I, II, and III, relating to the

Mount Vernon scheme, from counts IV and V, relating

to the Paper Place scheme. He argues that the Mount

Vernon and Paper Place schemes were dissimilar in

character and that the jury was prejudicially swayed

by the accumulated evidence against him.

94

Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) permits joinder of offenses

if “the offenses charged ... are of the same or similar

character or are based on the same act or transaction

or on two or more acts or transactions connected

together or constituting parts of a common scheme or

plan.” Rule 14 permits severance to avoid undue

prejudice. Where the offenses are similar in character

and occurred over a relatively short period of time and

the evidence overlaps, joinder is ordinarily

appropriate. United States v. Riley, 530 F.2d 767, 770

(8th Cir. 1976), United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45, 49

(8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 961 (1975). The

trial court has a wide range of discretion in matters of

severance, and we reverse only upon a finding of clear

prejudice and abuse of discretion. United States v.

Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 1111 (1977). United States v. Riley, supra;

United States v. Chrisco, 493 F.2d 232, 239 (8th Cir.

1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 847 (1974); United States v.

Simon, 453 F.2d 111, 114 (8th Cir. 1971). Here, the

defendant participated in each scheme in a nearly

identical manner: - that is, by receipt and sale of

fraudulently obtained merchandise as payment on a

previous loan. While Voeltz and Braumann did not

participate in the second scheme, McClintic’s

involvement in both smoothly shifted from sales of the

Mount Vernon goods to financing the Paper Place

operations. No abuse of discretion has been shown.

Defendant's contention that joinder allowed the jury

to impermissably pool incriminating evidence against

him is belied by his acquittal of count VI.

95

ITI.

Timothy Morrissey was’ the _ principal

government witness concerning the Paper Place

scheme. He testified that although he and McClintic

had discussed the scheme prior to his Denver trip, he

did not explain to the defendant after the trip how the

goods had been obtained. The government then

elicited over the defendant’s objection Morrissey’'s

opinion that McClintic knew that the Denver

merchandise had _ been fraudulently obtained.

Defendant now claims that this testimony went

beyond the proper bonds for a lay witness’ opinion and

could not have been rationally based on _ the

perceptions of the witness.

Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence limits

the opinions of a lay witness to “those opinions or

inferences which are (a) rationally based on the

perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear

understanding of his testimony or the determination of

a fact in issue.” Defendant does not contest that the

opinion of the person closest to McClintie during the

planning of the Denver scheme and its aftermath

would be helpful in determining whether or not the

defendant knew that the goods were obtained by

fraud. Rather, defendant disputes the basis for the

witness’ opinion.

Here the basis seems ample. In the first place

there had been a full discussion between defendant

and Morrissey of the details of operation of the Paper

Place scheme, which was employed in Denver.

Moreover, defendant's actions in negotiating cash

sales of the fraudulently obtained goods soon after

Morrissey returned from Denver were fully consistent

with the implementation of the theretofore discussed

scheme. Morrissey’s opinion that the defendant fully

understood how the goods had been obtained was

rationally based upon his perceptions, and his opinion

was proper as “a shorthand rendition of [the witness’]

knowledge of the total situation and the collective

facts.” United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1184, 1191

(10th Cir. 1975). The trial court did not abuse its

discretion by permitting this testimony.

IV.

The defendant, testifying in his own behalf,

asserted that the first time in his life when he had done

anything illegal was when he participated in

organizing the Paper Place scheme in Rockford,

Illinois. On cross-examination, however, the

prosecutor inquired into the defendant's atempt in

1973 to sell a two-hundred dollar ring for $8,000. The

buyer had been in reality an FBI agent, and the

attempted swindle had resulted in a charge in the

97

defendant's then-current terms of probation.’ The trial

court ruled, over objection, that this inquiry was

proper cross-examination. Defendant argues that it

unfairly prejudiced him by presenting prior criminal

acts which bore no relation to the issues at trial. We

disagree.

Inquiry into the defendant's prior act of

misconduct is justified on two grounds. First,

McClintic’s attempt to swindle the ring buyer was an

act of deception that reflected upon his character for

truthfulness and as such, was properly subject to

inquiry during cross-examination under Fed. R. Evid.

4.

