Petitioners Reply Brief — Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stamping Plant) v. NLRB

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ZOR ARGUMENT

Sapreme Court, U. &

IN THE FER 23

Supreme Court of the Gite| States mcm

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\9T9

OcTOBER TERM, 1978 ———_—

No. 77-1806

FORD MOTOR COMPANY

(CHICAGO STAMPING PLANT),

Petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

and

LOCAL 588, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AERO-

SPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT

WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER,

FORD MOTOR COMPANY

THEOPHIL C. KAMMHOLZ

WituiaM W. McKirrrick

MICHAEL G. CLEVELAND

115 South LaSalle Street

Chicago, [linois 60603

STANLEY R. Strravss

1750 Pennsvlvania Avenue, N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20006

JAMES R. J ACKSON

WiLuiAM J. Rooney

Ford Motor Company

The American Road

Dearborn, Michigan 48121

Counsel for Ford Motor Company

Of Counsel :

VeppeEr, Prick, KAUFMAN & KAMMHOLZz

115 South LaSalle Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

Gunthorp-Werren Printing Company, Chicago e Financial 66565

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Ee ee ee ee a ccuves en ii

Ave.

I. Respondents fee Neither Shown That In-

Plant Food Prices Should Be a Mandatory

Subject of Bargaining Nor Refuted Ford’s

Ce CII kd va ccc cascsnnceeess 1

II. Respondents and the AFL-CIO Have Intro-

duced a Number of Matters Irrelevant to

Resolution of the Food Price Issue Pre-

SE Gb ee CD ik idvcccaccvevenseveces 8

LII. The Order That Ford Bargain About ** Food

Services’? Was Improper ................ 13

BG MEE wo cddcckds séteCesncenscecinses 14

FP OPPT ESET eer TLeTTreT yee ST TTT TTT Te Al

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh

Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. 157 (1971) ...... 5, 8, 10

Alpena General Hospital, 50 LA 48 (Jones, 1967) 12

American Art Clay Co. v. N. L. R. B., 328 F. 2d

Se ee EE acc ctcedentnvennneanwanewe 7

American Smelting and Retining Co. v. N. L. R. B.,

406 F. 2d 552 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395

ee 2 Leer re ree ecia «CUO

Bastian-Blessing Div. of Goloconda Corp. v.

N. L. R. B., 474 F. 2d 49 (6th Cir. 1973) ...... 9

Braleo Metals, Inc., 214 NLRB 143 (1974) ...... 10

Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. N. L. R. B.,

GIS FH. BE Ete CS Ole. TRGS). .cccccvcccuccses 10

Cosmo Graphies, Ine., 217 NLRB 1061 (1975) .. 10

D & C Textile Corp., 189 NLRB 716 (1971) .... 10

Dobbs Houses, Ine. v. N. L. R. B., 325 F. 2d 531

OF Se pry penne ein per 7

Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N. L. R. B.,

gg & Sf, rere res ere e se 2,3

Fleming Mfg. Co., 119 NLRB 452 (1957) ...... 11

Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB No. 135 (1977) .. 10

Greater Los Angeles Zoo Ass’n, 60 LA 838

CG MINED <dbbedcdccvdscvedscdipucsas 12

Hasty Print, Inc., d/b/a Walker Color Graphics,

ee © fF Fe) errr 10

Hilton Hotels Corp., 42 LA 1267 (Hanlon, 1964) 12

Laidlaw Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 414 F. 2d 99 (7th

Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U. S. 920 (1970) .. 6

Lutheran Medical Center, 44 LA 110 (Wolf, 1964) 12

iii

Missourian Publishing Co., 216 NLRB 175 (1975) 10

N. L. R. B. v. Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 206 F. 2d 33

Coe Mee CE, Od oc oeaceendneends éyes cess 4

N. L. R. B. v. Brown, 380 U. 8S. 278 (1965) ...... 7

N. L. R. B. v. Central Illinois Publie Service Co.,

324 F. 2d 916 (7th Cir. 1963) ...........000.: 9

N. L. R. B. v. Citizens Hotel Co., 326 F. 2d 501

ee Ge pice Gun ccscchanes oedendees 11

N. L. R. B. v. Inland Steel Co., 170 F. 2d 247 (7th

Cir. 1948), cert. denied in relevant part, 336

ig Sr a caVbdsecnctedexcass<hencus i)

