Appendix — Weiner v. United States
Supreme Court brief1978
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IN THE venanins
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1978
No.
JULIAN S.H. WEINER, and
SOLOMON BLOCK,
Petitioners,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
APPENDICES FOR
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HAROLD A. ABELES
315 South Beverly Drive
Suite 300
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
(213) 553-0885
Attorney for Petitioner
JULIAN S.H. WEINER
NATHAN MARKOWITZ
315 South Beverly Drive
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
(213) 553-0885
Attorney for Petitioner
SOLOMON BLOCK
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1978
No.
JULIAN S.H. WEINER, and
SOLOMON BLOCK,
vs.
UNITED STATES
Petitioners,
OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
APPENDICES FOR
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HAROLD A. ABELES
315 South Beverly Drive
Suite 300
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
(213) 553-0885
Attorney for Petitioner
JULIAN S.H. WEINER
NATHAN MARKOWITZ
315 South Beverly Drive
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
(213) 553-0885
Attorney for Petitioner
SOLOMON BLOCK
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
INDEX TO APPENDICES
Opinion of United States
Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, filed
May 15, 1978
Order of the Ninth Circuit
denying the Petition for
Rehearing En Banc, filed
July 21, 1978
Allen Instruction given
by the District Judge
Affidavit of Juror
Mary Krueger, handwritten
ballot and transcription
thereof
Affidavit of Juror
Amando Carrillo
Affidavit of Juror
Charles Flores
APPENDIX A
\
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH DISTRICT
FILED
MAY 15, 1978
EMIL E. MELFI, UR.
CLERK, U.S. COURT
OF APPEALS
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
NO.
Appellee, 959933
| Vv. )
JULIAN S. H. WEINER, MARVIN } 14.
AL LICHTIG; AND SOLOMON BLOCK, )
Appellants. )
Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Central District
of California
Before: CHOY and GOODWIN, Circuit
Judges, and THOMPSON,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM: **
«The Honorable Bruce R. Thompson, United
States District Judge for the District
of Nevada, sitting by designation
'
.
:
**2A11 three members of the panel shared
equally in the writing of this decision.
Julian Weiner, Marvin Lichtig, and
Solomon Block appeal their respective
convictions for securities fraud aris-
ing out of their employment as auditors
of Equity Funding Corporation of America
(Equity Funding) during the time cover-
ed by the indictment.
Equity Funding was incorporated in
1960 to sell life insurance, mutual
funds, and "equity funding" programs.+
The company operated legitimately and
profitably until 1964, when, the govern-
ment proved, it began to publish in-
accurate and false financial statements.
Equity Funding was accused of massive
fraud in overstating its income and °
seit: nonexistent assets in order to
increase the market value of its stock.
Wolfson, Weiner, Ratoff, and Lapin
were the independent public accountants
for Equity Funding from 1961 until 1971.
In early 1972, the Los Angeles branch
of the Wolfson, Weiner firm joined with
the accounting firm of Seidman & Seid-
man. The combined firm served as Equity
Funding's independent public accountant
}
i
until the exposure of the fraud in 1973.
Julian Weiner was the Wolfson, Wein-~
er partner in charge of the audits of
Equity Funding from 1961 to 1973. He
was convicted of six counts of secur-
ities fraud, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 77q(a),
for accounting practices which fraud-
ulently overstated the income and assets
of Equity Funding and of four counts of
willfully making untrue statements to
the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the New York or Pacific Coast
Stock Exchanges, in violation of
15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 77£, 78ff, 78m.
Marvin Lichtig, as an employee and
later as a junior partner of Wolfson,
Weiner, supervised the audit field work
of Equity Funding for the audits between
1963 and 1968. He reported directly to
Julian Weiner. From 1968 until 1973,
Lichtig served as an officer of Equity
Funding and signed registration state~-
ments as the principal accounting
officer of the company. Lichtig was
convicted of the same six counts of
securities fraud as Weiner.
3.
Lichtig was also convicted of seven
counts of filing false statements with
the SEC and the New York or Pacific
Coast Stock Exchange in violation of
15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 77f£, 78ff, 781,78m.
Solomon Block was employed by Wolf-
son, Weiner in 1968 and replaced Lich-
tig as the supervisor of field audits.
Block served as supervisor for the 1969
through 1972 audits. Block was charged
with the same six counts of securities
fraud as Weiner and Lichtig, but Block
was convicted of only five of the
counts. Block was convicted of two
counts of making false statements to
the SEC and the New York or Pacific
Coast Stock Exchanges in violation of
15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 77£, 78ff, 78m.
A. UNANIMOUS VERDICT
Defendants argue that the convic-
tions must be reversed because the jury
verdict was not unanimous. This chal-
lenge is based on juror affidavits.
The jury returned a verdict of
guilty, and each member of the panel
was polled. The judge asked "please
4.
indicate by answering if the verdicts
just read are your verdicts," and each
juror responded individually in the
affirmative. The verdicts were receiv-
ed and the jury was discharged. Half
an hour later, a juror went to the
judge's chambers and said that she had
never voted "guilty", but rather had
voted "guilty with reservation" during
the jury's deliberations. She further
stated that she understood that the
jury's verdict was eleven "guilty" and
one "guilty with reservation", and was
confused by the events in the courtroom
when she responded affirmatively that
the verdict rendered was her verdict.
Two other jurors made affidavits to
support this juror's statement that she
had always qualified her "guilty" vote
"with reservation".
The defendants moved for a new trial,
based on the affidavits of the three
jurors. The district judge denied the
motion, holding that the affidavits
were not admissible to impeach the
verdicts.
The district court followed estab-
lished law. Jurors may not impeach
their own verdict. McDonald v. Pless,
238 U.S. 264 (1915). This rule, with
narrow exceptions, is codified in Fed.
R. Evid. 606(b).
Defendants argue that they are not
seeking to impeach the verdict. They
contend that the verdict rendered in
court was not the true verdict of the
jury and the affidavits should be ad-
missible to prove this fact. They cite
Fox v. United States, 417 F.2d 84 (5th
Cir. 1969). In that case, a juror re-
mained silent when polled, and other
jurors by affidavit said they thought a
verdict by a majority was sufficient.
The court held that there was no legal
verdict. But here there was a verdict,
and upon a poll of each juror in open
court it was unanimous. Even if the
defendants were able to prove that one
juror had consistently voted "guilty
with reservation", the only purpose of
such testimony would be to impeach the
verdict. The meaning of "with reser-
vation" would thus be left to the in-
genuity of counsel and the vagaries of
social behavior in every case.
The juror answered in the affirma-
tive when asked if "guilty" was her ver-
dict. Many jurors have some second
thoughts about their verdicts. "Beyond
a reasonable doubt" need not exclude
all doubt. To permit this juror to
contradict this verdict by an explana-
tion that her vote was “guilty with
reservation" would sanction the im-
peachment of any verdict in which a jur-
or could be found who was willing to
repudiate the answer he gave when pol-
led.” Opportunities for harassment of
jurors and jury tampering would abound.
Such a burden on the jury system could
not long be tolerated.
B. THE “ALLEN CHARGE"
The defendants also argue that the
jury was coerced by the giving of the
Allen charge.> After 5 days of delib-
erations the foreman of the jury not-
ified the judge that “one of the mem-
bers of our jury feels unable to par~
ticipate in deliberations with the rest
7
of us." After ascertaining that the
juror was not suffering from a physical
Or mental disability, the judge gave a
modified Allen instruction substantially
as set out in E. Devitt & C. Blackmar,
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions
§ 18.14 2d ed., (1970). (This instruc-
tion is §18.14 in the Third Edition,
1977.)
This court has consistently upheld
this form of the Allen charge. Sulli-
van_v. United States 414 F.2d 714 (9th
Cir. 1969). The cases which discuss
the assumed effect of the Allen charge
are all appealed by defendants who were
convicted. Defendants who have been
acquitted after the giving of the charge
have not complained. ' Upon review of all
the circumstances of the case, we hold
that the supplemental instruction was
not coercive.
C. PREJUDICIAL COMMUNICATIONS
During the trial, the prosecutor
learned that two jurors had been on an
elevator during a conversation between
a government attorney and a government
witness. The prosecutor notified the
trial judge, who called a conference in
chambers with all parties to the con-
versation plus defense counsel. The
judge determined that nothing prejud-
icial had been said. There was no mo~
tion for a mistrial. Defense counsel
now assert that there was something
sinister about the event. The record,
however, reveals no reason for disturb-
ing the trial court's descretion in
handling the matter.
The same juror who had expressed her
reservations in the jury room and later
in a posttrial affidavit also stated in
her affidavit that during the deliber-
ations she had initiated a conversation
with the bailiff by asking whether the
judge expected a verdict. She said the
bailiff told her that he didn't know,
but he assumed that the judge would
"like" a verdict. The bailiff, by
affidavit, denied the conversation. In
any event, the defendants fail to show
how such a conversation, if it occurred,
could have prejudiced anyone. Since
the alleged conversation occurred, if
9.
it occurred at all, nearly a week after
the judge had given the Allen charge
earlier complained of, it should have
been apparent to even the most obtuse
juror that a verdict would be a wel-
comed development, We find no basis for
charging the trial judge with an abuse
of discretion for refusing to grant a
new trial upon this sort of clutching
at straws, It was a long trial, and
such trials frequently produce a number
of imperfections. It is to the credit
of the experienced trial judge that this
is the sort of assignment of error to
which the appellants apparently must
look in their search for reversible
error,
D. ALLEGED MISCONDUCT BY
PROSECUTOR
Appellant Lichtig claims that the
prosecutor made an impermissible ref-
erence in final argument to his and
Block's failure to take the stand.
Block's attorney, in his part of the
summation, had made a reference to cer-
tain evidence thought to be exculpatory
of Block. The prosecutor in his final
LO.
argument referred to "Julian Weiner's
exculpatory testimony" and the absence
of other testimony on the point. None
of these comments trespassed upon the
rule against calling attention to fail-
ure to testify. The jury knew very well
that neither Block nor Lichtig had
testified, and, if this failure left
some unanswered questions in the minds
of jurors, that was a risk that had
been assumed long before final argument.
The government took no unfair advantage
of the situation, and there was no er~-
ror in refusing a new trial on this
score. The trial court carefully in-
structed the jury about the presumption
of innocence, the burden of proof, and
the right of the defendant to refrain
from testifying.
Lichtig and Block also complain
about the exploitation by the prosecutor
of the term "reciprocal income"> during
the course of the trial. The point is
frivolous. "Reciprocal income" and
"reciprocals" were terms commonly used
in the reporting of inflated or non-
existing assets. The trial court
ll.
carefully instructed the jury that there
was nothing illegal about reciprocal
income. The illegal conduct consisted
of making false or exaggerated reports
about "reciprocal" and other kinds of
income.
E. ALLEGED IMPERMISSIBLE
RESTRICTION OF CROSS-
EXAMINATION OF WITNESS
LOWELL
The interrogation of Samuel Lowell,
one of the government's principal wit-
nesses, commenced in the afternoon of
Friday, February 21, 1975. At the close
of that session the trial was continued
to 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, February 25,
1975. The direct examination continued
through Tuesday and for a very short
time Wednesday morning, when the case
was continued to Thursday on motion of
defense counsel. Cross-examination by
Mr. Abeles for defendant Weiner lasted
all day Thursday and all day Friday.
Mr. DeSantis, representing defendant
Lichtig, commenced cross~examination
late Friday afternoon. On adjournment,
the trial was continued to Tuesday,
March 1l. Mr. DeSantis cross-examined
12.
- ——
eet ee
Lowell all day Tuesday, and half of
Wednesday morning. Mr. Markowitz, rep-~
resenting defendant Block, then took
over and completed his questioning in
the middle of the afternoon.
In addition, during the government's
case, the court permitted defense coun-
sel to recall Mr. Lowell for further
cross-interrogation on March 20, 1975.
During cross-examination there were
numerous and repetitive attacks upon the
credibility of the witness. Counsel
probed Lowell on extramarital relation-
ships and participation in fraudulent
conduct not charged in the indictment.
It will serve no useful purpose to de-
tail the specific instances in which
defendants claim that cross-examination
was improperly curtailed or restricted.
With respect to each such assignment of
error, the impeaching information came
to the attention of the jury. The
attack is only upon the court's refusal
to permit counsel unrestricted license
to exhaust the details of the particular
circumstance or transaction. There was
13.
no error.
The scope and extent of cross-exam-
ination is within the discretion of the
trial court, and the court's limitation
of cross-examination will not result in
reversal unless it is clear that a def-
endant was thereby denied his consti-
tutional right to confrontation, Smith
v. Illinois, 390 U.D. 129, 132 (1968);
United States v. Haili, 443 F.2d 1295,
1299 (9th Cir. 1971); Enciso v. United
States, 370 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1967),
The court in its discretion may
limit cross-examination in order to pre-
clude repetitive questioning, upon det-
ermining that a particular subject has
been exhausted, or to avoid extensive
and time-wasting exploration of col-
lateral matters. See e.g. United States
Vv. Zane, 495 F.2d 683, 695 (2d Cir.
1973); United States y. Miller, 473 F.2d
600 (lst Cir. 1972).
The trial court has a duty to con-
trol cross-examination to prevent it
from unduly burdening the record with
cumulative or irrelevant matter. Alford
14,
v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694
(1931); United States v. Carrion, 463
F.2d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 1972). This
duty includes a specific duty to pre-
vent counsel from confusing the jury
with a proliferation of details on col-
lateral matters. United States v.
Carrion, 463 F.2d at 707. See also Fed.
R. Evid. 403 and 608(b).
F. ACCESS TO AND ADMISSIBILITY
OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
Apparently two pages of notes made
by prosecutor Rathje of an interview
with Fred Levin, a government witness,
were supplied to the defense and used
by the defense in cross-examination.
The government then offered the notes as
evidence. Defendants objected. They
wanted the notes to be censored before
submission to the jury. Later the
government withdrew the offer. The ex-
hibit was never reoffered by defense
counsel. The alleged error was not pre-
served for appellate review. This is
certainly not a situation, as suggested
by defense counsel, where the govern-
ment has withheld or suppressed ex-
15.
culpatory material as was the case in
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88
(1963). See United States v. Agurs, 421
U.S. 97, 107-14 (1976).
