Petitioners Reply Brief — Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stamping Plant) v. NLRB
Supreme Court brief1979
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
ZOR ARGUMENT
Sapreme Court, U. &
IN THE FER 23
Supreme Court of the Gite| States mcm
:D
\9T9
OcTOBER TERM, 1978 ———_—
No. 77-1806
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
(CHICAGO STAMPING PLANT),
Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
and
LOCAL 588, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AERO-
SPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER,
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
THEOPHIL C. KAMMHOLZ
WituiaM W. McKirrrick
MICHAEL G. CLEVELAND
115 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, [linois 60603
STANLEY R. Strravss
1750 Pennsvlvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
JAMES R. J ACKSON
WiLuiAM J. Rooney
Ford Motor Company
The American Road
Dearborn, Michigan 48121
Counsel for Ford Motor Company
Of Counsel :
VeppeEr, Prick, KAUFMAN & KAMMHOLZz
115 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Gunthorp-Werren Printing Company, Chicago e Financial 66565
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Ee ee ee ee a ccuves en ii
Ave.
I. Respondents fee Neither Shown That In-
Plant Food Prices Should Be a Mandatory
Subject of Bargaining Nor Refuted Ford’s
Ce CII kd va ccc cascsnnceeess 1
II. Respondents and the AFL-CIO Have Intro-
duced a Number of Matters Irrelevant to
Resolution of the Food Price Issue Pre-
SE Gb ee CD ik idvcccaccvevenseveces 8
LII. The Order That Ford Bargain About ** Food
Services’? Was Improper ................ 13
BG MEE wo cddcckds séteCesncenscecinses 14
FP OPPT ESET eer TLeTTreT yee ST TTT TTT Te Al
il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. 157 (1971) ...... 5, 8, 10
Alpena General Hospital, 50 LA 48 (Jones, 1967) 12
American Art Clay Co. v. N. L. R. B., 328 F. 2d
Se ee EE acc ctcedentnvennneanwanewe 7
American Smelting and Retining Co. v. N. L. R. B.,
406 F. 2d 552 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395
ee 2 Leer re ree ecia «CUO
Bastian-Blessing Div. of Goloconda Corp. v.
N. L. R. B., 474 F. 2d 49 (6th Cir. 1973) ...... 9
Braleo Metals, Inc., 214 NLRB 143 (1974) ...... 10
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. N. L. R. B.,
GIS FH. BE Ete CS Ole. TRGS). .cccccvcccuccses 10
Cosmo Graphies, Ine., 217 NLRB 1061 (1975) .. 10
D & C Textile Corp., 189 NLRB 716 (1971) .... 10
Dobbs Houses, Ine. v. N. L. R. B., 325 F. 2d 531
OF Se pry penne ein per 7
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N. L. R. B.,
gg & Sf, rere res ere e se 2,3
Fleming Mfg. Co., 119 NLRB 452 (1957) ...... 11
Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB No. 135 (1977) .. 10
Greater Los Angeles Zoo Ass’n, 60 LA 838
CG MINED <dbbedcdccvdscvedscdipucsas 12
Hasty Print, Inc., d/b/a Walker Color Graphics,
ee © fF Fe) errr 10
Hilton Hotels Corp., 42 LA 1267 (Hanlon, 1964) 12
Laidlaw Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 414 F. 2d 99 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U. S. 920 (1970) .. 6
Lutheran Medical Center, 44 LA 110 (Wolf, 1964) 12
iii
Missourian Publishing Co., 216 NLRB 175 (1975) 10
N. L. R. B. v. Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 206 F. 2d 33
Coe Mee CE, Od oc oeaceendneends éyes cess 4
N. L. R. B. v. Brown, 380 U. 8S. 278 (1965) ...... 7
N. L. R. B. v. Central Illinois Publie Service Co.,
324 F. 2d 916 (7th Cir. 1963) ...........000.: 9
N. L. R. B. v. Citizens Hotel Co., 326 F. 2d 501
ee Ge pice Gun ccscchanes oedendees 11
N. L. R. B. v. Inland Steel Co., 170 F. 2d 247 (7th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied in relevant part, 336
ig Sr a caVbdsecnctedexcass<hencus i)
