Petition — Moon v. Virginia

% JUL 19

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

at 8 =63S *

RicKY MANN Moon,

Petitioner,

VU.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN

PHILIP J. HIRSCHKOP

HIRSCHKOP & GRAD, P.C.

108 North Columbus Street

Post Office Box 1226

Alexandria, Virginia 22313

(703) 836-6595

Attorneys for Petitioner

[MICHAEL RODAK. JR.. CLERK

Washington, 0.C. + THIEL PRESS + (202) 638-4521

(?)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

OSS ESE OS RS eR 1

NER TESS SE a 1

ne cee cecnces 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY |

Nee ee eu eacees 2-3

STATOR OF THRGASE >... 5... 5. 5... ce ee: 3-5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THIS CASE PRESENTS THE IMPORTANT,

CURRENT, AND MUCH LITIGATED QUESTION

OF WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT FOR

.OF FENSES INVOLVING MARIJUANA, A NON-

ADDICTIVE DRUG, WITH ADDICTIVE DRUGS

SUCH AS HEROIN IS ARBITRARY AND

IRRATIONAL AND HENCE VIOLATIVE OF

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT .......... awa

A. The Classification of Marijuana With Hard

Drugs For Punishment Purposes Is Utterly

NS Wawa bake baw wie wie b.6a0 6 oe se 03 5-9

B. There Exists A Conflict Of Authority Concerning

The Constitutionality of Punishing Marijuana

Offenses As Harshly As Those Involving Hard

Il. THIS CASE PRESENTS THE IMPORTANT

QUESTION OF THE PROPER APPLICATION OF

UNITED STATES V. CHADWICK TO SEARCHES

OF PACKAGES FOUND IN AUTOMOBILES ........ 10

aii b's Cie he's «bolo 5 ee 2 ene eee 12

Appendix:

Cc cece cevecs la

EE la-4a

Order Denying Petition For Writ Of Error And

ee eek ack eae 6h so oa ce eke eee sees 5a

(11)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Boswell v. State, 290 Ala. 349, 276 So.2d 592

(BOTS). sc vod vee an bas hid evecclcncscasececuce 10

Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S, 443 (1973) 2... 6. eee ee 10

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S, 42 (1970)... 2... 2.602 eee 10

Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924) .......... 7

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 445 (1971)......... 10

Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).......... nak eee 10

Hawaii v. Kantner, 53 Haw. 371, 493 P.2¢ 306 (1972)....... 9

Leary v, United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) .........00006s 7

Mincey v. Arizona, 46 U.S.L.W. 4734 (June 21,

ROSES CRITE ESSA) > 7 ARS IR AERA 12

People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971)....... 9

People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d

GREE Gis so as 60 bw OG) os Cbd 0 0.6 we.c eee a's 9

Randall v. United States, No. 78-0817 (D.D.C.,

SS 6 sO alee ded oie wh 46:00 0:0 5 00000 00 8

Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412

SE GD die MG dele Necewe see tecseoereeqes 6

Sherman v. State, 89 Nev. 77, 506 P.2d 417

(FRCS ah Ua bte bale 6 UNUM EWES 00 Pe Pasvtevce’s 10

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364

SOUP aks Ge eae RS Ge he On bes 06s bes 0608 10

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)... 2... ee ee ee ees 12

Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975). 2... ccc cc cr sc ccces 10

Tracey v. Janco, 351 F.Supp. 836 (N.D.W.Va.

en FO Pe a ee ee eee a ee 10

Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398

Ee a te le Nb en 7

United States v. Carolene Products Co.,

PP PP UIED otic 6 0c cee ic a ebbeviswoseees 7

(112)

Cases, continued: Page

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1

OS a htirbhwit 65 aa pe ks u chat’ s bbe oes 10, 11,12

United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106

Sy ED ns cc 24 WRN oh bo vo wo de woe es 11

United States Department of Agriculture v.