Appellant Lichtig says his consti-
tutional rights were infringed by the
government's failure to disclose a pre-
trial agreement (in a companion civil
action) between the trustee in reorgan-
ization and the previously mentioned
Lowell which allegedly absolved Lowell
of civil liability in the Equity Funding
litigation. Here, the verdict of the
jury was returned on May 20, 1975, def-
endants were sentenced on July 14, 1975,
and appeals were taken on July 25, 1975.
Lichtig's present claim of error is
based on an application for a continu-
ance made on May 7, 1976, in the civil
litigation, for the purpose of consum-
mating a settlement with respect to
Lowell. Obviously, none of this is part
of the record on appeal. Since the
agreement Lichtig would have had the
government disclose was not made until
a year after trial, it was hardly sus-
ceptible of nondisclosure during the
16.
iad -
trial. There was no infringement of a
right to exculpatory material.
Lichtig also complains of the den-
ial of his oral motion during the trial
for an order requiring the government
to lodge all SEC transcripts and state-
ments and interviews with witnesses by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the postal service, or anyone else that
were in possession of the United States
Attorney, for the court's examination
to ferret out possible Brady material.
As the Supreme Court noted in United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106, a re-
quest "for ‘all Brady meterial' or for
‘anything exculpatory'" is equivalent
to no cequest at all. The trial judge
need not accord the slightest heed to
such a shotgun approach. This attempt
to create error has as little merit as
the one preceding it.
G. DISQUALIFICATION OF U.S.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
Appellant Block asserts error in the
refusal of the trial judge to disqualify
the United States Attorney's office from
prosecuting the case. An attorney em-
17.
ployed by the law firm of Nelson, Liker
& Merrifield while that firm represented
Weiner and Block in connection with
matters arising out of the Equity Fund-
ing fraud ieft the firm and went to work
for the SEC.
Appellant suggests, but the record
does not confirm, close cooperation be-
tween the SEC and the Department of
Justice in the management of this pro-
secution,
In order to disqualify the U.S.
Attorney's office, the court would first
have to impute to the former private
apa knowledge of the Equity Fund-
ing litigation possessed by other mem-
bers of his former law firm. Second
the court would have to impute this <7
knowledge to the other attorneys at the
— And third, the court would have to
impute all SEC knowledge to the office
of the United States Attorney by virtue
of the alleged cooperation between the
Department of Justice and the SEC.
The first step of the exercise may
be possible (see Lasky Brothers v. War-
18.
ner Brothers Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d
924, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1955)), but the
logic thereafter become tenuous. Prob-
lems concerning the imputation of know-
ledge to government attorneys are sui
generis. A free flow of information
may be assumed to exist within a law
partnership, but the size and diversity
of many government agencies makes sim-
ilar assumptions about agencies wholly
unrealistic. See United States v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 360-63
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). There is nothing in
the record before us to support a find-
ing that the named employee of the SEC
ever investigated or passed upon the
subject matter of the instant case, or
that information pertaining to this case
ever reached him. Cf. General Motors
Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639,
651 (2a Cir. 1974). As this court noted
in Gas-a-tron of Arizona v. Union Oil
Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976),
we will not disturb the district court's
exercise of its discretion in dealing
with challenges to government attorneys
as long as the record reveals no sound
19.
basis for disqualification. The record
in this case supports the district
court's refusal to disqualify the United
States Attorney's office.
H, COCONSPIRATOR HEARSAY
EXCEPTION
The government originally charged
twenty-two defendants on 105 counts.
Twenty-two of those counts involved
Weiner, Lichtig and Block. Count 1 al-
leged a conspiracy between Weiner, Lich-
tig, Block and some of the other
defendants.
Two counts involving Weiner, Lichtig
and Block were dismissed after presen-
tation of the prosecution's case in
chief. At the close of all the evid-
ence, the government withdrew two other
counts - the conspiracy charge and a
mail-fraud charge (Counts 1 and 2).
The court dismissed those counts, leay-
ing sixteen counts (Counts 6, 10-14,
and 75-84) for presentation to the jury.
At the time the conspiracy count was
withdrawn, the defendants moved to
Strike all testimony admitted under the
20
|
|
)
:
coconspirator exception to the hearsay
rule. Previous timely exceptions had
been made to the admission of the test-
imony. The motions were denied. Appel-
lants now contend that the dismissal of
the conspiracy count by the court made
inadmissible all statements previously
received under the exception. Alternat-
ively, they claim that even if there was
no absolute bar to the testimony, it was
inadmissible because the standards of
admissibility under the exception had
not been met since there was insuffic-
ient proof aliunde of the conspiracy and
and defendants’ connection with it.
Defendants’ first contention, that
the mere dismissal of the conspiracy
count mandated striking all testimony
previously admitted under the hearsay
exception, is frivolous. The eventual
submission of the charge does not det-
ermine the admissibility of the evidence.
This circuit has established that
coconspirator hearsay is admissible only
when a foundation is laid to show that:
(1) the declaration was in furtherance
21.
of the conspiracy, (2) it was made dur-
ing the pendency of the conspiracy, and
(3) there is independent proof of the
existence of the conspiracy and of the
connection of the declarant and the def-
endant to it, United States v. Snow,
521 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976). See
also United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d
847, 852 (9th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Calaway, 524 F,2d 609, 612 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976);
Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718
(9th Cir, 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
953 (1964). It is not necessary for a
charge of conspiracy to have been brou-
ght in order for coconspirator hearsay
to become admissible, Dutton vy. Evans,
400 U.S. 74 (1970); United States vy.
Williams, 435 F,2d 642 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971); Lee
Dip v. United States, 92 F.2d 802, 803
(9th Cir, 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S.
638 (1938). Nor is the exception limit-
ed to trials where coconspirators are
also codefendants. United States y.
Randall. 491 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1974);
22,
)
)
“
United States v. Williams, Supra.
The trial judge initially decides
whether the declarations of coconspira-
tors are admissible. There is no set
order of proof. The admission of the
evidence subject to a motion to strike
because of the insufficiency of proof
of the necessary preliminary facts is
well within the trial judge's discretion.
United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d at 852;
United States v. Knight, 416 F.2d 1181,
1185 (9th Cir. 1969).
In this case the disputed statements
were clearly made during and in further-
ance of the conspiracy. The only ques-
tion is whether there was sufficient
independent evidence of a conspiracy and
the defendants' connection to it.
The quantum of independent proof
necessary for the application of the co-
conspirator heresay exception is suf-
ficient, substantial evidence to estab-
lish a prima facie case that the con-
spiracy existed and that the defendant
was a part of it. Glasser v. United
States, 312 U.S. 60 (1942); United
23.
States v. Testa, 548 F.2d at 853; United
States v. Calaway, 524 F2d at 612;
United States v. Svanos. 462 F.2d 1012
(9th Cir. 1972): Carbo v. United States.
supra.
Once the existence of a conspiracy
has been established, independent ey-
idence is necessary to show prima facie
the defendant's connection with the con-
spiracy, even if the connection is
slight, ’ United States v. Freie, 545
F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); United
States v. Knight, supra,
Several officers and officials of
eisie Funding who had pleaded guilty,
including Jerome Evans, Treasurer until
1968, the earlier-mentioned Samuel
Lowell, Controller, and Michael Sultan,
Assistant Controller, testified for the
prosecution, Other Equity Funding em-
ployees, and auditors and SEC examiners
who had reviewed the company's financ-
ial records after discovery of the
fraud also testified,
It is undisputed that the financial
24,
records of Equity Funding did not ac~
curately reflect the financial condition
of the company and its subsidiaries.
Testimony about particular fraudulent
financial transactions and recordkeep~
ing abounds in the record. For example,
both Sultan and Lowell testified about
the purchase of Investors Planning Corp-
oration of America (Tnvestors Planning)
in 1969. The total cost of the acquisi-
tion was approximately $10 million, $2
million assigned to book value and ap-
proximately $8 million to excess cost
that included the value of the sales
force acquired and of the contractual
plans acquired.
Thereafter, because of a shortfall
in the Funded Loans and Receivables
Account, the prime source of the com-
pany's paper profit, it was decided to
revalue the future premiums due under an
account entitled "Clients Contractual
Receivables," which allegedly represen-
ted the trail commissions” due on the
Investors Planning programs. In order
to substantiate the transaction, Stanley
Goldblum, the president of Equity Fund-
25.
ing, wrote a letter to the auditors in-
forming them that a sale was in process
and that he would personally guarantee
a purchase of the trail commissions for
close to the amount of the recorded
value. After debits for commissions
payable, Equity Funding increased its
paper income by over $13 million by this
accounting treatment of the contractual
commissions. No real sale was anticipa-
ted. Lowell and Sultan testified that?
$2 million in funds from Equity Funding
was routed through two shell corpora-
tions in Europe and then paid back to
Equity Funding as the Supposed down pay-
ment on the purchase. Thus, Equity
Funding paid itself, and the value re-
corded was never received.
ae improprieties testified to by
various Equity Funding employees includ-
ed falsification of confirmations for
pasadiiae: assets claimed by Equity Fund-
int. Another example was the insertion
of a oe plug in the total of the
detail making up the Funded Loans
Receivable portion of the Funded Loans
and Accounts Receivable account. The
26.
4
j
$2 million did not appear on the com-
puter printouts of the detail, but only
in the total. In later years the detail
sheets substantiated the total, but the
full account numbers were not given and
accounts were randomly duplicated with-
in the detail until the desired sum was
reached. In addition, various notes re-
ceivable were created with shell corp-
orations, some of which continued on the
books at full value even after the date
of maturity despite non-payment.
The testimony of the various Equity
Funding officials about their personal
participation in and knowledge of the
various schemes showed an obvious com-
mon purpose and practice intended to
inflate falsely the reported value of
Equity Funding. Auditors and examiners
who reviewed the financial records under
the direction of the company's receiver
and the SEC confirmed the testimony of
the employees.
The existence of a conspiracy to
provide false information to the public
and to the SEC is firmly established.
27.
Defendants’ second contention, that
there was insufficient independent ev~
idence of the connection of each def-
endant to the conspiracy, also fails.
The record again supplies ample evidence
upon which the trial judge could have
determined that prima facie proof ex~-
isted to establish the necessary con~
nection of each defendant with the con-
spiracy.
The lack of agreement between the
financial statements and the actual fin-
ances of Equity Funding is relevant be-
cause each defendant, Weiner, Lichtig,
and Block, was involved in at least one
of the audits as an independent auditor.
Weiner and Lichtig were responsible for
the 1968 audit, and Weiner and Block
were responsible for the audits pre-
pared for 1969, 1970 and 1971. Lichtig
became Treasurer of Equity Funding dur-
ing the 1968 audit. Lichtig had bought
shares of Equity Funding while still
acting as an independent auditor. Def-
endants each had several meetings with
Equity Funding officials involved in the
financial manipulations. Frank West, a
28.
CPA employed by Wolfson, Weiner, Rat-
Off and Lapin, who worked on audits of
Equity Funding from 1969 through 1972,
and Samuel Lowell both testified to
conversations with defendants about
questionable transactions.
The workpapers of defendants did not
reveal requests for confirmation of the
amount of collateral being used as sec-
urity for outstanding funded loan pro-
grams, and for the amount of internally
held funding programs. Various arith-
metical calculations that were incorrect
in the original worksheets or Equity
Funding calculations were not corrected,
even in one case where the worksheets
revealed that the auditors were aware
of the mistake. There was much give and
take between Weiner, and later Block,
and the Equity Funding officials in at-
tempts to develop auditing methods that
would show income in amounts the company
felt was desirable.
The responsibilities of defendants
were also established by testimony re-
garding their own statements and actions.
29.
Extrajudicial declarations made by def-
endants themselves are not hearsay, but
qualify as independent evidence,
United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d at
613; Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d
847 (9th Cir. 1973). Such evidence in-
cluded (1) Block directing auditors
working under him not to pursue certain
areas that involved fraudulent or fals-
ified information despite the auditor's
requests for further information, and
(2) Weiner suggesting accounting pro-
cedures that obscured Equity Funding's
true financial situation.
Independent evidence to connect de-
fendants with the conspiracy for the
purpose of admitting the hearsay decla-
rations was abundant. Some of the ev~-
idence is circumstantial; but circum-
stantial evidence can provide the nec-
essary quantum of proof. United States
v. Calaway, 524 F.2d at 612. Once the
judge determines that the hearsay ev-
idence is admissible, the weight to be
given that evidence becomes a question
for the jury. United States v. Ragland,
375 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. de-
30 -
nied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968); Carbo y.
United States, 314 F.2d at 737.
We hold that the evidence heard un-
der the coconspirator hearsay exception
to the hearsay rule was properly ad-
mitted. A prima facie case was made for
the existence of a conspiracy and the
involvement of the particular defendants
in it.
Defendants further contend that the
testimony of Lowell, Sultan, John Tem-
pleton (who served as Controller of
Equity Funding from 1968 to 1969), and
others concerning extrajudicial declar-
ations by Goldblum violated their right
of confrontation because the prosecution
never called Goldblum as a witness.
Goldblum was called by the defense
but refused to testify after asserting
his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. Goldblum's extrajudicial
Statements were admissible as discussed
above under the coconspirator exception.
The admissibility of evidence under
the coconspirator exception, however,
31:
does not automatically demonstrate com-
pliance with the confrontation clause.
United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730,
734 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Bax-
ter, 492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974).
In Dutton v. Evans, supra, the Sup-
reme Court dealt with a situation where
a third party testified to a conversa~
tion with Evans's codefendant, Williams,
who was tried separately. Williams did
not testify at Evans's trial. The
Court did not indicate whether Williams
was available to testify, and did not
address the issue. In dealing with the
relationship between the coconspirator
hearsay exception and the Sixth Amend-
ment, the Court acknowledged that the
confrontation clause does not bar the
admission of all hearsay. 400 U.S. at
80. Although the hearsay rule and the
confrontation clause have a similar ba-
sis, the two do not precisely overlap.
400 U.S. at 82, quoting from California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970).
Under Dutton an analysis must be made
32.
to determine whether there are sufficient
indicia of reliability to permit the in-
troduction of the hearsay declarations in
spite of the lack of opportunity for the
defendant to cross-examine the declarant.