N. L. R. B. v. Ladish Co., 538 F. 2d 1267 (7th Cir.
BED ox ciessddaksessdetiendeeeraeenesates 5
N. L. R. B. v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205 F.
Se ae CE Ge ED wed awieedc descevesenee 4
N. L. R. B. v. Loeal 964, Brotherhood of Car-
penters, 447 F. 2d 643 (2d Cir. 1971) ........ 2,6
N. L. R. B. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
Be EE cucu bucnenaceucnbvertees 3
N. L. R. B. v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F. 2d
ee Cs EE Wie Ou ov cases cdvevcaeseces 11
N. L. R. B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370
ee 0 ER prreerrr rr srr ror Te rrr 4
N. L. R. B. v. Wonder State Manufacturing Co.,
344 F. 2d 210 (8th Cir. 1965) .............06. 11
N. L. R. B. v. Wooster Division of Borg Warner
Corp., 356 U. S. 342 (1958) ......... ce eeeeees 6
Oil, Chemical & Atomie Workers v. N. L. R. B.,
547 F. 2d 575 (D. C. Cir. 1977) ......... eee i)
O’Land, Ine., 206 NLRB 210 (1973) ............ 11
Preston Products Corp., 158 NLRB 322 (1966),
enforced, 392 F. 2d 801 (D. C. Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 392 U. S. 906 (1968) ............45-. 11
iv
Seattle First National Bank v. N. L. R. B., 444
F, 2d 30 (9th Cir. 1971) ...........00. ec eee 5,8
United Slate Workers, Local 36, 172 NLRB 2248
SEE. cel Ceeeda cand cided es ekbaaneaRereenan 2
Universal Form Clamp Co., 68 LA 1223 (Miller,
NS oe te ek eis eee eee eee 11
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 NLRB 672 (1949) 9
Statutes
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61
Stat. 136, 29 U.S. C. § 151 et seq. .......... passim
Misce!laneous
All New Fannie Farmer Boston Cooking School
Cookbook, 10th ed. Bantam paperback (New
ME DE 58 Cub chs koneueRieeeeeenciandhe 12
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 77-1806
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
(CHICAGO STAMPING PLANT),
Petitioner,
Us.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
and
LOCAL 588, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AERO-
SPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER,
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
I. RESPONDENTS HAVE NEITHER SHOWN THAT
IN-PLANT FOOD PRICES SHOULD BE A MANDA.
TORY SUBJECT OF BARGAINING NOR REFUTED
FORD’S CONTRARY ARGUMENTS.
Neither the Board nor the UAW has furnished the
Court with a convincing rationale for holding in-plant
food prices to be a mandatory subject of bargaining;
9
-
nor, indeed, has the AFL-CIO, the wmicus curiae sup-
porting their position.
A. Basie to the position of the Board and the VAW
is the tautological argument that bargaining over in-
plant food prices should be declared mandatory be-
eause a principal purpose of the Act—the peaceful
settlement of industrial disputes through the collective
bargaining process'—would thereby be furthered
(Board Br. pp. 13, 28; UAW Br. pp. 8-9). The argu-
ment, also made by the AFL-CLO (AFL-CIO Br. pp.
16-19), begs the question, however, for its acceptance
would require that there be collective bargaining over
any matter that either the employer or the union might
select, thereby obliterating the long-established distine-
tion between mandatory and permissive bargaining
subjects (See Ford Br. pp. 23-26, 31).
B. The Board, the UAW, and the AFL-CIO also
argue (Board Br. pp. 11, 15-17, 30-31; UAW Br. pp.
1. Both the Board and the AFL-CIO argue that because Ford’s
employees engaged in a cafeteria-vending machine boycott to pro-
test increases in food prices, bargaining should be required with
respect to such increases in the interest of industrial peace (Board
Br. p. 29, AFL-CLO Br. p. 25, n. 10). The argument is unper-
suasive for a finding in agreement with the Board’s position might
well encourage, rather than prevent, disruptive activity. See infra,
pp. 6-7. The industrial strife that the Act seeks to avoid is strike
action (withholding by employees of labor) that disrupts the econ-
omy, not the withholding of patronage that is part of the economic
system. Furthermore, in numerous instances in the past where
employees had undertaken economic action to enforce bargaining
demands, the Board and the Courts have rejected claims that the
various matters involved were mandatory subjects of bargaining.
Sec, e.g., N. L. R. B. vy. Local 964, Brotherhood of Carpenters, 447
F. 2d 643 (2d Cir. 1971); United Slate Workers, Local 36, 172
NLRB 2248 (1968).