Sere S48 UE. BP EI hin ho ob ce hciccice sc eeiees 6

Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483

GE od «= 0 65 DEAD 4s OR deen Woe ts be 6

Constitution:

United States Constitution: Fourth Amendment,

Fourteenth Amendment............ eT Tee eee passim

Statutory Provisions:

OF tas. oc shesants gala eek Riana ee o pecag

Se buh chk oa ahes os Caan ee th ees 6

INES a aa 200-4 6 dae anew eae meso eas 2

ee I ED 6 5 66 edn b-0 60.400 0% d00 6 6

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § § 36-1002 through

PEE be OUR se Ged Aeid od 06-5 6.0.0 Cais saab ss 6

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 56% §§ 704, 1401, 1402 .............. 6

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 94C §§31, 32,34 ........... 6

Be i NS a 6355955 eee ¥n,60 000 be owes 6

Nev. Rev. Stat. § §453.321, 453.337,

UN RT bea aa An OE dena. kc 00 0h do Sales wae e's 6

Tenn. Code Ann. § §54-1413, 1422,

EE. Oe Mae i Gee UN ihe eo Ae EN ee 2's eek 6

Tex. Penal Code Ann. tit. 71 §§ 4.03-4.05 .............. 6

We a ne hw eww aeseeenes 3, 4, 6

Vi, EV ns bk ccc ceeduccspecetess 3, 4, 6

We SE Es oa ae obs kw b's 0 kee eu eee 6

Rule 5:6 of Rules of the Supreme Court of

a ak OSes no ONS 1b eRe 0b 9% oe kas aa!

(wv)

Other Authorities:

Marijuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding,

National Commission on Marijuana

and Drug Abuse (1972) 2.0.6... eee eee were ee eeees 8

Marijuana and Health, Annual Report of

the Department of Health, Education

and Welfare (1971-1976) . 0... 6. eee eee weer ee eeee 8

Marijuana Reconsidered, Dr. Lester Grinspoon

¢ 2 ) eee 8

White Paper on Drug Abuse, Domestic Counsel

Drug Abuse Task Force (1975) 2... 6 ee eee eee eee eee 8

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

‘

No.

RICKY MANN Moon,

Petitioner,

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

Petitioner Ricky Mann Moon respectfully requests

that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment of

the Supreme Court of Virginia entered on April 11, 1978,

which upheld petitioner’s conviction for possession of

marijuana with intent to distribute it.

OPINIONS BELOW

No opinions were issued by the courts below.

JURISDICTION

The decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia denying

a Writ of Error and Supersedeas, thereby affirming appel-

lants’ judgment of conviction in the Westmoreland

l

2

County Circuit Court was entered on April 11, 1978.

Jurisdiction of the Court is invoked pursuant to 28

U.S.C, §1257(3).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1, Whether Virginia law, which provides penalties for

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it of

five to forty years imprisonment, the same as those

imposed for distribution of hard drugs like heroin,

barbiturates and amphetamines, violates the due process

and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment.

2. Whether a warrantless search of the car Moon was

driving and the additional warrantless search of a bag in

the car found later to contain marijuana was permissible

under the Fourth Amendment, where the search was not

incident to an arrest and where the government intro-

duced no evidence to suggest that exigent circumstances

required a warrantless search.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their per-

sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-

able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and

no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons

or things to be seized.

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-

tion:

3

SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in

the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the

State wherein they reside. No State shall make or

enforce any law which shail abridge the privileges

or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor

shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law; nor deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-

tection of the laws.

The text of the Virginia Statutes listed below and set

forth in the Appendix:

§ 18.2-248

§54-524.84:4

_ STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 7, 1976, Ricky Mann Moon, then age 19,

and two companions drove into a hotel parking lot in

Colonial Beach, Virginia, and parked the car they were

driving, which was on loan from Moon’s employer.