United States v. Snow, supra, is in-
structive in this case. Snow contended
that testimony by a DEZ agent regarding
declarations of a coconspirator denied
his right of confrontation. The govern-
ment argued that the defendant had been
equally free to subpoena the declarant.
We held that the testimony contained suf-
ficient indicia of reliability to meet
the Dutton v. Evans standards and that:
"While it is unquestioned
that the government has the bur-
den of producing evidence showing
the guilt of the accused beyond
a reasonable doubt, it does not
have the burden of calling every
witness whose testimony would
Support a verdict of guilty, and
it need not call a witness, eq-
ually available to both sides,
merely because cross-examination
of such a witness might prove
helpful to the defense case."
United States v. Snow 521 F.2d
at 736. ae
Goldblum was equally available to both
33.
sides during the trial, and was in fact
called by the defense. He chose to as~
sert his constitutional right against
self-incrimination, and his testimony
thus became unavailable to both sides.
The failure of the prosecution to call
Goldblum as its witness — not constit-
ute grounds for reversal.
Once Goldblum's refusal to testify
and his resulting unavailability are
established and cross-examination is
thus precluded, the next question is
whether there are sufficient indicia of
reliability to permit introduction of
his declarations without violating the
Sixth Amendment.
"* * * The relevant —_
inquiry is whether, under the
siseunsbendels the unavailability
of the declarant for cross-exam-
ination deprived the jury of a
satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the extrajudicial
declaration.* * *" United States
. Adams, 446 F.2d 682,
1 r.) cert. denied, 404 U.S.
943 (1971).
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972);
Dutton v. Evans, supra; United States
34.
ee ee ee ee
|
v. Baxter, 492 F.2d at 177.
Among the factors to be considered
in determining the reliability of the
hearsay declarations is whether the wit-
ness testifying would have had knowledge
of the roles and identities of others
within the conspiracy. Also significant
is whether the witness's recollection
of the declarant's statements is likely
to be accurate and whether the declarant
would have had any reason to have lied
to the witness. The court must deter-
mine whether cross-examination of the
declarant woula be likely to show that
the declarant's statements were un-
reliable.?? Another important deter-
mination is whether the evidence is
“crucial” or “devastating” to the de-
fense. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 87;
United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833
(9th Cir. 1976). cert. denied, 430 U.S.
966 (1977); United States v. Snow, 521
F.2d at 735; United States v. Adams,
446 F.2d at 684,
Employing the Dutton approach, +4we
hold that Goldblum's declarations con-
35.
tained sufficient indicia of reliability
and were properly admitted. Each of the
witnesses testifying about Goldblum's
extrajudicial declarations was involved
in the day-to-day running of the com-
pany. They were officers and employees
of Equity Funding, and the conversations
to which they testified were directed
to the operation of the corporation and
the maintenance of its financial records.
The witnesses were talking from personal
knowledge. Because of their positions
within the company and, in some cases,
within the conspiracy, it is unlikely
that Goldblum would have been lying to
them. The testimony of Lowell, Evans,
and others who were among the original
persons charged also contained state-
ments against their own penal interests,
a further badge of reliability.
Finally, none of the declarations
was “crucial” or “devastating”. There
was abundant evidence regarding the man-
ipulation of Equity Funding's financial
recordkeeping, and the conversations
with Goldblum were not a major compon-
ent of proof against the defendants.
36,
In fact, so substantial was the other
evidence that, even if error, the ad-
mission of Goldblum's declarations would
have been error harmless beyond a reas-
onable doubt. Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967); United States v.
Adams, 446 F.2d at 684.
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF LICHTIG
WORKPAPERS
Appellant Lichtig alleges error in
the receipt in evidence of workpapers
produced by Lichtig in 1968. He cites
Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914
(9th Cir. 1960). Nothing in Gallego
supports this assignment of error.
Lichtig contends that the chain of
custody of the workpapers between 1968
and the trial was incomplete and that
the workpapers themselves were incom-
plete. Assuming these insufficiencies,
the trial judge has discretion to admit
the workpapers into evidence if he "is
satisfied that in reasonable probability
** *[they have] not been changed in im-
portant respects"; the jury is free to
weigh the evidence according to its own
37.
evaluation of its authenticity. Gal-
lego v. United States, 276 F.2d at 917; .
Williams v. United States, 381 F.2d 20
(9th Cir. 1967). This court said, in
linited States v. King:
"Tt is the function of the
trial court to determine whether
proffered evidence has enough
prima facie trustworthiness to
warrant its consideration by the
jury, and generally the suffic-
iency of a showing of authenti-
city of a writing sought to be
introduced into evidence is a
matter within the discretion of
the trial judge.* * * " 472 F.2d
at 7.
In this case, there was substantial
testimony from witnesses who had used
the workpapers or who knew the hand-
writing, identifying and authenticating
the workpapers. The court did not abuse
its discretion. See United States v.
Brown, 482 F.2d 1226 (8th Cir. 1973).
J. ALLEGED ERROR IN QUASHING
SUBPOENA FOR THE "PARKER
REPORT"
Appellant Weiner alleges error in
the court's suppression of a subpoena
duces tecum for the Parker Report. The
Parker Report resulted from an invest-
38.
eneay
inl ae;
bi ett tine
gia ss oe
Atti
Wh Se
:
3
:
de
5 4
Ea}
igation made for the guidance and in-
formation of the attorneys retained by
the accounting firm of Seidman & Seid-
man to defend numerous civil actions
filed as a consequence of the Equity
Funding fraud. Parker was a partner of
Seidman & Seidman. Weiner, as noted
earlier, was a partner of Seidman &
Seidman at the time the report was pre-
pared. Block also joined Seidman &
Seidman in the merger with Wolfson,
Weiner.
Block's attorney caused a subpoena
duces tecum to be issued to the att-
Orneys for Seidman & Seidman for a copy
of the Parker Report. The Seidman &
Seidman attorneys moved to quash or sup-
press the subpoena claiming attorney-
client and work-product privileges. The
motion to suppress Block's subpeona was
granted. With respect to Weiner, who
assigns the error on appeal, the sub-
poena was never ruled upon. Action on
the motion was withheld or suspended at
Weiner's request, and the motion was
never thereafter properly brought be-
fore the court for action. There is no
39.
basis for an assignment of error.
In the reply brief Weiner states:
"weiner had every reason to believe that
the 'Parker' report contained totally
exonerating information regarding his
personal absence from all of the audit-
ing functions at * * * [Equity Funding] ."
This speculation is unsupported by any~-
thing in the record. In the same brief,
Weiner seeks to rely on United States
v. Agusr, supra, and Brady v. Maryland,
supra, to support this assignment of
error. How prosecutorial misconduct in
a Brady context can be inferred in this
situation is not demonstrated.
K. DENIAL OF BLOCK'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS HIS TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE SEC
Block contends that he was deprived
of his right to counsel during his var-
ious appearances at investigative hear-—
ings before the SEC. More specifically,
Block asserts that counsel who appeared
with him during his testimony before the
SEC, and upon whose advice he decided to
testify, had a conflict of interest be-
cause the attorneys' law firm represent-
40.
OWS Rb itiels
=
:
*
4
3
ed certain accounting firms of which
Block was a present or past employee at
the same time the attorneys were appear-
ing with Block. The trial court denied
Block's motion to suppress his testimony
before the SEC, after finding that
Block had not been deprived of his right
to cxunsel and that he had voluntarily
waived his right to be represented by
his own attorney
It is firmly established that a
party compelled to appear before an in-
vestigation by the SEC has a right to
retain counsel. The Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.D. §555(b), pro-
vides in pertinent part:
"A person compelled to
appear in person before an
agency or representative there-
of is entitled to be accompanied,
represented, and advised by
counsel or, if permitted by the
agency, by other qualified rep-
resentative. A party is entitled
to appear in person or by or
with counsel or other duly
qualified representative in an
agency proceeding* * *,"
This right to have an independent coun-
sel can, however, be waived. See United
4l.
States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527, 530 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Frame, 454
F.2d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1972); Kaplan
v. United States, 375 F.2d 895 (9th Cir,
1967). Here, the finding of waiver by
the trial judge is amply supported by
evidence,
L. DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION OF
BLOCK'S BANKRUPTCY
TESTIMONY
Block personally was adjudicated a
bankrupt on November 14, 1973. He
testified at the first meeting of his
creditors on December 11, 1973, which
was continued on January 7, 1974, and
June 24, 1974. On January 7, 1974,
Block refused to answer certain ques-~-
tions on Fifth Amendment grounds. The
district court held Block to be in con-
tempt. To purge himself of contempt, he
then answered the questions,
Prior to trial, Block moved for sup-
pression of any evidence obtained by
the government from the testimony given
by him at those first meetings of his
creditors. He based his motion on
section 7(a) (10) of the Bankruptcy Act,
42,
i
!
11 U.S.C. § 25(a) (1), which in pertinent
part provides that the bankrupt shall:
"* * * [A]t the first meeting
of his creditors, at the hearing
upon objections, if any, to his
discharge and at such other times
as the court shall order, submit
to an examination concerning the
conducting of his business, the
cause of his bankruptcy, his
dealings with his creditors and
other persons, the amount, kind,
and whereabouts of his property,
and, in addition, all matters
which may affect the administration
and settlement of his estate or
the granting of his discharge;
but no testimony, or any evidence
which is directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony,
given by him shall be offered in
evidence against him in any crim-
inal proceeding, except such
testimony as may be given by him
in the hearing upon obje¢kions
to his discharge * * *,"
This immunity cast on the government the
heavy burden of affirmatively showing
that the evidence it intended to present
was derived from a legitimate source
wholly independent from Block's bank-
ruptcy testimony. Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S.441, 461-62 (1972);
Block v. Consino, 535 F.2d 1165, 1169
43 .
(9th Cir. 1976).
The trial court denied Block's mot~
ion to suppress, ruling that the govern-
ment's affidavits and testimony met the
burden. Prior to its ruling, the court
offered to allow Block to call addition-
al witnesses in support of his motion if
he presented a written summary + ae
how his testimony before the SEC” dif-
fered from his bankruptcy testimony, and
if he represented that those witnesses
could give competent and relevant test-
imony. Otherwise, the court thought,
there was nothing in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings which was not covered before
the SEC. Block's counsel said a com-
parison of the SEC and the bankruptcy
testimonies would be attempted. How-
ever, nothing was done to comply with
the court's suggestion, and Block did
not raise the subject again.
Block now contends that the district
court improperly put the burden upon
him to prove that the government's ey-
idence was tainted by use of his bank-
ruptcy testimony. However, the record
44.
shows that the court first required the
government to prove by affidavits and
testimony that no government attorneys
Or personnel connected with them in this
case had seen, read, or used Block's
bankruptcy testimony, directly or in-
directly, before denying the motion to
suppress.
We have reviewed the pertinent por-
tions of the record in this appeal, and
agree with the district court that the
government met its burden under Kasti-
gar. The court properly denied Block's
motion to suppress.
M. PROPRIETY OF PROTECTIVE
ORDER ISSUED IN BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDINGS.
While Block's bankruptcy was in
progress during the pendency of this
criminal case in the district court,
Equity Funding was also undergoing Chap-
ter X bankruptcy proceedings in the same
district court. Block's bankruptcy was
before Bankruptcy Judge Russell Seymour,
and Equity Funding's bankruptcy was be-
fore Bankruptcy Judge James Moriarty.
Block obtained bankruptcy subpoenas
45°
from Judge Seymour under Rule 205, Rules
of Bankruptcy, to examine 61 witnesses.
Block's acknowledged purpose in obtain-
ing those subpoenas was to prepare for
his criminal trial. Because two of
those witnesses were located in Washing-
ton, D.C., Block initiated an ancillary
proceeding in the bankruptcy court of
that federal district pursuant to order
of Judge Seymour, and subpoenas were
issued there. Meanwhile, the trustee
in reorganization for Equity Funding
filed an application for a protective
order to prevent the examination of the
two District of Columbia witnesses, who
had been lawyers for Equity Funding in
connection with SEC matters. The trus-
tee's reason (among others) was that
examination of those witnesses would
unduly disrupt the reorganization pro-
ceedings. On recommendation of Judge
Moriarty, the district court issued the
protective order enjoining the enforce-
ment of the District of Columbia bank-
ruptcy subpoenas.
Block contends that the protective
order deprived him of his right to pre-
46,
:
|
;
:
%
4
Pi
4
:
|
a
pare adequately for trial and his right
to effective assistance of counsel. The
district judge characterized this argu-
ment as frivolous.
Bankruptcy Rule 205(d) provides:
"The examination under subdivisions (a)
and (b) of the rule may relate only to
the acts, conduct, or property of the
bankrupt, or to any matter which may
affect the administration of the bank-
rupt's estate, or to his right to dis-
charge." The rule pertains to prepar-
ation for bankruptcy proceedings only -
not to preparation for defense of a
criminal action, which was Block's avow-
ed purpose.
The protective order did not purport
to limit any right Block had under Fed.
R. Crim. P.15, 16, and 17 to use sub-
poenas, have discovery, and take dep-
ositions in connection with his crimin-
al trial. We agree with the district
judge that Block's contention is friv-
olous.
47.
AIN
N. PROPRIETY OF CERT
COUNTS ON WHICH APPELLANTS
WERE CONVICTED.
Lichtig contends that, as a matter
of law, he could not have been convic-
ted on Counts 6 and 10 through 14 be-
cause these six counts reallege by ref-
erence portions of Counts 1 and 2, which
were dismissed ae the case was sub-
mitted to the jury. Block and Weiner
adopt this argument as to the relevant
counts on which each of them was con~
victed.
Count 1 charged Lichtig, Weiner,
Block and nineteen others with conspir-
acy to commit securities fraud by mail,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count
2 charged all twenty-two defendants with
securities fraud in violation of 15
U.S.C. §§ 77q(a) and 77x. Count 2 in-
corporated by reference certain infor-
mational paragraphs of Count 1. The
six counts each consisted of two para~
graphs, the first of which incorporated
by reference all the allegations of
Count 2 (except the last paragraph of
Count 2, which pertained only to defen-
48,
-
-
:
dant Evans), and the second paragraph of
which related a particular transaction
wherein certain defendants, other than
Lichtig, Weiner, and Block, used the
mails. From these facts, Lichtig argues,
reversal is required on the six counts
because the first paragraph of each
count merely realleges Counts 1 and 2,
which no longer exist, and the second
paragraph does not even refer to him.
