Respondents Brief — Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stamping Plant) v. NLRB

Supreme Court brief1979

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Text

FOR ARGUMENT

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Supreme C U.S.

FILED

No. 77-1806 ‘JAN 22 1979

Iu the Supreuwe Court of the Un CLERK

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

ForD Motor COMPANY (CHICAGO STAMPING

PLANT), PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

WavDE H. McCreEg, JR.

Solicitor General

LAWRENCE G. WALLACE

Deputy Solicitor General

ANDREW J. LEVANDER

Assistant to the Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

JOHN S. IRVING

General Counsel

JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR.

Deputy General Counsel

ROBERT E. ALLEN

Acting Associate General Counsel

NORTON J. COME

Deputy Associate General Counsel

RuTH E. PETERS

Attorney

National Labor Relations Board

Washington, D.C. 20570

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Statement:

A. The Board’s findings of fact -...........

B. The Board’s decision and order ........

C. The decision of the court of appeals..

ee

Argument:

The Board properly concluded that prices of

food and the food services provided in an em-

ployer’s in-plant food facilities for its employ-

ees are mandatory subjects of bargaining un-

der the National Labor Relations Act ..........

A. The Board has correctly found that

in-plant food prices and services fall

well within the ordinary meaning of

“terms and conditions of employ-

I” - siiniiiniincenmiaeiiiaasiiaipidiseaaihs cities

B. Established industrial practices show

that in-plant food services and prices

are “terms and conditions of em-

SII . soittanrcctiinitiesidiaiinadiitnesainmaiiae

C. The legislative history and statutory

purposes of the National Labor Re-

lations Act support the Board’s con-

clusion that in-plant food prices are

subject to mandatory bargaining......

mw wo

14

14

23

26

Argument—Continued Page

D. The Board’s determination that in-

plant food prices are “terms and con-

ditions of employment” is consistent

with this Court’s prior decisions........ 80

ENE ELH aN ELLE 32

CITATIONS

Cases:

Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pitts-

burgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157.... 15, 31

Alpena General Hospital, 50 Lab. Arb.

a A -siseniaienceveapscoinsihinciiaonteiiaapleatauadaiabiccabanitie 24

American Smelting and Refining Co. v.

NLRB, 406 F.2d 552, cert. denied, 395

SI SII cine. ccoiainidiliidamadapiebedainaanineiniaeNetie 17

Bastian-Blessing, Div. of Golconda Corp.

ev UW UDG§lLc UE lO—y aaa 19

Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429

RE I sealable cl et ay 23

Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U.S.

ST iii iakiiatalisanlliti ca Dibiatacahiinia Liat aia 21

Bralco Metals, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 143..16, 17, 18

Cosmo Graphics, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 1061.. 18

D & C Textile Corp., 189 N.L.R.B. 769.... 17

Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.

= f & Bae passim

Fleming Manufacturing Co., 119 N.L.R.B.

ARI SIE as ee oe 17

Florida Steel Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 928 ...... 22

Greater Los Angeles Zoo Ass’n, 60 Lab.

SI UD iN tae a at 24

Hasty Print, Inc., d/b/a Walker Color

Graphics, 227 N.L.R.B. 455

Cases—Continued Page

Hilton Hotels Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. Rep.

I an aaa sil nla 24

Inland Steel v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, cert.

denied in relevant part, 336 U.S. 960,

aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Ameri-

can Communications Ass’n v. Douds,

i!) Re 16

International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 392

F.2d 801, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906... 16

Ladish Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 354, enforce-

ment denied sub nom. NLRB vy. Ladish

ee 2+ § see 9, 16, 17, 30

Local 24, International Brotherhood of

Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283......15, 31-32

Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat

Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676.. 17, 23,

31

Lutheran Medical Center, 44 Lab. Arb.

GENEL SITET. pususiasdneseahienctneannintnladiiinimpianteaiichdniitien 24

McCall Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. 540, enforce-

ment denied sub nom. McCall Corp. v.

pF OS 6 6§ eo eee 9, 25

Missourian Publishing Co., 216 N.L.R.B.

SUTED abaichsidessiiciuiausdeapbaaiatdubbiabibindiadceadaaaeseeaiaaians 17, 22

N.L.R.B. v. Citizens Hotel Co., 326 F.2d

NI <iaccelicessadiiticlaniaiiaadilca iclidiblabaicesdbitetd casita 21

N.L.R.B. v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d

IEEE ecascisesieauhaedbasiniashibtcinntudiiniesinineiatedelsiaariiaitien 17

N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,

Se eee 28

N.L.R.B. v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co.,

Sy IIT DE cece nsectssieeibldccediaieitiadeataniieiaseniinttiatie 17, 22

N.L.R.B. v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199

IRA Re en ee 21

IV

Cases—Continued Page

N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co.,

i! eee ee 16, 31

N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Division of Borg-

Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 _.............. 15

Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l

Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 575 -........... 19

O’Land, Inc., d/b/a Ramada Inn South,

BSS en 17, 22

Package Machinery Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 268,

enforcement denied sub nom. NLRB v.

Package Machinery Co., 457 F.2d 936.. 9

Pennco, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 677 -....00......... 17

Preston Products Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 322,

rev'd on other grounds, 373 F.2d 671... 17

Richfield Oil Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 356,

enf’d, 231 F.2d 717, cert. denied, 351

In IT theca niall databace 22

S.S. Kresge Co. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1225.. 17

United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783.... 29

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340

SINE IEE snticcianennibioniniahtindnadinbdissndateietsine 21

Universal Form Clamp Co., 68 Lab. Arb.

I hacen ceca 24

W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d

ITU Ssaineaceeiihstihiseshaienaaeipsiiah eiciatihcadiaiediadaal nail 21, 23

Westinghouse Electric Corp., 156 N.L.R.B.

1080, enf’d sub nom. Westinghouse

Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 369 F.2d 891,

rev'd en banc, 387 F.2d 542... 9, 10, 25, 28

Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B.

672

Statutes: Page

National Labor Relations Act, as amended

(61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.

151 et seq.):

Section 1, 29 U.S.C. 151 _....-..... 2

Section 1(b), 29 U.S.C. 151(b) —_...... 28

Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)

AE contii-echninnnahanetebicsiniaiiamniintiiiannteinn 9

Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)

Eee: See ae 9, 14, 22

Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. 158(d) -....... passim

Section 9(a), 29 U.S.C. 159(a) —...... 14

Miscellaneous:

BNA, 2 Collective Bargainina (Negotia-

tions and Contracts) (1978) ...............-- 16, 24

BNA, Labor Policy and Practice Series

(Personnel Management) (1978) ......... 25, 26

Comment, A Case for Air Pollution as a

Mandatory Bargaining Subject, 51 Ore.

