motion to dismiss — Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle

Supreme Court brief1978

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ann oon. a4

D

ations JUL 10 1978

Supreme Court of the Unite States a

October Term, 1977 i me n

No. 77-1671

MODJESKA SIGN STUDIOS, INC.,

Appellant,

We

PETER A.A. BERLE,

Appellee.

On Appeal from the Court of Appeals

of the State of New York

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ

Attorney General of the

State of New York

Attorney for Appellee

The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224

Tel. No. (518) 474-8096

RUTH KESSLER TOCH

Solicitor General

STANLEY FISHMAN

MURRAY SUSSWEIN

Assistant Attorneys General

of Counsel

Daily Record Corporation 3948 Spauiding Law Printing

Rochester. New York ( ) Syracuse, New York

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NE Ss dio cu deernannsececescooune u

Opinion and Determinations Below ............... 2

ccc tthe vag ee Cee ea ee Nabe she aE EROS 2

ein ted de Neo RS ECKEE TR ORD oO 2

I ee re ee ee ee 4

EE Su eh ee bed Pha We hensicesenvde cesses 5

Argument

POINT I — The determination appealed from — having

remitted the case to a trial court for further proceeding

involving a constitutional issue — is not a final

judgment. Therefore, this court does not have

jurisdiction to hear thisappeal ....... asicuve as »

POINT II — No substantial federal questions are

presented on this appeal, since it is well-settled that a

statute, enacted pursuant to a state’s police power,

which: (A) merely regulates the place and manner of

commercial advertising, such as billboards, does not

infringe upon freedom of speech in violation of the

First Amendment; and (B) provides an amortization

period for phaseout of pre-existing uses to enable an

owner to substantially recoup his investment in such

property prior to discontinuance of the use thereof,

does not deprive the owner of property without due

process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-

Wa vad sc bee Nok Care buecceeec er eneene 10

u

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488 F. 2d 118

(10th Cir., 1973), cert. den. 417 U.S. 982 (1974) ...... 17

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26(1954) ............... ll

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) .... 8,9

Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) ............045. 13

Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85

RE ae a ee eee eed os aaa 16

Markham Advertising Co., Inc. v. Washington, 73 Wash

2d 405, 439 P. 2d 248 (1968), app. dismissed for want of

a substantial federal question 393 U.S. 316 (1969);

rehearing denied 393 U.S. 1112(1969) .......... 13, 16,17

National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 464 P.

2d 33 (Cal, 1970), cert, den. 398 U.S. 946(1970) ...... 17

People v. Adirondack Raiiway Co., 160 N.Y. 225 (1899),

affd sub nom Adirondack Railway Co. v. New York

ee, PE Eo cS bbeuceesieecee ds ll

Radvo Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945) )

Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62

DE gc cnen cheeks ates Keeaheanaeenade wees 9

Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 43 NY2d 483

ne eer ss Perr a er ee 2,6

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) ......... 13

Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council,

i eos wkcdawecuns cas Phnece 14, 16

Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) . . . 16

wi

Page

New York Constitutional Provisions:

BY a ne ee 15

N.Y. Const., Art. XIV (“Conservation”) ............. 3, 11

Statutes:

EY, icc cu tanweuewsudeunednscanaws 1, 2, 4, 8

N.Y. Environmental Conservation Law, § 9-0305

EN iad EN ad wg passim

N.Y. Environmental Conservation Law, § 9-0101 (1) and

i es ee oe ae 11

N.Y. Environmental Conservation Law, § 11-0529

i ee ea cid ewee 11

N.Y. Public Lands Law, § 17 (McKinney’s 1951) ....... ll

SEIUUML UE ‘Scnavaceduaanedcecccsues 11

ED dc ondncdcennenséueseces 11

EE vec keexsécedcbewene ces 10

oe eee bed enkeees 3, 10

UAE 64.606 606060050c00000005 3, 10

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1977

No. 77-1671

MODJESKA SIGN STUDIOS, INC.,

Appellant,

Vv.

PETER A.A. BERLE,

Appellee.

On Appeal from the Court of Appeals

of the State of New York

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

Appellee, Peter A.A. Berle, Commissioner of Environmental

Conservation of the State of New York, by his attorney, Louis J.

Lefkowitz, Attorney General of the State of New York, moves

this Court, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of this

Court, to dismiss the appeal herein on the following grounds:

I. This Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal

since the determination appealed from is not a “final

determination” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2);

II. No substantial Federal questions are presented by this

appeal.