Lichtig overlooks the following:
(1) Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) (1), which
provides, "Allegations made in one
count may be incorporated by reference
in another count"; (2) settled law that
the dismissal of one count of an indict-
ment which is referred to in the remain-
ing counts where, as here, the refer-
ence is sufficiently full to incorporate
the matter from the dismissed count
(Crain y, United States, 162 U.S. 625,
653 (1896); United States vy. Shavin,
287 F.2d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1961);
Barnard v. United States, 16 F.2d 451,
453 (9th Cir, 1926)); (3) settled law
that one of several defendants may be
charged with and convicted of a sub-
49.
stantive offense when, as here, the
evidence shows that he joined the con-
spiracy and that the substantive offense
was committed in furtherance of the con-
spiracy, even if that defendant did not
do and was not specifically aware of
all the acts constituting the offense
(Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.
640 (1946); see also United States v.
Janelli, 461 F.2d 483, 486 (2d Cir.
1972); United States v. Roselli, 432
F.2d 879, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1970)).
O. SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE
Defendants contend that there was
insufficient evidence to sustain their
convictions. In our review we must take
the evidence in "the light most favor-
able to the verdict." United States v.
Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir.
1969); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. at 80; United States v. Hood, 493
F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 852 (1974).
Weiner was convicted of ten counts,
Lichtig of thirteen, and Block of seven.
Each defendant was sentenced to con-
50.
CK et ew
ee
~~ os
ne lle.
the Se Ne pecedre~sa +
ee eee”.
:
4
45
current sentences on all counts. We
need only find evidence sufficient to
Support conviction on one count for
each defendant in order to sustain the
verdicts under the concurrent-sentence
doctrine. United States yv. Valdovinos,
558 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Moore, 552 F.2d 860,
865 (9th Cir. 1977); United States y.
Rodriguez, 546 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.
1976). We will, however, consider more
than one count as to each defendant, be-
cause of the nature and complexity of
the case,
The counts under consideration may
be divided into two groups. Counts 75,
78, 80, and 84 allege that one or more
of the defendants "willfully made or
caused to be made untrue statements of
material fact" in various registration
Statements filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The allegedly
false statements were that the firm of
Wolfson, Weiner, Ratoff and Lapin?® had
audited the financial statements of
Equity Funding and its subsidiaries
using generally accepted auditing stan-
51.
dards (GAAS) and had found them to be
in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles (caap) .29
The second group, Counts 76, 77, 79,
81, 82 and 83 charge Lichtig, and others
not tried here, with willfully making
and causing to be made untrue or false
and misleading statements of material
fact or willfully omitting or causing
to be omitted statements of material
fact about specific accounts contained
in the financial statements included in
the registration statements filed with
the SEC. These counts deal with errors
in the actual amounts reported.
These two groups of counts were
treated together by the judge as the
"false filing charges". [In his instruc-
tions to the jury he stated the three
necessary elements that the prosecution
must establish in order to warrant a
conviction:
"The first element is that
the defendant under consideration
in the specific document named
in the count made or caused to
be made a false statement of
material fact, or, where alleged
52.
omitted or caused to be omitted
a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not
misleading.
"Counts 76, 77, 79 and 8l
allege both false statements and
omissions to make certain dis-
closures. The other counts
allege only false statements.
"The second element is that
the document named in each res-
pective count has been filed
with one or more of the bodies
named in the count.
"The third element is that
the defendant under consideration
acted wilfully and, with respects
to Counts 82, 83 and 84 that he
additionally acted knowingly."
As previously stated, it is undis-
puted that the financial statements of
Equity Funding failed to reflect the
actual condition of the company. Thus,
the first element is satisfied because
the financial statements contained false
statements of accounts. The connection
of the defendants with the statements
was shown by their individual responsi-
bilities in relation to the audits.
Each had a managerial role and had re-
$3.
sponsibilities for the overall audit
and the final reports. Lichtig's con-
nection, when he was an officer of
Equity Funding, was shown by his sig-
nature on each registration statement as
the Executive Vice President with fin-
ancial responsibilities. The second
element is also easily shown, as each
document in question bears proof on its
face of filing with the SEC.
The remaining inquiry is whether
defendants approved of and concurred in
the grossly misstated reports in the
good faith belief that the statements
were accurate representations or wheth-
er they knowingly and willfully ac-
quiesced in the dissemination of false
statements. See United States v. Col-
asurdo, 453 F.2d 585, 594 (2d Cir. 1971)
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972);
United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1006 (1970). In our discussion of in-
tent in United States v. Kaplan, 554
F.2d 958 (9th. Cir.), cert. denied,
U.S. (1977), we stated:
54.
"Credibility was for the
jury. The jury had to resolve
evidentiary conflicts and draw
reasonable inferences therefrom.
* * * An inference of criminal
intent can be drawn from cir-
cumstantial evidence. * * *"
554 F.2d at 964. (Citations
Omitted. )
As we discuss below, there was suffic-
ient evidence from which the jury could
find that defendants willfully and know-
ingly produced the documents containing
erroneous information.
1. Sufficiency - An Overview
Each group of counts charged sim-
ilar acts in different years. An er-
roneously recorded transaction in one
year often persisted into the following
years. Our count-by-count analysis is ;
chronological, but in order to under-
stand the full impact of particular ac-
tions a general examination is helpful.
Equity Funding's unorthodox book-
keeping began in the early 60's. Ev-
idence of the manipulation before 1968
was presented to the jury. By 1968 a
pattern had emerged in which the Funded
55.
Loans and Accounts Receivable asset ac-
count (FLAR) was being used as an um-
brella account for numerous and varying
false entries. Other accounts, both
assets and liabilities, were inflated
or created as needed to present the de-
sired picture of a healthy, growing
corporation. Weiner and Lichtig had
audited the company since the early
sixties. After Lichtig became Equity
Funding's Executive Vice President,
Block became the audit manager. They
were thus involved with the company's
financial history almost from its in-
ception. Weiner and Lichtig also help-
ed engineer many of the "innovative"
accounting techniques utilized over the
years.
Various Equity Funding officials
testified to the falsity of the figures
that appeared on the financial state-
ments and to the fact that in many in-
stances no backup papers supported the
entries. Therefore, if the auditors
had attempted to confirm the informa-
tion given to them they would have been
unable to do so. The lack of backup
56.
and supporting schedules would have
been a clear indication that something
was wrong. Since such backup often was
not even fabricated, the jury could in-
fer that the auditors either completely
failed to audit the areas, in disregard
of GAAS, or consciously failed to audit
in "cooperation" with the Equity Funding
officials, thus purposely avoiding the
false entries. If the questionable
areas had been audited and no backup
found, the failure of the auditors to
reflect that fact in their report would
have clearly contravened GAAS and the
purpose of an independent audit.
After the fraud was discovered in
1973, Touche, Ross & Co. was appointed
to audit the financial statements of
Equity Funding in accordance with GAAS
and GAAP. Touche, Ross & Co. made sub-
stantial adjustments after finding it
impossible to confirm properly many of
the recorded transactions or upon find-
ing that mathematical calculations were
erroneous. Many of the adjustments re-
lated to transactions that occurred
years before. The total final adjust-
57.
ment to the FLAR account alone was a
deduction of $62,305,353 to eliminate
the items related to false or improper
entries. The remaining valid balance
was approximately $44,000,000.
The testimony of William Simpson, an
SEC accountant, further supported the
Findings of the auditors from Touche,
Ross & Co., as did the testimony of the
Equity Funding employees regarding the
development of nonexistent assets. The
sheer magnitude of the adjustment, and
the length of time over which Weiner,
Lichtig, and Block were involved with
the company, warrants at first consid-
eration a strong inference that the
defendant auditors either were totally
inept or, more likely, were at least
partly aware of the false inflation of
Equity Funding's accounts. Our dis-
cussion of the FLAR and other accounts
in the financial statement for 1968
through 1971 will detail the particular
treatment of several items later found
to be false.
58.
2. The Audits
a. 1968
At the beginning of the 1968 audit,
Jerome Evans, Treasurer of Equity Fund-
ing, disappeared. The company's books
also vanished. John Templeton was ap-
pointed controller and, with the co-
operation of Equity Funding employees
and the auditors, attempted a recon-
struction of the books. Starting from
the unaudited third-quarter statement,
they developed a yearly statement. The
FLAR account showed a balance of
$36,311,037. The opposite liabilities
account, Notes Payable and Funded Loans
and Accounts Receivable, totaled
$15,564,629.29. The Consolidated
Statement of Financial Condition that
appeared in registration statements
filed with the SEC on April 22, 1969,
and December 31, 1969, contained these
figures.
Count 75 of the indictment alleges
that defendants Weiner and Lichtig
"willfully made and caused to be made
untrue statements of material fact” in
59.
-~
the April registration statement. The
untrue statements were in the Account-
ant's Report submitted to the SEC with
the registration statement. The untrue
facts and omissions were the erroneous
reporting of various specific accounts
contained in the financial statement
and incomplete descriptions of certain
accounts.
There is no question about the in-
accuracy of the figures contained in
the financial statements. The nec-
essary determination is whether there
was sufficient evidenct to support the
jury's verdict and the underlying find-
ing that defendants had acted willfully
and with knowledge in filing the incor-
rect financial data and certifying its
reliability.
The FLAR and Notes Payable Accounts
contain references to footnote 4 in the
Notes to the Consolidated Financial
Statement“, which states:
"Under the method of oper-
ations of the company, this rep-
resents, in the aggregate, the
amount that clients owe as a
60.
result of the various ‘funding
programs' offered by the com-
pany, together with loans and/or
receivables where ‘funding
programs' have terminated and
where the respective shares
have not been liquidated as of
December 31, 1968.
"The Funded Loans and
Accounts Receivable are offset,
in part, by the Contra Notes
Payable in Funded Loans and
Accounts Receivable. The dif-
ference, in the amount of
$20,746,408 is held by Equity
Funding Corporation of America
or one of its subsidiaries."
Contrary to the footnote, the FLAR was
not composed only of sums related to the
funding programs. Templeton had been
unable to support the estimated figure
for the FLAR with detail from funding
programs in his original work and had
been told that the discrepancy was due
to the fact that $13,500,000 included
in the account represented reciprocal
¢1 the SEC had
previously ruled that brokers were for-
commissions (recip).
bidden to pay such commissions. There
was, however, no constraint on Equity
Funding's right to receive such money.
61.
At Templeton's insistence, Weiner
and Lichtig were informed of the in-
clusion of "recip" in the FLAR account.
They were told it was necessary to place
the item in the account because probl-
ems could arise if there were an open
reporting of the funds. Lichtig and
Weiner agreed to the inclusion of the
amount without any confirmation.
The inclusion of the “recip” in the
FLAR account was misleading. The foot-
note for the account contains no in-
dication that it represents any money
other than that related to the various
funding programs. There is a material
difference in representing that the
$13,500,000 was a receivable resulting
from the sale of the product the co-
mpany offered rather than a one-time
collection of monies due.
A second error in the FLAR balance
demonstrated that the independent aud-
itors failed properly to check the
company's financial statements. Temp-
leton testified that he had determined
that the “collateral held by EFCA" on
funded loans that had terminated was
worth $6,672,337. He arrived at the
figure by looking at approximately 390
funding programs and finding that seven
for which Equity Funding still held the
collateral had terminated. He computed
this as a termination rate of 18 per-
cent, and multiplied that figure by the
estimated total collateral held by
Equity Funding to reach the $6 million
figure. In fact, the percentage was
properly 1.8 percent, and the figure
should have been only $667,233.70
William Simpson testified that the work-
papers contained a notation next to the
inflated figure: "To be revised." In
parentheses on another sheet, the lower
percentage had been used to arrive at
the correct, lower figure. The revis-
ion was never included in the final
trial balance or the completed finan-
cial statements.
Other evidence tending to show the
lack of application of GAAS and GAAP
included the fact that the footnote
showed no figure for the total amount of
collateral supposedly held by Equity
63.
Funding for the funded loans. Auditors
examining the records after discovery
of the fraud found confirmation of the
internally held programs of their col-
lateral. Other mathematical duplica-
tions in various accounts went uncor-
rected. Detail work for the portion of
the FLAR arising out of the actual pro-
grams was not fully confirmed.
Thus, in 1968 the FLAR was riddled
with mathematical errors, incorrectly
described in the relevant footnote, and
contained items that were not and often
could not be confirmed. Weiner was the
managing partner for the audit, and
Lichtig was the field manager. Temp-
leton testified that Lichtig had in-
formed him that the inclusion of
"recip" in the FLAR account was accept-
able, and there would be no confirmation,
Lichtig was in constant contact with
Templeton and was aware of Templeton's
frequent questions about various pro-
cedures. He was also responsible for
reviewing the workpapers of the aud-
itors working below him. Templeton
testified that Lichtig told him he
64.
would not confirm the accounts receiv-
able, and that Lichtig refused to per-
mit Templeton to see the audit work-
papers from previous years to aid in
the reconstruction of the records,
Finally, Lichtig was responsible for
the note describing the FLAR and Contra
Notes Payable accounts.
There was clearly sufficient evid-
ence to support the jury's conviction
of Lichtig on Count 75. Since Count 76
dealt with a registration statement
containing the same financial statement,
that conviction was also supported by
the evidence. Lichtig had become an
officer of Equity Funding by the time
of the filing of the second statement,
and his signature appears at the end of
the statement in his official capacity.
As an auditor he had known about the
falsehoods in the financial statement,
and as an officer of the corporation he
continued to misrepresent the fact that
the statement did not accurately refl-
ect Equity Funding's financial status.