5 | EE ner 16

93 Cong. Rec. 6444, 6529 (1947) _.......... 27

Dana, In-House Food Services Can In-

crease Morale and Productivity, 52

Personnel Journal 50-53 (1973) ........... 25

Fisher, Operating Your Firm’s Dining

Area Profitably, 27 Administrative

Management 66-67 (Oct. 1966) .......... 25

Hearings on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22 Before

the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public

Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). 27

H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st

ERR 27

H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947)... 27

VI

Miscellaneous—Continued Page Gu the Supreme Court of the United States

H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. OCTOBER TERM, 1978

LARA eT 27

How Ford Motor Dishes Up 18,000 Meals

A Day, Business Week (October 27,

le 30 No. 77-1806

: Mee, Pereonnet Handb ook (1961)... as FoRD Motor COMPANY (CHICAGO STAMPING

unching at the Office: Four Plans, Piast), selma

28 Administrative Management 32 ,

6 | 25 .

NICB, Office Personnel Practices: Non-

manufacturing, Personnel Policy Study NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ET AL.’

Ble, BOT CAGED) neccccccececcecccsescccoccsscesusesenes 26

NICB, Personnel Practices in Factory and

Office: Manufacturing, Personnel Pol-

icv Study No. 194 (1964)...................... 26 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

S = fir Collective eae Negotia- COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

tions and Agreements (1953) ............... 24

Scheer, The Company Cafeteria, 45 Per-

sonnel Journal 85-86 (1966).................. 25 BRIEF FOR

T. Toedt, L. Lovejoy, R. Story and D. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Shainin, Managing Manpower in the

Industrial Environment (1962) ........... 25

a 25 OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-

A17) is reported at 571 F.2d 993. The decision and

order of the National Labor Relations Board (Pet.

App. A18-A45) are reported at 230 N.L.R.B. 716.

? Local 588, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural

Implement Workers of America, UAW—the charging party

before the Board and an intervenor in the court of appeals—

is also a party here.

(1)

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on April 18, 1978 (Pet. App. A47-A48) following

denial of a petition for rehearing on March 23, 1978

(Pet. App. A46). The petition for a writ of certiorari

was filed on June 21, 1978, and granted on October

10, 1978 (A. 100). The jurisdiction of this Court

rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Board properly concluded that prices

of food and the food services provided in an employ-

er’s in-plant cafeterias and vending machines are

mandatory subjects of bargaining under the National

Labor Relations Act.

STATUTE INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of the National Labor Rela-

tions Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519,

29 U.S.C. 151, et seg.), are set forth in the Brief for

Petitioner, App. Al-A3.

STATEMENT

A. The Board’s Findings of Fact *

1. Petitioner, Ford Motor Company (“the Com-

pany”), operates an automotive parts stamping plant

on a one-quarter mile square site, in Chicago Heights,

2 Many of the relevant facts were stipulated to by the

parties (A. 14).

3

Illinois. The plant employs approximately 3,600

hourly-rated production employees, who work in three

shifts (Pet. App. A32; A. 14-16, 18-19, 67). The sole

bargaining representative of these employees is the

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace

and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,

UAW, and its administrative component Local 588

(Pet. App. A32; A. 25). The Company and the Inter-

national Union have been party to a series of national

collective bargaining agreements covering employees

at the Company’s various plants since approximately

1956, when the International was certified by the

Board; Local 588 and the Company have, in addition,

negotiated a series of supplementary local agree-

ments. The relevant national agreement ran from

November 1973 until September 1976, and the rele-

vant local agreement, from June 1974 until Septem-

ber 1976 (Pet. App. A35-A36; A. 17-18, 21-23).

2. The Company provides its employees with two

air-conditioned cafeterias and five air-conditioned

vending machine areas, called “coke cribs.” The main

cafeteria, which seats 400 to 500 employees, is open

for breakfast, scheduled meal periods, and during

shift changes. Hot food from steam tables is avail-

able in this cafeteria at breakfast and the scheduled

meal periods. In addition, the main cafeteria houses

coin-operated vending machines that dispense bever-

ages, hot and cold food, pastry, and candy (Pet. App.

A33; A. 20). The other cafeteria, which seats ap-

proximately 50 to 100 persons, does not have a steam

table and is open only during some of the scheduled

4

meal periods. It is equipped with two coffee machines

and twelve vending machines that dispense a variety

of foods. Each “coke crib” also contains a variety of

vending machines and is open during all meal and

rest periods. Four of these coke cribs have a seating

capacity of 40 to 50 persons and one seats 75 to 100

persons (Pet. App. A34; A. 30).

Pursuant to a 1972 agreement with the Company

(Pet. App. A382; A. 27-28, 81), ARA Services, Inc.

(“ARA”), operates the cafeterias and coke cribs.

Under this agreement, ARA furnishes food, machines,

management, and personnel (Pet. App. A32-A33).

Specifically, section 2(d) of the agreement provides

that ARA shall (Pet. App. A19-A20; A. 86):

furnish products of quality in accordance with

purchasing specifications that shall have been

submitted to and approved by [the Company],

and in accordance with a price and portion list

for said manual food service and vending ma-

chines that shall have been submitted to [the

Company] and that shall be subject to review at

the request of [the Company] or [ARA].

The agreement further authorizes the Company to

inspect all machines and equipment to determine com-

pliance with established standards of quality and

cleanliness (Pet. App. A33; A. 92).

Under section 3(a) of the agreement, the Company

must reimburse ARA for all direct costs of the food

and vending operations and pay ARA a nine percent

5

surcharge on net receipts.’ Should the receipts ex-

ceed ARA’s costs plus the nine percent surcharge, the

Company is entitled to the excess (Pet. App. A20,

A33; A. 89-90). Insofar as revenues do not meet the

costs of the operation plus the surcharge (as has

happened in recent years), the Company is obligated

to subsidize ARA up to $52,000 per year (Pet. App.

A20, A383; A. 34, 82). The contract is terminable by

either party upon 60 days’ written notice (Pet. App.

A20, A33; A. 93).

All employees have a 30-minute lunch period. In

addition, employees who work directly on production

lines are afforded a 5-minute washup period before

their meals and two 22-minute rest breaks (Pet. App.

A34; A. 17). Employees are not permitted to leave

the plant building during the break periods, and it is

not feasible for them to do so during the short lunch

period (Pet. App. A20, A35; A. 40-42). Mobile food

vending trucks are not permitted on plant property

and are not usually available outside the plant gate

(Pet. App. A20, A385; A. 42-43). Some restaurants

are located within a four-mile area of the plant, but

there are more than a dozen other industrial plants in

the same area employing several thousand employees

who also have access to those restaurants (Pet. App.