2. For over 30 years the Board and the Courts have developed
and employed this distinction. Only if this distinction is made can
effect be given Justice Stewart's statement in Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp, v. N. L. R. B., 379 U.S. 203, 220 (1964) that: ‘*The
Nationa! Labor Relations Act does not say that the employer and
employees are bound to confer upon any subject which interests
either of them.”’
_ 3
7,13; AFL-CIO Br. p. 6, n. 2) that in-plant food prices
fall within the ‘‘ordinary meaning’’ of the Section
8(d) phrase ‘‘terms and conditions of employment”’
heeause, as Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out in Fibre-
board Paper Products Corp. v. N.L. R. B., 379 U.S.
203, 222 (1964), that phrase is commonly understood
to encompass ‘*the various physical dimensions of [an
employee’s] working environment.’” It is strikingly
clear, however, that a construction which equates food
prices with the term ‘‘working environment’’ over-
burdens any connotation fairly derived from the latter
concept. Indeed, Mr. Justice Stewart appears to have
heen thinking in different terms when he wrote the
passage upon which the Board and the UAW now rely.
He said (379 U.S. at 222):
In common parlance, the conditions of a person’s
employment are most obviously the various physi-
cal dimensions of his working environment. What
one’s hours are to be, what amount of work is
expected during these hours, what periods of
relief are available, what safety practices are ob-
served, would all seem conditions of one’s em
ployment.
Thus stated, the ‘*various physical dimensions of [an
emplovee’s] working environment’ is a narrow con-
eept that signifies the ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘when”’’ of work
performed by employees (‘‘work amounts”’; ‘‘work
hours’’; ‘‘periods of relief’’) as well as the immediate
circumstances under which the work is performed
(‘‘safety practices’’). Beyond such matters, we submit,
the concept may not logically be extended. In short, the
3. The argument made by counsel for the Board that in-plant
food prices are *‘wages’’ within the meaning of Section &8(d)
(Board Br. p. 23, n. 22), was not addressed by the Board or the
Court of Appeals and, as a post-hoc rationalization of counsel,
should not be accepted by the Court as a basis for the Board’s
decision. See N. L. R. B. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 380
U.S. 438, 443-444 (1965).
4
prices at which employees buy food, whether in-plant
or on the outside, are too far removed from the em-
ployees’ work stations, both physically and concep-
tually, to be considered a part of their work environ-
ment."
Furthermore, even if the ‘‘work environment”’
eoneept could be stretched to include the matter of
in-plant food prices, the argument that the Board, the
4. In the context of its ‘‘ working environment’’ argument, the
Board likens **food availability’’ (and thus food prices) to the
following matters which the Board states, citing cases, are all
‘*subject to mandatory bargaining’’: plant air temperature and
quality, restroom privileges and conditions, and employee rental of
company-owned housing (Bd. Br. p. 16 and n. 7, pp. 16-17).
Ford agrees that both the temperature and quality of plant
air and employees’ restroom privileges and conditions are matters
that may be encompassed by Mr. Justice Stewart’s ‘‘ working en-
vironment’’ concept. Significantly, however, none of the cases
cited by the Board to support its position with respect to such
matters turned on, or even mentioned, the latter concept. Even
more troubling is the Board’s misleading citation of NV. L. R. B. v.
Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U. 8S. 9 (1962), to support the
proposition that the matter of plant air temperature is a manda-
tory subject of bargaining. For, as the AFL-C1O correctly noted
(AFL-CIO Br. n. 2, pp. 6-7), the issue in Washington Aluminum
was whether a walkout protesting an uncomfortably cold plant
temperature was a protected concerted activity within the mean-
ing of Section 7 of the Act; and the case in no way concerned
the matter of mandatory bargaining.
Furthermore, neither of the cases cited by the Board with respect
to the rental of company-owned housing equated that subject with
the ‘‘working environment’’ concept. Rather, both American
Smelting and Refining Co. v. NX. L. R. B., 406 F. 2d 552 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969), and N. L. R. B. v. Lehigh
Portland Cement Co., 205 F. 2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953), sustained
the Board's view that bargaining was required over company-
supplied housing because of the particular circumstances that
were present—i.e., rents below the prevailing rate charged over
a long period of time and the unavailability of alternative housing
(Lehigh Portland); relatively isolated, company-owned housing
in a company town not serviced by public transportation to other
locations (American Smelting). In addition, compare N. L. R. B. v.
Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 206 F. 2d 33 (Sth Cir. 1953), a case not cited
in the Board brief, where the occupancy of company-owned housing
was held not to be subject to compulsory bargaining.
5
UAW, and the AFL-CIO build upon the concept does
not meet Ford’s basic position in this case. Ford sub-
mits that for a matter to be a mandatory subject of
bargaining it must ‘‘vitally affeet’’—as in-plant food
prices clearly do not—employees’ working conditions.
See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittshurgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179 (1971), and Ford
Br. pp. 23-29.°
C. In its brief, Ford asserted that bargaining over
in-plant food prices is not general labor-management
practice (Ford Br. p. 29). Significantly, the Board,
the UAW, and the AFL-CIO have not cited to the
Court a single collective bargaining agreement which
contains a provision setting in-plant food prices or
establishing a procedure for bargaining about such
prices. Moreover, the Board’s statement that bargain-
ing about in-plant food prices is a ‘‘wide-spread’’ in-
dustrial practice (Board Br. 23) not only is totally
unsupported but is at odds with the Board’s statement
that ‘‘[s]uch [in-plant food price] clauses apparently
exist’’ (Board Br. p. 24, n. 23). Further, neither the
UAW nor the AFL-CIO, each of which has access to
5. Respondents seek to limit the ‘‘vitally affeet’’ concept
set forth in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers to situations
in which ‘‘the matter in issue directly involves individuals
outside the employer-employee relationship’? (Board Br. p. 31,
UAW Br. pp. 10-13; AFL-CIO Br. pp. 8-9). This argument wholly
ignores the fact that in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers it
was the Board which first perceived that the effect of retired
employees’ pension benefits on current employees was direct and
substantial enough to ‘‘vitally affect’’ the latter group. See, 177
NLRB at 915-916. It is that conclusion with which the Court
disagreed, deeming the effects found by the Board ‘‘speculative and
insubstantial’’ at best, but in no way indicating that the ‘*‘ vitally
affect’’ standard should be narrowly confined, as the Board now
urges. 404 U. S. at 180. Indeed, the Courts of Appeals, including
the Court below, have not limited the ‘‘ vitally affect’’ standard to
situations in which persons outside the employment relationship
are involved. See, e.g., N. L. R. B. v. Ladish Co., 538 F. 2d 1267,
1272 (7th Cir. 1976); Seattle First National Bank v. N.L. R.B.,
444 F. 2d 30, 33 (9th Cir. 1971).
6
numerous collective bargaining contracts in a wide
diversity of industries, points to even a single such
agreement setting, or referring to, in-plant food prices.”
D. Although the Board, the UAW, and the AFL-
CIO argue generally that in-plant food prices should
be declared to be a mandatory bargaining subject,
only the UAW acknowledges the likely consequences
of such a declaration. Thus, the UAW has stated:
‘‘Assume arguendo that the parties are petty, and
fall into economic warfare over the smallest mat-
ters. The Act contemplates economic combat. . . .”’
(UAW Br. p. 20). In fact, should bargaining over
in-plant food prices be declared mandatory, the de-
cision would remove employee inhibitions against
striking to enforce bargaining demands made with
respect to such prices. Thus, ‘‘it is lawful to insist [as
a condition to any agreement] upon matters within the
scope of mandatory bargaining and unlawful to insist
upon matters without,’ V. L. R. B. v. Wooster Division
of Borg Warner Corp., 356 U. 8, 342, 349 (1958) ; and
employees who strike to enforce a demand over a man-
datory subject of bargaining have preferential recall
rights. Laidlaw Corp. v. N.L. R. B., 414 F.2d 99 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970). Con-
versely, a strike to enforee a demand on a non-manda-
tory subject is an unfair labor practice, N. L. R. B. v.
Local 964, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, supra,
and employees who participate in such a strike are
6. Indeed, although the UAW surveyed some 101 Local UAW-
Ford agreements, it points to only 41 that even deal with ‘‘nourish-
ment, normally food services’ (UAW Br. p. 18, n. 19). Sig-
nificantly, the UAW makes no assertion that any such Local agree-
ment deals with food pricing.