The evidence as to Weiner is not as
clear as to Count 75. The major rele-
vant testimony is Templeton's descrip-
tion of Lichtig's representations re-
garding "recip" after the meeting with
Weiner and Goldblum. Were this the
only evidence and the only count against
Weiner, his conviction might be diff-
icult to sustain. In light of the
testimony regarding his participation
in later years, his position of res-
ponsibility, and the enormity of the
misstatements, however, it was possible
for the jury to infer his knowing and
willful participation in the prepar-
ation of the false statements. In any
event, we need not consider the ques-
tion further because there is ample ev-
idence to sustain his conviction under
other counts.
b. 1969
Counts 77 and 82 repeat the basic
allegation contained in Count 76, and
Count 78 repeats the basic allegation
contained in Count 75. Counts 77 and
82 relate to a registration statement
filed with the SEC on December 9, 1970;
66.
Count 78 relates to one filed on August
20, 1970. Lichtig is charged in
Counts 77 and 82 with making or causing
to be made untrue statements about ac-
counts listed in the financial state-
ments contained in the registration
statements, and Weiner and Block are
charged with making or causing to be
made untrue statements or omitting mat-
erial facts in the accountants' report
in Count 78. Weiner and Lichtig were
convicted on these counts; Block was not.
Each registration statement contain-
ed an audited Consolidated Stat ment of
Financial Condition as of December 31,
1969. The "Report of Independent Cer-
tified Public Accounts" signed by
Wolfson, Weiner, Ratoff and Lapin, and
included with the financial statements,
represents that an independent audit
had been made, that the examination was
"made in accordance with generally ac-
cepted auditing standards", and that
the financial statement was in conform-
ity with GAAP.
The FLAR account is recorded at
67.
$51,188,199, up almost $15 million from
the year before. Contra Notes Payable
equaled $21,703,967, and Note 4, the
referenced footnote, states that the
difference of $29,484,151 is held by
Equity Funding and its subsidiaries.
The note essentially duplicates that
written for the 1968 statement, except
for the figures and the insertion of
the words "and net contracts receivable"
in the first paragraph. ?7
Sultan testified that the first
trial balance during the audit for 1969
had a FLAR balance of $33 million, which
was too low. After discussions with
others in the company it was decided
that other assets would be added to the
FLAR account and the detail would be
padded on the basic funded loans asset.
The Investors Planning acquisition
previously discussed took place in 1969,
and the creation of the Client Contract-
ual Receivable Account significantly in-
creased the FLAR balance. The final
amount booked in the Clients Contract-
ual Receivable Account in which the
68.
Investors Planning manipulations were
reflected was $17,847,290, with com-
missions payable of $4,638,473, fora
total of around $13 million in income
recorded. According to West, the CPA
from Wolfson, Weiner, Ratoff and Lapin
who worked on the audits from 1969
through 1972, a final adjustment of
$1,500,000 was made in the account after
Block indicated that the company needed
more income.
Norman Grossman, a partner in
Touche, Ross & Co., testified that the
accounting treatment of the trail com-
missions was contrary to GAAP. Normal-
ly, when a company makes an acquisition
the assigned value cannot exceed the
purchase price. The purchase price here
was $10 million, but an additional $17
million value was assigned to the trail
commissions. The value of the $10 mil-
lion acquisition was thus inflated in
the financial statement to approximately
$27,8000,000. It was also contrary to
GAAP to accrue these commissions in the
year of purchase and to record excess
value.
69.
Once the establishment of the Cli-
ents Contractual Account had been agreed
to, Goldblum promised to write a letter
to Weiner guaranteeing the purchase of
the commissions should the planned sale
not go through. Block then wrote a
footnote to the financial statement ac~
curately describing the transaction.
Lowell testified that he, Weiner, and
Goldblum found the footnote totally un-
acceptable. With Weiner's participa-
tion, they compromised on inserting the
phrase "and net contracts receivable."
It was inserted in the middle of an un-
related sequence in order to avoid
arousing interest. According to Lowell,
Weiner was aware that if Block's foot-
note had been used the company would
have shown a decrease in earnings, while
the use of the compromise footnote and
the addition of the Clients Contractual
Receivable to the FLAR account created
an increase.
A deliberate arithmetical error was
introduced to the final detail infor-
mation on the funded loans asset to in-
crease its paper value. Lowell met
70.
with Weiner and told him that if he
did not have the detail added up, the
company could take care of the shortfall.
This was done by inserting a $2 million
"plug", which appeared in the total but
not in the detail lists. Lowell showed
the computer card containing the "plug"
to Lichtig. Lloyd Edens former direc-
tor of financial services of Equity
Funding and Treasurer of Equity Funding
Life, in his testimony, confirmed the
use of the device.
Fred Levin, Executive Vice President
of Equity Funding and President of the
life insurance subsidiary, Equity Fund-
ing Life Insurance Company (Equity Fund-
ing Life), confirmed that meetings had
taken place between Weiner and Lowell
regarding the treatment of the Inves-~-
tors Planning commissions. West test-
ified that he and other coworkers on
the audit had questioned Block about
the recording of the Client Contractual
Account on the 1969 audit because they
felt it was an unorthodox treatment,
Block told them he would discuss it
with Weiner, and later said that on
71,
Weiner's direction it would be allowed
to stand.
There was ample evidence to show
Weiner's knowledge of the improper han-
dling of the FLAR account. The modif-
ied footnote that he helped draft con-
cealed the true condition and operations
of the company. According to Lowell,
Weiner was aware of the misleading ef-
fect of the presentation used. In add-
ition, Grosman and others testified
about the failure to adhere to GAAP and
GAAS. This evidence, and evidence of
failures to confirm major assets claim-
ed or to check the information supplied
by the company, supports the jury's
finding that Weiner knowingly and will-
fully made or caused to be made false
and misleading statements in the aud-
itor's report. Weiner's position as
managing partner and his active part-
icipation in developing ways of present-
ing only advantageous descriptions of
the company's financial condition also
support his conviction on Count 78.
Lichtig's involvement was shown in
72.
a number of ways. He was originally in
charge of presenting the figures to the
auditors in the beginning of 1969.74
He was a participant in meetings with
Goldblum, Weiner, and Lowell where the
accounting treatment of the trail com-
missions was determined. He was shown
the card with the "plug". His signature
appears on the SEC statement as Execu-
tive Vice President and Treasurer. He
knew of the inflation in the FLAR ac-
count from previous years. This and
other evidence demonstrated his general
knowledge of the purposeful false in-
flation of FLAR and other accounts on
the financial statement. The jury had
sufficient evidence to convict him on
Counts 77 and 82.
c. 1970 and 1971
Count 79 charges Lichtig with acts
similar to those charged in Count 76
with regard to a registration statement
filed with the SEC on December 7, 1971.
Count 80 charges Weiner and Block with
the same violation as charged in Count
75 with regard to the 1971 registration
ry
statement, which contained the audited
statements for 1970. All three defen-
dants were convicted.
In 1970, the Investors Planning
trail commission sale was made. There
was no confirmation of the sale in the
workpapers, and West testified he saw
no attempts to verify the collectibility
of the balance of the receivable after
the initial down payment by checking on
the purchaser's financial condition.
There was testimony that this was con-
trary to GAAS. Other significant events
in 1970 included the discovery of a
$10 million plug in the total for the
Funded Loans Receivable asset. Edens
testified that he had helped manufacture
the plug by running a special total
sheet that was given to the auditors.
The plug was found when West added a
few sample pages of the detail, multip-
lied it by the total number of pages,
and found the result greatly inadequate.
Lichtig alerted Lowell to the problen,
and a meeting was held among Lowell,
Lichtig, Edens, and another Equity Fund-
ing employee, Bill Mercudo. Edens was
74.
directed to prepare a reconciliation, |
which he then gave to Block. Edens |
testified that he manufactured backup
for the information given to Block, and
that a check of the schedules supplied
would have revealed the Jalsity of the
claimed assets.
The general ledger contained many
entries that showed simultaneous in-
creases and transfers in round numbers
in accounts that normally are unrelated,
Grosman, Benjamin Karchin, an SEC ex-
aminer, and West all confirmed the im-
propriety of the entries. Block never
questioned the methodology underlying
the entries, and there was no evidence
found in the workpapers that any checks
on the various transfers and inflations
had taken place. Sultan testified that
the entries were purely fictitious and
no backup or schedules supporting them
had been prepared.
Block was also specifically aware of
the reclassification of Selling, General
and Administrative costs into Commission
expenses. The two accounts were un-
75.
related, so the reclassification was
suspicious on its face. Block did not
follow up on the reclassification to
determine the justification for it. The
change was in fact an improper manipu-
lation of the accounts. Block also
never questioned the inclusion of ex-
ploration costs on the books of Equity
Funding. Such costs normally would be
reflected on the books of the company
actually doing the exploration, i.e.,
the appropriate subsidiary, rather than
on the books of the parent corporation.
Lowell testified that in 1971, dur-
ing the course of the 1970 audit, Block
told him that he knew about "recip".?>
The statement came up during a conver-
sation about notes receivable. The
notes did not exist as a true receiv-
able, but supposedly represented a col-
lection of "recip" that Equity Funding
did not want to reveal. Block asked
for confirmation, and a confirmation
was arranged through someone in Italy.
Weiner directed Lowell to get confir-
mation for Block, despite Lowell's pro-
tests. This was only one of several
76.
times that Lowell had confirmations
manufactured at Weiner's request. Block
indicated knowledge of the questionable
nature of some of these false confir-
mations when he pointed out to Lowell
that envelopes bearing the confirmations
had unlikely postmarks.
Lowell testified that Block had
questioned some of the procedures dur-
ing the first part of the audit. Lowell
with concurrence of other participants
in the scheme, offered Block a trip to
Rome if he would cooperate. After this
conversation, the reconciliation to ex-
plain the $10 million gap in the funded
loans asset was given to Block, and he
was told to handle it himself. No
further questions were raised by him
about the asset, and, as stated, appar-
ently no inquiry into backup was made.
Block's suspicions were aroused in 1969.
The jury chose not to convict him for
his activities then. Their finding
that by 1971, during the audit for 1970,
Block had the requisite willfulness and
knowledge is supported by the record,
Although he may not have known the mag-
77.
—-
nitude of the fraud or many of its de-
tails, his awareness of the manipula-
tions used and his willingness to co-
operate and not fully investigate sus-
picious areas suffice to sustain his
conviction on Count 80.
During the 1970 audit Weiner knew
that two confirmations, one for an ac~-
count at Banco Union and another for
Banque Jordan, were prepared at Lowell's
direction. Weiner received one by mail
and one from Lowell personally. At the
least, he knew that the explanation for
the accounts was that they concealed
"recip" income, and he nonetheless co-
operated in falsifying the confirmations.
The confirmations showed the accounts to
be cash deposits subject to withdrawal
by check with no interest shown as pay~-
able. This was never questioned even
though the accounts were listed as in-
vestment accounts in the financial
statements. Weiner also knew that cer-
tain notes receivable were not what they
purported to be. During the 1970 audit
he participated in developing a cover-
up of a mistake made in the 1969 record-
78.
ing of an investment. The account was
reclassified with Weiner's knowledge,
and a note was attached to the journal
entries dealing with the reclassifica-
tion which stated: "all transactions
verified by JW - WWR & L == no adjust-
ments necessary." Lowell prepared the
schedule and note and sent a copy to
Weiner and Block. Weiner's continuing
involvement with various misleading
practices was sufficiently proved to
sustain his conviction on Count 80,
Lichtig participated in the dis-
cussions of how to cover up the $10
million plug discovered by West. His
continued role as an officer of Equity
Funding involved in its financial af-
fairs, combined with his previous know-
ledge of the falsification in the ac-
count, supplied sufficient evidence to
sustain his conviction on Count 79,
Counts 81 and 93, charging Lichtig,
and 84, charging Block and Weiner, are
the same counts for the 1971 audit based
on SEC registration statements filed on
September 8,1972, and April 5, 1972,
79.
which contained audited financial
statements for the year 1971. The in-
volvement of each defendant was contin-
uing. They each held the same position
as in the years before, Block's furth-
er knowledge of the falsity of the fin-
ancial statements was demonstrated by
events such as a conversation with
Lowell in the summer of 1971 wherein he
described, hypothetically, a transaction
exactly like that which had been set up
for the purported sale of the Investors
Planning Client Contractual receivable.
He also made requests to Lowell and
Goldblum for a job with Equity Funding,
thus bringing his independence sharply
into question. Sultan testified that
the earnings~per-share figure released
in a press release turned out to be a
penny off, and that he had discussed
the problem with Block. Sultan changed
the figures showing the number of out-
standing shares, and Block was aware
that the change to an erroneous figure
was made.
In general, inflations of accounts
continued in 1971, and earlier incorrect
80.
figures were carried froward even though
in some instances there was a prima
facie indication that something was
wrong with the accounts. In one in-
stance an account that would not nor-
mally have been static had the same be-
ginning and ending balance, and there
was no investigation to determine the
reason for such an unusual situation.
Also, no payment was received on var-
ious notes receivable; yet the notes
were not discounted or written off but
were carried at full value. Thus, suf-
ficient evidence existed to support
defendants' convictions on each of the
applicable counts for the audits for
the years 1970 and 1971.
In view of the sufficiency of the
evidence on the foregoing counts, the
concurrent sentence doctrine makes it
unnecessary to review in detail the
evidence on Counts 6 and 10 through 14.
Summation,
Defendants have contended that they
were victims of the fraud perpetrated
by the officers of Equity Funding, and
81,
that, although they might have been to
some degree negligent or they might have
erred in their judgment as auditors,
their criminal participation was not
proved. More accurate is the following
comment of the trial judge made during
the proceedings relating to defendant's
motion for new trial:
"The evidence, I think, does
not show that the defendants were
aware of the fraud in its early
stages. I think they were the
victims of the fraud for some
period of time. * * * Even
though the evidence is not al-
together direct, it is largely
circumstantial, it is overwhelm-
ing to the point where I cannot
escape the conclusion that the
defendants must have known and
must have come to a point where
they knew of the fraud, and that
they thereafter did acts in
furtherance of the fraud."