Opinion and Determinations Below

The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals, dated

December 21, 1977, is reported at 43 NY2d 468 and is set forth as

Appendix “A” to appellant's “Jurisdictional Statement”

(hereinafter “J.S.”), at pages la - 13a.

The Court of Appeals in its “Remittitur”, also dated December

21, 1977 (J.S., App. “D”, pp. 3la - 32a), “remitted the case to

Supreme Court, Albany County, for further proceedings in

accordance with the opinion herein” .' (Emphasis ours.)

Jurisdiction

Appellant seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under

28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).

It is appellee's position (as discussed in Point I of “Argument”,

infra, pp. 8-10) that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear

this appeal.

Statutes Involved

I. Federal Statute

Appellant claims that the determination by the New York

State Court of Appeals is a final judgment and, therefore, it may

appeal to this Court therefrom pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2),

which, in relevant part, provides:

“§ 1257. State courts, appeal; certiorari. Final

judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a

State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed

by the Supreme Court as follows:

IThereafter, the Court of Appeals, by order dated February 22, 1978 (JS.,

App. “E”, p. 39a) denied a motion by appellant herein (and by the appellant

in a related case, entitled Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse [which

case is being simultaneously appealed to this Court)), “for reargument of the

eer

.

appeals ° * * or, in the alternative to amend the remittiturs herein

(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity

of a statute of any state on the ground of its being

repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the

United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.”

Il. New York State Statute

The statute challenged on this appeal is § 9-0305 of the En-

vironmental Conservation Law of the State of New York

(hereinafter ECL, § 9-0305). This statute bars the erection or

maintenance of any off-premises outdoor advertising signs,

device or structure within the boundaries of the Adirondack and

Catskill Parks’ without a permit issued by the New York State

Department of Environmental Conservation. This statute was

made applicable to the Catskill Park by Laws of 1969, Chapter

1052, effective May 26, 1969, which provided that all signs in the

Catskill Park not eligible for a permit were to be amortized over

a period of time to be individually determined for each sign, and

then removed.

By Laws of 1970, Chapter 392, effective May 1, 1970, the

statute was further amended to provide a general amortization

period of 6-1/2 years for signs in the Catskill Park, in place of the

individually determined amortization periods.

The relevant portions of the statute, as currently in effect,

provide:

“§ 90305. Signs and advertising in Adirondack and

Catskill parks.

“1. In order to conserve the natural beauty of the

Adirondack and Catskill parks, to preserve and regulate

the said parks for public uses for the resort of the public

for recreation, pleasure, air, light and enjoyment, to keep

them open, safe, clean, and in good order for the welfare

2]t should be noted that the state-owned lands, consisting of a substantial

portion of said parks, are constitutionally protected and required to “be

forever kept as wild forest lands.” (N.Y.S. Cons., Art. XIV, Section 1.)

of society, and to protect and conserve the investment of

the state in forest lands, campsites and other interests in

real property in said parks, no person shall erect or

maintain within the boundaries thereof any advertising

sign, advertising structure or device of any kind, except

under written permit from the department. The

provisions of this section shall not apply to signs erected

or maintained upon a parcel or real property in con-

nection with the principal business or principal

businesses conducted thereon and which advertise such

business or businesses only, or to signs within the limits

of an incorporated village.

“As to signs, structures or devices existing within the

Catskill park on May 26, 1969, and which require a

permit pursuant to this section, the same may continue to

be maintained without permit until January 1, 1976

provided that the property owner or owner of such sign,

structure or device registers the same with the depart-

ment on or before January 1, 1972.

. oe *,

Questions Presented

I. Is the opinion and order of remittitur of the New York

State Court of Appeals — which reversed the order of the Ap

pellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

and remitted the case “for further proceedings in accordance

with the opinion herein” — a final judgment within the meaning

of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), thus giving this Court jurisdiction to hear

this appeal?

II. Since it is well settled that a state statute regulating the

place and manner of outdoor advertising signs for aesthetic

purposes, and which contains an amortization period for

phaseout of existing non-conforming signs, constitutes a valid

exercise of the police power, and that such a statute neither

violates the freedom of speech provisions of the First Amend-

ment nor constitutes a deprivation of property without due

process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, do claims

that ECL, § 9-0305 violate the aforesaid provisions of the First

and Fourteenth Amendments present substantial Federal

questions warranting plenary review by this Court?

