Respondents Brief — Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stamping Plant) v. NLRB
Supreme Court brief1979
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FOR ARGUMENT
< Ca iee FF F |
Supreme C U.S.
FILED
No. 77-1806 ‘JAN 22 1979
Iu the Supreuwe Court of the Un CLERK
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
ForD Motor COMPANY (CHICAGO STAMPING
PLANT), PETITIONER
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WavDE H. McCreEg, JR.
Solicitor General
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
Deputy Solicitor General
ANDREW J. LEVANDER
Assistant to the Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
JOHN S. IRVING
General Counsel
JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR.
Deputy General Counsel
ROBERT E. ALLEN
Acting Associate General Counsel
NORTON J. COME
Deputy Associate General Counsel
RuTH E. PETERS
Attorney
National Labor Relations Board
Washington, D.C. 20570
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Statement:
A. The Board’s findings of fact -...........
B. The Board’s decision and order ........
C. The decision of the court of appeals..
ee
Argument:
The Board properly concluded that prices of
food and the food services provided in an em-
ployer’s in-plant food facilities for its employ-
ees are mandatory subjects of bargaining un-
der the National Labor Relations Act ..........
A. The Board has correctly found that
in-plant food prices and services fall
well within the ordinary meaning of
“terms and conditions of employ-
I” - siiniiiniincenmiaeiiiaasiiaipidiseaaihs cities
B. Established industrial practices show
that in-plant food services and prices
are “terms and conditions of em-
SII . soittanrcctiinitiesidiaiinadiitnesainmaiiae
C. The legislative history and statutory
purposes of the National Labor Re-
lations Act support the Board’s con-
clusion that in-plant food prices are
subject to mandatory bargaining......
mw wo
14
14
23
26
Argument—Continued Page
D. The Board’s determination that in-
plant food prices are “terms and con-
ditions of employment” is consistent
with this Court’s prior decisions........ 80
ENE ELH aN ELLE 32
CITATIONS
Cases:
Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157.... 15, 31
Alpena General Hospital, 50 Lab. Arb.
a A -siseniaienceveapscoinsihinciiaonteiiaapleatauadaiabiccabanitie 24
American Smelting and Refining Co. v.
NLRB, 406 F.2d 552, cert. denied, 395
SI SII cine. ccoiainidiliidamadapiebedainaanineiniaeNetie 17
Bastian-Blessing, Div. of Golconda Corp.
ev UW UDG§lLc UE lO—y aaa 19
Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429
RE I sealable cl et ay 23
Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U.S.
ST iii iakiiatalisanlliti ca Dibiatacahiinia Liat aia 21
Bralco Metals, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 143..16, 17, 18
Cosmo Graphics, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 1061.. 18
D & C Textile Corp., 189 N.L.R.B. 769.... 17
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
= f & Bae passim
Fleming Manufacturing Co., 119 N.L.R.B.
ARI SIE as ee oe 17
Florida Steel Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 928 ...... 22
Greater Los Angeles Zoo Ass’n, 60 Lab.
SI UD iN tae a at 24
Hasty Print, Inc., d/b/a Walker Color
Graphics, 227 N.L.R.B. 455
Cases—Continued Page
Hilton Hotels Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. Rep.
I an aaa sil nla 24
Inland Steel v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, cert.
denied in relevant part, 336 U.S. 960,
aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Ameri-
can Communications Ass’n v. Douds,
i!) Re 16
International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 392
F.2d 801, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906... 16
Ladish Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 354, enforce-
ment denied sub nom. NLRB vy. Ladish
ee 2+ § see 9, 16, 17, 30
Local 24, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283......15, 31-32
Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676.. 17, 23,
31
Lutheran Medical Center, 44 Lab. Arb.
GENEL SITET. pususiasdneseahienctneannintnladiiinimpianteaiichdniitien 24
McCall Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. 540, enforce-
ment denied sub nom. McCall Corp. v.
pF OS 6 6§ eo eee 9, 25
Missourian Publishing Co., 216 N.L.R.B.
SUTED abaichsidessiiciuiausdeapbaaiatdubbiabibindiadceadaaaeseeaiaaians 17, 22
N.L.R.B. v. Citizens Hotel Co., 326 F.2d
NI <iaccelicessadiiticlaniaiiaadilca iclidiblabaicesdbitetd casita 21
N.L.R.B. v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d
IEEE ecascisesieauhaedbasiniashibtcinntudiiniesinineiatedelsiaariiaitien 17
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
Se eee 28
N.L.R.B. v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co.,
Sy IIT DE cece nsectssieeibldccediaieitiadeataniieiaseniinttiatie 17, 22
N.L.R.B. v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199
IRA Re en ee 21
IV
Cases—Continued Page
N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co.,
i! eee ee 16, 31
N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Division of Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 _.............. 15
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l
Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 575 -........... 19
O’Land, Inc., d/b/a Ramada Inn South,
BSS en 17, 22
Package Machinery Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 268,
enforcement denied sub nom. NLRB v.
Package Machinery Co., 457 F.2d 936.. 9
Pennco, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 677 -....00......... 17
Preston Products Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 322,
rev'd on other grounds, 373 F.2d 671... 17
Richfield Oil Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 356,
enf’d, 231 F.2d 717, cert. denied, 351
In IT theca niall databace 22
S.S. Kresge Co. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1225.. 17
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783.... 29
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
SINE IEE snticcianennibioniniahtindnadinbdissndateietsine 21
Universal Form Clamp Co., 68 Lab. Arb.
I hacen ceca 24
W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d
ITU Ssaineaceeiihstihiseshaienaaeipsiiah eiciatihcadiaiediadaal nail 21, 23
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 156 N.L.R.B.
1080, enf’d sub nom. Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 369 F.2d 891,
rev'd en banc, 387 F.2d 542... 9, 10, 25, 28
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B.
672
Statutes: Page
National Labor Relations Act, as amended
(61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.
151 et seq.):
Section 1, 29 U.S.C. 151 _....-..... 2
Section 1(b), 29 U.S.C. 151(b) —_...... 28
Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)
AE contii-echninnnahanetebicsiniaiiamniintiiiannteinn 9
Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)
Eee: See ae 9, 14, 22
Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. 158(d) -....... passim
Section 9(a), 29 U.S.C. 159(a) —...... 14
Miscellaneous:
BNA, 2 Collective Bargainina (Negotia-
tions and Contracts) (1978) ...............-- 16, 24
BNA, Labor Policy and Practice Series
(Personnel Management) (1978) ......... 25, 26
Comment, A Case for Air Pollution as a
Mandatory Bargaining Subject, 51 Ore.