Tr. 90, 143, 180.! Shortly thereafter, Officer R. D. Davis

of the Westmoreland County Police pulled his squad car

up behind them. The three occupants alighted from the

car. Davis approached them and, though he possessed no

search warrant, searched all three individuals for contra-

band drugs. Tr. 90. He found no drugs or weapons in

their possession, and saw no drugs in plain view in the

car. Tr, 145-46.

Davis released the two individuals accompanying

Moon. Tr. 36. He then proceeded to search the bor-

rowed car and found a brown grocery bag under the front

’ References are to the trial transcript.

4

seat. He opened the bag, searched its contents, and found

what was subsequently identified as several ounces of

marijuana. Tr. 120-121. Davis arrested Moon and Moon

was eventually indicted for the crime of possession of

marijuana with intent to distribute it. Since marijuana is

classified in Virginia as a Schedule I narcotic, Moon’s

offense was a felony carrying a minimum sentence of five

years imprisonment and a maximum of forty years impri-

sonment, the same sentence as he would receive if the

drug involved were heroin, amphetamines or another hard

drug. Va. Code §18.2-248, 54-524.84:4. He was tried

without a jury on April 12, 1977, in Westmoreland

County Circuit Court, convicted and, on June 1, 1977,

sentenced to ten years imprisonment, eight of which the

court suspended.

Prior to his trial, Moon moved to dismiss the case on

the ground that the imposition of identical penalties for

possession with intent to distribute marijuana as are

imposed for offenses involving far more dangerous drugs

such as amphetamines and heroin, is arbitrary and irra-

tional and hence a violation of his right to due process

and to equal protection of the law. Tr. 7-76, He pre-

sented evidence that marijuana has none of the addictive

or other harmful effects of hard drugs like heroin and

morphine, and argued on the basis of these facts that it

was utterly arbitrary for Virginia constitutionally to clas-

sify marijuana with these drugs for punishment purposes.

The court denied his motion.

Moon also moved to suppress evidence used against

him deriving from the warrantless search of the automo-

bile he was driving because it viclated his right under the

Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures. Tr. 93-120. The Commonwealth

introduced no evidence to suggest that exigent circum-

stances existed to justify the warrantless search and did

not explain why the car containing the brown paper bag

5

was not impounded so that a warrant could be obtained.

It also admitted that neither the search incident to arrest

nor plain view doctrines applied to the search. The trial

court nevertheless upheld the validity of the search,

stating, “It looks to me like the law has gotten more

liberal so far as searches are concerned, at least that’s

the way I interpret the recent Supreme Court decisions.’’

Tr. 119-120.

On June 3, 1977, Moon timely noted an appeal of his

conviction to the Supreme Court of Virginia pursuant to

Rule 5:6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

He assigned as error, inter alia, the issues raised in this

petition, On April 11, 1978, the Virginia Supreme Court

affirmed Moon’s conviction without opinion. A copy of

the court’s order is contained in the Appendix.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I,

THIS CASE PRESENTS THE IMPORTANT, CURRENT,

AND MUCH LITIGATED QUESTION OF WHETHER THE

PUNISHMENT FOR OFFENSES INVOLVING MARI-

JUANA, A NON-ADDICTIVE DRUG, WITH ADDICTIVE

DRUGS SUCH AS HEROIN IS ARBITRARY AND IRRA.

TIONAL AND HENCE VIOLATIVE OF THE FOUR.

TEENTH AMENDMENT.

A.The Classification of Marijuana With Hard Drugs

For Punishment Purposes Is Utterly Irrational

Many years of research have shown that formerly held

assumptions about the dangerousness of marijuana to be

unfounded and the severe penalties for its illegal use and

distribution have been altered in many jurisdictions. In

particular, recognizing the vast differences between mari-

juana and drugs like heroin and amphetamines, states and

the federal government have imposed lesser penalties for

6

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it? than

they do for equivalent offenses involving hard drugs.

