Petition — Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board

Supreme Court brief1978

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IN THE MICHAEL ROBAK JR_CLERK

Siprenw Court of the Unite? States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

77-1470

N

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

Petitioner.

Vv.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Law Department JAMES W. CALLISON

Delta Air Lines, Inc. SIDNEY F. Davis

Hartsfield Atlanta Int’l Airport ROBERT S. HARKEY

Atlanta, Georgia 30320 Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

ROBERT REED Gray, Esq.

HALE RUSSELL GRAY SEAMAN

& BIRKETT

1001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

———— A TN ————

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - RE 7-6002 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I IT ccscacocitadeceusniascapsacapenatipnsabenabiaasieictidemateie 1

ITI cc iatictiiiniatinicieiintinsiatnoenirendinaainccteeiaiecnen 2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .......................--...--..0---- ae 2

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED ......... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE _. satellite 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT... alee 10

1. The Board’s Reasons for Ordering Arbitration

Were Not Supported by the Record and the Re-

quirement to Arbitrate Was Contrary to the De-

cisional Criteria Stated by the Board —.............. 11

2. The Court of Appeals Erred in Applying an

“Abuse of Discretion” Standard in Reviewing

the Decision of the Board Instead of a Standard

of Whether the Board Had Adhered to the Rec-

ord and its Own Decisional Criteria. __..... 17

SEIDEN siketiepidetsishesiildnnieltiian—<ie semis innaeiieeaetl — 22

Il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case, CAB Orders 72-

4-31/32 : . 3

Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 126 U.S. App. D.C.

399, 379 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1967) 11, 15, 19

Carey V. O’Donneli, 165 U.S. App. D.C. 46, 506

F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.

1110 er . x

City of Lawrence v. CAB, 348 F.2d 582 (1st Cir

1965) | 16, 19

Committee of Former Northeast Stewardesses Vv.

CARB, Case No. 75-1066 (D.C. Cir. May 27,

1975) 1,8

Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 148 US. App.

D.C. 330, 443 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1971) 17, 18, 19

Deita-Northeast Merger Case ey

CAB Orders 72-5-73/74 3,4

CAB Order 72-8-1 4

CAB Order 73-9-42 2, 6, 12, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21

CAB Order 75-1-6 2,8, 12,13, 14, 16

CAB Order 76-9-129 2,8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 19

Kent v. CAB, 204 F.2d 268 (2nd Cir. 1953) 3

Outland v. CAB, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 90, 284 F.2d |

224, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1960) 5

United-Capital Merger Case, 33 CAB 307 (1961 ) 4

Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) 2

49 U.S.C. § 1878 3

49 U.S.C. § 1486 | 28.9

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No.

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

. Petitioner,

CIvIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Delta Air Lines, Inc. (“Delta”) herewith petitions this

Court to issue a writ of certiorari to review the opinion

and judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit entered on January 20,

1978, which affirms a decision of the Civil Aeronautics

Board (“Board”) which ordered Delta to submit to arbi-

tration a seniority integration dispute growing out of the

merger of Northeast Airlines, Inc. (“Northeast”) into

Delta.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, review of which is

sought here, is not yet reported, but is set forth at page

la of the Appendix to this petition. Also pertinent and

necessary to the consideration of this case are (1) the

unreported order and opinion of the Court of Appeals in

the case of Committee of Former Northeast Stewardesses

v. CAB (D. C. Cir. May 27, 1975) which is set forth at

2

page 1b of the Appendix, (2) the Board's order of which

review was sought in the Court of Appeals (Delta-North-

east Merger Case, Order 76-9-129, dated September 29,

1976) which is set forth at page lc of the Appendix, and

(3) the Board’s prior orders in the case, Orders 75-1-6

and 73-9-42, set forth at pages ld and le, respectively,

of the Appendix.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit was entered on January 20, 197%

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

$ 1254/1) and 49 U.S.C. § 1486(f).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(1) Whether, under applicable principles of adminis-

trative law, the Civil Aeronautics Board may order an

air carrier to arbitrate a seniority integration dispute

under the Board’s Labor Protective Provisions (imposed

in airline mergers) when the request for arbitration un-

disputedly came many months after the time limits for

seeking arbitration had run, when the Board itself recog-

nized the importance of enforcing the time limits in order

to avoid labor strife, and when there was no evidence in

the record to support the Board’s reasons for ordering

arbitration.

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying an

“abuse of discretion” standard in reviewing the decision

of the Civil Aeronautics Board instead of the standard of

whether the Board had adhered to the record and its own

decisional criteria.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

Although not directly related to the issues in this case,

Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as

3

amended (“Act”), 49 U.S.C. § 1378, is the statutory au-

thority for the Labor Protective Provisions | LPP's

imposed by the Board in this and other cases maven to

do with mergers of air carriers. See Kent v. CAB, 204

F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1953). Section 408 is set out at page

if of the Appendix (“App.”). There are no regulations

involved, but the LPP’s imposed by the Board as a condi-

tion to its approval of the merger of Northeast into Delta,

when the merger was approved by the Board in May of

1972, are directly in issue in this case. Because of the

similarity of the LPP’s to statutory and regulatory provi-

sions and their pertinence to this case, the awe and

related portions of the Board’s Orders 72-4-31 32' and

Orders 72-5-73 74 are included in the Appendix.’

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As is explained in greater detail below, in this case

Delta was ordered by the Board to submit to arbitration

a dispute concerning the integration of seniority lists for

the stewardesses of Delta and Northeast following the

merger of the two companies in August of 1972, notwith-

standing the facts that (1) the Board’s LPI 8 called for

submission of disputes to arbitration and decision within

90 days, and (2) it was (and is) undisputed that the

Committee seeking arbitration did not request it until the

spring of 1974.

The merger of Delta and Northeast was approved by

: . . FOF

the CAB pursuant to § 408 of the Act in Orders 72-5

"1 Orders 72-4-31/22 (App. lg) approved the merger of Alleghe nl

Airlines and Mohawk Airlines. In the All ahe nu-Mohawk CORE, ‘ a

Board indicated that it also would apply its reasoning In that -_

with regard to the LPP’s to the Delta-Northeast case. (App. 49,

footnote 25). In the ordcr approving the Delta-Northeast cnse

(App. th), the Board incorporated by reference its statements re-

garding the LPP’s made in the Allegheny-Mohawk case. (App.

2h).

? The LPP’s themselves appear at page li of the Appendix.

i

73/74 dated April 24, 1972 (App. lh), and was consum-

mated on August 1, 1972. In connection with its approval

of the merger, the Board imposed the LPP’s which are

attached as Appendix 1 to Order 72-5-73 (App. li)

Among other things the LPP’s require the surviving car-

rier to provide for the integration of seniority lists “in

a fair and equitable manner” and for the arbitration of

disputes arising under the LPP’s, including those related

to seniority integration. (App. li-2i, 11i)

These LPP’s are substantiall

es y the same as the standard

= 8 imposed by the Board in the United-Capital Merger

ase, 33 CAB 307 (1961), and subsequent merger cases

except for several changes in the arbitration procedures

which were designed to ensure expedited presentation and

resolution of disputes. The Board said:

“Expedited hearings and decisi

al ecisions will be e -

ed, and a decision shall be rendered within 90 days

after the controversy arises, unless an extension of

time is mutually agreeable to all parties.” {empha-

sis added} (App. 11i) . ;

: v4 reliance of the total package of conditions attached

Vv the Board to the approval of the merger, including the

LPP’s containing the expedited arbitration procedures

Delta accepted the terms of the merger imposed b the

Board and Northeast’s certificates were ro svein te

Delta on August 1, 1972. See Order 72-8-1 :

In July of 1972, prior to the effective date of the mer-

ger, representatives of the two carriers and the Tran

port Workers Union (“TWU”) met in connection with

the integration of the stewardess senurity lists. (At that

time, the TWU was still the collective bargainin re -

sentative of the Northeast stewardesses under the Rail.

way Labor Act.) At this meeting TWU insisted th t it

should negotiate the lists with Delta, but Delta sts 4

that representative committees of the two danuielon

|

'

- —_-

5

groups should be selected for this purpose. Subsequently,

committees were selected by both stewardess groups and

negotiations began. The Northeast committee was not

represented by any TWU personnel during these negoti-

ations.

The negotiations extended over a period of approxi-

mately two months, but eventually resulted in an inabili-

ty of the two groups to agree upon an integrated list,

primarily because of the insistence of the Northeast

stewardesses on a straight date of hire integration.* The

Northeast representatives then withdrew from the nego-

tiations. At this point Delta concluded that its responsi-

bility under the LPP’s required that it develop a fair and

equitable seniority list, based upon the ideas that it had

been put forward by both stewardess groups during the

meetings, subject to any arbitration that might be in-

voked by any dissatisfied employees.

Delta did not receive complaints from any steward-

esses, former Northeast or original Delta, after the inte-

grated list was published, although the TWU had re-

quested arbitration before the integrated list was pub-

lished. Delta responded to TWU’s request by pointing

out that the TWU was not authorized to represent the

former Northeast stewardesses under the LPP’s merely

by virtue of its former representation under the Railway

Labor Act, citing CAB precedent to this effect and em-

phasizing that Delta had not received complaints from

individual stewardesses or been provided with any evi-

dence that TWU had been authorized by any employees

’ With respect to this contention, which was later embraced by the

Committee of Former Northeast Stewardesses, it is interesting

to note the court’s statement in Outland Vv. CAB, 109 U.S. App.

D.C. 90, 284 F.2d 224, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1960), that “The contention

that length of service could control or even that it should always

be the dominant factor in seniority is not consistent with experience

nor with judicial attitudes toward the subject.” [citations omitted |

6

to represent . ;

wy ry them for LPP purposes. Still no complaints

P b January of 1973, TWU filed a petition with the

seeking an order compelling Delta to arbitrate the

stewardess seniority lists. In its answer filed on Febru-

ary 15, 1973, Delta responded essentially as it had to the

TWU itself, stating that the TWU had not shown that it

represented any employees under the LPP’s, that because

of the break-down in negotiations between the stewardess

a Delta had been forced to integrate the

ists in What it considered to be a fair and equitable man-

ner, subject to requests for arbitration from dissatisfied

employees, and that it had recei

oe ived no such requests from

In May of 1973, the TWU filed a supplement to it

sera — - statements to TWU from five Penton

east stewardesses, advising that these stewardes

were dissatisfied with the integrated seniori y Met. Delta

— by stating that Delta itself stil] Steet cake

7 py agp or requests for arbitration and pointing

, tat by this time it had been many months since the

effective date of the merger and since Delta had ubli Jj a

the tegrated list so that any complaints filed t thi

point would not be timely under the LPP’s =

a In he rage of 1973, the Board issued Order 73-9-42

w ich it denied the TWU petition. The Board sum-

marized Delta’s July 2, 1973 answer as follows:

a its answer, Delta states that it still has not

re request from any former Northeast stew-

- — .. . for arbitration of a seniority problem:

woh, ~ Raby has not informed Delta of any au-

n to represent any former North

ployees in seniority matters: t/ Seord ahonid

or ; ; that the Board sh

reject TWU’s petition on th | i

e grounds that no dis-

wer heaped properly submitted to Delta for wii

m Ww a reasonable period ] ,

- of time afte

he dispute arose... .’ [emphasis added] lng ef

Then the Board ruled:

“We will dismiss the TWU petition on the alter-

nate grounds that (1) no showing has been made

which warrants intervention on the Board’s part, and

(2) TWU is not a ‘representative’ of the former

Northeast employees for purposes of invoking the

provisions for arbitration contained in our labor

protective provisions merely because it was the col-

lective bargaining representative of those employees

prior to the merger.” (App. 5e)

The Board refrained from deciding the question of

timeliness raised by Delta, saying in a footnote that this

and other questions were appropriate “for resolution in

the context of negotiation or an arbitration proceeding

and, accordingly, we do not decide them here.” The

Board did not, however, give any indication of how the

question of timeliness should be handled or otherwise

provide any guidance should the question be submitted

to arbitration. Nor did it order arbitration in the event

that a further request was made. The TWU did not seek

review of this order and thereafter Delta received no

further request from the TWU for arbitration.

It was not until April of 1974—some 6 months after

the Board had denied TWU’s petition, approximately 18

months after the integrated seniority list had been pub-

lished and over 20 months after the effective date of the

merger—that Delta received a request from an attorney

representing three former Northeast stewardesses (the

“Committee”), supported by written authorizations, re-

questing negotiation or arbitration of the stewardess

seniority list. These stewardesses claimed to have au-

thority to represent other former Northeast stewardesses,

although written authorizations from the other steward-

esses were not furnished at that time. Delta denied the

request on the basis that it came many months after the

expiration of the time limits set out in the LPP’s and

8

_ to enter into arbitration at such a late date would

wart the major purpose of the LPP’s, i.e., to avoid

labor strife and unrest. i iy rs

Following Delta’s response to their reques

0 eg Stewardesses waited almost na po sone

= ¢ ae any further action. Then in June of 1974

; ey eda petition with the CAB seeking an order di-

ee —o nde panae-o oe! approximately six more

om, © issued Order 75-1-6. In this or

a Aang to deal with the policy arguments se

beng we — denying the request for arbitration on the

co dheuien the guiion, deuting tho guiiienes »

: ing the petitioners to th

courts, because the Board “ordinari ‘

tata petitions requesting that sa eer ape oagee

proceed to arbitration under the Board’s canines teteer

emer ype esi sage the basis of its ruling "the

rd ¢ its lack of expertise in labor matt

possibility of an appeal should it order i ig “

problems with enforcement of any sae dina “ry

= ectin i-

7 mg pte sought review of this aa ma

ade ettaa = . §$ 1486 and the Court of Appeals sum-

a —_ and remanded for a “decision on the

= ve = ry By, v. O'Donnell, 165 U.S. App. D.C

ae 4 ~e ~” (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 US.

pone Po w oe court had held that the Board has

oo S sree iction to decide matters arising under its

PP's. C mmittee of Former Northeast Stewardes

Civil Aeronautics Board, supra. (App. 1b) —

In its . 76.90.1909 ;

and pada "oe Gad in response to the court’s reversal

the time lienits a recognized and strongly embraced

ceiletnainnll a grt that Delta has consistently

con” Mie a ce t e Committee first requested arbitr ad

. After reciting the basic facts, the Board said: a

“Ordinarily, the Bo

xe ° Sd : ard would consid. >

recital of facts, if true, to be dapecitive of the one

S-

—

_ a en

9

tion of timeliness. As we pointed out in the Alle-

gheny-M ohawk Merger Case, supra, delays in reach-

ing arbitration prolong labor disputes and under-

Open-ended avail-

mine harmonious labor relations.

ability of arbitration can only ferment further strife

and is an invitation for abuse of the system adopted

by the Board for the protection of employees af-

fected by a merger, or a large-sale {sic | acquisition.

Moreover, it is clear that the Board's arbitration

provision contemplates 4a speedy resolution of dis-

putes.” | mphasis added| (Order 76-9-129, p. 4)

(App. 6c)

The Board went on to conclude, however, that because

of what is called “highly unusual circumstances and con-

flicting assertions attending the history of this particular

seniority integration” and supposed deficiencies in the

record, “we are unable to definitively resolve . . . the

merits of Delta’s argument that the arbitration provisions

are untimely invoked.”

Therefore, the Board decided “. . . to order arbitration,

but to include in the arbitrator’s mandate a jurisdictional

question” as to the timeliness issue. The Board made it

quite clear, however, that it considered the timeliness

question as one which it normally would decide.

