Appendix — Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles

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| — Supreme Coug, U.

FILED

} AUG 21 1978

APPENDIX

MICHABL RODAK, JR., CLERK

—

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1977

No. 77-1378

JAPAN LIne, LTD., ef al.,

Appellants,

vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et ai.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From the Supreme Court of the

State of California.

Filed March 28, 1978.

Jurisdiction Postponed June 12, 1978.

APPENDIX

Page

Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries ......

sidelines llieietihiaiteainteatintimnigmaienpcesmamtatate App. p. 1

A ESN a 3

Certificate of Assignment or Transfer, Dated May

13, 1971.

Complaint. Recovery of Taxes ............ sepeniinenetiatuies 9

Certificate of Assignment or Transfer, Dated Febru-

ary 1, 1972.

Complaint for Recovery of Taxes ........ 7h 15

Certificate of Assignmeat or Transfer, Dated Febru-

ary 14, 1973.

oe 21

Agreed Statement in Lieu of Clerk's and Reporter's

Ee 26

Agreed Statement in Lieu of Clerk’s and Reporter's

Transcripts ..........cccccceecceesseessvessseeen ‘Mae 28

ST iiiaiiiiaetaadiindietenentiniinenhsiniascovececeesesceveces 39

EE ee 41

Opinion of the Court of Appeal .....0.....0...00.0ccee. 43

Opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Cali-

EEE ey Te 52

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1977

No. 77-1378

JAPAN Line, LTD.., ef ai.,

Appellants,

vs.

COUNTY OF Los ANGELES, et ai.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From the Supreme Court of the

State of California.

APPENDIX

ss

Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries.

May 18, 1971—Plaintiffs’ Complaint for recovery

of taxes for fiscal year 1970-71 filed in the California

Superior Court, Los Angeles County (Case No. SOC

25617).

June 14, 1971—Defendants’ Answer to said Complaint

(Case No. SOC 25617) filed.

February 2, 1972—Plaintiffs’ Complaint for recovery

of taxes for fiscal year 1971-72 filed in the Cali-

fornia Superior Court, Los Angeles County (Case

No. SOC 27593).

April 5, 1972—-Defendants’ Answer to said Complaint

(Case No. SOC 27593) filed.

February 15, 1973—Plaintiffs’ Complaint for recovery

of taxes for fiscal year 1972-73 filed in the Cali-

fornia Superior Court, Los Angeles County (Case

No. SOC 30557).

March 23, 1973—Defendants’ Answer to said Com-

plaint (Case No. SOC 30557) filed.

October 10, 1973—Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate

the above three actions heard and granted by the

Superior Court.

March 14, 1974—Intended Decision in favor of plain-

tiffs filed following trial in the Superior Court.

October 15, 1974—Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law and Judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs

by the Superior Court.

December 12, 1974—Notice of Appeal filed by defend-

ants in the Superior Court.

September 17, 1975—Agreed Statement in Lieu of

Clerk’s and Reporter’s Transcripts filed by plaintiffs

=

and defendants in the California Court of Appeal,

Second Appellate District, (hereafter, Court of Ap-

peal).

December 22, 1975—Defendants’ Opening Brief filed

in the Court of Appeal.

March 19, 1976—Plaintiffs’ Brief filed in the Court

of Appeal.

May 17, 1976—Defendants’ Reply Brief filed in the

Court of Appeal.

July 16, 1976—Plaintiffs’ Supp'emental Brief filed in

the Court of Appeal.

July 30, 1976—Defendants’ Supplemental Brief filed

in the Court of Appeal.

August 27, 1976—Opinion of the Court of Appeal

filed, reversing the decision of the Superior Court

and entering judgment in favor of defendants.

September 13, 1976—Plaintiffs’ Petition for Rehearing

filed in the Court of Appeal.

September 22, 1976—Plaintiffs’ Petition for Rehearing

denied by the Court of Appeal.

October 6, 1976—Plaintiffs’ Petition for Hearing filed

in the California Supreme Court.

October 27, 1976—Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’

Petition for Hearing filed in the California Supreme

Court.

November 24, 1976—Plaintiffs’ Petition for Hearing

granted by the California Supreme Court.

November 18, 1977—Opinion of the California Su-

preme Court filed, affirming the decision of the

Court of Appeal.

=——

December 9, 1977—Plaintiffs’ Petition for Rehearing

filed in the California Supreme Court.

December 28, 1977—Plaintiffs’ Petition for Rehearing

denied by, and Order Modifying Opinion filed in,

the California Supreme Court.

February 28, 1978—Notice of Appeal by plaintiffs

to the United States Supreme Court filed in the

California Supreme Court.

Complaint.

Superior Court of the State of California, for the

County of Los Angeles.

JAPAN LINE, LTD.; KAWASAKI KISEN KAISHA,

LTD.; MITSUI O.S.K. LINES, LTD; NIPPON YUSEN

KAISHA; SHOWA SHIPPING CO., LTD.; YAMA-

SHITA-SHINNIHON STEAMSHIP CO., LTD., foreign

corporations, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF LOS AN-

GELES AND CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendants.

NO. SOC 25617.

Original Filed: May 8, 1971.

Plaintiffs allege:

I

Plaintiffs are and at all times hereinafter mentioned

were, Corporations duly organized and existing under

the laws of Japan engaged primarily in the operation

of steamships and containerships in the carriage of

cargo in foreign commerce.

II

Defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES is, and

at all times hereinafter mentioned was, a politica! sub-

division of the State of California.

—_

Il

Defendant CITY OF LOS ANGELES is, and at

all times hereinafter mentioned was, a municipal corpo-

ration and political subdivision of the State of Caii-

fornia. At all times mentioned herein, defendant COUN-

TY OF LOS ANGELES acted in part for defendant

CITY OF LOS ANGELES in levying and collecting

the taxes which are the subject matter of this complaint.

IV

On March 1, 1970, at 12:01 a.m., plaintiffs were

the owners and lessees of certain cargo containers

located in the City of Los Angeles. Said containers

are an integral part of the movement of goods in

foreign commerce by plantiffs’ vessels, which are regis-

tered under the laws of Japan, where each of plaintiffs

has its corporate and commercial domicile and the

home port of its vessels and containers. At all times

when said containers are physically present in the City

of Los Angeles, they are so located only for short

periods of time sufficient for the delivery and loading

of the international cargo shipments contained therein.

Vv

The Assessor of the County of Los Angeles assessed

against the subject cargo containers, and the Tax Collec-

tor of the County of Los Angeles levied taxes thereon

as follows:

Plaintiff-Taxpayer Appraisal Assessment Tax Levied

Japan Line $ 765,000 $191,250 $20,512.32

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha 1,250,100 312,525 33,519.55

Mitsui O.S.K. Line 1,251,000 312,750 33,543.68

Nippon Yusen Kaisha 1,389,000 347,250 37,243.95

Showa Shipping Co. 595,000 148,750 15,954.03

Yamashita-Shinnihon 824,000 206,000 22,094.32

Between December 28, 1970 and March 2, 1971,

plaintiffs herein paid, under written protest, the amount

a

of tax respectively levied against each of them. The

grounds of the protest were set out in an exhibit

accompanying the payment of the tax, which grounds

are set forth in Exhibit “A” attached hereto and in-

corporated herein.

VI

At 12:01 a.m., on March 1, 1970, none of the

cargo containers physically present within the City of

Los Angeles had acquired taxable situs in the County

or City of Los Angeles. The subject containers were

and are constantly committed to and engaged in the

process of importation to and exportation from the

United States and are integral to the transportation

of goods aboard plaintiffs’ vessels exclusively in foreign

commerce. As instrumentalities of foreign commerce,

and due to their integral participation and exclusive

use in foreign commerce and foreign movements of

cargo, the containers were subject to taxation exclusive-

ly in Japan. Therefore, the said taxes were unlawfully

levied and collected in that the subject containers were

exempt from taxation by United States Constitution

Article I Sections 8, 9 and 10, Amendment V and

Amendment XIV; the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce

and Navigation between the United States and Japan

(especially Article XI and XVII) and, pursuant to

the most-favored-nation provisions of that Treaty, (Ar-

ticle VI Section 4 and Article XI Section 3) under

treaties with other nations; California Constitution Arrti-

cle 13 Sections 1 and 4; and Revenue and Taxation

Code Section 201. The levying and collecting of the

subject taxes subjected plaintiffs and the containers

to double taxation, as between California and Japan,

in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code Section

102. As movable property without a “normal place

endins

of return” between movements, the containers have

situs exclusively at plaintiffs’ principal place of business,

Japan. (See, e.g., 18 California Administrative Code

205).

Vil

The subject taxes were unlawfully levied and col-

lected in that the assessment upon which the taxes

were based was not made “on discovery” of the presence

of the subject containers as required by Revenue and

Taxation Code Section 531.