5 | EE ner 16
93 Cong. Rec. 6444, 6529 (1947) _.......... 27
Dana, In-House Food Services Can In-
crease Morale and Productivity, 52
Personnel Journal 50-53 (1973) ........... 25
Fisher, Operating Your Firm’s Dining
Area Profitably, 27 Administrative
Management 66-67 (Oct. 1966) .......... 25
Hearings on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22 Before
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). 27
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st
ERR 27
H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947)... 27
VI
Miscellaneous—Continued Page Gu the Supreme Court of the United States
H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. OCTOBER TERM, 1978
LARA eT 27
How Ford Motor Dishes Up 18,000 Meals
A Day, Business Week (October 27,
le 30 No. 77-1806
: Mee, Pereonnet Handb ook (1961)... as FoRD Motor COMPANY (CHICAGO STAMPING
unching at the Office: Four Plans, Piast), selma
28 Administrative Management 32 ,
6 | 25 .
NICB, Office Personnel Practices: Non-
manufacturing, Personnel Policy Study NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ET AL.’
Ble, BOT CAGED) neccccccececcecccsescccoccsscesusesenes 26
NICB, Personnel Practices in Factory and
Office: Manufacturing, Personnel Pol-
icv Study No. 194 (1964)...................... 26 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
S = fir Collective eae Negotia- COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
tions and Agreements (1953) ............... 24
Scheer, The Company Cafeteria, 45 Per-
sonnel Journal 85-86 (1966).................. 25 BRIEF FOR
T. Toedt, L. Lovejoy, R. Story and D. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Shainin, Managing Manpower in the
Industrial Environment (1962) ........... 25
a 25 OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-
A17) is reported at 571 F.2d 993. The decision and
order of the National Labor Relations Board (Pet.
App. A18-A45) are reported at 230 N.L.R.B. 716.
? Local 588, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, UAW—the charging party
before the Board and an intervenor in the court of appeals—
is also a party here.
(1)
2
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on April 18, 1978 (Pet. App. A47-A48) following
denial of a petition for rehearing on March 23, 1978
(Pet. App. A46). The petition for a writ of certiorari
was filed on June 21, 1978, and granted on October
10, 1978 (A. 100). The jurisdiction of this Court
rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Board properly concluded that prices
of food and the food services provided in an employ-
er’s in-plant cafeterias and vending machines are
mandatory subjects of bargaining under the National
Labor Relations Act.
STATUTE INVOLVED
The relevant provisions of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519,
29 U.S.C. 151, et seg.), are set forth in the Brief for
Petitioner, App. Al-A3.
STATEMENT
A. The Board’s Findings of Fact *
1. Petitioner, Ford Motor Company (“the Com-
pany”), operates an automotive parts stamping plant
on a one-quarter mile square site, in Chicago Heights,
2 Many of the relevant facts were stipulated to by the
parties (A. 14).
3
Illinois. The plant employs approximately 3,600
hourly-rated production employees, who work in three
shifts (Pet. App. A32; A. 14-16, 18-19, 67). The sole
bargaining representative of these employees is the
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
UAW, and its administrative component Local 588
(Pet. App. A32; A. 25). The Company and the Inter-
national Union have been party to a series of national
collective bargaining agreements covering employees
at the Company’s various plants since approximately
1956, when the International was certified by the
Board; Local 588 and the Company have, in addition,
negotiated a series of supplementary local agree-
ments. The relevant national agreement ran from
November 1973 until September 1976, and the rele-
vant local agreement, from June 1974 until Septem-
ber 1976 (Pet. App. A35-A36; A. 17-18, 21-23).
2. The Company provides its employees with two
air-conditioned cafeterias and five air-conditioned
vending machine areas, called “coke cribs.” The main
cafeteria, which seats 400 to 500 employees, is open
for breakfast, scheduled meal periods, and during
shift changes. Hot food from steam tables is avail-
able in this cafeteria at breakfast and the scheduled
meal periods. In addition, the main cafeteria houses
coin-operated vending machines that dispense bever-
ages, hot and cold food, pastry, and candy (Pet. App.
A33; A. 20). The other cafeteria, which seats ap-
proximately 50 to 100 persons, does not have a steam
table and is open only during some of the scheduled
4
meal periods. It is equipped with two coffee machines
and twelve vending machines that dispense a variety
of foods. Each “coke crib” also contains a variety of
vending machines and is open during all meal and
rest periods. Four of these coke cribs have a seating
capacity of 40 to 50 persons and one seats 75 to 100
persons (Pet. App. A34; A. 30).
Pursuant to a 1972 agreement with the Company
(Pet. App. A382; A. 27-28, 81), ARA Services, Inc.
(“ARA”), operates the cafeterias and coke cribs.
Under this agreement, ARA furnishes food, machines,
management, and personnel (Pet. App. A32-A33).
Specifically, section 2(d) of the agreement provides
that ARA shall (Pet. App. A19-A20; A. 86):
furnish products of quality in accordance with
purchasing specifications that shall have been
submitted to and approved by [the Company],
and in accordance with a price and portion list
for said manual food service and vending ma-
chines that shall have been submitted to [the
Company] and that shall be subject to review at
the request of [the Company] or [ARA].
The agreement further authorizes the Company to
inspect all machines and equipment to determine com-
pliance with established standards of quality and
cleanliness (Pet. App. A33; A. 92).
Under section 3(a) of the agreement, the Company
must reimburse ARA for all direct costs of the food
and vending operations and pay ARA a nine percent
5
surcharge on net receipts.’ Should the receipts ex-
ceed ARA’s costs plus the nine percent surcharge, the
Company is entitled to the excess (Pet. App. A20,
A33; A. 89-90). Insofar as revenues do not meet the
costs of the operation plus the surcharge (as has
happened in recent years), the Company is obligated
to subsidize ARA up to $52,000 per year (Pet. App.
A20, A383; A. 34, 82). The contract is terminable by
either party upon 60 days’ written notice (Pet. App.
A20, A33; A. 93).
All employees have a 30-minute lunch period. In
addition, employees who work directly on production
lines are afforded a 5-minute washup period before
their meals and two 22-minute rest breaks (Pet. App.
A34; A. 17). Employees are not permitted to leave
the plant building during the break periods, and it is
not feasible for them to do so during the short lunch
period (Pet. App. A20, A35; A. 40-42). Mobile food
vending trucks are not permitted on plant property
and are not usually available outside the plant gate
(Pet. App. A20, A385; A. 42-43). Some restaurants
are located within a four-mile area of the plant, but
there are more than a dozen other industrial plants in
the same area employing several thousand employees
who also have access to those restaurants (Pet. App.