“We should emphasize that our action with respect

to the timeliness issue is predicated upon the par-

ticular circumstances present and the record before

us. Our normal inclination, given an adequate rec-

ord not requiring further proceedings, would be to

resolve the issue at this stage. However, this is not,

to all appearances, such a case.” {emphasis added |

(Order 76-9-129, p. 6, App. 8c)

Delta sought review in the Court of Appeals pursuant

to 49 U.S.C. § 1486, on the basis that the Board had

failed to adhere to its own decisional criteria, i.e., that

ere true, the Board itself would have

because the request for arbitration

if the stated facts w

dismissed the petition

10

was not timely filed. Delta showed that the facts wer

undisputed (indeed, Delta accepted the facts pleaded “

the Committee ) and that application of the Board’s rea-

soning to these facts required a decision dismissin, the

petition on the merits. In its decision on a wing the

Court of Appeals concluded that “The basic question non

fore this Court is whether the Board abused its discretion

by referring to the arbitrator the procedural issue of

timeliness of the request for arbitration rather th:

deciding that issue on the record before it e y App 2a)

Applying this standard, the Court concluded po the

Board had not abused its discretion and affir ,

Board’s order, —

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

T ; ae "Ac » 3 ;

i his case presents important questions concerning the

: ministration of Labor Protective Provisions in airline

er . ¢ a J 7 J a . ~~ ;

mee yl cases, as well as questions concerning the require-

7 saan nan pear esapcienaty agency adhere to the evidence

pie — an to its own decisional criteria. In addition

“apa questions as to the proper standard to be applied

od + pp such cases by courts of appeals. The stand

ard of review utilized by " n this

y the Court of A

; Appeals in this

case co :W ; alt

= c a with the standard used by the First Circuit

= ee pel nenpensn used by the District of Columbia

‘cult In other cases, Th |

ses. e conflict should be res

on a se : e resolved

; 8 Court. Additionally. b

Y, because the Board :

> ard and the

a of Appeals so clearly departed from the accepted

« ) ‘ * . *}

oP a of appropriate standards of administrative

7 — case which has vital precedent value with respect

ner merger cases, this C

t ses, this Court’s power of s visi

wi ' . Supervision

is called for to correct the serious errors below |

11

1. The Board’s Reasons for Ordering Arbitration Were

Not Supported by the Record and the Requirement to

Arbitrate Was Contrary to the Decisional Criteria

Stated by the Board.

There is no more fundamental principal of administra-

tive law than the requirement that the agency must ad-

here to the evidence of record. See Braniff Airways, Inc.

v. CAB, 126 U.S. App. D.C. 399, 379 F.2d 453, 456

(D.C. Cir. 1967). The Board’s decision in this case is

based, however, not on the clear and undisputed facts in

the record, but on vague statements concerning the his-

tory of the dispute and factors which the Board said

“appeared” to be relevant or pertinent. After stating

that the recited facts ordinarily wouid be dispositive of

the issue of timeliness and recognizing the policy reasons

for enforcing the time limits, the Board reasoned as fol-

lows:

“On the other hand, we cannot ignore the highly

unusual circumstances and conflicting assertions at-

tending the history of this particular seniority list

integration dispute. This history is described in some

detail in Order 73-9-42 (served September 13, 1973)

and Order 75-1-6, supra, the pertinent portions of

which we incorporate herein by reference, and need

not be repeated here at length. Briefly, the dispute

was under active negotiation between the former

Northeast stewardesses, more precisely, their as-

sumed representative, the Transport Workers Union,

since prior to the consummation of the merger; the

negotiations failed; pursuit of arbitration by the

Transport Workers Union, on behalf of the stew-

ardesses, foundered because of problems with respect

to the TWU’s authority to represent the Northeast

stewardesses (see Order 73-9-42, supra); and subse-

quent to TWU’s withdrawal, a group of individual

stewardesses took up the task of pursuing the arbi-

tration remedy, culminating in the instant proceed-

ing.

12

“Moreover, while the record is rife with documents

detailing various aspects of this continuing history,

the material is in the form of numerous—and ap-

parently conflicting—unsworn allegations of a fact-

ual, legal. and equitable nature, involving various

aspects of labor-management relations as well as

other matters. Relevant to the ultimate issue of

timeliness raised by Delta appears to be the ques-

tion of the representational capacity of various in-

dividuals and groups, and the TWU, involved in the

negotiations and the quest for arbitration of the

underlying seniority integration dispute. Also perti-

nent may be Delta’s actual knowledge of dissatisfac-

tion with the seniority list adopted by it following

the failure of negotiations and the form that such

dissatisfaction took, whether formal complaints or

otherwise. Furthermore, there is in our mind some

question as to the extent that Delta’s own actions

in this ongoing controversy may have served to

defeat, through delay, legitimate rights to arbitra-

oo a ~ bet labor protective provisions,”

emphasis added} (

— | (Order 76-9-129, pp. 4-5) (App.

Orders 73-9-42 (App. 1d) and 75-1-6 (App. le) do not,

however, support the Board’s conclusions and the factors

cited in the second paragraph quoted above are nothing

more than the Board’s repetition of the arguments made

by the Committee which are legally irrelevant. The

Board’s “brief history” of the case implies that the TWU’s

efforts “foundered” for some reason with which the Board

had no connectior and that the Committee’s efforts were

merely an uner-cen continuation of the TWU effort. The

undisputed facts are that the Board dismissed the TWU’s

request for an order directing arbitration and that Delta

received no request from the Committee for

thereafter. * many months

In Order 13-9-42, which dealt with the TWU’s request

for arbitration, the Board found nothing “unusual” about

Delta’s refusal to submit the stewardess seniority aribtra-

13

tion matter to arbitration with the TWU. To the con-

trary, the Board held in no uncertain terms that the TWU

had no right to demand arbitration merely because it had

been the representative of the Northeast stewardesses

under the Railway Labor Act prior to the merger and

that it must present evidence of its representative capac-

ity under the LPP’s in order to invoke arbitration. The

Board said:

“We will dismiss the TWU petition on the al-

ternate grounds that (1) no showing has been made

which warrants intervention on the Board’s part,

and (2) TWU is not a ‘representative’ of the former

Northeast employees for purposes of invoking the

provisions for arbitration contained in our labor pro-

tective provisions merely because it was the collective

bargaining representative of those employees prior to

the merger.” (Order 73-9-42, p. 4, App. 5e)

The TWU did not appeal this order which was issued

in September of 1973 or come forward with any evidence

of representation despite the Board’s statement that it

could obtain arbitration by doing so. (See Order 73-9-42,

p. 4, App. 6e) It was not until March of 1974 that the

Committee’s lawyer contacted Delta with a request to

arbitrate and it was April of 1974 before the lawyer sub-

mitted the evidence of representation clearly required

under Order 73-9-42.

In Order 75-1-6, in which the Board initially dealt with

the Committee’s request for arbitration, the Board cited

no unusual circumstances or conflicting assertions on the

issue of timeliness. It merely stated that for reasons hav-

ing to do with the Board’s lack of expertise in labor mat-

ters the petitioners “. . . should resort to the courts to

the extent that they seek an order directing a carrier to

proceed to arbitration.” (App. 6d) There was no state-

ment whatsoever of conflicting assertions which would at

that time have precluded the Board from deciding the

question of timeliness.

alll

14

‘The Board’s position in Order 75-1-6 cannot be squared

with its decision in the order now at issue. Under the last

order a decision on timeliness “normally” is one for the

Board which would be decided when the petition for arbi-

tration is filed. (Order 76-9-129, p. 6, App. 8c) Delta

asked the Board to make just that decision when the Com-

mittee s petition was filed and the Board refused to make

it in Order 75-1-6, although it now says that under the

facts mm this ease it would have decided that the request

for arbitration was barred by the time limits, absent the

unusual circumstances.” Nothing has changed since the

filing of the petition and Delta’s response, which consti--

tuted the record when the Board issued its Order 75-1-6

except that the Committee appealed and the Court of

Appeals remanded the case to the Board for “a decision

on the merits.” The Board failed, however, to comp!

with the court’s mandate and instead manufactured addi.

tional reasons not to render a consistent decision on the

merits. The latest reasons are not supported by Orders

73-9-42 and 75-1-6 as the Board states, and thev are not

supported by the record. a

In its filing with the Board, the Committee maintained

that it was the successor to the TWU as representative

of the former Northeast stewardesses and that, accord-

ingly, it should not be barred by the LPP time limits be

cause of the early efforts of the TWU to seek arbitration

and the Board apparently was swayed by this argument

Even assuming, however, that there was any relationshi ,

between the TWU and the Committee, the undis aa

facts, tdeed the facts as stated by the Committee ‘ite l

m its original petition, show that the LPP time lis -

were grossly violated even if the time is measured i

from the dat iti }

al e date that the TWU petition was denied by the

The Committee itself did not alle

T ge that Delta h -

ceived any request to arbitrate except for the TW od

15

quest and the request of the Committee filed many months

after the Board dismissed TWU’s petition. Accordingly,

there was absolutely no dispute and there were no “con-

flicting assertions” concerning the facts related to the ts-

sue of timeliness. These undisputed facts show that the

very first contact to Delta by the Committee came almost

290 months after the merger effective date, almost 18

months after Delta advised all flight attendants of the

integrated seniority list, almost 6 months after the Board

dismissed the TWU petition, over 5 months after the

Committee was advised by the TWU that it would not

proceed and almost 4 months after the Committee re-

tained counsel. When the LPP’s, which were distributed

to each of the former Northeast stewardesses prior to the

merger, call for submission of disputes after 20 days and

decision within 90 days after a dispute arises, there can

be no question that, as a matter of law, a dispute sub-

mitted over 18 months from the date the dispute arose is

barred. Even after the Committee retained legal counsel

there was no contact for almost 4 months, a period which

in itself violated the LPP requirements.

The Board simply ignored the clear and uncontested

facts in the record to reach a decision ordering arbitra-

tion when in the same order the Board said that if the

facts were uncontested it would dispose of the case itself

in Delta’s favor. The ruling of the Board also is contrary

to the Board’s statement that “We should emphasize that

_.. given an adequate record not requiring further pro-

ceedings ... ,” the Board would “.. . resolve the issue

at this stage.” (Order 76-9-129, p. 6, App. 8c) It was

shown that the relevant facts in the record were complete

and undisputed. Thus the Board improperly delegated

the issue to an arbitrator under its own standard for

delegation.

As the Court of Appeals said in Braniff Airways, Ine.

v. CAB, supra:

16

“None of [the] salutary inci

me @ it Y principles of judici

a : equires the court to po he ‘odmin

€ pronouncements clearly at ith

established facts.’ NLRB v. M 4 = Putt Pao

‘ - Morganton Full Fash-

ond —s Co., 214 F.2d 913, 916 ‘a Oe

ag et this is precisely what we have found

pe Ma sagpoe: of the record and comparison with

er Ras bees cannot ignore the funda-

retion between the Board’ ]

of fact and what the record : .” lon

phasis added] (379 F.2d 453 at 40g em

Similarly, in this ca

y, Se the Board’s assertion of

7 a |

a a to decide the issue of timeliness pr

nspection of the record (specifically the facts stated

ca dispositive of the question of timeliness.” The Board’s

cea ror it was delegating the case to an arbitrator

of deficiencies in the record quite simply are con

Moreover, the inconsi

istency between the B , i

sional bases (that the Stated facts, if true wana cae

and the inconsistency wi

7 y with the Orders 73-9-42

ppg — under the decision in City of cae

F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1965). The following state-

ments of the Court in .

to this case: that case could be applied equally

“A M

M9 ~— these internal inconsistencies the

cision, without explanation, reverses an

;

Me en.

—————————————<$ lll — tst—s

17

omitted] and is inconsistent with other aspects of

the same proceeding. . . . Such action is arbitrary

and capricious and must be reversed.” {emphasis

added| (343 F.2d at 588)

Finally, as the District of Columbia Circuit itself said

in Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 143 U.S. App. D.C.

330, 443 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1971):

“In our reviewing role, it is peculiarly appropriate

for us to take the Board at its own word as to what

it is doing, and to scrutinize the result in terms of

that process.” (emphasis added} (443 F.2d at 756)

The Board’s action in this case cannot withstand such

scrutiny. The Board said (indeed emphasized) that it

would decide the case if the record were not deficient and

said that if the recited facts were true it would dispose

of the case. The Board did not do, however, what it said

it was doing.

2. The Court of Appeals Erred in Applying an “Abuse

of Discretion” Standard in Reviewing the Decision of

the Board Instead of a Standard of Whether the Board

Had Adhered to the Record and its Own Decisional

Criteria.

The Court of Appeals viewed the issue presented to it

as follows:

“In our review, we must initially determine whether

the Board has discretion to delegate procedural is-

sues arising under the LPP’s, such as timeliness of

arbitration complaints, to an arbitrator. If the Board

dovs have such discretion and acted within its scope,

we must then decide, on the basis of the administra-

tive record, whether the Board abused its discretion.”

(App. 6a)

In so conceiving the issue, the Court entirely misunder-

stood Delta's contertions and the true issue before the

Court. Delta did not and does not dispute that the Board

th . s ;

e LPP’s, including procedural] issues such as timeliness

abide by its own re i

i asoning and criteria j idi

a | | reas erla in decidin

Pe a to arbitration on the issue of thesiinaee arn

proc ~ presented Was not whether the Board had dis.

jm : order arbitration, or whether it abused it “a

ro - ut whether, as the court said in the Con#i

"es Case, supra, the Board was doi ’ “purrs

myth oing what it said

re Even in its conclusion that it must “

| € administrative record” (App. 8a). th Court mi

ceived its scope of review Nauie ne

termine “first wheth

, er 1

joe ores the Board consider

judgment.’ ”

gm ‘App. 8a) The true issue presented had

made an error

stion of wheth-

; 7 a li j 4 o 2

criteria to the undisputed facts in the pnd own decisional

As the Court of Appeals said:

test to i i 7

Delta until many months after the lve

The Court sidestepped the

reasoning as applied to i

dismissal of the vole arg rn

—. . that the Board b , :

tion’ lle 4, DY stating its ‘n “ye

° demteet te © such issues, was [not] er inclina-

without being nent r . k Which it could nm dota

— oO . ‘

and capricious action. ave engaged in arbitrary

19

“Rather, we believe that the Board was recognizing

that it had discretion either to resolve or to dele-

gate the timeliness question, depending upon the ade-

quacy of the record before it and the perceived need

for specialized knowledge in labor matters to deal

with the question.” (App. 9a-10a)

The Court’s conclusion in this regard is squarely in

conflict with the First Circuit’s decision in City of Law-

rence V. CAB, supra, and the District of Columbia Cir-

cuit’s decisions in the Braniff Airways and Continental

Air Lines cases, supra, in which the courts analyzed the

Board’s actions in terms of deciding whether the Board

had adhered to its own reasoning process as related to

the facts shown by the record. Moreover, in examining

the record and the Board’s stated reasons for sending the

case to arbitration, the Court itself engaged in the same

kind of “boot strap” reasoning that the Board had used,

which reasoning ignored the undisputed facts and relied

upon speculation which was inconsistent with the Board’s

prior orders.

The Board relied on three factors in sending the case to

arbitration. These were:

(1) The supposedly unresolved “question of the rep-

resentational capacitv »f the various individuals

and groups, and the TWU, involved in the ne-

gotiations and the quest for arbitration.”