The defendant had testified on direct examination that in 1972 he

had been indicted for his involvement in an alleged scheme to defraud a

vending machine company. Those charges were resolved by a plea

bargain: defendant pled guilty to three counts of mail fraud in exchange

for a sentence of three years on probation and dismissal of 30 other counts

of the indictment.

During defendant's cross-examination, only the true identity of the

ring buyer was revealed to the jury; the effect of the incident on the.

defendant's probation was not.

608 (b).° United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 438 (8th Cir.

1977), cert. denied sub nom., Hendrix v. United States,

430 U.S. 937 (1977). Admissibility of prior misconduct

which is probative of a witness’ truthfulness is

expressly entrusted to the trial court's discretion by

Rule 608(b). This incident was not remote in time from

the trial,® its nature made it probative of the

defendant's untruthfulness, and the prejudicial aspects

of its effect on the defendant's probationary status

were not exposed to the jury. We cannot say that the

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues or

misleading the jury so substantially outweighed the

5.

Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) provides:

Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the

purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than

conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by

extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the

court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired

into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his

character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning

the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another

witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined

has testified.

The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any

other witness, does not operate as a waiver of his privilege

against self-incrimination when examined with respect to

matters which relate only to credibility.

6.

An incident’s remoteness in time is no longer an explicit factor

under Rule 608(b). See, H.R. Rep. 93-650, 93d Cong., Ist Sess; United

States v. Burch, 490 F.2d 1300, 1302 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 416

U.S. 990 (1974). Nevertheless, remoteness in time remains a consideration

relevant to the evidence's probative value.

99

evidence's probative value that its admission was an

abuse of discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 403. '

Moreover, the ring-swindle cross-examination

was proper as impeachment by contradiction. C.

McCormic, McCormick on Evidence § 47 at 97 (2d ed.

1972). By painting a picture of himself as an innocent

who succumbed to sympathy for Morrissey in the

Rockford, Illinois scheme, the defendant invited cross-

examination concerning this previous misconduct.®

We find no abuse of discretion in the rulings

made.

V.

Finally we consider the motion for a new trial.

Defendant's co-conspirators Voeltz and Braumann

were the government's principal witnesses in the

Mount Vernon scheme. Both had struck plea bargains

before testifying but not all of the terms had been

reduced to writing in the government's memoranda

during cross-examination but they were not admitted

7.

See, Advisory Committee's note to Proposed Rule 608,

Subdivision (b).

8.

United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d 994, 1002 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.

denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); United States ». Reddington, 433 F.2d 997,

998 (4th Cir. 1970). See also United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.

1977) (allow-extrinsie evidence to contradict the defendant's assertion

that he was naive in drug matters).

100

as exhibits on the ground that they were merely |

cumulative. After defendant's conviction the terms of |

the bargain made were the subject of lengthy

controversy, as well as evidentiary hearings, and

based upon the evidence there developed, a motion for

new trial on the grounds .of newly discovered

evidence was made. The denial of this motion is

asserted as error.

The version of the bargain that had gone before

the jury was that, in return for the testimony of Voeltz

and Braumann, the government would recommend

probation as to Braumann and “recommend and bind

itself’ to probation for Voeltz.? But it finally

developed, from the evidentiary hearings, and it was

conceded by the government, that the bargain actually

made involved the unusual commitment by the

9.

On direct examination the following testimony was elicited by

prosecutor Robert Sikma from codefendants Braumann and Voeltz:

BRAUMANN

Q. What is that agreement, the best of your understanding?

A. If I cooperate and plead guilty to one count and the

Government recommends probation.

Voeltz

Q. You have been also told that the Government will agree to

recommend and bind itself to a sentence of probation in this

case. Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

101

government that if the Court did not acquiesce in

probation all charges would be dismissed.'?

Initially Braumann was put on probation but

probation was refused as to Voeliz. After a series of

legal maneuvers which we need not recite, the case

was transferred to Judge Hanson and Voeltz

eventually received probation.'' Thus each

codefendant has received the benefit of his bargain.

The issue argued by defendant is a narrow one,

namely that the defendant is entitled to a new trial on

the ground that the lenient term of the plea

agreement, relating to dismissal of the charges, was

placed before neither the court nor jury, and that the

trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial.