N. L. R. B. v. Ladish Co., 538 F. 2d 1267 (7th Cir.

BED ox ciessddaksessdetiendeeeraeenesates 5

N. L. R. B. v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205 F.

Se ae CE Ge ED wed awieedc descevesenee 4

N. L. R. B. v. Loeal 964, Brotherhood of Car-

penters, 447 F. 2d 643 (2d Cir. 1971) ........ 2,6

N. L. R. B. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,

Be EE cucu bucnenaceucnbvertees 3

N. L. R. B. v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F. 2d

ee Cs EE Wie Ou ov cases cdvevcaeseces 11

N. L. R. B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370

ee 0 ER prreerrr rr srr ror Te rrr 4

N. L. R. B. v. Wonder State Manufacturing Co.,

344 F. 2d 210 (8th Cir. 1965) .............06. 11

N. L. R. B. v. Wooster Division of Borg Warner

Corp., 356 U. S. 342 (1958) ......... ce eeeeees 6

Oil, Chemical & Atomie Workers v. N. L. R. B.,

547 F. 2d 575 (D. C. Cir. 1977) ......... eee i)

O’Land, Ine., 206 NLRB 210 (1973) ............ 11

Preston Products Corp., 158 NLRB 322 (1966),

enforced, 392 F. 2d 801 (D. C. Cir. 1967), cert.

denied, 392 U. S. 906 (1968) ............45-. 11

iv

Seattle First National Bank v. N. L. R. B., 444

F, 2d 30 (9th Cir. 1971) ...........00. ec eee 5,8

United Slate Workers, Local 36, 172 NLRB 2248

SEE. cel Ceeeda cand cided es ekbaaneaRereenan 2

Universal Form Clamp Co., 68 LA 1223 (Miller,

NS oe te ek eis eee eee eee 11

Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 NLRB 672 (1949) 9

Statutes

National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61

Stat. 136, 29 U.S. C. § 151 et seq. .......... passim

Misce!laneous

All New Fannie Farmer Boston Cooking School

Cookbook, 10th ed. Bantam paperback (New

ME DE 58 Cub chs koneueRieeeeeenciandhe 12

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 77-1806

FORD MOTOR COMPANY

(CHICAGO STAMPING PLANT),

Petitioner,

Us.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

and

LOCAL 588, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AERO-

SPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT

WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER,

FORD MOTOR COMPANY

I. RESPONDENTS HAVE NEITHER SHOWN THAT

IN-PLANT FOOD PRICES SHOULD BE A MANDA.

TORY SUBJECT OF BARGAINING NOR REFUTED

FORD’S CONTRARY ARGUMENTS.

Neither the Board nor the UAW has furnished the

Court with a convincing rationale for holding in-plant

food prices to be a mandatory subject of bargaining;

9

-

nor, indeed, has the AFL-CIO, the wmicus curiae sup-

porting their position.

A. Basie to the position of the Board and the VAW

is the tautological argument that bargaining over in-

plant food prices should be declared mandatory be-

eause a principal purpose of the Act—the peaceful

settlement of industrial disputes through the collective

bargaining process'—would thereby be furthered

(Board Br. pp. 13, 28; UAW Br. pp. 8-9). The argu-

ment, also made by the AFL-CLO (AFL-CIO Br. pp.

16-19), begs the question, however, for its acceptance

would require that there be collective bargaining over

any matter that either the employer or the union might

select, thereby obliterating the long-established distine-

tion between mandatory and permissive bargaining

subjects (See Ford Br. pp. 23-26, 31).

B. The Board, the UAW, and the AFL-CIO also

argue (Board Br. pp. 11, 15-17, 30-31; UAW Br. pp.

1. Both the Board and the AFL-CIO argue that because Ford’s

employees engaged in a cafeteria-vending machine boycott to pro-

test increases in food prices, bargaining should be required with

respect to such increases in the interest of industrial peace (Board

Br. p. 29, AFL-CLO Br. p. 25, n. 10). The argument is unper-

suasive for a finding in agreement with the Board’s position might

well encourage, rather than prevent, disruptive activity. See infra,

pp. 6-7. The industrial strife that the Act seeks to avoid is strike

action (withholding by employees of labor) that disrupts the econ-

omy, not the withholding of patronage that is part of the economic

system. Furthermore, in numerous instances in the past where

employees had undertaken economic action to enforce bargaining

demands, the Board and the Courts have rejected claims that the

various matters involved were mandatory subjects of bargaining.