(2) “Delta’s actual knowledge of dissatisfaction with

the seniority list.”

(3) “Delta’s own actions in this ongoing controversy

[which] may have served to defeat, through

delay, legitimate rights to arbitration under the

Board’s labor protective provisions.” (Order 76-

9-129, pp. 4-5, App. 7e)

Both the Board and the Court ignored (1) the Board’s

previous orders in which it had clearly rejected the TWU’s

representational capacity absent evidence thereof which,

20

undisputedly, was never submitted; (2) the Board’s fail-

ad = any previous order to indicate any concern with

a Rm knowledge of dissatisfaction (particu-

y when the Board itself has recognized on numerous

that by its very nature the integration process

+l _ —- employees dissatisfied ); and (3) that

wor Anca —— no evidence in the record that Delta

ptr " pt tomay | any request for arbitration by

pw Bre a we eee at e Board nor the Court could

With respect to the latter point, the Cour

0g “Furthermore, whether or not a ba =

| re + hear yon it cannot be denied that Delta’s demands

sae po! ae authorization delayed both

biter * ommittee’s pursuit of the arbitration

- a a a) Such reasoning is circular and avoids

ee y « “mew which should have been decided by the

sec — “ in fact previously been decided by the

eee Fae rd Delta’s position “was legally justi-

in Order 73-9-42 rai snp ry one net ta

absolutely correct in demandin ans rr a mn

wor capacity. See Order 73-9-42 ean a8 (App.

ae : - view of this finding, it is inconceivable that

a could then be held to have delayed requests to arbi-

trate by not honorin

. £ the TWU’s ue :

of its representational capacity. an a Soe

Thus the Court, as

, 48 well as the Board i

. , placed ; :

a a den on Delta which was nenniieiens eth

oard orders, the reasoning in the very order in

which the Board or . -

+ a ordered arbitration, and the undisputed

The Court said:

“The outcome of this case mi

$ case might have been di

if there had been no factual basis in tg peer

ee

ctr sittin Ae tes art nce) ee. ili nthe tte se athe 6 ae

21

for the issues raised by the Board or if the legal

aspects of those issues had previously been settled.”

(App. 10a-1lla)

As is pointed out above, the legal aspects of the repre-

sentational question had previously been settled by the

Board in Order 73-9-42 and this decision undercut the

first and third factors on which the Board had based its

decision to order arbitration. The second factor, that

Delta may have had actual knowledge of dissatisfaction,

is clearly irrelevant in any legal sense. As the Board has

often acknowledged, it is impossible to integrate seniority

lists without there being some dissatisfaction. This does

not mean, however, that Delta must, without a request,

submit the “dissatisfaction” to arbitration. To hold other-

wise would ignore the most essential traditional principles

of Anglo-American jurisprudence. It would seem that

nothing could be clearer than that a claim cannot be

held cognizable by a court, an agency or an adverse party

until it is actually submitted, and that the adverse party

cannot be held accountable prior to such submission. This

would be equivalent to holding that a statute of limita-

tions is tolled if a prospective defendant has knowledge

of a possible claim against him.

Thus the Court not only utilized the wrong standards,

it incorrectly analyzed the factors relied upon by the

Board and the evidence and legal principles applicable

thereto. As a result, Delta has been forced into a lengthy

and expensive arbitration process that still has not been

concluded and questions which adversely affect relations

between the former Northeast and original Delta flight

attendants which should have been resolved many years

ago have been resurrected, resulting in labor strife and

unrest. Thus, the basic purpose of the LPP’s, to avoid

labor unrest and strife, has been thwarted.

22

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the writ should be granted

and the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Law Department JAMES W. CALLISON

Delta Air Lines, Inc. SIDNEY F. Davis

Hartsfield Atlanta Int’l Airport ROBERT S. HARKEY

Atlanta, Georgia 30320 Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

ROBERT REED GRAY, Esy.

HALE RUSSELL GRAY SEAMAN

& BIRKETT

1001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Appendices

AV Cle he Na Bl ds =p

te | ne ee ee

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

se

G,

H,

I,

APPENDICES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Delta v. CAB (D.C. Cir. January 20,

1978)

Committee of Former Northeast Stew-

ardesses V. CAB, Case No. 75-1066

(D.C. Cir. May 27, 1975)

Delta-Northeast Merger Case, CAB

Order 76-9-129

Delta-Northeast Merger Case, CAB

Order 75-1-6

, Delta-Northeast Merger Case, CAB

Order 73-9-42

, Federal Aviation Act, § 408 (49 U.S.C.

§ 1378)

Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case, CAB

Orders 72-4-31/32

Delta-Northeast Merger Case, CAB

Orders 72-5-73/74

Labo» Protective Provisions, (Delta-

Northeast Merger Case)

Page

la

lb

le

1d

le

if

lg

lh

li

-_ Ee we,

:

4

:

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 76-1901

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

. Petitioner

Civil AERONAUTICS BOARD,

Respondent

COMMITTEE OF FORMER NORTHEAST STEWARDESSES,

Intervenor

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Civil Aeronautics Board

Argued October 4, 1977

Decided January 20, 1978

Frank F. Rox and Robert S. Harkey with whom Robert

Reed Gray was on the brief, for petitioner.

Barbara Thorson, Attorney, Civil Aeronautics Board

with whom James C. Shultz, General Counsel, Jerome

Nelson, Deputy General Counsel, Glen M. Bendixsen, As-

sociate General Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Board and

Carl D. Lawson and Daniel J. Conway, Attornevs, Depart-

ment of Justice were on the brief, for respondent.

J. Gordon Forester, Jr., for intervenor.

“Oe

2a

Before: Bazr

. “ LON

Circuit Judges, » Chief Judge, Tam

Opinion for the court filed by Cirewit

‘ Tam, Circuit Judge: In Jy

agra Northeast Stewardesses

le Civil Aeronauties Board (B

Lines, Ine., to submit ne

Stewardess seniority lis

east Airlines, Ine., into Delta

the order of the Board granti

tion." The basic question oem

Judge Tamm.

discretion by refery;

ne procedural issue of timelin referring to the ar

ration, r > ogre

rather than deciding that issue on the record

. r

before it, F

- for the reasons

Board’s order, sons Stated below, we affirm the

I

In the sprin

“pring of 1972, the Boar

of Delta and Northeast, subject to :

Provisions (LPP’s) = Section 3 of th

approved the merger

rtain labor protective

Ose provisions states:

affects the Seniority rights

€S, provisions shall be made

equitable manner including we, roe “4

, ng, where appli

plicable, agree-

: ctive bar *

riers ; = gaining betwe ;

roomed = representatives of the pre ne car-

may be submitted te of failure to agree, the dis “é

accord ; . ed by either party for qj Spute

cordance with section 13° . adjustment in

*CAB Order 76-9-129 (Se

at 17. This appe pt. 23, 1976), Joint A

he al was filed pursuant to 49 U.s ¢

*CAB Orders 72-5-73/74 2

Ppendix (J.A_)

Cima - ¥ 1486(a) (1970).

pril 24, 1972), JA. ,

* Id., Appendix Tat 1, J.A. at 65 ne a

M and WILKey,

ne 1974, a Committee of

ry ) petitioned

rd! to direct Delta Aj

« . M 7 M -

oe the integration of

8 following the merger of North-

bitrator

ess of the request for arbi-

38a

Section 13(a) provides that any party may refer a dis-

pute arising under the LPP’s to an arbitrator, and that

“a decision shall be rendered within 90 days after the

controversy arises, unless an extension of time is mutual-

ly agreeable to all parties.” ‘

Prior to the merger, which became effective on August

1, 1972, the Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-

CIO (TWU), had been the collective bargaining repre-

sentative for the Northeast stewardesses. Between mid-

summer and early October of 1972, representatives of

Delta and Delta stewardesses had a series of meetings

with a group of former Northeast stewardesses to nego-

tiate the integration of seniority lists, but no agreement

was reached. During the month of October, Delta uni-

laterally integrated the seniority lists and informed all

stewardesses of the results of that integration by letter

dated October 31, 1972.’

In the meantime, after the impasse had developed in

negotiations, the negotiating group of former Northeast

stewardesses asked TWU to pursue their arbitration

remedy. On September 29, 1972, TWU informed Deita

that it intended “to seek the appropriate relief,” ° and on

October 4, 1972, requested the National Mediation Board

to furnish a panel of arbitrators for the integration dis-

pute.’ Delta, however, refused to participate in the selec-

tion of an arbitrator, on the ground that TWU had not

provided any evidence t] 2t it continued to represent any

former Northeast stewardesses after the effective date of

the merger.*

* Jd., Appendix I at 9, J.A. at 73.

° J.A. at 137.

®° Id. at 83.

* Id. at 95, 100.

* Jd. at 106.

AE A a IE:

4a

O .

whee 30, 1973, TWU, on behalf of the stew-

ey ~ erly employed by Northeast, petitioned the

ect arbitration of seniority list integration

basing its Opposition to

merger,’ F; i

ger Furthermore, Since Delta conceded its duty t

¢ vy to

Ina Was unn t

footnote, the Board Specifically addressed Delta’s « ,

such iss " i ae

sues “are appropriate matters for redial te an

context of negotiation or an arbitration proceeding e

. hese TWU did not appeal the Boar

emp oO present evidence to Delta of its

ority, the Committee, which has

appeal, w:

Ppeal, was formed to pursue arbitration, To that end

a

CAB Order 73-9-42 at 5 (Sept. 11, 1973) J.A

© Id. at 4, J.A. at 8. a

"Td. at4 n.5, J.A. at 8 n.6.

*? J.A. at 207.

8 Td. at 187 ; see id. at 183, 189

Sa

5a

Delta renewed its assertion that the complaint was un-

timely,’ and the Committee petitioned the Board to com-

pel arbitration.

After an initial dismissal of the petition,’’ an appeal

from that order, and a remand by this court for a de-

cision on the merits,” the Board granted the Committee’s

petition and ordered arbitration. In its mandate to the

arbitrator, the Board included the initial “jurisdictional”

question of “whether, under all of the circumstances, the

claim to arbitration was asserted within a reasonable

time.” ‘' In justifying the delegation of the timeliness is-

sue to the arbitrator, the Board stated that, on the basis

of the inadequate record before it, it was unable defin-

itively to resolve certain issues which were possibly per-

tinent to the merits of Delta’s timeliness argument, such

as the representational aspects of the dispute, the possibil-

ity that Delta contributed to delay, and the effect of

Delta’s actual knowledge of employee dissatisfaction.’

Such issues, the Board stated, are the type “in which an

experienced labor arbitrator may well be able to shed

more light, more quickly than the Board.” ** We are now

called upon to review the Board’s decision to refer the

timeliness issue to arbitration.

'* Jd. at 187.

CAB Order 75-1-6 (Jan. 2, 1975), J.A. at 12. In this order,

the Board stated that the courts, rather than the Board, were the

proper forums for seeking enforcement of arbitration clauses in

LPP’s. It also made specific reference to the footnote in its earlier

order in which it had posited that the issue of timeliness should

be dealt with in arbitration. Jd. at 2-3, J.A. at 13 n.3, 14.

% Committee of Former Northeast ©‘ wardesses v.

75-1066 (D.C. Cir. May 27, i975).

7 CAB Order 76-9-129 at 5 (Sept. 23, 1976), J.A. at 21.

* Jd. at 4-5, J.A. at 20-21.

* Jd. at 5, J.A. at 21.

CAB, No.

a

6a

II

In our review, we must initially determi

the Board has the discretion to delegate soamineas lean

arising under the LPP’s, such as timeliness of arbitration

complaints, to an arbitrator. If the Board does have such

discretion and acted within its scope, we must then

decide, on the basis of the administrative record, whether

the Board abused its diseretion. Citizens to ‘rane

Overton Park, Ine. y. Volpe, 401 US 402 415-16

(1971): see 5 U.S.C. 8 706(2)(A) (1970). ) |

It is clear that the Board has the authority to j

— on its approval of the merger of air ation

ont v. CAB, 204 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.), cert. dentad

346 US. 826 (1953); see 49 U.S.C. § 1878 ib) (1970,

and that these conditions may include the duty to nego-

seniority lists of employees affec ;

land V. CAB, 284 F.2d 224, a Agha. .

American Airlines, Ine. vy. CAB, 445 F.2d 891 895, (24

Cir, 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1015 (1972) ‘the -

Sanctioned the arbitration of such substantive dis t ap

der LPP’s, Stating, in part: wusiilieye

= Board, like other agencies, operates on a limited

udget, both of money and of time; it may proper!

decide that these Scarce resources should be yee

banded for the tasks for which it considers itself

to he expert, rather than frittered away in an are

more suitable for an experienced labor arbitrator :

When called upon to j

. ! nterpret negotiated labor -

tracts, courts have repeatedly held that procedural Hone

In Citizens to Preserve O

~dinag ? verton Park, ‘ .

Suggested a third mquiry for review of an Aron _ preme Court also

cation—whether the agency “followed th

Ta

such as whether grievances were properly and timely

filed, should be delegated to arbitration along with the

substantive issues of labor disputes. John Wiley & Sons

v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964); accord, To-

bacco Workers International Union, Local 317 v. Lorillard

Corp., 448 F.2d 949, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1971): Rochester

Telephone Corp. Vv. Communication Workers of America,

340 F.2d 237, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1965). One rationale for

approval of the delegation of procedural issues to arbitra-

tion is that the substantive and procedural aspects of

labor controversies are normally so intertwined that divid-

ing their resolution between arbitrators and courts would

cause unnecessary delay and duplication of effort. John

Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. at 557-58. Further-

more, questions as to whether the procedural prerequisites

to arbitration have been met “do not arise in a vacuum;

they develop in the context of an actual dispute about the

rights of the parties to the contract or those covered by

it.” Id. at 556-57. Therefore, the knowledge and exper-

tise of an experienced labor arbitrator may be just as

necessary to the efficacious disposition of the procedural

problems of an arbitrable dispute as to the resolution

of the substance of the labor controversy itself. Associa-

tion of Industrial Scientists v. Shell Development Co.,

348 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1965) ; see Carey v. General

Electric Co., 315 F.2d 499, 503 (2d Cir. 1963), cert.

denied, 377 U.S. 908 (1964).

The reasoning of these labor contract decisions is equal-

ly applicable to procedural disputes arising under LPP’s

imposed by the Board during mergers. Just as under ne-

gotiated labor contracts, both the procedural and substan-

tive issues under the LPP’s normally involve labor rela-

tions law and custom, subjects in which the Board has

neither experience nor specialized knowledge. See Out-

land v. CAB, 284 F.2d at 228. Once it is determined,

therefore, that the subject matter of a controversy is

8a

tg to arbitration under the LPP’s, we believe that

pendb-vang brn the na snag to refer to the arbitrator

cerning the procedural propriety

. - . . et

claims for arbitration of that “ahem so

In this case, it is clear i

; that the dispute over the j

seen of the seniority lists was arbitrable. CAB Orders

atagtag thy Page. a, 1972); see American Airlines

. vz », 449 F.2d at 228. Delta’s refusal t iel-

pendhinDipinene dic s 0 partici-

= in arbitration was based on the procedural mcleiahin

a r- proper request for arbitration of the dispute had

poeta n be Pong the time limits established by

s 6 ’s. Under these circumst i

reasonably be said that the Bo See the eke

: } sa ard, after finding the sub-

stance of the dispute arbitrable. acted within ‘the be

atin . .

the arbitrator. Bating the procedural question to

Phy = a in our review is to determine whether

tion, radi that’ ‘Gann — hn scope of its discre-

Delta’s timeliness cmiuuien te atten by referring

eal ‘ation. Tom i

apm ye we must carefully examine the vt ne rr

ascertain, f 4 V. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973), to

want Goan rst, whether the Board considered the rele-

actors, and second, whether it made “a clear error

of judgment.” Citizens , |

Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416. 0 Preserve Overton Park vy.