Statement

In its “Statement” (J.S., pp. 4-10), appellant sets forth an

argumentative version of the “facts”, liberally supplemented by

statements of opinion and “facts” not contained in, nor sup

ported by, the Record on Appeal before the New York State

Court of Appeals. Appellant, by the paucity of its references to

that Record, implicitly acknowledges that the bulk of its “facts”

were not before the Court below.

We therefore set forth what we submit is the essential! factual

background of the case.

Appellant is the owner of approximately 96 outdoor ad-

vertising signs located in the Catskill Park (R. 92)’, all of which

were erected prior to May 26, 1969, when the provisions now

contained in ECL, § 9-0305 became applicable to the Catskill

Park.

ECL, § 9-0305 prohibits the erection of off-premise advertising

signs or structures within the Catskill or Adirondack Parks,

except under written permit from the Department of En-

vironmental Conservation. The ststute expressly exempts from

its scope all “signs withir the limics of an incorporated village.”

It also provides that signs within the Catskill Park existing prior

to May 26, 1969, may continue to be maintained without a

permit until January 1, 1976. As stated at page 8 of Appellant’s

Jurisdictional Statement, appellant’s signs are not eligible for

permits under rules promulgated by the Department of En-

vironmental Conservation and, hence, as of January 1, 1976, the

signs were subject to removal.

Appellant commenced this action in the New York State

Supreme Court, Albany County, for a declaratory judgment on

December 30, 1975, by service of the summons (R. 23) and

3Unless otherwise noted, parenthetical references (R. _) are to the Record

on Appeal before the New York State Court of Appeals.

verified complaint (R. 24-41), together with an order to show

cause (R. 18-20), seeking a preliminary injunction. Appellant's

complaint contained allegations, inter alia, that ECL, § 9-0305

was unconstitutional on its face in that (a) it effects a

deprivation of property without due process of law, in violation

of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (b) it effects an im-

permissible abridgment of speech, in violation of the First

Amendment.

Appellee cross-moved (R. 42-48) to dismiss the complaint for

failure to state a cause of action and requested that such motion

be treated as one for summary judgment, on the grounds that no

materia! question of fact existed and the complaint raised solely

questions of law which must, on the basis of settled decisional

law of the State of New York, be decided in appellee’s favor.

New York Supreme Court, Special Term, denied appellant's

motion for a preliminary injunction and granted appellee’s cross-

motion for summary judgment declaring the subject statute to

be constitutional (R. 917). The New York Appellate Division

affirmed (R. 88-97).

The New York Court of Appeals (the State’s highest Court)

reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the

case to Supreme Court, Albany County “to provide plaintiff with

an opportunity to establish, if it can, that the statutory

amortization period of six and one-half years is unreasonable, as

applied” (43 NY2d at p. 481 [J.S., App. “A”, p. 12a).

The Court of Appeals did, however, uphold the con-

stitutionality of ECL, § 9-0305 on its face, stating, “we cannot

agree with plaintiff's contention that BCL 9-0305 unreasonably

deprives it of property without due process of law” (43 NY2d at

p. 477 [J.S., App. “A”, p. 7a). The Court of Appeals, instead, held

ECL, § 9-0305 to be a reasonable exercise of the police power,

reaffirming its “prior decisions holding aesthetics to be a valid

basis for the exercise of the police power (see Suffolk Outdoor

Adv. Co. v. Hulse, 43 NY2d 483 [decided herewith])” 43 NY2d at

p. 473 [J.S., App. “A”, p. 2a]). The Court further stated that the

statute did not constitute a “taking” of property without due

process, since “it cannot be said that the prohibition of billboards

deprives landowners or their lessees of all reasonable use of their

property” (43 N Y2d at p. 477 [J.S., App. “A”, pp. 6a-7a)).

The Court did go on to differentiate the regulation of

billboards premised on highway safety from that based solely on

aesthetics, holding that “it would have been unreasonable to

require, solely for aesthe:ic purposes, the immediate removal of

the billboards prohibited in the present case” (43 NY2d at p. 478

{J.S., App. “A”, p. 8a]. Thus, the Court remanded the case for

determination of the reasonableness of the 6’ year statutory

amortization period, as applied to appellant’s signs, holding that

it could not decide this issue on the basis of the record before it.