Other states, including Virginia, have resisted this change,

and still classify marijuana for punishment purposes as a

Schedule I drug, with drugs having such devastating harm-

ful effects as morphine, heroin, and amphetamines, so

that its possession with intent to distribute it (even, as

here, such a small amount as eleven ounces) carries severe

punishment, here a minimum of five to a maximum of

forty years imprisonment. See Virginia Code §18.2-248

(punishment); §54-524.84:4 (schedule).? The number of

marijuana prosecutions under this and other harsh but

irrational statutes, involving so many instances of lengthy

incarceration, warrants review of these punishment

schemes,

While recognizing the power of the state to classify

drugs and punish their illicit sales, the Constitution

imposes limits on Virginia’s power in requiring some

rational basis for the classification, United States Depart-

ment of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973);

Williamson v, Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955);

Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920),

which does not exist in this case. As the Supreme Court

has explained:

[W]e recognize that the constitutionality of a

statute, valid on its face, may be assailed by proof

of facts tending to show that the statute as applied

2See, ¢.g., 21 U.S.C, §841 (b); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 36-1002

through 36-1002.07; Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 56% §§704, 1401, 1402;

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 94C §§31, 32, 34; Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 195.200; Tenn. Code Ann. § §54-1413, 1422, 1482; Tex. Penal

Code Ann. tit 71, § §4.03-4.05.

3Other such statutes include Ale, Code Title 22 §258(47);

Nev. Rev. Stat. §§453.321, 459.337, 453.336. W. Va. Code

§ 1385(23),

i)’.

7

to a particular article is without support in reason

because the article, although within the prohibited

class, is so different from others of the class as to be

without the reason for the prohibition. United

States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S, 144, 153

(1938).

A legislative declaration of fact, moreover, appearing

reasonable when enacted, does not insulate che statute

from judicial review. United States v. Carolene Products

Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair,

264 U.S. 543 (1924).

This Court has in the past had occasion to review drug

classification schemes in the related context of statutory

presumptions contained in 21 U.S.C. §176 that persons

who possessed marijuana would be presumed to know the

marijuana had been illegally imported. The Court: held

the presumptions invalid, for it was ‘based upon a legisla-

tive declaration of facts subject to attack on the ground

that the facts no longer exist.’’ Leary v, United States,

395 U.S. 6, 38 n. 68 (1969). In Turner v, United States,

396 U.S. 398 (1970), the Court performed similar

analysis as to presumptions concerning cocaine and

heroin.

The evidence presented in this case, when coupled with

studies by scholars and researchers throughout the

country, demonstrates overwhelmingly that no rational

basis exists for the classification of marijuana as a

Schedule I drug for all purposes, along with heroin and

amphetamines. Dr. Dorothy Whipple testified in this case

that marijuana is not addictive; that it does not produce

tolerances; that it is much less dangerous than ampheta-

mines or heroin; that there is not a single recorded inci-

dent of a death from an overdose of marijuana in a

laboratory animal or in a human being, that it has

8

medical uses;* and that it has more benign physiological

effects than alcohol or tobacco.

These conclusions have been confirmed by the most

respected academic and governmental studies of the

effects of marijuana. The National Commission on Mari-

juana and Drug Abuse, in its study, Marijuana; A Signal

of Misunderstanding (1972) reported no _ significant

physiological effects of marijuana, either long or short

term, and found no evidence of addiction or high poten-

tial for abuse. The Commission further found that

marijuana use is not associated with crime and that it did

not lead to use of hard drugs. The same conclusions were

reached by Dr. Lester Grinspoon, Professor of Medicine

at Harvard University and the nation’s most noted

authority on the subject, in Marijuana Reconsidered

(1971), by the more recent study by the Domestic

Council Drug Abuse Task Force, White Paper on Drug

Abuse (1975), and by the annual reports to Congress by

the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,

Marijuana and Health (1971-1976).