Vill

No refund of said taxes, or any part thereof, has

been made to plaintiffs.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against

defendants in the respective amounts of taxes levied

and paid as set forth in Paragraph V of this Complaint,

together with interest thereon from the date of payment

at the maximum rate of interest, which rate is no

less than 842% per annum from the date of payment,

for costs of suit, and for such other and further relief

as may be just and proper.

Dated: April 30, 1971.

GRAHAM & JAMES

FRANCIS L. TETREAULT

REED M. WILLIAMS

DONALD H. READ

By /s/ Reed M. Williams

REED M. WILLIAMS

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

= =

EXHIBIT A

1) The subject containers as “movable property”

have not acquired situs in Los Angeles County under

the standards of Rule 205 of the California Administra-

tive Code, Title 18; and, pursuant to that Rule, have

situs Only at the principal place of business of the

taxpayer, Japan.

2) The subject containers are integral to taxpayer's

movement of cargo in foreign commerce.

a) They are instrumentalities of foreign com-

merce and are taxable only in taxpayer’s domicile,

Japan, under the “home port” doctrine and under

the “commerce clause” of the United States Con-

stitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; Article

XIII, Section 1, of the California Constitution;

and Revenue and Taxation Code, Section 201,

and the due process clauses of the United States

Constitution Amendments V and XIV.

b) The containers are constantly engaged in

the process of importation to and exportation from

the United States, and, as such, are exempt from

taxation under the “import-export” and “com-

merce” clauses [Article 1, §§10 and 8(3)] of

the United States Constitution and under Article

XIII, Section 1, of the California Constitution,

and under Revenue and Taxation Code, Section

201, and the due process clauses, Amendments

V and XIV to the United States Constitution.

3) The containers are integral parts of the vessels

which transport the cargo and as such are exempt

under Article XIII, Section 4, of the California Con-

stitution, and Section 201 of the Revenue and Taxation

Code.

—

4) These containers are exempt from taxation under

the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation

between the United States and Japan and, pursuant

to the most-favored-nation provision of that treaty,

under treaties with other nations.

5) The presence of the% containers in Los Angeles

County was well known to the general public and

the Assessor during the regular assessment period in

1969 and the escaped assessment is, therefore, void

as not made “on discovery” as required by Revenue

and Taxation Code Section 531.

DECLARATION

State of California, County of Los Angeles—ss.

I, the undersigned, say:

I am a member of the firm of GRAHAM &

JAMES, attorneys for the Plaintiffs herein; said Plain-

tiffs are corporations, all of whose officers are absent

from the County of Los Angeles, California, where

Said attorneys have their offices, and that I make

this verification for and on behalf of said party for

that reason; the foregoing document is true of my

own knowledge, except as to the matters which are

therein stated on information or belief, and as to those

matters I believe it to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing

is true and correct.

Executed on April 30, 1970 at Long Beach, Calli-

fornia.

/s/ Reed M. Williams

REED M. WILLIAMS

ee

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Complaint.

Recovery of Taxes.

Superior Court of the Siate of California, for the

County of Los Angeles.

Japan Line Ltd.; Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.; Kwasaki

Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.; Nippon Yusen Kaisha; Showa Ship-

ping Co., Ltd.; Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co.,

Ltd., foreign corporations, Plaintiffs, v. County of Los

Angeles and City of Los Angeles, Defendants. No.

SOC 27593.

Original Filed: Feb. 2, 1972.

Plaintiffs allege;

I

Plaintiffs are and at all times hereinafter mentioned

were, corporations duly organized and existing under

the laws of Japan engaged primarily in the operation

of steamships and containerships in the carriage of

cargo in foreign commerce.

II

Defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES is, and

at all times hereinafter mentioned was, a political subdi-

vision of the State of California.

Ill

Defendant CITY OF LOS ANGELES is, and at

all times hereinafter mentioned was, a municipal cor-

poration and political subdivision of the State of Cali-

fornia. At all times mentioned herein, defendant COUN-

TY OF LOS ANGELES acted in part for defendant

CITY OF LOS ANGELES in levying and collecting

the taxes which are the subject matter of this complaint.

=

IV

On March 1, 1971, at 10:01 A.M., plaintiffs were

the owners and lessees of certain cargo containers

located in the City of Los Angeles. Said containers

are an integral part of the movement of goods in

foreign commerce by plaintiff's vessels, which are regis-

tered under the laws of Japan, where each of plaintiffs

has its corporate and commercial domicile and the

home port of its vessels and containers. At all times

when said containers are physically present in the City

of Los Angeles, they are so located only for short

periods of time sufficient for the delivery and loading

of the international cargo shipments contained therein.

Vv

The Assessor of the County of Los Angeles assessed

against the subject cargo containers, and the Tax Col-

lector of the County of Los Angeles levied taxes thereon

as follows:

Plaintiff-Taxpayer Appraisal Assessment Tax Levied

Japan Line $ 885,500 $221,375 $26,617.46

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha 977,720 244,430 29,389.52

Mitsui O.S.K. Line 1,228,860 307,215 36,938.60

Nippon Yusen Kaisha 1,213,400 303,350 36,473.89

Showa Shipping Co. 553,200 138,300 16,628.77

Yamashita-Shinnihon 835,400 208,850 25,111.49

Between August 14, 1971, and August 31, 1971, plain-

tiffs herein paid, under written protest, the amount

of tax respectively levied against each of them. The

grounds of the protest were set out in an exhibit

accompanying the payment of the tax, which grounds

are set forth in Exhibit “A” attached hereto and in-

corporated herein.

VI

At 12:01 A.M., on March 1, 1971, none of the

cargo containers physically present within the City of

ae ne ne

wt Wee. ee

a

Los Angeles had acquired taxable situs in the County

or City of Los Angeles. The subject containers were

and are constantly committed to and engaged in the

process of importation to and exportation from the

United States and are integral to the transportation

of goods aboard plaintiff's vessels exclusively in foreign

commerce. As instrumentalities of foreign commerce,

and due to their integral participation and exclusive

use in foreign commerce and foreign movements of

cargo, the containers were subject to taxation exclu-

sively in Japan. Therefore, the said taxes were unlawful-

ly levied and collected in that the subject containers

were exempt from taxation by United States Constitu-

tion Article I Sections 8, 9 and 10, Amendment V

and Amendment XIV; the Treaty of Friendship, Com-

merce and Navigation between the United States and

Japan (especially Article XI and XVII) and, pursuant

to the most-favored-nation provisions of that Treaty,

(Article VI Section 4 and Article XI Section 3) under

treaties with other nations; California Constitution Ar-

ticle 13 Sections 1 and 4; and Revenue and Taxation

Code Section 201. The levying and collecting of the

subject taxes subjected plaintiffs and the containers

to double taxation, as between California and Japan,

in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code Section

102. As movable property without a “normal place

of return” between movements, the containers have

situs exclusively at plaintiff's principal place of business,

Japan. (See, e.g., 18 California Administrative Code

205.)

Vil

The subject taxes were unlawfully levied and col-

lected in that the assessment upon which the taxes

were based was not made “on discovery” of the presence

——

of the subject containers as required by Revenue and

Taxation Code Section 531.

Vill

No’ refund of said taxes, or any part thereof, has

been made to plaintiffs.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against

defendants in the respective amounts of taxes levied

and paid as set forth in Paragraph V of this Com-

plaint, together with interest thereon from the date

of payment at the maximum rate of interest, which

rate is no less than 82% per annum from the date

of payment, for costs of suit, and for such other and

further relief as may be just and proper.

DATED: February 1, 1972

GRAHAM & JAMES

By /s/ Reed M. Williams

Reed M. Williams

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DECLARATION

State of California, County of Los Angeles—-ss.

I, the undersigned, say:

I am a member of the firm of GRAHAM & JAMES,

attorneys for the Plaintiffs herein; said Plaintiffs are

corporations, all of whose officers are absent from

the County of Los Angeles, California, where said

attorneys have their offices, and that I make this verifica-

tion for and on behalf of said party for that reason;

the foregoing document is true of my own knowledge,

except as to the matters which are therein stated on

information or belief, and as to those matters I believe

it to be true.

==

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing

is true and correct.

Executed on February 1, 1972, at Long Beach,

California.

/s/ Reed M. Williams

REED M. WILLIAMS

EXHIBIT A

1) The subject containers as “movable property”

have not acquired situs in Los Angeles County under

the standards of Rule 205 of the California Administra-

tive Code, Title 18; and, pursuant to that Rule, have

situs only at the principal place of business of the

taxpayer, Japan.