The Equity Funding account was a
large part of the business of Wolfson,
Weiner, Ratoff and Lapin. Weiner and
Block had worked with Equity Funding
almost from its inception. Weiner's
participation in financial decision-
making at critical stages was establish-
82.
ed. Lichtig moved into an executive
position. By 1971, Block was also at-
tempting to gain employment with Equity
Funding. There is no question that a
purposeful fraud was perpetrated by the
officers of Equity Funding. The over-
whelming scope of the fraud, its often
complex but sometimes very simple mech-
anisms, and the failure of the auditors
to find in any of the suspicious pro-
cedures cause to dig further into Equity
Funding's financial records system all
lead to the inescapable conclusion that
defendants were involved. Even if they
did not initially know or indeed learn
the step-by-step fictitious entries and
improper manipulations, their consistent
failure to apply GAAS and GAAP after
they knew some kind of a major fraud was
afoot provided a basis from which the
jury could reasonably infer defendants'
knowing and willful participation in the
fraud.
"* * *Generally accepted
accounting principles instruct
an accountant what to do in the
usual case where he has no reason
to doubt that the affairs of the
83.
corporation are being honestly
conducted. Once he has reason
to believe that this basic as-
sumption is false, an entirely
different situation confronts
him.* * *," United States v.
Simon, 425 F.2d at 806.
P, JURY INSTRUCTIONS DEALING
WITH INTENT
We next dispose of defendants' con-
tentions regarding certain jury instruc~
tions: those related to the question
of the sufficiency of the evidence.
a. Compliance with GAAS and GAAP
Defendants first challenge the
court's instruction on the rule of
generally accepted auditing standards
and generally accepted accounting
principles in the jury's deliberations.
The instruction is reproduced in the
—
margin.
We have not previously ruled on the
propriety of instructions which state
that compliance or noncompliance with
GAAS or GAAP is relevant to the deter-
mination of a defendant's intent. The
Second Circuit has dealt with similar
instructions in United States v. Simon,
84.
25 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), and United
States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 318-24
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
934 (1976). In Simon three accountants
appealed from their convictions on three
counts arising out of their drawing up
and certifying a misleading and false
financial statement. The jury was in-
structed that the primary determination
was whether the financial statements
accurately reflected the company's con-
dition, and, if not, whether the def-
endants acted in good faith. Proof of
complaince with GAAS was deemed "ev-
idence which may be very persuasive but
not necessarily conclusive that he act-
ed in good faith." 425 F.2d at 805
See United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d
at 318-24; United States v. Colasurdo,
453 F.2d at 594,
The prosecution introduced into ev-
idence the Statement on Auditing Stan-
dards (1973) issued by the Committee on
Auditing Procedure, American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants. The
Statement outlines the general purpose
of the independent audit,’ and
85.
§ 110.05 explains the responsibilities ness.
of the individual auditor who finds
fraud in the entity whose records are
being examined:
Sufficient evidence was introduced
to raise the issue of conformity with
GAAS and GAAP. During the trial sev-
"In making the ordinary
examination, the independent
auditor is aware of the poss-~
ibility that fraud may exist
* * *. However, the ordinary
examination directed to the
expression of an opinion on
financial statements is not
primarily or specifically de-
signed and cannot be relied
upon, to disclose defalcation
and other similar irregularities,
although their discovery may
result * * *, The responsibility
of the independent auditor for
failure to detect fraud (which
responsibility differs as to
clients and others) arises only
when such failure clearly results
from failure to comply with
generally accepted auditing
standards."
Under these standards the auditor is not
"responsible" for fraud that has gone
undetected despite his utilization of
generally accepted auditing standards.
In our case, failure to apply generally
accepted auditing standards is relevant
to the issue of knowledge and willful-
86.
eral witnesses testified that many of
the practices under consideration were
not in conformance with GAAS and GAAP.
Generally, no audit manual was prepared
for each year's audit, no checks on in-
ternal controls were made, and basic
standards for confirming accounts were
not followed. The witnesses included
Norman Grosman, a partner in Touche,
Ross & Co.; Frank West, who worked on
the audits from 1969 through 1972; and
William Simpson and Benjamin Karchin,
SEC employees who reviewed Equity Fund-
ing's books. The jury had evidence from
which it could determine whether GAAS
and GAAP were properly utilized and
whether the failure to utilize them was
such as to lead to a reasonable infer-
ence of criminal intent.
The judge's instruction, which
stated that evidence regarding com-
pliance with GAAS and GAAP was not con-
87.
clusive but was relevant, was a proper
statement. The weight to be given the
evidence was for the jury's determin-
ation.
b. "“Willfulness"
Defendants also assert that the
court erred in instructing the jury on
the issue of knowledge. The jury was
instructed that proof of negligence was
insufficient to support a conviction,
and that proof of good faith constitu-
ted a complete defense to the charges.
The court went on to instruct the jury
that, in determining intent, the jury
could consider whether defendants acted
in "reckless, deliberate indifference
to or disregard for truth or falsity"
and could infer from proof of such acts
that defendants acted willfully and
knowingly. 2°
The instruction was given before
our decision in United States v. Jewell,
532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (i976),
where we held:
"* * * To act ‘knowingly, '
88.
therefore, is not necessarily
to act only with positive
knowledge, but also to act with
an awareness of the high prob-
ability of the existence of
the fact in question. When
such awareness is present,
"positive" knowledge is not
required." 532 F.2d at 700
United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d
911, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1977). The trial
court's instruction in the present case
followed closely the instruction app-
roved by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d at 322-23.
There the trial court had instructed the
jury that, on proof of "reckless de-
liberate indifference to or disregard
for truth or falsity," the jury could
infer the defendants' willful and
knowing participation in the filing of
false financial information with the
SEC. The defendants contended that the
instruction erroneously failed to state
also that there must be a concurrent,
"conscious purpose to avoid learning
the truth." 527 F.2d at 323. The
court approved the instruction and
stated:
89.
"* * *The dual instruction
is not necessarily required, how-
ever, when the defendant is under
a specific duty to discover the
true facts, the facts tendered
are suspect, and he does nothing
to correct them." 527 F.2d
at 323
The court properly instructed the
jury on the need to find both deliber-
ate avoidance and an awareness of im-
propriety. Defendants here, as audit-
ors, had a duty carefully to investi-
gate and review the information pre-
sented. Because the instruction stated
that good faith constituted a complete
defense, it was implicit in the instruc-
tion that, coupled with a finding of
deliberate avoidance of knowledge, the
jury also had to find bad faith.
As the Second Circuit stated in
United States v. Simon:
"# @ * ‘While there is no
allowable inference of knowledge
from the mere fact of falsity,
there are many cases where from
the actor's special situation
and continuity of conduct an
inference that he did know the
untruth of what he said or wrote
may legitimately be drawn.'* * *
Evidence that defendants knowingly
90 .
suppressed one fact permitted,
although it surely did not
compel, an inference that their
suppression of another was like-
wise knowing and willful."
425 F.2d at 809, quoting from
Bentel v. United States, 13 F.2d
’ ir.), cert. denied,
273 U.S. 713 (1926.
In view of the defendants' duty because
of their roles as auditors and financial
officer of the company, the jury in-
struction was proper.
Q. JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON
UNANIMITY
Lichtig, joined by Block and Weiner,
contends that the court failed to in-
struct the jury properly on the unanim-
ity requirements for a finding of guilt
on Count 6 and Gounts 10 through 14.4
These counts charged mail-fraud viol-
ations, and incorporated Count 2 and a
portion of Count 1 which detailed
specific wrongful acts. Lichtig argues
that Counts 1 and 2 alleged acts oc-
curring both while he was an auditor
and while he was an executive of Equity
Funding, that two distinct time periods |
were thus established, and that the jury
91.
should have been instructed that is had
to be unanimous as to at least one time
period. 7° Appellants also argue that
there was a failure to instruct on the
need for unanimity as to individual
“acts or specifications” in a single
count.
A reading of the jury instructions
shows that the court separated out the
six mail-fraud counts and instructed
the jury that it had to find three
elements in order to convict. The first
two elements were the participation of
the particular defendant in the offer-
ing or sale of securities where use was
made of some manner of transportation
in interstate commerce or of the mails.
The third element contained three al-
ternative subparts. As to this element
the jury was instructed it also had to
find that the defendant (1) willfully
and knowingly employed any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2)
willfully obtained money or property
by utilizing untrue statements of mat-
erial fact or by omitting statements of
material fact which were necessary to
92.
make the statement accurate, or (3) will-
fully and knowingly engaged in a trans-
action, practice, or course of business
which operated as a fraud or deceit
upon a purchaser. Immediately following
this instruction, the court continued:
"Although it is necessary
to prove only one of the three
different subparts I have just
mentioned, if you find one or
more of such subparts has been
proved, you must agree unanimously
upon at least one of such subparts
before you can convict for such
offense."
The instruction outlined the ele-
ments, and, for the one portion where
alternate findings were possible, clear-
ly emphasized the necessity of unanim-
ity. Unlike United States v. Natelli,
527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 394 (1976); Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 547 (1969); and
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(1957), the jury here was properly in-
structed on unanimity and the various
alternate bases were supported by the
evidence. (See discussion on suffic-
iency of the evidence, Part O, supra.)
93.
As to the necessity of instructing
the jury that it had to agree unanimous-
ly in its verdicts on the individual
acts specified in a given charge:
"xe * *[T)he defendants
confuse the scheme to defraud,
which is the gist of the offense,
with the means adopted to effect-
uate that scheme.* * *" Simons v.
United States, 119 F.2d 539, 549
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
616 (1941).
See United States v. Amrep Corp., 560
F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1977). The charges
against the defendants involved schemes
to defraud, and the particular acts al-
leged were the means for carrying the
general schemes into effect. The court
sufficiently instructed the jury on the
need for unanimity.
R. FAILURE TO HAVE CERTAIN
PROCEEDINGS RECORDED
Defendants contend that the trial
court erred in failing to have three
portions of the trial reported pursuant
to the mandate of the Court Reporter
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 753(b), that "all
proceedings in criminal cases had in
94.
open court" be recorded verbatim. The
proceedings that went unreported were:
(1) the judge's action in ascertaining
that the presence of two jurors on an
elevator during a conversation between
a government attorney and witness was
harmless; (2) part of the discussion
regarding the proposed jury instruc-
tions; and (3) a portion of the jury
voir dire.
The first event has been dealt with
in our discussion of alleged prejudic-
ial communications, Part C, supra, where
we find no significant basis for over-
ruling the trial court. We further
note that no explicit request for a
court reporter was made by defendants
at the time of the incident. See
United States v. Piascik, 559 F.2d 545,
550 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
U.S. (1978). There was no error
in the court's handling of the situation.
As to the second incident, at the
commencement of the discussion on the
jury instructions the court stated,
"It seems to me that we should let the
95.
reporter go, because I don't plan on
making any rulings." No objection was
made and the reporter was dismissed.
Thereafter, Markowitz, attorney for
Block, requested the presence of the
reporter. A discussion on the record
ensued and the judge informed counsel
that he was willing to keep the report-
er there, but that the "free discussion"
they had been having would have to
cease and each attorney would have to
speak from the podium. The court as-
sured counsel that they would be given
an opportunity to make timely object-
ions on the record. Markowitz agreed
that if the making of a timely objec-
tion was shown on the record, there was
no need for the reporter. The reporter
was again excused. No objection was
made by any counsel.
Defendants now contend that they
are prejudiced because all of their
arguments regarding the instructions
are not available for review. As
promised by the judge, their objections
were reported in detail after a deter-
96.
mination had been made as to what in-
structions were to be given. Defendants
point to no objection that went unre-
ported; they point only to unreported
arguments in support of their objec-
tions. The objections were adequately
preserved for our review, and no counsel
has been bound merely to restating the
arguments made below; they have in fact
expanded on their arguments on appeal.
Trial courts frequently discuss in-
structions in chambers before a record
is made.
In addition, although this court
has held that compliance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 753(b) is mandatory, we have also
held that a waiver without personal
consent of the defendant is permissible.
United States v. Piascik, 559 F.2d at
549-50. Counsel here withdrew the ob-
jection to the reporter's absence and
cannot now reassert it.
The last disputed incident involved
the trial court's preliminary "admin-
istrative" voir dire of the prospective
jurors. Before the case was formally
97.
called, the judge informed the array
of jurors that those who wished to be
excused should approach the bench in-
dividually, and he would then rule on
the sufficiency of each excuse present-
ed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c). The in-
dividual excuses were not reported.
When the case was called, defendants ob-
jected to the array and requested a
new array in its stead. The objection
was overruled, and regular voir dire
was conducted.
Although we believe that the better
procedure is to report everything said
in the courtroom, a reversal is not
necessary. Defendants allege no pre-
judice. The court's administrative
transactions with jurors who had per-
sonal excuses preceded the calling of
the case and the formal commencement
of the proceedings. The preliminary
screening of the array here, prior to
the calling of the case for trial, pre-
sents no different situation than if
the jurors had telephoned or written
their requests. If something prejudi-
cial to the case occurred, counsel
98.
could be depended upon to tell us what
it was. There has been no hint of any
irregularity. In United States v.
Piascik, decided after the trial in
this case, we stated:
"* * *In the exercise of
Our supervisory powers, we
Suggest that court reporters
e required to record (but not
transcribe unless requested for
appellate purposes) the voir dire
examination of jurors* * * when
requested by the court or counsel.
* * *" 559 F.2d at 550 (Emphasis
added).
S. CONCLUSION
While it was not necessary to not-
ice and discuss every point made by the
appellants in their lengthy briefs, we
have considered them all. Lichtig makes
several other charges of improper tac-
tics by government counsel which, when
examined in the context of the trial,
evaporate into harmless error, if in-
deed there was error at all. We do
notice, however, Lichtig's point about
the alleged failure of the government
to comply with 18 U.S.C. §3504, This
section requires the government in
99.
certain situations to admit or deny
certain types of surveillance. The
standards for such disclaimers are ad-
equately covered in United States v.
See, 505 F.2d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975);
United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d
1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1027
(9th Cir. 1973). We are satisfied, as
was the trial court, that the affida-
vits of the prosecutor sufficiently an-
swered all of Lichtig's checklist as-
sertions of improper surveillance. The
charges of misconduct leveled against
the prosecutor, not unlike some of the
other assignments of error, have been
magnified in the hope that some pellet
from the shotgun might fall upon a vul-
nerable spot. It is to the consider-
able credit of the judge who tried this
complex case that the record is not
only free from reversible error, but is
remarkably clean in terms of the minor
imperfections that creep into a long
and involved trial.