Bey d rm inspection of the Board’s order and the ma-

ad “ e - when its decision was made, it is plain

ard considered those fact ‘ i

choice to refer the i Bp hae

procedural issue to th i

ser ct e arbitrator. It

oo oe of the policy underlying the arbitra-

a clause in the LPP’s—to promote the expeditiou

pee of labor disputes arising after mugwe—end

eae at its normal inclination would be to resolve th

meliness issue itself, rather than referring it to arbi.

ek Cael ems rh. dS et cee! 0 3

Ya

tration." However, after inspecting the record, the Board

believed that, although there were certain undisputed

facts which might appear dispositive of the procedural

argument, there were also factual inadequacies on various

issues which the Board perceived as possibly pertinent to

the final outcome of the dispute.** Moreover, the resolu-

tion of those labor issues would involve not only further

factual investigation, but also the application of labor law

principles in which the Board had no special knowledge or

expertise.” Our study of the Board’s order in this case

thus reveals that the Board carefully considered those

factors relevant to its final decision, balancing the general

desire for speedy settlement under the LPP’s against the

need in this particular case for further factual and legal

determinations by an experienced labor arbitrator.

The question remains, however, whether the Board

made a clear error of judgment in declining to decide the

timeliness issue on the record before it. In this regard,

Delta asserts that all the facts necessary to a decision on

the timeliness issue were undisputed and therefore that

the Board’s reasons for delegating the procedural ques-

tion were not supported by the record.** We do not agree.

21 CAB Order 76-9-129 at 4, 6 (Sept. 23, 1976), J.A. at 20, 22.

22 Jd. at 5, J.A. at 21.

28 Jd.

24 Brief of Petitioner at 16-17, 29. Delta also contends that the

Board’s treatment of the record was inconsistent with its announced

preference for resolving procedural issues itself in order to expedite

the settlement of disputes under LPP’s. /d. at 29-33; see CAB Order

76-9-129 at 4,6 (Sept. 23, 1976), J.A. at 20, 22. We do not believe,

however, that the Board, by stating its “normal inclination’ to

decide such issues, was thereby setting a standard for itself from

which it could not deviate without being found to have engaged

in arbitrary and capricious action. Cf. City of Lawrence v. CAB,

943 F.2d 583, 588 (1st Cir. 1965) (in which the court cited and

relied on cases in which the agency was held to have established

such a standard). Rather, we believe that the Board was recog-

nizing that it had the discretion either to resolve or to delegate

cma anh irl aia

10a

; The undisputed facts in the record before the Board

~d pend the Committee made no formal protest to

a until many months after the Board’

td ard’s September

—_ oe on TWU’s representational aie How-

. or, epending upon the arbitrator’s resolution of the is-

a posed by the Board, such a lapse of time could

oe irrelevant to the final outcome of the timeliness

ange pe er pag the arbitrator might find that

contributed to delay in arbitration r

| equests or ha

7 sagen of stewardess dissatisfaction, and ba

— ‘ . ay or knowledge caused Delta’s duty to arbitrate

eh na ng seth LPP’s time limit. Moreover, if the

‘ator found that TWU or some othe i

euetraten r group or in-

yr ner pons it prt the former fl on

ses and made a timely demand f i i

factual and legal findi , tad eprint ae

tal and ngs could eliminate any pr

promnge F~ in the Committee’s subsequent nih a ” te

use of its uncertainty as to the f i ;

et r acts relating to th

issues and their legal effect on Delta’s timeli ; =

elta’s timeline

tion, the Board decided to r niger

efer the whole matter

arbitrator, rather than to i ple

, rat make a decision based

—— which it believed to be inadequate and cele te

on labor principles with which it was unfamiliar

The outcome of this case mi

ight have been di

there had been no factual basis in the rae Pm

the timeliness question, d

: , depending upon the ;

before it and the iv e adequacy of the record

perceived need for speciali cor

mat F . pecialized knowledge j .

ee hr ae the question. Furthermore, pt ayn

sistently stated that oe to this appeal, the Board had ad

sta at Delta’s particul imeline -

be resolved in negotiation and —— argument should

*° See notes 12 & 13 supra.

*° In this regard, althou

z . gh Delta has asser

rocee asserted thr >

“ : : yd ~~ by proper request for arbitration ser ‘es pe

: “A. at 187, the Committee alleges that its request

is merely a continuation , .

TWU, sce id. at 188, 187 of those lodged in the fall of 1972 by

nee

ee a ee eae

lla

issues raised by the Board or if the legal aspects of those

issues had previously been settled. However, all the is-

sues which the Board believed might ultimately be per-

tinent to the proper resolution of Delta’s timeliness con-

tention did have a factual basis in the record already

before the Board and were unresolved at the time of its

order. For instance, the question of whether TWU or

other groups or individuals actually had the authority

to represent former Northeast stewardesses was not

answered clearly by the documents or assertions in the

record and had not been resolved completely by the

Board’s earlier order.*” Furthermore, the record indicates

that Delta could have had actual knowledge of employee

dissatisfaction in the fall of 1972 and that its continuing

insistence on formal representational authorization could

have contributed to the delay in arbitration requests.

The administrative record in this case thus supports

the factual existence of those issues which the Board be-

lieved might be important to the final disposition of the

timeliness issue. Finding that further investigation and

experienced application of labor law principles were neces-

sary to the proper resolution of these issues, both as to

27 See id. at 146-48, 169; CAB Order 73-9-42 (Sept. 11, 1973),

J.A. at 5. In its order dismissing TWU’s petition, the Board con-

fined its discussion of TWU’s authority to represent the former

Northeast stewardesses to the issue of whether TWU’s representa-

tional status transcended the merger.

2* For instance, Delta was informed of TWU’s intention to pursue

arbitration on behalf of the former Northeast stewardesses in

September 1972, J.A. at 83, and of TWU’s requests to the National

Mediation Board in October 1972, id. at 100. Actual knowledge of

specific employee discontent can also be attributed to Delta at the

time TWU filed its supplemental petition to the Board, with letters

from five stewardesses to TWU voicing their dissatisfaction with

the integrated seniority list. See id. at 141, 146-54. Furthermore,

whether or not such action was legally justified, it cannot be denied

that Delta’s demands for formal representational authorization de-

layed both TWU’s and the Committee’s pursuit of the arbitration

remedy. See id. at 107-08, 183, 187.

l2a

their factual basis and their legal effect, the Board re-

ferred the entire procedural problem to the arbitrator.

On the basis of the record before us, we do not believe that

such delegation constitutes a clear error of judgment.

III

Many of the problems posed by the present case are of

the Board’s own making. A concise statement of the ap-

proved manner of filing requests for arbitration and of

establishing representational capacity would eliminate

confusion and delay in the settling of disputes under the

LPP’s, Nevertheless, we find that the Board had the

discretion to delegate to arbitration the resolution of the

timeliness issue raised by Delta. We further hold, after

reviewing the administrative record, that the Board did

not abuse its discretion in doing so. The order of the

Board is therefore

Affirmed.

——

|

.

4

?

;

lb

APPENDIX B

APPEALS

UNITED STATES COURT OF

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

September Term, 1974

No. 75-1066

Vv.

Civi. AERONAUTICS BOARD,

Respondent.

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

Intervenor.

Before MCGOWAN AND TAMM, Circuit Judges

ORDER

i i iti ‘ tion for sum-

On consideration of the petitioners mo

om reversal and of the responses thereto, = -

respondent’s motion for summary cage = A er

nses thereto, and it appearing to the ¢

oa presented by the petition for review a

has been decided by the Court in Carey v. J. J. O'Donnell,

U.S. App. D.C. ——, 506 F.2d 107 (1974), cert.

denied, 42 L. Ed. °%6 (1975), it is

2b

depen = pm that order No. 75-1-6 of the

, ‘onaulics Board is hereby reversed, and ¢

remanded to the Board for ‘isi ‘the sa gt

pitinaas dines tees ng decision on the merits of

Ps aaa feat eo 4 respondent’s motion

unrmance is denied. See als

sen “gry Council v. Civil ica Gee

mls App. D.C. —, 506 F.2d 97 (1974). cort

ian ? . Ct. 783 (1975); Kesinger vy. Universal Air-

» #ne., 474 F.2d 1127 (6th Cir. 1973) ; Oling v. Air

Line Pilots Association, 3

: ¢ , 046 F. at

denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965). 2d 270 (7th Cir.), cert,

Per Curiam

le

APPENDIX C

ORDER 76-9-129

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board

at its office in Washington, D.C.,

on the 23rd day of September, 1976

Docket 23315

DELTA-NORTHEAST MERGER CASE

ORDER ON REMAND

The Committee of Former Northeast Stewardesses has

petitioned the Board to issue an order directing Delta

Air Lines, inc., to submit to arbitration a claim that the

integrated flight attendant seniority list adopted by Delta

following merger with Northeast Airlines, Inc., is unfair

as to former Northeast attendants.’ By Order 75-1-6

(January 2, 1975) the Board dismissed the petition, es-

sentially on grounds that it would be inappropriate and

inefficient for the Board to interpose itself as a forum

1 The merger was approved by Orders 72-5-73/74 (served May 19,

1972), subject to the Board’s standard labor protective provisions.

Section 3 of the provisions provides for “the integration of seniority

lists in a fair and equitable manner,” and Section 13 provides for

arbitration of disputes arising under the provisions. The Board

retained jurisdiction over the merger proceeding generally. It is

pursuant to the labor protective provisions and the Board’s re-

tained jurisdiction that the petition is filed.

2c

in ; x6

pea it saw to be a contractual dispute, which or-

lly would be resolved in judicial proceedings,’

Petitioner sought court review and by an order dated

a ae of Columbia Circuit, on moticn for summa

: 0 ia and remanded the Board’s order “for

s on the merits of petitioner’ j

reg s claims.” * -

ee a attempt to persuade the ition

sider or clarify its order, th

or » the Board, on Au

_ ar ogg the parties to submit comments a

= = i, Ley s — in response to the remand

wo rounds of comments b D |

| elta ;

gee ar om, the last filed neni 24 phn

‘ ‘Ger 1s to comply with t t’s or

eu meccren * he court’s order remand-

a ae brief order does not address

©rns which prompted us to decli "

the petition initial] j tom vac ene ary

y. We continue to believ

per - | e that Board-

oe oe compared to court-ordered, arbitration °

parse " or-management disputes is not ordinarily a

ctory or a speedy means of resolving such dis-

—

. Moreover, we . ie

particularly. we noted that the. Board ie” (tine oUF hand

a that resort to the Board instead og aeor management ‘matters,

the Ben tional litigation and consequent delay era, kel

ing arbitration. rect coulempt power to enforce an order direct.

* Committee of Former N

Cir. Ne acon ormer Northeast Stewardesses Vv. C.A.B., D.C.

*The second | yi

pulliinen> tn Delta’ rorized) round consists of a response by

to file an mene ae in the form of a petition ey ed

Delta requesting reiectew ee ANd a subsequent motion by

“petition” for “ed oe of that document, We will de —’ ~

ac Oo good caus . ’ eny t e

sIta’e , se being show

Delta’s motion, being moot, will be } sco: A » ane entionetiness.

0 EOEESC'CS'SCTTS RR

Siew

3¢

putes.” This remains our view notwithstanding that the

Court has apparently ruled against the necessary predi-

cate for the Board’s position, namely, that although ju-

risdiction with respect to the arbitration section of the

labor protective provisions is shared by the Board and

the courts, the Board has discretion to refer the parties

to a judicial tribunal for its enforcement.’ Given that

ruling, however, it is evident that we must put aside

our reservations about the efficacy of the relief requested

of us and consider the request on its own merits. Upon

such consideration, the Board has concluded that the peti-

tion should be granted as being in the public interest.

As a threshold matter, we must determine the scope

of the Board’s inquiry in reaching “a decision on the

° See also our discussion of this point in the Allegheny-Mohawk

Merger Case, Orders 72-4-31/32 (decided March 28, 1972), Opinion

at 20-21. Indeed, the Board’s redraft of the standard arbitration

section in the Allegheny-Mohawk case, to the form applied here,

was specifically designed to obviate the need for resort to the Board

under its retained jurisdiction prior to any court enforcement

of the arbitration provisions.

®* The court’s ruling is predicated upon the case of Carey v. J. J.

O'Donnell, 506 F.2d 107 (1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 783 (1975).

Carey concerned a Board order determining that a negotiated

seniority list—arising out of the instant merger, and involving

the Northeast pilots—had been integrated in a fair and equitable

manner. That order was sustained on direct review by the Court

of Appeals in a companion case, Northeast Master Executive

Council v. C.A.B., 506 F.2d 97 (1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 783

(1975). In Carey a District Court’s dismissal of a suit attacking

the integrated seniority list, for want of jurisdiction, was under

review. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioners in that case,

having “had their day in court as contemplated by the statute”

(viz., the Board’s determination with respect to the seniority list

and direct Court of Appeals review of that determination) were

not entitled to collaterally attack the Board’s action in District

Court, or any other forum. In other words, the Board having acted

upon the merits of a claim that an integrated list is unfair, the

only remaining remedy is review of the Board’s action in a Court

of Appeals pursuant to Section 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act,

and district courts have no jurisdiction with respect to the subject

matter.

4c

pages of petitioner’s claim,” as mandated by the court

po: 7 — that the court, in relying on Carey,

pe 7 rs that the Board will here, as in that case,

pone ~s ree as te whether or not the existing

eemnee” Hee been integrated in a fair and equitable

aang “ ue action is indisputably within our power

rset ; —s takes this position, in arguing that a

must be made by petitioner

“1. ; ; ) r that the e i i

i xn agg xistin

> ee 01 yregers before relief may be ad

r, on the other hand, asserts rena

is one for the arbitrator. | Oe

W ”

ened pal lie the court’s order as requiring the

beyond satisf plumb the substance of petitioner's claim

pt fas pelos ourselves that the claim is not friv-

‘May 7 Rpg ye Merger Case, Order 71-5-30

provided for b f« “ the function of the arbitrator, as

tng »/ ection 13, to weigh the validity of peti-

prior — ry of unfairness in light of all cireum-

Seumieansl see ahar a bd Delta’s argument would

- a provisions by r ;

eager payin tion clause. It would ao te

versies, ch as Gael of specific disputes and contro-

Board, which ha the integration of labor lists, with the

ostinente dail neither expertise nor resources to finally

445 F.2d 891 Caf See American Airlines Vv. C.A.B

(1972). bel a . bs f = ie 404 U.S. 1015

the B , , reuit specificall

pg S powel to delegate this function to —_

Cae en in the absence of successful peer: wa

‘In Ameri :

ain an pote Boys court sustained Board orders directin

the American-Trans pre integration dispute arisin Ky

(May 7. 1971) ¢ . aribbean Merger Case. See Ord = of

the Sad, joo = 1 (June 11, 1971). It held thet “Lwihet

aoe eer = yey appointed pursuant to it w |hat

the Board in that case as “~ Contentions were a

fairnes hfe : a e Board it: Pw

irness of the integrated seniority list, ‘ ponding a ae the

: e Board

as a ° . pp

a

al tee

oes

We find no compelling reason in t

this case warranting

held and court-approve

specific disputes is best left for arbitrat

Delta’s invitation to do so.”

concedes that

5e

he circumstances of

a departure from the Board’s long-

d position that the resolution of

ion, and decline

As we noted in our original order in this matter, Delta

it has received formal complaints regarding

the equity of the seniority list integration, and requests

for arbitration.’ Indeed, there is no dispute that, pur-

suant to the labor protective provisions, Delta is under

an obligation to arbitrate upon a valid request therefor.

