Petition — Ute Indian Tribe v. State Tax Commission

Supreme Court brief1978

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IN Tilk

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1978

THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

F. BURTON HOWARD

STEPHEN G. BOYDEN

SCOTT C. PUGSLEY

1000 Kennecott Building

10 East South Temple

Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

Telephone : (801) 521-0800

Attorneys for Petitioner

—

INDEX

Page

Cee On Se WOON ce 1

Pp EL A AE ARR RS I ee 2

ESE RT OTT a 2

Constitution and statutes involved —..........-........-:ceseeeeeeeee 3

een ae Te GE ni hia et ns 3

meastas for granting the writ ._.__........................... 7

a a RE et a or eae eee ym) Caen ee 19

Appendix A — Opinions and judgment below ................ A-1

I. Findings, conclusions and order of

ee I III diicttenscciscniestninmenecipantitelieiand A-l

II. Opinion of Court of Appeals .......................-..-. A-15

III. Order denying Petition for Rehearing .......... A-15

CITATIONS

Appendix B — Constitutional provisions and statutes..A-21

CASES

Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).................... 7

DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).. 18

E. C. Olsen v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563,

a SE eee ee 13

H. Hackford & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442 (1905).. 16

Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1902) .............-escescesseeceseeees 16

Kennerly v. District Court of Montana,

Gp Ue, Ge CATE) 3, 9

McClanahan v. State Tax Commission,

A IC I CU chip etccicietne 7

INDEX — (Continued)

Page

Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).... 10

Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,

Sr A CI ciattiecdnha su ccnctneaiieisiinervainninsnneheusbiovinieta 5, 6

Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co. v. State Tax

Commission, 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 57 (1964)........ 14

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,46U.S.L.

Week 4412 (U.S. May 15, 1978) .....................-scesceseeeeees 7

Union Stock Yards v. State Tax Commission of Utah,

Se Tt EU, Fk cae te CRIED anccancscv es cvesseneescccecoeeess 13

United States v. Wheeler, 46 U.S.L. Week 4243

RX _. RIPPERS eremerrcoerry oats soeener re Om 7

Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commission,

BE Be ec dicclietetbitecetinrecontinninpiesetincnndindzoens 8

W. F. Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission,

90 Utah 359, 61 P.2d 629 (1936)..................-..-ccccesseceesee 13

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).....................----ececeeees 7

Constitutional Provisions

Federal Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8 ...................-:-::-e0esee0- 3

Ces: GE SPRUE, BE, BIB nictenicce crs ncsetsvesitoncntoconipeincinnnnins 3

Statutes and Other Authorities

United States Code:

25 U.S.C. § 261 Rr eee Tere 8

ob O04 OO nk el 10

WUBO 6 lic Seo eae 3, 10

OE 6S... cin ccniemenrnauaniacecamuatan 5

i SU 6 nn ce ee 3

INDEX — (Continued)

Page

Ie RP 3, 10

hc RR RE Ore SA ND 9

ey 10

Oe ny ish cc clsisincome 2

I RG Te A debs c tasedeccSactinedatanesnsinid daeencdeiddoaniee 5

rT si cemineniae 5

Utah Enabling Act (28 Stat. 107) .........cecccccccceceeececeeseeees 11

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended

a 12

i ee Ss na THRE Ree Na 12

I NIE Bigiicsaskcs stich GAlcpheninicbacaleincbes Rec inidlsasticasann 12

II CO ica 14

I I ee a eA 5, 12

55 I.D. (Decisions of the United States Department

FM FERRE ew Oe A 11

— it i

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1978

THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner, the Ute Indian Tribe, respectfully prays

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the opinion of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

entered in this proceeding on February 17, 1978, reversing

and remanding the judgment of the United States District

Court for the District of Utah dated February 25, 1976.

OPINION BELOW

i The opinion of the Court of Appeals, not yet reported,

appears in Appendix A. The Order denying the Petition

for Rehearing, and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Order rendered below by the United States

District Court for the District of Utah also appear in

Appendix A.

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth

Cireuit was entered on February 17, 1978. A timely peti-

tion for re-hearing was denied on June 2, 1978, and this

petition for certiora:i was filed within 90 days of that

date. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§1254 (1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the respondent Tax Commission hag jur-

isdiction to impose Utah sales tax on sales by the Ute

Tribe on trust lands and elsewhere in Utah, where the

tax in question is a transaction tax, the incidence of which

falls equally on both buyer and seller and where the tribe

also has a valid sales tax ordinance taxing the identical

sales by the tribe. :

2. Whether the summary collection and enforcement

procedures used against the Ute Tribe by the Tax Com-

mission below, which included docketing a warrant against

tribal trust property, constitute unreasonable interfer-

ence with the internal affairs and right of self determi-

nation of the Tribe on its reservation.

3. Were the District Court’s findings that the peti-

tioner’s federally recognized Indian reservation continues

to exist within its original reservation boundaries clearly

erroneous, as determined by the Court of Appeals, in

light of the fact that such findings were supported by

competent evidence received at trial, without opposing

evidence being offered, and in light of the presumption

of continued reservation existence absent clear, unambig-

uous proof to the contrary.

SP nee

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

STATUTES INVOLVED

The case directly involves Article I, Section 8, Clause

3 of the Constitution of the United States; Article ITI,

Constitution of Utah; the Utah Enabling Act (Act of

July 16, 1894; 28 Stat. 107), Section 3; 25 U.S.C. § 476;

25 U.S.C. § 1322; and Title 59, Chapter 15, Utah Code

Annotated (1953) Sections 2 (h), 4, 5, 8 and 11, all of

which are printed in Appendix B.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, the Ute Indian Tribe (herein referred to

as the ‘‘Tribe’’ or ‘‘Ute Tribe’’), is a federally recog-

nized‘ American Indian Tribe exercising powers of self-

government*® on the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reserva-

tion in the State of Utah.* The Ute Tribe has never, by

agreement or otherwise,‘ submitted to the jurisdiction of

the State of Utah pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1321 et seq., for

the purposes of taxation or otherwise.°

Utefab, Ltd., at all times relevant herein, was a wholly-

owned economic enterprise of the Ute Tribe established

to provide employment for, and develop work skills in,

members of the Tribe. It was engaged in the business

of producing cabinetry and millwork at its plant on trust

lands on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation.°

1App. A, Finding of Fact No. 4.

2App. A, Finding of Fact Nos. 6 and 7.

SApp. A, Finding of Fact Nos. 5 and 6.

*See 25 U.S.C. §1321 et seq.; Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400

US. 423 (1971).

®App. A, Finding of Fact No. 9.

*App. A, Finding of Fact No. 10.

4

The Ute Tribe is organized’ under a tribal Constitu-

tion and Bylaws* which establish a Tribal Business Com-

mittee empowered, inter alia, to promulgate and enforce

tax ordinances, to levy taxes and license fees within its

reservation, and to regulate trade upon the reservation.°

The Ute Tribe’s Tribal Business Committee adopted

an ordinance, effective January 1, 1974, which provides

for the taxation of sales to or by Indians within the ex-

terior boundaries of the Tribe’s reservation’? Prior to

that time, Utefab had collected Utah sales taxes and had

prepared and filed Utah sales tax returns with respond-

ent State Tax Commission of the State of Utah (herein

referred to as the ‘‘Tax Commission’’ or the ‘‘Commis-

sion’’), for sales occurring during the period January 1,

1971, through December 31, 1973. Such sales were made

at the tribal plant on trust land within the reservation

to both Indian and non-Indian purchasers with’ delivery

taken both on trust and non-trust lands within the Tribe’s

reservation, as well as outside of the reservation.”

In March of 1974, the Tribe made demand upon the

Tax Commission for the return of said sales tax remit-

tances by means of a formal application and claim for

a refund. The Tax Commission refused to refund any

of the money so collected.’* While such claim for a re-

fund was pending the Tax Commission docketed a war-

rant for delinquent sales tax remittances against the Tribe

7See 25 U.S.C. §476.

SApp. A, Finding of Fact Nos. 6 and 7.

*App. A, Finding of Fact No. 7.

10App. A, Finding of Fact No. 8.

MApp. A, Finding of Fact Nos. 11, 12 and 13.

12App. A, Finding of Fact No. 16.

~~,

ed

5

and its real and personal property."* Under Utah law,”

such a warrant has the legal effect of an execution upon

the personal property of the Tribe and becomes a lien

in the nature of a docketed judgment upon the real prop-

erty of the Tribe, all of which real property is held in

trust for the Tribe by the United States of America."