Ford has conducted its own examination of all its collective bar-
gaining agreements with the UAW, and now reports to the Ceurt
that none contains a provision setting or referring to in-plant
food prices.
7
not protected under the Act. Dobbs Houses, Ine. v.
N.L. R. B., 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963); American
Art Clay Co. v. N.L.R. B., 328 F.2d 88 (7th Cir.
1964).
E. The argument of the AFL-CIO (AFL-CIO Br.
p. 3) that the acceptance of Ford’s position would leave
in-plant food prices in the ‘‘exelusive control of man-
agement’’ is unpersuasive. In fact, employees have the
same means available to them as do consumers for
influencing prices, such as boycotting and item substi-
tution. Indeed, that the employees in this case engaged
in a boyeott to protest food price increases serves to
underscore the fact that the employees themselves per-
ceived that the increases affected them as consumers of
one source of food, rather than as employees whose
conditions of employment changed.
F. Finally, contrary to the Board’s contention
(Board Br. pp. 12, 22-23), we submit that special
deference should not be accorded to the Board’s view
with respect to in-plant food prices. For, as the Court
observed in N. L. R. B. v. Brown, 380 U. 8S. 278, 291-
292 (1965) :
... Courts should be ‘‘slow to overturn an admin-
istrative decision, "Labor Board vy. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112, but they are not left
“to ‘sheer acceptance’ of the Board’s conclu-
sions,’’ Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board,
324 U.S. 793, 803... [R]Jeview is always properly
within the judicial province, and courts would ab-
dicate their responsibility if they did not fully
review such administrative decisions. Of course
due deference is to be rendered to agency deterzai-
nations of fact, so long as there is substantial evi-
dence to be found in the record as a whole. But
where, as here, the review is not of a question of
fact, but of a judgment as to the proper balance
to be struck between conflicting interests, ‘‘ [t]he
8
deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be
allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results
in the unauthorized assumption by an ageney
of major poliey decisions properly made by
Congress.”’
To accord deference to the Board’s determination
would he particularly inappropriate here, we submit,
‘because the Board’s decisions on the matter now be-
“fore the Court have been premised on shifting ra-
tionales and have been marked by strong dissents (see
Ford’s principal brief, nu. 9 at pp. 15-16), and have
each, except for the one in this case, been overturned
_by a reviewing court (see Ford Br. pp. 15-21).
II. RESPONDENTS AND THE AFL-CIO HAVE IN.
TRCDUCED A NUMBER OF MATTERS IRRELE-
VANT TO RESOLUTION OF THE FOOD PRICE
ISSUE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE.
A. The Board’s assertion (Board Br. pp. 25-26)
that bargaining should be required about food prices
beeause the emplover benefits from the existence of
in-plant feeding facilities is unpersuasive. Were this
argument to be accepted, bargaining would be required
over many nonmandatory subjects. Thus, bargaining
could arguably be required over pension benefits for
retired emplovees, Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers,
supra, because, inter alia, it might be said that paying
such benefits enhances employee morale and the em-
ployer’s ability to recruit new employees.’ Further-
7. The same argument could be made with respect to the matter
decided in Neattle First National Bank vy. N. L. R. B., 444 F. 2d
30 (1971), where the Ninth Cireuit held that a bank was not
required to bargain over the discontinuance of its policy of pro-
viding free to its employees investment services for which it
charged its customers. The court said:
(Footnote continued on next page.)
9
more, Ford does not operate the in-plant food service
to make a profit; and nothing in the record suggests
that Ford has ever either used in-plant feeding to
induce employment or asserted that it should be con-
sidered a benefit of employment.*
B. In an effort to demonstrate that bargaining
ought to be required, the Board has cited a number of
decisions dealing with in-plant feeding issues which
have no bearing on whether the matter of in-plant
food prices ought to be a bargainable subject (Board
Br. pp. 17-18).° Thus, clearly not relevant to this case is
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
We find it difficult to understand how the use of the bank’s
investment service department by the employees at half-price
or free of charge can be within the phrase ‘‘terms and condi-
tions of employment.’’ The purchase and sale of securities by
employees has little or nothing to do with their employment.
The source of funds may or may not originate from employ-
ment. In the words of Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,
supra, the pricing of such services is one of the management
decisions ‘‘which impinge only indirectly upon employment
security and should be excluded’’ from Section 8(d) matters.
(444 F. 2d at 33.)