Delta’s reason for failing to honor the requests it has re-

ceived, aside from the above-discussed allegation that

there has been no showing that the existing list was

not developed fairly and equitably, is simply that the re-

quests were untimely. It states that no formal com-

plaint and request for arbitration was received by Delta

until April 5, 1974, or some twenty months after the

merger became effective. A delay in submission of this

jength is, in Delta’s view, incompatible with the arbitra-

tion provision, which permits any party to refer any dis-

pute or controversy arising under the labor protective

provisions to arbitration “20 days after the controversy

arises,” and directs an arbitrator’s decision “within 90

days after the controversy arises, unless an extension

of time is mutually agreeable to all parties.”

n in the following terms “If the Board’s experi-

the Board's actio

ty lists of employees

ence convinced it that the integration of senior!

of merging carriers was a function which it was not well suited to

perform and which, in the absence of agreement, had best be left

to arbitration, that was a judgment it was competent to make”

(Id., at 895).

* See Outland V. C.A.B., 284 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir., 1960) ; O'Donnell

vy. Pan American World Airways, 200 F.2d 929 (2nd Cir., 1953);

and American Airlines V. C.A.B., supra.

* Order 75-1-6 at 3.

6e

Pe pywe. the Board would consider the above re-

7 bt acts, if true, to be dispositive of the question

= on a As we pointed out in the Allegheny-Mohawk

“ m 4 ase, supra, delays in reaching arbitration pro-

oe r ea se undermine harmonious labor re-

8. Open-ended availability of arbi

a eo i arbitration can only

strife and is an invitatio ’

n for abuse

pol ed — ae by the Board for the protection of

yees affected by a inerger, or ;

plo; | yal } a large-sale ac-

oe cena Moreover, it is clear that the Board’s arbitra-

‘Ovision conte sas a i di

me mplates a speedy resolution of dis-

m... he other hand, we cannot ignore the highly un-

= a eee and conflicting assertions attending

story of this particular seniority list i

-" of y list integration

se a history is described in some detail ——~

jose Pages geen 13, 1973) and Order 75-1-6

' pertinent portions of which

“ne ich we incorporate

oom ee need not be repeated “a at

' efly, the dispute was under activ iati

ee ae er active negotiation

er Northeast stewardess

—— me i sses, more pre-

port Samy assumed representative, the Transport Work.

‘ , Since prior to the consummati

Sit ‘ on of the merger;

a failed ; pursuit of arbitration by "the

aa : orkers Union, on behalf of the stewardesses

aes ecause of problems with respect to the TWU’s

em - by represent the Northeast stewardesses (see

p wren -9-42, supra) ; and subsequent to TWU’s with-

a fe group = individual stewardesses took up the

sk ursuing the arbitration r » euleatanti i

ths tuations eeeminen n remedy, culminating in

ier cadens a the record is rife with documents de-

ntedied fo tn bg of this continuing history, the

pooled me orm of numerous—and apparently

7 sworn allegations of a factual, legal and

eq e nature, involving various aspects of labor-

Te

management relations as well as other matters. Relevant

to the ultimate issue of timeliness raised by Delta ap-

pears to be the question of the representational capacity

of various individuals and groups, and the TWU, involved

in the negotiations and the quest for arbitration of the

underlying seniority integration dispute. Also pertinent

may be Delta’s actual knowledge of dissatisfaction with

the seniority list adopted by it following the failure of

negotiations and the form that such dissatisfaction took,

whether formal complaints or otherwise. Furthermore,

there is in our mind some question as to the extent that

Delta’s own actions in this ongoing controversy may

have served to defeat, through delay, legitimate rights to

arbitration under the Board’s labor protective provisions.

On the record before us, we are unable to definitively

resolve these and other questions pertinent to the merits

of Delta’s argument that the arbitration provisions are

untimely invoked. In some part, the record is short on

reliable facts. Moreover, elements of labor law, practice,

and custom appear to also be relevant to untangling the

various contentions, particularly the representational as-

pects. The Board believes it is imprudent to devote its

limited and already overburdened resources to the reso-

lution of the involved questions presented, particularly

in light of the substantive labor related factual issues

involved."

In light of the above, we believe that the wisest course

to follow in furtherance of the Court of Appeals’ ruling

10 As we have often noted, the Board’s premier function is tf

economic regulation of the nation’s air transportation system

the public interest. To the extent that questions of labor relations

affect that system, we may and do take cognizance of them, as for

example by the promulgation of the labor protective provisions

However, we do not view ourselves as a labor tribunal for the

resolution of specific disputes, for which other forums are generally

available. Any other course would likely be at the expense, in time

and effectiveness, of our other functions.

he

in

8c

wor thn w order arbitration, but to include in the arbitra-

ors mandate a Jurisdictional question. Specifically, th

arbitrator is to determine, as an initial matter ae

Jurisdiction to hear the merits of the claim with res :

to the fairness of the integrated seniority list by first

deciding whether, under al! of the circumstances th

claim to arbitration Was asserted within a ieeniis

gy Bs he finds not, his mandate ends. If he finds in

a rmative, he is then to consider the substantive

matter of seniority integration. This is the type of in-

quiry in which an experienced labor arbitrator may well

e able to shed more light, more quiekly than the Board.”

This delegation to the arbitrator represents we beli ,

the most effective overall allocation of is daninee of

the Board as well as the parties, and is well otita on

competence to make, see American Airlines y C.A B.,

supra. The arbitrator and the parties may employ such

procedures for the resolution

of these “s .

deem appropriate. matters as they

We should emphasize that our action with res rect t

the timeliness issue is predicated upon the conti :

circumstances present and the record before us vane

normal inclination, given an adequate record not ’ a

ing further proceedings, would be to resolve the Pac pe

this stage How OY . .

Ss ever, this is not, to !

a Case. ; all appearances, such

Pern = rad — that the interests of all flight

ants sha taken into account to the j

. e ta ce maximum

extent feasible, even if not participating in the ordered

''We noted in our previ

‘ oa . =. oe prey ious order denying TW " were.

nr Ag “¥ initial order dismissing petitioner's pag =

fiat cones cae a nee against the integrated seaioioe

olde hate reasonable time, as well as other jss: ‘

appropriate matters for resolution in the context az: re A

= we arbitration proceeding. . . .” Order 75-9-42 at 4 oe

»-1-6 at 2, footnote 3. We continue to adhere to this view. vila

oe 4 » rl 4 + z va,

ewe nee tee ls NS oO a ee or ie Abed eet et eee ed «sie ee. . — .

—— td ee Pen, ee ees . .

SoS ee wehiiirits ” ib adie

9c

arbitration proceeding. Concomitantly, we expect this

arbitration to put an end to all claims by Delta’s flight

attendants with respect to the integration of seniority

lists arising out of the merger, and will therefore provide

that the arbitration shall be binding upon Delta and all

flight attendants as to whom a dispute exists, whether

choosing to participate or not.’* In this connection, it will

be incumbent upon Delta to provide appropriate notice

to affected employees with respect to the arbitration pro-

ceeding. In addition, we note that should the merits of

petitioner’s claims with respect to seniority list integra-

tion be reached, the existing seniority list, which has been

in effect for some time, may be disturbed. This may

raise issues of retroactivity, which should be considered

in the arbitrator’s decision in light of all of the equities

involved.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Ordering paragraph 1 of Order 75-1-6 ‘served Jan-

uary 6, 1975) be and it hereby is voided;

2. The petition of the Commitee of Former Northeast

Stewardesses, filed June 7, 1974, be and it hereby is

granted to the extent ordered below;

3. Delta shall, within 60 days from the date of this

order, participate in the selection of an arbitrator pur-

suant to the provisions of Section 13(a) of the labor

protective provisions for the purposes enumerated in the

text, above, the arbitration to be conducted in conform-

ance with said Section 13(a): Provided, That nothing in

this order shall preclude the parties from agreeing to

proceed pursuant to Section 13(b} of the labor protective

provisions within the above-named period ;

12 American-TCA Merger Case, Order 71-5-30 (May 7, 1971), and

Order 71-6-71 (June 11, 1971).

10¢

4. In the event that any group of flight attendants of

Delta or their representative(s) shall decline to partici-

pate in, or fail to cooperate with respect to the ordered

arbitration proceedings, the procedures adopted shall be

such as to ensure, to the maximum extent feasible under

the circumstances, that the determination rendered by

the arbitral tribunai shall fully consider the interests of

such employees;

5. The determination of the arbitral tribunal shall be

final and binding upon Delta and all flight attendants

of Delta as to whom there exists a dispute with respect

to seniority list integration which has been the subject

of the arbitration proceedings ordered herein;

6. Delta shall provide appropriate notice to all af-

fected employees or their representatives with respect to

the institution of the arbitration proceedings, the issues

to be decided, and the employees’ right to participate

therein;

7. Delta shall, upon the rendering of any arbitrator’s

decision, file 2 copies of such decision in the docket of

this proceeding;

8. The Board shall retain jurisdiction in this pro-

ceeding for the purpose of taking such further action

as it may deem necessary or appropriate in the public

interests; and

9. Except to the extent granted herein, the petition

of the Committee of Former Northeast Stewardesses and

all petitions, motions and other requests related thereto

be and they hereby are denied.

This order shall be published in the Federal Register.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:

PHYLLIS T. KAYLOR

| SEAL] Secretary

—EE

i

er

id

APPENDIX D

Order 75-1-6

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board

at its office in Washington, D. C.,

on the 2nd day of January, 1975

Docket 23315

DELTA-NORTHEAST MERGER CASE

ORDER

By Order 72-5-73/74 the Board approved the merger

of Delta Air Lines and Northeast Airlines subject to

acceptance by Delta of Allegheny-Mohawk’ type labor

protective provisions. Delta unequivocally accepted that

condition, among others: See Order 72-8-1.

Section 3 of the labor protective provisions reads as

follows:

“Insofar as the merger affects the seniority rights

of the carriers’ employees, provisions shall be made

for the integration of seniority lists in a fair and

equitable manner, including, where applicable, agree-

ment through collective bargaining between the car-

riers and the representatives of the employees af-

fected. In the event of failure to agree, the dispute

' Orders 72-4-31/32.

2d

may be submitted by either party for adjustment in

accordance with section 13.”

Section 13 of the provisions provides for the arbitra-

tion of any dispute or controversy that arises with re-

spect to the labor protective provisions. The Board also,

in accordance with its customary practice, reserved juris-

diction to make such modifications, amendments, and

additions to the labor protective provisions as circum-

stances may require.

In reliance on this reserved jurisdiction, and on sec-

tions 3 and 13 of the labor protective provisions, various

former Northeast flight attendants have petitioned the

Board to order that Delta submit to arbitration for the

purpose of resolving their dispute with Delta regarding

the integration of the flight attendant seniority lists of

Delta and Northeast.’

The petition here before us is the second one dealing

with this subject matter. A similar petition was filed

approximately one year earlier by the Transport Workers

Union ‘on behalf of the Northeast flight attendants)

seeking the same relief. Delta opposed grant of that

petition on various grounds, including that the relief

sought was untimely.

While the Board denied TWU’s petition, the order

made clear that Delta was obligated to proceed to arbitra-

tion if presented with evioence of authority by TWU to

represent the flight attendants." The Board concluded

* There has also been filed a motion on behalf of the petitioners

for leave to file unauthorized documents. The motion will be

granted.

* Order 73-9-42. The Board pointed out that: (1) Delta agreed

that it was under a duty to arbitrate any unresoived seniority dis-

pute with any dissatisfied former Northeast employee and that, in

any case, such an obligation was clear; (2) the TWU could not

be deemed a “representative” of the former Northeast flight attend-

ants merely because that union had been their collective bargaining

le i A

3d

that: “Thus, TWU may ultimately obtain arbitration if

it presents evidence to Delta of authority to represent

former Northeast employees and if that dispute is not

otherwise resolved. In these circumstances, we fail to

perceive any duty on our part to direct that which TWU

may obtain through its own efforts.”” The same order also

referred to the Board’s view “that it should not inter-

vene to order arbitration where arbitration can be di-

rected by a court with authority to enforce its decree,

and that the more appropriate enforcement action by

the Board is penalty action against a carrier for viola-

tion of the requirement to arbitrate.” *

According to the petition at hand, the manner in which

the Northeast and Delta flight attendant seniority lists

were integrated by Delta is unfair to the former North-

east flight attendants. The petition goes on to argue that

the integrated list has never been agreed to by any

authorized representative of all the former Northeast

flight attendants; and that subsequent to the issuance

of Order 73-9-42, supra, three former Northeast stew-

ardesses, on behalf of many others, asked that Delta

arbitrate the seniority list integration dispute and that

Delta has refused.

agent prior to the merger; (3) the TWU, in complaining to Delta

about the manner in which the seniority lists were integrated, did

not provide evidence to Delta that it in fact was representing any

former Northeast flight attendants in making the complaint; and

(4) the carrier had not received a formal complaint from any

Northeast flight attendant with respect to seniority integration

or from any representative who was able to give evidence of his

representative capacity.

The Board went on to note, in respect to Delta’s argument re-

garding the alleged untimeliness of TWU’s complaint to Delta re-

garding seniority integration, that this argument and other similar

ones “are appropriate matters for resolution in the context of

negotiation or an arbitration proceeding and accordingly we do not

decide them here.”

*The Board used the same words in an even more recent order

in a proceeding also arising out of the Delta-Northeast Merger;

Order 74-5-71.

4d

In its answer Delta concedes that it has received a

formal complaint from at least three former Northeast

flight attendants regarding seniority list integration but

argues that nonetheless it need not honor that request for

arbitration, and that for three different reasons the

Board should support Delta’s position. First, the petition

represents a “calculated effort to promote labor strife

and disrupt relations between former Northeast and

former Delta employees.” Second, the Delta and North-

east “flight attendant seniority lists have been integrated

in a fair and equitable manner. Third, the request for

arbitration is untimely.

We have concluded that the petition should be dis-

missed since it is our view that the Board ordinarily

ought not entertain petitions requesting that it direct

air carriers to proceed to arbitration under the Board’s

standard labor protective provisions.

When the Board imposes conditions upon its approval

of a merger agreement, the parties may either accept

the conditions or withdraw from the agreement. If the

conditions are accepted, they become in effect a part of

the overall arrangement which the Board has approved.

As a general proposition, the Board does not attempt to

enforce the undertakings of the carriers toward third-

parties, and we perceive no reason in principle why the

Board itself should undertake to enforce the labor pro-

tective provisions of a merger arrangement to any

greater extent than the Board would attempt to enforce

compliance with other provisions therein. Further, there

are affirmative reasons why it should not undertake to

do so. We have repeatedly noted, and the courts have

consistently agreed,’ that the Board has no particular

‘E.g., Outland v. CAB, 109 U.S. app. D.C. 90, 284 F.2d 224

(1960), Northeast Master Exec. Council v. CAB, D.C. Cir. No. 73-

1595 et al. (August 19, 1974).