Sec, e.g., N. L. R. B. vy. Local 964, Brotherhood of Carpenters, 447

F. 2d 643 (2d Cir. 1971); United Slate Workers, Local 36, 172

NLRB 2248 (1968).

2. For over 30 years the Board and the Courts have developed

and employed this distinction. Only if this distinction is made can

effect be given Justice Stewart's statement in Fibreboard Paper

Products Corp, v. N. L. R. B., 379 U.S. 203, 220 (1964) that: ‘*The

Nationa! Labor Relations Act does not say that the employer and

employees are bound to confer upon any subject which interests

either of them.”’

_ 3

7,13; AFL-CIO Br. p. 6, n. 2) that in-plant food prices

fall within the ‘‘ordinary meaning’’ of the Section

8(d) phrase ‘‘terms and conditions of employment”’

heeause, as Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out in Fibre-

board Paper Products Corp. v. N.L. R. B., 379 U.S.

203, 222 (1964), that phrase is commonly understood

to encompass ‘*the various physical dimensions of [an

employee’s] working environment.’” It is strikingly

clear, however, that a construction which equates food

prices with the term ‘‘working environment’’ over-

burdens any connotation fairly derived from the latter

concept. Indeed, Mr. Justice Stewart appears to have

heen thinking in different terms when he wrote the

passage upon which the Board and the UAW now rely.

He said (379 U.S. at 222):

In common parlance, the conditions of a person’s

employment are most obviously the various physi-

cal dimensions of his working environment. What

one’s hours are to be, what amount of work is

expected during these hours, what periods of

relief are available, what safety practices are ob-

served, would all seem conditions of one’s em

ployment.

Thus stated, the ‘*various physical dimensions of [an

emplovee’s] working environment’ is a narrow con-

eept that signifies the ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘when”’’ of work

performed by employees (‘‘work amounts”’; ‘‘work

hours’’; ‘‘periods of relief’’) as well as the immediate

circumstances under which the work is performed

(‘‘safety practices’’). Beyond such matters, we submit,

the concept may not logically be extended. In short, the

3. The argument made by counsel for the Board that in-plant

food prices are *‘wages’’ within the meaning of Section &8(d)

(Board Br. p. 23, n. 22), was not addressed by the Board or the

Court of Appeals and, as a post-hoc rationalization of counsel,

should not be accepted by the Court as a basis for the Board’s

decision. See N. L. R. B. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 380

U.S. 438, 443-444 (1965).

4

prices at which employees buy food, whether in-plant

or on the outside, are too far removed from the em-

ployees’ work stations, both physically and concep-

tually, to be considered a part of their work environ-

ment."

Furthermore, even if the ‘‘work environment”’

eoneept could be stretched to include the matter of

in-plant food prices, the argument that the Board, the

4. In the context of its ‘‘ working environment’’ argument, the

Board likens **food availability’’ (and thus food prices) to the

following matters which the Board states, citing cases, are all

‘*subject to mandatory bargaining’’: plant air temperature and

quality, restroom privileges and conditions, and employee rental of

company-owned housing (Bd. Br. p. 16 and n. 7, pp. 16-17).

Ford agrees that both the temperature and quality of plant

air and employees’ restroom privileges and conditions are matters

that may be encompassed by Mr. Justice Stewart’s ‘‘ working en-

vironment’’ concept. Significantly, however, none of the cases

cited by the Board to support its position with respect to such

matters turned on, or even mentioned, the latter concept. Even

more troubling is the Board’s misleading citation of NV. L. R. B. v.

Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U. 8S. 9 (1962), to support the

proposition that the matter of plant air temperature is a manda-

tory subject of bargaining. For, as the AFL-C1O correctly noted

(AFL-CIO Br. n. 2, pp. 6-7), the issue in Washington Aluminum

was whether a walkout protesting an uncomfortably cold plant

temperature was a protected concerted activity within the mean-

ing of Section 7 of the Act; and the case in no way concerned

the matter of mandatory bargaining.

Furthermore, neither of the cases cited by the Board with respect

to the rental of company-owned housing equated that subject with

the ‘‘working environment’’ concept. Rather, both American

Smelting and Refining Co. v. NX. L. R. B., 406 F. 2d 552 (9th Cir.