A35; A. 15). Thus, a negligible number of employees
* The surcharge consists of a five percent service fee and
a four percent allowance for general administrative costs.
Net receipts are defined as gross receipts less applicable state
and local taxes (A. 89).
6
(no more than 12 out of 3,600) actually leave the
plant during the lunch period (Pet. App. A20; A. 52).
Employees are permitted to bring food into the
plant. Such food, which may be eaten only in the
cafeterias or coke cribs, must be stored in the em-
ployees’ lockers and not in working areas (Pet. App.
A20-A21, A35; A. 20-21). However, these lockers
are located in rooms that are not air-conditioned, and
there are no refrigeration facilities available to em-
ployees (Pet. App. A21, A35; A. 19, 21, 45). During
the summer months, when temperatures frequently
range between 80 to 100 degrees, the locker rooms
become hot and sticky, and employees have com-
plained about food spoilage (Pet. App. A21, A365;
A. 45-47, 49). Moreover, on occasion, the Company
has used exterminator services after employees com-
plained about unsanitary conditions in the locker
rooms (Pet. App. A21, A35; A. 55, 61).
3. Although the Company has at all times refused
to bargain about food prices in its in-plant eating
facilities, it has negotiated over food services. In-
deed, since 1967 the agreement between the Company
and Local 588 has contained specific provisions con-
cerning vending machine and cafeteria services, such
as the kinds of food to be provided, the staffing of
service lines, adequate cafeteria supervision, the
cleanliness of utensils, the restocking and repairing
of vending machines, and the provision of additional
eating facilities (Pet. App. A20, A36-A39; A. 27, 62-
63, 69-73). The 1974 local agreement included the
following (Pet. App. A38; A. 73): “The Company
7
recognizes its continuing responsibility for the satis-
factory performance of the caterer and for the ex-
peditious handling of complaints concerned with such
performance.”
On February 6, 1976, the Company informed
Local 588 that cafeteria and vending machine prices
would be increased on February 9 by an unspecified
amount (Pet. App. A21, A39; A. 31). The Com-
pany refused Local 588’s request to discuss the in-
creases before they were put into effect, and, on
February 9, the prices were increased from 5 to 10
cents per item (Pet. App. A21, A39; A. 31, 50).
On February 13, Local President Richard Marco sent
a letter to Tom Brown, the Company’s industrial re-
lations manager, requesting to bargain regarding
food prices and services (Pet. App. A21, A39; A. 74).
The letter further stated (Pet. App. A21; A. 74):
As you know [food prices and services are]
a subject of great concern. Good food at reason-
able prices is considered to be a condition of
employment by our members. If we discuss this
promptly, we may be able to reach full agree-
ment prior to opening of negotiations for a new
contract.
The Company, by letter dated February 18, denied
Local 588’s request to bargain, stating that “food
prices and services are not a proper subject for nego-
tiations” (Pet. App. A21-A22, A39; A. 77).
On March 23, 1976, Local 588 requested informa-
tion concerning the Company’s role in cafeteria and
vending machine operations in order to administer
the existing contract and to prepare for upcoming
negotiations (Pet. App. A22, A39; A. 75-76). On
April 9, the Company declined to provide the Union
with the requested information and again refused to
bargain about cafeteria and vending machine prices
and services (Pet. App. A389; A. 27). Local 588’s
several subsequent requests to bargain about food
prices and services were also rejected by the Com-
pany (ibid.).
Meanwhile, on February 16, 1976, Local 588 began
a boycott of the food service operations in which sub-
stantially more than half of the employees partici-
pated (Pet. App. A22, A40; A. 33). The cafeteria
boyeott ended on May 19, 1976, and the vending
machine boycott ended on June 7, 1976 (Pet. App.
A40; A. 33). The onset of hot weather, which re-
sulted in the spoilage of food that employees brought
from home, and the lack of success in reducing prices
led to the cancellation of the boycott (Pet. App. A40;
A. 51-52).
B. The Board’s Decision and Order
After adopting the factual findings of the admin-
istrative law judge summarized above, the Board,
disagreeing with the law judge’s legal conclusions,
held that in-plant cafeteria and vending machine food
prices and services constitute “terms and conditions
of employment” within the meaning of Section 8(d)
of the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act’), 29
U.S.C. 158(d). In particular, the Board found that,
despite the Company’s acknowledgement of its duty
to bargain over at least some aspect of food services,
9
the Company had completely refused to bargain about
both food services and food prices (Pet. App. A24).
Because matters falling within the purview of Sec-
tion 8(d) are subject to mandatory bargaining, the
Board concluded that the Company had violated Sec-
tions 8(a) (5) and 8(a) (1) of the Act by refusing to
supply requested information to, or bargain with,
Local 588 regarding food prices and services (Pet.
App. A26).
As noted by the Board (Pet. App. A22-A24), this
decision adhered to the Board’s earlier decisions hold-
ing that in-plant food prices are generally a “condi-
tion of employment” within the meaning of Section
8(d) of the Act.* Although it reaffirmed this broader
proposition, the Board also observed that “the instant
case, on its facts, is in many respects a stronger case
than [N.L.R.B. v.] Ladish [Co.],” 538 F.2d 1267
(7th Cir. 1976), which had previously been decided
by the Seventh Circuit contrary to the Board’s posi-
tion (Pet. App. A23 n.11). The Board specifically
pointed out the following factors (among others)
that were present: in this case and absent in Ladish
(ibid.): (1) the Company’s “right to review prices
* Westinghouse Electric Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1081
(1966), enf’d sub nom. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB,
369 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1966), rev’d en banc, 387 F.2d 542
(1967) ; McCall Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. 540 (1968), enforcement
denied sub nom. McCall Corp. v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 187 (4th Cir.
1970) ; Package Machinery Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 268 (1971), en-
forcement denied sub nom. NLRB v. Package Machinery Co.,
457 F.2d 936 (1st Cir. 1972); Ladish Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 354
(1975), enforcement denied sub nom. NLRB v. Ladish Co., 538
F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1976).
10
and its leverage of the subsidy agreement,” (2) the
possibility of the Company’s making a profit on the
food service operation, (3) the history of bargaining
about some features of cafeteria and vending machine
services, (4) the lack of a viable alternative to the
in-plant food facilities, and (5) substantial and seri-
ous employee concern over in-plant food services and
prices as evidenced by the widespread boycott.