5d

expertise in labor-management matters. Indeed, the

courts are likely to have considerably more experience

than the Board in unraveling the facts invoived in em-

ployer-employee disputes, and the resolution of the ques-

tion of whether arbitration should be directed under labor

protective provisions agreed to by the carrier should

present issues uo different from those involved in normal

contract disputes where provisions are made for arbi-

tration. Further, a Board proceeding to determine

whether arbitration should be directed is all too likely to

spawn litigation in addition to that which would ensue

from direct resort to a court for an order directing

arbitration. Not only must the Board ascertain the

facts involved, but even if it should order arbitration

(and such an order might well be appealed to the

courts), the Board has no direct power to enforce the

requirement. Thus, if the Board’s order were not obeyed,

the Board would be required to bring an action against

the carrier in a district court to compel obedience or

to embark upon some form of enforcement proceedings

against the recalcitrant carrier, a course again calculated

to increase rather than decrease litigation and resultant

delay. Moreover the Board does not consider that it was

established by the Congress to deal with individual dis-

putes between carriers and their employees even though

empowered to do so, but rather to deal with broad eco-

nomic questions affecting the public. The Board dis-

charges this duty in merger cases by providing in its

labor protective provisions the machinery through whicn

individual disputes can be resolved. The jurisdiction

which it has retained to take further action concerning

labor protective matters more appropriately is employed

for determining whether there shouid be changes in the

basic protective provisions in response to a demonstrated

* See American Airlines v. CAB, 445 F.2d 891 (C.A. 2, 1971),

cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1015 (1972).

6d

need therefor, rather than for enforcing the requirements

of those provisions in individual cases. Judicial enforce-

ment of the requirement to arbitrate represents no im-

pingement upon the Board’s authority to alter the basic

provisions where the public interest requires their alter-

ation. Conversely, a deferral by the board to the greater

expertise and enforcement powers of the courts does not

represent any abdication by the Board of its duties.

Rather, the situation is the familiar one in which third-

party rights are enforced by the courts.

In these circumstances the Board reiterates that em-

ployees such as those here involved should resort to the

courts to the extent that they seek an order directing a

carrier to proceed to arbitration. This is not to say,

however, that a carrier may ignore the requirement for

arbitration with impunity. On the contrary, in our view

it does so at its peril. A willful or unjustifiable failure

to proceed to arbitration represents a failure on the part

of the carrier to comply with the Board’s requirement

that the labor protective conditions be carried out as a

part of the obligations undertaken by the carrier in con-

nection with its merger. The consequences, in our view,

are that the carrier is subject to appropriate enforce-

ment action.’

In this same regard, and in view of the history of

matters here under consideration and, particularly, our

admonitions in Order 73-9-42--admonitions which Delta

appears to have determined to ignore—we are referring

to the Board’s Bureau of Enforcement the question of

whether Delta’s refusal to honor the flight attendants’

request to arbitrate warrants the institution of civil or

criminal proceedings under sections 901 and 902 of the

Act, or other appropriate enforcement action.

* While any such enforcement action may have the practical effect

of forcing compliance, this indirect effect is not the same as directing

the carrier to arbitrate, and the concepts and consequences iavolved

in the different types of actions are different.

7d

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

AL The petition of a Committee of former Northeast

flight attendants, filed June 7, 1974, for exercise of re-

served jurisdiction be and it hereby is dismissed; and

2. The motion on behalf of the petitioners to file an

unauthorized document be and it hereby is granted.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:

EDWIN Z. HOLLAND

Secretary

[SEAL]

le

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Order 73-9-42

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board

at its office in Washington, D.C.

on the 11th day of September, 1973

Docket 23315

DELTA-NORTHWEST MERGER CASE

ORDER

By Orders 72-5-73/74, served May 19, 1972, the Board

approved the merger of Delta Air Lines and Northeast

Airlines, Inc., subject to Allegheny-Mohawk type labor

protective provisions (see Orders 72-4-31/32), with certain

modifications not here relevant. Section 3 of those provi-

sions reads as follows:

“Insofar as the merger affects the seniority rights of

the carriers’ employees, provisions shall be made for

the integration of seniority lists in a fair and equita-

ble manner, including, where applicable, agreement

through collective bargaining between the carriers

and the representatives of the employees affected. In

the event of failure to agree, the dispute may be sub-

mitted by either party for adjustment in accordance

with section 13.”

Section 13 of the provisions provides for the arbitration

of any dispute or controversy that arises with respect to

the labor protective conditions. The Board also, in ac-

cordance with its customary practice, reserved jurisdic-

2e

tion “to make such amendments, modifications, and addi-

tions to the labor protective conditions . . . as the circum-

stances may require.” In reliance on this reserved juris-

diction and on the terms of sections 3 and 13 of the labor

protective conditions, the Transport Workers Union of

America, AFL-CIO (“TWU”) filed a petition requesting

that the Board (1) order arbitration pursuant to sec-

tion 13 of the labor protective provisions to determine the

fair and equitable integration of clerical and stewardess

seniority lists of the two carriers and (2) require Delta

to provide interim protection to the employees pending

resolution of the dispute by recognizing the seniority

status of all former Northeast employees as it existed

on November 30, 1972. An answer in opposition to the

petition has been filed by Delta.’

This dispute arises from efforts to integrate seniority

lists for the two classes of employees in question. A first

meeting was held on July 11, 1972, prior to consumma-

tion of the merger on August 1, 1972, among representa-

tives of the two carriers and the TWU. At that meeting it

was decided that further discussions among those pres-

ent would be held concerning the clericals and that a TWU

Northeast stewardess committee would meet with a Delta

stewardess committee. The stewardess negotiations ended

in deadlock after approximately two months, and counsel

for the TWU notified Delta of its intention to arbitrate

the dispute. At about the same time the union requested

the National Mediation Board (“NMB”) to furnish a

panel of names from which the parties might select an

arbitrator. On October 31, Delta informed all of the

stewardesses that because of the impasse it would be

necessary for the carrier to integrate the seniority lists

unilaterally. Meanwhile, the TWU had made several re-

'The TWU represented Northeast stewardess and clerical per-

sonnel prior to the merger. Delta’s stewardess and clerical em-

ployees are not represented by a labor organization.

3e

quests to Delta for a seniority list for the Delta clericals

as a first step toward integrating lists for that class of

employees. Having failed to receive such a list, the TWU

notified the NMB on August 29, 1972, that it wished to

refer the matter to an arbitrator. Delta opposed both this

request and the TWU request made in connection with

the stewardess negotiations. On November 2, the NMB

submitted to the parties two panels of names. However

Delta has refused to arbitrate, denying any obligation on

its part to do so.

In support of its petition the TWU alleges that it has

sought to reach a satisfactory agreement with Delta, pur-

suant to the Board’s order, as to the seniority rights of

the former Northeast clericals and stewardesses; that

Delta has refused to engage in good faith negotiations,

has refused to arbitrate the dispute, and intends to inte-

grate the lists unilaterally by a method considered un-

fair and unreasonable by the TWU and the former

Northeast employees; that the TWU as a “party” to

the merger proceeding is entitled to refer these disputes

to arbitration under section 13; that a claim by Delta

that the TWU must prove its representative status is

without precedent; that further it is impossible for the

TWU to prove its representative status because the NMB,

the only agericy with authority to certify representation,

would not determine a representative for the ex-Northeast

employees since they now constitute only a portion of a

“craft or class”; and that the TWU is the only proper

representative of the employees in question.

In its answer, Delta asserts that, despite Delta’s state-

ments that it would meet with TWU representatives if

the TWU showed any evidence that it in fact represents

the former Northeast employees under the labor pro-

tective provisions, the TWU has made no such showing,

and that neither the TWU’s status as a party in the

merger case nor its status as the former representative

de

of the former Northeast employees under the Railway

Labor Act in any way gives it the right to invoke arbi-

tration. The carrier further states that the stewardess

lists have been integrated in a fair and equitable manner

in accordance with section 3 of the labor protective pro-

visions; that it has not received a formal complaint from

a single former Northeast employee with respect to sen-

iority integration; that it dealt with a group of North-

east stewardess represeniatives in negotiations and was

then requested to arbitrate with the TWU which had

not participated in the negotiations; and that Delta is

ready to submit to arbitration if it is invoked by dis-

satisfied employees. With respect to the clerical em-

ployees, Delta additionally argues that integration of

seniority lists is unnecessary and inappropriate since

seniority is not the controlling factor in determining job

opportunities for those employees; to the extent that

Delta does use seniority, it is based on date of hire and

reference is merely made to personnel records.’ There-

fore, to the extent of its use, seniority was automatically

integrated upon consummation of the merger. Finally,

since the TWU is not entitled to the primary relief

sought, Delta contends that “interim” relief pending arbi-

tration is inappropriate.’

On May 21, 1973, the TWU filed a Petition for Per-

mission to File an Extraordinary Document which pur-

ports to refute various assertions made by Delta in its

answer to the TWU’s original petition, and reiterates

the TWU’s request that the Board issue an order re-

? Thus, Delta claims, compliance with TWU’s request would have

required that Delta construct a seniority list for that class of

employees.

* Delta contends that interim relief would be inappropriate since

the grant of such relief would impinge upon Delta’s ability to con-

duct its operations, and since the TWU has made no showing of

irreparable injury (citing American-TCA Merger Case, Order 71-

5-30, May 7, 1971).

“a

5e

quiring Delta and the TWU to select an arbitrator to

determine integration of the seniority lists of the Delta

and Northeast clericals and stewardesses, and that the

Board order interim relief. Appended to this pleading

are letters from former Northeast stewardesses now

employed by Delta that, the TWU alleges, show that

the stewardesses are dissatisfied with the integrated sen-

iority list and look to the TWU for help.

On July 2, 1973, Delta filed a Motion for Leave to

File an Unauthorized Document with its answer to the

TWU’s May 21 filing.’ In its answer, Delta states that

it still has not had a request from any former North-

east stewardess or clerical employees for arbitration of

a seniority problem; that the TWU has not informed

Delta of any authorization to represent any former

Northeast employees in seniority matters; that the Board

should reject TWU’s petition on the grounds that no

dispute has been properly submitted to Delta for arbi-

tration within a reasonable period of time after the

dispute arose; that the TWU’s answer did not refute

any of Delta’s arguments with respect to the agent

clerical group; and that the Board should not look with

favor upon the TWU’s attempts to use the labor pro-

tective provisions to perpetuate its representation of vari-

ous former Northeast Airlines’ employees.

We will dismiss the TWU petition on the alternate

grounds that (1) no showing has been made which war-

rants intervention on the Board’s part, and (2) TWU

is not a “representative” of the former Northeast em-

ployees for purposes of invoking the provisions for arbi-

tration contained in our labor protective provisions merely

because it was the collective bargaining representative of

those employees prior to the merger.

*We will grant both the TWU’s supplementai petition and Delta’s

motion for leave to file an unauthorized document.

6e

The Board has heretofore noted that it lacks expertise

in labor matters, that it is not charged with responsibility

to act as a labor board for the aviation industry, and

that its limited resources are more appropriately directed

to the resolution of those tasks directly assigned to it

and with which it is familiar. See American Airlines

v. CAB, 445 F.2d 891 (2nd Cir., 1971), cert. denied,

92 S. Ct. 681 (1972); and Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d

224 (D.C. Cir., 1960). Indeed, the requiremert for

arbitration of disputes between employees and carriers

concerning the application of our labor protective con-

ditions is grounded upon these premises. See American-

Trans Caribbean Merger Case, Order 71-5-30, p. 4; Ameri-

can Airlines v. CAB, supra. For the same reasons, the

Board has stated that it should not intervene to order

arbitration where arbitration can be directed by a court

with authority to enforce its decree, and that the more

appropriate enforcement action by the Board is penalty

action against a carrier for violation of the requirement

to arbitrate. See American-Trans Caribbean Merger Case

(Petition of James Matthiesen), Order 72-10-98, pp. 5-6.

We recognize that the present dispute involves issues

other than a failure by a carrier to comply with the terms

of the Board’s prior order. Nonetheless, the plain pur-

port of our prior holdings has been that disputes capable

of resolution through negotiation or arbitration without

recourse to the Board should be settled in that manner.

Here, Delta has conceded, at least initially, that it is under

a duty to arbitrate any unresolved seniority issue upon

demand of any dissatisfied former Northeast employee

or group of employees, and in our view that obligation is

clear. Moreover, TWU asserts that it has in fact been

requested by former Northeast employees to act in their

behalf. Thus, TWU may ultimately obtain arbitration if

it presents evidence to Delta of authority to represent

former Northeast employees and if the dispute is not

-_

Te

otherwise resolved. In these circumstances, we fail to

perceive any duty on our part to direct that which TWU

may obtain through its own efforts.’

Further, if it be thought that the Board should deter-

mine whether TWU is the present “representative” of the

former Northeast employees within the meaning of this

term as used in section 3 of the labor protective condi-

tions solely on the basis of its status as their collective

bargaining representative when they were employed by

Northeast, our determination is that it is not." We need

not reach the question of whether, if an agreement be-

tween TWU and Delta had been negotiated or consum-

mated prior to the merger, TWU would have had stand-

ing to complain of any breach (as opposed to being re-

quired to show that it was authorized to act by employee

beneficiaries of the agreement). No such agreement was

in fact reached, and it does not appear that TWU’s status

as collective bargaining representative of the Northeast

employees for Railway Labor Act purposes survived the

merger (‘see Air Line Employees Association vy. CAB,

413 F.2d 1092 (CADC 1969)). Moreover, a continuation

*In its answer to the TWU’s supplemental petition, Delta raises

the argument that the former Northeast employees should not b«

granted relief, in any event, since they have not filed a complaint

against the integrated seniority list within a reasonable time. This

question, as well as such questions as the impact to be given in a

section 3 dispute to the fact that a relatively small number of em-

ployees are dissatisfied with the manner in which the seniorits

lists were integrated (if that is in fact the case), and the applica-

bility of the seniority integration provisions of section 3 to Delta’s

clerical employees, are appropriate matters for resolution in the

context of negotiation or an arbitration proceeding and, accord-

ingly, we do not decide them here.

*TWU’s argument that it has a right to invoke arbitration under

section 13(a) by reason of its status as a party to the merger pro-

ceeding is not persuasive. Clearly, from the context of that section,

its reference to “any party” was intended to encompass only parties

to the particular dispute in question.

8e

of representative status is not essential to the application

and enforcement of the labor protective conditions.

In these circumstances, no persuasive reason has been

advanced as to why TWU should be deemed to repre-

sent the former Northeast employees merely because it

was their former representative. Such automatic status

is not required either for the purpose of enabling em-

ployees to avail themselves of the Board’s labor protec-

tive provisions or to enable the former bargaining repre-

sentative to represent the employees if the employees

so desire. On the other hand, significant changes in em-

ployer-employee relations resulting from a merger can

result in different interests between a union and its for-

mer members so that the employees would not necessarily

want the union to represent them for labor protective

purposes. Moreover, the Board has recognized that every

group of employees affected by negotiations under these

provisions is entitled to separate representation that will

protect the group’s interesi ‘see Order 71-5-30, supra,

at page 5, note 10; Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case,

17 CAB 19 (1953)). It can be argued, of course, that

recognition of the union as a continuing “representative”

for purposes of section 3 will not defeat any right of

employees not desiring such representation since they

may be represented by someone else. However, there is

no showing that this course of action will promote stabil-

ity in labor relations. Indeed, such stability might be

better advanced if the shoe is on the other foot.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED:

1. That the petition of the Transport Workers Union

of America, AFL-CIO, for exercise of reserved juris-

diction, be and it hereby is dismissed ;

2. That the petition of the Transport Workers Union

for leave to file an extraordinary document be and it

hereby is granted; and

9e

3. That the motion of Delta Air Lines, Inc. for leave

to file an unauthorized document be and it hereby is

granted.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board;

EDWIN Z. HOLLAND

Secretary

| SEAL |

MURPHY, Member, Filed The Attached Dissent.