1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969), and N. L. R. B. v. Lehigh

Portland Cement Co., 205 F. 2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953), sustained

the Board's view that bargaining was required over company-

supplied housing because of the particular circumstances that

were present—i.e., rents below the prevailing rate charged over

a long period of time and the unavailability of alternative housing

(Lehigh Portland); relatively isolated, company-owned housing

in a company town not serviced by public transportation to other

locations (American Smelting). In addition, compare N. L. R. B. v.

Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 206 F. 2d 33 (Sth Cir. 1953), a case not cited

in the Board brief, where the occupancy of company-owned housing

was held not to be subject to compulsory bargaining.

5

UAW, and the AFL-CIO build upon the concept does

not meet Ford’s basic position in this case. Ford sub-

mits that for a matter to be a mandatory subject of

bargaining it must ‘‘vitally affeet’’—as in-plant food

prices clearly do not—employees’ working conditions.

See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittshurgh

Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179 (1971), and Ford

Br. pp. 23-29.°

C. In its brief, Ford asserted that bargaining over

in-plant food prices is not general labor-management

practice (Ford Br. p. 29). Significantly, the Board,

the UAW, and the AFL-CIO have not cited to the

Court a single collective bargaining agreement which

contains a provision setting in-plant food prices or

establishing a procedure for bargaining about such

prices. Moreover, the Board’s statement that bargain-

ing about in-plant food prices is a ‘‘wide-spread’’ in-

dustrial practice (Board Br. 23) not only is totally

unsupported but is at odds with the Board’s statement

that ‘‘[s]uch [in-plant food price] clauses apparently

exist’’ (Board Br. p. 24, n. 23). Further, neither the

UAW nor the AFL-CIO, each of which has access to

5. Respondents seek to limit the ‘‘vitally affeet’’ concept

set forth in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers to situations

in which ‘‘the matter in issue directly involves individuals

outside the employer-employee relationship’? (Board Br. p. 31,

UAW Br. pp. 10-13; AFL-CIO Br. pp. 8-9). This argument wholly

ignores the fact that in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers it

was the Board which first perceived that the effect of retired

employees’ pension benefits on current employees was direct and

substantial enough to ‘‘vitally affect’’ the latter group. See, 177

NLRB at 915-916. It is that conclusion with which the Court

disagreed, deeming the effects found by the Board ‘‘speculative and

insubstantial’’ at best, but in no way indicating that the ‘*‘ vitally

affect’’ standard should be narrowly confined, as the Board now

urges. 404 U. S. at 180. Indeed, the Courts of Appeals, including

the Court below, have not limited the ‘‘ vitally affect’’ standard to

situations in which persons outside the employment relationship

are involved. See, e.g., N. L. R. B. v. Ladish Co., 538 F. 2d 1267,

1272 (7th Cir. 1976); Seattle First National Bank v. N.L. R.B.,

444 F. 2d 30, 33 (9th Cir. 1971).

6

numerous collective bargaining contracts in a wide

diversity of industries, points to even a single such

agreement setting, or referring to, in-plant food prices.”

D. Although the Board, the UAW, and the AFL-

CIO argue generally that in-plant food prices should

be declared to be a mandatory bargaining subject,

only the UAW acknowledges the likely consequences

of such a declaration. Thus, the UAW has stated:

‘‘Assume arguendo that the parties are petty, and

fall into economic warfare over the smallest mat-

ters. The Act contemplates economic combat. . . .”’

(UAW Br. p. 20). In fact, should bargaining over

in-plant food prices be declared mandatory, the de-

cision would remove employee inhibitions against

striking to enforce bargaining demands made with

respect to such prices. Thus, ‘‘it is lawful to insist [as

a condition to any agreement] upon matters within the

scope of mandatory bargaining and unlawful to insist

upon matters without,’ V. L. R. B. v. Wooster Division

of Borg Warner Corp., 356 U. 8, 342, 349 (1958) ; and

employees who strike to enforce a demand over a man-

datory subject of bargaining have preferential recall

rights. Laidlaw Corp. v. N.L. R. B., 414 F.2d 99 (7th

Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970). Con-

versely, a strike to enforee a demand on a non-manda-

tory subject is an unfair labor practice, N. L. R. B. v.

Local 964, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, supra,

and employees who participate in such a strike are

6. Indeed, although the UAW surveyed some 101 Local UAW-

Ford agreements, it points to only 41 that even deal with ‘‘nourish-

ment, normally food services’ (UAW Br. p. 18, n. 19). Sig-

nificantly, the UAW makes no assertion that any such Local agree-

ment deals with food pricing.