A35; A. 15). Thus, a negligible number of employees

* The surcharge consists of a five percent service fee and

a four percent allowance for general administrative costs.

Net receipts are defined as gross receipts less applicable state

and local taxes (A. 89).

6

(no more than 12 out of 3,600) actually leave the

plant during the lunch period (Pet. App. A20; A. 52).

Employees are permitted to bring food into the

plant. Such food, which may be eaten only in the

cafeterias or coke cribs, must be stored in the em-

ployees’ lockers and not in working areas (Pet. App.

A20-A21, A35; A. 20-21). However, these lockers

are located in rooms that are not air-conditioned, and

there are no refrigeration facilities available to em-

ployees (Pet. App. A21, A35; A. 19, 21, 45). During

the summer months, when temperatures frequently

range between 80 to 100 degrees, the locker rooms

become hot and sticky, and employees have com-

plained about food spoilage (Pet. App. A21, A365;

A. 45-47, 49). Moreover, on occasion, the Company

has used exterminator services after employees com-

plained about unsanitary conditions in the locker

rooms (Pet. App. A21, A35; A. 55, 61).

3. Although the Company has at all times refused

to bargain about food prices in its in-plant eating

facilities, it has negotiated over food services. In-

deed, since 1967 the agreement between the Company

and Local 588 has contained specific provisions con-

cerning vending machine and cafeteria services, such

as the kinds of food to be provided, the staffing of

service lines, adequate cafeteria supervision, the

cleanliness of utensils, the restocking and repairing

of vending machines, and the provision of additional

eating facilities (Pet. App. A20, A36-A39; A. 27, 62-

63, 69-73). The 1974 local agreement included the

following (Pet. App. A38; A. 73): “The Company

7

recognizes its continuing responsibility for the satis-

factory performance of the caterer and for the ex-

peditious handling of complaints concerned with such

performance.”

On February 6, 1976, the Company informed

Local 588 that cafeteria and vending machine prices

would be increased on February 9 by an unspecified

amount (Pet. App. A21, A39; A. 31). The Com-

pany refused Local 588’s request to discuss the in-

creases before they were put into effect, and, on

February 9, the prices were increased from 5 to 10

cents per item (Pet. App. A21, A39; A. 31, 50).

On February 13, Local President Richard Marco sent

a letter to Tom Brown, the Company’s industrial re-

lations manager, requesting to bargain regarding

food prices and services (Pet. App. A21, A39; A. 74).

The letter further stated (Pet. App. A21; A. 74):

As you know [food prices and services are]

a subject of great concern. Good food at reason-

able prices is considered to be a condition of

employment by our members. If we discuss this

promptly, we may be able to reach full agree-

ment prior to opening of negotiations for a new

contract.

The Company, by letter dated February 18, denied

Local 588’s request to bargain, stating that “food

prices and services are not a proper subject for nego-

tiations” (Pet. App. A21-A22, A39; A. 77).

On March 23, 1976, Local 588 requested informa-

tion concerning the Company’s role in cafeteria and

vending machine operations in order to administer

the existing contract and to prepare for upcoming

negotiations (Pet. App. A22, A39; A. 75-76). On

April 9, the Company declined to provide the Union

with the requested information and again refused to

bargain about cafeteria and vending machine prices

and services (Pet. App. A389; A. 27). Local 588’s

several subsequent requests to bargain about food

prices and services were also rejected by the Com-

pany (ibid.).

Meanwhile, on February 16, 1976, Local 588 began

a boycott of the food service operations in which sub-

stantially more than half of the employees partici-

pated (Pet. App. A22, A40; A. 33). The cafeteria

boyeott ended on May 19, 1976, and the vending

machine boycott ended on June 7, 1976 (Pet. App.

A40; A. 33). The onset of hot weather, which re-

sulted in the spoilage of food that employees brought

from home, and the lack of success in reducing prices

led to the cancellation of the boycott (Pet. App. A40;

A. 51-52).

B. The Board’s Decision and Order

After adopting the factual findings of the admin-

istrative law judge summarized above, the Board,

disagreeing with the law judge’s legal conclusions,

held that in-plant cafeteria and vending machine food

prices and services constitute “terms and conditions

of employment” within the meaning of Section 8(d)

of the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act’), 29

U.S.C. 158(d). In particular, the Board found that,

despite the Company’s acknowledgement of its duty

to bargain over at least some aspect of food services,

9

the Company had completely refused to bargain about

both food services and food prices (Pet. App. A24).

Because matters falling within the purview of Sec-

tion 8(d) are subject to mandatory bargaining, the

Board concluded that the Company had violated Sec-

tions 8(a) (5) and 8(a) (1) of the Act by refusing to

supply requested information to, or bargain with,

Local 588 regarding food prices and services (Pet.

App. A26).

As noted by the Board (Pet. App. A22-A24), this

decision adhered to the Board’s earlier decisions hold-

ing that in-plant food prices are generally a “condi-

tion of employment” within the meaning of Section

8(d) of the Act.* Although it reaffirmed this broader

proposition, the Board also observed that “the instant

case, on its facts, is in many respects a stronger case

than [N.L.R.B. v.] Ladish [Co.],” 538 F.2d 1267

(7th Cir. 1976), which had previously been decided

by the Seventh Circuit contrary to the Board’s posi-

tion (Pet. App. A23 n.11). The Board specifically

pointed out the following factors (among others)

that were present: in this case and absent in Ladish

(ibid.): (1) the Company’s “right to review prices

* Westinghouse Electric Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1081

(1966), enf’d sub nom. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB,

369 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1966), rev’d en banc, 387 F.2d 542

(1967) ; McCall Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. 540 (1968), enforcement

denied sub nom. McCall Corp. v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 187 (4th Cir.

1970) ; Package Machinery Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 268 (1971), en-

forcement denied sub nom. NLRB v. Package Machinery Co.,

457 F.2d 936 (1st Cir. 1972); Ladish Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 354

(1975), enforcement denied sub nom. NLRB v. Ladish Co., 538

F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1976).

10

and its leverage of the subsidy agreement,” (2) the

possibility of the Company’s making a profit on the

food service operation, (3) the history of bargaining

about some features of cafeteria and vending machine

services, (4) the lack of a viable alternative to the

in-plant food facilities, and (5) substantial and seri-

ous employee concern over in-plant food services and

prices as evidenced by the widespread boycott.