The Board ordered the Company, inter alia, to bar-
gain with Local 588 upon request “with respect to
food services and any changes, now in effect or here-
after made or proposed, in food prices charged em-
ployees in the vending machines and cafeterias,” and
to supply Local 588 “with information necessary for
collective-bargaining, in relation to its part or role in
the cafeteria and vending machine operations” (Pet.
App. A27). In accordance with Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1081 (1966), enf’d
sub nom. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 369
F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1966), rev’d en banc, 387 F.2d
542 (1967), this order did not require the Company
“to bargain about every proposed price change in
food prices before putting such change in effect,’
[but rather] * * * to bargain on such price change[s]
only after they are determined unilaterally and upon
a request of the Union” (Pet. App. A25).
C. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
The court of appeals enforced the Board’s order
(Pet. App. Al-A17). Although it rejected the gen-
eral proposition that “in-plant cafeteria and vending
11
machine food prices and services are necessarily”
mandatory subjects of bargaining .Pet. App. AQ),
the court of appeals held “that under the facts and
circumstances of this case, in-plant cafeteria and
vending machine food prices and services materially
and significantly affect and have an impact upon
terms and conditions of employment, and therefore
are mandatory subjects of bargaining” (Pet. App.
A13-A14). On that basis, the court distinguished
other cases in which it and other courts of appeals
had denied enforcement of Board orders requiring
bargaining about in-plant food prices (Pet. App. Al4-
Al17).°
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The price of food and the food services that are
available to employees at in-plant eating facilities
are subjects about which the National Labor Rela-
tions Act requires employers and representatives of
their employees to bargain collectively. Sections 8(d),
8(a)(5) and 9(a) impose a duty upon an employer
to bargain about “terms and conditions of employ-
ment.” Since that phrase, which is found in Sec-
tion 8(d), encompasses “the various physical dimen-
sions of [an employee’s] working environment,”
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203, 222 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), all sub-
stantial aspects of in-plant eating facilities, including
food prices, fall well within the ordinary meaning of
Section 8(d).
° See note 4, supra.
12
Petitioner’s attempt to minimize the importance to
employees of in-plant food prices is both factually
inapplicable and legally erroneous. In light of an
employee’s need for food and drink during the course
of an eight-hour work day, the Board, whose deter-
mination of the scope of Section 8(d) is entitled to
great deference, has consistently found that the avail-
ability of in-plant food at reasonable prices is an
important aspect of an employee’s working environ-
ment. That conclusion is especially warranted in the
instant case where the Company’s employees of neces-
sity eat in petitioner’s in-plant facilities. Moreover,
the Company’s employees felt sufficiently aggrieved
by the raising of food prices here that they engaged
in a large-scale boycott for several months.
Furthermore, an employer cannot avoid mandatory
bargaining over the “terms and conditions of employ-
ment” merely because the particular terms or condi-
tions may be subject to seemingly minor changes that
can otherwise be compensated for. Any change in a
company-sponsored health insurance program, for ex-
ample, is subject to mandatory bargaining on request.
An employer’s obligation to bargain about in-plant
food prices and services is similarly comprehensive,
but, as the Board’s order reflects, this does not mean
that the Company ordinarily will have to bargain
about insignificant matters. Instead, it has been or-
dered to bargain only if the Union so requests follow-
ing the Company’s making of unilateral changes in
food prices. Such subjects can also be dealt with in
a comprehensive manner in collective agreements.
13
Common industrial practice is consistent with the
Board’s conclusion that the prices of food and food
services available to employees in an in-plant eating
facility are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Many
collective bargaining agreements have explicit or im-
plicit provisions concerning food services and prices
in in-plant eating facilities. Indeed, since 1967 the
Company and Local 588 have included many detailed
provisions regarding in-plant food services in their
collective bargaining agreement. In addition, man-
agement often considers subsidized in-plant facilities,
such as those at issue here, to be a major benefit for
both employees and employers.
Both the legislative history and the policies of the
National Labor Relations Act strongly support the
Board’s determination here that Congress intended to
subject a large spectrum of matters to mandatory
bargaining by using the broad phrase “terms and
conditions of employment.” In keeping with this
Court’s decisions, the Board in applying Section 8(d)
has remained faithful to the Act’s strong policy in
favor of collective bargaining as a means of resolving
industrial disputes. Indeed, the potential for indus-
trial strife arising out of in-plant food facility dis-
putes is highlighted by the wide scale food boycott
that occurred here. Concomitantly, in-plant food ser-
vices and prices do not involve “managerial decisions,
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.”
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, supra,
379 U.S. at 223.
14
ARGUMENT
THE BOARD PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT PRICES
OF FOOD AND THE FOOD SERVICES PROVIDED IN
AN EMPLOYER’S IN-PLANT FOOD FACILITIES FOR
ITS EMPLOYEES ARE MANDATORY SUBJECTS OF
BARGAINING UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RE-
LATIONS ACT
A. The Board Has Correctly Found That In-Plant Food
Prices and Services Fall Well Within the Ordinary
Meaning of “Terms and Conditions of Employment”
1. As originally enacted, the National Labor Rela-
tions Act did not directly specify the subjects about
which employers and unions must bargain. Section
8(a)(5) of the Act, now codified at 29 U.S.C 158
(a) (5), simply declares it an unfair labor practice
for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees, subject to
the provisions of section 9(a).” 49 Stat. 453. Sec-
tion 9(a), in turn, provides that a union selected by
a majority of the bargaining unit shall be the collec-
tive bargaining representative “in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment.” Ibid. (now codified at 29
U.S.C. ..159(a)).
Section 8(d) of the Act, which is the focal point
of this case, was added to the Act in 1947 by the Taft-
Hartley Amendments. 61 Stat. 142 (now codified at
29 U.S.C. 158(d)). This provision, using language
essentially parallel to that found in Section 9(a),
made explicit what was implicit in the original Act:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the
:_-_ -~
15
representative of the employees to meet at rea-
sonable times and confer in good faith with re-
spect to wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment * * *.
Read together, the foregoing provisions of the Act
“establish the obligation of the employer and the rep-
resentative of its employees to bargain with each
other in good faith with respect to ‘wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment * * *.’ The
duty is limited to those subjects, and within that area
neither party is legally obligated to yield. * * * As to
other matters, however, each party is free to bargain
or not to bargain * * *.” Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964), quoting
NLEB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356
U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
2. This case primarily involves the construction
and application of the phrase “terms and conditions
of employment” as used in Section 8(d). The broad
language of that provision encompasses, at a mini-
mum, all “issues that settle an aspect of the relation-
ship between the employer and employees.” Allied
Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971). Accord, NLRB v.
Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., supra, 356
U.S. at 350; Local 24, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 294 (1959). While
the sweep of Section 8(d) is not unlimited, certainly
“the various physical dimensions of [an employee’s]
working environment” constitute “terms and condi-
tions of employment.” Fibreboard Paper Products
16
Corp. v. NLRB, supra, 379 U.S. at 222 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
Although it acknowledges that many aspects of in-
plant food services are covered by Section 8(d) (Pet.
App. A20, A36-A37; A. 27, 62-63, 69-73),° petitioner
nonetheless contends that in-plant food prices are not
mandatory subjects of labor-management negotia-
tions. But no employee can be expected to work a
full eight-hour day without stopping to eat. Given
the necessity of eating, food availability is no less
germane to the employees’ working environment
than plant air temperature and quality, restroom
privileges and conditions, or employee rental of
company-owned housing—all of which are subject
to mandatory bargaining.’ For that reason, manage-
6 The concession is well warranted. The Company, as is
common for many employers in many different industries, has
bargained about many aspects of its in-plant food services
since 1967 (e.g., Pet. App. A20, A36-A37). See, e.g., BNA, 2
Collective Bargaining (Negotiations and Contracts) 95:421-
424, 441-444 (1978). In addition, the courts of appeals have
uniformly found such matters to constitute “terms and condi-
tions of employment.” See, e.g., NLRB v. Ladish Co., supra,
538 F.2d at 1272; International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 392
F.2d 801, 804, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906
(1968) ; Inland Steel v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir.
1948), cert. denied in relevant part, 336 U.S. 960 (1949), aff’d
on other grounds sub nom. American Communications Ass’n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See also Bralco Metals, Inc.,
214 N.L.R.B. 143, 146-150 (1974); Hasty Print, Inc., d/b/a
Walker Color Graphics, 227 N.L.R.B. 455, 461 (1976).
’ See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9,
15 (1962) (air temperature) ; Comment, A Case for Air Pollu-
tion as a Mandatory Bargaining Subject, 51 Ore. L. Rev. 223
(1971) ; American Smelting and Refining Co. v. NLRB, 406
— A
17
ment must bargain about meal hours and coffee
breaks even if no in-plant facilities exist.* And where,
as here, the employer has chosen to establish in-plant
eating facilities for the employee’s use, the employer
must also bargain about all aspects of the use of those
facilities, and the services provided in them, including
improvement in lunchroom equipment and supplies,”
coffee break scheduling and service of free coffee,”
free meal policy,” cancellation of catering truck
F.2d 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969) (com-
pany housing) ; NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205
F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953) (company heasing) ; Pennco, Inc.,
212 N.L.R.B. 677, 682-683 (1974), and Preston Products Co.,
158 N.L.R.B. 322, 344-345 (1966), aff’d in relevant part, 392
F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968)
(restrooms). See also NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822
(5th Cir. 1967) (safety and health rules) ; S.S. Kresge Co. v.
NLRB, 416 F.2d 1225, 1229-1230 (6th Cir. 1969) (employee
dress and smoking) ; Bralco Metals, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 143,
146-150 (1974) (personal telephone calls).
* See, e.g., Fibreboard, supra, 379 U.S. at 222; Local Union
No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676, 691 (1965); NLRB v. Ladish Co., supra, 538 F.2d at
1272; Missourian Publishing Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 175, 180
(1975); D & C Textile Corp., 189 N.L.R.B. 769, 771, 783
tm Fleming Manufacturing Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 452, 455
1957).
* Preston Products Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 322 (1966), aff’d in
relevant part, 392 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 906 (1968).
10 Missourian Publishing Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 175, 180 (1975) ;
Fleming Manufacturing Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 452 (1957).
™ O’Land, Inc., d/b/a Ramada Inn South, 206 N.L.R.B. 210,
214-215 (1978).
18
service,” meal areas,“ cleanup of !unchroom areas by
employees * and, we submit, the prices of the food
served.
Petitioner is not in the business of selling food to
its employees, and it cannot realistically be claimed
that in-plant food prices invclve “managerial deci-
sions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial con-
trol.” Fibreboard, supra, 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart,
J., concurring). Rather, those prices, like the eco-
nomic aspects of employee use of other in-plant facili-
ties—such as fees or charges, if any, for lockers, pay
toilets, or parking accommodations—are as much a
subject of the mandatory bargaining obligation as
their physical attributes. It is, after all, especially
with respect to economic disputes between labor and
management that the Act was intended to substitute
the bargaining process for work disruptions that
might otherwise ensue (see point C, infra).
In addition, the right to negotiate about in-plant
food services could be rendered nugatory if the em-
ployees’ representatives were unable to discuss the
price of the food that is provided. For example,
negotiations over the cleanliness and variety of selec-
tions available at an in-plant cafeteria would not be
meaningful if the employer were free unilaterally to
raise cafeteria prices to prohibitively expensive levels
2 Bralco Metals, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 143, 146-150 (1974).
18 Hasty Print, Inc., d/b/a Walker Color Graphics, 227
N.L.R.B. 455, 461 (1976).
% Cosmo Graphics, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 1061 (1975).
19
without any obligation subsequently to bargain about
the price in good faith at the union’s request. In sum,
it is whether desirable in-plant food is available at
reasonable prices that constitutes a condition or term
of employment.”
3. Petitioner attempts to avoid the plain thrust of
Section 8(d) by belittling the importance of in-plant
food prices to employees. Even if petitioner’s char-
acterization of this issue is correct, however, the Com-
pany must still bargain over changes in food prices
if the employees’ bargaining representative so de-
sires.” While an employer’s decision to raise the
** Ordinarily, when a matter is subject to mandatory bar-
gaining, all of its facets are subject to negotiation. For ex-
ample, mandatory bargaining over health insurance involves
not only whether insurance will be provided, but also the ex-
tent, cost of coverage, and any other pertinent matter affect-
ing employee benefits. See, e.g., Bastian-Blessing, Div. of Gol-
conda Corp. Vv. NLRB, 474 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1973) : Oil,
Chemical & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d
575, 582 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
* Since the Board’s order allows the Company unilaterally
to effect price changes and those changes will result in labor-
management bargaining only if the union subsequently re-
quests to negotiate, truly de minimis matters presumably will
not have to be discussed. Furthermore, an employer and union
could structure their bargaining relationships regarding food
prices to avoid repeated negotiations by, for example, placing a
ceiling on price increases allowable during a particular time
period. Petitioner’s assertion that the Board’s position will
lead to “endless rounds of negotiation” (Br. 28) is thus
baseless. In any event, the Act reflects Congress’s judgment
that negotiations are preferred to industrial strife and ‘hat
the latter may arise from seemingly minor complaints about
a condition of employment as well as from a major issue such
as wages.