Ford has conducted its own examination of all its collective bar-

gaining agreements with the UAW, and now reports to the Ceurt

that none contains a provision setting or referring to in-plant

food prices.

7

not protected under the Act. Dobbs Houses, Ine. v.

N.L. R. B., 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963); American

Art Clay Co. v. N.L.R. B., 328 F.2d 88 (7th Cir.

1964).

E. The argument of the AFL-CIO (AFL-CIO Br.

p. 3) that the acceptance of Ford’s position would leave

in-plant food prices in the ‘‘exelusive control of man-

agement’’ is unpersuasive. In fact, employees have the

same means available to them as do consumers for

influencing prices, such as boycotting and item substi-

tution. Indeed, that the employees in this case engaged

in a boyeott to protest food price increases serves to

underscore the fact that the employees themselves per-

ceived that the increases affected them as consumers of

one source of food, rather than as employees whose

conditions of employment changed.

F. Finally, contrary to the Board’s contention

(Board Br. pp. 12, 22-23), we submit that special

deference should not be accorded to the Board’s view

with respect to in-plant food prices. For, as the Court

observed in N. L. R. B. v. Brown, 380 U. 8S. 278, 291-

292 (1965) :

... Courts should be ‘‘slow to overturn an admin-

istrative decision, "Labor Board vy. Babcock &

Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112, but they are not left

“to ‘sheer acceptance’ of the Board’s conclu-

sions,’’ Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board,

324 U.S. 793, 803... [R]Jeview is always properly

within the judicial province, and courts would ab-

dicate their responsibility if they did not fully

review such administrative decisions. Of course

due deference is to be rendered to agency deterzai-

nations of fact, so long as there is substantial evi-

dence to be found in the record as a whole. But

where, as here, the review is not of a question of

fact, but of a judgment as to the proper balance

to be struck between conflicting interests, ‘‘ [t]he

8

deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be

allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results

in the unauthorized assumption by an ageney

of major poliey decisions properly made by

Congress.”’

To accord deference to the Board’s determination

would he particularly inappropriate here, we submit,

‘because the Board’s decisions on the matter now be-

“fore the Court have been premised on shifting ra-

tionales and have been marked by strong dissents (see

Ford’s principal brief, nu. 9 at pp. 15-16), and have

each, except for the one in this case, been overturned

_by a reviewing court (see Ford Br. pp. 15-21).

II. RESPONDENTS AND THE AFL-CIO HAVE IN.

TRCDUCED A NUMBER OF MATTERS IRRELE-

VANT TO RESOLUTION OF THE FOOD PRICE

ISSUE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE.

A. The Board’s assertion (Board Br. pp. 25-26)

that bargaining should be required about food prices

beeause the emplover benefits from the existence of

in-plant feeding facilities is unpersuasive. Were this

argument to be accepted, bargaining would be required

over many nonmandatory subjects. Thus, bargaining

could arguably be required over pension benefits for

retired emplovees, Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers,

supra, because, inter alia, it might be said that paying

such benefits enhances employee morale and the em-

ployer’s ability to recruit new employees.’ Further-

7. The same argument could be made with respect to the matter

decided in Neattle First National Bank vy. N. L. R. B., 444 F. 2d

30 (1971), where the Ninth Cireuit held that a bank was not

required to bargain over the discontinuance of its policy of pro-

viding free to its employees investment services for which it

charged its customers. The court said:

(Footnote continued on next page.)

9

more, Ford does not operate the in-plant food service

to make a profit; and nothing in the record suggests

that Ford has ever either used in-plant feeding to

induce employment or asserted that it should be con-

sidered a benefit of employment.*

B. In an effort to demonstrate that bargaining

ought to be required, the Board has cited a number of

decisions dealing with in-plant feeding issues which

have no bearing on whether the matter of in-plant

food prices ought to be a bargainable subject (Board

Br. pp. 17-18).° Thus, clearly not relevant to this case is

(Footnote continued from preceding page.)

We find it difficult to understand how the use of the bank’s

investment service department by the employees at half-price

or free of charge can be within the phrase ‘‘terms and condi-

tions of employment.’’ The purchase and sale of securities by

employees has little or nothing to do with their employment.

The source of funds may or may not originate from employ-

ment. In the words of Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,

supra, the pricing of such services is one of the management

decisions ‘‘which impinge only indirectly upon employment

security and should be excluded’’ from Section 8(d) matters.

(444 F. 2d at 33.)