Following the docketing of said warrant against the

Tribe and its real and personal property, the Tribe in-

stituted this action for declaratory and injunctive relief

against the Tax Commission and for the return of the

State sales tax proceeds remitted by the Tribe to the

Tax Commission. Sometime after the filing of a com-

plaint in the Utah Federal District Court, the Tax Com-

mission released the warrant.’* Jurisdiction in the District

Court was predicated upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Federal

Question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (Actions by Indian

Tribes. )*’

Following trial to the court without a jury, the Dis-

trict Court made éxtensive Findings of Fact and Conclu-

sions of Law’* and, based thereon, determined, inter alia,

that the Tribe’s tax ordinance was valid. The District

Court further enjoined the Tax Commission from col-

lecting sales and use taxes on sales by the Ute Tribe or

by or to Indians within the Ute Tribe’s reservation and

ordered certain Utah sales tax proceeds collected and

paid by Utefab refunded to the Tribe.

18App. A, Finding of Fact No. 17.

14§ 59-15-11, U.C.A., 1953, appended hereto as part of Appendix B.

15App. A, Finding of Fact No. 18; See Appendix B § 59-15-11 U.S.C. 1953.

Congress has expressly provided for the continuation of Federal Restrictions on

the property of the Ute Indian Tribe. See 25 U.S.C. § 677 et seq.

16App. A, Finding of Fact Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 19.

11See Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).

18 Appendix A.

6

Following entry of this judgment, the Tax Commis-

sion sought to reopen the case to challenge the District

Court’s findings regarding the boundaries and status of

the Tribe’s reservation and for the first time, to present

evidence in relation thereto. All such motions were denied

by the District Court, following which the Tax Commis-

sion perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit.

In connection with its appeal, the Tax Commission

attempted to supplement the trial court record by sub-

mitting hundreds of pages of documents purporting to

bear on the issue of the present status of the Ute Tribe’s

Uintah and Ouray Reservation. The Court of Appeals

refused to receive such documents, but in its Cocision’®

determined that the findings by the District Court as to

reservation boundaries and the extent of the trust lands

were ‘‘clearly erroneous.’’

As to the remainder of the District Court’s findings,

the Court of Appeals affirmed the jurisdiction of the

District Court over the proceedings, affirmed the find-

ings regarding lack of State power to tax sales by Indians

to Indians, but reversed the District Court’s findings re-

garding the nature of the Utah sales tax, the right of

the Tribe to a refund for moneys paid to the State prior

to 1974, and decreed that, under the holding of Moe v.

Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463

(1976), the Utah sales tax was applicable to sales by the

Tribe’s commercial enterprise (Utefab) to non-Indians

on trust lands. No mention is made in the opinion either

of the Ute Tribe’s own taxing ordinance or of the effect

of the Tax Commission’s enforcement warrant on the

trust property of the Tribe. The case was thereupon ‘‘Re-

19Appendix A.

7

versed and Remanded for further proceedings’’ consist-

ent with the opinion.

This Petition follows the refusal of the Court of Ap-

peals to grant a rehearing.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The decision of the Court of Appeals below sanc-

tions interference by a state with the internal affairs and

right of self determination of a federally recognized In-

dian Tribe on its reservation and is in direct conflict with

prior decisions of this Court in this regard. Bryan v.

Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); ef. United States v.

Wheeler, 46 U.S.L. Week 4243, (U.S. March 22, 1978);

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 46 U.S.L. Week 4412

(U.S. May 15, 1978).

Petitioner believes that the central question of

‘‘whether the state action infringed on the right of res-

ervation Indians to make their own laws and to be ruled

by them’’ has been decided below in a manner inconsist-

ent with Williams v. Lee, 358 US. 217 (1959) and

McClanahan v. State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).

The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging ‘‘a pre-

emption of State taxing authority by federal legislation,’’

completely ignores both the existence of the Tribe’s sales

tax on sales to or by Indians within the reservation and

the summary collection procedures used by the Tax Com-

mission to enforce jurisdiction over the Tribe. It further

holds that ‘‘sales not on trust lands by the Tribe to In-

dians only are not within the state taxing power.”’

As this factual matter, i.e. sales to Indians only out-

side the reservation was not ever before the Court below,

8

the ‘‘holding’’ only serves to obscure the real issues of

interference with tribal self-determination.

The effect of the decision is that sales by the Tribe

on trust lands to non-Indians are subject to two taxes.

The Tribe must either repeal its tax or suffer the com-

petitive disadvantage of requiring purchasers of its goods

on the reservation to pay a double tax. The decision fur-

ther denies the Tribe the right to regulate commerce with

its own members within its reservation where either fee

lands or non-Indians are involved.

2. The decision below stands for the proposition that

the only Indian related sales which are not subject to

state jurisdiction are those on trust lands between Indians.

As such it contradicts decisions of this Court relating to

Indian Traders and Indian Country. See Warren Trad-

ing Post v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).

This Court on several occasions has considered the

propriety of state tax jurisdiction on Indian Reservations.

Where the incidence of the tax sought to be imposed falls

directly upon an Indian or an Indian Tribe, the tax has

been found to be an impermissible burden on ‘‘Commerce

. with the Indian Tribes.’’ Warren Trading Post v.

Arizona Tax Commission, Supra.; McClanahan v. State

Tax Commission, Supra. ; cf. 25 U.S.C. § 261.

One of the most recent cases to consider this issue

was Moe ». Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of

the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). There the

pivotal jurisdictional issue was the incidence of the tax.

Construing a Montana Statute which conclusively pre-

sumed the tax to be on the non-Indian consumer, the Court

ruled that the state could impose a minimal collection

burden on Indian retailers designed to avoid the likeli-

9

hood that non-Indians purchasing from tribal sellers would

avoid the payment of a lawful tax.

However in Moe, this Court expressly declined to ex-

press an opinion on the ‘‘complicated problems’’ of en-

forcement of state jurisdiction over Indian sellers. 425

U.S. at p. 467 n. 6. The Appellate Court below ignored

the fact that this action resulted only after the Utah Tax

Commission asserted jurisdiction over the Ute Tribe by

docketing a warrant against all of its real and personal -

property.

The enforcement problems contemplated in Moe were

before the Court of Appeals. It resolved them by disregard-

ing the requirement established by 25 U.S.C. § 1326 and

Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971),

that tribal consent be given as a precondition to the as-

sumption of state jurisdiction. The opinion below re-

versed the trial court’s decision condemning such collec-

tion procedures, and by inference authorizes the imposi-

tion of state tax jurisdiction on Indian Tribes under threat

of execution and sale of tribal property.

Petitioner believes that the decision below is incon-

sistent and in conflict with decisions of this Court in these

regards.

3. The decision below is in conflict with established

congressional policies relating to Indian taxation.

This Court has recently reaffirmed that ‘‘Congress

has plenary authority to legislate for the Indian Tribes

in all matters,. . .’’ United States v. Wheeler, 46 U.S.L.

Week 4243 (U.S. March 22, 1978). Congress, in exercis-

ing this power has legislated both generally and specifi-

cally in terms which conflict with the Court of Appeals’

10

finding that the Ute Tribe is subject to the jurisdiction

of the Utah Tax Commission both for purposes of sales

tax liability and enforcement of such taxes. In general

terms, the stated Congressional policies of both the Indian

Self-Determination Act of 1975 (25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq.,

especially § 450(a) ‘‘Congressional Declaration of Policy’’)

and the Indian Financing Act of 1974 (25 U.S.C. § 1451

et seq., especially § 1451 ‘‘Congressional Declaration of

Policy’’) are but recent reaffirmations of ‘‘the well-

established federal policy of furthering Indian self-gov-

ernment’’ (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 46 U.S.L.

Week 4412 (U.S. May 15, 1978).

In failing to consider the effect of the Tax Commis-

sion’s taxing powers and collection procedures on the

Ute Tribe herein, the Court of Appeals has run afoul of

the several federal statutes which expressly deny such

power to the State of Utah. These include:

(1) 25 U.S.C. § 476 (Section 16 of the Indian Reor-

ganization Act of 1934) which vested in the Ute Tribe

(pursuant to the adoption of its Tribal Constitution) the

power ‘‘to prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encum-

brance of tribal lands, or other tribal assets without the

consent of the Tribe.’’ (emphasis added). This Court has

previously noted that, ‘‘The [Indian] Reorganization Act

did not strip Indian tribes and their reservation lands

of their historic immunity from state and local control.’’

Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 153 (1973).

