Petition — Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board
Supreme Court brief1978
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IN THE MICHAEL ROBAK JR_CLERK
Siprenw Court of the Unite? States
OCTOBER TERM, 1977
77-1470
N
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
Petitioner.
Vv.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Law Department JAMES W. CALLISON
Delta Air Lines, Inc. SIDNEY F. Davis
Hartsfield Atlanta Int’l Airport ROBERT S. HARKEY
Atlanta, Georgia 30320 Attorneys for Petitioner
Of Counsel:
ROBERT REED Gray, Esq.
HALE RUSSELL GRAY SEAMAN
& BIRKETT
1001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
———— A TN ————
WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - RE 7-6002 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I IT ccscacocitadeceusniascapsacapenatipnsabenabiaasieictidemateie 1
ITI cc iatictiiiniatinicieiintinsiatnoenirendinaainccteeiaiecnen 2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .......................--...--..0---- ae 2
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED ......... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE _. satellite 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT... alee 10
1. The Board’s Reasons for Ordering Arbitration
Were Not Supported by the Record and the Re-
quirement to Arbitrate Was Contrary to the De-
cisional Criteria Stated by the Board —.............. 11
2. The Court of Appeals Erred in Applying an
“Abuse of Discretion” Standard in Reviewing
the Decision of the Board Instead of a Standard
of Whether the Board Had Adhered to the Rec-
ord and its Own Decisional Criteria. __..... 17
SEIDEN siketiepidetsishesiildnnieltiian—<ie semis innaeiieeaetl — 22
Il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case, CAB Orders 72-
4-31/32 : . 3
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 126 U.S. App. D.C.
399, 379 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1967) 11, 15, 19
Carey V. O’Donneli, 165 U.S. App. D.C. 46, 506
F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1110 er . x
City of Lawrence v. CAB, 348 F.2d 582 (1st Cir
1965) | 16, 19
Committee of Former Northeast Stewardesses Vv.
CARB, Case No. 75-1066 (D.C. Cir. May 27,
1975) 1,8
Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 148 US. App.
D.C. 330, 443 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1971) 17, 18, 19
Deita-Northeast Merger Case ey
CAB Orders 72-5-73/74 3,4
CAB Order 72-8-1 4
CAB Order 73-9-42 2, 6, 12, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21
CAB Order 75-1-6 2,8, 12,13, 14, 16
CAB Order 76-9-129 2,8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 19
Kent v. CAB, 204 F.2d 268 (2nd Cir. 1953) 3
Outland v. CAB, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 90, 284 F.2d |
224, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1960) 5
United-Capital Merger Case, 33 CAB 307 (1961 ) 4
Statutes:
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) 2
49 U.S.C. § 1878 3
49 U.S.C. § 1486 | 28.9
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1977
No.
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
. Petitioner,
CIvIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Delta Air Lines, Inc. (“Delta”) herewith petitions this
Court to issue a writ of certiorari to review the opinion
and judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit entered on January 20,
1978, which affirms a decision of the Civil Aeronautics
Board (“Board”) which ordered Delta to submit to arbi-
tration a seniority integration dispute growing out of the
merger of Northeast Airlines, Inc. (“Northeast”) into
Delta.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, review of which is
sought here, is not yet reported, but is set forth at page
la of the Appendix to this petition. Also pertinent and
necessary to the consideration of this case are (1) the
unreported order and opinion of the Court of Appeals in
the case of Committee of Former Northeast Stewardesses
v. CAB (D. C. Cir. May 27, 1975) which is set forth at
2
page 1b of the Appendix, (2) the Board's order of which
review was sought in the Court of Appeals (Delta-North-
east Merger Case, Order 76-9-129, dated September 29,
1976) which is set forth at page lc of the Appendix, and
(3) the Board’s prior orders in the case, Orders 75-1-6
and 73-9-42, set forth at pages ld and le, respectively,
of the Appendix.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit was entered on January 20, 197%
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
$ 1254/1) and 49 U.S.C. § 1486(f).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) Whether, under applicable principles of adminis-
trative law, the Civil Aeronautics Board may order an
air carrier to arbitrate a seniority integration dispute
under the Board’s Labor Protective Provisions (imposed
in airline mergers) when the request for arbitration un-
disputedly came many months after the time limits for
seeking arbitration had run, when the Board itself recog-
nized the importance of enforcing the time limits in order
to avoid labor strife, and when there was no evidence in
the record to support the Board’s reasons for ordering
arbitration.
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying an
“abuse of discretion” standard in reviewing the decision
of the Civil Aeronautics Board instead of the standard of
whether the Board had adhered to the record and its own
decisional criteria.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
Although not directly related to the issues in this case,
Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as
3
amended (“Act”), 49 U.S.C. § 1378, is the statutory au-
thority for the Labor Protective Provisions | LPP's
imposed by the Board in this and other cases maven to
do with mergers of air carriers. See Kent v. CAB, 204
F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1953). Section 408 is set out at page
if of the Appendix (“App.”). There are no regulations
involved, but the LPP’s imposed by the Board as a condi-
tion to its approval of the merger of Northeast into Delta,
when the merger was approved by the Board in May of
1972, are directly in issue in this case. Because of the
similarity of the LPP’s to statutory and regulatory provi-
sions and their pertinence to this case, the awe and
related portions of the Board’s Orders 72-4-31 32' and
Orders 72-5-73 74 are included in the Appendix.’
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As is explained in greater detail below, in this case
Delta was ordered by the Board to submit to arbitration
a dispute concerning the integration of seniority lists for
the stewardesses of Delta and Northeast following the
merger of the two companies in August of 1972, notwith-
standing the facts that (1) the Board’s LPI 8 called for
submission of disputes to arbitration and decision within
90 days, and (2) it was (and is) undisputed that the
Committee seeking arbitration did not request it until the
spring of 1974.
The merger of Delta and Northeast was approved by
: . . FOF
the CAB pursuant to § 408 of the Act in Orders 72-5
"1 Orders 72-4-31/22 (App. lg) approved the merger of Alleghe nl
Airlines and Mohawk Airlines. In the All ahe nu-Mohawk CORE, ‘ a
Board indicated that it also would apply its reasoning In that -_
with regard to the LPP’s to the Delta-Northeast case. (App. 49,
footnote 25). In the ordcr approving the Delta-Northeast cnse
(App. th), the Board incorporated by reference its statements re-
garding the LPP’s made in the Allegheny-Mohawk case. (App.
2h).
? The LPP’s themselves appear at page li of the Appendix.
i
73/74 dated April 24, 1972 (App. lh), and was consum-
mated on August 1, 1972. In connection with its approval
of the merger, the Board imposed the LPP’s which are
attached as Appendix 1 to Order 72-5-73 (App. li)
Among other things the LPP’s require the surviving car-
rier to provide for the integration of seniority lists “in
a fair and equitable manner” and for the arbitration of
disputes arising under the LPP’s, including those related
to seniority integration. (App. li-2i, 11i)
These LPP’s are substantiall
es y the same as the standard
= 8 imposed by the Board in the United-Capital Merger
ase, 33 CAB 307 (1961), and subsequent merger cases
except for several changes in the arbitration procedures
which were designed to ensure expedited presentation and
resolution of disputes. The Board said:
“Expedited hearings and decisi
al ecisions will be e -
ed, and a decision shall be rendered within 90 days
after the controversy arises, unless an extension of
time is mutually agreeable to all parties.” {empha-
sis added} (App. 11i) . ;
: v4 reliance of the total package of conditions attached
Vv the Board to the approval of the merger, including the
LPP’s containing the expedited arbitration procedures
Delta accepted the terms of the merger imposed b the
Board and Northeast’s certificates were ro svein te
Delta on August 1, 1972. See Order 72-8-1 :
In July of 1972, prior to the effective date of the mer-
ger, representatives of the two carriers and the Tran
port Workers Union (“TWU”) met in connection with
the integration of the stewardess senurity lists. (At that
time, the TWU was still the collective bargainin re -
sentative of the Northeast stewardesses under the Rail.
way Labor Act.) At this meeting TWU insisted th t it
should negotiate the lists with Delta, but Delta sts 4
that representative committees of the two danuielon
|
'
- —_-
5
groups should be selected for this purpose. Subsequently,
committees were selected by both stewardess groups and
negotiations began. The Northeast committee was not
represented by any TWU personnel during these negoti-
ations.
The negotiations extended over a period of approxi-
mately two months, but eventually resulted in an inabili-
ty of the two groups to agree upon an integrated list,
primarily because of the insistence of the Northeast
stewardesses on a straight date of hire integration.* The
Northeast representatives then withdrew from the nego-
tiations. At this point Delta concluded that its responsi-
bility under the LPP’s required that it develop a fair and
equitable seniority list, based upon the ideas that it had
been put forward by both stewardess groups during the
meetings, subject to any arbitration that might be in-
voked by any dissatisfied employees.
Delta did not receive complaints from any steward-
esses, former Northeast or original Delta, after the inte-
grated list was published, although the TWU had re-
quested arbitration before the integrated list was pub-
lished. Delta responded to TWU’s request by pointing
out that the TWU was not authorized to represent the
former Northeast stewardesses under the LPP’s merely
by virtue of its former representation under the Railway
Labor Act, citing CAB precedent to this effect and em-
phasizing that Delta had not received complaints from
individual stewardesses or been provided with any evi-
dence that TWU had been authorized by any employees
’ With respect to this contention, which was later embraced by the
Committee of Former Northeast Stewardesses, it is interesting
to note the court’s statement in Outland Vv. CAB, 109 U.S. App.
D.C. 90, 284 F.2d 224, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1960), that “The contention
that length of service could control or even that it should always
be the dominant factor in seniority is not consistent with experience
nor with judicial attitudes toward the subject.” [citations omitted |
6
to represent . ;
wy ry them for LPP purposes. Still no complaints
P b January of 1973, TWU filed a petition with the
seeking an order compelling Delta to arbitrate the
stewardess seniority lists. In its answer filed on Febru-
ary 15, 1973, Delta responded essentially as it had to the
TWU itself, stating that the TWU had not shown that it
represented any employees under the LPP’s, that because
of the break-down in negotiations between the stewardess
a Delta had been forced to integrate the
ists in What it considered to be a fair and equitable man-
ner, subject to requests for arbitration from dissatisfied
employees, and that it had recei
oe ived no such requests from
In May of 1973, the TWU filed a supplement to it
sera — - statements to TWU from five Penton
east stewardesses, advising that these stewardes
were dissatisfied with the integrated seniori y Met. Delta
— by stating that Delta itself stil] Steet cake
7 py agp or requests for arbitration and pointing
, tat by this time it had been many months since the
effective date of the merger and since Delta had ubli Jj a
the tegrated list so that any complaints filed t thi
point would not be timely under the LPP’s =
a In he rage of 1973, the Board issued Order 73-9-42
w ich it denied the TWU petition. The Board sum-
marized Delta’s July 2, 1973 answer as follows:
a its answer, Delta states that it still has not
re request from any former Northeast stew-
- — .. . for arbitration of a seniority problem:
woh, ~ Raby has not informed Delta of any au-
n to represent any former North
ployees in seniority matters: t/ Seord ahonid
or ; ; that the Board sh
reject TWU’s petition on th | i
e grounds that no dis-
wer heaped properly submitted to Delta for wii
m Ww a reasonable period ] ,
- of time afte
he dispute arose... .’ [emphasis added] lng ef
Then the Board ruled:
“We will dismiss the TWU petition on the alter-
nate grounds that (1) no showing has been made
which warrants intervention on the Board’s part, and
(2) TWU is not a ‘representative’ of the former
Northeast employees for purposes of invoking the
provisions for arbitration contained in our labor
protective provisions merely because it was the col-
lective bargaining representative of those employees
prior to the merger.” (App. 5e)
The Board refrained from deciding the question of
timeliness raised by Delta, saying in a footnote that this
and other questions were appropriate “for resolution in
the context of negotiation or an arbitration proceeding
and, accordingly, we do not decide them here.” The
Board did not, however, give any indication of how the
question of timeliness should be handled or otherwise
provide any guidance should the question be submitted
to arbitration. Nor did it order arbitration in the event
that a further request was made. The TWU did not seek
review of this order and thereafter Delta received no
further request from the TWU for arbitration.
It was not until April of 1974—some 6 months after
the Board had denied TWU’s petition, approximately 18
months after the integrated seniority list had been pub-
lished and over 20 months after the effective date of the
merger—that Delta received a request from an attorney
representing three former Northeast stewardesses (the
“Committee”), supported by written authorizations, re-
questing negotiation or arbitration of the stewardess
seniority list. These stewardesses claimed to have au-
thority to represent other former Northeast stewardesses,
although written authorizations from the other steward-
esses were not furnished at that time. Delta denied the
request on the basis that it came many months after the
expiration of the time limits set out in the LPP’s and
8
_ to enter into arbitration at such a late date would
wart the major purpose of the LPP’s, i.e., to avoid
labor strife and unrest. i iy rs
Following Delta’s response to their reques
0 eg Stewardesses waited almost na po sone
= ¢ ae any further action. Then in June of 1974
; ey eda petition with the CAB seeking an order di-
ee —o nde panae-o oe! approximately six more
om, © issued Order 75-1-6. In this or
a Aang to deal with the policy arguments se
beng we — denying the request for arbitration on the
co dheuien the guiion, deuting tho guiiienes »
: ing the petitioners to th
courts, because the Board “ordinari ‘
tata petitions requesting that sa eer ape oagee
proceed to arbitration under the Board’s canines teteer
emer ype esi sage the basis of its ruling "the
rd ¢ its lack of expertise in labor matt
possibility of an appeal should it order i ig “
problems with enforcement of any sae dina “ry
= ectin i-
7 mg pte sought review of this aa ma
ade ettaa = . §$ 1486 and the Court of Appeals sum-
a —_ and remanded for a “decision on the
= ve = ry By, v. O'Donnell, 165 U.S. App. D.C
ae 4 ~e ~” (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 US.
pone Po w oe court had held that the Board has
oo S sree iction to decide matters arising under its
PP's. C mmittee of Former Northeast Stewardes
Civil Aeronautics Board, supra. (App. 1b) —
In its . 76.90.1909 ;
and pada "oe Gad in response to the court’s reversal
the time lienits a recognized and strongly embraced
ceiletnainnll a grt that Delta has consistently
con” Mie a ce t e Committee first requested arbitr ad
. After reciting the basic facts, the Board said: a
“Ordinarily, the Bo
xe ° Sd : ard would consid. >
recital of facts, if true, to be dapecitive of the one
S-
—
_ a en
9
tion of timeliness. As we pointed out in the Alle-
gheny-M ohawk Merger Case, supra, delays in reach-
ing arbitration prolong labor disputes and under-
Open-ended avail-
mine harmonious labor relations.
ability of arbitration can only ferment further strife
and is an invitation for abuse of the system adopted
by the Board for the protection of employees af-
fected by a merger, or a large-sale {sic | acquisition.
Moreover, it is clear that the Board's arbitration
provision contemplates 4a speedy resolution of dis-
putes.” | mphasis added| (Order 76-9-129, p. 4)
(App. 6c)
The Board went on to conclude, however, that because
of what is called “highly unusual circumstances and con-
flicting assertions attending the history of this particular
seniority integration” and supposed deficiencies in the
record, “we are unable to definitively resolve . . . the
merits of Delta’s argument that the arbitration provisions
are untimely invoked.”