20
annual employee contribution to the cost of health
insurance by a few cents would only marginally affect
the employees, it is beyond cavil that such a decision
is subject to mandatory bargaining. Similarly, the
fact that the increased cost of in-plant food or health
insurance could be offset by an increase in wages or
a cost of living adjustment clause does not place
those terms or conditions of employment beyond the
purview of Section 8(d). In short, that a term or
condition of employment is subject to minor changes
that are arguably compensable by increased wages
does not somehow erase the duty to bargain.”
Furthermore, petitioner’s characterization of the
importance of in-plant food prices is inaccurate. A
small increase in food prices is substantial when
viewed over a period of time. For example, if the
price of all food items provided in an in-plant food
facility were increased by ten cents, a worker who
purchases an average of four items per day (such as
one or two beverages and two or three food items in
an eight-hour work day) would pay an additional
eight dollars for food in a month with 20 work days
and an additional $88 in a year in which he worked
220 days. These figures are comparable to an in-
crease of eight dollars per month in employee health
cost payments or the cessation of a regular $75-$100
17 Nor is there merit in petitioner’s assertion (Br. at 26)
that an increase in the prices of food available in its in-plant
facilities is no different from an increase in prices at the local
food store. Health insurance is also available outside of the
employment relationship, but an increase in the cost to em-
ployees of employer-supplied insurance is clearly subject to
mandatory bargaining.
21
Christmas bonus—matters that are clearly subject to
mandatory bargaining. E.g., NLRB v. Citizens Hotel
Co., 326 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Niles-
Bem2nt-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952);
W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir.
1949) .™
Petitioner also seeks (Br. 31-32) to avoid the
plain terms of Section 8(d) on the ground that the
existence of an alternative (“brown bagging’) to the
cafeterias and coke cribs precludes classifying in-
plant food prices as a term or condition of employ-
ment. This contention is both factually inapplicable
and legally erroneous. Both the Board and the court
of appeals found that “brown bagging” was not a
viable alternative because the employees’ lockers were
often too hot and occasionally vermin infested (Pet.
App. A16-A17, A23 n.11). Such a concurrent factual
finding is ordinarily not reviewed by this Court. See
Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U.S. 630, 635
(1967) ; Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 491 (1951). In any event, not every member of
a bargaining unit must avail himself of a benefit in
order for that benefit to be a mandatory subject
* The effect of in-plant price increases is particularly ap-
parent in the instant case. Since virtually all employees must
eat in the in-plant facilities and since the employees’ lockers
are often unsuited to the storage of food, the Company has a
captive market. The importance of in-plant food prices is
further reflected in the mass employee boycott that occurred
here. Indeed, as a general matter, in-plant food prices and
services may well be of intense interest to employees who value
highly the scheduled breaks from what may otherwise be a
dull work routine.
22
of bargaining. See, e.g., Richfield Oil Corp., 110
N.L.R.B. 356 (1954), enf’d, 231 F.2d 717 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956) (optional
stock purchase plan); NLRB v. Lehigh Portland
Cement Co., 205 F.2d 821, 823 (4th Cir. 1953)
(only 25% of employees rented employer housing).”
4. In light of the important role of readily avail-
able in-plant food services at reasonable prices in the
overall working environment of employees, the Board
and the court of appeals correctly concluded that peti-
tioner had violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to
bargain.” The Board’s determination that in-plant
food prices and services are terms and conditions
of employment adheres to more than ten years of con-
sistent precedent.” Because the “classification of bar-
1° The Amicus Curiae Brief On Behalf of the National Auto-
matic Merchandising Association suggests that the Board’s
decision unduly interferes with the third party relationship
between the employer and the independent in-plant food facil-
ity managers and suppliers. In this case, however, the Com-
pany retained the power to control and review food services
and prices. Where the employer does not have such explicit
power, he can nonetheless seek to affect prices by, inter alia,
initiating or increasing a subsidy to the food caterer. We
further note that many employee benefits, such as health in-
surance, involve third-party suppliers.
2 As previously indicated, the Board found (and the court
of appeals agreed) that the Company had refused to negotiate
about both food services and food prices (Pet. App. A24; see
Pet. App. A21-A22, A39; A. 77 .
21In addition to the authorities cited in note 4, supra, see
also Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949);
O’Land, Inc., d/b/a Ramada Inn South, 206 N.L.R.B. 210,
215-216 (1973); Missourian Publishing Co., 216 N.L.R.B.
175, 180 (1975); Florida Steel Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 923
(1977).
23
gaining subjects as ‘terms or conditions of employ-
ment’ is a matter concerning which the Board has
special expertise,” Local Union No. 189, Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
685-686 (1965), the Board’s determination here is
entitled to great deference. Cf. Bayside Enterprises,
Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 302-304 (1977).
B. Established Industrial Practices Show That In-Plant
Food Services and Prices are “Terms and Conditions of
Employment”
This Court has repeatedly approved the propriety
of looking to industrial practices as an aid in deter-
mining the scope of Section 8(d). See, e.g., Fibre-
board, supra, 379 U.S. at 203. The inclusion of provi-
sions relating to in-plant food services and prices
in collective bargaining agreements is a widespread
practice in a substantial range of industries. See
* Although we argue primarily that in-plant food prices are
“terms and conditions of employment,” we submit that such
matters are also “wages” within the purview of Section 8(d).
In Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672, 676 (1949),
the Board held that meals served to employees at a remote
timber camp constituted “wages” (as well as “conditions of
employment”). The Board reasoned that the meals repre-
sented an “emolument of value” to the employees because they
saved both on the cost of transportation to obtain food and on
the cost of the food itself since the meals were sold below
cost. Cf. W. W. Cross & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878
(Ist Cir. 1949). The same analysis applies to food services
furnished by, and at, an industrial plant. As highlighted by
the facts of this case, the in-plant meals represent “emolu-
ments of value” in terms of transportation expenses, insofar
as alternative sources of food are relatively distant, and meal
costs, insofar as the Company has subsidized ARA.