8. Thus, both NV. L. R. B. vy. Central Illinois Public Service Co.,

324 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1963) (eited by the AFL-CIO at p. 28 of

its brief) and N. L. R. B. v. Inland Steel Co., 170 F. 2d 247 (7th

Cir. 1948), cert. denied in relevant- part, 336 U.S. 960 (1949)

(cited at p. 16 of the Board’s brief, at p. 16 of the UAW’s brief.

and at pp. 6 and 23 of the AFL-CIO brief) where plans or pro-

grams of benefits were represented by the employers to their em-

ployees as such, are here irrelevant. Likewise inapposite is Weyer-

haeuser Timber Co., 87 NLRB 672 (1949), cited in the Board’s

brief at pp. 22-23, where meals were sold to employees in a remote

lumber camp at below the employer’s cost.

9. The Board’s circular statement that ‘‘when a matter is

subject to mandatory bargaining, all of its facets are subject to

negotiation’’ (Board Br. p. 19, n. 15) ignores the fundamental

issue of the impact that the particular matter involved has on

employees. Moreover, the authorities cited, Bastian-Blessing, Div.

of Golconda Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 474 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1973) and

Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers y. N.L.R.B., 547 F.2d 575

(D.C. Cir. 1977), which deal with changes in health insurance

carriers, in no way support the Board’s proposition. In Golconda

(Footnote continued on next page.)

10

whether employees will be permitted to eat at some

time during the work shift and the duration of lunch

periods or breaks (matters plainly encompassed within

Section 8(d)’s mandate of bargaining concerning

hours of employment) ;"’ whether meal periods will be

paid or unpaid time (which clearly involves employee

wages) :'' or whether unit employees will be required

to clean existing lunch areas (a matter plainly in-

volving emplovees’ joh duties) .”*

Also distinguishable from, and not relevant to, the

question presented in this case are matters which

bear directly upon management’s right to discipline—

to use an example chosen by the UAW, whether an

employee may be disciplined for producing too much

scrap (UAW Br. p. 19, n. 21)—and those cases cited by

the Board which deal with whether a Christmas or

other bonus is so frequently and customarily paid

(Footnote continued from preceding page.)

the change of health insurance coverage from an established insur-

ance company to a self-insured program resulted in substantial

changes in coverage. 475 F.2d at 51-52. In OCAW, the Fifth

Cireuit observed that the change in insurance carriers ‘effected

many changes in coverage’’ 549 F. 2d at 582. Compare Connecticut

Light & Power Co. v. N. LR. B., 476 F.2d 1079, 1083 (2d Cir.

1973), a case not cited by the Board, holding that the employer

was not obligated to bargain about a change in insurance carrier

for medieal insurance coverage for its employees because, under

the test set forth in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pitts-

burgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971), the change did not

have a significant effect on employees.

10. Cosmo Graphics, Ine., 217 NLRB 1061 (1975) 5 Bralco

Metals, Inc., 214 NLRB 143 (1974) ; Missourvan Publishing Co.,

216 NLRB 175 (1975); D & C Textile Corp., 189 NLRB 769

(1971).

_ Hasty Print, Inc., d b/a Walker Color Graphics, Inc., 227

NLRB 455 (1976) ; Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB No. 135

(1977) ; Bralco Metals, Inc., 214 NURB 143 (1974).

12. Cosmo Graphics, Inc., 217 NLRB 1061.

11

that it is properly viewed as ‘‘wages”’ or a ‘condition

of employment.’

Likewise having no relevance here is the fact that

an arbitrator might hold that a collective hargaining

agreement voluntarily entered into prohibits discon-

tinuance of a practice of providing certain foods free

of charge to emplovees (Board Br. p. 24).

13. See NV. L.R.B. v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713,

714 (2d Cir. 1952) (‘‘ Where, as here, the so called gifts have been

made over a substantial period of time and in amount have been

based on the respective wages earned by the recipients, the Board

was free to treat them as bonuses not economically different from

other special kinds of remuneration ...’’); N. L. R. B. v. Citizens

Hotel Co., 326 F. 2d 501, 503 (5th Cir. 1964) (Board’s view

supportable ‘‘considering the regularity of the gift, the existence

of a formal policy as to the eligibility of recipients and ascertain-

ment of the dollar amounts, preemployment reference to the bonus

as an inducement to prospective employees . . .*’), Not cited by

the Board is NV. L. R. B. v. Wonder State Manufacturing Co., 344

F, 2d 210 (8th Cir. 1965), which holds irregularly paid Christmas

bonuses are not a mandatory subject.