The government, per contra, urges that the jury was

well aware that, because of their plea bargains, the

codefendants were not to suffer incarceration, and

whether their freedom resulted from grant of

probation or dismissal of charges the end result was

the same, namely, that under no circumstance would

either codefendant “serve time.”

There is no doubt that the essential terms of a

plea bargain, once reached, must be honored by the

10.

This was specifically applicable to Voeltz (T. p. 10, Hearing on

Government's Motion to Dismiss Indictment) and, according to

Braumann’'s counsel, (T. pp. 20 and 21, Hearing on Plea and Sentencing)

also to him.

11.

So we were informed, and without denial, upon oral argument.

102

prosecution, Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262

(1971).

Rudimentary demands of a fair trial also

require that the terms of a plea bargain reached witha

material prosecution witness be disclosed to the judge

and jury so that the trier of fact may weigh the

witness’ credibility. United Siutes v. Pope, 529 F.2d

112, 114 (9th Cir. 1976). While this doctrine arose from

a series of cases in which witnesses were allowed to

prejure themselves as to agreements made, either

through inadvertence or design,’ it also encompasses

situations in which the government allows materially

misleading statements to go uncorrected. United

States v. Harris, 498 F.2d 1164, 1169 (3d Cir. 1974),

cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974).'° In this case, the

12.

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) extended Napue v.

/llinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) to nondisclosures, “whether the ... the result

of negligence or design.” Giglio v. United States, at 154. See also United

States v. Sutton, 542 F. 2d 1239, 1241 (4th Cir. 1976); Boone v. Paderick,

541 F.2d 447, 450-51 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977).

13.

We do not believe, however, that the prosecution's duty

to disclose false testimony by one of its witnesses is to be

narrowly and technically limited to those situations where the

prosecutor knows that the witness is guilty of the crime of

perjury. Regardless of the lack of intent to lie on the part of the

witness, Giglio and Napue require that the prosecutor apprise

the court when he knows that his witness is giving testimony

that is substantially misleading. This is not to say that the

prosecutor must play the role of defense counsel, and ferret out

ambiguities in his witness’ responses on cross-examination,

However, when it should be obvious to the Government that the

witness’ answer, although made in good faith, is untrue, the

Government's obligation to correct that statement is as

compelling as it is in a situation where the Government knows

that the witness is intentionally committing perjury.

United States v. Harris, 498 F.2d 1164, 1169 (3d Cir. 1974).

103

government inexcusably neglected to correct the

misleading impression made by the memoranda of

negotiated pleas and to fully and accurately disciose

the true nature of the plea bargain.

But in order to justify a new trial we must

weigh the reasonable impact of the omitted evidence

on the jury verdict. As the Supreme Court held in

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972):"4

We do not, however, automatically require a

new trial whenever “a combing of the

prosecutors’ files after the trial has disclosed

evidence possibly useful to the defense but not

likely to have changed the verdict. ..." United

States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (CA2 1968). A

finding of materiality of the evidence is required

under Brady, supra, at 87.'!° A new trial is

required if “the false testimony could... in any

reasonable likelihood have affected the

judgment of the jury... .” Napue, supra, at

271.'* (Footnotes ours.)

14.

The Giglio standard has been recently reconfirmed by the

Supreme Court in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) as it has

been applied to conduct which may have corrupted the truth-finding

process. See United States v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239, 1241 (4th Cir. 1976).

15.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

16.

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).

104

Here the proviso not brought to the attention of

court and jury!’ could not, in any reasonable

likelihood, have affected the judgment of the jury. It

was made clear to the jury that neither Voeltz nor

Braumann would suffer incarceration as a result of

their bargain.'® The fact that their freedom would

result from a grant of probation rather than a

dismissal of the charges might have a legal significance

as to some situations but it would not, in our judgment,

and that of the trial court, be so additionally

persuasive to a jury on the issue of credibility, and

thus ultimately on the issue of defendant's guilt or

innocence, that a new trial should result. We find no

error in the court’s denial of the motion for new trial.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A true copy

ATTEST:

CLERK, US. COURT OF APPEALS,

EIGHTH CIRCUIT

17.