The Board ordered the Company, inter alia, to bar-

gain with Local 588 upon request “with respect to

food services and any changes, now in effect or here-

after made or proposed, in food prices charged em-

ployees in the vending machines and cafeterias,” and

to supply Local 588 “with information necessary for

collective-bargaining, in relation to its part or role in

the cafeteria and vending machine operations” (Pet.

App. A27). In accordance with Westinghouse Elec-

tric Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1081 (1966), enf’d

sub nom. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 369

F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1966), rev’d en banc, 387 F.2d

542 (1967), this order did not require the Company

“to bargain about every proposed price change in

food prices before putting such change in effect,’

[but rather] * * * to bargain on such price change[s]

only after they are determined unilaterally and upon

a request of the Union” (Pet. App. A25).

C. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The court of appeals enforced the Board’s order

(Pet. App. Al-A17). Although it rejected the gen-

eral proposition that “in-plant cafeteria and vending

11

machine food prices and services are necessarily”

mandatory subjects of bargaining .Pet. App. AQ),

the court of appeals held “that under the facts and

circumstances of this case, in-plant cafeteria and

vending machine food prices and services materially

and significantly affect and have an impact upon

terms and conditions of employment, and therefore

are mandatory subjects of bargaining” (Pet. App.

A13-A14). On that basis, the court distinguished

other cases in which it and other courts of appeals

had denied enforcement of Board orders requiring

bargaining about in-plant food prices (Pet. App. Al4-

Al17).°

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The price of food and the food services that are

available to employees at in-plant eating facilities

are subjects about which the National Labor Rela-

tions Act requires employers and representatives of

their employees to bargain collectively. Sections 8(d),

8(a)(5) and 9(a) impose a duty upon an employer

to bargain about “terms and conditions of employ-

ment.” Since that phrase, which is found in Sec-

tion 8(d), encompasses “the various physical dimen-

sions of [an employee’s] working environment,”

Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.

203, 222 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), all sub-

stantial aspects of in-plant eating facilities, including

food prices, fall well within the ordinary meaning of

Section 8(d).

° See note 4, supra.

12

Petitioner’s attempt to minimize the importance to

employees of in-plant food prices is both factually

inapplicable and legally erroneous. In light of an

employee’s need for food and drink during the course

of an eight-hour work day, the Board, whose deter-

mination of the scope of Section 8(d) is entitled to

great deference, has consistently found that the avail-

ability of in-plant food at reasonable prices is an

important aspect of an employee’s working environ-

ment. That conclusion is especially warranted in the

instant case where the Company’s employees of neces-

sity eat in petitioner’s in-plant facilities. Moreover,

the Company’s employees felt sufficiently aggrieved

by the raising of food prices here that they engaged

in a large-scale boycott for several months.

Furthermore, an employer cannot avoid mandatory

bargaining over the “terms and conditions of employ-

ment” merely because the particular terms or condi-

tions may be subject to seemingly minor changes that

can otherwise be compensated for. Any change in a

company-sponsored health insurance program, for ex-

ample, is subject to mandatory bargaining on request.

An employer’s obligation to bargain about in-plant

food prices and services is similarly comprehensive,

but, as the Board’s order reflects, this does not mean

that the Company ordinarily will have to bargain

about insignificant matters. Instead, it has been or-

dered to bargain only if the Union so requests follow-

ing the Company’s making of unilateral changes in

food prices. Such subjects can also be dealt with in

a comprehensive manner in collective agreements.

13

Common industrial practice is consistent with the

Board’s conclusion that the prices of food and food

services available to employees in an in-plant eating

facility are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Many

collective bargaining agreements have explicit or im-

plicit provisions concerning food services and prices

in in-plant eating facilities. Indeed, since 1967 the

Company and Local 588 have included many detailed

provisions regarding in-plant food services in their

collective bargaining agreement. In addition, man-

agement often considers subsidized in-plant facilities,

such as those at issue here, to be a major benefit for

both employees and employers.

Both the legislative history and the policies of the

National Labor Relations Act strongly support the

Board’s determination here that Congress intended to

subject a large spectrum of matters to mandatory

bargaining by using the broad phrase “terms and

conditions of employment.” In keeping with this

Court’s decisions, the Board in applying Section 8(d)

has remained faithful to the Act’s strong policy in

favor of collective bargaining as a means of resolving

industrial disputes. Indeed, the potential for indus-

trial strife arising out of in-plant food facility dis-

putes is highlighted by the wide scale food boycott

that occurred here. Concomitantly, in-plant food ser-

vices and prices do not involve “managerial decisions,

which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.”

Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, supra,

379 U.S. at 223.

14

ARGUMENT

THE BOARD PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT PRICES

OF FOOD AND THE FOOD SERVICES PROVIDED IN

AN EMPLOYER’S IN-PLANT FOOD FACILITIES FOR

ITS EMPLOYEES ARE MANDATORY SUBJECTS OF

BARGAINING UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RE-

LATIONS ACT

A. The Board Has Correctly Found That In-Plant Food

Prices and Services Fall Well Within the Ordinary

Meaning of “Terms and Conditions of Employment”

1. As originally enacted, the National Labor Rela-

tions Act did not directly specify the subjects about

which employers and unions must bargain. Section

8(a)(5) of the Act, now codified at 29 U.S.C 158

(a) (5), simply declares it an unfair labor practice

for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively

with the representatives of his employees, subject to

the provisions of section 9(a).” 49 Stat. 453. Sec-

tion 9(a), in turn, provides that a union selected by

a majority of the bargaining unit shall be the collec-

tive bargaining representative “in respect to rates

of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-

tions of employment.” Ibid. (now codified at 29

U.S.C. ..159(a)).

Section 8(d) of the Act, which is the focal point

of this case, was added to the Act in 1947 by the Taft-

Hartley Amendments. 61 Stat. 142 (now codified at

29 U.S.C. 158(d)). This provision, using language

essentially parallel to that found in Section 9(a),

made explicit what was implicit in the original Act:

[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of

the mutual obligation of the employer and the

:_-_ -~

15

representative of the employees to meet at rea-

sonable times and confer in good faith with re-

spect to wages, hours, and other terms and con-

ditions of employment * * *.

Read together, the foregoing provisions of the Act

“establish the obligation of the employer and the rep-

resentative of its employees to bargain with each

other in good faith with respect to ‘wages, hours, and

other terms and conditions of employment * * *.’ The

duty is limited to those subjects, and within that area

neither party is legally obligated to yield. * * * As to

other matters, however, each party is free to bargain

or not to bargain * * *.” Fibreboard Paper Products

Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964), quoting

NLEB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356

U.S. 342, 349 (1958).