Therefore, the Board decided “. . . to order arbitration,
but to include in the arbitrator’s mandate a jurisdictional
question” as to the timeliness issue. The Board made it
quite clear, however, that it considered the timeliness
question as one which it normally would decide.
“We should emphasize that our action with respect
to the timeliness issue is predicated upon the par-
ticular circumstances present and the record before
us. Our normal inclination, given an adequate rec-
ord not requiring further proceedings, would be to
resolve the issue at this stage. However, this is not,
to all appearances, such a case.” {emphasis added |
(Order 76-9-129, p. 6, App. 8c)
Delta sought review in the Court of Appeals pursuant
to 49 U.S.C. § 1486, on the basis that the Board had
failed to adhere to its own decisional criteria, i.e., that
ere true, the Board itself would have
because the request for arbitration
if the stated facts w
dismissed the petition
10
was not timely filed. Delta showed that the facts wer
undisputed (indeed, Delta accepted the facts pleaded “
the Committee ) and that application of the Board’s rea-
soning to these facts required a decision dismissin, the
petition on the merits. In its decision on a wing the
Court of Appeals concluded that “The basic question non
fore this Court is whether the Board abused its discretion
by referring to the arbitrator the procedural issue of
timeliness of the request for arbitration rather th:
deciding that issue on the record before it e y App 2a)
Applying this standard, the Court concluded po the
Board had not abused its discretion and affir ,
Board’s order, —
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
T ; ae "Ac » 3 ;
i his case presents important questions concerning the
: ministration of Labor Protective Provisions in airline
er . ¢ a J 7 J a . ~~ ;
mee yl cases, as well as questions concerning the require-
7 saan nan pear esapcienaty agency adhere to the evidence
pie — an to its own decisional criteria. In addition
“apa questions as to the proper standard to be applied
od + pp such cases by courts of appeals. The stand
ard of review utilized by " n this
y the Court of A
; Appeals in this
case co :W ; alt
= c a with the standard used by the First Circuit
= ee pel nenpensn used by the District of Columbia
‘cult In other cases, Th |
ses. e conflict should be res
on a se : e resolved
; 8 Court. Additionally. b
Y, because the Board :
> ard and the
a of Appeals so clearly departed from the accepted
« ) ‘ * . *}
oP a of appropriate standards of administrative
7 — case which has vital precedent value with respect
ner merger cases, this C
t ses, this Court’s power of s visi
wi ' . Supervision
is called for to correct the serious errors below |
11
1. The Board’s Reasons for Ordering Arbitration Were
Not Supported by the Record and the Requirement to
Arbitrate Was Contrary to the Decisional Criteria
Stated by the Board.
There is no more fundamental principal of administra-
tive law than the requirement that the agency must ad-
here to the evidence of record. See Braniff Airways, Inc.
v. CAB, 126 U.S. App. D.C. 399, 379 F.2d 453, 456
(D.C. Cir. 1967). The Board’s decision in this case is
based, however, not on the clear and undisputed facts in
the record, but on vague statements concerning the his-
tory of the dispute and factors which the Board said
“appeared” to be relevant or pertinent. After stating
that the recited facts ordinarily wouid be dispositive of
the issue of timeliness and recognizing the policy reasons
for enforcing the time limits, the Board reasoned as fol-
lows:
“On the other hand, we cannot ignore the highly
unusual circumstances and conflicting assertions at-
tending the history of this particular seniority list
integration dispute. This history is described in some
detail in Order 73-9-42 (served September 13, 1973)
and Order 75-1-6, supra, the pertinent portions of
which we incorporate herein by reference, and need
not be repeated here at length. Briefly, the dispute
was under active negotiation between the former
Northeast stewardesses, more precisely, their as-
sumed representative, the Transport Workers Union,
since prior to the consummation of the merger; the
negotiations failed; pursuit of arbitration by the
Transport Workers Union, on behalf of the stew-
ardesses, foundered because of problems with respect
to the TWU’s authority to represent the Northeast
stewardesses (see Order 73-9-42, supra); and subse-
quent to TWU’s withdrawal, a group of individual
stewardesses took up the task of pursuing the arbi-
tration remedy, culminating in the instant proceed-
ing.
12
“Moreover, while the record is rife with documents
detailing various aspects of this continuing history,
the material is in the form of numerous—and ap-
parently conflicting—unsworn allegations of a fact-
ual, legal. and equitable nature, involving various
aspects of labor-management relations as well as
other matters. Relevant to the ultimate issue of
timeliness raised by Delta appears to be the ques-
tion of the representational capacity of various in-
dividuals and groups, and the TWU, involved in the
negotiations and the quest for arbitration of the
underlying seniority integration dispute. Also perti-
nent may be Delta’s actual knowledge of dissatisfac-
tion with the seniority list adopted by it following
the failure of negotiations and the form that such
dissatisfaction took, whether formal complaints or
otherwise. Furthermore, there is in our mind some
question as to the extent that Delta’s own actions
in this ongoing controversy may have served to
defeat, through delay, legitimate rights to arbitra-
oo a ~ bet labor protective provisions,”
emphasis added} (
— | (Order 76-9-129, pp. 4-5) (App.
Orders 73-9-42 (App. 1d) and 75-1-6 (App. le) do not,
however, support the Board’s conclusions and the factors
cited in the second paragraph quoted above are nothing
more than the Board’s repetition of the arguments made
by the Committee which are legally irrelevant. The
Board’s “brief history” of the case implies that the TWU’s
efforts “foundered” for some reason with which the Board
had no connectior and that the Committee’s efforts were
merely an uner-cen continuation of the TWU effort. The
undisputed facts are that the Board dismissed the TWU’s
request for an order directing arbitration and that Delta
received no request from the Committee for
thereafter. * many months
In Order 13-9-42, which dealt with the TWU’s request
for arbitration, the Board found nothing “unusual” about
Delta’s refusal to submit the stewardess seniority aribtra-
13
tion matter to arbitration with the TWU. To the con-
trary, the Board held in no uncertain terms that the TWU
had no right to demand arbitration merely because it had
been the representative of the Northeast stewardesses
under the Railway Labor Act prior to the merger and
that it must present evidence of its representative capac-
ity under the LPP’s in order to invoke arbitration. The
Board said:
“We will dismiss the TWU petition on the al-
ternate grounds that (1) no showing has been made
which warrants intervention on the Board’s part,
and (2) TWU is not a ‘representative’ of the former
Northeast employees for purposes of invoking the
provisions for arbitration contained in our labor pro-
tective provisions merely because it was the collective
bargaining representative of those employees prior to
the merger.” (Order 73-9-42, p. 4, App. 5e)
The TWU did not appeal this order which was issued
in September of 1973 or come forward with any evidence
of representation despite the Board’s statement that it
could obtain arbitration by doing so. (See Order 73-9-42,
p. 4, App. 6e) It was not until March of 1974 that the
Committee’s lawyer contacted Delta with a request to
arbitrate and it was April of 1974 before the lawyer sub-
mitted the evidence of representation clearly required
under Order 73-9-42.
In Order 75-1-6, in which the Board initially dealt with
the Committee’s request for arbitration, the Board cited
no unusual circumstances or conflicting assertions on the
issue of timeliness. It merely stated that for reasons hav-
ing to do with the Board’s lack of expertise in labor mat-
ters the petitioners “. . . should resort to the courts to
the extent that they seek an order directing a carrier to
proceed to arbitration.” (App. 6d) There was no state-
ment whatsoever of conflicting assertions which would at
that time have precluded the Board from deciding the
question of timeliness.
alll
14
‘The Board’s position in Order 75-1-6 cannot be squared
with its decision in the order now at issue. Under the last
order a decision on timeliness “normally” is one for the
Board which would be decided when the petition for arbi-
tration is filed. (Order 76-9-129, p. 6, App. 8c) Delta
asked the Board to make just that decision when the Com-
mittee s petition was filed and the Board refused to make
it in Order 75-1-6, although it now says that under the
facts mm this ease it would have decided that the request
for arbitration was barred by the time limits, absent the
unusual circumstances.” Nothing has changed since the
filing of the petition and Delta’s response, which consti--
tuted the record when the Board issued its Order 75-1-6
except that the Committee appealed and the Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the Board for “a decision
on the merits.” The Board failed, however, to comp!
with the court’s mandate and instead manufactured addi.
tional reasons not to render a consistent decision on the
merits. The latest reasons are not supported by Orders
73-9-42 and 75-1-6 as the Board states, and thev are not
supported by the record. a
In its filing with the Board, the Committee maintained
that it was the successor to the TWU as representative
of the former Northeast stewardesses and that, accord-
ingly, it should not be barred by the LPP time limits be
cause of the early efforts of the TWU to seek arbitration
and the Board apparently was swayed by this argument
Even assuming, however, that there was any relationshi ,
between the TWU and the Committee, the undis aa
facts, tdeed the facts as stated by the Committee ‘ite l
m its original petition, show that the LPP time lis -
were grossly violated even if the time is measured i
from the dat iti }
al e date that the TWU petition was denied by the
The Committee itself did not alle
T ge that Delta h -
ceived any request to arbitrate except for the TW od
15
quest and the request of the Committee filed many months
after the Board dismissed TWU’s petition. Accordingly,
there was absolutely no dispute and there were no “con-
flicting assertions” concerning the facts related to the ts-
sue of timeliness. These undisputed facts show that the
very first contact to Delta by the Committee came almost
290 months after the merger effective date, almost 18
months after Delta advised all flight attendants of the
integrated seniority list, almost 6 months after the Board
dismissed the TWU petition, over 5 months after the
Committee was advised by the TWU that it would not
proceed and almost 4 months after the Committee re-
tained counsel. When the LPP’s, which were distributed
to each of the former Northeast stewardesses prior to the
merger, call for submission of disputes after 20 days and
decision within 90 days after a dispute arises, there can
be no question that, as a matter of law, a dispute sub-
mitted over 18 months from the date the dispute arose is
barred. Even after the Committee retained legal counsel
there was no contact for almost 4 months, a period which
in itself violated the LPP requirements.
The Board simply ignored the clear and uncontested
facts in the record to reach a decision ordering arbitra-
tion when in the same order the Board said that if the
facts were uncontested it would dispose of the case itself
in Delta’s favor. The ruling of the Board also is contrary
to the Board’s statement that “We should emphasize that
_.. given an adequate record not requiring further pro-
ceedings ... ,” the Board would “.. . resolve the issue
at this stage.” (Order 76-9-129, p. 6, App. 8c) It was
shown that the relevant facts in the record were complete
and undisputed. Thus the Board improperly delegated
the issue to an arbitrator under its own standard for
delegation.
As the Court of Appeals said in Braniff Airways, Ine.
v. CAB, supra:
16
“None of [the] salutary inci
me @ it Y principles of judici
a : equires the court to po he ‘odmin
€ pronouncements clearly at ith
established facts.’ NLRB v. M 4 = Putt Pao
‘ - Morganton Full Fash-
ond —s Co., 214 F.2d 913, 916 ‘a Oe
ag et this is precisely what we have found
pe Ma sagpoe: of the record and comparison with
er Ras bees cannot ignore the funda-
retion between the Board’ ]
of fact and what the record : .” lon
phasis added] (379 F.2d 453 at 40g em
Similarly, in this ca
y, Se the Board’s assertion of
7 a |
a a to decide the issue of timeliness pr
nspection of the record (specifically the facts stated
ca dispositive of the question of timeliness.” The Board’s
cea ror it was delegating the case to an arbitrator
of deficiencies in the record quite simply are con
Moreover, the inconsi
istency between the B , i
sional bases (that the Stated facts, if true wana cae
and the inconsistency wi
7 y with the Orders 73-9-42
ppg — under the decision in City of cae
F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1965). The following state-
ments of the Court in .
to this case: that case could be applied equally
“A M
M9 ~— these internal inconsistencies the
cision, without explanation, reverses an
;
Me en.
—————————————<$ lll — tst—s
17
omitted] and is inconsistent with other aspects of
the same proceeding. . . . Such action is arbitrary
and capricious and must be reversed.” {emphasis
added| (343 F.2d at 588)
Finally, as the District of Columbia Circuit itself said
in Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 143 U.S. App. D.C.
330, 443 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1971):
“In our reviewing role, it is peculiarly appropriate
for us to take the Board at its own word as to what
it is doing, and to scrutinize the result in terms of
that process.” (emphasis added} (443 F.2d at 756)
The Board’s action in this case cannot withstand such
scrutiny. The Board said (indeed emphasized) that it
would decide the case if the record were not deficient and
said that if the recited facts were true it would dispose
of the case. The Board did not do, however, what it said
it was doing.
2. The Court of Appeals Erred in Applying an “Abuse
of Discretion” Standard in Reviewing the Decision of
the Board Instead of a Standard of Whether the Board
Had Adhered to the Record and its Own Decisional
Criteria.
The Court of Appeals viewed the issue presented to it
as follows:
“In our review, we must initially determine whether
the Board has discretion to delegate procedural is-
sues arising under the LPP’s, such as timeliness of
arbitration complaints, to an arbitrator. If the Board
dovs have such discretion and acted within its scope,
we must then decide, on the basis of the administra-
tive record, whether the Board abused its discretion.”
(App. 6a)
In so conceiving the issue, the Court entirely misunder-
stood Delta's contertions and the true issue before the
Court. Delta did not and does not dispute that the Board
th . s ;
e LPP’s, including procedural] issues such as timeliness
abide by its own re i
i asoning and criteria j idi
a | | reas erla in decidin
Pe a to arbitration on the issue of thesiinaee arn
proc ~ presented Was not whether the Board had dis.
jm : order arbitration, or whether it abused it “a
ro - ut whether, as the court said in the Con#i
"es Case, supra, the Board was doi ’ “purrs
myth oing what it said
re Even in its conclusion that it must “
| € administrative record” (App. 8a). th Court mi
ceived its scope of review Nauie ne
termine “first wheth
, er 1
joe ores the Board consider
judgment.’ ”
gm ‘App. 8a) The true issue presented had
made an error
stion of wheth-
; 7 a li j 4 o 2
criteria to the undisputed facts in the pnd own decisional
As the Court of Appeals said:
test to i i 7
Delta until many months after the lve
The Court sidestepped the
reasoning as applied to i
dismissal of the vole arg rn
—. . that the Board b , :
tion’ lle 4, DY stating its ‘n “ye
° demteet te © such issues, was [not] er inclina-
without being nent r . k Which it could nm dota
— oO . ‘
and capricious action. ave engaged in arbitrary
19
“Rather, we believe that the Board was recognizing
that it had discretion either to resolve or to dele-
gate the timeliness question, depending upon the ade-
quacy of the record before it and the perceived need
for specialized knowledge in labor matters to deal
with the question.” (App. 9a-10a)
The Court’s conclusion in this regard is squarely in
conflict with the First Circuit’s decision in City of Law-
rence V. CAB, supra, and the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit’s decisions in the Braniff Airways and Continental
Air Lines cases, supra, in which the courts analyzed the
Board’s actions in terms of deciding whether the Board
had adhered to its own reasoning process as related to
the facts shown by the record. Moreover, in examining
the record and the Board’s stated reasons for sending the
case to arbitration, the Court itself engaged in the same
kind of “boot strap” reasoning that the Board had used,
which reasoning ignored the undisputed facts and relied
upon speculation which was inconsistent with the Board’s
prior orders.
The Board relied on three factors in sending the case to
arbitration. These were:
(1) The supposedly unresolved “question of the rep-
resentational capacitv »f the various individuals
and groups, and the TWU, involved in the ne-
gotiations and the quest for arbitration.”