The New York Court of Appeals also rejected appellant's

contention that ECL, § 9-0305 violates the First Amendment's

guarantee of free speech, citing its discussion of that issue in the

Suffolk case (43 NY2d at p. 481 [J.S., App. “A”, p. 12a), supra. In

that case, the Court held that the prohibition of non-accessory

billboards to promote aesthetics constituted a permissible

regulation of the place and manner of speech to effectuate a

significant government interest (43 NY 2d 483, 489).

Argument

POINT I

The determination appealed from — having remitted the

case to a trial court for further proceedings involving a

constitutional issue — is not a final judgment. Therefore, this

Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

Appellant baldly asserts (J.S., p. 3) that this Court has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C., § 1257 (2),

which provision, of course, is applicable only where there has

been a final judgment. However, appellant attempts to gloss over

the actual determination made, by relegating to a footnote (Fn.

“2” JS., p. 3) the indisputable fact that the New York Court of

Appeals remanded the matter for further proceedings involving

a constitutiona! issue (whether the statute, as applied to ap

pellant’s billboards, effects a deprivation of property without

due process). Appellant conclusorily asserts in this footnote that

“there is no question as to the finality of the judgment”, and in

support of this blanket statement refers to Cor Broadcasting

Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). It is submitted that there is,

indeed, much question as to the finality of the judgment and, in

claiming the contrary, appellant has misread or misinterpreted

the Cox Broadcasting case.

In Cox, supra, this Court discussed in detail four exceptions

which have developed to the traditional rule precluding review

by this Court where anything further remains to be determined

by a state court, upon remand or otherwise. However, none of

the four exceptions would appear to apply to the case at bar.

Each concerns a situation where all the federal question(s) in-

volved have been finally determined and the further proceedings

to be completed concerned only non-federal issues. These ex-

ceptions are further limited to cases in which the additional

state proceedings will not conceivably involve other federal

issues that could require Supreme Court review at a later date.

In the case at bar, the two federal issues involved are freedom

of speech and deprivation of property without due process.‘

While the New York Court of Appeals has made a final

determination on the freedom of speech issue, there has not been

any such final determination on the “taking” issue, since the

remand is for the very purpose of providing “plaintiff with an

opportunity to establish, if it can, that the statutory amor-

tization period of six and one-half vears is unreasonable, as

applied” (43 NY2d at p. 481 [J.S., App. “A”, p. 12a]. Surely, if

appellant feels itself aggrieved by the determinations which

remain to be made in the state courts as to the constitutionality

of the amortization period as applied to its various billboards, it

will, at such time in the future, still be able to claim that its

proper .y has been “taken” without due process — a federal issue

which may be brought to this Court for review.

Thus, entertaining appellant’s appeal at this time would not

necessarily terminate the action, nor even preclude a later

review by this Court of a federal question but, instead, might

well result in the type “piecemeal” review which has always

been eschewed by this Court. Republic Natural Gas Co. v.

Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62 (1948).

Moreover, it would seem that the case at bar is analogous to

the eminent domain proceedings referred to by this Court in

Footnote “6” of its opinion in the Cox Broadcasting case, supra

(420 U.S. at pp. 477-478). In such cases, this Court has held that

the state court judgment will not be considered as final unless it

was dispositive of the entire case and adjudicated all issues

including the issue of just compensation (see, also, Radio Station

WOW, Ine. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 [1945). Accordingly, even

though the First Amendment freedom of speech issue has been

finally decided by the New York Court of Appeals, the Four-

4in any event, it is appellee's position that neither of these issues raise any

substantia! federal questions. See Point II, infra, pages 10-18.

10

teenth Amendment question of whether appellant has been

deprived of property without due process has not been finally

determined by the New York Court of Appeals and, therefore, it

is submitted that this Court should not sever the First Amend-

ment issue while another federal question remains open.

POINT II

No substantial federal questions are presented of this

appeal, since it is well-settled that a statute, enacted pur-

suant to a state’s police power, which: (A) merely regulates

the place and manner of commercial advertising, such as

billboards, does not infringe upon freedom of speech in

violation of the First Amendment; and (B) provides an

amortization period for phase-out of pre-existing uses to

enable an owner to substantially recoup his investment in

such property prior to discontinuance of the use thereof, does

not deprive the owner of property without due process of law

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The predecessor to ECL, § 9-0305 first became a law in 1924 (L.

of New York 1924, c. 512) and, from its very inception, it is clear

that it was a regulatory statute enacted pursuant to the State’s

police power. As stated in its original form:

“In order to conserve the natural beauty of the

Adirondack park by preserving and regulating it for

public uses * * * and to abate the public nuisance which

has arisen through the unrestricted use of signs and

billboards therein, no person shall erect or maintain

within the boundaries thereof any advertising sign or

billboard, except under written permit from the com-

mission. * * * ” (Emphasis ours.)