2) The subject containers are integral to taxpayer's

movement of cargo in foreign commerce.

a) They are instrumentalities of foreign com-

merce and are taxable only in taxpayer’s domicile,

Japan, under the “home port” doctrine and under

the “commerce clause” of the United States Con-

stitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; Article

XIII, Section 1, of the~California Constitution:

and Revenue and Taxation Code, Section 201,

and the due process clauses of the United States

Constitution Amendments V and XIV.

b) The containers are constantly engaged in

the process of importation to and exportation from

the United States, and, as such, are exempt from

taxation under the “import-export” and “com-

merce” clauses (Article I, Sections 10 and 8(3)

of the United States Constitution and under Article

XIII, Section 1, of the California Constitution,

and under Revenue and Taxation Code, Section

201, and the due process clauses, Amendments

V and XIV to the United States Constitution.

—v

3) The containers are integral parts of the vessels

which transport the cargo and as such are exempt

under Artic! XIII, Section 4, of the California Con-

stitution, and Section 201 of the Revenue and Taxation

Code.

4) These containers are exempt from taxation under

the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation

between the United States and Japan and, pursuant

to the most-favored-nation provision of that treaty,

under treaties with other nations.

5) The presence of these containers in Los Angeles

County was well known to the general public and

the Assessor during the regular assessment period in

1971 and the escaped assessment is, therefore, void

as not made “on discovery” as required by Revenue

and Taxation Code Section 531.

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ennfifiens

Complaint for Recovery of Taxes.

Superior Court of the State of California, for the

County of Los Angeles.

Japan Line Ltd.; Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.; Kawasaki

Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.; Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line; Showa

Shipping Co., Ltd.; Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co.

Ltd., foreign corporations; Lilly Shipping Agencies, a

corporation, Plaintiffs, vs. County of Los Angeles and

City of Los Angeles, Defendants. No. SOC 30557.

Original Filed: Feb. 15, 1973.

Plaintiffs allege:

J

Plaintiffs are and at all times hereinafter mentioned

were, corporations duly organized and existing under

the laws of Japan or elsewhere, and excepting LILLY

SHIPPING AGENCIES (hereafter “LILLY”) were en-

gaged primarily in the operation of steamships and

containerships in the carriage of cargo in foreign com-

merce. LILLY was and is the agent of and for YAMA-

SHITA-SHINNIHON STEAMSHIP CO., Ltd.

II

Defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES is, and

at all times hereinafter mentioned was, 4 political sub-

division of the State of California.

Il

Defendant CITY OF LOS ANGELES is, and at

all times hereinafter mentioned was, a municipal corpo-

ration and political subdivision of the State of Califor-

nia. At all times mentioned herein, defendant COUNTY

OF LOS ANGELES acted in part for defendant CITY

OF LOS ANGELES in levying and collecting the taxes

which are the subject matter of this Complaint.

= =

IV

On March 1, 1972, at 12:01 A.M., plaintiffs were

the owners and lessees of certain cargo containers lo-

cated in the City of Los Angeles. Said containers

are an integral part of the movement of goods in

foreign commerce by Japanese plaintiff's vessels, which

are registered under the laws of Japan, where each

of Japanese plaintiffs has its corporate and commercial

domicile and the home port of its vessels and containers.

At all times when said containers are physically present

in the City of Los Angeles, they are so located only

for short periods of time sufficient for the delivery

and loading of the international cargo shipments con-

tained therein.

Vv

The Assessor of the County of Los Angeles assessed

against the subject cargo containers, and the Tax Collec-

tor of the County of Los Angeles levied taxes thereon

as follows:

Plaintiff-Taxpayer Appraisal Assessment Tax Levied

Japan Line, Ltd. $1,696,900 $424,225 $54,297.83

Kawasaki Kisen 1,768,280 442,070 56,581.86

Kaisha, Ltd.

Mitsui O.S.K. 1,342,200 335,550 42,948.05

Lines, Ltd.

Nippon Yusen 1,173,920 293,480 37,563.38

Kaisha Line

Showa Shipping Co., Ltd. 564,340 141,085 18,057.89

Yamashita-Shinnihon 731,040 182,760 23,392.00

Steamship Co., Ltd. &

Lilly Shipping Agencies

Between June 19, 1972, and August 31, 1972, plaintiffs

herein, excepting YAMASHITA - SHINNIHON

STEAMSHIP CO., LTD., paid, under written protest,

the amount of tax respectively levied against each of

them. The grounds of the protest were set out in

an exhibit accompanying the payment of the tax, which

= =

grounds are set forth in Exhibit “A” attached hereto

and incorporated herein. On or about June 19, 1972

LILLY, as agent for and on behalf of YAMASHITA-

SHINNIHON STEAMSHIP CO., LTD. paid the

amount of tax levied against YAMASHITA-SHINNI-

HON STEAMSHIP CO., LTD. and thereafter, on or

about February 5, 1973 LILLY and YAMASHITA-

SHINNIHON STEAMSHIP CO., LTD. duly filed claim

for refund (which has been denied) the grounds for

which are likewise set forth in Exhibit “A” attached

hereto and incorporated herein.

VI

At 12:01 A.M., on March 1, 1972, none of the

cargo containers physically present within the City of

Los Angeles had acquired taxable situs in the County

or City of Los Angeles. The subject containers were

and are constantly committed to and engaged in the

process of importation to and exportation from the

United States and are integral to the transportation

of goods aboard Japanese plaintiff's vessels exclusively

in foreign commerce. As instrumentalities of foreign

commerce, and due to their integral participation and

exclusive use in foreign commerce and foreign move-

ments of cargo, the containers were subject to taxation

exclusively in Japan. Therefore, the said taxes were

unlawfully levied and collected in that the subject con-

tainers were exempt from taxation by United States

Constitution Article I, Sections 8, 9 and 10, Amend-

ment V and Amendment XIV; the Treaty of Friendsuuip,

Commerce and Navigation between the United States

and Japan (especially Article XI and XVII) and, pur-

suant to the most-favored-nation provisions of that

Treaty, (Article VI, Section 4 and Article XI, Section

3) under treaties with other nations; California Consti-

anbfies

tution Article 13, Sections | and 4; and Revenue

and Taxation Code Section 201. The levying and col-

lecting of the subject taxes subjected plaintiffs and

the containers to double taxation, as between California

and Japan, in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code

Section 102. As movable property without a “normal

place of return” between movements, the containers

have situs exclusively at Japanese plaintiff's principal

place of business, Japan. (See, e.g., 18 California Ad-

ministrative Code 205. )

Vil

No refund of said taxes, or any part thereof, has

been made to plaintiffs.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against

defendants in the respective amounts of taxes levied

and paid as set forth in Paragraph V of this Complaint,

together with interest thereon from the date of payment

at the maximum rate of interest, which rate is no

less than 842% per annum from the date of payment,

for costs of suit, and for such other and further relief

as may be just and proper.

DATED: February 14, 1973

GRAHAM & JAMES

By /s/ Reed M. Williams

Reed M. Williams

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DECLARATION

State of California, County of Los Angeles—ss.

I, the undersigned, say:

I am a member of the firm of GRAHAM & JAMES,

attorneys for the Plaintiffs herein; said Plaintiffs are

niin

corporations, all of whose officers are absent from the

County of Los Angeles, California, where said attorneys

have their officers, and that I make this verification

for and on behalf of said party for that reason; the

foregoing Complaint For Recovery of Taxes is true

of my own knowledge, except as to the matters which

are therein stated on information or belief, and as

to those matters I believe them to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing

is true and correct.

Executed on February 14, 1973, at Los Angeles,

California.

/s/ Reed M. Williams

REED M. WILLIAMS

EXHIBIT “A”

1) The subject containers as “movable property”

have not acquired situs in Los Angeles County under

the standards of Rule 205 of the California Administra-

tive Code, Title 18; and, pursuant to that Rule. have

situs only at the principal place of business of the

taxpayer, Japan.

2) The subject containers are integral to taxpayer's

movement of cargo in foreign commerce.

a) They are instrumentalities of foreign com-

merce and are taxable only in taxpayer's domicile,

Japan, under the “home port” doctrine and under

the “commerce clause” of the United States Consti-

tution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; Article XIII,

Section 1, of the California Constitution; and Reve-

nue and Taxation Code, Section 201, and the

due process clauses of the United States Constitu-

tion Amendments V and XIV.

aii

b) The containers are constantly engaged in

the process of importation to and exporation from

the United States, and, as such, are exempt from

taxation under the “import-export” and “com-

merce” clauses (Article I, Sections 10 and 8

(3)) of he United States Constitution and under

Article XIII, Section 1, of the California Constitu-

tion, and under Revenue and Taxation Code, Sec-

tion 201, and the due process clauses, Amendments

V and XIV to the United States Constitution.

3) The containers are integral parts of the vessels

which transport the cargo and as such are exempt

under Article XIII, Section 4, of the California Consti-

tution, and Section 201 of the Revenue and Taxation

Code.

4) These containers are exempt from taxation under

the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation

between the United States and Japan and, pursuant

to the most-favored-nation provision of that treaty,

under treaties with other nations.

—

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| _

| Intended Decision.