(2) “Delta’s actual knowledge of dissatisfaction with
the seniority list.”
(3) “Delta’s own actions in this ongoing controversy
[which] may have served to defeat, through
delay, legitimate rights to arbitration under the
Board’s labor protective provisions.” (Order 76-
9-129, pp. 4-5, App. 7e)
Both the Board and the Court ignored (1) the Board’s
previous orders in which it had clearly rejected the TWU’s
representational capacity absent evidence thereof which,
20
undisputedly, was never submitted; (2) the Board’s fail-
ad = any previous order to indicate any concern with
a Rm knowledge of dissatisfaction (particu-
y when the Board itself has recognized on numerous
that by its very nature the integration process
+l _ —- employees dissatisfied ); and (3) that
wor Anca —— no evidence in the record that Delta
ptr " pt tomay | any request for arbitration by
pw Bre a we eee at e Board nor the Court could
With respect to the latter point, the Cour
0g “Furthermore, whether or not a ba =
| re + hear yon it cannot be denied that Delta’s demands
sae po! ae authorization delayed both
biter * ommittee’s pursuit of the arbitration
- a a a) Such reasoning is circular and avoids
ee y « “mew which should have been decided by the
sec — “ in fact previously been decided by the
eee Fae rd Delta’s position “was legally justi-
in Order 73-9-42 rai snp ry one net ta
absolutely correct in demandin ans rr a mn
wor capacity. See Order 73-9-42 ean a8 (App.
ae : - view of this finding, it is inconceivable that
a could then be held to have delayed requests to arbi-
trate by not honorin
. £ the TWU’s ue :
of its representational capacity. an a Soe
Thus the Court, as
, 48 well as the Board i
. , placed ; :
a a den on Delta which was nenniieiens eth
oard orders, the reasoning in the very order in
which the Board or . -
+ a ordered arbitration, and the undisputed
The Court said:
“The outcome of this case mi
$ case might have been di
if there had been no factual basis in tg peer
ee
ctr sittin Ae tes art nce) ee. ili nthe tte se athe 6 ae
21
for the issues raised by the Board or if the legal
aspects of those issues had previously been settled.”
(App. 10a-1lla)
As is pointed out above, the legal aspects of the repre-
sentational question had previously been settled by the
Board in Order 73-9-42 and this decision undercut the
first and third factors on which the Board had based its
decision to order arbitration. The second factor, that
Delta may have had actual knowledge of dissatisfaction,
is clearly irrelevant in any legal sense. As the Board has
often acknowledged, it is impossible to integrate seniority
lists without there being some dissatisfaction. This does
not mean, however, that Delta must, without a request,
submit the “dissatisfaction” to arbitration. To hold other-
wise would ignore the most essential traditional principles
of Anglo-American jurisprudence. It would seem that
nothing could be clearer than that a claim cannot be
held cognizable by a court, an agency or an adverse party
until it is actually submitted, and that the adverse party
cannot be held accountable prior to such submission. This
would be equivalent to holding that a statute of limita-
tions is tolled if a prospective defendant has knowledge
of a possible claim against him.
Thus the Court not only utilized the wrong standards,
it incorrectly analyzed the factors relied upon by the
Board and the evidence and legal principles applicable
thereto. As a result, Delta has been forced into a lengthy
and expensive arbitration process that still has not been
concluded and questions which adversely affect relations
between the former Northeast and original Delta flight
attendants which should have been resolved many years
ago have been resurrected, resulting in labor strife and
unrest. Thus, the basic purpose of the LPP’s, to avoid
labor unrest and strife, has been thwarted.
22
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the writ should be granted
and the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Law Department JAMES W. CALLISON
Delta Air Lines, Inc. SIDNEY F. Davis
Hartsfield Atlanta Int’l Airport ROBERT S. HARKEY
Atlanta, Georgia 30320 Attorneys for Petitioner
Of Counsel:
ROBERT REED GRAY, Esy.
HALE RUSSELL GRAY SEAMAN
& BIRKETT
1001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Appendices
AV Cle he Na Bl ds =p
te | ne ee ee
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
se
G,
H,
I,
APPENDICES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Delta v. CAB (D.C. Cir. January 20,
1978)
Committee of Former Northeast Stew-
ardesses V. CAB, Case No. 75-1066
(D.C. Cir. May 27, 1975)
Delta-Northeast Merger Case, CAB
Order 76-9-129
Delta-Northeast Merger Case, CAB
Order 75-1-6
, Delta-Northeast Merger Case, CAB
Order 73-9-42
, Federal Aviation Act, § 408 (49 U.S.C.
§ 1378)
Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case, CAB
Orders 72-4-31/32
Delta-Northeast Merger Case, CAB
Orders 72-5-73/74
Labo» Protective Provisions, (Delta-
Northeast Merger Case)
Page
la
lb
le
1d
le
if
lg
lh
li
-_ Ee we,
:
4
:
la
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 76-1901
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
. Petitioner
Civil AERONAUTICS BOARD,
Respondent
COMMITTEE OF FORMER NORTHEAST STEWARDESSES,
Intervenor
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Civil Aeronautics Board
Argued October 4, 1977
Decided January 20, 1978
Frank F. Rox and Robert S. Harkey with whom Robert
Reed Gray was on the brief, for petitioner.
Barbara Thorson, Attorney, Civil Aeronautics Board
with whom James C. Shultz, General Counsel, Jerome
Nelson, Deputy General Counsel, Glen M. Bendixsen, As-
sociate General Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Board and
Carl D. Lawson and Daniel J. Conway, Attornevs, Depart-
ment of Justice were on the brief, for respondent.
J. Gordon Forester, Jr., for intervenor.
“Oe
2a
Before: Bazr
. “ LON
Circuit Judges, » Chief Judge, Tam
Opinion for the court filed by Cirewit
‘ Tam, Circuit Judge: In Jy
agra Northeast Stewardesses
le Civil Aeronauties Board (B
Lines, Ine., to submit ne
Stewardess seniority lis
east Airlines, Ine., into Delta
the order of the Board granti
tion." The basic question oem
Judge Tamm.
discretion by refery;
ne procedural issue of timelin referring to the ar
ration, r > ogre
rather than deciding that issue on the record
. r
before it, F
- for the reasons
Board’s order, sons Stated below, we affirm the
I
In the sprin
“pring of 1972, the Boar
of Delta and Northeast, subject to :
Provisions (LPP’s) = Section 3 of th
approved the merger
rtain labor protective
Ose provisions states:
affects the Seniority rights
€S, provisions shall be made
equitable manner including we, roe “4
, ng, where appli
plicable, agree-
: ctive bar *
riers ; = gaining betwe ;
roomed = representatives of the pre ne car-
may be submitted te of failure to agree, the dis “é
accord ; . ed by either party for qj Spute
cordance with section 13° . adjustment in
*CAB Order 76-9-129 (Se
at 17. This appe pt. 23, 1976), Joint A
he al was filed pursuant to 49 U.s ¢
*CAB Orders 72-5-73/74 2
Ppendix (J.A_)
Cima - ¥ 1486(a) (1970).
pril 24, 1972), JA. ,
* Id., Appendix Tat 1, J.A. at 65 ne a
M and WILKey,
ne 1974, a Committee of
ry ) petitioned
rd! to direct Delta Aj
« . M 7 M -
oe the integration of
8 following the merger of North-
bitrator
ess of the request for arbi-
38a
Section 13(a) provides that any party may refer a dis-
pute arising under the LPP’s to an arbitrator, and that
“a decision shall be rendered within 90 days after the
controversy arises, unless an extension of time is mutual-
ly agreeable to all parties.” ‘
Prior to the merger, which became effective on August
1, 1972, the Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-
CIO (TWU), had been the collective bargaining repre-
sentative for the Northeast stewardesses. Between mid-
summer and early October of 1972, representatives of
Delta and Delta stewardesses had a series of meetings
with a group of former Northeast stewardesses to nego-
tiate the integration of seniority lists, but no agreement
was reached. During the month of October, Delta uni-
laterally integrated the seniority lists and informed all
stewardesses of the results of that integration by letter
dated October 31, 1972.’
In the meantime, after the impasse had developed in
negotiations, the negotiating group of former Northeast
stewardesses asked TWU to pursue their arbitration
remedy. On September 29, 1972, TWU informed Deita
that it intended “to seek the appropriate relief,” ° and on
October 4, 1972, requested the National Mediation Board
to furnish a panel of arbitrators for the integration dis-
pute.’ Delta, however, refused to participate in the selec-
tion of an arbitrator, on the ground that TWU had not
provided any evidence t] 2t it continued to represent any
former Northeast stewardesses after the effective date of
the merger.*
* Jd., Appendix I at 9, J.A. at 73.
° J.A. at 137.
®° Id. at 83.
* Id. at 95, 100.
* Jd. at 106.
AE A a IE:
4a
O .
whee 30, 1973, TWU, on behalf of the stew-
ey ~ erly employed by Northeast, petitioned the
ect arbitration of seniority list integration
basing its Opposition to
merger,’ F; i
ger Furthermore, Since Delta conceded its duty t
¢ vy to
Ina Was unn t
footnote, the Board Specifically addressed Delta’s « ,
such iss " i ae
sues “are appropriate matters for redial te an
context of negotiation or an arbitration proceeding e
. hese TWU did not appeal the Boar
emp oO present evidence to Delta of its
ority, the Committee, which has
appeal, w:
Ppeal, was formed to pursue arbitration, To that end
a
CAB Order 73-9-42 at 5 (Sept. 11, 1973) J.A
© Id. at 4, J.A. at 8. a
"Td. at4 n.5, J.A. at 8 n.6.
*? J.A. at 207.
8 Td. at 187 ; see id. at 183, 189
Sa
5a
Delta renewed its assertion that the complaint was un-
timely,’ and the Committee petitioned the Board to com-
pel arbitration.
After an initial dismissal of the petition,’’ an appeal
from that order, and a remand by this court for a de-
cision on the merits,” the Board granted the Committee’s
petition and ordered arbitration. In its mandate to the
arbitrator, the Board included the initial “jurisdictional”
question of “whether, under all of the circumstances, the
claim to arbitration was asserted within a reasonable
time.” ‘' In justifying the delegation of the timeliness is-
sue to the arbitrator, the Board stated that, on the basis
of the inadequate record before it, it was unable defin-
itively to resolve certain issues which were possibly per-
tinent to the merits of Delta’s timeliness argument, such
as the representational aspects of the dispute, the possibil-
ity that Delta contributed to delay, and the effect of
Delta’s actual knowledge of employee dissatisfaction.’
Such issues, the Board stated, are the type “in which an
experienced labor arbitrator may well be able to shed
more light, more quickly than the Board.” ** We are now
called upon to review the Board’s decision to refer the
timeliness issue to arbitration.
'* Jd. at 187.
CAB Order 75-1-6 (Jan. 2, 1975), J.A. at 12. In this order,
the Board stated that the courts, rather than the Board, were the
proper forums for seeking enforcement of arbitration clauses in
LPP’s. It also made specific reference to the footnote in its earlier
order in which it had posited that the issue of timeliness should
be dealt with in arbitration. Jd. at 2-3, J.A. at 13 n.3, 14.
% Committee of Former Northeast ©‘ wardesses v.
75-1066 (D.C. Cir. May 27, i975).
7 CAB Order 76-9-129 at 5 (Sept. 23, 1976), J.A. at 21.
* Jd. at 4-5, J.A. at 20-21.
* Jd. at 5, J.A. at 21.
CAB, No.
a
6a
II
In our review, we must initially determi
the Board has the discretion to delegate soamineas lean
arising under the LPP’s, such as timeliness of arbitration
complaints, to an arbitrator. If the Board does have such
discretion and acted within its scope, we must then
decide, on the basis of the administrative record, whether
the Board abused its diseretion. Citizens to ‘rane
Overton Park, Ine. y. Volpe, 401 US 402 415-16
(1971): see 5 U.S.C. 8 706(2)(A) (1970). ) |
It is clear that the Board has the authority to j
— on its approval of the merger of air ation
ont v. CAB, 204 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.), cert. dentad
346 US. 826 (1953); see 49 U.S.C. § 1878 ib) (1970,
and that these conditions may include the duty to nego-
seniority lists of employees affec ;
land V. CAB, 284 F.2d 224, a Agha. .
American Airlines, Ine. vy. CAB, 445 F.2d 891 895, (24
Cir, 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1015 (1972) ‘the -
Sanctioned the arbitration of such substantive dis t ap
der LPP’s, Stating, in part: wusiilieye
= Board, like other agencies, operates on a limited
udget, both of money and of time; it may proper!
decide that these Scarce resources should be yee
banded for the tasks for which it considers itself
to he expert, rather than frittered away in an are
more suitable for an experienced labor arbitrator :
When called upon to j
. ! nterpret negotiated labor -
tracts, courts have repeatedly held that procedural Hone
In Citizens to Preserve O
~dinag ? verton Park, ‘ .
Suggested a third mquiry for review of an Aron _ preme Court also
cation—whether the agency “followed th
Ta
such as whether grievances were properly and timely
filed, should be delegated to arbitration along with the
substantive issues of labor disputes. John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964); accord, To-
bacco Workers International Union, Local 317 v. Lorillard
Corp., 448 F.2d 949, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1971): Rochester
Telephone Corp. Vv. Communication Workers of America,
340 F.2d 237, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1965). One rationale for
approval of the delegation of procedural issues to arbitra-
tion is that the substantive and procedural aspects of
labor controversies are normally so intertwined that divid-
ing their resolution between arbitrators and courts would
cause unnecessary delay and duplication of effort. John
Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. at 557-58. Further-
more, questions as to whether the procedural prerequisites
to arbitration have been met “do not arise in a vacuum;
they develop in the context of an actual dispute about the
rights of the parties to the contract or those covered by
it.” Id. at 556-57. Therefore, the knowledge and exper-
tise of an experienced labor arbitrator may be just as
necessary to the efficacious disposition of the procedural
problems of an arbitrable dispute as to the resolution
of the substance of the labor controversy itself. Associa-
tion of Industrial Scientists v. Shell Development Co.,
348 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1965) ; see Carey v. General
Electric Co., 315 F.2d 499, 503 (2d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 908 (1964).
The reasoning of these labor contract decisions is equal-
ly applicable to procedural disputes arising under LPP’s
imposed by the Board during mergers. Just as under ne-
gotiated labor contracts, both the procedural and substan-
tive issues under the LPP’s normally involve labor rela-
tions law and custom, subjects in which the Board has
neither experience nor specialized knowledge. See Out-
land v. CAB, 284 F.2d at 228. Once it is determined,
therefore, that the subject matter of a controversy is
8a
tg to arbitration under the LPP’s, we believe that
pendb-vang brn the na snag to refer to the arbitrator
cerning the procedural propriety
. - . . et
claims for arbitration of that “ahem so
In this case, it is clear i
; that the dispute over the j
seen of the seniority lists was arbitrable. CAB Orders
atagtag thy Page. a, 1972); see American Airlines
. vz », 449 F.2d at 228. Delta’s refusal t iel-
pendhinDipinene dic s 0 partici-
= in arbitration was based on the procedural mcleiahin
a r- proper request for arbitration of the dispute had
poeta n be Pong the time limits established by
s 6 ’s. Under these circumst i
reasonably be said that the Bo See the eke
: } sa ard, after finding the sub-
stance of the dispute arbitrable. acted within ‘the be
atin . .
the arbitrator. Bating the procedural question to
Phy = a in our review is to determine whether
tion, radi that’ ‘Gann — hn scope of its discre-
Delta’s timeliness cmiuuien te atten by referring
eal ‘ation. Tom i
apm ye we must carefully examine the vt ne rr
ascertain, f 4 V. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973), to
want Goan rst, whether the Board considered the rele-
actors, and second, whether it made “a clear error
of judgment.” Citizens , |
Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416. 0 Preserve Overton Park vy.