(2) 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) which, even if the state of Utah

had otherwise assumed jurisdiction over the Ute Tribe,

which it has not, would have prevented the state from

attempting any ‘‘alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of

any real or personal property . . . belonging to any Indian

or Indian tribe.’’ (emphasis added).

11

(3) The Utah Enabling Act of July 16, 1894 (28 Stat.

107) (See Appendix B herein) which provides that,

The people inhabiting said proposed state do

agree that they forever disclaim all right and title

... to all lands lying within said limits owned or

held by any Indian or Indian tribes . . . and said

Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jur-

isdiction and control of the Congress of the United

States. ... (Section 3).

This provision is carried forth and incorporated into the

Utah Constitution. See Article III, Paragraph ‘‘Second.”’

25 U.S.C. § 476 is important also because it specifi-

cally confirmed in Indian tribes ‘‘all powers vested in

any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law.’’ Shortly

after this language was adopted by Congress in 1934,

the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior issued an

opinion identifying and defining such ‘‘powers.’’ This

opinion, entitled ‘‘Powers of Indian Tribes,’’ 55 I.D. 14

(1934), under the sub-heading ‘‘The Taxing Power of an

Indian Tribe,’’ states as follows:

Chief among the powers of sovereignty recognized

as pertaining to an Indian tribe is the power of

taxation. Except where Congress has provided

otherwise, this power may be exercised over mem-

bers of the tribe and over non-members, so far as

such non-members may accept privileges of trade,

residence, etc., to which taxes may be attached as

conditions. (55 I.D. at 46).

This opinion has been recently cited by this Court as

identifying such powers. See United States v. Wheeler,

supra., n. 27.

Petitioner submits that substantial questions, critical

to every Indian Tribe seeking economic self-determination,

exist as a result of these general and specific congressional

12

pronouncements and the opinion of the Court of Appeals

imposing Utah sales taxes and enforcement procedures on

the Ute Tribe.

(4) The Court of Appeals reversed the finding of

the Chief Judge of the District of Utah as to the incidence

and nature of the Utah Tax and held that ‘‘The Utah sales

tax... places a tax on the purchaser of tangible personal

property...’’

Petitioner respectfully submits that numerous deci-

sions of the Utah Supreme Court, together with the

language of the Utah Sales Tax Act itself, contradict this

conclusion.

The Utah tax in question is ‘‘[a] tax upon every

retail sale of tangible personal property made within the

State of Utah. . .’’ § 59-15-4 U.C.A. (1953) (See Appendix

B for all cited provisions of the Utah Code Annotated).

Vendors receiving consideration upon a sale of tangible

property or service ‘‘are responsible for the collection

of the amount of the tax imposed on [the] sale.’’ § 59-15-5

U.C.A. (1953). ‘*The word ‘tax’ means... the aggre-

gate amount of taxes due from the vendor .. . during

the period for which he is required to report his collec-

tions. ..’’ § 59-15-2(h) U.C.A. (1953).

The vendor is required to collect the tax from the

vendee, file quarterly returns and remit taxes on total

sales during the reporting period. § 59-15-5 U.C.A. (1953).

Failure to do so subjects the vendor to absolute liability

for the tax, criminal sanctions, penalties, and interest.

Section 59-15-11, U.C.A., (1953), dealing with subject

of ‘‘Collection of Tax by Warrant’’ states as foliows:

13

A tax due and unpaid under this act shall consti-

tute a debt due the state from the vendor and may

be collected, together with interest, penalty and

costs, by appropriate judicial proceeding... .

(emphasis added)

Since shortly after passage of the Utah sales tax law

in 1933, the Utah Supreme Court held that,

The Sales Tax Act imposes the taa on the transac-

tion, The amount of consideration involved in the

sale or transaction (a sale always involves a pur-

chase) is the measure to which the rate is applied.

The vendor or the person receiving the payment

or consideration upon a sale is charged under the

law with the responsibility of collecting or account-

ing to the” State for the tax imposed. (emphasis

added)

That the burden or incidence of the Utah sales tax falls

on sellers as well as buyers is emphasized by the following:

It is the duty of the vendor to collect the tax

from vendees who are ‘‘consumers’’ and to remit

the same with proper records to the Tax Com-

mission. [Citing what is now § 59-15-5, U.C.A.,

(1953)] However, the last cited section of the code

makes the vendor to consumers liable for the sales

tax regardless of whether or not said vendor col-

lects said tax from the vendee.”'

That the vendor is a ‘‘taxpayer’’ under the Utah law

is reaffirmed by the following:

20W, F. Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90 Umh 359, 61 P.2d

629, 630-1 (1936). See also Union Stock Yards v. State Tax Commission of

Utah, 93 Utah 174, 71 P.2d 542 (1937). ’

212, C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168 P.2d 324,

326-7 (1946).

14

First we must clarify that the sales tax is im-

posed upon all sales of tangible personal property

where passage of title and delivery occur within

the State of Utah. ... One need not be ‘‘retailer’’

to be taxed. Either retailers or wholesalers are

taxed if the sale is to the consumer or user. (First

emphasis in original; second added.)*

Further, Section 59-15-11, U.C.A., (1953), specifically re-

fers to the party against whom the State’s collection war-

rant is issued as ‘‘the delinquent taxpayer.’’

The clear error of the Circuit Court in reversing the

District Court’s finding that the Ute Tribe is entitled

to the refund is manifest in Section 59-15-8 of the Utah

statute dealing with ‘‘Overpayments and deficiencies,’’

* which provides:

If the amount paid exceeds that which is due,

the excess, ... shall be credited or refunded to

the person paying it upon written application there-

for. If the commission determines that any amount

... has been erroneously or illegally collected or

computed, the commission shall certify to the State

auditor the amount collected is excess of what was

legally due, from whom it was collected or by whom

paid to the Commission ... and the balance shall

be refunded to that person....

The importance of further review of this issue by

this Court is not limited to whether or not the Tribe gets

the refund, but is demonstrated by the emphasis in the

Moe decision that the tax considered therein was solely

a tax on the non-Indian customer and not a tax on the

reservation Indian himself. If in fact the burden of the

Utah sales tax is on the Indian vendor (the Ute Tribe

220gden Union Railway and Depot Co. v. State Tax Commission, 16 Utah

2d 23, 395 P2d 57, 59-60 (1964).

Dl EOE

15

herein), on the reservation, as the District Court found,

then state enforcement of the tax herein should be pre-

cluded by such decisions of this Court as Mescalero Apache

Tribe v. Jones,” McClanahan v. Arizona Taz Commission,”

and, recently, Bryan v. Itasca County.”

(5) The Court of Appeals below departed from the

standard of review in Indian reservation status cases by

reversing and remanding the District Court’s findings

relative to petitioners’ reservation.

The case was presented to the District Court on largely

stipulated facts. The parties agreed for the purposes of

this case that the reservation existed and that sales took

place within and without the reservation. No contradic-

tory evidence was offered at trial. No significant objec-

tion was raised by the Tax Commission to the District

Court’s findings and decision which incorporated the

parties’ stipulations and other testimony concerning these

issues.

For the first time on appeal below, the Tax Com-

mission proffered voluminous exhibits as a proposed ap-

pendix to its brief purporting to evidence what it claimed

was congressional intent to disestablish the Uintah and

Ouray reservation. The Court of Appeals refused to ac-

cept the exhibits, but nevertheless stated that the issue

of ‘‘the boundaries of the reservation or what might con-

stitute trust lands’’ was ‘‘not the subject to a stipulation

binding on the Court in any manner. The finding by the

Trial Court as to the reservation boundaries or as to

trust lands was clearly erroneous.’’

29411 US. 145 (1973).

24411 U.S. 164 (1973).

29425 US. 373 (1976).

16

Petitioner believes that the Appellate Court acted

inappropriately and in conflict with decisions of this

Court when it refused to accept the stipulated record of

the Trial Court. The case of H. Hackford & Co. v. United

States, 197 U.S. 442 (1905), involved a stipulation of ulti-

mate facts which the Court of Appeals concluded was not

binding.

This Court then stated:

‘‘We think the parties were entitled to have

this case tried upon the assumption that these

ultimate facts, stipulated into the record were

established no less than the specific facts recited.’’

(Ibid, P. 447). See also Kelley v. Rhodes, 188 U.S.

1 (1902).