It is thus completely irrational to expose a person con-

victed of possession with intent to distribute marijuana to

the same penalties as one who engages in similar activity

with respect to heroin, morphine and other drugs.

The effects of that arbitrariness on individuals through-

out the United States can hardly be underestimated.

Hundreds, perhaps thousands of people, including young

people like Moon, continue to be victims of a punishment

‘indeed, in litigation, the United States has recently agreed to

permit medical use of marijuana for glaucoma by a private citizen

for non-research purposes. Randall v. United States, No. 78-0817

(D.D.C., May 18, 1978).

9

scheme which has no relation to the seriousness of the

crime committed or to offenses involving hard drugs.

Because states like Virginia refuse to change their legis-

lation is no excuse for the perpetuation of punishments

so unfitting to the crime and repugnant to constitutional

standards. Hence certiorari should be granted.

B. There Exists A Conflict Of Authority Concerning -

The Constitutionality of Punishing Marijuana

Offenses As Harshly As Those Involving Hard

Drugs.

At least two state courts have held that the punish-

ment of marijuana offenses similarly with those involving

hard drugs is completely irrational and hence a violation

of federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection

of the law. In People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194

N.W.2d 878 (1972), the Michigan Supreme Court

considered the sentence of nine and one half to ten years

imposed on a person convicted of possession of mari-

juana. Although the majority found the sentence in viola-

tion of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the

constitution, the concurring opinions suggested that the

categorization of marijuana with hard drugs was a denial

of equal protection under the laws. In People v. McCabe,

49 Ill. 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971), the defendant suc-

cessfully challenged the existing Illinois statute, which

provided a mandatory ten year minimum sentence for

marijuana first offenders. The court held that marijuana

was misclassified among addictive drugs. Other states,

while upholding the classification of marijuana along with

hard drugs, have expressly held that the classification was

permissible only because lower punishments were im-

posed for marijuana offenses than for offenses involving

hard drugs. See, e.g., Hawati v. Kantner, 53 Haw. 371,

493 P.2d 306 (1972).

10

Other states, however, have upheld penalty schemes

similar to Virginia’s, refusing to distinguish marijuana

from hard drugs for punishment purposes. See, ¢.g.,

Tracey v. Janco, 351 F.Supp. 836 (N.D. W. Va. 1972);

Sherman v. State, 89 Nev. 77, 0J6 P.2d 417 (1973);

Boswell v. State, 290 Ala. 349, 276 So.2d 592 (1973).

This conflict in authority provides additional reason to

grant the Writ.

OF

THIS CASE PRESENTS THE IMPORTANT QUESTION

THE PROPER APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES

v. CHADWICK TO SEARCHES OF PACKAGES FOUND

IN AUTOMOBILES.

The decision below in this case demonstrates a con-

tinuing refusal of state trial and appellate courts to

abide by this Court’s decisions concerning the permis-

sible scope of warrantless searches of automobiles and

their contents, even after United States v. Chadwick,

433 U.S. 1 (1977).

The automobile exception applies only in three types

of situations. First, an automobile may be searched if

there is actual danger that a vehicle containing contra-

band will be driven away. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443 (1971). Second, the exception applies

where the vehicle is lawfully in police custody and, in

order to protect the public or perform normal police

functions, the vehicle must be inventoried. South Dakota

v. Opperman, 428 U.S, 364 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski,

413 U.S. 433 (1973); Cooper v. California, 386 US. 58

(1967). Finally, an automobile may be searched incident

or subsequent to an arrest under circumstances which

would permit any other search incident to an arrest.

Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Chambers v.

Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).

1]

Virginia has never claimed that petitioner’s automobile

was the subject of an inventory search and, as already

stated, this is not a case of a search incident to arrest.

The only remaining possible exception is that exigent

circumstances existed which compelled the arresting

officer to act quickly in order to prevent escape. But

there is no evidence in this case that petitioner was about

to flee or that the arresting officer believed he was about

to flee.