8. Thus, both NV. L. R. B. vy. Central Illinois Public Service Co.,
324 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1963) (eited by the AFL-CIO at p. 28 of
its brief) and N. L. R. B. v. Inland Steel Co., 170 F. 2d 247 (7th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied in relevant- part, 336 U.S. 960 (1949)
(cited at p. 16 of the Board’s brief, at p. 16 of the UAW’s brief.
and at pp. 6 and 23 of the AFL-CIO brief) where plans or pro-
grams of benefits were represented by the employers to their em-
ployees as such, are here irrelevant. Likewise inapposite is Weyer-
haeuser Timber Co., 87 NLRB 672 (1949), cited in the Board’s
brief at pp. 22-23, where meals were sold to employees in a remote
lumber camp at below the employer’s cost.
9. The Board’s circular statement that ‘‘when a matter is
subject to mandatory bargaining, all of its facets are subject to
negotiation’’ (Board Br. p. 19, n. 15) ignores the fundamental
issue of the impact that the particular matter involved has on
employees. Moreover, the authorities cited, Bastian-Blessing, Div.
of Golconda Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 474 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1973) and
Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers y. N.L.R.B., 547 F.2d 575
(D.C. Cir. 1977), which deal with changes in health insurance
carriers, in no way support the Board’s proposition. In Golconda
(Footnote continued on next page.)
10
whether employees will be permitted to eat at some
time during the work shift and the duration of lunch
periods or breaks (matters plainly encompassed within
Section 8(d)’s mandate of bargaining concerning
hours of employment) ;"’ whether meal periods will be
paid or unpaid time (which clearly involves employee
wages) :'' or whether unit employees will be required
to clean existing lunch areas (a matter plainly in-
volving emplovees’ joh duties) .”*
Also distinguishable from, and not relevant to, the
question presented in this case are matters which
bear directly upon management’s right to discipline—
to use an example chosen by the UAW, whether an
employee may be disciplined for producing too much
scrap (UAW Br. p. 19, n. 21)—and those cases cited by
the Board which deal with whether a Christmas or
other bonus is so frequently and customarily paid
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
the change of health insurance coverage from an established insur-
ance company to a self-insured program resulted in substantial
changes in coverage. 475 F.2d at 51-52. In OCAW, the Fifth
Cireuit observed that the change in insurance carriers ‘effected
many changes in coverage’’ 549 F. 2d at 582. Compare Connecticut
Light & Power Co. v. N. LR. B., 476 F.2d 1079, 1083 (2d Cir.
1973), a case not cited by the Board, holding that the employer
was not obligated to bargain about a change in insurance carrier
for medieal insurance coverage for its employees because, under
the test set forth in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971), the change did not
have a significant effect on employees.
10. Cosmo Graphics, Ine., 217 NLRB 1061 (1975) 5 Bralco
Metals, Inc., 214 NLRB 143 (1974) ; Missourvan Publishing Co.,
216 NLRB 175 (1975); D & C Textile Corp., 189 NLRB 769
(1971).
_ Hasty Print, Inc., d b/a Walker Color Graphics, Inc., 227
NLRB 455 (1976) ; Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB No. 135
(1977) ; Bralco Metals, Inc., 214 NURB 143 (1974).
12. Cosmo Graphics, Inc., 217 NLRB 1061.
11
that it is properly viewed as ‘‘wages”’ or a ‘condition
of employment.’
Likewise having no relevance here is the fact that
an arbitrator might hold that a collective hargaining
agreement voluntarily entered into prohibits discon-
tinuance of a practice of providing certain foods free
of charge to emplovees (Board Br. p. 24).
13. See NV. L.R.B. v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713,
714 (2d Cir. 1952) (‘‘ Where, as here, the so called gifts have been
made over a substantial period of time and in amount have been
based on the respective wages earned by the recipients, the Board
was free to treat them as bonuses not economically different from
other special kinds of remuneration ...’’); N. L. R. B. v. Citizens
Hotel Co., 326 F. 2d 501, 503 (5th Cir. 1964) (Board’s view
supportable ‘‘considering the regularity of the gift, the existence
of a formal policy as to the eligibility of recipients and ascertain-
ment of the dollar amounts, preemployment reference to the bonus
as an inducement to prospective employees . . .*’), Not cited by
the Board is NV. L. R. B. v. Wonder State Manufacturing Co., 344
F, 2d 210 (8th Cir. 1965), which holds irregularly paid Christmas
bonuses are not a mandatory subject.