The Tribe submits that for the Court of Appeals to

find the record below lacking in ‘‘evidence or basis’’ and

consequently clearly ‘‘erroneous’’ is a fundamental breach

of that Court’s appellate responsibility, meriting plenary

review by this Court

In response to the District Court’s findings regard-

ing the status and extent of petitioner’s reservation, the

Court of Appeals stated :

We are unable from the record to find any

evidence or basis for the determination by the trial

court as to the boundaries of the reservation or

what might constitute trust lands. The issue was

not litigated apparently due to a misunderstanding

as to a provision of the pretrial order... . The

finding by the trial court as to the reservation

boundaries or as to trust lands was clearly erron-

eous.

This pronouncement by the Court of Appeals ignores

the pleadings, admissions, pre-trial order and stipulations

17

before the District Court. It further disregards testimony

and exhibits received from the United States Bureau of

Indian Affairs Realty Officer for petitioner’s reserva-

tion as to the location of the original reservation bound-

aries.”*

Even in its Reply Brief filed with the Court of Ap-

peals, the Tax Commission concluded that ‘‘it is fair to

say a ‘reservation’ consisting only of the present trust

lands... continued even after 1905.’’*’

The Commission further contended in the same brief:

‘‘The original Uintah Reservation and the

original Uncompahgre Reservation were disestab-

lished by acts of Congress, and the present Uintah

and Ouray Reservation occupies an area smaller

than contained in the two former reservations.’’ (em-

phasis added)*

All of the evidence below was to the effect that the

Ute Tribe has a reservation, that sales took place from

trust lands on that reservation to buyers on trust lands,

on private lands within the original boundaries of the

reservation and outside those boundaries altogether. The

Tribe claimed all of these sales were exempt from Utah

tax jurisdiction. The Commission took a contrary view.

The Trial Court agreed with the Tribe.

An issue which was not litigated was the Tax Com-

mission’s belated assertion that the Tribe’s reservation

had been disestablished or diminished, but this claim was

*°Trial Transcript Feb. 11, 1976 pp. 37-49.

*"Reply Brief of the State of Utah, P. 13.

**Reply Brief of the State of Utah, P. 13. The Commission by these con-

cessions apparently abandoned its claim that the Tribe's present reservation

was disestablished.

18

never made until after the trial in the District Court, by

pleadings or otherwise.

The Court of Appeals apparently determined that

this was a threshold question which should have been

tried in the District Court and remanded the case for this

purpose. Petitioner believes this conclusion to be erron-

eous for two reasons.

First, as long as there is no dispute regarding the

fact that sales by the Tribe were made from trust lands,

there was ample evidence and precedent for the District

Court to find that the Commission had no jurisdiction

over the Tribe for purposes of these sales in this case.

In such circumstances the issue of diminishment of the

Tribe’s reservation is immaterial to the resolution of any

questions of state jurisdiction over the Tribe. Further,

as the existence of the tribe, and a valid tribal tax ordi-

nance were undisputed, the question of the right of the

tribe to impose a sales tax on sales by its tribal enter-

prise on trust lands to buyers anywhere would appear

unaffected by any diminishment issue sought to be raised

by the Tax Commission.

Second, as the burden of proving reservation dimin-

ishment or disestablishment has always been on the pro-

ponent of such a contention, the Tax Commission’s burden

below was to show a clearly expressed congressional in-

tent to disestablish or diminish, absent which showing,

this Court requires all reasonable ambiguities to be re-

solved in favor of the Indians and in favor of continued

reservation existence. See DeCoteau v. District County

Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444-447 (1975).

The Court of Appeals has not only disregarded the

record before it, but has apparently reversed the long

standing presumptions regarding reservation status and

19

the burden of proving reservation disestablishment. A

further review of this matter is appropriate to affirm the

proper judicial standard of review applicable to such a case.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue

to review the judgment and opinion of the Court of Ap-

peals for the Tenth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

F. BURTON HOWARD

STEPHEN G. BOYDEN

SCOTT C. PUGSLEY

1000 Kennecott Building

10 Kast South Temple

Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

Telephone : (801) 521-0800

Attorneys for Petitioner

Appendix

APPENDIX A

OPINIONS AND JUDGMENT BELOW

I. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

CENTRAL DIVISION

No. C 74-183

THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE,

vs.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

AND ORDER

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial

on the llth day of February, 1976, upon the Amended

Complaint of the plaintiff for declaratory judgment, in-

junctive relief and return of taxes alleged to have been

improperly collected, and the plaintiff, The Ute Indian

Tribe, appearing by and through its counsel, F. Burton

Howard, and defendant, State Tax Commission of the

State of Utah, appearing by and through its counsel,

G. Blaine Davis, and the Court having heard the evi-

dence and having considered the pleadings and the ex-

hibits admitted into evidence, and after argument of coun-

sel, the Court hereby makes the following

A-2

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. This is an action in four counts for declaratory

relief declaring that sales and use taxes on sales by the

Ute Indian Tribe and its tribal enterprise, Ute Fab, Ltd.,

as levied by the defendant are illegal and invalid, and

further declaring that the defendant has no jurisdiction

to levy or collect sales or use taxes or otherwise inter-

fere with the commercial activities of the plaintiff on

the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.

2. Plaintiff in this action further seeks declaratory

relief that a judgment warrant docketed against proper-

ties held in trust for the plaintiff by the United States

of America is void and that plaintiff’s tax ordinance is

valid and effective within the exterior boundaries of the

Reservation.

3. The action further requests an order compelling

the return of monies erroneously forwarded by the plain-

tiff to the defendant and enjoining and restraining fur-

ther levy and collection of sales and use taxes or further

docketing warrants to effect the collection of the same

against the Tribe.

4. Plaintiff is a sovereign American Indian Tribe or-

ganized pursuant to Act of Congress of June 18, 1934,

(48 Stat. 984), 25 U.S.C. § 761, et seq., as amended, with

its governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of

the Interior, and its existence is within Federal jurisdic-

tion and is governed by the laws of the United States.

In such capacity plaintiff is an instrumentality of the

United States.

5. The Uintah and Ouray Reservation was created

and exists and its boundaries established under and pur-

suant to Executive Orders of October 3, 1861 and January

A-3

5, 1882 and Acts of Congress of May 5, 1864, (13 Stat.

63) and March 11, 1948 (62 Stat. 72) and the laws of the

United States.

6. Pursuant to Act of Congress of June 18, 1934 (48

Stat. 984), plaintiff adopted its Constitution and By-Laws

confirming and extending plaintiff’s jurisdiction to the

territory within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and

Ouray Reservation as set forth by the above mentioned

Executive Orders and Acts of Congress.

7. Plaintiff’s Constitution further empowers plain-

tiff’s Tribal Business Committee to promulgate and en-

force tax ordinances, to levy taxes and license fees upon

non-members doing business within the Reservation, and

to regulate trade upon the Reservation.

8. Plaintiff, through its governing body, the Tribal

Business Committee, duly adopted an ordinance effective

January 1, 1974, which provides for the taxation of sales

to or by Indians within the exterior boundaries of its

Reservation. Defendant also levied and attempted to col-

lect sales taxes on sales by the plaintiff during the first

quarter of 1974.

9. Plaintiff at no time, by agreement or otherwise,

has submitted to the jurisdiction of or ceded jurisdiction

to the State of Utah or to the State Tax Commission to

levy or collect sales or use taxes on sales to or by Indians

on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation nor has there been

any enactment by Congress providing that Utah law shall

apply to such sales.

10. Plaintiff, acting through its tribal enterprise,

Ute Fab, Ltd. for the purpose of developing skills of

tribal members and assisting in the attainment of eco-

A-4

nomic self-sufficiency for the Ute Indian Tribe, makes,

sells and distributes personal property of various kinds,

including cabinets, millwork, wood products, furniture and

associated hardware and tools from its plant on the Uintah

and Ouray Reservation.

11. Said personal property was sold by the plaintiff

and delivery was taken by purchasers from the plaintiff

at three general areas, to-wit:

A. Plaintiff’s plant at the Tribal Headquarters on

lands originally received as part of the original Uintah

and Ouray Indian Reservation and administered by the

Bureau of Indian Affairs as trust lands.

B. Lands within the present exterior boundary of

the Reservation which were originally part of the Uintah

and Ouray Indian Reservation but are presently owned

in fee by other individuals primarily non-Indians.

C. Lands outside the exterior boundaries of the Res-

ervation which are not now and never have been part of

the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.

12. That during the period January 1, 1971, through

December 31, 1973, plaintiff prepared and filed sales tax

returns and reported sales to the defendant as follows:

A. Sales made from plaintiff’s plant at the Tribal

Headquarters where delivery was taken on trust lands

maintained as part of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Res-

ervation, $132,140.61.