2. This case primarily involves the construction

and application of the phrase “terms and conditions

of employment” as used in Section 8(d). The broad

language of that provision encompasses, at a mini-

mum, all “issues that settle an aspect of the relation-

ship between the employer and employees.” Allied

Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass

Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971). Accord, NLRB v.

Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., supra, 356

U.S. at 350; Local 24, International Brotherhood of

Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 294 (1959). While

the sweep of Section 8(d) is not unlimited, certainly

“the various physical dimensions of [an employee’s]

working environment” constitute “terms and condi-

tions of employment.” Fibreboard Paper Products

16

Corp. v. NLRB, supra, 379 U.S. at 222 (Stewart, J.,

concurring).

Although it acknowledges that many aspects of in-

plant food services are covered by Section 8(d) (Pet.

App. A20, A36-A37; A. 27, 62-63, 69-73),° petitioner

nonetheless contends that in-plant food prices are not

mandatory subjects of labor-management negotia-

tions. But no employee can be expected to work a

full eight-hour day without stopping to eat. Given

the necessity of eating, food availability is no less

germane to the employees’ working environment

than plant air temperature and quality, restroom

privileges and conditions, or employee rental of

company-owned housing—all of which are subject

to mandatory bargaining.’ For that reason, manage-

6 The concession is well warranted. The Company, as is

common for many employers in many different industries, has

bargained about many aspects of its in-plant food services

since 1967 (e.g., Pet. App. A20, A36-A37). See, e.g., BNA, 2

Collective Bargaining (Negotiations and Contracts) 95:421-

424, 441-444 (1978). In addition, the courts of appeals have

uniformly found such matters to constitute “terms and condi-

tions of employment.” See, e.g., NLRB v. Ladish Co., supra,

538 F.2d at 1272; International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 392

F.2d 801, 804, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906

(1968) ; Inland Steel v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir.

1948), cert. denied in relevant part, 336 U.S. 960 (1949), aff’d

on other grounds sub nom. American Communications Ass’n

v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See also Bralco Metals, Inc.,

214 N.L.R.B. 143, 146-150 (1974); Hasty Print, Inc., d/b/a

Walker Color Graphics, 227 N.L.R.B. 455, 461 (1976).

’ See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9,

15 (1962) (air temperature) ; Comment, A Case for Air Pollu-

tion as a Mandatory Bargaining Subject, 51 Ore. L. Rev. 223

(1971) ; American Smelting and Refining Co. v. NLRB, 406

— A

17

ment must bargain about meal hours and coffee

breaks even if no in-plant facilities exist.* And where,

as here, the employer has chosen to establish in-plant

eating facilities for the employee’s use, the employer

must also bargain about all aspects of the use of those

facilities, and the services provided in them, including

improvement in lunchroom equipment and supplies,”

coffee break scheduling and service of free coffee,”

free meal policy,” cancellation of catering truck

F.2d 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969) (com-

pany housing) ; NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205

F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953) (company heasing) ; Pennco, Inc.,

212 N.L.R.B. 677, 682-683 (1974), and Preston Products Co.,

158 N.L.R.B. 322, 344-345 (1966), aff’d in relevant part, 392

F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968)

(restrooms). See also NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822

(5th Cir. 1967) (safety and health rules) ; S.S. Kresge Co. v.

NLRB, 416 F.2d 1225, 1229-1230 (6th Cir. 1969) (employee

dress and smoking) ; Bralco Metals, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 143,

146-150 (1974) (personal telephone calls).

* See, e.g., Fibreboard, supra, 379 U.S. at 222; Local Union

No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.

676, 691 (1965); NLRB v. Ladish Co., supra, 538 F.2d at

1272; Missourian Publishing Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 175, 180

(1975); D & C Textile Corp., 189 N.L.R.B. 769, 771, 783

tm Fleming Manufacturing Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 452, 455

1957).

* Preston Products Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 322 (1966), aff’d in

relevant part, 392 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392

U.S. 906 (1968).

10 Missourian Publishing Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 175, 180 (1975) ;

Fleming Manufacturing Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 452 (1957).

™ O’Land, Inc., d/b/a Ramada Inn South, 206 N.L.R.B. 210,

214-215 (1978).

18

service,” meal areas,“ cleanup of !unchroom areas by

employees * and, we submit, the prices of the food

served.

Petitioner is not in the business of selling food to

its employees, and it cannot realistically be claimed

that in-plant food prices invclve “managerial deci-

sions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial con-

trol.” Fibreboard, supra, 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart,

J., concurring). Rather, those prices, like the eco-

nomic aspects of employee use of other in-plant facili-

ties—such as fees or charges, if any, for lockers, pay

toilets, or parking accommodations—are as much a

subject of the mandatory bargaining obligation as

their physical attributes. It is, after all, especially

with respect to economic disputes between labor and

management that the Act was intended to substitute

the bargaining process for work disruptions that

might otherwise ensue (see point C, infra).

In addition, the right to negotiate about in-plant

food services could be rendered nugatory if the em-

ployees’ representatives were unable to discuss the

price of the food that is provided. For example,

negotiations over the cleanliness and variety of selec-

tions available at an in-plant cafeteria would not be

meaningful if the employer were free unilaterally to

raise cafeteria prices to prohibitively expensive levels

2 Bralco Metals, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 143, 146-150 (1974).

18 Hasty Print, Inc., d/b/a Walker Color Graphics, 227

N.L.R.B. 455, 461 (1976).

% Cosmo Graphics, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 1061 (1975).

19

without any obligation subsequently to bargain about

the price in good faith at the union’s request. In sum,

it is whether desirable in-plant food is available at

reasonable prices that constitutes a condition or term

of employment.”

3. Petitioner attempts to avoid the plain thrust of

Section 8(d) by belittling the importance of in-plant

food prices to employees. Even if petitioner’s char-

acterization of this issue is correct, however, the Com-

pany must still bargain over changes in food prices

if the employees’ bargaining representative so de-

sires.” While an employer’s decision to raise the

** Ordinarily, when a matter is subject to mandatory bar-

gaining, all of its facets are subject to negotiation. For ex-

ample, mandatory bargaining over health insurance involves

not only whether insurance will be provided, but also the ex-

tent, cost of coverage, and any other pertinent matter affect-

ing employee benefits. See, e.g., Bastian-Blessing, Div. of Gol-

conda Corp. Vv. NLRB, 474 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1973) : Oil,

Chemical & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d

575, 582 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

* Since the Board’s order allows the Company unilaterally

to effect price changes and those changes will result in labor-

management bargaining only if the union subsequently re-

quests to negotiate, truly de minimis matters presumably will

not have to be discussed. Furthermore, an employer and union

could structure their bargaining relationships regarding food

prices to avoid repeated negotiations by, for example, placing a

ceiling on price increases allowable during a particular time

period. Petitioner’s assertion that the Board’s position will

lead to “endless rounds of negotiation” (Br. 28) is thus

baseless. In any event, the Act reflects Congress’s judgment

that negotiations are preferred to industrial strife and ‘hat

the latter may arise from seemingly minor complaints about

a condition of employment as well as from a major issue such

as wages.