Affirmed.
100.
UNITED STATES v. WEINER
No. 75-2973
FOOTNOTES:
1
In “equity funding" or "life fund-
ing" programs, a participant purchases
mutual funds for cash; at the same time,
the participant purchases life insur-
ance with funds borrowed from the com-
pany by pledging the mutual funds as
security.
In United States v. Lustig, 555
F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1977), we said:
"Lustig would have a valid objection if
one or more jury members expressed some
uncertainty as to the verdict." But we
were speaking of the expression of the
uncertainty at the time of the poll,
not after the jurors had been excused
and subjected to out-of-court cultiva-
tion.
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.
492 (1896).
4We have recently held that giving
the instruction a second time is er-
roneous per se, United States v. Sea-
well, 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir, 1977).
"Reciptocal income" was a term
used to describe a practice by brokers,
until it was discontinued, of sharing
commissions on market transactions with
the insurance producers.
The trial took place prior to the
effective date of Pub.L. 93-595, § l,
88 Stat. 1932 (1975), which created the
codified Federal Rules of Evidence,
Prior law is therefore applicable.
Cf. United States v. Dunn, 564
F.2d 348, 357 (9th Cir. 1977) (dis-
cussing the slight evidence rule in the
context of sufficiency of the evidence).
Investors Planning sold contract-
ual plans for the purchase of mutual
funds. These plans did not involve an
actual contractual agreement, but
-b-
merely denoted programs where commiss-
ions on the sale of mutual funds were
collected in such a manner that up to
50 percent of the commissions were col-
lected in the first year and the balance
of the commissions were spread out over
the remainder of the period of acquisi-
tions, an average of 12-1/2 years. The
actual amount of commissions collected
On a completed program was approximately
equivalent to that collected under
other kinds of payment plans. Purchas-
ers of mutual funds were under no ob-
ligation to complete the plan and could
withdraw at any time, thus relieving
themselves of any future commission
obligation as well.
Trail commissions represent com-
missions not yet collected but expected
as future sales under the programs are
made.
10 Detail is the term for the in-
dividual components of an account.
-Cc@-
11 Coconspirator hearsay admissib-
ility does not depend upon the declar-
ant's unavailability. 4 J. Weinstein
& M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence
qq 800 [04], 804(a) [01]; Fed. R. Evid.
804.
12 The defendants' contention that
the government was obliged to grant
immunity to Goldblum so that he might
testify on their behalf is also merit-
less. The Sixth Amendment contains no
such requirement. United States v.
Bautista, 509 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
United States v. Baxter, 492
F.2d 150, 177 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974).
14
See also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408
U.S. 204, 213 (1972), where the Court
reemphasizes the significance of the
reliability of the offered evidence.
1s This statutory grant of "use
plus derivative use" immunity is co-
extensive with the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
462 (1971). See Goldberg v. Weiner,
480 F.2d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1972).
16 In Part K we discuss an aspect
of the proceeding before the SEC,
Block testified before the SEC on May
21, 22, and 30, 1973, and on September
24, 1973. He first testified in his
bankruptcy case on December 11, 1973.
17
The trial judge was careful to
summarize the charges in the six counts
for the jury, including the portions
of Counts 1 and 2 which were incorpor-
ated by reference, and to admonish the
jury to consider only the counts sub-
mitted to it and not the counts which
had been dismissed.
46 The accounting firm of which all
three defendants were a part was orig-
inally called Wolfson and Weiner. It
expanded to Wolfson, Weiner, Ratoff and
Lapin, and then merged with Seidman and
Seidman in 1971.
19 The relevant portion of the text
which appears in each of these counts
is as follows:
"* * * [T]he firm of Wolfson,
Weiner, Ratoff and Lapin (Seid-
man and Seidman), certified
public accountants, had examined
the consolidated statements of
financial condition of EFCA and
its subsidiaries as of December
31, 1968 (1969-1971), and the
related consolidated statements
of earnings and retained earn-
ings and the consolidated state-
ments of additional paid-in
capital for the five years then
ended, in accordance with general-
ly accepted auditing standards,
and that, in the opinion of
Wolfson, Weiner, Ratoff and
Lapin (Seidman and Seidman), the
aforesaid financial statements
presented fairly the consolidated
financial position of EFCA and
its subsidiaries as of December
31, 1968 (1969-1971), and the
consolidated results of operations
ofa
for the five years then ended,
in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles
applied on a consistent basis."
20
21 "Reciprocal commissions' is the
term used for the portion of commiss-
ions earned by various brokerage houses
on securities transactions involving
Equity Funding that was returned to
Equity Funding.
22 The revised portion of the note,
with the addition underlined, reads:
"Under the Company's
method of operations, this
represents, in the aggregate,
the amount that clients owe as
a result of the various "Equity
Funding Programs' offered by
the Company, and net contracts
receivable together with loan
and/or receivables where ‘Equity
Funding Programs' have terminated."
23
Referring to our earlier dis-
aa
cussion of the transaction, we note
that the valuation placed on the Clients
Contractual Accounts and the creation
of the account were concurred in by
Weiner, who participated in developing
the accounting treatment.
24 He made an error that Goldblum
feared would invite close scrutiny of
the financial statements, and was then
replaced in this role by Lowell,
25 Because covering up the receipt
of "recip" was one of the reasons
given for many questionable recording
practices, the jury could logically
infer that Block's statement showed
knowledge of at least some of these
practices.
26 The instruction reads, in per-
tinent part:
"One circumstance you are en-
titled to consider and weigh in
determining whether the defen-
dants Weiner, Lichtig, and Block
acted willfully and knowingly
=@h=
while in their capacities as
independent accountants in
relation to Equity Funding is
whether they followed or deviated
from generally accepted auditing
Standards or accounting principles
in effect at the times here
pertinent,
"For example, in this case,
you may recall evidence of cer-
tain accounting principles or
auditing standards which were
talked about.
"The government points to
evidence which they say estab-
lishes that, at various times
each of the defendants deviated
from sound accounting principles
and auditing standards,
"Evidence on this issue is
not conclusive, however, on the
overriding issue of the defen-
dant's [sic] knowledge and intent.
The weight and credibility to be
extended by you to such proof
must depend among other things,
on the weight you give to the
opinion evidence offered by the
Governments' [sic] witnesses,
"Generally, when a certified
public accountant is engaged to
perform an independent audit for
a corporation such as Equity
Funding, he represents and warrants
that he will perform the audit
and other accounting work in
-i-
accordance with generally accept-
ed auditing standards and general-
ly accepted accounting principles
and that he will render an opinion
as to whether the financial state-
ment of the company fairly rep-
resents its financial position
and the results of its business
operation.
"Proof, if any, that any of
these defendants departed from
such standards of auditing and
accounting as were then applicable
or participated in the preparation
or approval of an audited finan-
cial statement that did not
fairly present Equity Funding's
financial position is evidence,
though not necessarily conclusive
evidence, that the individual
defendant involved did not act
honestly or in good faith, and
that the financial statement
prepared contrary to such stan-
dards may have been materially
false or misleading."
a7 "The objective of the ordinary
examination of financial state-
ments by the independent auditor
is the expression of an opinion
on the fairness with which they
present financial position in
conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles. The audit-
or's report is the medium through
which he expresses his opinion or,
if circumstances require, dis-
-j-
claims an opinion. In either case,
he states whether his examina-
tion has been made in accordance
with generally accepted auditing
standards." Committee on Auditing
Procedure, American Institute of
ee Public Accountants,
atement on Auditi
§ 110.01 (1973). i ei aaa
The instruction reads, in per-
tinent part:
"It is not enough, of c
merely to establish chat a re fon
defendant acted negligently or
through error or mistake. Under
our system of laws men are not
punished criminally for mere mis-
takes in judgment, mismanagement
carelessness, negligence, or
errors of judgment. They are
punished only for intentional
wrongdoing. The defendants are
not on trial here for errors of
judgment or mistakes or mismanage-
ment or negligence, but are on
trial for a criminal offense, and
an essential element of that
offense is an evil or criminal
intent, which it is incumbent
upon the government to prove to
your satisfaction and beyond a
reasonable doubt before you will
be warranted in returning a
verdict of guilty.
"The defendants argue that
oka
they acted in good faith in
their activities relating to
Equity Funding. Good faith,
that is to say, an honest belief
in the truth of the statement
made, would constitute a complete
defense here.
"Tf the evidence in the case
leaves you with a reasonable
doubt as to whether the accused
in good faith believed the finan-
cial statements, auditors'
certificates, and other written
statements to be true at the
time they were made, then you
should acquit the accused.
"While I have stated that
negligence or mistake does not
constitute guilty knowledge or
intent, nevertheless, ladies and
gentlemen, you are entitled to
consider in determining whether
a defendant acted with such
intent if he deliberately closed
his eyes to the obvious or to the
facts that certainly would be
observed or ascertained in the
course of his portion of the
accounting works, or whether he
recklessly states as facts
matters of which he knew he was
ignorant.
"If you find such a reckless,
deliberate indifference to or dis-
regard for truth or falsity on the
part of a given defendant when
considered in the light of all
other evidence relating to inte..t,
=-j=
ee se SESS.
me
wre
you may, but you need not
necessarily, infer therefrom that
such defendant acted willfully
re knowingly. Such an
inference, of course, depends upon
the weight and credibility ex- '
tended to the evidence of
reckless and indifferent conduct
if any."
29
Block and Weiner also raise this
issue in regard to Counts 80 and 84.
30
Block's and Weiner's incorpora-
tion of this argument is clearly merit-
less since Lichtig's argument is pre-
mised on his change in position.
-m-
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FILED
JUL 21 1978
EMIL E. MELFI, JR.
CLERK, U.S. COURT
OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
Appellee,
Vv.
JULIAN S. H. WEINER;
MARVIN AL LICHTIG:
and SOLOMON BLOCK,
Appellants.
No. 75-2973
)
)
)
) ORDER
)
)
)
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of
California
Before: CHOY and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges,
and THOMPSON*, District Judge.
On May 26, 1978, appellants Weiner and
Block filed a petition for rehearing with
a suggestion for rehearing en banc.
On May 30, 1978, appellant Lichtig
filed a petition for rehearing.
® The Honorable Bruce R. Thompson,
United States District Judge for the
District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
B-l.
—
has
May
The panel as constituted in this case
voted to amend the opinion filed
15, 1978, in the following particulars:
At page 10, line 5, of the
typewritten opinion (page 1587 of
the printed slip opinion, top of
right-hand column), starting with
"Lichtig's present claim", delete
the remainder of the paragraph and
substitute the following language:
Lichtig claims he discovered
the existence of the agree-
ment on May 7, 1976, almost
a year after the conclusion
of the trial. However, the
record on appeal does not
contain any evidence of the
agreement or of the govern-
ment's knowledge that such
an agreement existed. The
issue is therefore not pro-
perly before us.
At page 35, line 20, of the type-
written opinion (page 1601 of the
printed slip opinion, line 10,
right-hand column), delete the
period after the word “statement”
and insert before "The untrue”
the following language:
which stated that an indepen-
dent audit of the financial
B-2.
statement using GAAS had
found it to reflect truth-
fully the financial condi-
tion of the company and its
operations and to have been
prepared according to GAAP.
Count 76 charges that
Lichtig and another defen-
dant “wilfully made and
caused to be made untrue
statements of material fact"
or “wilfully omitted and
caused to be omitted state-
ments of material fact" in
the December registration
statement.
At page 36, lines 15-18, of
the typewritten opinion (page
1602 of the printed slip opinion,
lines 12-16, left hand column),
delete the two sentences begin-
ning "The SEC had previously
ruled” and ending “to receive
such money.”
At page 48, line 1l, of the
typewritten opinion (page 1608
of the printed slip opinion,
line 4, right-hand column),
substitute "Lichtig” for
"Block".
With the opinion so amended, the
panel has voted to deny the petitions
B-3.
for rehearing and to reject the sugges-
tion for rehearing en banc. The full
court has been advised of the proposed
amendments, and of the suggestion for
rehearing en banc, and no judge has
requested a vote on the suggestion for
rehearing en banc. Fed. R. App. P.
35(b).
It is ordered that the opinion in
this case is amended as set forth above;
the petition for rehearing filed by
appellant Lichtig is denied; and the
petition for rehearing filed by appel-
lants Weiner and Block is denied and
their suggestion for rehearing en banc
is rejected.
B-4.
APPENDIX C
ALLEN INSTRUCTION GIVEN
BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE
"This is an important case. The
trial has been expensive in time and
effort and money to both the defense and
the prosecution. If you should fail to
agree on a verdict the case is left open
and undecided. Like all cases, it must
be disposed of some time.
"There appears no reason to believe
that another trial would not be as costly
to both sides, nor does there appear any
reason to believe that the case can be
tried again by either side better or more
exhaustively than it has been tried
before you.
"Any future jury would be selected
in the same manner from the same sgurce
as you have been chosen, so there appears
to be no reason to believe that the case
would ever be submitted to twelve men
and women more conscientious, more im-
partial or more competent to decide, or
that more or clearer evidence could be
produced on behalf of either side.
"Of course, these things suggest
themselves upon a brief reflection to
C-l,
all of us who have sat through this
trial. The only reason they are mentioned
now is because some of them may have
escaped your attention which must have
been fully occupied up to this time in
reviewing the evidence in the case.
"They are matters which, along with
others, and perhaps more obvious ones,
remind us how desirable it is that you
unanimously agree on a verdict.
"As stated in the instructions given
at the time the case was submitted to you
for decision, you should not surrender
your honest conviction as to the weight
or effect of evidence solely because of
the opinion of the other jurors, or for
the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
However, it is your duty as jurors to
consult with one another and to delib-
rate with a view to reaching an agree-
ment if you can do so without violence
to your individual judgment.
"Bach of you must decide the case for
yourself, but you should do so only after
a consideration of the evidence in the
case with your fellow jurors. And in the
course ot your deliberations you should
not hesitate to re-examine your own views
C-2.
and change your opinion if convinced that
it is erroneous.