24
BNA, 2 Collective Bargaining (Negotiations and Con-
tracts) 95:421-424, 441-444 (1978) ;™ see also note
24, infra. Indeed, since 1967 the local agreements
between petitioner and Local 583 have contained de-
tailed provisions regarding in-plant food services
(Pet. App. A20, A36-A39; A. 27, 62-63, 69-73). In
addition, numerous arbitration decisions have con-
strued collective bargaining agreements to cover the
cost of employer-supplied food as a condition of em-
ployment.”
That management commonly considers the provi-
sion of in-plant food to be “one of the most important
23 As petitioner points out (Br. at 29), none of the few
sample clauses from collective bargaining agreements repro-
duced in this study refer to in-plant food prices directly, al-
though several refer to the distribution of canteen profits to
the union. Such clauses apparently exist, however, see S. Torff,
Collective Bargaining: Negotiations and Agreements 279
(1953), especially in unpublished local agreements. Moreover,
the duty of management to negotiate about at least some
aspects of food services (which petitioner has conceded, Pet.
App. A24) confirms the duty to negotiate over food prices. The
right to negotiate over food services can be rendered illusory
if management can raise prices at will. It is whether desir-
able food is available at reasgnable prices that constitutes a
condition of employment. \
24 See, e.g., Universal Form Clamp Co., 68 Lab. Arb. Rep.
1223 (Miller, 1977) (cost of coffee) ; Hilton Hotels Corp., 42
Lab. Arb. Rep. 1267, 1270-1272 (Hanlon, 1964) (cost and
type of meals) ; Greater Los Angeles Zoo Ass’n, 60 Lab. Arb.
Rep. 838 (Christopher, 1973) (employer may not discontinue
practice of providing free meals to zoo food vendors when
contract provided that there would be no reduction of em-
ployee benefits) ; Alpena General Hospital, 50 Lab. Arb. Rep.
48 (Jones, 1967), and Lutheran Medical Center, 44 Lab. Arb.
Rep. 107 (Wolf, 1964) (free meals are working condition).
25
employee benefits” further evidences the correctness
of the Board’s determination here.“ In addition to
being a convenient mechanism for supplying neces-
sary meals while allowing employees to fraternize
with their fellow workers,” in-plant food services are
considered by management to benefit employees in
numerous other ways such as providing better nutri-
tion and nutrition education.” Such employee benefits
are enhanced by the availability of reasonable, or
subsidized, meals.* Management, in turn, my de-
rives a number of advantages from in-plant food
facilities: increased employee morale and productiv-
ity, reduced employee absenteeism and tardiness. the
ability to schedule shorter lunch hours and eales
breaks, and the greater ability to recruit new em-
ployees.”
** Fisher, Operating Your Firm’s Dinin
tears een g Area Profit
Administrative Management 66-67 (Oct. 1966). rofitably, 27
*° See Scheer, The Company Cafeteria, 4
Pi any f , 45 Personnel Journal
27 See W. Waite, Personnel Administration 578 (1952) ;
T. Toedt, L. Lovejoy, R. Story and D. Shainin, Managing
Manpower in the Industrial Environment 550 (1962).
** See Scheer, The Company Cafeteria, supra:
sonnel Handbook 577-579 (1951): T. Toedt, L "can,
R. Story and D. Shainan, Managing Manpower, supra, at 548-
550; Lunching at the Office: Four Plans, 28 Administrative
Management 32 (1967). See also Westinghouse Electric Corp
v. NLRB, supra, 369 F.2d at 894. )
2° See, e.g., Dana, In-House Food Services
Morale and Productivity, 52 Personnel Journal heaped orton é
BNA, Labor Policy and Practice Series (Personnel Man-
agement), 241:16 (1978); McCall Corporation, supra, 172
N.L.R.B. at 546 n.39. See also notes 25-28, supra.
26
Thus, many employers choose to provide in-plant
food services for their employees, and a substan-
tial portion of these food operations are employer-
subsidized.” These in-plant facilities are both an in-
tegral part of the employees’ working environment
and a significant employee benefit. In light of the
common industrial practice of providing for, and
bargaining about, such food operations, the Board
has reasonably concluded that in-plant food prices
and services are conditions and terms of employment.
C. The Legislative History and Statutory Purposes of the
National Labor Relations Act Support the Board’s Con-
clusion That In-Plant Food Prices Are Subject to Man-
datory Bargaining
1. The relevant legislative history indicates that
in enacting Section 8(d) Congress intended to sub-
% Petitioner is contractually obligated to subsidize ARA up
to $52,000 per year, which it has done in recent years (Pet.
App. A20, A383; A. 34, 82). Moreover, a recent survey con-
ducted through the Bureau of National Affairs’ Personnel
Policies Forum showed that 54 percent of the responding com-
panies provided food services using a lunchroom with vending
machines; 43% of the companies provided employee cafe-
terias, and 15% provided vending machines with snack bar
service. BNA, Labor Policy and Practice Series, supra, at 245:
201-204. Surveys published by the National Industrial Con-
ference Board in 1964 showed that 47% of the manufacturing
companies that responded provided cafeteria services, and
55% of the companies with cafeterias subsidized the opera-
tion. Only 8% of the companies reported that they were try-
ing to operate the cafeterias at a profit. NICB, Personnel
Practices in Factory and Office: Manufacturing, Personnel
Policy Study No. 194 at 76-77 (1964). For data on food
services in nonmanufacturing companies, see NICB, Office
Personnel Practices: Nonmanufacturing, Personnel Policy
Study No. 197 (1965).
27
ject a wide range of matters to mandatory bargain-
ing. The original House bill had sought to curtail the
scope of labor-management negotiations by specifically
listing the limited topics subject to mandatory bar-
gaining. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., § 2(11)
(1947) ; H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-
23, 49 (1947). However, the Senate, guided by the
comments of. then NLRB Chairman Paul Herzog,”
adopted the broader and more general language now
found in Section 8(d), thereby deferring to the
Board’s expertise in these matters.
In conference, the House’s attempt to “straight
jacket[]” and “limit narrowly the subject matters
appropriate for collective bargaining,” H.R. Rep. No.
245, supra, at 71 (Minority Report authored by
then Rep. John F. Kennedy), was rejected in favor
of the Senate version. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 34 (1947); 93 Cong. Rec. 6444
(1947) (summary report of Sen. Taft) ; id. at 6529
(remarks of Sen. Kilgore).** Congress thus appar-
ently foresaw that the scope of collective bargaining
51 See Hearings on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22 Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
1914 (1947).