Bey d rm inspection of the Board’s order and the ma-
ad “ e - when its decision was made, it is plain
ard considered those fact ‘ i
choice to refer the i Bp hae
procedural issue to th i
ser ct e arbitrator. It
oo oe of the policy underlying the arbitra-
a clause in the LPP’s—to promote the expeditiou
pee of labor disputes arising after mugwe—end
eae at its normal inclination would be to resolve th
meliness issue itself, rather than referring it to arbi.
ek Cael ems rh. dS et cee! 0 3
Ya
tration." However, after inspecting the record, the Board
believed that, although there were certain undisputed
facts which might appear dispositive of the procedural
argument, there were also factual inadequacies on various
issues which the Board perceived as possibly pertinent to
the final outcome of the dispute.** Moreover, the resolu-
tion of those labor issues would involve not only further
factual investigation, but also the application of labor law
principles in which the Board had no special knowledge or
expertise.” Our study of the Board’s order in this case
thus reveals that the Board carefully considered those
factors relevant to its final decision, balancing the general
desire for speedy settlement under the LPP’s against the
need in this particular case for further factual and legal
determinations by an experienced labor arbitrator.
The question remains, however, whether the Board
made a clear error of judgment in declining to decide the
timeliness issue on the record before it. In this regard,
Delta asserts that all the facts necessary to a decision on
the timeliness issue were undisputed and therefore that
the Board’s reasons for delegating the procedural ques-
tion were not supported by the record.** We do not agree.
21 CAB Order 76-9-129 at 4, 6 (Sept. 23, 1976), J.A. at 20, 22.
22 Jd. at 5, J.A. at 21.
28 Jd.
24 Brief of Petitioner at 16-17, 29. Delta also contends that the
Board’s treatment of the record was inconsistent with its announced
preference for resolving procedural issues itself in order to expedite
the settlement of disputes under LPP’s. /d. at 29-33; see CAB Order
76-9-129 at 4,6 (Sept. 23, 1976), J.A. at 20, 22. We do not believe,
however, that the Board, by stating its “normal inclination’ to
decide such issues, was thereby setting a standard for itself from
which it could not deviate without being found to have engaged
in arbitrary and capricious action. Cf. City of Lawrence v. CAB,
943 F.2d 583, 588 (1st Cir. 1965) (in which the court cited and
relied on cases in which the agency was held to have established
such a standard). Rather, we believe that the Board was recog-
nizing that it had the discretion either to resolve or to delegate
cma anh irl aia
10a
; The undisputed facts in the record before the Board
~d pend the Committee made no formal protest to
a until many months after the Board’
td ard’s September
—_ oe on TWU’s representational aie How-
. or, epending upon the arbitrator’s resolution of the is-
a posed by the Board, such a lapse of time could
oe irrelevant to the final outcome of the timeliness
ange pe er pag the arbitrator might find that
contributed to delay in arbitration r
| equests or ha
7 sagen of stewardess dissatisfaction, and ba
— ‘ . ay or knowledge caused Delta’s duty to arbitrate
eh na ng seth LPP’s time limit. Moreover, if the
‘ator found that TWU or some othe i
euetraten r group or in-
yr ner pons it prt the former fl on
ses and made a timely demand f i i
factual and legal findi , tad eprint ae
tal and ngs could eliminate any pr
promnge F~ in the Committee’s subsequent nih a ” te
use of its uncertainty as to the f i ;
et r acts relating to th
issues and their legal effect on Delta’s timeli ; =
elta’s timeline
tion, the Board decided to r niger
efer the whole matter
arbitrator, rather than to i ple
, rat make a decision based
—— which it believed to be inadequate and cele te
on labor principles with which it was unfamiliar
The outcome of this case mi
ight have been di
there had been no factual basis in the rae Pm
the timeliness question, d
: , depending upon the ;
before it and the iv e adequacy of the record
perceived need for speciali cor
mat F . pecialized knowledge j .
ee hr ae the question. Furthermore, pt ayn
sistently stated that oe to this appeal, the Board had ad
sta at Delta’s particul imeline -
be resolved in negotiation and —— argument should
*° See notes 12 & 13 supra.
*° In this regard, althou
z . gh Delta has asser
rocee asserted thr >
“ : : yd ~~ by proper request for arbitration ser ‘es pe
: “A. at 187, the Committee alleges that its request
is merely a continuation , .
TWU, sce id. at 188, 187 of those lodged in the fall of 1972 by
nee
ee a ee eae
lla
issues raised by the Board or if the legal aspects of those
issues had previously been settled. However, all the is-
sues which the Board believed might ultimately be per-
tinent to the proper resolution of Delta’s timeliness con-
tention did have a factual basis in the record already
before the Board and were unresolved at the time of its
order. For instance, the question of whether TWU or
other groups or individuals actually had the authority
to represent former Northeast stewardesses was not
answered clearly by the documents or assertions in the
record and had not been resolved completely by the
Board’s earlier order.*” Furthermore, the record indicates
that Delta could have had actual knowledge of employee
dissatisfaction in the fall of 1972 and that its continuing
insistence on formal representational authorization could
have contributed to the delay in arbitration requests.
The administrative record in this case thus supports
the factual existence of those issues which the Board be-
lieved might be important to the final disposition of the
timeliness issue. Finding that further investigation and
experienced application of labor law principles were neces-
sary to the proper resolution of these issues, both as to
27 See id. at 146-48, 169; CAB Order 73-9-42 (Sept. 11, 1973),
J.A. at 5. In its order dismissing TWU’s petition, the Board con-
fined its discussion of TWU’s authority to represent the former
Northeast stewardesses to the issue of whether TWU’s representa-
tional status transcended the merger.
2* For instance, Delta was informed of TWU’s intention to pursue
arbitration on behalf of the former Northeast stewardesses in
September 1972, J.A. at 83, and of TWU’s requests to the National
Mediation Board in October 1972, id. at 100. Actual knowledge of
specific employee discontent can also be attributed to Delta at the
time TWU filed its supplemental petition to the Board, with letters
from five stewardesses to TWU voicing their dissatisfaction with
the integrated seniority list. See id. at 141, 146-54. Furthermore,
whether or not such action was legally justified, it cannot be denied
that Delta’s demands for formal representational authorization de-
layed both TWU’s and the Committee’s pursuit of the arbitration
remedy. See id. at 107-08, 183, 187.
l2a
their factual basis and their legal effect, the Board re-
ferred the entire procedural problem to the arbitrator.
On the basis of the record before us, we do not believe that
such delegation constitutes a clear error of judgment.
III
Many of the problems posed by the present case are of
the Board’s own making. A concise statement of the ap-
proved manner of filing requests for arbitration and of
establishing representational capacity would eliminate
confusion and delay in the settling of disputes under the
LPP’s, Nevertheless, we find that the Board had the
discretion to delegate to arbitration the resolution of the
timeliness issue raised by Delta. We further hold, after
reviewing the administrative record, that the Board did
not abuse its discretion in doing so. The order of the
Board is therefore
Affirmed.
——
|
.
4
?
;
lb
APPENDIX B
APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
September Term, 1974
No. 75-1066
Vv.
Civi. AERONAUTICS BOARD,
Respondent.
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
Intervenor.
Before MCGOWAN AND TAMM, Circuit Judges
ORDER
i i iti ‘ tion for sum-
On consideration of the petitioners mo
om reversal and of the responses thereto, = -
respondent’s motion for summary cage = A er
nses thereto, and it appearing to the ¢
oa presented by the petition for review a
has been decided by the Court in Carey v. J. J. O'Donnell,
U.S. App. D.C. ——, 506 F.2d 107 (1974), cert.
denied, 42 L. Ed. °%6 (1975), it is
2b
depen = pm that order No. 75-1-6 of the
, ‘onaulics Board is hereby reversed, and ¢
remanded to the Board for ‘isi ‘the sa gt
pitinaas dines tees ng decision on the merits of
Ps aaa feat eo 4 respondent’s motion
unrmance is denied. See als
sen “gry Council v. Civil ica Gee
mls App. D.C. —, 506 F.2d 97 (1974). cort
ian ? . Ct. 783 (1975); Kesinger vy. Universal Air-
» #ne., 474 F.2d 1127 (6th Cir. 1973) ; Oling v. Air
Line Pilots Association, 3
: ¢ , 046 F. at
denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965). 2d 270 (7th Cir.), cert,
Per Curiam
le
APPENDIX C
ORDER 76-9-129
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board
at its office in Washington, D.C.,
on the 23rd day of September, 1976
Docket 23315
DELTA-NORTHEAST MERGER CASE
ORDER ON REMAND
The Committee of Former Northeast Stewardesses has
petitioned the Board to issue an order directing Delta
Air Lines, inc., to submit to arbitration a claim that the
integrated flight attendant seniority list adopted by Delta
following merger with Northeast Airlines, Inc., is unfair
as to former Northeast attendants.’ By Order 75-1-6
(January 2, 1975) the Board dismissed the petition, es-
sentially on grounds that it would be inappropriate and
inefficient for the Board to interpose itself as a forum
1 The merger was approved by Orders 72-5-73/74 (served May 19,
1972), subject to the Board’s standard labor protective provisions.
Section 3 of the provisions provides for “the integration of seniority
lists in a fair and equitable manner,” and Section 13 provides for
arbitration of disputes arising under the provisions. The Board
retained jurisdiction over the merger proceeding generally. It is
pursuant to the labor protective provisions and the Board’s re-
tained jurisdiction that the petition is filed.
2c
in ; x6
pea it saw to be a contractual dispute, which or-
lly would be resolved in judicial proceedings,’
Petitioner sought court review and by an order dated
a ae of Columbia Circuit, on moticn for summa
: 0 ia and remanded the Board’s order “for
s on the merits of petitioner’ j
reg s claims.” * -
ee a attempt to persuade the ition
sider or clarify its order, th
or » the Board, on Au
_ ar ogg the parties to submit comments a
= = i, Ley s — in response to the remand
wo rounds of comments b D |
| elta ;
gee ar om, the last filed neni 24 phn
‘ ‘Ger 1s to comply with t t’s or
eu meccren * he court’s order remand-
a ae brief order does not address
©rns which prompted us to decli "
the petition initial] j tom vac ene ary
y. We continue to believ
per - | e that Board-
oe oe compared to court-ordered, arbitration °
parse " or-management disputes is not ordinarily a
ctory or a speedy means of resolving such dis-
—
. Moreover, we . ie
particularly. we noted that the. Board ie” (tine oUF hand
a that resort to the Board instead og aeor management ‘matters,
the Ben tional litigation and consequent delay era, kel
ing arbitration. rect coulempt power to enforce an order direct.
* Committee of Former N
Cir. Ne acon ormer Northeast Stewardesses Vv. C.A.B., D.C.
*The second | yi
pulliinen> tn Delta’ rorized) round consists of a response by
to file an mene ae in the form of a petition ey ed
Delta requesting reiectew ee ANd a subsequent motion by
“petition” for “ed oe of that document, We will de —’ ~
ac Oo good caus . ’ eny t e
sIta’e , se being show
Delta’s motion, being moot, will be } sco: A » ane entionetiness.
0 EOEESC'CS'SCTTS RR
Siew
3¢
putes.” This remains our view notwithstanding that the
Court has apparently ruled against the necessary predi-
cate for the Board’s position, namely, that although ju-
risdiction with respect to the arbitration section of the
labor protective provisions is shared by the Board and
the courts, the Board has discretion to refer the parties
to a judicial tribunal for its enforcement.’ Given that
ruling, however, it is evident that we must put aside
our reservations about the efficacy of the relief requested
of us and consider the request on its own merits. Upon
such consideration, the Board has concluded that the peti-
tion should be granted as being in the public interest.
As a threshold matter, we must determine the scope
of the Board’s inquiry in reaching “a decision on the
° See also our discussion of this point in the Allegheny-Mohawk
Merger Case, Orders 72-4-31/32 (decided March 28, 1972), Opinion
at 20-21. Indeed, the Board’s redraft of the standard arbitration
section in the Allegheny-Mohawk case, to the form applied here,
was specifically designed to obviate the need for resort to the Board
under its retained jurisdiction prior to any court enforcement
of the arbitration provisions.
®* The court’s ruling is predicated upon the case of Carey v. J. J.
O'Donnell, 506 F.2d 107 (1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 783 (1975).
Carey concerned a Board order determining that a negotiated
seniority list—arising out of the instant merger, and involving
the Northeast pilots—had been integrated in a fair and equitable
manner. That order was sustained on direct review by the Court
of Appeals in a companion case, Northeast Master Executive
Council v. C.A.B., 506 F.2d 97 (1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 783
(1975). In Carey a District Court’s dismissal of a suit attacking
the integrated seniority list, for want of jurisdiction, was under
review. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioners in that case,
having “had their day in court as contemplated by the statute”
(viz., the Board’s determination with respect to the seniority list
and direct Court of Appeals review of that determination) were
not entitled to collaterally attack the Board’s action in District
Court, or any other forum. In other words, the Board having acted
upon the merits of a claim that an integrated list is unfair, the
only remaining remedy is review of the Board’s action in a Court
of Appeals pursuant to Section 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act,
and district courts have no jurisdiction with respect to the subject
matter.
4c
pages of petitioner’s claim,” as mandated by the court
po: 7 — that the court, in relying on Carey,
pe 7 rs that the Board will here, as in that case,
pone ~s ree as te whether or not the existing
eemnee” Hee been integrated in a fair and equitable
aang “ ue action is indisputably within our power
rset ; —s takes this position, in arguing that a
must be made by petitioner
“1. ; ; ) r that the e i i
i xn agg xistin
> ee 01 yregers before relief may be ad
r, on the other hand, asserts rena
is one for the arbitrator. | Oe
W ”
ened pal lie the court’s order as requiring the
beyond satisf plumb the substance of petitioner's claim
pt fas pelos ourselves that the claim is not friv-
‘May 7 Rpg ye Merger Case, Order 71-5-30
provided for b f« “ the function of the arbitrator, as
tng »/ ection 13, to weigh the validity of peti-
prior — ry of unfairness in light of all cireum-
Seumieansl see ahar a bd Delta’s argument would
- a provisions by r ;
eager payin tion clause. It would ao te
versies, ch as Gael of specific disputes and contro-
Board, which ha the integration of labor lists, with the
ostinente dail neither expertise nor resources to finally
445 F.2d 891 Caf See American Airlines Vv. C.A.B
(1972). bel a . bs f = ie 404 U.S. 1015
the B , , reuit specificall
pg S powel to delegate this function to —_
Cae en in the absence of successful peer: wa
‘In Ameri :
ain an pote Boys court sustained Board orders directin
the American-Trans pre integration dispute arisin Ky
(May 7. 1971) ¢ . aribbean Merger Case. See Ord = of
the Sad, joo = 1 (June 11, 1971). It held thet “Lwihet
aoe eer = yey appointed pursuant to it w |hat
the Board in that case as “~ Contentions were a
fairnes hfe : a e Board it: Pw
irness of the integrated seniority list, ‘ ponding a ae the
: e Board
as a ° . pp
a
al tee
oes
We find no compelling reason in t
this case warranting
held and court-approve
specific disputes is best left for arbitrat
Delta’s invitation to do so.”
concedes that
5e
he circumstances of
a departure from the Board’s long-
d position that the resolution of
ion, and decline
As we noted in our original order in this matter, Delta
it has received formal complaints regarding
the equity of the seniority list integration, and requests
for arbitration.’ Indeed, there is no dispute that, pur-
suant to the labor protective provisions, Delta is under
an obligation to arbitrate upon a valid request therefor.