"In order to bring twelve minds to
a unanimous result you must examine the
questions submitted to you with candor
and frankness and with proper deference
to and regard for the opinions of each
other. That is to say, in conferring
together each of you should pay due
attention and respect to the views of
the others and listen to each other's
arguments with a disposition to re-
examine your own views.
"If much the greater number of you
are for a conviction, each dissenting
juror ought to consider whether a doubt
in his or her mind is a reasonable one
since it makes no effective impression
upon the minds of so many equally honest,
equally conscientious fellow jurors who
bear the same responsibility, serve under
the same oath and have heard the same
evidence with, and we may assume, the
same attention and an equal desire to
arrive at the truth.
"On the other hand, if a majority
or even a lesser number of you are for
acquittal, other jurors ought seriously
c-3. |
|
to ask themselves most thoughtfully
whether they do not have reason to doubt
the correctness of a judgment which is
not concurred in by many of their fellow
jurors and whether they should not dis-
trust the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence which fails to convince the
minds of several other fellows beyond a
reasonable doubt.
"You are not partisians, you are
judges, judges of the facts. Your sole
interest here is to seek the truth from
the evidence in the case.
"You are the exclusive judges of the
credibility of all witnesses and the
weight and effect of all evidence. In
the performance of this high duty you
are at liberty to disregard all comments
of both the Court and counsel, including,
of course, the remards which I am now
making.
"Remember at all times that no juror
is expect [sic] to yield a conscientious
conviction he or she may have as to the
weight or effect of evidence. But,
remember, also, that after full delibera-
tion and consideration of all the
C-4.
evidence in the case it is your duty to
agree upon 4 verdict if you can do so
without violating your own individual
judgment and your conscience."
APPENDIX D
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY KRUEGER
STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )
I, MARY KRUEGER, being duly sworn,
say:
I was a juror in the above-entitled
matter. That at no time did I vote
"Guilty" for the defendants, but rather
voted "Guilty with reservation", and my
ballot was so marked and I so informed the
jury. By so informing the jury, I meant
that I had a reasonable doubt. I made
this statement repeatedly to the jury,
particularly on May 20, 1975 in the jury
room before the final vote in the matter.
I read the statement which is marked Ex-
hibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated
herein by reference and which reflects my
attitude at the time and qualification of
my "Guilty" vote as being one subject to
reasonable doubt or reservation.
The form of the question, as asked by
the Clerk, as to whether or not that was
my verdict, threw me off because obviously
that was the verdict of the jury if you in-
cluded my conditional "Guilty" vote which
D-l.
was not truly a “Guilty” vote, but a
"Guilty" with an inordinate doubt as to
guilt. If I had been asked the question
in the form I expected it, I would have
answered that I felt that any vote of
"Guilty" by me was subject to at least a
reasonable doubt as defined by the Court
and was in fact a “Not Guilty” vote. How-
ever, following my surprise at the ques-
tion coming in a different form than I had
anticipated, I became so upset that I
could not speak further in order to ex-
plain my position. For that reason, I re-
quested to see Judge Curtis, and met with
the Judge for the purpose of explaining
my opposition and showing him Exhibit "A",
which is attached hereto. I did this as
soon as I could after Court recessed fol-
lowing the verdict. The Judge told me
there is no use in flaying myself and “to
go home and forget it.”
I felt during the trial that I was sub-
ject to a great deal of pressure from the
Judge to reach a verdict, as I have stated
in the statement which I read to the jury
before my vote. I also felt pressure from
my fellow jurymen in that I felt that they
were anxious to terminate the deliberation,
D-2.
and I felt I was holding them up and keep-
ing them from going about their busines-
ses. They said that they were getting
butterflies in their stomachs, that they
were afraid the Judge was going to scold
them, and unless I capitulated that they
would never get to leave because the Judge
would keep us there until we reached a
unanimous verdict based on the last in-
struction of record on May 14, 1975, given
by the Judge. These were the reasons
that I even gave the qualified vote of
"Guilty with reservations" on Tuesday,
May 20, 1975, which had nothing to do with
the merits of the case or any belief in
the guilt of the defendants on my part. I
did not then think that the defendants
were guilty at the time of the vote, in-
cluding the final vote. I did not think
that we reached a unanimous verdict of
Guilty. I have not ever thought they were
Guilty, and I do not now believe them to
be Guilty. I wish to reiterate that I
never voted "Guilty". I voted "Guilty with
reservation" which to me was the equivalent
of meaning I had inordinate doubt as to
their Guilt, which in the eyes of the law I
thought would be equivalent to innocent, and
D-3
APPENDIX TO AFFIDAVIT OF MARY KREUGER
eege' he pat ome Pesan pee see =
would be the equivalent of a "Not Guilty” és —
vote. Serbs BOs ae y_pnlcpedd”
I expected the foreman to report a eres, i Ot thd al ‘te’. Ez lose SS
vote of eleven "Guilty" votes and one : alt f
: , Z Setersls of. Ce Lows, “cere ,
vote “Guilty with Mary's explanation" (I > anil hyp
understood this to mean my "“reservation") an Legfe Seale Segased by h, hen “ff
which I expected to explain meant "Guilty f, WA
Lo 7 oe reel lia foo!
with an inordinate doubt" ("Not Guilty") fA eg tie
if, Ad a Luaews auteade,
had I been given the opportunity (and
| | she ate eed. ale
which opportunity anticipated having). er Z
This was a way I knew to try to get across ey, hg ale howe! ade i to Ceutag
to the Judge that my convictions and con- r Cat - We ft Lif the 2 Bent
science were being violated by his last peed el oe CE ff a.
aft fi x4
instruction of Wednesday, May 14, 1975. y: y 3 , eg Aa
4g Ze ‘oiliss
One part of that instruction contradicted ae A * abe?
another part of it. I felt that this last A Va ihe acter ine! . |
instruction pressured my vote. pat “7° J wee ee aay es
woe Yon = me
I declare under penalty of perjury ip Bs
that the foregoing is true and correct. A va ae ” Ue, fou ey Oe onal, Afr
uaa i os S
Ae g s yf" Mivigs oe Pe
Executed at Los Angeles, California, 2 wo LAté
this 27th day of May, 1975. ve lee aihy 4 7
as Mehl of tel,
(Xerox of Mary Krueger's letter ar . Lip . fai yes
attached hereto)
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Transliteration of Appendix of
Affidavit
The last five days have not been a rest
for me; it has been a prolonged agony.
Last Wednesday I tried to wash my hands
of this decision. I anticipated that I
would be released from duty to the jury
and that an alternate would replace me
inasmuch that they also heard all the
testimony and evidence. I felt that my
purposes in declining to participate in
the jury was both misunderstood and im-
pugned. I had no intention of "hangin”
the jury when I refused to be party to
the jury. I intended to “unhang" the
jury and get all of us, including myself,
off of the hook judicially. As you know
my good intentions were not realized, in-
stead it appeard as if I intended to hang
the jury. I am sorry to have discomfited
you. As you are aware, instead of being
released from the jury; the Judge required
that we reach a unanimous verdict. The
Judge gave additional instructions to the
jury and in doing so he impaled me on the
horns of a dilemma I may not evade. In
effect he has forced a confrontation with
contradictions in his instructions. As
D-12.
an example, look at our four day vacation.
Although I suspect that the suggestion
emanated from the brain of Mr. Ablese,
the Judge concurred and gave us 2 extra
days off not only for the stated reason
of taking a rest, but also to expedite
the decision, to speed the juridical
process, and to return from the four
free days with a verdict one way or the
other. In those same instructions, he
said that we should take as much time as
necessary and be at our leisure.
A contradiction of greater impact was
the Judge's statement that the dissenting
juror should consider the majority deci-
sion, give weight to the opinion of other
jurors, and reconsider the evidence. To
the contrary, the Judge said the dissent-
ing juror should not do violence to one's
conscience. If I concur with the Majority
opinion, I've done violence to my con-
science. If I do not do violence to my
conscience, I have not made verdict unani-
mous. By virtue of the instructions the
Judge gave us, I'm in the wrong by the
criterion of one instruction or the other
no matter which decision I make. The
fact that I have tried my best to wash my
D-13.
hands of this conviction, that I do not
make this decision willingly, but un-
willingly, that the Judge has ordained
the decision instead of my acting on my
own volition, does not deprive me of
guilt inculcated by my decision, but
shares it with the Judge who demands
the decision.
These facts throw a sop to my sore con-
science and salves my suffering. Thus I
cast my vote with your verdict and throw
in my lot with yours with my many reser-
vations and qualifications you will know
because I insist on it, altho the court
probably will not.
To my mind, you have presented positive,
but evidence insufficient for myself
which does not adequately convince me of
conviction. There has been a claim I
have based my decision on pure feeling.
This is false inasmuch that it is not
entirely true. I, too, have made a case
which I have not made clear as you do
not understand or acknowledge as a case
because of its poor presentation. As I
stated several times before I do not
doubt that the defendants did what they
D-14.
did such as sign registration statements,
but I do not think that what they did
constitutes criminal intent, that they
were altogether willing and knowing par-
ticipants in the fraud, that these were
holes in the government's case. You
based your case on the evidence you im-
puted to the charges; I based mine on
negative proof, on the insufficiency of
your case to my mind, to the overreaching
doubt in my mind. I do not have a reason-
able doubt, but more than a reasonable
doubt; an inordinate doubt. I believe
they are only guilty of negligence, mal-
feasance, and general slobbery which are
subject to civil suit. You have won the
case not ee on merits but by default of
my memory to prove the contrary, by my
inability to argue my case adequately,
all of which goes to show I would make a
lousy lawyer.
Hence I capitulate to your conviction,
commit myself to culpability, and curtsey
to my conscience. I am an unwilling par-
ty to verdict of guilty and I stand com-
mitted to stricken conscience.
D-15.
APPENDIX E
AFFIDAVIT OF ARMANDO CARRILLO
STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )
I, ARMANDO CARRILLO, being duly sworn,
say:
I was a juror in the above-entitled
matter. At no time did Mary Krueger vote
"Guilty" for the Defendants, but rather,
at all times after Wednesday, May 14,
1975, voted "Guilty with Reservation."
When the foreman Charles Flores read and
tallied the votes on the final vote and
on numerous votes preceding the final
vote where Mary Krueger had voted "Guilty
with Reservation," the foreman always
read "Eleven Guilty, one Guilt with
Reservation" or "Twelve Guilty with
Mary Krueger's Reservation." Mary Krueger
informed us, the jury, that her vote of
"Guilty with Reservation" meant that she
had at least reasonable doubt concerning
the guilt of the Defendants. She made
this statement repeatedly to us, and read
a rather lengthy statement to us on May
20, 1975, in the jury room before the
final vote was taken. The final vote was
E-l.
el
ees
read by the foreman as "Eleven Guilty,
one Guilty with Reservation." I ques-
tioned that this was not a unanimous
decision and a debate ensued thereon.
The jury never voted on whether the
final vote of “Eleven Guilty, one Guilty
with Reservation" should be reported to
the Court «as a unanimous guilty verdict.
I always understood Mary Krueger's vote
to be, in fact, a "Not Guilty" vote.
I also remember the jury discussing
how Mary Krueger would respond if polled
in the courtroom, It was clear in my
mind that if asked "Guilty or Not Guilty?"
Mary Krueger wovld have stated "Guilty
with Reservation" and would have explained
her vote to the Court in a manner similar
to the statement read in the jury room on
May 20, 1975. I also understood that if,
on polling, she were asked if the verdict
were of her own volition or made by her
freely and willingly, Mary Krueger would
have answered "No" and explained her
reasons. However, when the polling ques-
tion was asked it was not phrased in a
manner anticipated by the members of the
jury, nonetheless from the discussions
E-2.
in the jury room, I understood Mary
Krueger's vote to,
in fact, be "Not
Guilty" and that, if given the oppor-
tunity, she intended to explain her vote
to the Court.
E-3.
APPENDIX F
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES FLORES
STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
>: os
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )
I, CHARLES FLORES, being duly sworn,
say:
I was a juror in the above entitled
matter. During our deliberations we had
in the jury room with us the following
portions of the indictment: Count l, a
short portion of Count 2, Count 6, Counts
10-14 and Counts 75-84, Count 1 was read
by several jurors and I read it out loud
to the entire jury on at least one occa-
sion. I had the impression that the co-
conspirator portions of Count 1 were
still incorporated into the latter counts
which were submitted to us for our delib-
erations. There was, however, a hand-
written note at the top of Count 1, but
I do not recall what that note said or
know who wrote it.
It is my understanding from its de-
liberations and discussions that the jury
as a whole came to a Guilty verdict based
upon the mandates in the instruction that
dealt with reckless disregard and that
Fel,
the defendants could be found guilty of
the crimes charged if any of them signed
documents containing information of which
that defendant knew he was ignorant.
(Government's Proposed Instruction No.
35, as Modified). We, as a jury, had a
lot of problems reconciling this instruc-
tion with the negligence instruction also
read to us by the Judge,
Mary Krueger, the juror who had re-
fused to deliberate further on May 14,
1975, tried her best to follow the man-
dates of the instruction read to us by
the Judge the afternoon of May 14, 1975,
in order to reach some sort of a verdict
howsoever we (the jury) could; it was
not until then that she made a conces-
sion to our language
voting "Guilty with Reservation."
At no time did she vote straight
"Guilty" for the defendants, but rather,
at all times on Wednesday, May 14, 1975,
voted "Guilty with Reservation." When I,
as foreman, read and tallied the votes,
on the final vote and on numerous votes
preceding the final vote where Mary
Krueger had voted "Guilty with
F=2
Reservation", I read it as "Eleven
Guilty with one reservation," or ". ..
with Mary's reservation," or "with
Mary's explanation.” Mary Krueger read
a statement to the jury on May 20, 1975,
after we returned from lunch. I ques-
tioned each member of the jury as to
whether they would stand with her vote of
"Guilty with Reservation". Before re-
turning the verdict, Ms. Krueger an-
nounced her intention to explain her
"reservations" to the Court upon delivery
of the verdict.
Subscribed to and sworn to before a
Notary Public on the 6th day of June,
1975.
F-3, . ;
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.