MURPHY, Member, Dissenting:

The petition and related pleadings herein raise a close

question. I am persuaded, however, that the TWU has

effectively demonstrated that it represents certain Delta

stewardesses formerly employed by Northeast Airlines for

purposes of requesting arbitration. Letters attached to

the petition filed by TWU on May 21, 1973 show that

several former Northeast stewardesses are dissatisfied

with the manner with which the seniority rosters were

integrated and look to the TWU for assistance. It is

true the letters do not in formal terms designate TWU

as representative of these stewardesses but that is the

fair purport of the letters. To hold otherwise, in my

view, elevates form over substance. Aggrieved employees,

no matter how small their number, may select whomever

they choose as their designee to secure their rights under

the labor protective conditions. These stewardesses have

selected TWU and I believe that selection should be

honored.

The Board couid, as the majority suggests, leave TWU

and the stewardesses to seek a court order directing arbi-

tration. However, we also have the power under our

reserved jurisdiction to order arbitration. To issue such

10e

an order would be a simple matter for the Board and

would not involve us in labor matters beyond our com-

petence. I believe stability of labor relations would be

fostered by this action. If the complaints of these few

stewardesses are groundless, the arbitrator will so find

and Delta will not be injured. In fairness, therefore, the

Board, as a matter of discretion, should grant TWU’s

petition.

‘s/ ROBERT T. MURPHY

if

APPENDIX F

Federal Aviation Act of 1958

$ 408 (49 U.S.C. § 1378)

$ 1378. Consolidation, merger, and acquisition of con-

trol—Prohibited acts

(a) It shall be unlawful unless approved by order of

the Board as provided in this section—

(1) For two or more air carriers, or for any air

carrier and any other common carrier or any person

engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to con-

solidate or merge their properties, or any part

thereof, into one person for the ownership, manage-

ment, or operation of the properties theretofore in

separate ownerships ;

(2) For any air carrier, any person controlling an

air carrier, any other common carrier, or any person

engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to pur-

chase, lease, or contract to operate the properties,

or any substantial part thereof, of any air carrier;

(3) For any air carrier or person controlling an

air carrier to purchase, lease, or contract to operate

the properties, or any substantial part thereof, of any

person engaged in any phase of aeronautics other-

wise than as an air carrier;

(4) For any foreign air carrier or person con-

trolling a foreign air carrier to acquire control, in

any manner whatsoever, of any citizen of the United

States engaged in any phase of aeronautics;

(5) For any air carrier or person controlling an

air carrier, any other common carrier, or any person

engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to acquire

control of any air carrier in any manner whatsoever;

2f

(6) For any air carrier or person controlling an

air carrier to acquire control, in any manner whatso-

ever, of any person engaged in any phase of aero-

nauties otherwise than as an air carrier; or

(7) For any person to continue to maintain any

relationship established in violation of any of the

foregoing subdivisions of this subsection.

Application to Board; hearing ; approval ; disposal

without hearing.

(b) Any person seeking approval of a consolidation

merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition

of control, specified in subsection (a) of this section, shall

present an application to the Board, and thereupon the

Board shall notify the persons involved in the consolida-

tion, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acqui-

sition of control, and other persons known to have a sub-

stantial interest in the proceeding, of the time and place

of a public hearing. Unless, after such hearing, the Board

finds that the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, oper-

ating contract, or acquisition of control will not be con-

sistent with the public interest or that the conditions of

this section will not be fulfilled, it shall by order approve

such consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating

contract, or acquisition of control, upon such terms and

conditions as it shall find to be just and reasonable and

with such modifications as it may prescribe; Provided,

That the Board shall not approve any consolidation,

merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisi-

tion of control which would result in creating a monopoly

or monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeop-

ardize another air carrier not a party to the consolida-

tion, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acqui-

sition of control: Provided further, That if the applicant

is a carrier other than an air carrier, or a person con-

py oe a Sn

3f

trolled by a carrier other than an air carrier or affiliated

therewith within the meaning of section 5(8) of this title,

such applicant shall for the purposes of this section be

considered an air carrier and the Board shall not enter

such an order of approval unless it finds that the trans-

action proposed will promote the public interest by en-

abling such carrier other than an air carrier to use air-

craft to public advantage in its operation and will not

restrain competition: Provided further, That, in any case

in which the Board determines that the transaction which

is the subject of the application does not affect the con-

trol of an air carrier directly engaged in the operation of

aircraft in air transportation, does not result in creating

a monopoly, and does not tend to restrain competition,

and determines that no person disclosing a substantial

interest then currently is requesting a hearing, the Board,

after publication in the Federal Register of notice of the

Board’s intention to dispose of such application without a

hearing (a copy of which notice shall be furnished by the

Board to the Attorney General not later than the day

following the date of such publication), may determine

that the public interest does not require a hearing and by

order approve or disapprove such transaction.

Interests in ground facilities

(c) The provisions of this section and section 1379 of

this title shall not apply with respect to the acquisition or

holding by any air carrier, or any officer or director

thereof, of (1) any interest in any ticket office, landing

area, hangar, or other ground facility reasonably inci-

dental to the performance by such air carrier of any of

its services, or (2) any stock or other interest or any

office or directorship in any person whose principal busi-

ness is the maintenance or operation of any such ticket

office, landing area, hangar, or other ground facility.

4f

Jurisdiction of accounts of noncarriers

(d) Whenever, after the effective date of this section,

a person, not an air carrier, is authorized, pursuant to

this section, to acquire control of an air carrier, such

person thereafter shall, to the extent found by the Board

to be reasonably necessary for the administration of this

chapter, be subject, in the same manner as if such per-

son were an air carrier, to the provisions of this chapter

relating to accounts, records, and reports, and the inspec-

tion of facilities and records, including the penalties ap-

plicable in the case of violations thereof.

Investigations of violations

(e) The Board is empowered, upon complaint or upon

its own initiative, to investigate and, after notice and

hearing, to determine whether any person is violating any

provision of subsection (a) of this section. If the Board

finds after such hearing that such person is violating any

provision of such subsection, it shall by order require

such person to take such action, consistent with the pro-

visions of this chapter, as may be necessary, in the opin-

ion of the Board, to prevent further violation of such

provision. Pub.L. 85-726, Title IV, § 408, Aug. 23, 1958,

72 Stat. 767; Pub.L. 86-758, $1, Sept. 13, 1960, 74 Stat.

101.

lg

APPENDIX G

72-4-31

72-4-32

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Docket 23371

ALLEGHENY-MOHAWK MERGER CASE

Decided: March 28, 1972

Merger of Allegheny Airlines, Inc., and Mohawk Airlines,

Inc., approved subject to labor protective conditions.

APPEARANCES:

Same as in the examiner’s recommended decision and

in addition:

Edwin 1. Colodny for Allegheny Airlines, Inc.

Charles J. McIntyre for the Air Line Dispatchers

Association.

Richard A. Snelling for the State of Vermont.

Toronto and Montreal.”’

The Board’s decision on the transfer of the certificated

international route authority involved herein requires the

approval of the President under section 801 of the Fed-

a For the reasons stated by the examiner in Appendix 4, we will

modify exemption Order E-23845 to permit single-plane service

between Toronto and Washington/Philadelphia via Rochester.

2g

eral Aviation Act. No agency of the Government, nor

any other party, has suggested that the transfer would

raise any issue of adverse effect on our nation’s foreign

policy or the national defense." On this record we can

find no reason relating thereto for disapproving transfer

of these international routes or conditioning that transfer

in any way. For purposes of simplification, we will com-

bine the surviving carrier’s certificates for foreign air

transportation into one certificate for route 97F.

VIII.

The Board has a long-established policy of conditioning

its approval of air carrier mergers upon acceptance by

the surviving company of conditions designed to protect

employees."” Since the 1961 United-Capita! Merger Case,”

the Board has consistently applied the same set of labor

protective provisions.*'

In brief summary, those provisions require that in the

case of a merger the surviving carrie: must:

(1) Provide for the fair and equitable integration of

seniority lists.

(2) In regard to any employee who continues on in the

employment of the carrier, pay a “displacement allow-

* For the role of Federal agencies in proceedings before the

Board involving subsequent Presidential action under section 801,

see the letter of the President dated July 16, 1970 attached to Order

70-7-82, July 17, 1970, and the opinion of the Board in the Pacific

Islands Local Service Investigation, Order 71-7-174, August 11,

1971, pages 5-6.

Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 708 (1952) ;

Cf. United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B.

701 (1950).

2° 33 C.A.B. 307 (1961).

21 See American-Trans Caribbean Merger Case, Order 70-12-161;

Northwest-Northeast Merger Case, Order 70-12-162/163; Universal-

American Flyers Acquisition Case, Orders 71-5-80/81.

3g

ance” to that employee for up to four years, to the extent

that the employee is “placed in a worse position with

respect to compensation” as a result of the merger.

(3) Pay a “dismissal allowance” to any employee who

loses his job as a result of the merger. For dismissed

employees with 15 years of service with either of the

merger partners, payments continue for five years after

the discharge; employees with less seniority receive pay-

ments for a commensurately shorter period. At the em-

ployee’s option, a lesser amount can be taken in a lump

sum.

(4) Continue, for a stated period, fringe benefits, such

as hospitalization insurance, to employees affected by the

merger.

(5) Compensate employees who as a result of the

merger have to change their place of residence.

(6) Arbitrate disputes with employees arising under

the labor protective provisions.”

Various union parties have urged the Board in this

case, as they have in the past, to make the conditions

more favorable to employees adversely affected by merg-

ers. The union parties further urge that the labor

protective conditions promulgated under the Rail Passen-

ger Service Act of 1970* (“Railpax”) and certified by

the Secretary of Labor as being “fair and equitable” ** for

purposes of that Act provide a sufficient basis for us to

modify the United-Capital provisions now.

The examiner in this proceeding and the examiner in

the Delta-Northeast Merger Case have recommended that

*2 Other United-Capital provisions cover such matters as the

period within which a change of employment must occur in order

to be compensable.

= PLL. 91-518.

** Pursuant to section 405 of Railpax.

4g

the Board adopt a number of changes in the United-

Capital provisions, several of which are along the lines

recommended by the union parties.** Except for several

matters unique to Delta-Northeast, we have considered

these recommendations concurrently.

We agree with the examiner in Delta-Northeast that

experience has shown that the conditions dealing with

arbitration procedures, set out in section 13, need amend-

ment. But upon review of the parties’ contentions, the

recommendations of both examiners and the general

absence of new facts relating to other conditions, we

conclude there is insufficient basis presented herein for

altering the substance of any of those conditions. How-

ever, we do see the need for some elucidation of the mean-

ing of several provisions.

We turn first to section 13, which is intended to pro-

vide a mechanism for settlement by arbitration of dis-

putes arising under the labor protective provisions when

they cannot. be resolved by negotiation between the

parties. In a recent labor dispute growing out of the

American-Trans Caribbean Merger Case, supra, it was

necessary for the Board to order the carrier to submit

the dispute to arbitration,” and then to defend the valid-

ity of our order in court.” Despite affirmance of our

action by the Court of Appeals, several additional months

ensued while the parties attempted to choose an arbitra-

2° The hearings and the issuance of the recommended decisions

in this proceeding and in the Delta-Northeast Merger Case ( Docket

23315) were nearly contemporaneous. Moreover the evidence and

arguments regarding labor protective conditions were very similar

in both proceedings. On brief and in oral argument, the !abor

parties in this proceeding referred to both examiners’ recommenda-

tions concerning proposed changes in the labor protective conditions.

26 Order 71-5-30, reconsideration denied, Order 71-6-71.

** American Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 445 F.2d 891

(2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, —— U.S. ——, 92 S. Ct. 681 (1972).

awe ate —o

5g

tor and frame the specific issues to be presented. The

time between the failure of negotiations and the com-

mencement of arbitration ultimately ran to about a year.

A delay of any kind, much less one of a year’s duration,

is undesirable because it prolongs disputes and under-

mines the harmonious labor relations necessary to assure

efficient and uninterrupted service to the public. While

our orders make clear that either party has the unquali-

fied right to demand arbitration of any bona fide dispute

of a non-frivolous nature, the aftermath of American-

Trans Caribbean shows that disagreement over the issues

involved or over the selection of the arbitrator can pro-

long disputes needlessly, to the detriment of employees.

On the basis of this demonstrated experience, there-

fore, we agree with the examiner in Delta-Northeost that

the section should be modified to include: (1) a specific

provision for an arbitrator and the manner of his selec-

tion; (2) expedited hearings and decisions; (3) a definite

division between the parties of the arbitrator’s compen-

sation and expenses; (4) a right in any party to refer

an unsettled dispute to arbitration 20 days after the

controversy arises, instead of the present 30 days; and

to obviate further dispute and delay, (5) a clear affirma-

tion that the decision of the arbitrator is final and bind-

ing on all parties.** We will however, make two addi-

tional changes beyond those recommended by the ex-

aminer. It is possible that the parties to a dispute may

determine that some other procedure for submitting a

dispute for arbitration would be more satisfactory for

them. We shall therefore add a provision to section 13

—_——

2° We do not, of course, intend to deny parties to arbitration

proceedings their usual rights to have an arbitration award set

aside or corrected, for instance, where the arbitrator exceeded his

powers, or where an evident miscalculation of figures was made.

Cf. 9 U.S.C. sees. 10 and 11.

6g

to provide that the parties may by mutual consent de-

cide upon an alternative procedure appropriate for use

in their case. We will also make appropriate language

changes to provide for disputes in which there may be

more than two parties.

a ee

lh

APPENDIX H

72-5-73

72-5-74

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Docket 23315

Served: May 19, 1972

DELTA-NORTHEAST MERGER CASE

Decided: April 24, 1972

Merger of Delta Air Lines, Inc., and Northeast Air-

lines, Inc. approved, subject to conditions.

APPEARANCES:

Same as in the examiner’s recommended decision.

Ifl.

A number of changes to the Board’s standard labor

protective conditions have been recommended by the

examiner, urged by the labor parties and opposed by the

applicants. All the points made by the examiner and

the parties here have been considered in connection with

the review of all the proposed modifications of the stand-

ard labor protective conditions that we undertook in the

2h

Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case.’ Our general conclu-

sions concerning changes in the labor protective condi-

tions are set forth in Allegheny-Mohawk and will not be

repeated here.” We will, however, consider several prob-

lems raised by the unique circumstances of this case, and

which clearly warrant special consideration.

The first such problem concerns the determination of

the appropriate cutoff date for purposes of section 10

of the labor protective provisions. Section 10 provides:

If either carrier, on or after {a specified date]

shall rearrange or adjust its forces in anticipation

of the merger, with the purpose or effect of depriv-

ing an employee of benefits to which he should be

entitled under this order as an employee immediately

affected by the merger, the provisions of this order

shall apply to such employee as of the date when

he is so affected.

The date usually chosen for inclusion in section 10 is

the date of the merger applicants’ agreement in prin-

ciple to merge. Any employee believing

* * cal

“ Orders 72-4-31/32 at pp. 18-33.