Delta’s reason for failing to honor the requests it has re-
ceived, aside from the above-discussed allegation that
there has been no showing that the existing list was
not developed fairly and equitably, is simply that the re-
quests were untimely. It states that no formal com-
plaint and request for arbitration was received by Delta
until April 5, 1974, or some twenty months after the
merger became effective. A delay in submission of this
jength is, in Delta’s view, incompatible with the arbitra-
tion provision, which permits any party to refer any dis-
pute or controversy arising under the labor protective
provisions to arbitration “20 days after the controversy
arises,” and directs an arbitrator’s decision “within 90
days after the controversy arises, unless an extension
of time is mutually agreeable to all parties.”
n in the following terms “If the Board’s experi-
the Board's actio
ty lists of employees
ence convinced it that the integration of senior!
of merging carriers was a function which it was not well suited to
perform and which, in the absence of agreement, had best be left
to arbitration, that was a judgment it was competent to make”
(Id., at 895).
* See Outland V. C.A.B., 284 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir., 1960) ; O'Donnell
vy. Pan American World Airways, 200 F.2d 929 (2nd Cir., 1953);
and American Airlines V. C.A.B., supra.
* Order 75-1-6 at 3.
6e
Pe pywe. the Board would consider the above re-
7 bt acts, if true, to be dispositive of the question
= on a As we pointed out in the Allegheny-Mohawk
“ m 4 ase, supra, delays in reaching arbitration pro-
oe r ea se undermine harmonious labor re-
8. Open-ended availability of arbi
a eo i arbitration can only
strife and is an invitatio ’
n for abuse
pol ed — ae by the Board for the protection of
yees affected by a inerger, or ;
plo; | yal } a large-sale ac-
oe cena Moreover, it is clear that the Board’s arbitra-
‘Ovision conte sas a i di
me mplates a speedy resolution of dis-
m... he other hand, we cannot ignore the highly un-
= a eee and conflicting assertions attending
story of this particular seniority list i
-" of y list integration
se a history is described in some detail ——~
jose Pages geen 13, 1973) and Order 75-1-6
' pertinent portions of which
“ne ich we incorporate
oom ee need not be repeated “a at
' efly, the dispute was under activ iati
ee ae er active negotiation
er Northeast stewardess
—— me i sses, more pre-
port Samy assumed representative, the Transport Work.
‘ , Since prior to the consummati
Sit ‘ on of the merger;
a failed ; pursuit of arbitration by "the
aa : orkers Union, on behalf of the stewardesses
aes ecause of problems with respect to the TWU’s
em - by represent the Northeast stewardesses (see
p wren -9-42, supra) ; and subsequent to TWU’s with-
a fe group = individual stewardesses took up the
sk ursuing the arbitration r » euleatanti i
ths tuations eeeminen n remedy, culminating in
ier cadens a the record is rife with documents de-
ntedied fo tn bg of this continuing history, the
pooled me orm of numerous—and apparently
7 sworn allegations of a factual, legal and
eq e nature, involving various aspects of labor-
Te
management relations as well as other matters. Relevant
to the ultimate issue of timeliness raised by Delta ap-
pears to be the question of the representational capacity
of various individuals and groups, and the TWU, involved
in the negotiations and the quest for arbitration of the
underlying seniority integration dispute. Also pertinent
may be Delta’s actual knowledge of dissatisfaction with
the seniority list adopted by it following the failure of
negotiations and the form that such dissatisfaction took,
whether formal complaints or otherwise. Furthermore,
there is in our mind some question as to the extent that
Delta’s own actions in this ongoing controversy may
have served to defeat, through delay, legitimate rights to
arbitration under the Board’s labor protective provisions.
On the record before us, we are unable to definitively
resolve these and other questions pertinent to the merits
of Delta’s argument that the arbitration provisions are
untimely invoked. In some part, the record is short on
reliable facts. Moreover, elements of labor law, practice,
and custom appear to also be relevant to untangling the
various contentions, particularly the representational as-
pects. The Board believes it is imprudent to devote its
limited and already overburdened resources to the reso-
lution of the involved questions presented, particularly
in light of the substantive labor related factual issues
involved."
In light of the above, we believe that the wisest course
to follow in furtherance of the Court of Appeals’ ruling
10 As we have often noted, the Board’s premier function is tf
economic regulation of the nation’s air transportation system
the public interest. To the extent that questions of labor relations
affect that system, we may and do take cognizance of them, as for
example by the promulgation of the labor protective provisions
However, we do not view ourselves as a labor tribunal for the
resolution of specific disputes, for which other forums are generally
available. Any other course would likely be at the expense, in time
and effectiveness, of our other functions.
he
in
8c
wor thn w order arbitration, but to include in the arbitra-
ors mandate a Jurisdictional question. Specifically, th
arbitrator is to determine, as an initial matter ae
Jurisdiction to hear the merits of the claim with res :
to the fairness of the integrated seniority list by first
deciding whether, under al! of the circumstances th
claim to arbitration Was asserted within a ieeniis
gy Bs he finds not, his mandate ends. If he finds in
a rmative, he is then to consider the substantive
matter of seniority integration. This is the type of in-
quiry in which an experienced labor arbitrator may well
e able to shed more light, more quiekly than the Board.”
This delegation to the arbitrator represents we beli ,
the most effective overall allocation of is daninee of
the Board as well as the parties, and is well otita on
competence to make, see American Airlines y C.A B.,
supra. The arbitrator and the parties may employ such
procedures for the resolution
of these “s .
deem appropriate. matters as they
We should emphasize that our action with res rect t
the timeliness issue is predicated upon the conti :
circumstances present and the record before us vane
normal inclination, given an adequate record not ’ a
ing further proceedings, would be to resolve the Pac pe
this stage How OY . .
Ss ever, this is not, to !
a Case. ; all appearances, such
Pern = rad — that the interests of all flight
ants sha taken into account to the j
. e ta ce maximum
extent feasible, even if not participating in the ordered
''We noted in our previ
‘ oa . =. oe prey ious order denying TW " were.
nr Ag “¥ initial order dismissing petitioner's pag =
fiat cones cae a nee against the integrated seaioioe
olde hate reasonable time, as well as other jss: ‘
appropriate matters for resolution in the context az: re A
= we arbitration proceeding. . . .” Order 75-9-42 at 4 oe
»-1-6 at 2, footnote 3. We continue to adhere to this view. vila
oe 4 » rl 4 + z va,
ewe nee tee ls NS oO a ee or ie Abed eet et eee ed «sie ee. . — .
—— td ee Pen, ee ees . .
SoS ee wehiiirits ” ib adie
9c
arbitration proceeding. Concomitantly, we expect this
arbitration to put an end to all claims by Delta’s flight
attendants with respect to the integration of seniority
lists arising out of the merger, and will therefore provide
that the arbitration shall be binding upon Delta and all
flight attendants as to whom a dispute exists, whether
choosing to participate or not.’* In this connection, it will
be incumbent upon Delta to provide appropriate notice
to affected employees with respect to the arbitration pro-
ceeding. In addition, we note that should the merits of
petitioner’s claims with respect to seniority list integra-
tion be reached, the existing seniority list, which has been
in effect for some time, may be disturbed. This may
raise issues of retroactivity, which should be considered
in the arbitrator’s decision in light of all of the equities
involved.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Ordering paragraph 1 of Order 75-1-6 ‘served Jan-
uary 6, 1975) be and it hereby is voided;
2. The petition of the Commitee of Former Northeast
Stewardesses, filed June 7, 1974, be and it hereby is
granted to the extent ordered below;
3. Delta shall, within 60 days from the date of this
order, participate in the selection of an arbitrator pur-
suant to the provisions of Section 13(a) of the labor
protective provisions for the purposes enumerated in the
text, above, the arbitration to be conducted in conform-
ance with said Section 13(a): Provided, That nothing in
this order shall preclude the parties from agreeing to
proceed pursuant to Section 13(b} of the labor protective
provisions within the above-named period ;
12 American-TCA Merger Case, Order 71-5-30 (May 7, 1971), and
Order 71-6-71 (June 11, 1971).
10¢
4. In the event that any group of flight attendants of
Delta or their representative(s) shall decline to partici-
pate in, or fail to cooperate with respect to the ordered
arbitration proceedings, the procedures adopted shall be
such as to ensure, to the maximum extent feasible under
the circumstances, that the determination rendered by
the arbitral tribunai shall fully consider the interests of
such employees;
5. The determination of the arbitral tribunal shall be
final and binding upon Delta and all flight attendants
of Delta as to whom there exists a dispute with respect
to seniority list integration which has been the subject
of the arbitration proceedings ordered herein;
6. Delta shall provide appropriate notice to all af-
fected employees or their representatives with respect to
the institution of the arbitration proceedings, the issues
to be decided, and the employees’ right to participate
therein;
7. Delta shall, upon the rendering of any arbitrator’s
decision, file 2 copies of such decision in the docket of
this proceeding;
8. The Board shall retain jurisdiction in this pro-
ceeding for the purpose of taking such further action
as it may deem necessary or appropriate in the public
interests; and
9. Except to the extent granted herein, the petition
of the Committee of Former Northeast Stewardesses and
all petitions, motions and other requests related thereto
be and they hereby are denied.
This order shall be published in the Federal Register.
By the Civil Aeronautics Board:
PHYLLIS T. KAYLOR
| SEAL] Secretary
—EE
i
er
id
APPENDIX D
Order 75-1-6
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board
at its office in Washington, D. C.,
on the 2nd day of January, 1975
Docket 23315
DELTA-NORTHEAST MERGER CASE
ORDER
By Order 72-5-73/74 the Board approved the merger
of Delta Air Lines and Northeast Airlines subject to
acceptance by Delta of Allegheny-Mohawk’ type labor
protective provisions. Delta unequivocally accepted that
condition, among others: See Order 72-8-1.
Section 3 of the labor protective provisions reads as
follows:
“Insofar as the merger affects the seniority rights
of the carriers’ employees, provisions shall be made
for the integration of seniority lists in a fair and
equitable manner, including, where applicable, agree-
ment through collective bargaining between the car-
riers and the representatives of the employees af-
fected. In the event of failure to agree, the dispute
' Orders 72-4-31/32.
2d
may be submitted by either party for adjustment in
accordance with section 13.”
Section 13 of the provisions provides for the arbitra-
tion of any dispute or controversy that arises with re-
spect to the labor protective provisions. The Board also,
in accordance with its customary practice, reserved juris-
diction to make such modifications, amendments, and
additions to the labor protective provisions as circum-
stances may require.
In reliance on this reserved jurisdiction, and on sec-
tions 3 and 13 of the labor protective provisions, various
former Northeast flight attendants have petitioned the
Board to order that Delta submit to arbitration for the
purpose of resolving their dispute with Delta regarding
the integration of the flight attendant seniority lists of
Delta and Northeast.’
The petition here before us is the second one dealing
with this subject matter. A similar petition was filed
approximately one year earlier by the Transport Workers
Union ‘on behalf of the Northeast flight attendants)
seeking the same relief. Delta opposed grant of that
petition on various grounds, including that the relief
sought was untimely.
While the Board denied TWU’s petition, the order
made clear that Delta was obligated to proceed to arbitra-
tion if presented with evioence of authority by TWU to
represent the flight attendants." The Board concluded
* There has also been filed a motion on behalf of the petitioners
for leave to file unauthorized documents. The motion will be
granted.
* Order 73-9-42. The Board pointed out that: (1) Delta agreed
that it was under a duty to arbitrate any unresoived seniority dis-
pute with any dissatisfied former Northeast employee and that, in
any case, such an obligation was clear; (2) the TWU could not
be deemed a “representative” of the former Northeast flight attend-
ants merely because that union had been their collective bargaining
le i A
3d
that: “Thus, TWU may ultimately obtain arbitration if
it presents evidence to Delta of authority to represent
former Northeast employees and if that dispute is not
otherwise resolved. In these circumstances, we fail to
perceive any duty on our part to direct that which TWU
may obtain through its own efforts.”” The same order also
referred to the Board’s view “that it should not inter-
vene to order arbitration where arbitration can be di-
rected by a court with authority to enforce its decree,
and that the more appropriate enforcement action by
the Board is penalty action against a carrier for viola-
tion of the requirement to arbitrate.” *
According to the petition at hand, the manner in which
the Northeast and Delta flight attendant seniority lists
were integrated by Delta is unfair to the former North-
east flight attendants. The petition goes on to argue that
the integrated list has never been agreed to by any
authorized representative of all the former Northeast
flight attendants; and that subsequent to the issuance
of Order 73-9-42, supra, three former Northeast stew-
ardesses, on behalf of many others, asked that Delta
arbitrate the seniority list integration dispute and that
Delta has refused.
agent prior to the merger; (3) the TWU, in complaining to Delta
about the manner in which the seniority lists were integrated, did
not provide evidence to Delta that it in fact was representing any
former Northeast flight attendants in making the complaint; and
(4) the carrier had not received a formal complaint from any
Northeast flight attendant with respect to seniority integration
or from any representative who was able to give evidence of his
representative capacity.
The Board went on to note, in respect to Delta’s argument re-
garding the alleged untimeliness of TWU’s complaint to Delta re-
garding seniority integration, that this argument and other similar
ones “are appropriate matters for resolution in the context of
negotiation or an arbitration proceeding and accordingly we do not
decide them here.”
*The Board used the same words in an even more recent order
in a proceeding also arising out of the Delta-Northeast Merger;
Order 74-5-71.
4d
In its answer Delta concedes that it has received a
formal complaint from at least three former Northeast
flight attendants regarding seniority list integration but
argues that nonetheless it need not honor that request for
arbitration, and that for three different reasons the
Board should support Delta’s position. First, the petition
represents a “calculated effort to promote labor strife
and disrupt relations between former Northeast and
former Delta employees.” Second, the Delta and North-
east “flight attendant seniority lists have been integrated
in a fair and equitable manner. Third, the request for
arbitration is untimely.
We have concluded that the petition should be dis-
missed since it is our view that the Board ordinarily
ought not entertain petitions requesting that it direct
air carriers to proceed to arbitration under the Board’s
standard labor protective provisions.
When the Board imposes conditions upon its approval
of a merger agreement, the parties may either accept
the conditions or withdraw from the agreement. If the
conditions are accepted, they become in effect a part of
the overall arrangement which the Board has approved.
As a general proposition, the Board does not attempt to
enforce the undertakings of the carriers toward third-
parties, and we perceive no reason in principle why the
Board itself should undertake to enforce the labor pro-
tective provisions of a merger arrangement to any
greater extent than the Board would attempt to enforce
compliance with other provisions therein. Further, there
are affirmative reasons why it should not undertake to
do so. We have repeatedly noted, and the courts have
consistently agreed,’ that the Board has no particular
‘E.g., Outland v. CAB, 109 U.S. app. D.C. 90, 284 F.2d 224
(1960), Northeast Master Exec. Council v. CAB, D.C. Cir. No. 73-
1595 et al. (August 19, 1974).