Superior Court of the State of California, for the

County of Los Angeles.

Japan Line, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. County of

Los Angeles, et ai., Defendants. No. SO C 25617. (Con-

solidated for all purposes with: SO C 27593, and SO C

30557.)

Japan Line, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. County of

Los Angeles, et al., Defendants. No. SO C 27593.

Japan Line, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. County of

Los Angeles, et al., Defendants. No. SO C 30557.

The Court has before it three cases which were

consolidated. They all have identical facts and parties,

except that the periods in which an ad velorum tax

was levied are different, to wit:

Case No. SO C 25617—March 2, 1972

Case No. SO C 27593—August 31, 1971

Case No. SO C 30557—August 31, 1972

Briefly, Los Angeles County has levied a property

tax on cargo containers used by the five Japanese

shipping lines who are parties plaintiff, based on the

average number of containers constantly in Los

Angcles County. These containers are owned and con-

trolled by Japanese based concerns and only come

into this country for the purpose of bringing in cargoes

or shipping them out in foreign commerce. There is

no interstate or intrastate use. The taxes were paid

for the periods indicated under protest and this suit

to recover followed.

ee one

Another case identical in nature has been previously

tried by this Court and decided for the plaintiff (SO

C 23482). This decision was not appealed, but since

=_— =

that time the Court of Appeal has decided Sea-Land

vs. Alameda County, (District 1, Div. 2) 36 C.A.(2)

825, and the defendant contends that that decision

is controlling and at least calls for a reconsideration

of the whole question.

The parties have stipulated to the facts and to the

taxes paid each year, which exhibit is incorporated

into this Intended Decision and made a part hereof

as Exhibit A.

In SO C 23482, the Court found that the cargo

containers were instrumentalities of foreign commerce

and were a part of the ship. The Sea-Land case has

taken the position that they are only instrumentalities

of commerce to the extent that they provide a means

for transferring cargo from one form of transportation

to another (at page 832). This would belie the idea

that they are an extension of the ship. The distinction

makes no difference and as “instrumentalities of foreign

commerce” they are still afforded the benefits of the

“Home Port” rule.

Sea-Land was concerned with a domestic corporation

(New Jersey) engaged in both foreign, inter and intra-

state commerce and here lies the difference. There

was no consideration of the “Home Port” rule as that

was not involved; nor was any thought given to foreign

treaties so well discussed in Scandinavian Airlines vs.

County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal.(2) 11, cert. denied,

368 U.S. 899.

This Court is of the opinion that nothing has changed

since the last decision on this matter, and therefore,

adopts that part of the previous decision relating to

Federal law, Home Port rule, and treaties. It is as

follows:

ee eee ee +

or

=— =

Our Supreme Court in the Scandinavian Airlines

system case made it clear that “Foreign Commerce”

is a federal matter exclusively. It further stated that

if the tax is repugnant to the treaty it cannot stand.

Two treaties were considered here: The “General Agree-

ment on Tariffs and Trade” and the “Treaty of Friend-

ship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United

States and Japan”.

In the previous decision by this Court it was

remarked in the Intended Decision that the Court didn’t

think the “Most Favored Nation” rule was applicable

and that it based its ruling on the Treaty of Friend-

ship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United

States and Japan (1953), and the particular Article

XI therein which provides that parties engaged in trade

within the territory of the other party shall not be

subject to the payment of taxes, fees or charges imposed

upon or applied to income, capital, transactions, activ-

ties or any other object more burdensome than those

borne by nationals of the host country.

A tax levied on the containers by Los Angeles

County would violate this section, because it was stipu-

lated that plaintiffs pay a tax in Japan. There is no

way to prorate the same, as we do in interstate com-

merce. The Japanese would be paying a double tax,

while a domestic company would, by reason of prora-

tion, be paying only one tax.

In addition to this, the Court now feels “The Most

Favored Nation Rule” is likewise applicable, because

we are favoring our nationals (by reason of only one

total tax) as against our foreign parties.

It is also to be noted that U.S. companies pay

no tax on containers in Japan (by stipulation). To

aff «

allow the tax levy would result in unequal treatment

of our foreign parties.

To consider proration of taxes with foreign entitites

is not practical. There is no tribunal that can adjudicate

these rights unless it be the International Court and

to invoke its services jurisdiction must be consented

to by all parties. For this reason, our Federal Courts

have consistently held that vessels which are instru-

mentalities of foreign commerce and engaged in foreign

commerce can be taxed in their home port only.

Whether we consider the containers as a part of

the ship or not, they do have a home port (Japan).

They are engaged exclusively in foreign commerce and

they are taxed in their home port so it presents no

problem to extend to them the benefits of the “Home

Port” rule.

The plaintiffs have conceded that certain generator

sets were included in the taxes levied and that the

tax on those was legal. The Court has, therefore,

deducted stipulated amounts from the “Schedule of

Payments” to reflect the true amounts in issue in this

case.

Judgment will be for plaintiffs against defendants

in amounts indicated in Exhibit A, plus interest at

7% per annum on the amounts indicated on Exhibit

A under the particular plaintiff's name from the date

of payment so indicated, excluding from such sums

the portion thereof that was paid on generator sets.

Plaintiff will prepare judgment.

Dated: March 14, 1974.

HAMPTON HUTTON

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENT DATES

Y-S Line

NYK a

M-O Line

Payment J Line K Line

Date of

Tax Year

$ 37,243.95 $ 15.954.03 $ 22,094.22

$ 20,512.32 $ 33,519.55 $ 33,543.68

3-2-71

70-71

f

a

= 8

- a

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$ 70,597.71

$

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$119,490.93

$

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1,181.32

$ 69,416.39

1,106.18

$

$ 2,175.08

$111,255.25

1,874.49

794.76

$

LESS

$110,175.04

$117,616.44

$100,632.85

=—

Agreed Statement in Lieu of Clerk’s and

Reporter’s Transcripts.

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California,

Second Appellate District.

Japan Line, Ltd.; Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.;

Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.; Nippon Yusen Kaisha; Showa

Shipping Co., Ltd.; Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship

Co., Ltd.; foreign corporations, Plaintiffs and Respond-

ents, vs. County of Los Angeles and City of Los

Angeles, Defendants and Appellants. Nos. SO C-25617,

SO C-27593, SO C-30557.

Original Filed July 21, 1975.

Appeal from the Superior Court, Los Angeles Coun-

ty, Honorable Hampton Hutton, Judge.

Appearances:

GRAHAM and JAMES, 100 Oceangate, Suite 515,

Long Beach, California 90802, Area Code (213)

435-4435, Counsel for Respondents.

JOHN H. LARSON, County Counsel, JAMES DEX-

TER CLARK, Deputy County Counsel, 648 Hall of

Administration, Los Angeles, California 90012, Area

Code (213) 974-1889, Counsel for Appellants.

— =

AGREED STATEMENT IN LIEU

OF

CLERK’S AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS

28

Agreed Statement in Lieu of Clerk’s and Reporter’s

Transcripts.

Superior Court of the State of California for the

County of Los Angeles.

Japan Line, Ltd.; Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.;

Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.; Nippon Yusen Kaisha;

Showa Shipping Co., Ltd.; Yamashita-Shinnihon Steam-

ship Co., Ltd.; foreign corporations, Plaintiffs and Re-

spondents, vs. County of Los Angeles and City of

Los Angeles, Defendants and Appellants. Nos. SO C-

25617, SO C-27593, SO C-30557.

Appellants herein submit and file with the Clerk,

the Agreed Statement in Lieu of Clerk’s and Reporter's

Transcripts signed by the parties herein under California

Rules of Court, Rule 6.

I

A copy of the Judgment is attached hereto.

Il

A copy of the Notice of Appeal is attached hereto

and was filed on December 12, 1974.

Ill

The nature of the controversy is whether cargo ship-

ping containers, owned by Respondents, Japanese dom-

iciliaries, and subject to and in fact taxed in Japan,

and used exclusively for the transportation of cargo

for hire in foreign commerce, may be taxed by Appel-

lants, County and City, on an ad valorem basis.

IV

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Superior

Court of Los Angeles County, South District, entered

—29—

on Plaintiffs’ (Respondents herein) Complaints on Oc-

tober 15, 1974, in the amount of $559,736.66, plus

interest as provided by Revenue and Taxation Code

$5141, and against Defendants (Appellants herein).

Original jurisdiction was vested in the Superior Court

by California Constitution Article IV, Section V. On

December 12, 1974, within sixty (60) days of entry

of judgment, notice of appeal was filed by Appellants.

A copy of said notice is attached hereto. Jurisdiction

is conferred on this Court by California Constitution

Article VI, 4b, (10 and 11).

Vv

The questions involved herein arose as the result

of a levy of personal property tax on the Respondents’

cargo shipping containers. The Appellants answered

the Complaints, denying that the tax was unlawful.