After various amendments (not relevant herein), in 1969 (L.

1969, c. 1052), the statute was made applicable to the Catskill

Park, and in 1970 (L. 1970, c. 392) the statute was further

amended to provide for an amortization period of some six and

1]

one-half years for non-complying signs in the Catskill Park (in

place of individually determined amortization periods).

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that both the Adirondack

and Catskill Parks (the boundaries of which are defined,

respectively, in ECL, § 9-0101 [1] and [2]), are uniquely beautiful

areas within the State of New York which have long been given

special protection.’ They consist of an inter-mixture of private

and State-owned lands, with the State-owned lands — known as

the “forest preserve” — being protected by Article XIV

(“Conservation”) of the New York State Constitution. Suffice it

to say, as found by the Appe'late Division of the Supreme Court

of the State of New York in its opinion in this case (55 AD2d 340

[1977] at page 343 (J.S., App. “B”, p. 18a):

“The Adirondack and Catskill State Parks are con-

stitutionally protected preserves (N.Y. Const., art. XIV)

wherein special material and cultural values exist which

are deserving of preservation for future generations.

Thus, objects, such as outdoor advertising structures, that

offend the eye and detract from the natural beauty of the

setting are legitimate targets of legislation requiring

their removal providing the totality of the means em-

ployed is reasonable * * * ”

That a State, as a proper exercise of its police power, may

enact laws designed to conserve and protect the beauty and

appearance of an area — particularly areas of inestimable value

to the public such as the Adirondack and Catskill Parks — is now

beyond any shadow of doubt. Almost twenty-five years ago, in

the landmark and frequently cited case of Berman v. Parker, 348

SThe Adirondack Park was created in 1892 (L. 1892, c. 707) and the Catskill

Park was created in 1904 (L. 1904, c. 233). As to the “special protection”

given these areas, see, e.g., People v. Adirondack Railway Co., 160 N.Y. 225

(1899), aff'd sub nom Adirondack Railway Co. v. New York State, 176 US.

335 (1900); Environmental Conservation Law, § 11-0529 and Public Lands

Law, § 17.

12

US. 26 (1954), Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a unanimous

Court, observed (p. 32):

“We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has

been known as the police power. An attempt to define its

reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case

must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially

the product of legislative determinations addressed to the

purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor

historically capable of complete definition. Subject to

specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature

has spoken, the mublic interest has been declared in terms

well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the

judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be

served by social legislation, whether it be Congress

legislating concerning the District of Columbia (see Block

v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135) or the States legislating con-

cerning local affairs. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236;

Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525;

California State Association v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 1065.

*eer

Mr. Justice Douglas then declared (p. 33):

“The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.

See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,

424. The values it represents are spiritual as well as

physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the

power of the legislature to determine that the community

should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as

clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. ;

Thus, it is unquestionable that the interests sought to be

protected by ECL, § 9-0305 — aesthetic enhancement of uniquely

beautiful regions of the State of New York through regulation of

billboards and outdoor advertising signs — are constitutionally

legitimate and proper objects of attainment by the State under

its police power.

13

A.

With regard to the instant appeal, the appellee submits that it

is not necessary for this Court to again review whether a statute

which regulates the place and manner — not the content — of

commercial speech, in order to serve an important government

interest that is totally unrelated to suppression of free speech, is

an impermissible abridgement of freedom of speech, since this

Court has firmly and definitively determined that such type of

regulation is not unconstitutional.

In Markham Advertising Co. v. Washington, 73 Wash. 2d 405,

439 P. 2d 248 (1968), the Supreme Court of Washington, in

reviewing a statute strikingly similar to the statute now being

challenged, rejected the advertising company’s claim that the

statute unconstitutionally abridged freedom of speech, and held

that the minimal free speech interest affected by the statute was

outweighed by the public’s right to enjoy highways free of

dangerous, obtrusive and unsolicited presence of advertising

signs. Moreover, the Court specifically stated (439 P. 2d, at p.