*S Suffice to say that for the reasons and with the interpretations

stated there, we shall make no substantive alterations in the stand-

ard labor provisions with the exception of condition 13, which re-

lates to procedures for arbitration.

ne nl SS ek

0 ln oe

li

APPENDIX I

Labor Protective Provisions

Section 1. The fundamental scope and purpese of the

conditions hereinafter specified are to provide for com-

pensatory allowances to employees who may be affected

by the proposed merger of Delta Air Lines, Inc. and

Northeast Airlines, Inc. approved by the attached order,

and it is the intent that such conditions are to be re-

stricted to those changes in employment due to and re-

sulting from such merger. Fluctuations, rises and falls,

and changes in volume or character of employment

brought about by other causes are not covered by or in-

tended to be covered by these provisions.

Section 2(a). The term “merger” as used herein

means joint action by the two carriers whereby they

unify, consolidate, merge, or pool in whole or in part

their separate airline facilities or any of the operations

or services previously performed by them through such

separate facilities.

(b) The term “carrier” as used herein refers to either

Delta or Northeast or to the corporation surviving after

consummation of the proposed merger of the two com-

panies. .

(ec) The term “effective date of merger” as used here-

in shall mean the effective date of the amended certifi-

cates of public convenience and necessity transferred to

Delta pursuant to the approval granted in the attached

order.

(d) The term “employee” as used herein shall mean

an employee of the carriers other than a temporary or

part-time employee.

Section 3. Insofar as the merger affects the seniority

rights of the carriers’ employees, provisions shall be made

2i

for the integration of seniority lists in a fair and equi-

table manner, including, where applicable, agreement

through collective bargaining between the carriers and

the representatives of the employees affected. In the

event of failure to agree, the dispute may be submitted

by either party for adjustment in accordance with sec-

tion 13.

Section 4(a). Subject to the applicable conditions set

forth herein, no employee of either of the carriers in-

volved in the merger who is continued in service shall

as a result of the merger be placed in a worse position

with respect to compensation than he occupied immedi-

ately prior to his displacement so long as he is unable

in the normal exercise of his seniority rights under exist-

ing agreements, rules, and practices to obtain a position

producing compensation equal to or exceeding the com-

pensation of the position held by him immediately prior

to such date, except, however, that if he fails to exercise

his seniority rights to secure another available position,

which does not require a change in residence, to which

he is entitled under the working agreement and which

carries a rate of pay and compensation exceeding those

of the position which he elects to retain, he shall there-

after be treated for the purposes of this section as oc-

cupying the position which he elects to decline.

(b) The protection afforded by the foregoing para-

graph is hereby designated as a “displacement allow-

ance” which shall be determined in each instance in the

manner hereinafter described. Any employee entitled to

such an allowance is hereinafter referred to as a “dis-

placed” employee.

(e) Each displacement allowance shaJl be a monthly

allowance determined by computing the total compensa-

tion received by the employee and his total time paid for

during the last 12 months in which he performed service

3i

immediately preceding the date of his displacement (such

12 months being hereinafter referred to as the “test

period”) and by dividing separately the total compensa-

tion and the total time paid for by 12, thereby producing

the average monthly compensation and average monthly

time paid for, which shall be the minimum amounts used

to guarantee the displaced employee; and if his compen-

sation in his current position is less in any month in

which he performs work than the aforesaid average com-

pensation, he shall be paid the difference, less compensa-

tion for any time lost on account of voluntary absences

to the extent that he is not available for service equiva-

lent to his average monthly time during the test period,

but he shall be compensated in addition thereto at the

rate of the position filled for any time worked in excess

of the average monthly time paid for during the test

period.

(d) The protection afforded herein shall only apply to

displacements occurring within a period of 3 years from

the effective date of the merger (referred to herein as

the claim period) ; and the period during which this pro-

tection is to be given ‘referred to herein as the protec-

tive period) shall extend for a period of 4 years from the

date on which the employee is displaced.

Section 5(a). Any employee of either of the carriers

participating in the merger who is deprived of em-

ployment as a result of said merger shall be accorded an

allowance (hereinafter termed a “dismissal allowance’),

based on length of service, which (except in the case of

an employee with less than 1 year of service) shall be a

monthly allowance equivalent in each instance to 60 per-

cent of the average monthly compensation of the em-

ployee in question during the last 12 months of his em-

ployment in which he earned compensation prior to the

date he is first deprived of employment as a result of

the merger. This dismissal allowance will be made to

4i

each eligible employee, while unemployed, by Delta dur-

ing a period beginning at the date he is first deprived

of employment as a result of the merger and extending

in each instance for a length of time determined and

limited by the following schedule:

Length of service Period of payment

Years Months

I si decaecnsssmononnnninss seiceanencatiiie kee

SS SE NTT

IS hoe cia paeanadesanionsichsbasianiainiaetiiae

I fs cesamvaisnigsnbnoesinmecenaeesioll

SS EER

ER TTT

In the case of an employee with less than 1 year of

service such employee shall not be covered by the benefits

provided in this section, but shall receive such benefits,

and only such benefits, as are provided by section 7.

(b) For the purpose of these provisions, the length

of service of the employee shall be determined from the

date he last acquired an employment status with the

employing carrier and he shali be given credit for 1

morth’s service for each month in which he performed

any service (in any capacity whatsoever) and 12 such

months shall be credited as 1 year’s service. The em-

ployment status of an employee shall not be interrupted

by furlough in instances where the employee has a right

to and does return to service when called. In determining

length of service of an employee acting as an officer or

other official representative of an employee organization

he will be given credit for performing service while so

engaged on leave of absence from the service of the

carrier: Provided, That in caiculating the dismissal al-

lowanee for such an employee, such allowance shall be

based upon the compensation paid such employee by the

carrier during his last 12 months of service on the com-

“ —

5i

pany payroll and not on the compensation he may have

been paid by the employee representative organization.

(c) An employee shall not be regarded as deprived of

employment in case of his resignation, death, or retire-

ment on account of age or disability in accordance with

the current rules and practices applicable to employees

generally, dismissal for justifiable cause in accordance

with the rules, or furlough because of reduction in forces

due to seasonal requirements of the service; nor shall

any employee be regarded as deprived of employment as

the result of the merger who is not deprived of his em-

ployment within 3 years from the effective date of said

merger.

(d) Each employee receiving a dismissal allowance

shall keep Allegheny informed of his address and the

name and address of any other person by whom he may

be regularly employed.

(e) The dismissal allowance shall be paid to the regu-

larly assigned incumbent of the position abolished. If

the position of an employee is abolished while he is absent

from service, he will be entitled to the dismissal allow-

ance when he is available for service. The employee

temporarily filling said position at the time it was abol-

ished will be given a dismissal allowance on the basis of

said position until the regular employee is available for

service and thereafter shall revert to his previous status

and will be given a dismissal allowance accordingly if any

is due.

(f) An employee receiving a dismissal allowance shall

be subject to call to return to service after being notified

in_aceordance with the working agreement, and such

employee may be required to return to the service of the

employing carrier for other reasonably comparable em-

ployment for which he is physically and mentally quali-

fied and which does not require a change in his place of

6i

residence, if his return does not infringe upon the em-

ployment rights of other employees under the working

agreement.

(g) If an employee who is receiving a dismissal al-

lowance returns to service the dismissal allowance shall

cease while he is so reemployed and the period of time

during which he is so reemployed shall be deducted from

the total period for which he is entitled to receive a dis-

missal allowance. During the time of such reemployment,

however, he shall be entitled to protection in accordance

with the provisions of section 4.

ih) If an employee who is receiving a dismissal al-

lowance obtains other employment, his dismissal allow-

ance shall be reduced to the extent that the sum total of

his earnings in such employment plus his allowance and

any unemployment insurance benefit (or similar benefit)

exceed the amount upon which his dismissal allowance is

based: Provided, That this shall not apply to employees

with less than 1 year’s service.

(i) A dismissal allowance shall cease prior to the

expiration of its prescribed period in the event of—

1. Failure without geod cause to return to service

after being notified of a position for which he is eligible

and as provided in paragraphs (f) and (g).

2. Resignation.

3. Death.

4. Retirement on account of age or disability in ac-

cordance with the current rules and practices applicable

to employees generally.

5. Dismissal for justifiable cause.

°

Section 5. An employee affected by the merger shall

not during the applicable protective period be deprived of

Ti

benefits attaching to his previous employment, such as

hospitalization, relief, and the like.

Section 7. Any employee eligible to receive a dismissal

allowance under section 5 hereof may, at his option at

the time of merger, resign and (in lieu of all other

benefits and protections provided in these provisions)

accept in a lump sum a separation allowance determined

in accordance with the following schedule:

Length of service Separation allowance

Years Months’ pay

Dee misssemimmmesenen 10

ESE 6

EE 9

I seems 12

In the case of employees with less than 1 year’s service,

5 days’ pay, at the straight time rate per working day

of the position last occupied, for each full month in which

they performed service will be paid as the lump sum.

(a) Length of service shall be computed as provided in

section 5.

(b) One month’s pay shall be computed by multiplying

by 30 the calendar daily rate of pay received by the em-

ployee in the position last occupied prior to the time of

the merger.

Section 8(a). Any employee who is retained in the

service of the carrier surviving the merger (or who is

later restored to service from the group of employees en-

titled to receive a dismissal allowance) who is required

to change the point of his employment as a result of such

merger, and is therefore required to move his place of

residence, shall be reimbursed for all expenses of moving

his household and other personal effects and for the

traveling expenses of himself and members of his family,

including living expenses for himself and his family and

8i

his own actual wage loss during the time necessary for

such transfer, and for a reasonable time thereafter (not

to exceed 2 working days), used in securing a place of

residence in his new location. The exact extent of the

responsibility of the carrier under this provision and the

ways and means of transportation shall be agreed upon in

advance between the carrier and the affected employee or

his representative. No claims for expenses under this

section shall be allowed unless they are incurred within

3 years from the effective date of the merger, and the

claim must be submitted within 90 days after the ex-

penses are incurred.

(b) Changes in place of residence subsequent to the

initial change caused by the merger which grow out of

the normal exercise of seniority in accordance with work-

ing agreements are not comprehended within the provi-

sions of this section.

Section 9(a). The following provisions shall apply, to

the extent they are applicable in each instance, to any

employee who is retained in the service of the carriers in-

volved in this merger (or who is later restored to such

service from the group of employees entitled to receive a

dismissal allowance) who is required to change the point

of his employment as a result of such merger and is

therefore required to move his place of residence.

1. If the employee owns his own home in the locality

from which he is required to move, he shall at his option

be reimbursed by the carrier for any loss suffered in

the sale of his home for less than its fair value. In each

ease the fair value of the home in question shall be de-

termined as of a date sufficiently prior to the merger to

be unaffected thereby; Provided, however, That if the

home is not sold within a substantial period of time after

the merger, then the fair value of the home shall be

determined as of a date as closely related to the date of

sale as possible, with an agreed-upon adjustment being

9i

made to exclude any effect of the merger on such fair

value. The carrier shall in each instance be afforded an

opportunity to purchase the home at such fair value

before it is sold by the employee to any other party.

2. If the employee is under a contract to purchase his

home, the carrier shall protect him against loss to the

extent of the fair value of any equity he may have in

the home and in addition shall relieve him from any fur-

ther obligations under his contract.

. 3. If the employee holds an unexpired lease of a dwell-

ing occupied by him as his home, the carrier shall pro-

tect him from all loss and cost in securing the cancella-

tion of his said lease.

(b) Changes in place of residence subsequent to the

initial change caused by the merger which grow out of

the normal exercise of seniority in accordance with work-

ing agreements are not comprehended within the provi-

sions of this section.

( ¢) No claim for loss shall be paid under the provisions

of this section which is not presented within 3 years after

the effective date of the merger.

(d) Should a controversy arise in respect to the value

of the home, the loss sustained in its sale, the loss under

contract for purchase, loss and cost in securing termina-

tion of lease, or any other question in connection with

these matters, it shall be decided through joint confer-

ence between the employee or his representative and the

carrier, and, in the event they are unable to agree, the

dispute may be referred by either party to a board of

three competent real estate appraisers, selected in the

following manner: One to be selected by the employee or

his representative and one by the carrier, respectively;

these two shall endeavor by agreement within 10 days

after their appointment to select the third appraiser, or to

select some person authorized to name the third appraiser ;

10i

and in the event of failure to agree, then the Chairman

of the National Mediation Board shall be requested to

appoint the third appraiser. A decision of a majority of

the appraisers shall be required and said decision shall

be final and conclusive. The salary and expenses of the

third or neutral appraiser, including the expenses of the

appraisal board, shall be borne equally by the parties to

the proceedings. All other expenses shall be paid by the

party incurring them, including the salary of the ap-

praiser selected by such party.

Section 10. If either carrier, on or after April 23, 1971,

shall rearrange or adjust its forces in anticipation of

the merger, with the purpose or effect of depriving an

employee of benefits to which he should be entitled under

these provisions as an employee immediately affected by

the merger, these provisions shall apply to such an em-

ployee as of the date when he is so affected.

Section 11. Delta and Northeast shall jointly or sev-

erally give at least 45 days’ written notice containing a

full and adequate statement of the proposed changes to be

effected by the merger, including an estimate of the

number of employees of each class, craft, or field of en-

deavor affected by the intended changes. Such notice

shall be posted on bulletin boards or other conspicuous

places convenient to the employees of said carriers, and a

copy of the notice shall be sent by registered mail to all

authorized representatives of any of the employees of

both carriers.

If requested in writing by any employee or employees

of either carrier or the authorized representative of such

employee or employees, the date and place of a meeting

between said employees or their representatives and the

representatives of the carriers to settle problems of the

rearrangement of such employees arising out of and be-

cause of the merger shall be agreed upon within 10 days

1li

after such request is received by the carrier. The meet-

ing shall commence within 30 days from the date the

request is received by the carrier.

In the event of a failure to agree upon a settlement

of a problem or of problems presented at the meeting, the

unsettled problems may be submitted by either party for

adjustment in accordance with section 13.

Section 12. No employee of either carrier shall, as a

condition of eligibility for the protection afforded by the

terms of this order be required to accept employment

with the surviving carrier that is not within the class,

craft, or field of endeavor in which he was employed by

either carrier on the date of the attached order.

Section 13(a). “In the event that any dispute or con-

troversy (except as to matters arising under section 9)

arises with respect to the protections provided herein,

which cannot be settled by the parties within 20 days

after the controversy arises, it may be referred by any

party to an arbitrator selected from a panel of seven

names furnished by the National Mediation Board for

consideration and determination. The parties shall select

the arbitrator from such panel by alternately striking

names until only one remains, and he shall serve 2s

arbitrator. Expedited hearings and decisions will be ex-

pected, and a decision shall be rendered within 90 days

after the controversy arises, unless an extension of time is

mutually agreeable to all parties.” The salary and ex-

penses of the arbitrator shall be borne equally by the

carrier and (i) the organization or organizations repre-

senting the employee or employees, or (ii) if unrepre-

sented, the employee or employees or group or groups of

employees. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final

and binding on the parties.

(b) The above condition shall not apply if the parties

by mutual agreement determine that an alternative

12i

method for dispute settlement or an alternative proce-

dure for selection of an arbitrator is appropriate in their

particular dispute. No party shall be excused from com-

plying with the above conditions by reason of having

suggested an alternative method or procedure, unless and

until that alternative method or procedure shall have

been agreed to by all the parties.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition — Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board · 439 U.S. 819 | Frix