All three cases involved herein, covering a period of

three years, were consolidated for all purposes. The

Superior Court held that the tax was unlawful. Respond-

ents paid the taxes under protest on the grounds set

forth in their letter of protest which is attached hereto

as Exhibit “A” and made a part hereof as if fully

set forth herein. Complaints for recovery of taxes based

on the same grounds were filed by Respondents.

VI

The facts which are stipulated on appeal are as

follows:

1. There were present in Los Angeles County

on lien dates 1970, 1971 and 1972 an unspecified

number of cargo shipping containers owned and con-

trolled by Plaintiffs and having the market values as

set forth in the Findings of Fact.

— Ss

2. Said containers were not concealed and their

presence was open and obvious. Taxes on said cargo

shipping containers were timely paid, under protest,

as set forth in the Findings of Fact.

3. Said amounts are the correct amounts of the

tax, assuming that all containers present on the lien

date were subject to tax based on their total fair

market values.

4. Said amounts of taxes were paid by Plaintiffs

within six months prior to the commencement of the

actions herein.

5. Said containers are used exclusively for the trans-

portation of cargo for hire in foreign commerce.

6. Said containers are never used for intrastate or

interstate transportation of cargo except as continuations

of international voyages.

7. The interstate or intrastate movement of empty

containers are solely for the purpose of picking up

cargo to be carried in foreign commerce, or returning

the containers to ports (principally Los Angeles), all

containers thereafter moving by Plaintiffs’ vessels to

foreign countries.

8. All of the loaded containers physically present

within Los Angeles County on the lien dates were

loaded with cargo either inbound from or outbound

to foreign ports.

9. All empty containers physically present within

Los Angeles County on the lien dates were awaiting

loading of cargo to be carried on Plaintiffs’ vessels

in foreign commerce, or carriage to other ports (prin-

cipally in Japan) by Plaintiffs’ vessels.

10. No container has a usual place of return in

California or the United States between uses.

— =

11. Each container is in constant transit save for

repair time and time awaiting new cargo.

12. None of the containers present in Los Angeles

County on lien dates 1970, 1971 or 1972 had been

in California for as much as six months during the

twelve months immediately preceding said lien dates.

13. The average stay of any of the containers in

California at any one time is less than three weeks.

14. No container is permanently situated in Cali-

fornia or scheduled, on departure from Los Angeles,

to return to Los Angeles or any other place in California

or the United States.

15. Plaintiffs are incorporated under the laws of

Japan, and have their principal places of business and

commercial domiciles in Japan.

16. All of Plaintiffs’ vessels, on which the subject

containers are carried, have their home port in and

are registered in Japan, and are used exclusively in

foreign commerce.

17. None of Plaintiffs’ vessels on which the subject

containers are carried is registered in the United States.

18. All of Plaintiffs’ vessels on which the subject

containers are carried are specifically designed and

constructed to accommodate the subject containers, and

carry only cargo in such containers.

19. In general, all containers carried by Plaintiffs’

vessels as aforesaid, including the subject containers,

upon arriving from Japan are discharged from said

vessels in the Port of Los Angeles and either (1)

transported by truck or rail to the ultimate inland

destination of the imported cargo contained therein,

or (2) unloaded in Los Angeles Harbor.

=)

(a) Those containers transported to such inland

destinations are unloaded at such destinations and

are then either (1) reloaded with export cargo

at an inland location and transported to one of

Plaintiffs’ vessels by truck or rail for export, or

(2) returned empty by truck or rail to Los Angeles

Harbor for export or for reloading for export,

all containers thereafter moving by said vessels

to Japan.

20. The inland (outside Los Angeles Harbor) desti-

nations and origins of cargo carried in said containers

include locations in other states, as well as in California.

21. An outbound container may leave the United

States through any port, and need not leave through

the port through which it entered the United States.

22. All containers of Plaintiffs are subject to prop-

erty tax and are, in fact, taxed in Japan.

23. Plaintiffs have not received a refund of said

taxes.

24. Said taxes were paid to and received by Defend-

ants as set forth in the Findings of Fact.

25. During all periods referred to in Plaintiffs’ com-

plaints, cargo shipping containers owned or corirolled

by steamship companies domiciled in the United States,

which containers from time to time were located in

Japan while engaged in receiving and delivering cargo

and awaiting shipment by vessel, were not subject

to property taxation in Japan, and were not taxed

in Japan.

26. The number of containers physically present

in Los Angeles County on the lien dates 1970, 1971

and 1972 is fairly representative of the number of

containers present in Los Angeles County on other

dates throughout the tax year.

Vil

The Court rendered Findings of Fact and conclusions

of law, which are as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On the first day of March 1970, 1971 and

1972, there were present in the City of Los Angeles

and the County of Los Angeles certain cargo shipping

containers owned and controlled by Plaintiffs, the fair

market values and assessed values being as follows:

Fair Market Values

Plaintiff 1970 1971 1972

Japan Line, Ltd. $ 765,000 $ 885,550 $1,696,900

Kawasaki Kisen

Kaisha, Ltd 1,250,100 977,720 1,768,280

Mitsui O.S.K.

Lines, Ltd 1,251,000 1,228,860 1,342,200

Nippon Yusen Kaisha 1,389,000 1,213,400 1,173,920

Showa Shipping Co. 595,000 553,200 564,340

Yamashita-Shinnihon

Steamship Co. 824,000 835,400 731,040

Assessed Values

Japan Line, Ltd. $191,250 $221,375 $424,225

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. 312,525 244,430 442,070

Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. 312,750 307,215 335,550

Nippon Yusen Kaisha 347,250 303,350 293,480

Showa Shipping Co. 148,750 138,300 141,085

Yamashita-Shinnihon

Steamship Co. 206,000 208,850 182,760

eniiiius

2. Defendants assessed and levied taxes as follows

against Plaintiffs with respect to said containers. The

amounts of said taxes are properly calculated as follows:

Plaintiff 1970 1971 1972

Japan Line, Ltd. $20,512.32 $25,822.70 $54,297.83

Kawasaki Kisen

Kaisha, Ltd. 33,519.55 27,515.03 56,581.86

Mitsui O.S.K.

Lines, Ltd. 33,543.68 34,763.52 42,948.05

Nippon Yusen Kaisha 37,243.95 35,367.71 37,563.38

Showa Shipping Co. 15,954.03 16,628.77 18,057.89

Yamashita-Shinnihon

Steamship Co. 22,094.22 23,930.17 23,392.00

3. Plaintiffs timely paid said taxes, under protest,

as follows:

Tax Year Date of Payment

1970-1971 March 2, 1971

1971-1972 August 31, 1971

1972-1973 August 31, 1972

4. Plaintiffs’ suits for refund of said taxes were

filed within six months from the date of payment

of said taxes.

5. No refund of said taxes has been made.

6. Plaintiffs are incorporated under the laws of

Japan, and have their principal places of business and

commercial domiciles in Japan.

7. All of Plaintiffs’ vessels, on which the said con-

.tainers are carried, have their home port in and are

registered in Japan, and are used exclusively in

foreign commerce.

8. All of Plaintiffs’ vessels on which the said con-

tainers are carried are specifically designed and con-

structed to accommodate the said containers, and carry

cargo only in said containers.

&

=_ =

9. Said containers have their home port in Japan,

and are used constantly and exclusively for the trans-

portation of cargo for hire in foreign commerce.

10. No container has a usual place of return in

California or the United States between uses.

11. Each container is in constant transit save for

repair time, and time awaiting the loading of cargo.

12. None of the containers present in Los Angeles

County on the first day of March 1970, 1971, or

1972 had been in California for as much as six months

during the twelve months immediately preceding said

dates.

13. The average stay of any of the containers in

California at any one time is less than three weeks.

14. All containers of Plaintiffs are subject to prop-

erty tax, and are, in fact, taxed in Japan.

15. During all periods referred to in Plaintiffs’ com-

plaints, those cargo shipping containers owned or con-

trolled by steamship companies domiciled in the United

States, and which from time to time were located

in Japan while engaged in receiving and delivering

cargo (being transported in foreign commerce) and

awaiting shipment by vessel, were not subject to prop-

erty taxation in Japan, and were not taxed in Japan.

16. The number of containers physically present

in Los Angeles County on the lien dates 1970, 1971

and 1972 is fairly representative of the number of

containers present in Los Angeles County on other

dates throughout the tax year.

17. Any movements, or periods of non-movement

of any of said containers while in the United States

(whether said containers are empty or filled with car-

==

go), are incidental to and inseparable from the use

of said containers in the transportation of cargo in

foreign commerce, any such movements or periods of

non-movement being essential to and solely for the

efficiency and economic utilization of the containers

as instrumentalities of foreign commerce.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Said containers, as utilized by Plaintiffs at all

times relevant hereto, are instrumentalities of foreign

commerce.

2. That said containers are exempt from taxation

by Defendants.