20

annual employee contribution to the cost of health

insurance by a few cents would only marginally affect

the employees, it is beyond cavil that such a decision

is subject to mandatory bargaining. Similarly, the

fact that the increased cost of in-plant food or health

insurance could be offset by an increase in wages or

a cost of living adjustment clause does not place

those terms or conditions of employment beyond the

purview of Section 8(d). In short, that a term or

condition of employment is subject to minor changes

that are arguably compensable by increased wages

does not somehow erase the duty to bargain.”

Furthermore, petitioner’s characterization of the

importance of in-plant food prices is inaccurate. A

small increase in food prices is substantial when

viewed over a period of time. For example, if the

price of all food items provided in an in-plant food

facility were increased by ten cents, a worker who

purchases an average of four items per day (such as

one or two beverages and two or three food items in

an eight-hour work day) would pay an additional

eight dollars for food in a month with 20 work days

and an additional $88 in a year in which he worked

220 days. These figures are comparable to an in-

crease of eight dollars per month in employee health

cost payments or the cessation of a regular $75-$100

17 Nor is there merit in petitioner’s assertion (Br. at 26)

that an increase in the prices of food available in its in-plant

facilities is no different from an increase in prices at the local

food store. Health insurance is also available outside of the

employment relationship, but an increase in the cost to em-

ployees of employer-supplied insurance is clearly subject to

mandatory bargaining.

21

Christmas bonus—matters that are clearly subject to

mandatory bargaining. E.g., NLRB v. Citizens Hotel

Co., 326 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Niles-

Bem2nt-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952);

W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir.

1949) .™

Petitioner also seeks (Br. 31-32) to avoid the

plain terms of Section 8(d) on the ground that the

existence of an alternative (“brown bagging’) to the

cafeterias and coke cribs precludes classifying in-

plant food prices as a term or condition of employ-

ment. This contention is both factually inapplicable

and legally erroneous. Both the Board and the court

of appeals found that “brown bagging” was not a

viable alternative because the employees’ lockers were

often too hot and occasionally vermin infested (Pet.

App. A16-A17, A23 n.11). Such a concurrent factual

finding is ordinarily not reviewed by this Court. See

Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U.S. 630, 635

(1967) ; Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.

474, 491 (1951). In any event, not every member of

a bargaining unit must avail himself of a benefit in

order for that benefit to be a mandatory subject

* The effect of in-plant price increases is particularly ap-

parent in the instant case. Since virtually all employees must

eat in the in-plant facilities and since the employees’ lockers

are often unsuited to the storage of food, the Company has a

captive market. The importance of in-plant food prices is

further reflected in the mass employee boycott that occurred

here. Indeed, as a general matter, in-plant food prices and

services may well be of intense interest to employees who value

highly the scheduled breaks from what may otherwise be a

dull work routine.

22

of bargaining. See, e.g., Richfield Oil Corp., 110

N.L.R.B. 356 (1954), enf’d, 231 F.2d 717 (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956) (optional

stock purchase plan); NLRB v. Lehigh Portland

Cement Co., 205 F.2d 821, 823 (4th Cir. 1953)

(only 25% of employees rented employer housing).”

4. In light of the important role of readily avail-

able in-plant food services at reasonable prices in the

overall working environment of employees, the Board

and the court of appeals correctly concluded that peti-

tioner had violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to

bargain.” The Board’s determination that in-plant

food prices and services are terms and conditions

of employment adheres to more than ten years of con-

sistent precedent.” Because the “classification of bar-

1° The Amicus Curiae Brief On Behalf of the National Auto-

matic Merchandising Association suggests that the Board’s

decision unduly interferes with the third party relationship

between the employer and the independent in-plant food facil-

ity managers and suppliers. In this case, however, the Com-

pany retained the power to control and review food services

and prices. Where the employer does not have such explicit

power, he can nonetheless seek to affect prices by, inter alia,

initiating or increasing a subsidy to the food caterer. We

further note that many employee benefits, such as health in-

surance, involve third-party suppliers.

2 As previously indicated, the Board found (and the court

of appeals agreed) that the Company had refused to negotiate

about both food services and food prices (Pet. App. A24; see

Pet. App. A21-A22, A39; A. 77 .

21In addition to the authorities cited in note 4, supra, see

also Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949);

O’Land, Inc., d/b/a Ramada Inn South, 206 N.L.R.B. 210,

215-216 (1973); Missourian Publishing Co., 216 N.L.R.B.

175, 180 (1975); Florida Steel Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 923

(1977).

23

gaining subjects as ‘terms or conditions of employ-

ment’ is a matter concerning which the Board has

special expertise,” Local Union No. 189, Amalga-

mated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,

685-686 (1965), the Board’s determination here is

entitled to great deference. Cf. Bayside Enterprises,

Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 302-304 (1977).

B. Established Industrial Practices Show That In-Plant

Food Services and Prices are “Terms and Conditions of

Employment”

This Court has repeatedly approved the propriety

of looking to industrial practices as an aid in deter-

mining the scope of Section 8(d). See, e.g., Fibre-

board, supra, 379 U.S. at 203. The inclusion of provi-

sions relating to in-plant food services and prices

in collective bargaining agreements is a widespread

practice in a substantial range of industries. See

* Although we argue primarily that in-plant food prices are

“terms and conditions of employment,” we submit that such

matters are also “wages” within the purview of Section 8(d).

In Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672, 676 (1949),

the Board held that meals served to employees at a remote

timber camp constituted “wages” (as well as “conditions of

employment”). The Board reasoned that the meals repre-

sented an “emolument of value” to the employees because they

saved both on the cost of transportation to obtain food and on

the cost of the food itself since the meals were sold below

cost. Cf. W. W. Cross & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878

(Ist Cir. 1949). The same analysis applies to food services

furnished by, and at, an industrial plant. As highlighted by

the facts of this case, the in-plant meals represent “emolu-

ments of value” in terms of transportation expenses, insofar

as alternative sources of food are relatively distant, and meal

costs, insofar as the Company has subsidized ARA.