259) “we hold that the maintenance of the natural beauty of

areas along interstate highways is to be taken into account in

determining whether the police power is properly exercised.”

This Court then dismissed, for want of a substantial federal

question, the appeal taken by the advertising company (393 U.S.

316 [1969]), and also denied its petition for a rehearing (393 U.S.

1112 [1969).

The law, therefore, is clear that a state legislature need not

subordinate all other legitimate public interests to the

protection of free speech, nor is it required to totally ignore such

other legitimate public interests in order to preserve absolute

freedom of speech (see, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 {1949}.

In this regard, it is noted that, in United States v. O’Brien, 391

U.S. 367 (1968), this Court declared (p. 377):

“* * * we think it clear that a government regulation is

sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional

14

power of the Government; if it furthers an important or

substantial governmental interest; if the governmental

interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;

and if the incidental restriction on alleged First

Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to

the furtherance of that inverest. * * * ” (Emphasis ours.)

Nonetheless, the appellant, in attempting to cloak itself in the

mantle of vindicator of First Amendment freedom of speech

rights, contends that recent decisions by this Court — which

decisions, admittedly, have blurred the distinction between

commercial and ordinary speech — require this Court to give

plenary consideration to the question of whether the regulation

of the place and manner of appellant’s billboards accomplished

by the subject statute effects an unconstitutional abridgment of

appellant’s freedom of speech. In support of its request for

plenary review, appellant cites Viryinia Pharmacy Bad. v.

Virginia Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and urges

that the tests set forth in that case for a statute to pass con-

stitutional muster have not been satisfied in the case at bar.

In the Virginia Pharmacy Bd. case, supra, this Court held (425

US., at p. 771) that for a statute to permissibly infringe upon

freedom of speech, it could not be directed to the content of the

regulated speech; it must serve a significant governmental

interest; and must leave open ample alternative channels for

communication of information.

That the statute in question fully satisfies these tests is easily

demonstrated. Initially, it is important to again note that ECL,

§ 9-0305 does not constitute a prohibition of outdoor advertising

signs since it expressly exempts from regulation signs “erected

or maintained upon a parcel of real property in connection with

the principal business or principal businesses conducted

thereon” and any signs located “within the limits of an in-

corporated village.” That the subject statute is not in any way

directed to the content of signs or billboards and is self-evident

from the words of the statute itself and from the fact that ap

15

pellant’s claim of unconstitutionality is limited to the two

contentions that no significant governmental interest is served

by the statute and that the available alternative channels of

communication are inadequate.

As to the interest served, there can be no doubt whatsoever —

as previously discussed — that the subject statute is a proper

exercise of the police power enacted to attain a significantly

important governmental interest, which interest clearly out-

weighs the minimal infringement of speech occasioned by the

statute. Thus, appellant’s challenge reduces itself solely to the

claim that alternative channels of communication are not

adequate.

However, the speciousness of this claim — notwithstanding

appellant’s imaginative attempts to “prove” the “uniqueness” of

its billboards as a means of communication — is established by

the factual finding of the New York Supreme Court in this case

(87 Misc 2d 600, 606 [J.S., App. “C”, p. 29a} that “there are ample

other channels of communication available in the affected area

such as radio, television and newspapers”, and the concurrence

with this factual finding by the Appellate Division (55 AD2d 340,

345 [J.S., App. “B”, at 20a]) when it noted that “[t}he same in-

formation [conveyed by appellant’s billboards] can be conveyed to

the public by newspaper, radio or television advertising.” This

factual finding, which was not, and could not be, questioned by

the New York Court of Appeals‘ conclusively refutes appellant’s

arguments that alternative channels of communication for the

supposedly “unique” medium of billboards are inadequate.

Moreover, there are at least two very recent decisions by this

Court which further substantiate that the challenged statute

does not effect an impermissible abridgment of speech, and these

6In cases such as the one at bar, the Constitution of the State of New York,

Article VI, § 3 (a), provides that the jurisdiction of the New York Court of

Appeals “shall be limited to the review of questions of law.”

16

eases (Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 [1976] and

Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 [1977]

inexorably point to the conclusion that the question herein is not

a substantial federal question.