3. That Defendants unlawfully collected those taxes

from Plaintiffs as set forth in Findings of Fact No.

2.

4. That Plaintiffs are entitled to a refund of said

taxes.

5. That Plaintiffs have judgment against Defendants

for the following sums:

Plaintiff Sum

Japan Line, Ltd. $100,632.85

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. 117,616.44

Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. 111,255.25

Nippon Yusen Kaisha 110,175.04

Showa Shipping Co. 50,640.69

Yamashita-Shinnihon

Steamship Co. 69,416.39

together with interest pursuant to California Revenue

and Taxation Code $5141 computed from the dates

and on the amounts of payment as follows, until entry

of judgment:

—_— =

Plaintiff Mar.2,°71 Aug. 31,°71 Aug. 31,°71

Japan Line, Ltd. $20,512.32 $25,822.70 $54,297.83

Kawasaki Kisen

Kaisha, Ltd. 33,519.55 27,515.03 56,581.86

Mitsui O.S.K.

Lines, Ltd. 33,543.68 34,763.52 42,948.05

Nippon Yusen Kaisha 37,243.95 33,367.71 37,563.38

Showa-Shipping Co. 15,9°4.93 16,628.77 18,057.89

Yamashita-Shinnihon

Steamship Co. 22,094.22 22,930.17 23,392.00

together with costs of suit herein.

GRAHAM & JAMES

By /s/ Reed Williams

Reed Williams

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

and Respondents

JOHN H. LARSON

County Counsel

By /s/ James Dexter Clark

James Dexter Clark

Attorneys for Defendants

and Appellants

EXHIBIT A

1) The subject containers as “movable property”

have not acquired situs in Los Angeles County under

the standards of Rule 205 of the California Adminis-

trative Code, Title 18; and, pursuant to that Rule,

have situs only at the principal place of business of

the taxpayer, Japan.

2) The subject containers are integral to taxpayer's

movement of cargo in foreign commerce.

a) They are instrumentalities of foreign com-

merce and are taxable only in taxpayer's domicile,

Japan, under the “home port” doctrine and under

—

the “commerce clause” of the United States Consti-

tution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; Article

XIII, Section 1, of the California Constitution;

and Revenue and Taxation Code, Section 201,

and the due process clauses of the United States

Constitution Amendments V and XIV.

b) The containers are constantly engaged in

the process of importation to and exportation from

the United States, and, as such, are exempt from

taxation under the “import-export” and “com-

merce” clauses (Article I, Sections 10 and 8 (3)

of the United States Constitution, and under Ar-

ticle XIIi, Section 1, of the California Constitution,

and under Revenue and Taxation Code, Section

201, and the due process clauses, Amendments V

and XIV to the United States Constitution.

3) The containers are integral parts of the vessels

which transport the cargo and as such are exempt

under Article XIII, Section 4, of the California Con-

stitution, and Section 201 of the Revenue and Taxation

Code.

4) These containers are exempt from taxation under

the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation

between the United States and Japan and, pursuant

to the most-favored-nation provision of that treaty, un-

der treaties with other nations.

5) The presence of these containers in Los Angeles

County was well known to the general public and

the Assessor during the regular assessment period in

1971 and the escaped assessment is, therefore, void

as not made “on discovery” as required by Revneue

and Taxation Code Section 531.

oiliion

Judgment.

Superior Court of the State of California, for the

County of Los Angeles.

Japan Line, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs, v. County of

Los Angeles and City of Los Angeles, Defendants.

No. SO C 25617, SO C 27593, SO C 30557.

The above entitled causes came on regularly for

trial on February 14, 1974. GRAHAM & JAMES

and Reed M. Williams appeared as attorneys for plain-

tiffs. John H. Larson, County Counsel, and James

Dexter Clark, Deputy County Counsel, appeared as at-

torneys for defendants. A jury trial having been waived,

and the Court having heard the testimony and having

heard and considered the evidence and the matters

admitted by the parties, and the Court being fully

advised in the premises and having filed its findings

of fact and conclusions of law, and having directed

that judgment be entered in accordance therewith, now

therefore by reason of the law and findings aforesaid,

and good cause appearing:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that plaintiffs have judgment against defendants in the

following principal amounts, together with interest

thereon, pursuant to California Revenue and Taxation

Code §5141 from the dates specified hereafter to the

date of entry of judgment;

JAPAN LINE, LTD.

Principal $100,632.85

Interest

($4,482.10 ($20,512.32 from 3-2-71)

($3,877.50 ($25,822.70 from 8-31-71)

($8,153.27 ($54,297.83 from 8-31-72)

$ 16,512.87

TOTAL $117,145.72

wd

eniitins

KAWASAKI KISEN KAISHA, LTD.

Principal $117,616.44

Interest

($7,324.27 ($33,519.55 from 3-2-71)

($4,131.61 ($27,515.03 from 8-31-71)

($8,496.25 ($56,581.86 from 8-31-72)

$ 19,952.13

TOTAL $137,568.57

MITSUI O.S.K. LINES, LTD.

Principal $111,255.25

Interest

($7,329.55 ($33,543.68 from 3-2-71)

($5,220.03 ($34,763.52 from 8-31-71)

($6,449.02 ($42,948.05 from 8-31-72)

$ 18,998.60

TOTAL $130,253.85

NIPPON YUSEN KAISHA

Principal $110,175.04

Interest

($8,138.09 ($37,243.95 from 3-2-71)

($5,310.76 ($35,367.71 from 8-31-71)

($5,640.45 ($37,563.38 from 8-31-72)

$ 19,089.30

TOTAL $129,264.34

SHOWA SHIPPING CO., LTD.

Principal $ 50,640.69

Interest

($3,486.08 ($15,954.03 from 3-2-71)

($2,496.95 ($16,628.77 from 8-31-71)

($2,711.54 ($18,057.89 from 8-31-72)

$ 8,694.57

TOTAL $ 59,335.26

YAMASHITA SHINNIHON STEAMSHIP CO., LTD.

Principal $ 69,416.39

Interest

($4,827.76 ($22, 094.22 from 3-2-71)

($3,593.31 ($23,930.17 from 8-31-71)

($3,512.50 ($23,392.00 from 8-31-72)

$ 11,933.57

TOTAL $ 81,349.96

together with costs of suit herein taxed in the amount

Dated: Oct. 15, 1974.

HAMPTON HUTTON

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

—_—

Notice of Appeal.

Superior Court of the State of California, for the

County of Los Angeles.

Japan Line, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. County of

Los Angeles and City of Los Angeles, Defendants.

Nos.: SO C 25617, SO C 27593, SO C 30557.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the COUNTY

OF LOS ANGELES and CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

defendants, hereby appeal to the Court of Appeal of

the State of California, Second District, Division ........

from the Judgment rendered on October 15, 1974,

and entered in Minute Book, Volume SO 225, Page

085, on October 15, 1974, in favor of Japan Line,

Ltd., Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines,

Ltd., Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Showa Shipping Co., Ltd.,

and Yamashita Shinnihon Steamship Co., Ltd., plain-

tiffs.

DATED: December 12, 1974.

JOHN H. LARSON

County Counsel

By /s/ James Dexter Clark

JAMES DEXTER CLARK

Deputy County Counsel

Attorneys for Defendants

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL

State of California, County of Los Angeles

Doris Ross states: | am and at all times herein

mentioned have been a citizen of the United States

and a resident of the County of Los Angeles, over

the age of eighteen years and not a party to nor

interested in the within action; that my business ad-

dress is 648 Hall of Administration, City of Los An-

geles, County of Los Angeles, State of California;

anGies

That on the 12th day of December, 1974, I served

the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL upon Plaintiff's

Attorneys by depositing a copy thereof, enclosed in

a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid,

in a United States mail box in Los Angeles, California,

addressed as follows: Reed Williams, Esq., Graham

& James, 100 Oceangate, Long Beach, CA 90802

and that the person on whom said service was made

has his office at a place where there is a delivery

service by United States mail, and that there is a

regular communication by mail between the place of

mailing and the place so addressed.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing

is true and correct.

Los Angeles, California. Dated: December 12, 1974.

/s/ Doris Ross

—_—

Opinion of the Court of Appeal.

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California,

Second Appellate District, Division Three.

Japan Lines, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v. County of Los Angeles and City of Los Angeles,

Defendants and Appellants. 2d Civ. No. 47134. Sup.

Ct. Nos. SOC 25617, SOC 27593, SOC 30557.

Filed: Aug. 27, 1976.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court

of Los Angeles County. Hampton Hutton, Judge. Re-

versed.

John H. Larson, County Counsel, James Dexter

Clark, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and

Appellants.

Graham & James, and Reed M. Wiiliams, for Plain-

tiffs and Respondents.