24

BNA, 2 Collective Bargaining (Negotiations and Con-

tracts) 95:421-424, 441-444 (1978) ;™ see also note

24, infra. Indeed, since 1967 the local agreements

between petitioner and Local 583 have contained de-

tailed provisions regarding in-plant food services

(Pet. App. A20, A36-A39; A. 27, 62-63, 69-73). In

addition, numerous arbitration decisions have con-

strued collective bargaining agreements to cover the

cost of employer-supplied food as a condition of em-

ployment.”

That management commonly considers the provi-

sion of in-plant food to be “one of the most important

23 As petitioner points out (Br. at 29), none of the few

sample clauses from collective bargaining agreements repro-

duced in this study refer to in-plant food prices directly, al-

though several refer to the distribution of canteen profits to

the union. Such clauses apparently exist, however, see S. Torff,

Collective Bargaining: Negotiations and Agreements 279

(1953), especially in unpublished local agreements. Moreover,

the duty of management to negotiate about at least some

aspects of food services (which petitioner has conceded, Pet.

App. A24) confirms the duty to negotiate over food prices. The

right to negotiate over food services can be rendered illusory

if management can raise prices at will. It is whether desir-

able food is available at reasgnable prices that constitutes a

condition of employment. \

24 See, e.g., Universal Form Clamp Co., 68 Lab. Arb. Rep.

1223 (Miller, 1977) (cost of coffee) ; Hilton Hotels Corp., 42

Lab. Arb. Rep. 1267, 1270-1272 (Hanlon, 1964) (cost and

type of meals) ; Greater Los Angeles Zoo Ass’n, 60 Lab. Arb.

Rep. 838 (Christopher, 1973) (employer may not discontinue

practice of providing free meals to zoo food vendors when

contract provided that there would be no reduction of em-

ployee benefits) ; Alpena General Hospital, 50 Lab. Arb. Rep.

48 (Jones, 1967), and Lutheran Medical Center, 44 Lab. Arb.

Rep. 107 (Wolf, 1964) (free meals are working condition).

25

employee benefits” further evidences the correctness

of the Board’s determination here.“ In addition to

being a convenient mechanism for supplying neces-

sary meals while allowing employees to fraternize

with their fellow workers,” in-plant food services are

considered by management to benefit employees in

numerous other ways such as providing better nutri-

tion and nutrition education.” Such employee benefits

are enhanced by the availability of reasonable, or

subsidized, meals.* Management, in turn, my de-

rives a number of advantages from in-plant food

facilities: increased employee morale and productiv-

ity, reduced employee absenteeism and tardiness. the

ability to schedule shorter lunch hours and eales

breaks, and the greater ability to recruit new em-

ployees.”

** Fisher, Operating Your Firm’s Dinin

tears een g Area Profit

Administrative Management 66-67 (Oct. 1966). rofitably, 27

*° See Scheer, The Company Cafeteria, 4

Pi any f , 45 Personnel Journal

27 See W. Waite, Personnel Administration 578 (1952) ;

T. Toedt, L. Lovejoy, R. Story and D. Shainin, Managing

Manpower in the Industrial Environment 550 (1962).

** See Scheer, The Company Cafeteria, supra:

sonnel Handbook 577-579 (1951): T. Toedt, L "can,

R. Story and D. Shainan, Managing Manpower, supra, at 548-

550; Lunching at the Office: Four Plans, 28 Administrative

Management 32 (1967). See also Westinghouse Electric Corp

v. NLRB, supra, 369 F.2d at 894. )

2° See, e.g., Dana, In-House Food Services

Morale and Productivity, 52 Personnel Journal heaped orton é

BNA, Labor Policy and Practice Series (Personnel Man-

agement), 241:16 (1978); McCall Corporation, supra, 172

N.L.R.B. at 546 n.39. See also notes 25-28, supra.

26

Thus, many employers choose to provide in-plant

food services for their employees, and a substan-

tial portion of these food operations are employer-

subsidized.” These in-plant facilities are both an in-

tegral part of the employees’ working environment

and a significant employee benefit. In light of the

common industrial practice of providing for, and

bargaining about, such food operations, the Board

has reasonably concluded that in-plant food prices

and services are conditions and terms of employment.

C. The Legislative History and Statutory Purposes of the

National Labor Relations Act Support the Board’s Con-

clusion That In-Plant Food Prices Are Subject to Man-

datory Bargaining

1. The relevant legislative history indicates that

in enacting Section 8(d) Congress intended to sub-

% Petitioner is contractually obligated to subsidize ARA up

to $52,000 per year, which it has done in recent years (Pet.

App. A20, A383; A. 34, 82). Moreover, a recent survey con-

ducted through the Bureau of National Affairs’ Personnel

Policies Forum showed that 54 percent of the responding com-

panies provided food services using a lunchroom with vending

machines; 43% of the companies provided employee cafe-

terias, and 15% provided vending machines with snack bar

service. BNA, Labor Policy and Practice Series, supra, at 245:

201-204. Surveys published by the National Industrial Con-

ference Board in 1964 showed that 47% of the manufacturing

companies that responded provided cafeteria services, and

55% of the companies with cafeterias subsidized the opera-

tion. Only 8% of the companies reported that they were try-

ing to operate the cafeterias at a profit. NICB, Personnel

Practices in Factory and Office: Manufacturing, Personnel

Policy Study No. 194 at 76-77 (1964). For data on food

services in nonmanufacturing companies, see NICB, Office

Personnel Practices: Nonmanufacturing, Personnel Policy

Study No. 197 (1965).

27

ject a wide range of matters to mandatory bargain-

ing. The original House bill had sought to curtail the

scope of labor-management negotiations by specifically

listing the limited topics subject to mandatory bar-

gaining. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., § 2(11)

(1947) ; H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-

23, 49 (1947). However, the Senate, guided by the

comments of. then NLRB Chairman Paul Herzog,”

adopted the broader and more general language now

found in Section 8(d), thereby deferring to the

Board’s expertise in these matters.

In conference, the House’s attempt to “straight

jacket[]” and “limit narrowly the subject matters

appropriate for collective bargaining,” H.R. Rep. No.

245, supra, at 71 (Minority Report authored by

then Rep. John F. Kennedy), was rejected in favor

of the Senate version. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th

Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 34 (1947); 93 Cong. Rec. 6444

(1947) (summary report of Sen. Taft) ; id. at 6529

(remarks of Sen. Kilgore).** Congress thus appar-

ently foresaw that the scope of collective bargaining

51 See Hearings on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22 Before the Senate

Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.

1914 (1947).