5d
expertise in labor-management matters. Indeed, the
courts are likely to have considerably more experience
than the Board in unraveling the facts invoived in em-
ployer-employee disputes, and the resolution of the ques-
tion of whether arbitration should be directed under labor
protective provisions agreed to by the carrier should
present issues uo different from those involved in normal
contract disputes where provisions are made for arbi-
tration. Further, a Board proceeding to determine
whether arbitration should be directed is all too likely to
spawn litigation in addition to that which would ensue
from direct resort to a court for an order directing
arbitration. Not only must the Board ascertain the
facts involved, but even if it should order arbitration
(and such an order might well be appealed to the
courts), the Board has no direct power to enforce the
requirement. Thus, if the Board’s order were not obeyed,
the Board would be required to bring an action against
the carrier in a district court to compel obedience or
to embark upon some form of enforcement proceedings
against the recalcitrant carrier, a course again calculated
to increase rather than decrease litigation and resultant
delay. Moreover the Board does not consider that it was
established by the Congress to deal with individual dis-
putes between carriers and their employees even though
empowered to do so, but rather to deal with broad eco-
nomic questions affecting the public. The Board dis-
charges this duty in merger cases by providing in its
labor protective provisions the machinery through whicn
individual disputes can be resolved. The jurisdiction
which it has retained to take further action concerning
labor protective matters more appropriately is employed
for determining whether there shouid be changes in the
basic protective provisions in response to a demonstrated
* See American Airlines v. CAB, 445 F.2d 891 (C.A. 2, 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1015 (1972).
6d
need therefor, rather than for enforcing the requirements
of those provisions in individual cases. Judicial enforce-
ment of the requirement to arbitrate represents no im-
pingement upon the Board’s authority to alter the basic
provisions where the public interest requires their alter-
ation. Conversely, a deferral by the board to the greater
expertise and enforcement powers of the courts does not
represent any abdication by the Board of its duties.
Rather, the situation is the familiar one in which third-
party rights are enforced by the courts.
In these circumstances the Board reiterates that em-
ployees such as those here involved should resort to the
courts to the extent that they seek an order directing a
carrier to proceed to arbitration. This is not to say,
however, that a carrier may ignore the requirement for
arbitration with impunity. On the contrary, in our view
it does so at its peril. A willful or unjustifiable failure
to proceed to arbitration represents a failure on the part
of the carrier to comply with the Board’s requirement
that the labor protective conditions be carried out as a
part of the obligations undertaken by the carrier in con-
nection with its merger. The consequences, in our view,
are that the carrier is subject to appropriate enforce-
ment action.’
In this same regard, and in view of the history of
matters here under consideration and, particularly, our
admonitions in Order 73-9-42--admonitions which Delta
appears to have determined to ignore—we are referring
to the Board’s Bureau of Enforcement the question of
whether Delta’s refusal to honor the flight attendants’
request to arbitrate warrants the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings under sections 901 and 902 of the
Act, or other appropriate enforcement action.
* While any such enforcement action may have the practical effect
of forcing compliance, this indirect effect is not the same as directing
the carrier to arbitrate, and the concepts and consequences iavolved
in the different types of actions are different.
7d
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
AL The petition of a Committee of former Northeast
flight attendants, filed June 7, 1974, for exercise of re-
served jurisdiction be and it hereby is dismissed; and
2. The motion on behalf of the petitioners to file an
unauthorized document be and it hereby is granted.
By the Civil Aeronautics Board:
EDWIN Z. HOLLAND
Secretary
[SEAL]
le
APPENDIX E
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Order 73-9-42
Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board
at its office in Washington, D.C.
on the 11th day of September, 1973
Docket 23315
DELTA-NORTHWEST MERGER CASE
ORDER
By Orders 72-5-73/74, served May 19, 1972, the Board
approved the merger of Delta Air Lines and Northeast
Airlines, Inc., subject to Allegheny-Mohawk type labor
protective provisions (see Orders 72-4-31/32), with certain
modifications not here relevant. Section 3 of those provi-
sions reads as follows:
“Insofar as the merger affects the seniority rights of
the carriers’ employees, provisions shall be made for
the integration of seniority lists in a fair and equita-
ble manner, including, where applicable, agreement
through collective bargaining between the carriers
and the representatives of the employees affected. In
the event of failure to agree, the dispute may be sub-
mitted by either party for adjustment in accordance
with section 13.”
Section 13 of the provisions provides for the arbitration
of any dispute or controversy that arises with respect to
the labor protective conditions. The Board also, in ac-
cordance with its customary practice, reserved jurisdic-
2e
tion “to make such amendments, modifications, and addi-
tions to the labor protective conditions . . . as the circum-
stances may require.” In reliance on this reserved juris-
diction and on the terms of sections 3 and 13 of the labor
protective conditions, the Transport Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO (“TWU”) filed a petition requesting
that the Board (1) order arbitration pursuant to sec-
tion 13 of the labor protective provisions to determine the
fair and equitable integration of clerical and stewardess
seniority lists of the two carriers and (2) require Delta
to provide interim protection to the employees pending
resolution of the dispute by recognizing the seniority
status of all former Northeast employees as it existed
on November 30, 1972. An answer in opposition to the
petition has been filed by Delta.’
This dispute arises from efforts to integrate seniority
lists for the two classes of employees in question. A first
meeting was held on July 11, 1972, prior to consumma-
tion of the merger on August 1, 1972, among representa-
tives of the two carriers and the TWU. At that meeting it
was decided that further discussions among those pres-
ent would be held concerning the clericals and that a TWU
Northeast stewardess committee would meet with a Delta
stewardess committee. The stewardess negotiations ended
in deadlock after approximately two months, and counsel
for the TWU notified Delta of its intention to arbitrate
the dispute. At about the same time the union requested
the National Mediation Board (“NMB”) to furnish a
panel of names from which the parties might select an
arbitrator. On October 31, Delta informed all of the
stewardesses that because of the impasse it would be
necessary for the carrier to integrate the seniority lists
unilaterally. Meanwhile, the TWU had made several re-
'The TWU represented Northeast stewardess and clerical per-
sonnel prior to the merger. Delta’s stewardess and clerical em-
ployees are not represented by a labor organization.
3e
quests to Delta for a seniority list for the Delta clericals
as a first step toward integrating lists for that class of
employees. Having failed to receive such a list, the TWU
notified the NMB on August 29, 1972, that it wished to
refer the matter to an arbitrator. Delta opposed both this
request and the TWU request made in connection with
the stewardess negotiations. On November 2, the NMB
submitted to the parties two panels of names. However
Delta has refused to arbitrate, denying any obligation on
its part to do so.
In support of its petition the TWU alleges that it has
sought to reach a satisfactory agreement with Delta, pur-
suant to the Board’s order, as to the seniority rights of
the former Northeast clericals and stewardesses; that
Delta has refused to engage in good faith negotiations,
has refused to arbitrate the dispute, and intends to inte-
grate the lists unilaterally by a method considered un-
fair and unreasonable by the TWU and the former
Northeast employees; that the TWU as a “party” to
the merger proceeding is entitled to refer these disputes
to arbitration under section 13; that a claim by Delta
that the TWU must prove its representative status is
without precedent; that further it is impossible for the
TWU to prove its representative status because the NMB,
the only agericy with authority to certify representation,
would not determine a representative for the ex-Northeast
employees since they now constitute only a portion of a
“craft or class”; and that the TWU is the only proper
representative of the employees in question.
In its answer, Delta asserts that, despite Delta’s state-
ments that it would meet with TWU representatives if
the TWU showed any evidence that it in fact represents
the former Northeast employees under the labor pro-
tective provisions, the TWU has made no such showing,
and that neither the TWU’s status as a party in the
merger case nor its status as the former representative
de
of the former Northeast employees under the Railway
Labor Act in any way gives it the right to invoke arbi-
tration. The carrier further states that the stewardess
lists have been integrated in a fair and equitable manner
in accordance with section 3 of the labor protective pro-
visions; that it has not received a formal complaint from
a single former Northeast employee with respect to sen-
iority integration; that it dealt with a group of North-
east stewardess represeniatives in negotiations and was
then requested to arbitrate with the TWU which had
not participated in the negotiations; and that Delta is
ready to submit to arbitration if it is invoked by dis-
satisfied employees. With respect to the clerical em-
ployees, Delta additionally argues that integration of
seniority lists is unnecessary and inappropriate since
seniority is not the controlling factor in determining job
opportunities for those employees; to the extent that
Delta does use seniority, it is based on date of hire and
reference is merely made to personnel records.’ There-
fore, to the extent of its use, seniority was automatically
integrated upon consummation of the merger. Finally,
since the TWU is not entitled to the primary relief
sought, Delta contends that “interim” relief pending arbi-
tration is inappropriate.’
On May 21, 1973, the TWU filed a Petition for Per-
mission to File an Extraordinary Document which pur-
ports to refute various assertions made by Delta in its
answer to the TWU’s original petition, and reiterates
the TWU’s request that the Board issue an order re-
? Thus, Delta claims, compliance with TWU’s request would have
required that Delta construct a seniority list for that class of
employees.
* Delta contends that interim relief would be inappropriate since
the grant of such relief would impinge upon Delta’s ability to con-
duct its operations, and since the TWU has made no showing of
irreparable injury (citing American-TCA Merger Case, Order 71-
5-30, May 7, 1971).
“a
5e
quiring Delta and the TWU to select an arbitrator to
determine integration of the seniority lists of the Delta
and Northeast clericals and stewardesses, and that the
Board order interim relief. Appended to this pleading
are letters from former Northeast stewardesses now
employed by Delta that, the TWU alleges, show that
the stewardesses are dissatisfied with the integrated sen-
iority list and look to the TWU for help.
On July 2, 1973, Delta filed a Motion for Leave to
File an Unauthorized Document with its answer to the
TWU’s May 21 filing.’ In its answer, Delta states that
it still has not had a request from any former North-
east stewardess or clerical employees for arbitration of
a seniority problem; that the TWU has not informed
Delta of any authorization to represent any former
Northeast employees in seniority matters; that the Board
should reject TWU’s petition on the grounds that no
dispute has been properly submitted to Delta for arbi-
tration within a reasonable period of time after the
dispute arose; that the TWU’s answer did not refute
any of Delta’s arguments with respect to the agent
clerical group; and that the Board should not look with
favor upon the TWU’s attempts to use the labor pro-
tective provisions to perpetuate its representation of vari-
ous former Northeast Airlines’ employees.
We will dismiss the TWU petition on the alternate
grounds that (1) no showing has been made which war-
rants intervention on the Board’s part, and (2) TWU
is not a “representative” of the former Northeast em-
ployees for purposes of invoking the provisions for arbi-
tration contained in our labor protective provisions merely
because it was the collective bargaining representative of
those employees prior to the merger.
*We will grant both the TWU’s supplementai petition and Delta’s
motion for leave to file an unauthorized document.
6e
The Board has heretofore noted that it lacks expertise
in labor matters, that it is not charged with responsibility
to act as a labor board for the aviation industry, and
that its limited resources are more appropriately directed
to the resolution of those tasks directly assigned to it
and with which it is familiar. See American Airlines
v. CAB, 445 F.2d 891 (2nd Cir., 1971), cert. denied,
92 S. Ct. 681 (1972); and Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d
224 (D.C. Cir., 1960). Indeed, the requiremert for
arbitration of disputes between employees and carriers
concerning the application of our labor protective con-
ditions is grounded upon these premises. See American-
Trans Caribbean Merger Case, Order 71-5-30, p. 4; Ameri-
can Airlines v. CAB, supra. For the same reasons, the
Board has stated that it should not intervene to order
arbitration where arbitration can be directed by a court
with authority to enforce its decree, and that the more
appropriate enforcement action by the Board is penalty
action against a carrier for violation of the requirement
to arbitrate. See American-Trans Caribbean Merger Case
(Petition of James Matthiesen), Order 72-10-98, pp. 5-6.
We recognize that the present dispute involves issues
other than a failure by a carrier to comply with the terms
of the Board’s prior order. Nonetheless, the plain pur-
port of our prior holdings has been that disputes capable
of resolution through negotiation or arbitration without
recourse to the Board should be settled in that manner.
Here, Delta has conceded, at least initially, that it is under
a duty to arbitrate any unresolved seniority issue upon
demand of any dissatisfied former Northeast employee
or group of employees, and in our view that obligation is
clear. Moreover, TWU asserts that it has in fact been
requested by former Northeast employees to act in their
behalf. Thus, TWU may ultimately obtain arbitration if
it presents evidence to Delta of authority to represent
former Northeast employees and if the dispute is not
-_
Te
otherwise resolved. In these circumstances, we fail to
perceive any duty on our part to direct that which TWU
may obtain through its own efforts.’
Further, if it be thought that the Board should deter-
mine whether TWU is the present “representative” of the
former Northeast employees within the meaning of this
term as used in section 3 of the labor protective condi-
tions solely on the basis of its status as their collective
bargaining representative when they were employed by
Northeast, our determination is that it is not." We need
not reach the question of whether, if an agreement be-
tween TWU and Delta had been negotiated or consum-
mated prior to the merger, TWU would have had stand-
ing to complain of any breach (as opposed to being re-
quired to show that it was authorized to act by employee
beneficiaries of the agreement). No such agreement was
in fact reached, and it does not appear that TWU’s status
as collective bargaining representative of the Northeast
employees for Railway Labor Act purposes survived the
merger (‘see Air Line Employees Association vy. CAB,
413 F.2d 1092 (CADC 1969)). Moreover, a continuation
*In its answer to the TWU’s supplemental petition, Delta raises
the argument that the former Northeast employees should not b«
granted relief, in any event, since they have not filed a complaint
against the integrated seniority list within a reasonable time. This
question, as well as such questions as the impact to be given in a
section 3 dispute to the fact that a relatively small number of em-
ployees are dissatisfied with the manner in which the seniorits
lists were integrated (if that is in fact the case), and the applica-
bility of the seniority integration provisions of section 3 to Delta’s
clerical employees, are appropriate matters for resolution in the
context of negotiation or an arbitration proceeding and, accord-
ingly, we do not decide them here.
*TWU’s argument that it has a right to invoke arbitration under
section 13(a) by reason of its status as a party to the merger pro-
ceeding is not persuasive. Clearly, from the context of that section,
its reference to “any party” was intended to encompass only parties
to the particular dispute in question.
8e
of representative status is not essential to the application
and enforcement of the labor protective conditions.
In these circumstances, no persuasive reason has been
advanced as to why TWU should be deemed to repre-
sent the former Northeast employees merely because it
was their former representative. Such automatic status
is not required either for the purpose of enabling em-
ployees to avail themselves of the Board’s labor protec-
tive provisions or to enable the former bargaining repre-
sentative to represent the employees if the employees
so desire. On the other hand, significant changes in em-
ployer-employee relations resulting from a merger can
result in different interests between a union and its for-
mer members so that the employees would not necessarily
want the union to represent them for labor protective
purposes. Moreover, the Board has recognized that every
group of employees affected by negotiations under these
provisions is entitled to separate representation that will
protect the group’s interesi ‘see Order 71-5-30, supra,
at page 5, note 10; Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case,
17 CAB 19 (1953)). It can be argued, of course, that
recognition of the union as a continuing “representative”
for purposes of section 3 will not defeat any right of
employees not desiring such representation since they
may be represented by someone else. However, there is
no showing that this course of action will promote stabil-
ity in labor relations. Indeed, such stability might be
better advanced if the shoe is on the other foot.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED:
1. That the petition of the Transport Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO, for exercise of reserved juris-
diction, be and it hereby is dismissed ;
2. That the petition of the Transport Workers Union
for leave to file an extraordinary document be and it
hereby is granted; and
9e
3. That the motion of Delta Air Lines, Inc. for leave
to file an unauthorized document be and it hereby is
granted.