The situation arose, according to the prosecutor, by reason of a

clerical mishap in his office. A careful examination of all references in the

transcripts to the plea bargain discloses no hint of bad faith. The final

arguments were not reported; hence we have been unable to make an

examination thereof. But no significant charges with respect thereto are

presented by the appellant.

18.

In this case, it is not claimed that the prosecutor exacerbated the

situation by improper and misleading argument. Cf., United States v.

Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1974); Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447 (4th

Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977).

105

APPENDIX K

Regulations of Lonoke Production Credit

Association (g) and (h)

... No salaried officer, agent .. . “(g) Shall

participate, directly or indirectly, in any

transaction concerning the purchase or sale of

corporate stocks or bonds, commodities, or

other property for speculative purposes if such

action might tend to interfere with the proper

and impartial performance of his duties or bring

discredit upon any Farm Credit institution.

Employees are not prohibited by this paragraph

from making bona fide investments. When an

employee is uncertain as to whether a

contemplated transaction would constitute a

conflict of interest, he should consult his

immediate supervisor;

“(h) Shall have business relations, directly or

indirectly, involving activities with borrowers

which permits or gives the appearance of

permitting undue influence, such as_ the

purchase or sale of commodities or supplies, the

placement of insurance, sale of real estate,

auctioneering, sales barns, or appraisal service,

except in his official capacity, as an employee of

the Farm Credit institution; provided that this

prohibition shall not be applicable to any

employee who was engaged in such activity on

May 1, 1972, until December 31, 1973, and

thereafter shall not be applicable to any such

employee exempt therefrom upon _ the

recommendation of the bank board and approval

of the Governor, taking into account his

contribution to the System and alternatives

available.” (Emphasis added)

106

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

STATUTES INVOLVED

AMENDMENT 6 TO THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy...the right to be informed of the nature and cause

of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses

against him...

AMENDMENT 5 TO THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or

indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the

land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual

service in time of War or public danger;... nor shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law;...

18 USCA §1006. Federal credit institution entries,

reports and transactions.— Whoever, being an officer,

agent or employee of or connected in any capacity with

the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union

Administration, Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, Farm

Credit Administration, Department of Housing and

Urban Development, Federal Crop Insurance

Corporation, Farmers’ Home Corporation, the Secretary

107

of Agriculture acting through the Farmers’ Home

Administration, or any land bank, intermediate credit

bank, bank of cooperatives or any lending, mortgage,

insurance, credit or savings and loan corporation or

association authorized or acting under the laws of the

United States or any institution the accounts of which

are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance

Corporation, or by the Administrator of the National

Credit Union Administration, or any small business

investment company, with intent to defraud any such

institution or any other company, body politic or

corporate, or any individual, or to deceive any officer,

auditor, examiner or agent of any such institution or of

department or agency of the United States makes any

false entry in any book, report or statement of or to any

such institution, or without being duly authorized,

draws any order or bill of exchange, makes any

acceptance, or issues, puts forth or assigns any note,

debenture, bond or other obligation, or draft, bill of

exchange, mortgage, judgment, or decree, or with

intent to defraud the United States or any agency

thereof, or any corporation, institution, or association

referred to in this section, participates or shares in or

receives directly or indirectly any money, profit,

property, or benefits through any transaction, loan,

commission, contract, or any other act of any such

corporation, institution, or association, shall be fined not

more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five

years, or both. (June 25, 1948, c. 645, §1, 62 Stat. 750;

May 24, 1949, c. 139, §20, 63 Stat. 92; July 28, 1956, c.

773, §2, 70 Stat. 714; Aug. 21, 1358, P. L. 85-699, Title

VII, §704, 72 Stat. 698; Oct. 4, 1961, P. L. 7-353, §3(s),

108

75 Stat. 774; May 25, 1967, P. L. 90-19, §24(a), 81 Stat.

27.) Act Oct. 19, 1970 P. L. 91-468 §6, 84 Stat. 10.