* The Company claims (Br. 22) that, despite the broad

language of Section 8(d) as enacted, Congress intended to

retain the restrictive approach of the House bill. But, as

Mr. Justice Stewart has pointed out, the isolated language in

the House Conference Report that petitioner relies upon re-

fers to the similarity between the two bills in terms of collec-

tive bargaining procedures, not the scope of collective bar-

gaining. Fibreboard, supra, 379 U.S. at 221 n.5 (concurring

opinion).

28

might “vary with changes in industrial structure and

practice,” and therefore chose to leave the precise

details of what constituted a term or condition of

employment to the discretion of the Board. See Hear-

ings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor, note 31,

supra. Here, the Board, consistently with this legis-

lative history, has reasonably concluded that in-plant

food prices and services are mandatory subjects of

bargaining.

2. Similarly, the Board’s determination here ef-

fectuates a primary policy of the National Labor

Relations Act. The Act’s sponsors recognized that re-

fusals to bargain and negotiate had been a major

cause of industrial strife. NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-

lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1937). Thus, a

principal purpose of the Act is to promote the peace-

ful settlement of industrial disputes and labor-man-

agement controversies through the collective bargain-

ing process. See Fibreboard, supra, 379 U.S. at 211;

Section 1(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 151(b). As Judge

Craven, writing for the panel in Westinghouse Elec-

tric Corp. v. NLRB, supra, 369 F.2d at 895, stated:

The underlying philosophy of the Labor Act is

that discussion of issues between labor and man-

agement serves as a valuable prophylactic by

removing grievances, real or fancied, and tends

to improve and stabilize labor relations. Experi-

ence teaches that major work interruptions may

spring from seemingly trivial causes.

The Board’s inclusion of in-plant food prices and

services within the statutory scope of mandatory

29

bargaining thus effectuates the policies of the Act.

As epitomized by the large-scale boycott involved in

this case, relegating disputes over in-plant food mat-

ters to the collective bargaining process serves to

bring “a problem of vital concern to labor and man-

agement within the framework established by Con-

gress as most conducive to industrial peace.” Fibre-

board, supra.

While petitioner contends (Br. 27-28) that the

policies of the Act do not require in-plant food prices

to be a topic of mandatory bargaining, it acknow]-

edges that it must bargain over the inextricably

interlinked issue of food services. Indeed, since 1967

the collective bargaining agreements between peti-

tioner and Local 588 have contained various detailed

provisions concerning the in-plant food services (Pet.

App. A20, A36-A37; A. 27, 62-68, 69-73), and peti-

tioner does not claim that the negotiations underlying

those provisions were either unduly burdensome or

interfered with “managerial decisions, which lie at

the core of entrepreneurial control.” Fibreboard,

** With respect to food services, petitioner merely contends

(Br. 35-36) that the Board’s order does not define with rea-

sonable specificity the food service matters on which bargain-

ing is required. Since petitioner did not raise this issue before

the Board or the court of appeals—contending only that it did

not refuse to bargain about food services—it is foreclosed

from raising it here. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783,

788 n.7 (1977). In any event, the elements of the term “food

services” have already largely been defined by the Company’s

prior bargaining and by the Board and court decisions on this

subject. See notes 9-14, supra. The content of the term can be

further fleshed out in the course of subsequent negotiations

with Local 588.

30

supra, 379 U.S. at 228. Rather, given the importance

of in-plant food matters to the working environment

of employees and the interlocked nature of food

services and food prices,” the Board’s determination

below properly furthers the statutory policy of avoid-

ing industrial strife by means of labor-management

negotiations.

D. The Board’s Determination That In-Plant Food Prices

Are “Terms and Conditions of Employment” is Consis-

tent With This Court’s Prior Decisions

Although this Court has never directly addressed

the issue whether in-plant food matters are manda-

tory subjects of bargaining, an analysis of the Court’s

most relevant decisions supports the propriety of the

Board’s conclusion here. In a concurring opinion in

Fibreboard, supra, three Justices stated that Sec-

tion 8(d) at least includes “the various physical di-

mensions of [an employee’s] working environment.”

*In-plant facilities generally have a substantial impact

upon the employees’ working environment. See, e.g., Ladish

Co., supra, 219 N.L.R.B. at 357 & n.26 (citing Preston Prod-

ucts Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 322 (1966), rev’d on other grounds, .

873 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1967), and various industrial rela-

tions surveys). This conclusion is buttressed by the import-

ance that management attributes to this “employee benefit”

and management’s willingness to subsidize such facilities.

See pages 24-26, supra.

As previously noted, the facts of this case are particularly

compelling. Virtually every Company employee eats in the

plant because of the short lunch hour and the lack of alterna-

tives in the plant area, and because the employee locker area

is unsuitable for food storage.

*5 See pages 18-19, supra.

31

379 U.S. at 222. Other decisions of this Court have

recognized that the physical dimensions of an employ-

ee’s milieu, in turn, include air temperature” and

the particular hours of the day during which em-

ployees shall be required to work (and the times for

eating breaks) .”

Petitioner, relying on Allied Chemical & Alkali

Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., supra, 404

U.S. at 176, claims (Br. 23-27) that the Board has

erred because in-plant food prices do not “vitally af-

fect[] the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’ ”

We have shown, however, that in-plant food prices

are an integral and important part of an employee’s

working conditions. See pages 16-19, 24-26, supra.

Moreover, petitioner’s reliance upon the “vitally af-

fect” standard in Allied Chemical, supra, is misplaced.

That case involved the question whether retired em-

ployees’ pension benefits, which are not terms and

conditions of the employment of current employees,

nonetheless fall within the purview of Section 8(d)

because such benefits “vitally affect” the terms and

conditions of current workers. Thus, the “vitally

affect” standard has been used by this Court

when the matter in issue directly involves individuals

outside the employer-employee relationship and only

indirectly bears upon that relationship. See also

Local 24, International Brotherhood of Teamsters

** See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., supra.

** See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.

Jewel Tea Co., supra, 381 U.S. at 691; see also Fibreboard,

supra (“what periods of relief are available’).

32

v. Oliver, supra. Here, by contrast, in-plant food

prices, which a

re controlled and subsidized by the

Company, directly affect, and are a condition of, the

employment relationship.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN S. IRVING

General Counsel

WADE H. McCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

LAWRENCE G. WALLACE

Deputy Solicitor General

ANDREW J. LEVANDER

Assistant to the Solicitor General

JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR.

Deputy General

ROBERT E. ALLEN

Counsel

Acting Associate General Counsel

NORTON J. COME

Deputy Associate General Counsel

RUTH E. PETERS

Attorney

National Labor Relations Board

JANUARY 1979

W ov. &. Government printine orice, 1979 265252 260

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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