Also distinguishable are Fleming Mfg. Co., 119 NLRB 452

(1957), and Preston Products Corp., 158 NLRB 322 (1966),

enforced, 392 F. 2d 801 (D. C. Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 392 U. S.

906 (1968), since in both cases the Board found employers violated

Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by, in addition to many other unfair

labor practices, changing in-plant food services in order to dis-

courage employees from exercising protected Section 7 rights, See

Ford Br. p. 36, n. 51. Moreover, in the latter case, the Court of

Appeals did not expressly consider the food service improvements

in enforeing the Board’s order. Likewise not relevant here is

another case relied on by the Board, O’Land, Inc., 206 NLRB 210

(1973), finding the employer had unlawfully refused to bargain

when instituting a policy of providing free meals to employees not

participating in an on-going unfair labor practice strike. The

Board concluded: ‘‘In th[is] context ... the giving of free meals

had the appearance to the strikers of still another bad faith

unilateral action, designed in this case to reward employees for

not striking.’’ 206 NLRB at 216.

14. The Board’s citation of the following arbitration decisions,

each of which involve the interpretation of a collective bargaining

agreement, is thus misleading: Universal Form Clamp Co., 68 LA

1223 (Miller, 1977) (contract provision interpreted to require

employer to provide free coffee, as in the past, even though con-

(Footnote continued on next page.)

12

(. Whatever may be the proper rule when em-

plovees have no alternative food sources available

(Board Br. pp. 21-22, n. 18; UAW Br. p. 3, n. 3; AFL-

CIO Br. pp. 24-25, n. 10), record evidence shows

that Ford’s employees were not in that position.

See Ford's principal brief at pp. 31-32. Further, assum-

ing arguendo, that spoilage of food left in employee

lockers at the Ford plant was a problem, techniques

and food products are available that permit employees

to ensure that they have fresh food at work. See, for

example, ‘*Packed Lunches for Everyone,” Woman's

Day, September 27, 1978, pp. 38-40, CBS Publica-

tions (New York, 1978), reproduced in part in the

Appendix to this Brief, which describes some of

these products and techniques. In the same vein, the

venerable All New Fannie Farmer Boston Cooking

School Cookbook, Bantam paperback at 564 (10th Ed.,

New York, 1965), states: ‘‘ For lunchboxes and pienies.

Frozen sandwiches thaw completely in about 4 hours

and taste fresher (even though made days or weeks

before) than sandwiches made the same day which

have not been refrigerated.’

(Footnote continued from preceding page.) a4 me P apres

act stated only that employer would furnish coffee, no at it

eee # be free) ; Seeker Los Angeles Zoo Ass'n, 60 LA 8358

(Christopher, 1973) (employer held to have violated contract by

discontinuing free meals even though contract did not expressly

require free meals) ; Alpena General Hospital, 50 LA 48 (Jones,

1967) (employer found to have violated contract by discontinuing

past practice of allowing certain employees a free meal even

though contract contained no express provision to that effect) ;

Lutheran Medical Center, 44 LA 107 (Wolf, 1964) (to the same

effect as preceding case) ; Hilton Hotels Corp., 42 LA 1267 (Han-

lon, 1964) (interpreting contract provision requiring that meals

which employer had, prior to the execution of the bargaining agree-

ment, provided free to its employees be ‘‘ wholesome, hot, palatable

and balanced’’).

15. Although the UAW argues (UAW Br. p. 3, n. 3) that

Ford did not raise its evidentiary claim with respect to food

(Footnote continued on next page.)

13

Ill. THE ORDER THAT FORD BARGAIN ABOUT

‘“‘FOOD SERVICES’’ WAS IMPROPER

The Board incorrectly asserts (Board Br. p. 16,

n. 6, p. 29, n. 33) that Ford has conceded that it must

bargain about many aspects of food services. Ford has

made no such concession. What it has conceded is that

it regarded sanitary conditions—which could affect all

employees, not only those who use the cafeterias and

vending machines—as a mandatory subject of bargain-

ing. See A. 63. That Ford voluntarily bargained in the

past about certain aspects of in-plant food services as

permissive bargaining subjects does not require that

Ford continue to do so. See Ford Br, p. 31.