Also distinguishable are Fleming Mfg. Co., 119 NLRB 452
(1957), and Preston Products Corp., 158 NLRB 322 (1966),
enforced, 392 F. 2d 801 (D. C. Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 392 U. S.
906 (1968), since in both cases the Board found employers violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by, in addition to many other unfair
labor practices, changing in-plant food services in order to dis-
courage employees from exercising protected Section 7 rights, See
Ford Br. p. 36, n. 51. Moreover, in the latter case, the Court of
Appeals did not expressly consider the food service improvements
in enforeing the Board’s order. Likewise not relevant here is
another case relied on by the Board, O’Land, Inc., 206 NLRB 210
(1973), finding the employer had unlawfully refused to bargain
when instituting a policy of providing free meals to employees not
participating in an on-going unfair labor practice strike. The
Board concluded: ‘‘In th[is] context ... the giving of free meals
had the appearance to the strikers of still another bad faith
unilateral action, designed in this case to reward employees for
not striking.’’ 206 NLRB at 216.
14. The Board’s citation of the following arbitration decisions,
each of which involve the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement, is thus misleading: Universal Form Clamp Co., 68 LA
1223 (Miller, 1977) (contract provision interpreted to require
employer to provide free coffee, as in the past, even though con-
(Footnote continued on next page.)
12
(. Whatever may be the proper rule when em-
plovees have no alternative food sources available
(Board Br. pp. 21-22, n. 18; UAW Br. p. 3, n. 3; AFL-
CIO Br. pp. 24-25, n. 10), record evidence shows
that Ford’s employees were not in that position.
See Ford's principal brief at pp. 31-32. Further, assum-
ing arguendo, that spoilage of food left in employee
lockers at the Ford plant was a problem, techniques
and food products are available that permit employees
to ensure that they have fresh food at work. See, for
example, ‘*Packed Lunches for Everyone,” Woman's
Day, September 27, 1978, pp. 38-40, CBS Publica-
tions (New York, 1978), reproduced in part in the
Appendix to this Brief, which describes some of
these products and techniques. In the same vein, the
venerable All New Fannie Farmer Boston Cooking
School Cookbook, Bantam paperback at 564 (10th Ed.,
New York, 1965), states: ‘‘ For lunchboxes and pienies.
Frozen sandwiches thaw completely in about 4 hours
and taste fresher (even though made days or weeks
before) than sandwiches made the same day which
have not been refrigerated.’
(Footnote continued from preceding page.) a4 me P apres
act stated only that employer would furnish coffee, no at it
eee # be free) ; Seeker Los Angeles Zoo Ass'n, 60 LA 8358
(Christopher, 1973) (employer held to have violated contract by
discontinuing free meals even though contract did not expressly
require free meals) ; Alpena General Hospital, 50 LA 48 (Jones,
1967) (employer found to have violated contract by discontinuing
past practice of allowing certain employees a free meal even
though contract contained no express provision to that effect) ;
Lutheran Medical Center, 44 LA 107 (Wolf, 1964) (to the same
effect as preceding case) ; Hilton Hotels Corp., 42 LA 1267 (Han-
lon, 1964) (interpreting contract provision requiring that meals
which employer had, prior to the execution of the bargaining agree-
ment, provided free to its employees be ‘‘ wholesome, hot, palatable
and balanced’’).
15. Although the UAW argues (UAW Br. p. 3, n. 3) that
Ford did not raise its evidentiary claim with respect to food
(Footnote continued on next page.)
13
Ill. THE ORDER THAT FORD BARGAIN ABOUT
‘“‘FOOD SERVICES’’ WAS IMPROPER
The Board incorrectly asserts (Board Br. p. 16,
n. 6, p. 29, n. 33) that Ford has conceded that it must
bargain about many aspects of food services. Ford has
made no such concession. What it has conceded is that
it regarded sanitary conditions—which could affect all
employees, not only those who use the cafeterias and
vending machines—as a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing. See A. 63. That Ford voluntarily bargained in the
past about certain aspects of in-plant food services as
permissive bargaining subjects does not require that
Ford continue to do so. See Ford Br, p. 31.