Yet the trial and appellate courts have refused to

abide by these decisions, thereby warranting review here.

Furthermore, the Virginia Supreme Court ignored the

constraints on searches of automobile contents imposed

by United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In

Chadwick, this Court invalidated the warrantless search

of a locked two hundred pound trunk of marijuana found

in an automobile, even though a search of the car itself

might have been proper. Rather, the Court held that the

proper procedure was to have seized the trunk and

obtained a warrant for its search. The rationale for this

ruling was that there is a significant expectation of pri-

vacy surrounding closed containers which mandates the

protection of a judicial warrant before a search. The

countervailing governmental interests of preventing the

removal or destruction of the evidence in a container, and

in protecting against the use of any concealed weapons,

were held to be satisfied by seizure of the container.

Thus, under Chadwick, a warrantless search >f a closed

container found in a stationary automobile, once the con-

tainer -is safely seized, cannot be legitimated either

by the automobile exception to the warrant rule, based

on the danger of flight, or by the search incident to

arrest exception to the warrant rule, based on the

possibility of the use of force to prevent arrest. See

United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977).

12

Here, the closed bag which was under the arresting

officer’s control and which was not within the area of

petitioner’s control, should have been seized and a

warrant obtained for its search.

In addition to righting the injustice done to petitioner,

granting the writ in this case would provide clarification

for state courts on the proper application of Chadwick to

automobile searches, which occur with such regularity.

This clarification is especially important since under

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), federal habeas

corpus procedure is not available to a state prisoner to

challenge the constitutionality of a search, evidence from

which was used at his trial, if he has fully litigated his

claim in state court. Furthermore, review by certiorari

here is his only opportunity for federal review of Moon’s

Fourth Amendment claims, claims summarily dealt with

by both the trial court and the Virginia Supreme Court.

See Mincey v. Arizona, 46 U.S.L.W. 4737 (June 21,

1978) (Marshall, J., concurring). The unavailability of

any other federal review provides an additional reason to

grant the Wnit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner urges that this

Court issue a Petition for Certiorari to review the decision

below.

Respectfully submitted,

LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN

PHILIP J. HIRSCHKOP : -

HIRSCHKOP & GRAD, P.C.

108 North Columbus Street

Post Office Box 1226

July, 1978 Alexandria, Virginia 22313

(703) 836-6595

Attorneys for Petitioner.

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX

§ 18.2-248. Penalties for manufacture, sale, gift,

distribution or possession of a controlled drug.—Except

as authorized in The Drug Control Act, chapter 15.1

(§ 54-524.1 et seq.) of Title 54 of this Code, it shall be

unlawful for any person to manufacture, sell, give, dis-

tribute or possess with intent to manufacture, sell, give or

distribute a controlled substance.

(a) Any person who violates this section with respect

to a controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II

shall upon conviction be imprisoned for not less than five

nor more than forty years and fined not more than

twenty-five thousand dollars; . . .

§ 54-524.84:4. Schedule I.—(a) The controlled sub-

stances listed in this section are included in Schedule I.

(b) Any of the following opiates, including their

isomers, esters, ethers, salts and salts of isomers, esters,

and ethers, unless specifically excepted, whenever the

existence of these isomers, esters, ethers and salts is

possible within the specific chemical designation:

(1) Acetylmethadol;

(2) Allylprodine;

(3) Alphacetylmethadol;

(4) Alphameprodine;

(5) Alphamethadol;

(6) Benzethidine;

(7) Betacetylmethadol;

(8) . Betameprodine;

(9) Betamethadol;

(10) Betaprodine;

(11) Clonitazene;

(12) Dextromoramide;

(13) [Repealed.]