In its principal brief (pp. 35-36), Ford argued that

the Board’s order, as enforced by the Court of Appeals,

failed to define with sufficient particularity the ‘‘food

services’? about which Ford was directed to bargain.

For the Board to respond, as it does (Board Br. p. 29,

n. 33), that the meaning of its order may be fleshed out

in subsequent dealings between the parties, is not a

sufficient answer—especially in view of the fact that

Ford is subject to being held in contempt for dis-

obedience. Furthermore, the Board’s assertion that the

‘elements of the term ‘food services’ have already

largely been detined by prior bargaining’’ (Board Br.

p. 20, n. 33) is insupportable, for, if Ford and the

Union agreed about the meaning of the Union’s re-

(Footnote continued from preceding page.)

spoilage in the proceedings below, Ford in fact objected before the

Administrative Law Judge to the admission of hearsay evidence

pertaining to the matter (see Ford’s Br. pp. 32-33, n. 50) and

in its brief to the court below (p. 25) likewise contended that the

Board's treatment of the matter was not ‘‘supported by the facts.’’

14

quest, this dispute about ‘‘food services’’ would not

have arisen.”

IV. CONCLUSION.

For the reasons set forth herein and in Ford’s main

brief, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be

reversed and enforcement denied the Board’s order.

Respectfully submitted,

THEOPHIL C, KAMMHOLZ

WiiuiaM W. McKIrrrick

MICHAEL G, CLEVELAND

115 South LaSalle Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

STANLEY R. STRAUSS

1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20006

JAMES R. J ACKSON

WrtuiaAM J. ROONEY

Ford Motor Company

The American Road

Dearborn, Michigan 48121

Counsel for Ford Motor Company

Of Counsel:

Vepper, Prick, KAUFMAN & KAMMHOLZz

115 South LaSalle Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

16. The contention (Board Br. p. 29, n. 33) that Ford may not

now challenge the scope of the Board’s order because it did not

do so below is without merit. First, Ford could not have made

this claim before the Board because it prevailed before the Ad-

ministrative Law Judge. Second, Sections 10(e) and (f) of the

Act foreclose from consideration only those objections which have

‘‘not been urged before the Board, its member, agent or agency.’’

Third, by arguing in the Court of Appeals that it had already

fulfilled whatever bargaining duty might be thought to exist,

Ford placed squarely in issue the scope of an appropriate order

relating to food services.

Al

APPENDIX

Woman’s Day, September 27, 1978,

pp. 130-140

The Colleetor’s Cookbook

Woman’s Day Kitchen No. 265

Packed Lunches

for Everyone

Packing lunch can be a real inflation fighter and lots

of fun too. No one ever needs to be bored with a packed

lunch; a little imagination, a little planning and you'll

have the winning combination every time. The cook-

book’s menus and recipes cover light lunches, hearty

lunches and low-calorie lunches—a good assortment of

each, with tips on preparing and packing. Some of the

light lunches are good for children to take to school.

Some hearty lunches are good for hard work or harder

play. Our suggestions will help you make the best

possible use of your food, time and money.

* * * * *

PACKING TIPS

Save plastic containers (from margarine, cottage

cheese or yogurt) and small jars for salads and other

moist foods. Clean spice jars or leakproof pill con-

tainers are good for salad dressings, catsup or mustard.

* To avoid morning rush, pack lunch boxes the night

before and refrigerate, omitting hot or frozen food

(add the next morning).

*

A2

ae

“

For economy, buy large bags cf potato chips, corn

chips and pretzels. Rebag in small plastic bags.

* Purchase beverages at work or at school. Or pack

small frozen cans of fruit or vegetable juice with

lunch. They’ll keep other foods cold, thaw and still be

eold by lunchtime.

* * * * *

* Small wide-mouth thermos jars are worthwhile

investments for using up main-dish leftovers (chili,

soups, stews, casseroles ete.).

NO REFRIGERATION NEEDED

Dehydrated soups (individual servings of instant

soups, and soup and noodles in a cup)

* Jerky or pepperoni sticks

Canned potted meats

Canned Vienna sausage

Canned meat spreads (deviled ham, corned beet,

chicken, liverwurst and roast beef)

*”

(Canned luncheon meat

*

Canned tuna, salmon, shrimps and sardines

*%

Some pasteurized process cheese spreads (un-

opened )

“

Peanut butter, jelly and jam

%

Potato chips or sticks, chow mein noodles

Crackers

~

*

Canned fruits

IFresh or dried fruits

Canned puddings

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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