In its principal brief (pp. 35-36), Ford argued that
the Board’s order, as enforced by the Court of Appeals,
failed to define with sufficient particularity the ‘‘food
services’? about which Ford was directed to bargain.
For the Board to respond, as it does (Board Br. p. 29,
n. 33), that the meaning of its order may be fleshed out
in subsequent dealings between the parties, is not a
sufficient answer—especially in view of the fact that
Ford is subject to being held in contempt for dis-
obedience. Furthermore, the Board’s assertion that the
‘elements of the term ‘food services’ have already
largely been detined by prior bargaining’’ (Board Br.
p. 20, n. 33) is insupportable, for, if Ford and the
Union agreed about the meaning of the Union’s re-
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
spoilage in the proceedings below, Ford in fact objected before the
Administrative Law Judge to the admission of hearsay evidence
pertaining to the matter (see Ford’s Br. pp. 32-33, n. 50) and
in its brief to the court below (p. 25) likewise contended that the
Board's treatment of the matter was not ‘‘supported by the facts.’’
14
quest, this dispute about ‘‘food services’’ would not
have arisen.”
IV. CONCLUSION.
For the reasons set forth herein and in Ford’s main
brief, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
reversed and enforcement denied the Board’s order.
Respectfully submitted,
THEOPHIL C, KAMMHOLZ
WiiuiaM W. McKIrrrick
MICHAEL G, CLEVELAND
115 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
STANLEY R. STRAUSS
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
JAMES R. J ACKSON
WrtuiaAM J. ROONEY
Ford Motor Company
The American Road
Dearborn, Michigan 48121
Counsel for Ford Motor Company
Of Counsel:
Vepper, Prick, KAUFMAN & KAMMHOLZz
115 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
16. The contention (Board Br. p. 29, n. 33) that Ford may not
now challenge the scope of the Board’s order because it did not
do so below is without merit. First, Ford could not have made
this claim before the Board because it prevailed before the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge. Second, Sections 10(e) and (f) of the
Act foreclose from consideration only those objections which have
‘‘not been urged before the Board, its member, agent or agency.’’
Third, by arguing in the Court of Appeals that it had already
fulfilled whatever bargaining duty might be thought to exist,
Ford placed squarely in issue the scope of an appropriate order
relating to food services.
Al
APPENDIX
Woman’s Day, September 27, 1978,
pp. 130-140
The Colleetor’s Cookbook
Woman’s Day Kitchen No. 265
Packed Lunches
for Everyone
Packing lunch can be a real inflation fighter and lots
of fun too. No one ever needs to be bored with a packed
lunch; a little imagination, a little planning and you'll
have the winning combination every time. The cook-
book’s menus and recipes cover light lunches, hearty
lunches and low-calorie lunches—a good assortment of
each, with tips on preparing and packing. Some of the
light lunches are good for children to take to school.
Some hearty lunches are good for hard work or harder
play. Our suggestions will help you make the best
possible use of your food, time and money.
* * * * *
PACKING TIPS
Save plastic containers (from margarine, cottage
cheese or yogurt) and small jars for salads and other
moist foods. Clean spice jars or leakproof pill con-
tainers are good for salad dressings, catsup or mustard.
* To avoid morning rush, pack lunch boxes the night
before and refrigerate, omitting hot or frozen food
(add the next morning).
*
A2
ae
“
For economy, buy large bags cf potato chips, corn
chips and pretzels. Rebag in small plastic bags.
* Purchase beverages at work or at school. Or pack
small frozen cans of fruit or vegetable juice with
lunch. They’ll keep other foods cold, thaw and still be
eold by lunchtime.
* * * * *
* Small wide-mouth thermos jars are worthwhile
investments for using up main-dish leftovers (chili,
soups, stews, casseroles ete.).
NO REFRIGERATION NEEDED
Dehydrated soups (individual servings of instant
soups, and soup and noodles in a cup)
* Jerky or pepperoni sticks
Canned potted meats
Canned Vienna sausage
Canned meat spreads (deviled ham, corned beet,
chicken, liverwurst and roast beef)
*”
(Canned luncheon meat
*
Canned tuna, salmon, shrimps and sardines
*%
Some pasteurized process cheese spreads (un-
opened )
“
Peanut butter, jelly and jam
%
Potato chips or sticks, chow mein noodles
Crackers
~
*
Canned fruits
IFresh or dried fruits
Canned puddings
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.