In the Young case, supra, this Court, although emphasizing its

prior holding in Virginia Pharmacy Bad. v. Virginia Commercial

Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), supra, that commercial speech

is entitled to some protection under the First Amendment,

nonetheless explicitly stated (427 U.S., at p. 68) that “[a] state

statute may permit highway billboards to advertise businesses

located in the neighborhood but not elsewhere” and, in support

of this statement, cited (see fn. 30, 427 U.S., at p. 68), the case of

Markham Adveriising Co. v. Washington, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439

P. 2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial

federal question, 393 U.S. 316 (1969), supra.

Similarly, in the Linmark Associates case, supra, while this

Court struck down the township’s ordinance prohibiting the

posting of real estate “For Sale” and “Sold” signs on lawns

because the challenged ordinance was found to be directed at the

content of the signs — not merely the time, place and manner of

speech — this Court suggested (431 U.S., at p. 93) that had

Willingboro’s ordinance been genuinely concerned with the place

or manner of speech, or even “prohibited all lawn signs — or all

lawn signs of a particular size or shape — in order to promote

aesthetic values” (emphasis ours), the ordinance could have

survived constitutional scrutiny. Further, in making this ob-

servation, this Court, in a footnote (see fn. 7, 431 U.S., at p. 94),

cited, with apparent approval, the Markham Advertising Co.

case, supra.

Clearly, the freedom of speech issue in the case at bar is so fore-

closed by recent decisions of this Court as to leave no room for

real controversy and, therefore, cannot be deemed to present a

substantial federal question warranting plenary consideration

by this Court.

ee

17

Appellant’s claim that the subject statute effects a deprivation

of property (i.e., a “taking”) without due process of law in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is also without merit.

This claim is bottomed on the argument that an amortization

period — no matter how lengthy the period may be — can never

be a constitutionally adequate equivalent for compensation.

Surely, in the face of existing precedents, such argument is

patently frivolous.

As with the freedom of speech issue, the case of Markham

Advertising Co. v. State of Washington, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.

2d 248 (1968), supra, points to the conclusion that the “taking”

issued does not present a substantial federal question

warranting plenary review by this Court. In Markham, the

challenged statute provided for a maximum amortization period

of some four years, and the Washington Supreme Court held

that both the concept of amortization in lieu of compensation

and the length of the amortization period provided were con-

stitutional. As previously noted, this Court dismissed the appeal

taken by Markham for want of a substantial federal question

(393 U.S. 316 [1969], and also denied the petition for a rehearing

(393 U.S. 1112 [1969).

Similarly, in Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488

F. 2d 118 (10th Cir., 1973), the Tenth Circuit upheld the con-

stitutionality of amortization periods of two to five years for the

termination of signs made non-conforming by the subject or-

dinance, and this Court then denied a petition for certiorari. 417

U.S. 932 (1974).

Finally, in National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey,

464 P. 2d 33 (1970), the ordinance provided that billboards in “U”

(unclassified) districts were to be removed within one year after

the property on which a sign was located was reclassified into

some other district. The Supreme Court of California declared

that this one-year amortization period was constitutional with

18

respect to signs which had already been fully amortized, and

that other signs should be removed after the “expiration of a

reasonable amortization period in order to permit plaintiff to

recover their original cost” (464 P.2d, at p. 36). Certiorari was

thereafter denied by this Court. 398 U.S. 946 (1970).

As to the case at bar, it is important to note that ECL, § >

0305, on its face, provides for an amortization period of some 6-

1/2 years — significantly longer than the periods in the above-

discussed cases. Moreover, the Court of Appeals, in construing

this statute, not only upheld the 6-1/2 year amortization period

as being a constitutionally adequate and permissible alternative

to compensation but, additionally, directed (43 NY2d at p. 481

[J.S., App. “A”, p. 12a) that the case be remanded for a hearing

“to provide plaintiff with an opportunity to establish, if it can,

that the statutory amortization period of six and one-half years

is unreasonable, as applied.” Cf. National Advertising Co. v.

County of Monterey, supra.

Surely, under the circumstances herein, appellant’s claim of

deprivation of property without due process of law does not

present a substantial federal question and, indeed, is specious.

es ee Me

19

CONCLUSION

This Court should dismiss, the appeal on the ground that

there has not been a final judgment or, in the alternative,

that no substantial federal questions are presented.

Dated: July 6, 1978

Respectfully submitted,

LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ

Attorney General of the

State of New York

Attorney for Appellee

The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224

Tel. No. (518) 474-8096

RUTH KESSLER TOCH

Solicitor Genera!

STANLEY FISHMAN

MURRAY SUSSWEIN

Assistant Attorneys General

of Counsel

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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