By the Civil Aeronautics Board;
EDWIN Z. HOLLAND
Secretary
| SEAL |
MURPHY, Member, Filed The Attached Dissent.
MURPHY, Member, Dissenting:
The petition and related pleadings herein raise a close
question. I am persuaded, however, that the TWU has
effectively demonstrated that it represents certain Delta
stewardesses formerly employed by Northeast Airlines for
purposes of requesting arbitration. Letters attached to
the petition filed by TWU on May 21, 1973 show that
several former Northeast stewardesses are dissatisfied
with the manner with which the seniority rosters were
integrated and look to the TWU for assistance. It is
true the letters do not in formal terms designate TWU
as representative of these stewardesses but that is the
fair purport of the letters. To hold otherwise, in my
view, elevates form over substance. Aggrieved employees,
no matter how small their number, may select whomever
they choose as their designee to secure their rights under
the labor protective conditions. These stewardesses have
selected TWU and I believe that selection should be
honored.
The Board couid, as the majority suggests, leave TWU
and the stewardesses to seek a court order directing arbi-
tration. However, we also have the power under our
reserved jurisdiction to order arbitration. To issue such
10e
an order would be a simple matter for the Board and
would not involve us in labor matters beyond our com-
petence. I believe stability of labor relations would be
fostered by this action. If the complaints of these few
stewardesses are groundless, the arbitrator will so find
and Delta will not be injured. In fairness, therefore, the
Board, as a matter of discretion, should grant TWU’s
petition.
‘s/ ROBERT T. MURPHY
if
APPENDIX F
Federal Aviation Act of 1958
$ 408 (49 U.S.C. § 1378)
$ 1378. Consolidation, merger, and acquisition of con-
trol—Prohibited acts
(a) It shall be unlawful unless approved by order of
the Board as provided in this section—
(1) For two or more air carriers, or for any air
carrier and any other common carrier or any person
engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to con-
solidate or merge their properties, or any part
thereof, into one person for the ownership, manage-
ment, or operation of the properties theretofore in
separate ownerships ;
(2) For any air carrier, any person controlling an
air carrier, any other common carrier, or any person
engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to pur-
chase, lease, or contract to operate the properties,
or any substantial part thereof, of any air carrier;
(3) For any air carrier or person controlling an
air carrier to purchase, lease, or contract to operate
the properties, or any substantial part thereof, of any
person engaged in any phase of aeronautics other-
wise than as an air carrier;
(4) For any foreign air carrier or person con-
trolling a foreign air carrier to acquire control, in
any manner whatsoever, of any citizen of the United
States engaged in any phase of aeronautics;
(5) For any air carrier or person controlling an
air carrier, any other common carrier, or any person
engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to acquire
control of any air carrier in any manner whatsoever;
2f
(6) For any air carrier or person controlling an
air carrier to acquire control, in any manner whatso-
ever, of any person engaged in any phase of aero-
nauties otherwise than as an air carrier; or
(7) For any person to continue to maintain any
relationship established in violation of any of the
foregoing subdivisions of this subsection.
Application to Board; hearing ; approval ; disposal
without hearing.
(b) Any person seeking approval of a consolidation
merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition
of control, specified in subsection (a) of this section, shall
present an application to the Board, and thereupon the
Board shall notify the persons involved in the consolida-
tion, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acqui-
sition of control, and other persons known to have a sub-
stantial interest in the proceeding, of the time and place
of a public hearing. Unless, after such hearing, the Board
finds that the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, oper-
ating contract, or acquisition of control will not be con-
sistent with the public interest or that the conditions of
this section will not be fulfilled, it shall by order approve
such consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating
contract, or acquisition of control, upon such terms and
conditions as it shall find to be just and reasonable and
with such modifications as it may prescribe; Provided,
That the Board shall not approve any consolidation,
merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisi-
tion of control which would result in creating a monopoly
or monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeop-
ardize another air carrier not a party to the consolida-
tion, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acqui-
sition of control: Provided further, That if the applicant
is a carrier other than an air carrier, or a person con-
py oe a Sn
3f
trolled by a carrier other than an air carrier or affiliated
therewith within the meaning of section 5(8) of this title,
such applicant shall for the purposes of this section be
considered an air carrier and the Board shall not enter
such an order of approval unless it finds that the trans-
action proposed will promote the public interest by en-
abling such carrier other than an air carrier to use air-
craft to public advantage in its operation and will not
restrain competition: Provided further, That, in any case
in which the Board determines that the transaction which
is the subject of the application does not affect the con-
trol of an air carrier directly engaged in the operation of
aircraft in air transportation, does not result in creating
a monopoly, and does not tend to restrain competition,
and determines that no person disclosing a substantial
interest then currently is requesting a hearing, the Board,
after publication in the Federal Register of notice of the
Board’s intention to dispose of such application without a
hearing (a copy of which notice shall be furnished by the
Board to the Attorney General not later than the day
following the date of such publication), may determine
that the public interest does not require a hearing and by
order approve or disapprove such transaction.
Interests in ground facilities
(c) The provisions of this section and section 1379 of
this title shall not apply with respect to the acquisition or
holding by any air carrier, or any officer or director
thereof, of (1) any interest in any ticket office, landing
area, hangar, or other ground facility reasonably inci-
dental to the performance by such air carrier of any of
its services, or (2) any stock or other interest or any
office or directorship in any person whose principal busi-
ness is the maintenance or operation of any such ticket
office, landing area, hangar, or other ground facility.
4f
Jurisdiction of accounts of noncarriers
(d) Whenever, after the effective date of this section,
a person, not an air carrier, is authorized, pursuant to
this section, to acquire control of an air carrier, such
person thereafter shall, to the extent found by the Board
to be reasonably necessary for the administration of this
chapter, be subject, in the same manner as if such per-
son were an air carrier, to the provisions of this chapter
relating to accounts, records, and reports, and the inspec-
tion of facilities and records, including the penalties ap-
plicable in the case of violations thereof.
Investigations of violations
(e) The Board is empowered, upon complaint or upon
its own initiative, to investigate and, after notice and
hearing, to determine whether any person is violating any
provision of subsection (a) of this section. If the Board
finds after such hearing that such person is violating any
provision of such subsection, it shall by order require
such person to take such action, consistent with the pro-
visions of this chapter, as may be necessary, in the opin-
ion of the Board, to prevent further violation of such
provision. Pub.L. 85-726, Title IV, § 408, Aug. 23, 1958,
72 Stat. 767; Pub.L. 86-758, $1, Sept. 13, 1960, 74 Stat.
101.
lg
APPENDIX G
72-4-31
72-4-32
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Docket 23371
ALLEGHENY-MOHAWK MERGER CASE
Decided: March 28, 1972
Merger of Allegheny Airlines, Inc., and Mohawk Airlines,
Inc., approved subject to labor protective conditions.
APPEARANCES:
Same as in the examiner’s recommended decision and
in addition:
Edwin 1. Colodny for Allegheny Airlines, Inc.
Charles J. McIntyre for the Air Line Dispatchers
Association.
Richard A. Snelling for the State of Vermont.
Toronto and Montreal.”’
The Board’s decision on the transfer of the certificated
international route authority involved herein requires the
approval of the President under section 801 of the Fed-
a For the reasons stated by the examiner in Appendix 4, we will
modify exemption Order E-23845 to permit single-plane service
between Toronto and Washington/Philadelphia via Rochester.
2g
eral Aviation Act. No agency of the Government, nor
any other party, has suggested that the transfer would
raise any issue of adverse effect on our nation’s foreign
policy or the national defense." On this record we can
find no reason relating thereto for disapproving transfer
of these international routes or conditioning that transfer
in any way. For purposes of simplification, we will com-
bine the surviving carrier’s certificates for foreign air
transportation into one certificate for route 97F.
VIII.
The Board has a long-established policy of conditioning
its approval of air carrier mergers upon acceptance by
the surviving company of conditions designed to protect
employees."” Since the 1961 United-Capita! Merger Case,”
the Board has consistently applied the same set of labor
protective provisions.*'
In brief summary, those provisions require that in the
case of a merger the surviving carrie: must:
(1) Provide for the fair and equitable integration of
seniority lists.
(2) In regard to any employee who continues on in the
employment of the carrier, pay a “displacement allow-
* For the role of Federal agencies in proceedings before the
Board involving subsequent Presidential action under section 801,
see the letter of the President dated July 16, 1970 attached to Order
70-7-82, July 17, 1970, and the opinion of the Board in the Pacific
Islands Local Service Investigation, Order 71-7-174, August 11,
1971, pages 5-6.
Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 708 (1952) ;
Cf. United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B.
701 (1950).
2° 33 C.A.B. 307 (1961).
21 See American-Trans Caribbean Merger Case, Order 70-12-161;
Northwest-Northeast Merger Case, Order 70-12-162/163; Universal-
American Flyers Acquisition Case, Orders 71-5-80/81.
3g
ance” to that employee for up to four years, to the extent
that the employee is “placed in a worse position with
respect to compensation” as a result of the merger.
(3) Pay a “dismissal allowance” to any employee who
loses his job as a result of the merger. For dismissed
employees with 15 years of service with either of the
merger partners, payments continue for five years after
the discharge; employees with less seniority receive pay-
ments for a commensurately shorter period. At the em-
ployee’s option, a lesser amount can be taken in a lump
sum.
(4) Continue, for a stated period, fringe benefits, such
as hospitalization insurance, to employees affected by the
merger.
(5) Compensate employees who as a result of the
merger have to change their place of residence.
(6) Arbitrate disputes with employees arising under
the labor protective provisions.”
Various union parties have urged the Board in this
case, as they have in the past, to make the conditions
more favorable to employees adversely affected by merg-
ers. The union parties further urge that the labor
protective conditions promulgated under the Rail Passen-
ger Service Act of 1970* (“Railpax”) and certified by
the Secretary of Labor as being “fair and equitable” ** for
purposes of that Act provide a sufficient basis for us to
modify the United-Capital provisions now.
The examiner in this proceeding and the examiner in
the Delta-Northeast Merger Case have recommended that
*2 Other United-Capital provisions cover such matters as the
period within which a change of employment must occur in order
to be compensable.
= PLL. 91-518.
** Pursuant to section 405 of Railpax.
4g
the Board adopt a number of changes in the United-
Capital provisions, several of which are along the lines
recommended by the union parties.** Except for several
matters unique to Delta-Northeast, we have considered
these recommendations concurrently.
We agree with the examiner in Delta-Northeast that
experience has shown that the conditions dealing with
arbitration procedures, set out in section 13, need amend-
ment. But upon review of the parties’ contentions, the
recommendations of both examiners and the general
absence of new facts relating to other conditions, we
conclude there is insufficient basis presented herein for
altering the substance of any of those conditions. How-
ever, we do see the need for some elucidation of the mean-
ing of several provisions.
We turn first to section 13, which is intended to pro-
vide a mechanism for settlement by arbitration of dis-
putes arising under the labor protective provisions when
they cannot. be resolved by negotiation between the
parties. In a recent labor dispute growing out of the
American-Trans Caribbean Merger Case, supra, it was
necessary for the Board to order the carrier to submit
the dispute to arbitration,” and then to defend the valid-
ity of our order in court.” Despite affirmance of our
action by the Court of Appeals, several additional months
ensued while the parties attempted to choose an arbitra-
2° The hearings and the issuance of the recommended decisions
in this proceeding and in the Delta-Northeast Merger Case ( Docket
23315) were nearly contemporaneous. Moreover the evidence and
arguments regarding labor protective conditions were very similar
in both proceedings. On brief and in oral argument, the !abor
parties in this proceeding referred to both examiners’ recommenda-
tions concerning proposed changes in the labor protective conditions.
26 Order 71-5-30, reconsideration denied, Order 71-6-71.
** American Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 445 F.2d 891
(2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, —— U.S. ——, 92 S. Ct. 681 (1972).
awe ate —o
5g
tor and frame the specific issues to be presented. The
time between the failure of negotiations and the com-
mencement of arbitration ultimately ran to about a year.
A delay of any kind, much less one of a year’s duration,
is undesirable because it prolongs disputes and under-
mines the harmonious labor relations necessary to assure
efficient and uninterrupted service to the public. While
our orders make clear that either party has the unquali-
fied right to demand arbitration of any bona fide dispute
of a non-frivolous nature, the aftermath of American-
Trans Caribbean shows that disagreement over the issues
involved or over the selection of the arbitrator can pro-
long disputes needlessly, to the detriment of employees.
On the basis of this demonstrated experience, there-
fore, we agree with the examiner in Delta-Northeost that
the section should be modified to include: (1) a specific
provision for an arbitrator and the manner of his selec-
tion; (2) expedited hearings and decisions; (3) a definite
division between the parties of the arbitrator’s compen-
sation and expenses; (4) a right in any party to refer
an unsettled dispute to arbitration 20 days after the
controversy arises, instead of the present 30 days; and
to obviate further dispute and delay, (5) a clear affirma-
tion that the decision of the arbitrator is final and bind-
ing on all parties.** We will however, make two addi-
tional changes beyond those recommended by the ex-
aminer. It is possible that the parties to a dispute may
determine that some other procedure for submitting a
dispute for arbitration would be more satisfactory for
them. We shall therefore add a provision to section 13
—_——
2° We do not, of course, intend to deny parties to arbitration
proceedings their usual rights to have an arbitration award set
aside or corrected, for instance, where the arbitrator exceeded his
powers, or where an evident miscalculation of figures was made.
Cf. 9 U.S.C. sees. 10 and 11.
6g
to provide that the parties may by mutual consent de-
cide upon an alternative procedure appropriate for use
in their case. We will also make appropriate language
changes to provide for disputes in which there may be
more than two parties.
a ee
lh
APPENDIX H
72-5-73
72-5-74
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Docket 23315
Served: May 19, 1972
DELTA-NORTHEAST MERGER CASE
Decided: April 24, 1972
Merger of Delta Air Lines, Inc., and Northeast Air-
lines, Inc. approved, subject to conditions.
APPEARANCES:
Same as in the examiner’s recommended decision.
Ifl.
A number of changes to the Board’s standard labor
protective conditions have been recommended by the
examiner, urged by the labor parties and opposed by the
applicants. All the points made by the examiner and
the parties here have been considered in connection with
the review of all the proposed modifications of the stand-
ard labor protective conditions that we undertook in the
2h
Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case.’ Our general conclu-
sions concerning changes in the labor protective condi-
tions are set forth in Allegheny-Mohawk and will not be
repeated here.” We will, however, consider several prob-
lems raised by the unique circumstances of this case, and
which clearly warrant special consideration.
The first such problem concerns the determination of
the appropriate cutoff date for purposes of section 10
of the labor protective provisions. Section 10 provides:
If either carrier, on or after {a specified date]
shall rearrange or adjust its forces in anticipation
of the merger, with the purpose or effect of depriv-
ing an employee of benefits to which he should be
entitled under this order as an employee immediately
affected by the merger, the provisions of this order
shall apply to such employee as of the date when
he is so affected.
The date usually chosen for inclusion in section 10 is
the date of the merger applicants’ agreement in prin-
ciple to merge. Any employee believing
* * cal
“ Orders 72-4-31/32 at pp. 18-33.