The sole question presented by this appeal upon

an agreed statement from a tax refund judgment is

whether appellants, the County and City of Los An-

geles, may impose an apportioned ad valorem tax upon

cargo shipping containers, taxed in Japan, used here

essentially exclusively in foreign commerce and owned

and controlled by Japanese taxpayers. These taxpayers

are six shipping lines incorporated under the laws of

Japan which have their principal places of business

and commercial domiciles there.

FACTS

The facts as stipulated between the parties disclose

that the containers at issue are in constant transit

save for repair time and time awaiting new cargo.

They are only intermittently physically present within

auiiitives

the jurisdictions of appellants for an average stay of

less than three weeks. They are used exclusively for

the transportation of cargo for hire in foreign commerce.

They are either full or empty. The full containers

are loaded with cargo inbound from or outbound to

foreign ports. The empty containers are moved intra-

state within California and interstate from California

solely to pick up cargo to be carried in foreign com-

merce or to return the containers themselves to ports

(principally Los Angeles) for placement aboard the

taxpayers’ outbound vessels. The containers are never

used for either intrastate or interstate transportation

of cargo except in continuation of international voyages.

The Taxpayers’ Contentions

Since the judgment under appeal was rendered, our

Supreme Court decided unanimously in the case of

Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. County of Alameda, 12 Cal.3d

772, 775-776, that a California county may tax such

containers, under circumstances of use essentially identi-

cal to those before us, where the containers were used

mainly in foreign commerce’ but were owned by a

shipping company incorporated and commercially domi-

ciled within this country.

The taxpayers contend that the Sea-Land decision

is not dispositive of this case because, there, Sea-Land

conceded that its containers were subject to local tax-

ation within the United States. Its position was that

such taxation must be done exclusively at the home

port of its vessels. (Sea-Land, supra, at 781, 786.)

1The interstate commerce therein involved was via interna-

tional waters between California and the east coast of the

United States. (Sea-Land, supra, at 776.) The court made

no distinction between the containers used in foreign commerce

and those used in intercoastal commerce.

—

Here, the home ports of the taxpayers’ vessels, which

are specifically designed to carry the containers at

issue, are in Japan. The taxpayers’ vessels are likewise

registered there rather than in the United States.

The initial position of the taxpayers on this appeal

was that under both the home-port doctrine and the

most favored nation provisions of the 1953 Treaty

between the United States and Japan their containers

are not subject to taxation by any jurisdiction except

Japan.* In this connection, we note that the containers

of the taxpayers are subject to property taxation in

Japan and have actually been so taxed there. Similar

containers, similarly used in Japan but owned and

controlled by steamship companies domiciled in the

United States, have not been so taxed there.

At oral argument counsel for the taxpayers advanced

a new ground and an additional factual basis for their

position that their containers, notwithstanding the con-

tinuous use of the containers in the United States

within appellants’ jurisdictions, are not subject to prop-

erty taxation by any government except that of Japan.

They there argued that the property taxes at issue

constitute indirect tonnage duties prohibited by article

I, section 10, clause 3 of the United States Constitution

and, in support of oc of their initial contentions that

*The taxpayers do not now claim though that their cargo

containers have not acquired a taxable situs within California.

In any event, the following wen used by our Supreme

Court in Sea-Land, supra, 12 Cal.3d at 778, would appear

to be entirely apposite: “While no specific container may be

in the county for a substantial period of time, Sea-Land’s

containers are physically present in the county on every day

of the year. Such habitual presence of containers creates

a taxable situs, even though the identical containers are not

there every day and even —— none of the containers is

continuously within the county.” (Citations omitted. )

—

these taxes are also prohibited by applicable treaties,

called our attention for the first time to the existence

of the Supplementary Convention of 1964 (15 U.S.T.

1824) to the 1939 Convention between Sweden and

the United States on double taxation. (54 Stat. 1759.)

We could disregard this new matter without any

consideration thereof because, without any showing of

justification therefor, it was presented after the normal

briefing process had been concluded. (See Lotts v.

Board of Park Commrs., 13 Cal.App.2d 625, 636;

Sinclair v. Aquarius Electronics, Inc., 42 Cal.App.3d

216, 229.) But in the interest of being as fully informed

as reasonably possible on the fundamental tax issue

presented, we waived this obvious impropriety in the

taxpayers’ appellate procedure and asked for and ob-

tained from the parties supplemental briefs on the new

matter.

DISCUSSION

1. The Home-Port Doctiine

The taxpayers concede that in the field of inter-

state commerce the home-port doctrine has been super-

seded by the apportionment doctrine, but they argue

that it is still extant in the area of foreign commerce

where apportionment cannot be substituted except per-

haps by treaty or other agreement. Our Supreme Court

in Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of

Los Angeles, 56 Cal.2d 11, 15, 17, 33, 36-37 (here-

after SAS), applied the home-port doctrine to foreign

owned, based, registered and taxed airplanes flying

exclusively in foreign commerce and using Los Angeles

quite infrequently as their sole United States terminus

and thereby struck down the apportioned property taxes

upon such planes which appellants had imposed.

_ =

In Sea-Land, though, our Supreme Court criticized

the home-port doctrine at length (12 Cal.3d at 781-

788) and labeled it “anachronistic.” (Jd. at 787.)

It unanimously adopted the view of the minority in

SAS that the possibility of international double taxation

of instrumentalities of foreign commerce, which these

containers admittedly are, was no reason to limit the

local power to tax them upon a nondiscriminatory

apportioned basis provided they had (as they did)

a taxable situs here. (/d. at 786, 787-788. )

2. The Tonnage Duty Prohibition

Article I, section 10, clause 3 of the United States

Constitution prohibits the imposition by states (and

presumably their subdivisions) of tonnage duties. The

taxpayers contend that this prohibition invalidates the

local property taxes at issue since they in practical

effect are tonnage duties upon the cargo containers.

We disagree. In the recent case of Michelin Tire

Corp. v. Wages (1976) .... U.S. ...., .... [46 L.Ed.2d

495, 500], the United States Supreme Court held that

the assessment by Georgia of a nondiscriminatory ad

valorem property tax against imported tires was not

within the constitutional prohibition against the laying

of any impost or duty on imports. In support of this

holding the court pointed out that imposts and duties

“are essentially taxes on the commercial privilege of

bringing goods into a country,” while nondiscriminatory

ad valorem property taxes of the kind before us are

taxes by which a state apportions the costs of its

general services among the beneficiaries thereof (Miche-

lin, supra, at 504) and that the words “imposts” and

“duties”, as used in 1787, clearly meant only “exactions

upon imported goods as imports.” (Emphasis added. )

—48—

(Id. at 506, 502.) This being so, the taxes at issue

may not be regarded as tonnage duties prohibited by

article I, section 10, clause 3 of the United States

Constitution.*

3. The Treaty Question

The taxpayers contend that the local taxation at

issue violates certain treaty obligations of the United

States and is therefore invalid under the supremacy

clause of the United States Constitution (art. VI, cl.

2). (SAS, supra, 56 Cal.2d 11, 37.) In support of

this contention they point out first, that the afore-

mentioned 1953 Treaty between the United States and

Japan (4 U.S.T. 2063) contains most favored nation

provisions with respect to the ownership and possession

of movable property and taxes. (Art. IX, § 2; art. XI,

§ 3; art. XXII, § 2; 4 U.S.T. 2071, 2072, 2079.)

They then note that in the just-mentioned SAS case

our Supreme Court held that the terms of the previously

mentioned 1939 Convention between the United States

and Sweden respecting double taxation (54 Stat. 1759)

prevented appellants herein from generally taxing Swed-

ish-owned property, including particularly airplanes (56

Cal.2d at 39) and, therefore, the Japanese-owned con-

tainers before us are likewise exempt from taxation

by appellants pursuant to the just-mentioned most fav-

ored nation provisions of the 1953 Treaty between the

United States and Japan. The SAS court based its

8In Sea-Land, supra, 12 Cal.3d at 789, our Supreme Court

expressly rejected the contention that the similar cargo containers

therein involved were exempted from local property taxation

by the immediately preceding clause of the United States Consti-

tution. According to that ision the protection against local

taxation afforded by that clause extended only to goods and

commodities in the import-export stream and not to the con-

tainers which were merely a means of transport suitable for

repeated use.