B. Sales made from plaintiff’s plant at the Tribal

Headquarters and delivered by plaintiff in plaintiff’s ve-

hicles within the present exterior boundaries of the Res-

ervation to purchasers primarily non-Indians on lands

A-5

owned in fee and not administered as trust lands by the

Bureau of Indian Affairs, $3,915.42.

C. Sales made from plaintiff’s plant at the Tribal

Headquarters and delivered by plaintiff in plaintiff’s ve-

hicles to purchasers outside of the present exterior bound-

aries of the Reservation, $211,465.85.

13. In the course of making the aforesaid sales,

plaintiff collected from all of its purchasers a sales tax

at the rate of 442% and inadvertently and erroneously

forwarded said sales tax to the defendant Tax Commission.

14. The total amount of money forwarded to the

Tax Commission pursuant to said sales tax returns was

$15,430.33.

15. The portion of the $15,430.33 attributable to each

of the aforesaid areas is as follows:

A. $5,737.02

B. $ 177.36

C. $9,515.95

16. In March of 1974 plaintiff made demand of de-

fendant for return of the $15,430.33 and filed a formal

application and claim for refund in an administrative pro-

ceeding with defendant Tax Commission. Defendant re-

fused to return any part of those monies.

17. On May 22, 1974, prior to any hearing or deci-

sion by the Tax Commission, defendant docketed a war-

rant for delinquent sales tax for the period January 1,

1974, through March 31, 1974, against the plaintiff and

its real or personal property.

A-6

18. Section 59-15-11 and Section 59-16-15, U.C.A.,

1953, the Utah statutes which authorized this warrant,

purport to authorize a lien upon the real property of

the plaintiff, i.e., trust property, the legal owner of which

is the United States of America and which is admin-

istered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the plaintiff,

and further direct the County Sheriff of the County where

the property is located to levy upon and sell the real and

personal property of the plaintiff to satisfy the delinquent

tax. These statutes also purport to have the force and

effect of an execution against all personal property of

the plaintiff and to create a lien upon the real property

of the United States of America, in the same manner as

a docketed judgment.

19. Plaintiff thereupon sought relief in this Court

and filed its Complaint herein; sometime after the filing

of the Complaint, defendant released the warrant.

20. After the filing of the Complaint, the defendant

continued to audit the plaintiff’s business activities and

requested that the plaintiff appear at administrative hear-

ings to determine additional sales tax liability on sales

unrelated to the Complaint herein.

21. In an additional claim for refund of sales taxes

filed with the defendant in March of 1974 by an enrolled

member of plaintiff’s Tribe requesting relief from the

State sales tax imposed on the purchase of a trailer home

where delivery was taken upon plaintiff’s Reservation

on trust lands, the defendant failed to respond and re-

fused to grant a hearing on such claim and has continued

to fail and refuse to apply applicable law and render a

decision regarding whether said purchase was exempt

from Utah sales taxes.

A-7

22. In addition, the defendant has continued to re-

quire the Tribe to pay sales and use taxes on purchases

of property for the use and benefit of the Tribe during

the pendency of this action.

23. Throughout the pendency cf this matter, defend-

ant has continued to attempt to collect sales and use

taxes from the plaintiff and under Utah law will continue

to levy and collect such taxes from the plaintiff in the

future by the docketing of warrants or otherwise unless

restrained by this Court.

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes

the following

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and

the subject matter of the Complaint.

2. A justiciable controversy exists between the parties

herein.

3. The plaintiff is the real party in interest and has

standing to bring this action.

4. By Act of Congress of April 11, 1968, (82 Stat.

78, 79) 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321 and 1322, the United States has

given its consent to the States to assume jurisdiction over

civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians

are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country

within a state on the condition that the affected tribe

consents to such jurisdiction. This Act further prohibits

the alienation, encumbrance or taxation of real or per-

sonal property belonging to or held in trust by the United

States for any Indian or any Indian Tribe. The Act

further provides that any tribal ordinance adopted by any

A-8

Indian Tribe in the exercise of the authority which it

possesses shall be given full force and effect in the de-

termination of civil causes arising under the Act.

5. The area within the exterior boundaries of plain-

tiff’s Reservation is Indian country, notwithstanding the

existence of patented or fee lands within said bound-

aries, and as the plaintiff has not consented to the juris-

diction of the defendant by agreement or otherwise and

as there has been no enactment by Congress providing

that Utah State law shall apply to the sales within the

Reservation, the defendant has no jurisdiction within the

exterior boundaries of the Reservation to tax Indians or

Indian property.

6. The imposition of sales taxes on commercial trans-

actions between plaintiff and others by the defendant

violates the exclusive Federal jurisdiction over the right

to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes established

by Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution.

7. The collection and retention of sales and use taxes

by defendant which were paid by plaintiff in the amounts

herein set forth violate the provisions of Article I, Section

8, and Article VI, Clause 2, of the Constitution of the

United States.

8. Congress has preempted State taxation of sales

to or by Indians on Indian Reservations by the enactment

of Title 25, §4 261 through 264 of the United States Code.

9. The Utah State Constitution Article III, Section

2, acknowledges the absolute jurisdiction and control of

the Congress of the United States over Indian lands and

precludes the taxation of such lands until the title thereto

shall have been extinguished by the United States.

A-9

10. Section 63-36-16, U.C.A., 1953, specifically limits

the authority of the defendant to encumber or tax any

real or personal property of the plaintiff and further dis-

claims jurisdiction in the Utah courts to adjudicate ques-

tions raised by the docketing of the warrant herein. Ac-

cordingly, litigation involving the alienation, encumbrance,

or taxation of Indian property or purporting to restrict

the use of such property must be resolved other than in

the courts of the State of Utah.

11. The defendant has no jurisdiction to tax sales

to or by the plaintiff within the exterior boundaries of

the Uintah and Ouray Reservation.

12. The defendant further has no jurisdiction over

sales made by the plaintiff from its plant at the Tribal

Headquarters even if delivery of property sold occurs

outside of the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and

Ouray Reservation.

13. Sales made by the plaintiff where delivery was

taken upon fee lands within the exterior boundaries of

plaintiff’s Reservation are deemed to have occurred within

the exterior boundaries of the Reservation and are ex-

empt from Siate jurisdiction.

14. The exercise of State jurisdiction to tax sales

to or by Indians within plaintiff’s Reservation interferes

with plaintiff’s right of tribal self-government and its

right to self-determination and impairs rights granted or

reserved by Federal law.

15. Plaintiff is the person who paid the tax to the

defendant and therefore it is a taxpayer and is the person

to whom the refund should be paid pursuant to the pro-

visions of Section 59-15-8, U.C.A., 1953.

A-10

16. The defendant should be required to return to

the plaintiff all sums inadvertently and erroneously for-

warded and paid to defendant pursuant to the sales tax

returns filed herein.

17. This Court should permanently enjoin the de-

fendant from making further levy and collection of sales

and use taxes on any sales made by the plaintiff or on

sales to or by the plaintiff or other Indians within the

exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Res-

ervation.

18. This Court should declare that all monies for-

warded to the defendant by plaintiff be returned to plain-

tiff regardless of whether the sales took place within or

without the exterior boundaries of the Reservation.

19. Title to lands held in trust by the Federal Gov-

ernment for Indians can be extinguished only with. Fed-

eral consent and the determination of such titles is a

matter of Federal law.

20. The defendant may not without the consent of

Congress tax the property of the United States nor may

it tax instrumentalities of the United States.

21. The assessment, levy and attempted collection by

warrant of sales or use taxes by defendant on sales to

or by the plaintiff as an instrumentality of the United

States are illegal as to plaintiff and violate the provisions

of Article I, Section 8, and Section VI, Clause 2, of the

Constitution of the United States.

22. The warrant docketed by the defendant on May

22, 1974, is and should be declared by this Court to be

null and void.

A-11

23. This Court should permanently enjoin the defend-

ant from further docketing warrants pursuant to the pro-

visions of Sections 59-15-11 and 59-16-15, U.C.A., 1953,

as amended.

24. The Sales Tax Ordinance, effective January 1,

1974, adopted by plaintiff should be declared to be a validly

existing tax ordinance in full force and effect within the

exterior boundaries of plaintiff’s Reservation, and defend-

ant should be determined to be without authority to tax

sales or to proceed in any way so as to conflict or inter-

fere with the tax ordinance adopted by the plaintiff.

25. The plaintiff is an instrumentality of the United

States for all purposes pertinent hereto.

26. One of the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1362 is to

permit tribes to initiate litigation in the Federal Courts

involving issues which could have been instituted by the

United States as Trustee for the tribes, and the action

herein could have been instituted by the United States.