* The Company claims (Br. 22) that, despite the broad
language of Section 8(d) as enacted, Congress intended to
retain the restrictive approach of the House bill. But, as
Mr. Justice Stewart has pointed out, the isolated language in
the House Conference Report that petitioner relies upon re-
fers to the similarity between the two bills in terms of collec-
tive bargaining procedures, not the scope of collective bar-
gaining. Fibreboard, supra, 379 U.S. at 221 n.5 (concurring
opinion).
28
might “vary with changes in industrial structure and
practice,” and therefore chose to leave the precise
details of what constituted a term or condition of
employment to the discretion of the Board. See Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor, note 31,
supra. Here, the Board, consistently with this legis-
lative history, has reasonably concluded that in-plant
food prices and services are mandatory subjects of
bargaining.
2. Similarly, the Board’s determination here ef-
fectuates a primary policy of the National Labor
Relations Act. The Act’s sponsors recognized that re-
fusals to bargain and negotiate had been a major
cause of industrial strife. NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1937). Thus, a
principal purpose of the Act is to promote the peace-
ful settlement of industrial disputes and labor-man-
agement controversies through the collective bargain-
ing process. See Fibreboard, supra, 379 U.S. at 211;
Section 1(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 151(b). As Judge
Craven, writing for the panel in Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corp. v. NLRB, supra, 369 F.2d at 895, stated:
The underlying philosophy of the Labor Act is
that discussion of issues between labor and man-
agement serves as a valuable prophylactic by
removing grievances, real or fancied, and tends
to improve and stabilize labor relations. Experi-
ence teaches that major work interruptions may
spring from seemingly trivial causes.
The Board’s inclusion of in-plant food prices and
services within the statutory scope of mandatory
29
bargaining thus effectuates the policies of the Act.
As epitomized by the large-scale boycott involved in
this case, relegating disputes over in-plant food mat-
ters to the collective bargaining process serves to
bring “a problem of vital concern to labor and man-
agement within the framework established by Con-
gress as most conducive to industrial peace.” Fibre-
board, supra.
While petitioner contends (Br. 27-28) that the
policies of the Act do not require in-plant food prices
to be a topic of mandatory bargaining, it acknow]-
edges that it must bargain over the inextricably
interlinked issue of food services. Indeed, since 1967
the collective bargaining agreements between peti-
tioner and Local 588 have contained various detailed
provisions concerning the in-plant food services (Pet.
App. A20, A36-A37; A. 27, 62-68, 69-73), and peti-
tioner does not claim that the negotiations underlying
those provisions were either unduly burdensome or
interfered with “managerial decisions, which lie at
the core of entrepreneurial control.” Fibreboard,
** With respect to food services, petitioner merely contends
(Br. 35-36) that the Board’s order does not define with rea-
sonable specificity the food service matters on which bargain-
ing is required. Since petitioner did not raise this issue before
the Board or the court of appeals—contending only that it did
not refuse to bargain about food services—it is foreclosed
from raising it here. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783,
788 n.7 (1977). In any event, the elements of the term “food
services” have already largely been defined by the Company’s
prior bargaining and by the Board and court decisions on this
subject. See notes 9-14, supra. The content of the term can be
further fleshed out in the course of subsequent negotiations
with Local 588.
30
supra, 379 U.S. at 228. Rather, given the importance
of in-plant food matters to the working environment
of employees and the interlocked nature of food
services and food prices,” the Board’s determination
below properly furthers the statutory policy of avoid-
ing industrial strife by means of labor-management
negotiations.
D. The Board’s Determination That In-Plant Food Prices
Are “Terms and Conditions of Employment” is Consis-
tent With This Court’s Prior Decisions
Although this Court has never directly addressed
the issue whether in-plant food matters are manda-
tory subjects of bargaining, an analysis of the Court’s
most relevant decisions supports the propriety of the
Board’s conclusion here. In a concurring opinion in
Fibreboard, supra, three Justices stated that Sec-
tion 8(d) at least includes “the various physical di-
mensions of [an employee’s] working environment.”
*In-plant facilities generally have a substantial impact
upon the employees’ working environment. See, e.g., Ladish
Co., supra, 219 N.L.R.B. at 357 & n.26 (citing Preston Prod-
ucts Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 322 (1966), rev’d on other grounds, .
873 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1967), and various industrial rela-
tions surveys). This conclusion is buttressed by the import-
ance that management attributes to this “employee benefit”
and management’s willingness to subsidize such facilities.
See pages 24-26, supra.
As previously noted, the facts of this case are particularly
compelling. Virtually every Company employee eats in the
plant because of the short lunch hour and the lack of alterna-
tives in the plant area, and because the employee locker area
is unsuitable for food storage.
*5 See pages 18-19, supra.
31
379 U.S. at 222. Other decisions of this Court have
recognized that the physical dimensions of an employ-
ee’s milieu, in turn, include air temperature” and
the particular hours of the day during which em-
ployees shall be required to work (and the times for
eating breaks) .”
Petitioner, relying on Allied Chemical & Alkali
Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., supra, 404
U.S. at 176, claims (Br. 23-27) that the Board has
erred because in-plant food prices do not “vitally af-
fect[] the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’ ”
We have shown, however, that in-plant food prices
are an integral and important part of an employee’s
working conditions. See pages 16-19, 24-26, supra.
Moreover, petitioner’s reliance upon the “vitally af-
fect” standard in Allied Chemical, supra, is misplaced.
That case involved the question whether retired em-
ployees’ pension benefits, which are not terms and
conditions of the employment of current employees,
nonetheless fall within the purview of Section 8(d)
because such benefits “vitally affect” the terms and
conditions of current workers. Thus, the “vitally
affect” standard has been used by this Court
when the matter in issue directly involves individuals
outside the employer-employee relationship and only
indirectly bears upon that relationship. See also
Local 24, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
** See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., supra.
** See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co., supra, 381 U.S. at 691; see also Fibreboard,
supra (“what periods of relief are available’).
32
v. Oliver, supra. Here, by contrast, in-plant food
prices, which a
re controlled and subsidized by the
Company, directly affect, and are a condition of, the
employment relationship.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
JOHN S. IRVING
General Counsel
WADE H. McCREE, JR.
Solicitor General
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
Deputy Solicitor General
ANDREW J. LEVANDER
Assistant to the Solicitor General
JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR.
Deputy General
ROBERT E. ALLEN
Counsel
Acting Associate General Counsel
NORTON J. COME
Deputy Associate General Counsel
RUTH E. PETERS
Attorney
National Labor Relations Board
JANUARY 1979
W ov. &. Government printine orice, 1979 265252 260
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