*S Suffice to say that for the reasons and with the interpretations
stated there, we shall make no substantive alterations in the stand-
ard labor provisions with the exception of condition 13, which re-
lates to procedures for arbitration.
ne nl SS ek
0 ln oe
li
APPENDIX I
Labor Protective Provisions
Section 1. The fundamental scope and purpese of the
conditions hereinafter specified are to provide for com-
pensatory allowances to employees who may be affected
by the proposed merger of Delta Air Lines, Inc. and
Northeast Airlines, Inc. approved by the attached order,
and it is the intent that such conditions are to be re-
stricted to those changes in employment due to and re-
sulting from such merger. Fluctuations, rises and falls,
and changes in volume or character of employment
brought about by other causes are not covered by or in-
tended to be covered by these provisions.
Section 2(a). The term “merger” as used herein
means joint action by the two carriers whereby they
unify, consolidate, merge, or pool in whole or in part
their separate airline facilities or any of the operations
or services previously performed by them through such
separate facilities.
(b) The term “carrier” as used herein refers to either
Delta or Northeast or to the corporation surviving after
consummation of the proposed merger of the two com-
panies. .
(ec) The term “effective date of merger” as used here-
in shall mean the effective date of the amended certifi-
cates of public convenience and necessity transferred to
Delta pursuant to the approval granted in the attached
order.
(d) The term “employee” as used herein shall mean
an employee of the carriers other than a temporary or
part-time employee.
Section 3. Insofar as the merger affects the seniority
rights of the carriers’ employees, provisions shall be made
2i
for the integration of seniority lists in a fair and equi-
table manner, including, where applicable, agreement
through collective bargaining between the carriers and
the representatives of the employees affected. In the
event of failure to agree, the dispute may be submitted
by either party for adjustment in accordance with sec-
tion 13.
Section 4(a). Subject to the applicable conditions set
forth herein, no employee of either of the carriers in-
volved in the merger who is continued in service shall
as a result of the merger be placed in a worse position
with respect to compensation than he occupied immedi-
ately prior to his displacement so long as he is unable
in the normal exercise of his seniority rights under exist-
ing agreements, rules, and practices to obtain a position
producing compensation equal to or exceeding the com-
pensation of the position held by him immediately prior
to such date, except, however, that if he fails to exercise
his seniority rights to secure another available position,
which does not require a change in residence, to which
he is entitled under the working agreement and which
carries a rate of pay and compensation exceeding those
of the position which he elects to retain, he shall there-
after be treated for the purposes of this section as oc-
cupying the position which he elects to decline.
(b) The protection afforded by the foregoing para-
graph is hereby designated as a “displacement allow-
ance” which shall be determined in each instance in the
manner hereinafter described. Any employee entitled to
such an allowance is hereinafter referred to as a “dis-
placed” employee.
(e) Each displacement allowance shaJl be a monthly
allowance determined by computing the total compensa-
tion received by the employee and his total time paid for
during the last 12 months in which he performed service
3i
immediately preceding the date of his displacement (such
12 months being hereinafter referred to as the “test
period”) and by dividing separately the total compensa-
tion and the total time paid for by 12, thereby producing
the average monthly compensation and average monthly
time paid for, which shall be the minimum amounts used
to guarantee the displaced employee; and if his compen-
sation in his current position is less in any month in
which he performs work than the aforesaid average com-
pensation, he shall be paid the difference, less compensa-
tion for any time lost on account of voluntary absences
to the extent that he is not available for service equiva-
lent to his average monthly time during the test period,
but he shall be compensated in addition thereto at the
rate of the position filled for any time worked in excess
of the average monthly time paid for during the test
period.
(d) The protection afforded herein shall only apply to
displacements occurring within a period of 3 years from
the effective date of the merger (referred to herein as
the claim period) ; and the period during which this pro-
tection is to be given ‘referred to herein as the protec-
tive period) shall extend for a period of 4 years from the
date on which the employee is displaced.
Section 5(a). Any employee of either of the carriers
participating in the merger who is deprived of em-
ployment as a result of said merger shall be accorded an
allowance (hereinafter termed a “dismissal allowance’),
based on length of service, which (except in the case of
an employee with less than 1 year of service) shall be a
monthly allowance equivalent in each instance to 60 per-
cent of the average monthly compensation of the em-
ployee in question during the last 12 months of his em-
ployment in which he earned compensation prior to the
date he is first deprived of employment as a result of
the merger. This dismissal allowance will be made to
4i
each eligible employee, while unemployed, by Delta dur-
ing a period beginning at the date he is first deprived
of employment as a result of the merger and extending
in each instance for a length of time determined and
limited by the following schedule:
Length of service Period of payment
Years Months
I si decaecnsssmononnnninss seiceanencatiiie kee
SS SE NTT
IS hoe cia paeanadesanionsichsbasianiainiaetiiae
I fs cesamvaisnigsnbnoesinmecenaeesioll
SS EER
ER TTT
In the case of an employee with less than 1 year of
service such employee shall not be covered by the benefits
provided in this section, but shall receive such benefits,
and only such benefits, as are provided by section 7.
(b) For the purpose of these provisions, the length
of service of the employee shall be determined from the
date he last acquired an employment status with the
employing carrier and he shali be given credit for 1
morth’s service for each month in which he performed
any service (in any capacity whatsoever) and 12 such
months shall be credited as 1 year’s service. The em-
ployment status of an employee shall not be interrupted
by furlough in instances where the employee has a right
to and does return to service when called. In determining
length of service of an employee acting as an officer or
other official representative of an employee organization
he will be given credit for performing service while so
engaged on leave of absence from the service of the
carrier: Provided, That in caiculating the dismissal al-
lowanee for such an employee, such allowance shall be
based upon the compensation paid such employee by the
carrier during his last 12 months of service on the com-
“ —
5i
pany payroll and not on the compensation he may have
been paid by the employee representative organization.
(c) An employee shall not be regarded as deprived of
employment in case of his resignation, death, or retire-
ment on account of age or disability in accordance with
the current rules and practices applicable to employees
generally, dismissal for justifiable cause in accordance
with the rules, or furlough because of reduction in forces
due to seasonal requirements of the service; nor shall
any employee be regarded as deprived of employment as
the result of the merger who is not deprived of his em-
ployment within 3 years from the effective date of said
merger.
(d) Each employee receiving a dismissal allowance
shall keep Allegheny informed of his address and the
name and address of any other person by whom he may
be regularly employed.
(e) The dismissal allowance shall be paid to the regu-
larly assigned incumbent of the position abolished. If
the position of an employee is abolished while he is absent
from service, he will be entitled to the dismissal allow-
ance when he is available for service. The employee
temporarily filling said position at the time it was abol-
ished will be given a dismissal allowance on the basis of
said position until the regular employee is available for
service and thereafter shall revert to his previous status
and will be given a dismissal allowance accordingly if any
is due.
(f) An employee receiving a dismissal allowance shall
be subject to call to return to service after being notified
in_aceordance with the working agreement, and such
employee may be required to return to the service of the
employing carrier for other reasonably comparable em-
ployment for which he is physically and mentally quali-
fied and which does not require a change in his place of
6i
residence, if his return does not infringe upon the em-
ployment rights of other employees under the working
agreement.
(g) If an employee who is receiving a dismissal al-
lowance returns to service the dismissal allowance shall
cease while he is so reemployed and the period of time
during which he is so reemployed shall be deducted from
the total period for which he is entitled to receive a dis-
missal allowance. During the time of such reemployment,
however, he shall be entitled to protection in accordance
with the provisions of section 4.
ih) If an employee who is receiving a dismissal al-
lowance obtains other employment, his dismissal allow-
ance shall be reduced to the extent that the sum total of
his earnings in such employment plus his allowance and
any unemployment insurance benefit (or similar benefit)
exceed the amount upon which his dismissal allowance is
based: Provided, That this shall not apply to employees
with less than 1 year’s service.
(i) A dismissal allowance shall cease prior to the
expiration of its prescribed period in the event of—
1. Failure without geod cause to return to service
after being notified of a position for which he is eligible
and as provided in paragraphs (f) and (g).
2. Resignation.
3. Death.
4. Retirement on account of age or disability in ac-
cordance with the current rules and practices applicable
to employees generally.
5. Dismissal for justifiable cause.
°
Section 5. An employee affected by the merger shall
not during the applicable protective period be deprived of
Ti
benefits attaching to his previous employment, such as
hospitalization, relief, and the like.
Section 7. Any employee eligible to receive a dismissal
allowance under section 5 hereof may, at his option at
the time of merger, resign and (in lieu of all other
benefits and protections provided in these provisions)
accept in a lump sum a separation allowance determined
in accordance with the following schedule:
Length of service Separation allowance
Years Months’ pay
Dee misssemimmmesenen 10
ESE 6
EE 9
I seems 12
In the case of employees with less than 1 year’s service,
5 days’ pay, at the straight time rate per working day
of the position last occupied, for each full month in which
they performed service will be paid as the lump sum.
(a) Length of service shall be computed as provided in
section 5.
(b) One month’s pay shall be computed by multiplying
by 30 the calendar daily rate of pay received by the em-
ployee in the position last occupied prior to the time of
the merger.
Section 8(a). Any employee who is retained in the
service of the carrier surviving the merger (or who is
later restored to service from the group of employees en-
titled to receive a dismissal allowance) who is required
to change the point of his employment as a result of such
merger, and is therefore required to move his place of
residence, shall be reimbursed for all expenses of moving
his household and other personal effects and for the
traveling expenses of himself and members of his family,
including living expenses for himself and his family and
8i
his own actual wage loss during the time necessary for
such transfer, and for a reasonable time thereafter (not
to exceed 2 working days), used in securing a place of
residence in his new location. The exact extent of the
responsibility of the carrier under this provision and the
ways and means of transportation shall be agreed upon in
advance between the carrier and the affected employee or
his representative. No claims for expenses under this
section shall be allowed unless they are incurred within
3 years from the effective date of the merger, and the
claim must be submitted within 90 days after the ex-
penses are incurred.
(b) Changes in place of residence subsequent to the
initial change caused by the merger which grow out of
the normal exercise of seniority in accordance with work-
ing agreements are not comprehended within the provi-
sions of this section.
Section 9(a). The following provisions shall apply, to
the extent they are applicable in each instance, to any
employee who is retained in the service of the carriers in-
volved in this merger (or who is later restored to such
service from the group of employees entitled to receive a
dismissal allowance) who is required to change the point
of his employment as a result of such merger and is
therefore required to move his place of residence.
1. If the employee owns his own home in the locality
from which he is required to move, he shall at his option
be reimbursed by the carrier for any loss suffered in
the sale of his home for less than its fair value. In each
ease the fair value of the home in question shall be de-
termined as of a date sufficiently prior to the merger to
be unaffected thereby; Provided, however, That if the
home is not sold within a substantial period of time after
the merger, then the fair value of the home shall be
determined as of a date as closely related to the date of
sale as possible, with an agreed-upon adjustment being
9i
made to exclude any effect of the merger on such fair
value. The carrier shall in each instance be afforded an
opportunity to purchase the home at such fair value
before it is sold by the employee to any other party.
2. If the employee is under a contract to purchase his
home, the carrier shall protect him against loss to the
extent of the fair value of any equity he may have in
the home and in addition shall relieve him from any fur-
ther obligations under his contract.
. 3. If the employee holds an unexpired lease of a dwell-
ing occupied by him as his home, the carrier shall pro-
tect him from all loss and cost in securing the cancella-
tion of his said lease.
(b) Changes in place of residence subsequent to the
initial change caused by the merger which grow out of
the normal exercise of seniority in accordance with work-
ing agreements are not comprehended within the provi-
sions of this section.
( ¢) No claim for loss shall be paid under the provisions
of this section which is not presented within 3 years after
the effective date of the merger.
(d) Should a controversy arise in respect to the value
of the home, the loss sustained in its sale, the loss under
contract for purchase, loss and cost in securing termina-
tion of lease, or any other question in connection with
these matters, it shall be decided through joint confer-
ence between the employee or his representative and the
carrier, and, in the event they are unable to agree, the
dispute may be referred by either party to a board of
three competent real estate appraisers, selected in the
following manner: One to be selected by the employee or
his representative and one by the carrier, respectively;
these two shall endeavor by agreement within 10 days
after their appointment to select the third appraiser, or to
select some person authorized to name the third appraiser ;
10i
and in the event of failure to agree, then the Chairman
of the National Mediation Board shall be requested to
appoint the third appraiser. A decision of a majority of
the appraisers shall be required and said decision shall
be final and conclusive. The salary and expenses of the
third or neutral appraiser, including the expenses of the
appraisal board, shall be borne equally by the parties to
the proceedings. All other expenses shall be paid by the
party incurring them, including the salary of the ap-
praiser selected by such party.
Section 10. If either carrier, on or after April 23, 1971,
shall rearrange or adjust its forces in anticipation of
the merger, with the purpose or effect of depriving an
employee of benefits to which he should be entitled under
these provisions as an employee immediately affected by
the merger, these provisions shall apply to such an em-
ployee as of the date when he is so affected.
Section 11. Delta and Northeast shall jointly or sev-
erally give at least 45 days’ written notice containing a
full and adequate statement of the proposed changes to be
effected by the merger, including an estimate of the
number of employees of each class, craft, or field of en-
deavor affected by the intended changes. Such notice
shall be posted on bulletin boards or other conspicuous
places convenient to the employees of said carriers, and a
copy of the notice shall be sent by registered mail to all
authorized representatives of any of the employees of
both carriers.
If requested in writing by any employee or employees
of either carrier or the authorized representative of such
employee or employees, the date and place of a meeting
between said employees or their representatives and the
representatives of the carriers to settle problems of the
rearrangement of such employees arising out of and be-
cause of the merger shall be agreed upon within 10 days
1li
after such request is received by the carrier. The meet-
ing shall commence within 30 days from the date the
request is received by the carrier.
In the event of a failure to agree upon a settlement
of a problem or of problems presented at the meeting, the
unsettled problems may be submitted by either party for
adjustment in accordance with section 13.
Section 12. No employee of either carrier shall, as a
condition of eligibility for the protection afforded by the
terms of this order be required to accept employment
with the surviving carrier that is not within the class,
craft, or field of endeavor in which he was employed by
either carrier on the date of the attached order.
Section 13(a). “In the event that any dispute or con-
troversy (except as to matters arising under section 9)
arises with respect to the protections provided herein,
which cannot be settled by the parties within 20 days
after the controversy arises, it may be referred by any
party to an arbitrator selected from a panel of seven
names furnished by the National Mediation Board for
consideration and determination. The parties shall select
the arbitrator from such panel by alternately striking
names until only one remains, and he shall serve 2s
arbitrator. Expedited hearings and decisions will be ex-
pected, and a decision shall be rendered within 90 days
after the controversy arises, unless an extension of time is
mutually agreeable to all parties.” The salary and ex-
penses of the arbitrator shall be borne equally by the
carrier and (i) the organization or organizations repre-
senting the employee or employees, or (ii) if unrepre-
sented, the employee or employees or group or groups of
employees. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final
and binding on the parties.
(b) The above condition shall not apply if the parties
by mutual agreement determine that an alternative
12i
method for dispute settlement or an alternative proce-
dure for selection of an arbitrator is appropriate in their
particular dispute. No party shall be excused from com-
plying with the above conditions by reason of having
suggested an alternative method or procedure, unless and
until that alternative method or procedure shall have
been agreed to by all the parties.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.