27. The doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar

an action against a state agency for declaratory and in-

junctive relief against the application of State statutes

which violate provisions of the Constitution of the United

States.

28. Plaintiff was not required to exhaust administra-

tive remedies with the defendant Tax Commission or with

the courts of the State of Utah as a condition precedent

to filing its Complaint herein.

29. A plain, speedy, efficient or otherwise adequate

remedy was and is not available under Utah law or in the

courts of the State of Utah to provide plaintiff the relief

to which it is herein entitled.

A-12

30. Defendant by its actions in docketing a warrant

against the property of the United States on May 22,

1974, and voluntarily and arbitrarily asserting a judgment

lien against said property has waived its immunity from

suit and consented to a determination of its rights herein.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that plaintiff is a sovereign American Indian

tribe organized pursuant to Act of Congress of June 18,

1934, that the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is an Indian

Reservation created, existing and with its boundaries

established pursuant to Executive Orders of October 3,

1861, January 5, 1882, and under and pursuant to Acts

of Congress of May 5, 1864 and March 11, 1948. Said

Reservation constitutes Indian country, is within Federal

jurisdiction, and is governed by the laws of the United

States and defendant has no jurisdiction or authority to

levy or collect sales or use taxes against the plaintiff

within this Reservation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED with reference to Count I of plaintiff’s Com-

plaint that sales taxes levied by the defendant on sales of

the plaintiff and its tribal enterprise, Ute Fab, Ltd., are

illegal and invalid.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED with reference to Count I of plaintiff’s Com-

plaint that defendant be permanently enjoined from mak-

ing further levy and collection of sales and use taxes

made by the Ute Indian Tribe or on sales to or by Indians

within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray

Reservation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED with reference to Count I of plaintiff’s Com-

-imammmamaaaaaaamamaasumamassaaamusmamasumsaasasaaaatiiiuaeaai imitate i is

A-13

plaint that defendant return to plaintiff the sum of

$5,914.38, representing monies collected by the plaintiff

and forwarded erroneously to the defendant as sales taxes

for sales consummated within the exterior boundaries of

plaintiff’s Uintah and Ouray Reservation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED with reference to Count II of plaintiff’s Com-

plaint that defendant return to plaintiff the additional

sum of $9,515.95, representing monies collected by the

plaintiff and forwarded erroneously to the defendant as

sales taxes on sales where delivery was made outside the

exterior boundaries of plaintiff’s Uintah and Ouray Res-

ervation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED with reference to Count III of plaintiff’s

Complaint that defendant, State Tax Commission of the

State of Utah, be and the same is hereby permanently

enjoined from docketing further warrants against the Ute

Indian Tribe pursuant to the provisions of Sections

59-15-11 and 59-16-15, U.C.A., 1953, as amended.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED with reference to Count III of plaintiff’s Com-

plaint that the warrant docketed against the plaintiff on

May 22, 1974, in the total amount of $920.10 is null and

void, having no force or effect whatsoever.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED with reference to Count IV of plaintiff’s

Complaint that plaintiff’s taxing ordinance is legally en-

acted, is valid and is in full force and effect from January

1, 1974.

A-14

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED with reference to Count IV of plaintiff’s

Complaint that the assessment, levy and collection of

sales or use taxes by defendant on sales subject to plain-

tiff’s ordinance are illegal and in violation of the Con-

stitution of the United States.

DATED this 25th day of February, 1976.

WILLIS W. RITTER

Chief Judge

United States District Court

A-15

II. OPINION OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 76-1602

THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE,

Appellee,

v.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE

OF UTAH,

Appellant.

Appeal From The United States District Court

For The District of Utah

(D.C. # C-74-183)

Tom D. Tobin, Special Assistant Attorney General (Ver-

non B. Romney, Attorney General, G. Blaine Davis, H.

Wright Volker, Michael L. Deamer, Assistant Attorneys

General, with him on the Brief), for Appellant.

F. Burton Howard, Salt Lake City, Utah (Scott C. Pugs-

ley, of Boyden, Kennedy, Romney & Howard, Salt Lake

City, Utah, with him on the Brief), for Appellee.

Before SETH, Chief Judge, DOYLE, Circuit Judge, and

STANLEY, Senior District Judge.*

SETH, Chief Judge.

*Of the District of Kansas, Sitting by Designation.

A-16

This is an action brought by the Ute Indian Tribe

against the State Tax Commission of the State of Utah

for injunctive relief and for a declaratory judgment that

the State of Utah sales taxes could not be levied or col-

lected on sales of personal property made by a tribal

enterprise within the boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray

Reservation. The complaint also seeks the return of funds

theretofore collected by the Tribe on such sales, and re-

mitted to the State of Utah.

The trial court enjoined the State from seeking to

collect sales taxes on sales made by the Tribe on the

reservation, and directed the return to the Tribe of the

collections theretofore made on such sales. The trial court

determined that the reservation boundaries were as orig-

inally established. The State has taken this appeal.

It is apparent that this appeal is controlled basically

by Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425

U.S. 463; Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145,

and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S.

164.

In Moe the Court considered the relationship between

28 U.S.C. § 1341, which generally prohibits injunctions

preventing the levy or collection of state taxes if there

is a plain and speedy state remedy, and 28 U.S.C. § 1362

which gives the district courts jurisdiction over ‘‘all’’

civil actions brought by Indian Tribes in controversies

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States. The Court in Moe decided that 28 U.S.C.

§ 1362 was intended to grant jurisdiction to the district

courts in civil actions in all instances where the United

States could have or had the requisite interest to com-

mence such suit. The Court relied on Heckman v. Umted

States, 224 U.S. 413, and United States v. Rickert, 188

U.S. 432. The Court in Moe then said:

a

A-17

‘*. . . Since the United States is not barred

by § 1341 from seeking to enjoin the enforcement

of a state tax law, Department of Employment v.

United States, supra, we hold that the Tribe is

not barred from doing so here.’’

The Court in Moe thus indicated that the above in-

terpretation of section 1346 was the proper method to

apply section 1341 rather than using the federal instru-

mentality doctrine. The basis is described as a preemption

of State taxing authority by federal legislation. This also

apparently meets the Eleventh Amendment arguments.

The Court also there discussed the state service argu-

ments, and the General Allotment Act arguments ad-

vanced by the State of Montana. The Court in Moe held

that it is proper to give special treatment and special

preference to the Indians because they are Indians. Thus

they were so set apart on racial grounds as in Morton v.

Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, quoted by the Court. The court

also discussed the checkerboard problem arising from non-

Indian land ownership within the reservation boundaries,

and again held that the fact the plaintiffs were of a par-

ticular ‘‘racial’’ group and tribal organization permitted

them to assert rights not available to non-Indians in the

same area, They can also assert rights over non-Indians

in the same area under Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,

cited in Moe.

The Court in Moe concluded that the State of Mon-

tana could not assess a vendor’s license fee against an

Indian for selling cigarettes on ‘‘reservation land,’’ and

could not apply the cigarette sales tax on ‘‘reservation

sales’’ by Indians to Indians. The Court expressly did

not extend the prohibition to sales by Indians on Indian

land to non-Indians. The Montana tax was on the con-

sumer and precollected. The Court also held that the

A-18

Indian retailer could be required to collect the tax for

the State on sales to non-Indians.

The Utah sales tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-1

places a tax on the purchaser of tangible personal prop-

erty. The seller collects the tax on behalf of the State

from the buyer at the time of the sale, and remits to the

State. Where a ‘‘sale’’ is made is defined by Utah law

and for the most part is where the goods are delivered.

Insofar as this action seeks to have the State of

Utah return sales taxes collected by the Tribe under a

generalized or lump-sum claim, it must fail as these funds

now in the hands of the State were paid by the buyers of

the goods and not by the sellers. If anyone can seek re-

covery or refund, it is these buyers.

The portion of the complaint which seeks to enjoin

the imposition of a sales tax is another matter. Under the

decisions of the Supreme Court, referred to above, sales

on trust lands by the Tribe to Indians are not subject to

the state sales tax. The State here so acknowledges. The

provisions of the Utah Enabling Act do not lead to a dif-

ferent conclusion.

As to sales by the Ute commercial enterprise here con-

cerned on trust lands to non-Indians, the Utah sales tax

is applicable. This is also in accordance with Moe v. Con-

federated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463.

We also hold that sales not on trust lands by the

Tribe to Indians only are not within the state taxing power.