18 USC §1014. Loan and credit applications generally —

Renewals and discounts—Crop insurance.—Whoever

knowingly makes any false statement or report, or

willfully overvalues any land, property or security for

the purpose of influenceing in any way the action of the

Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Farm Credit

Administration, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation,

Farmers’ Home Corporation, the Secretary of

Agriculture acting through the Farmers’ Home

Administration, any Federal intermediate credit bank,

or any division, officer, or employee thereof, or any

corporation organized under sections 1131-1134m of

Title 12, or of any regional agricultural credit

corporation established pursuant to law, or of the

National Agricultural Credit Corporation, a Federal

Home Loan Bank, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,

the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, a Federal Savings

and Loan Association, a Federal land bank, a joint-stock

land bank, a Federal land bank association, a Federal

Reseve bank, a small business investment company, a

Federal credit union, an insured State-chartered credit

union, any institution the accounts of which are insured

by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation,

any bank the deposits of which are insured by the

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, any member of

the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Savings and

Loan Insurance Corporation, or the Administrator of the

National Credit Union Administration upon any

109

application, advance, discount, purchase, purchase

agreement, repurchase agreement, commitment, or

loan, or any change or extension of any of the same, by

renewal, deferment of action or otherwise, or the

acceptance, release, or substitution of security therefor,

shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not

more than two years or both (June 25, 1948, c. 645, §1,

62 Stat. 752; May 24, 1949, c. 139, §21, 63 Stat. 92; July

26, 1956, c. 741, Title I, §109, 70 Stat. 667; Aug. 21,

1958, P. L. 85-699, Title VII, §705, 72 Stat. 699; Oct. 4,

1961, P. L. 87-353, §3(t), 75 Stat. 774; July 2, 1964, P. L.

88-353, §5, 78 Stat. 269; Oct. 19, 1970, P. L. 91-468, §7,

84 Stat. 1017; Dec. 31, 1970, P. L. 91-609, Title IX, §915,

84 Stat. 1815.)

Explanatory note.—Provisions for the establish-

ment of National Agricultural Credit Corporations were

repealed by Acts Sept. 8, 1959, P. L. 86-230, §24, 73

Stat. 466, and Sept. 9, 1959, P. L. 86-251, §1 (c) (1), 73

Stat. 488.

18 USC §871. Conspiracy to commit offense or to

defraud United States.—If two or more persons conspire

either to commit any offense aganst the United States,

or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in

any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such

persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,

each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned

not more than five years, or both.

If, however, the offense, the commission of which

is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only,

110

the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the

maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.

(June 25, 1948, c. 645, §1, 62 Stat. 701.)

18 USC §2. Principals. —

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United

States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or

procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.

(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done

which if directly performed by him or another would be

an offense against the United States, is punishable as a

principal. (June 25, 1948, c. 645, §1, 62 Stat. 684; Oct.

31, 1951, c. 655, §17b, 65 Stat. 717.)

T. 18 USC §657. Lending, credit and insurance

institutions.— Whoever, being an officer, agent or

employee of or connected in any capacity with the

Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union

Administration, Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, Farm

Credit Administration, Department of Housing and

Urban Development, Federal Crop Insurance

Corporation, Farmers’ Home Corporation, the Secretary

of Agriculture acting through the Farmers’ Home

Administration, or any land bank, intermediate credit

bank, bank for cooperatives or any lending, mortgage,

insurance, credit or savings and loan corporation or

association authorized or acting under the laws of the

United States or any institution the accounts of which

ill

are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance

Corporation or by the Administrator of the National

Credit Union Administration, or any small business

investment company, and whoever, being a receiver of

any such institution, or agent or employee of the

receiver, embezzles, abstracts, purloins or willfully

misapplies any moneys, funds, credits, securities or

other things of value belonging to such institution, or

pledged or otherwise intrusted to its care, shall be fined

not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five

years, or both; but if the amount or value embezzled,

abstracted, purloined or misapplied does not exceed

$100, he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or

imprisoned not more than one year, or both. (June 25,

1948, c. 645, §1, 62 Stat. 729; May 24, 1949, c. 139, §11,

63 Stat. 90; July 28, 1956, c. 773, §1, 70 Stat. 714; Aug.

21, 1958, P. L. 85-699, Title VII, §703, 72 Stat. 698; Oct.

4, 1961, P. L. 87-353, §3(q), 75 Stat. 774; May 25, 1967,

P. L. 90-19, §24(a), 81 Stat. 27 Act Oct. 19, 1970, P. L.

91-468, §4, 84 Stat. 1016.)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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