2a

(14) Diampromide;

(15) Diethylthiambutene;

(15a) Difenoxin;

(16) Dimenoxadol;

(17) Dimepheptanol;

(18) Dimethylthiambutene;

(19) Dioxaphetylbutyrate;

20) Dipipanone;

1 Ethyimethylthiambutene :

(22) Etonitazene;

(23) Etoxeridine;

(24) Furethidine; "a

(25) Hydroxypethidine;

(26) Ketobemidone;

(27) Levomoramide;

(28) Levophenacylmorphan;

(29) Morpheridine;

(30) Noracymethadol;

(31) Norlevorphanol;

(32) Normethadone;

(33) Norpipanone;

(34) Phenadoxone;

(35) Phenampromide ;

(36) Phenomorphan;

(37) Phenoperidine;

(38) Piritramide;

(39) Proheptazine;

(40) Properidine;

(40a) Propiram;

(41) reine ly

(42) Trimeperidine. | a ee

of the following opium derivatives, the!

oe Peete and salts of isomers, unless specifically

3a

excepted, whenever the existence of these salts, isomers

and salts of isomers is possible within the specific

chemical designation:

(1) Acetorphine;

(2) Acetyldihydrocodeine;

(3) Benzylmorphine;

(4) Codeine methylbromide;

(5) Codeine-N-Oxide;

(6) Cyprenorphine;

(7) Desomorphine;

(8) Dihydromorphine;

(8a) Drotebanal;

(9) Etorphine;

(10) Heroin;

(11) Hydromorphinol;

(12) Methyldesorphine;

(13) Methyldihydromorphine;

(14) Morphine Methylbromide; |

(15) Morphine Methylsulfonate;

(16) Morphine-N-Oxide;

(17) Myrophine;

(18) Nicocodeine;

(19) Nicomorphine;

(20) Normorphine;

(21) Phoclodine;

(22) Thebacon.

(d) Hallucinogenic substances.—Unless specifically

excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any

material, compound, mixture, or preparation, which con-

tains ahy quantity of the following hallucinogenic sub-

stances, or which contains any of its salts, isomers, and

salts of isomers, whenever the existence of such salts,

isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the

4a

specific chemical designation (for purposes of this para-

graph only, the term “isomer” includes the optical,

position, and geometric isomers):

(1) 3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine;

(2) 5-methoxy-3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine;

(3) 3$,4,5-trimethoxy amphetamine;

(4) Bufotenine;

(5) Diethyltryptamine;

(6) Dimethyltryptamine;

(7) 4-methly-2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine;

(8) Ibogaine;

(9) Lysergic acid diethylamide;

(10) Marijuana;

(11) Mescaline;

(12) Peyote;

(13) N-ethyl-3-piperidyl benzilate;

(14) N-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate;

(15) Psilocybin;

(16) Psilocyn;

(17) Tetrahydrocannabinols;

(18) Hashish oil (Some trade or other names: hash oil;

liquid marijuana; liquid hashish);

(19) 2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine (Some trade or other

names: 2,5-dimethoxy-a-methylphenethylamine; 2,5-

DMA);

(20) 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine (Some trade

or other names: 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxyamethylphen-

ethylamine; 4-bromo-2,5-DMA);

(21) 4-methoxyamphetamine (Some trade or other

names: 4-methoxy-a-methylphenethylamine; parameth-

oxyamphetamine; PMA) (1972, c. 798; 1973, c. 479;

1976, c. 614; 1977, c. 302.)

5a

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virgini

Supren rginia held at the Su

Court Building in the City of Richmond on il ag

11th day of

Ricky Mann Moon, Appellant

against Record No. 771223

Circuit Court No. 7

Commonwealth of Virginia, Appellee

From the Circuit Court of Westmoreland County

Finding no reversible error in the Judgment complained

ef, the court refuses the petiti .

above-styled case. petition for appeal filed in the

A Copy,

Teste:

Allen L. Lucy, Clerk

By: /s/ Richard R. Bruish

Deputy Clerk