We are unable from the record to find any evidence

or basis for the determination by the trial court as to

the boundaries of the reservation or what might consti-

tute trust lands. The issue was not litigated apparently

eee sees -

A-19

due to a misunderstanding as to a provision in the pre-

trial order. Also this was a matter which required the

proof of facts and of the application of law. It was not

subject to a stipulation binding on the court in any man-

ner. The finding by the trial court as to the reservation

boundaries or as to trust lands was clearly erroneous.

Again, under the circumstances, this may not be an issue.

The case must be REVERSED AND REMANDED

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A-20

Ill. ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

REHEARING

MAY TERM — June 2, 1978

Before Honorable Oliver Seth, Honorable William J.

Holloway, Jr., Honorable Robert H. McWilliams, Honor-

able James E. Barrett, Honorable William E. Doyle, Hon-

orable Monroe G. McKay, Honorable James K. Logan,

Circuit Judges, and Honorable Arthur J. Stanley, Jr.,

Senior District Judge

No. 76-1602

THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE

OF UTAH, Defendant-Appellant,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Amicus Curiae,

This matter comes on for consideration of appellee’s

petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en

bane filed in the captioned cause.

Upon consideration whereof, the petition for rehear-

ing is denied by Circuit Judges Seth and Doyle and Senior

District Judge Stanley to whom the case was argued and

submitted.

The petition for rehearing having been denied by

the panel to whom the case was argued and submitted and

no member of the panel nor judge in regular active service

on the Court having requested that the Court be polled

on rehearing en bane, Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, the suggestion for rehearing en banc is denied.

HOWARD K. PHILLIPS

Clerk

APPENDIX B

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Art. I, § 8 — CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES

The Congress shall have Power...

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and

among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.

Art. II— CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Second:—The people inhabiting this State do affirm

and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title

to the unappropriated public lands lying within the bound-

aries hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits

owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that

until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the

United States, the same shall be and remain subject to

the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands

shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control

of the Congress of the United States. The lands belong-

ing to citizens of the United States, residing without this

State shall never be taxed at a higher rate than the lands

belonging to residents of this State; but nothing in this

ordinance shall preclude this state from taxing, as other

lands are taxed, any lands owned or held by any Indian

who has severed his tribal relations, and has obtained

from the United States or from any person, by patent or

other grant, a title thereto, save and except such lands

as have been or may be granted to any Indian or Indians

under any act of Congress, containing a provision exempt-

ing the lands thus granted from taxation, which last men-

tioned lands shall be exempt from taxation so long, and

to such extent, as is or may be provided in the act of Con-

gress granting the same. (As amended November 5, 1946,

effective January 1, 1947.)

A-22

UTAH ENABLING ACT (28 Stat. 107)

Second :—That the people inhabiting said proposed

State do agree that they forever disclaim all right and

title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the

boundaries thereof; and to all lands lying within said

limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and

that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished

by the United States, the same shall be and remain sub-

ject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian

lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and

control of the Congress of the United States; that the

lands belonging to citizens of the United States residing

without the said State shall never be taxed at a higher

rate than the lands belonging to residents thereof; that

no taxes shall be imposed by the State on lands or prop-

erty therein belonging to or which may hereafter be pur-

chased by the United States or reserved for its use; but

nothing herein, or in the ordinance herein provided for,

shall preclude the said State from taxing, as other lands

are taxed, any lands owned or held by any Indian who

has severed his tribal relations and has obtained from

the United States or from any person a title thereto by

patent or other grant, save and except such lands as have

been or may be granted to any Indian or Indians under

any Act of Congress containing a provision exempting

the lands thus granted from taxation; but said ordinance

shall provide that all such lands shall be exempt from taxa-

tion by said State so long and to such extent as such Act

of Congress may prescribe.

UNITED STATES CODE 25 § 476

Organization of Indian tribes ; constitution and by-laws ;

special election

Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same

reservation, shall have the right to organize for its com-

mon welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution

and bylaws, which shall become effective when ratified

by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe, or

of the adult Indians residing on such reservation, as the

——

es Cnet tee Ose ow

A-23

case may be, at a special election authorized and called

by the Secretary of the Interior under such rules and reg-

ulations as he may prescribe. Such constitution and by-

laws, when ratified as aforesaid and approved by the

Secretary of the Interior, shall be revocable by an elec-

tion open to the same voters and conducted in the same

manner as hereinabove provided. Amendments to the

constitution and bylaws may be ratified and approved by

the Secretary in the same manner as the original consti-

tution and bylaws.

In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe

or tribal council by existing law, the constitution adopted

by said tribe shall also vest in such tribe or its tribal coun-

cil the following rights and powers: To employ legal

counsel, the choice of counsel and fixing of fees to be

subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior;

to prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance

of tribal lands, interest in lands, or other tribal assets

without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with

the Federal, State, and local Governments, The Secretary

of the Interior shall advise such tribe or its tribal coun-

cil of all appropriation estimates or Federal projects for

the benefit of the tribe prior to the submission of such

estimates to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress.

June 18, 1934, c. 576, § 16, 48 Stat. 987.

25 § 1322 — Assumption by State of civil jurisdiction —

Consent of United States; force and effect of civil laws

(a) The consent of the United States is hereby given

to any State not having jurisdiction over civil causes of

action between Indians or to which Indians are parties

which arise in the areas of Indian country situated within

such state to assume, with the consent of the tribe oc-

cupying the particular Indian country or part thereof

which would be affected by such assumption, such measure

of jurisdiction over any or all such civil causes of action

arising within such Indian country or any part thereof

as may be determined by such State to the same extent

that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes

of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of

A-24

general application to private persons or private property

shall have the same force and effect within such Indian

country or part thereof as they have elsewhere within

that State.

Alienation, encumbrance, taxation, use, and probate

of property

(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alien-

ation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal

property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian

or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in

trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction

against alienation imposed by the United‘States; or shall

authorize regulation of the use of such property in a

manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement,

or statute, or with any regulation made pursuant thereto;

or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate,

in probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or

right to possession of such property or any interest

therein.

Force and effect of tribal ordinances or customs

(ce) Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or here-

after adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or community in

the exercise of any authority which it may possess shall,

if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the

State, be given full force and effect in the determination

of civil causes of action pursuant to this section.

Pub.L. 90—284, Title Iv, § 402, Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 79.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED

58-15-2. Definitions — Scope — Exemptions — Retail

sales — Wholesale sales.

(b) The term ‘‘sale’’ or ‘‘sales’’ includes installment

and credit sales, every closed transaction constituting a

sale, and also includes the sale of electrical energy, gas,

services or entertainment taxable under the terms of this

A-25

act. A transaction whereby the possession of property is

transferred but the seller retains the title as security for

the payment of the price shall be deemed a sale. An even

exchange of tangible personal properties shall not be

deemed a sale for purposes of this act, but in any transac-

tion wherein tangible personal property is taken as part of

the sales price of other tangible personal property, the bal-

ance valued in money or other consideration shall be

deemed a sale.

* * *

(h) The word ‘‘tax’’ means either the tax payable

by the purchaser of a commodity or service subject to

tax, or the aggregate amount of taxes due from the vendor

of such commodities or services during the period for

which he is required to report his collections, as the con-

text may require.

59-15-4, Excise tax — Rate. — From and after the

effective date of this act there is levied and there shall

be collected and paid:

(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible personal

property made within the state of Utah equivalent to

four per cent of the purchase price paid or charged, except

that where a person takes, as a trade-in for part payment

of the merchandise sold, tangible personal property other

than money, that tax shall be computed and paid only

upon the net difference between the selling price of the

merchandise sold and the amount of the trade-in allow-

ance. The sale of coal, fuel oil and other fuels shall not

be subject to tax except as hereinafter provided.

_ 99-15-5, Collection of tax — Remission — Returns —

Direct payment by purchaser of motor vehicle — Tokens —

Deposit of security and sale thereof — Remission of ex-

cess amount collected — Penalties and interest for viola-

tions — Fine or imprisonment. — Every person receiving

any payment or consideration upon a sale of property or

service subject to the tax under the provisions of this act,

or to whom such payment or consideration is payable

(hereinafter called the vendor) shall be responsible for

the collection of the amount of the tax imposed on said

A-26

sale; provided, however, that where any sale of tangible

personal property is made by a wholesaler to a retailer,

upon the representation by the said retailer that the said

personal property is purchased by the said retailer for

resale, and the said personal property thereafter is not

resold, the wholesaler shall not be responsible for the

collection or payment of the tax imposed on the said

sale, but the said retailer shall be solely liable for the

said tax. The vendor shall collect the tax from the vendee,

but in no ease shall he collect as tax an amount (without

regard to fractional parts of one cent) in excess of the

tax computed at the rates prescribed by this act, provided,

however, that on all motor vehicle sales made by other

than a regular licensed dealer the tax shall be paid by

the purchaser directly to the state tax commission upon

every sale of a motor vehicle subject to registration and

licensing under the laws of this state, and shall be col-

lected by the state tax commission at the time of such

registration and licensing. The tax imposed by this act

shall be due and payable to the state tax commission quar-

terly on or before the thirtieth day of the month next suc-

ceeding each calendar quarterly period, the first of such

quarterly periods being the period commencing with the

first day of January, 1953. Every vendor shall on or

before the thirtieth day of the month next succeeding each

calendar quarterly period, file with the commission a re-

turn for the preceding quarterly period. The return shall

be accompanied by a remittance of the amount of tax

herein required to be collected by the vendor for the

period covered by the return. The tax as computed in

the return shall in all cases be based upon the total sales

made during the period including both cash and charge

sales. Credit shall be allowed to the vendor for taxes paid

on sales represented by that portion of an account deter-

mined to be worthless and actually charged off for in-

come tax purposes or on the portion of the purchase

price remaining unpaid at the time of a repossession made

under the terms of a conditional sales contract. Such

returns shall contain such information and be made in

such manner as the tax commission may by regulation

Oe ee oe

A-27

prescribe. The state tax commission may extend the time

for making returns and paying the taxes collected under

such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, but no

such extension shall be for more than ninety days. The

state tax commission, if it deems it necessary in order to

ensure the payment of the tax imposed by this act, may

require returns and payment of the tax to be made for

other than quarterly periods.

If the acecanting methods regularly employed by the

vendor in the transaction of his business are such that

reports of sales made during a calendar month will im-

pose unnecessary hardships, the state tax commission may

accept reports at such intervals as will in its opinion

better suit the convenience of the taxpayer and will not

jeopardize the collection of the tax.

For the purpose of more efficiently securing the pay-

ment, collection and accounting for the taxes provided

for under this act, the tax commission in its discretion, by

proper rules and regulations, shall provide for the is-

suance of tokens or other appropriate devices to facilitate

collections; provided, no tax or token shall be collected

on lunches or dinners served by schools, churches, or char-

itable institutions.

The tax commission, whenever it deems it necessary

to ensure compliance with the provisions of this act, may

require any person, subject to the tax imposed hereunder

to deposit with it such security as the state tax commis-

sion shall determine. The same may be sold by the state

tax commission at public sale if it becomes necessary so

to do in order to recover any tax, interest or penalty due.

Notice of such sale may be served upon the person who

deposited such securities personally or by mail; if by mail,

notice sent to the last known address as the same appears

in the records of the state tax commission shall be suffi-

cient for the purposes of this requirement. Upon such

sale the surplus if any, above the amounts due under this

act, shall be returned to the person who deposited the

security.

A-28

If any vendor shall, during any reporting period col-

lect as a tax an amount in excess of two per cent of his

total taxable sales, he shall remit to the commission the

full amount of the tax herein imposed and also such ex-

cess; and if any vendor under the pretence or represen-

tation of collecting the tax imposed by this act shall col-

lect during any reporting period an amount in excess of

two per cent of his total taxable sales, the retention of

such excess or any part thereof, or the intentional failure

to remit punctually to the tax commission on the full

amount required to be remitted by the provisions of this

act, is declared to be unlawful and shall be punishable

by a fine of not exceeding $1,000 or by imprisonment for

not to exceed six months or both such fine and imprison-

ment.

Any person failing to pay any tax to the state or any

amount of tax herein required to be paid to the state

within the time required by this act, or file any return as

required by this act, shall pay, in addition to the tax, pen-

alties and interest as provided in section 59-15-8 hereof.

59-15-8. Overpayment and deficiencies. — As soon

as practicable after the return is filed, the tax commis-

sion shall examine it; if it then appears that the correct

amount of tax to be remitted is greater or less than that

shown on the return to be due, the tax shall be recomputed.

If the amount paid exceeds that which is due, the

excess, together with interest thereon at the rate of one-

half of one per cent per month from the date of overpay-

ment, and if it is determined that the original overpay-

ment was not intentionally made for purposes of invest-

ment, it shall be credited or refunded to the person paying

it upon written application therefor. If the commission

determines that any amount, penalty or interest has been

paid more than once or has been erroneously or illegally

collected or computed, the commission shall certify to the

state auditor the amount collected in excess of what was

legally due, from whom it was collected or by whom paid

to the commission, and the amount of interest computed

A-29

thereon, and if approved by the state auditor, it shall be

credited on any amounts then due from that person to

the state of Utah under this act or under any other taxing

act, the administration of which is vested in the commis-

sion and the balance shall be refunded to that person or

his successors, administrators, executors or assigns, but

no such credit or refund shall be allowed unless a claim

is filed with the state tax commission within three years

from the date of overpayment.

In the event any amount has been illegally deter-

mined to be due from any person, the commission shall

authorize the cancellation of the amounts upon its records.

If the amount paid is less than the amount dve, to

the difference shall be added interest thereon at the rate

of one-half of one per cent per month from the time the

return was due.

If any part of the deficiency is due to negligence or

intentional disregard of authorized rules and regulations

with knowledge thereof, but without intent to defraud,

there shall be added ten per cent of the total amount of

the deficiency and interest at the rate of one percent

per month on the amount of the deficiency from the

time the return was due. If any part of the deficiency is

due to fraud with the intent to evade, there shall be added

one hundred per cent of the total amount of the deficiency

and interest at the rate of one per cent per month on the

deficiency from the date the return was due.

The deficiencies in tax, together with penalties and

interest imposed by this section, shall be due and payable

by the taxpayer within ten days after notice and demand

by the tax commission; except that when the commission

determines that a greater amount was due than was shown

on the return, and the tax is not deemed to be in jeopardy,

the additional tax, penalty and interest shall be due pay-

able within thirty days after the commission mailed its

report of deficiency determination.

Except in the case where a deficiency is due to fraud

with intent to evade tax or a failure to file a return, the

A-30

amount of taxes imposed by this chapter shall be assessed

within three years after the return was filed and if not

so assessed no proceeding for the collection of the taxes

shall be begun after the expiration of the period.

In the case of a false or fraudulent return or payment

with intent to evade tax or of failure to file a return, the

tax may be assessed or a proceeding for the collection

of the tax may be begun without assessment at any time.

Upon making a record of its reasons, the commission

shall have the power, in its discretion, to waive, reduce or

compromise any of the penalties or interest provided in

this chapter.

59-15-11. Collection of tax by warrant. -—- A tax due

and unpaid under this act shall constitute a debt due the

state from the vendor and may be collected, together with

interest, penalty and costs, by appropriate judicial pro-

ceeding, which remedy shall be in addition to all other

existing remedies.

If the tax imposed by this act or any portion thereof

is not paid when the same becomes due and if the vendor

liable for the payment of the amount has not regularly

followed the procedure outlined in sections 59-15-12,

59-15-13, 59-15-14, 59-15-15, and 59-15-16 hereof, the tax

commission may issue a warrant in duplicate, under its of-

ficial seal, directed to the sheriff of any county of the

state commanding him to levy upon and sell the real and

personal property of a delinquent taxpayer found within

his county for the payment of the amount due thereof,

with the added penalties. interest, and costs and to return

such warrant to the tax commission and pay to it the

money collected by virtue thereof by a time to be therein

specified, not more than sixty days from the date of the

warrant. Immediately upon receipt of said warrant in

duplicate the sheriff shall file the duplicate with the clerk

of the district court in his county and thereupon the clerk

shall enter in the judgment docket, in the column for

judgment debtors, the name of the delinquent taxpayer

mentioned in the warrant and, in appropriate columns,

eo

A-31

the amount of tax, penalties, interest and costs for which

the warrant is issued and the date when such duplicate is

filed, and thereupon the amount of such warrant so dock-

eted shall have the force and effect of an execution against

all personal property of the delinquent taxpayer and

shall also become a lien upon the real property of the de-

linquent taxpayer in the same manner as a judgment duly

rendered by any district court and docketed in the office

of the clerk thereof. The sheriff shall thereupon proceed

upon the same in all respects, with like effect, and in the

same manner as is prescribed by law in respect to execu-

tions issued against property upon judgments of a court

of record and shall be entitled to the same fees for his

services in executing the warrant, to be collected in the

same manner.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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