—49—

holding largely on the provisions of article XIII, subdivi-

sion 2 of the Swedish Convention (54 Stat. 1766),

applying generally apparently to movable property, but

the taxpayers argue that their containers are also

exempt from local property taxation by appellants under

other provisions of the aforementioned Swedish Conven-

tion (arts. 1V and XIII, subd. (1)(b) (54 Stat. 1761,

1766)) exempting instrumentalities of foreign com-

merce (i.¢., ships and airplanes). Finally, the taxpayers

argue that by reason of the modification made in

the Swedish Convention by the aforementioned 1964

Supplementary Convention thereto (15 U.S.T. 1825)

the local property taxation of appellants at issue is

precluded by the provision in the convention prohibiting

nonreciprocal taxation.*

We reject the foregoing argument totally. We do

not think that either the holding of the SAS case or

the Supplementary Convention (which came into ex-

istence after the SAS decision) invalidates appellants’

nondiscriminatory ad valorem taxation of these con-

tainers. The SAS holding on its facts prohibits only

local taxation of foreign owned, based and registered

airplanes. (56 Cal.2d at 42.) It does not apply to

cargo containers as such. The taxpayers seek to extend

this holding nevertheless and the relevant treaty prohibi-

*The Supplementary Convention, among other things, replaced

a 7 of its protocol (54 Stat. 1777) with a new para-

graph 7, reading as follows:

“7. The citizens of one of the contracting States shall not,

while resident in the other State, be subject therein to other

or more burdensome taxes than are citizens of that other State

residing in its territory. The term ‘citizens’ as used in this

paragraph, includes also all legal persons, partnerships, and

associations created or organized under the laws in force in

the respective contracting State. In this paragraph the word

‘taxes’ means taxes of every kind or description, whether

Federal|,] State, or municipal.” (15 U.S.T. 1831-1832.)

—s50—

tions as well as describing both the airplanes involved

in the SAS case and the containers involved here as

instrumentalities of commerce. This generic description

of ships and airplanes does not appear, in the relevant

provisions of the 1939 Convention between Sweden

and the United States. Furthermore, the SAS court

did not view the airplanes there involved as instrumen-

talities of commerce, but instead as instrumentalities of

communication, whose activities in this country were

confined to the port of entry. (See 56 Cal.2d at 33.)

In any event, so far as the convention with Sweden

is concerned, then Justice Traynor pointed out in his

dissent in the SAS case that, properly interpreted, this

treaty does not apply to local property taxation at

all. (56 Cal.2d at 47-48.)

The same thing, however, cannot be said with respect

to the Supplementary Convention thereto. But in advis-

ing ratification by the United States of this convention,

the United States Senate did so on the basis of a

report from its Foreign Relations Committee, which

stated that the replacement paragraph in its protocol

(which we quoted in footnote 4) merely restated “for

the sake of clarity” the requirement of its predecessor

paragraph of nondiscriminatory tax treatment as be-

tween citizens and noncitizens (Tax Conventions and

Protocols with Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden

and Japan, Report of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, Ex. Report No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.

1964, p. 65).° Admittedly, the taxation at issue in

this case does not violate this requirement.

‘In determining the effect of an international agreement

as domestic law, a court of the United States is to some

extent required to take iniv account domestic sources in the

formation of an international agreement such as committee

reports indicative of the meaning that the United States Senate

—

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

Cobey, J.

We concur:

ALLPORT, Acting P.J.

POTTER, J.

has attached to an international agreement in cases where the

pes, as a matter of internal law, requires the assent

the Senate (Rest. 2d, Foreign Relations Law of the United

States (1965) § 151, com. (b)(i) pp. 462-463, compare Tray-

nor, J., dissent, SAS, supra, 56 Cal.2d at 48).

—_— =

Opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of California.

In the Supreme Court of the State of California.

Japan Line, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v. County of Los Angeles et al., Defendants and Ap-

pellants. Super. Ct. Nos. SO C-25617, CO C-27593,

SO C-30557.

In this action for recovery of ad valorem personal

property taxes paid under protest, defendants City of

Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles appeal from

a judgment entered after a nonjury trial in favor of

plaintiffs and against defendants for the recovery of

said taxes together with interest and costs. After de-

cision by the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate Dis-

trict, Division Three, reversing the judgment, we granted

a hearing in this court for the purpose of giving further

consideration to the issues raised. Having made a

thorough examination of the cause, we have concluded

that the opinion of the Court of Appeal prepared

by Justice Cobey and concurred in by Acting Presiding

Justice Allport and Justice Potter correctly treats and

disposes of the issues involved and we adopt such

opinion as and for the opinion of this court. That

opinion (with appropriate additions and deletions) is

as follows:*

*Brackets together, in this manner {] without enclosing ma-

terial, are used to indicate deletions from the opinion of the

Court of Appeal; brackets enclosing material (other than editor’s

parallel citations) are, unless otherwise indicated, used to denote

insertions or additions by this court. We thus avoid the exten-

sion of quotation marks within quotation marks, which would

be incident to the use of such conventional punctuation, and

at the same time accurately indicate the matter quoted. In

so doing, we adhere to a method of adoption employed by

us in the past. (See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western

Financial Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 311, fn. 2, and cases

there cited.)

— =

The sole question presented by this appeal upon

an agreed statement from a tax refund judgment is

whether appellants, the County of Los Angeles and

the City of Los Angeles, may impose an apportioned

ad valorem tax upon cargo shipping containers, taxed

in Japan, used here essentially exclusively in foreign

commerce and owned and controlled by Japanese tax-

payers. These taxpayers are six shipping lines incor-

porated under the laws of Japan which have their

principal places of business and commercial domiciles

there.

FACTS

The facts as stipulated between the parties disclose

that the ‘containers at issue are in constant transit

save for repair time and time awaiting new cargo.

They are only intermittently physically present within

the jurisdictions of appellants for an average stay of

less than three weeks. They are used exclusively for

the transportation of cargo for hire in foreign com-

merce. They are either full or empty. The full con-

tainers are loaded with cargo inbound from or outbound

to foreign ports. The empty containers are moved intra-

state within California and interstate from California

solely to pick up cargo to be carried in foreign com-

merce or to return the containers themselves to ports

(principally Los Angeles) for placement aboard the

taxpayers’ outbound vessels. The containers are never

used for either intrastate or interstate transportation

of cargo except in continuation of international voyages.

The Taxpayers’ Contentions

Since the judgment under appeal was rendered, | |

[this court] decided unanimously in the case of Sea-

Land Serv’-s, Inc. v. County of Alameda [1974] 12

—_— se

Cal.3d 772, 775-776, that a California county may

tax such containers, under circumstances of use essen-

tially identical to those before us, where the containers

were used mainly in foreign commerce’ but were owned

by a shipping company incorporated and commercially

domiciled within this country.

The taxpayers contend that the Sea-Land decision

is not dispositive of this case because, there, Sea-Land

conceded that its containers were subject to local taxa-

tion within the United States. Its position was that

such taxation must be done exclusively at the home

port of its vessels. (Sea-Land, supra, at pp. 781, 786.)

Here, the home ports of the taxpayers’ vessels, which

are specifically designed to carry the containers at

issue, are in Japan. The taxpayers’ vessels are likewise

registered there rather than in the United States.

The initial position of the taxpayers on this appeal

was that under both the home-port doctrine and the

most favored nation provisions of the 1953 treaty be-

tween the United States and Japan their containers

are not subject to taxation by any jurisdiction except

Japan.” In this connection, we note that the containers

1The interstate commerce therein involved was via interna-

tional waters between California and the East Coast of the

United States. (Sea-Land, supra, at p. 776.) [|] [This] court

made no distinction between the containers in foreign

commerce and those used in intercoastal commerce.

2The taxpayers do not now claim though that their ——

containers have not acquired a taxable situs within California.

In any event, the following language [| in Sea-Land, supra,

12 Cal.3d at p. 778, would appear to be entirely apposite:

“While no specific container may be in the county for a

substantial period of time, Sea-Land’s containers are physically

present in the county on every day of the year. Such habitual

presence of containers creates a taxable situs, even though

the identical containers are not there every day and even

none of the containers is continuously within the county.” (Cita-

tions omitted).

— =

of the taxpayers are subject to property taxation in

Japan and have actually been so taxed there. Similar

containers, similarly used in Japan but owned and

controlled by steamship companies domiciled in the

United States, have not been so taxed there.

At oral argument [before the Court of Appeal }

counsel for the taxpayers advanced a new ground and

an additional factual basis for their position that their

containers, notwithstanding the continuous use of the

containers in the United States within appellants’ juris-

dictions, are not subject to property taxation by any

government except that of Japan. They there argued

that the property taxes at issue constitute indirect ton-

nage duties prohibited by article I, section 10, clause

3 of the United States Constitution and, in support

of one of their initial contentions that these taxes

are also prohibited by applicable treaties, called our

attention for the first time to the existence of the

supplementary convention of 1964 (15 U.S.T. 1824)

to the 1939 convention between Sweden and the United

States on double taxa‘’on. (54 Stat. 1759.)

We could disregard this new matter without any

consideration thereof because, without any showing of

justification therefor, it was presented after the normal

briefing process had been concluded. (See Lotts v.

Board of Park Commrs. [1936] 13 Cal.App.2d 625,

636; Sinclair v. Aquarius Electronics, Inc. [1974] 42

Cal.App.3d 216, 229.) But in the interest of being

as fully informed as reasonably possible on the funda-

mental tax issue presented, [| [the Court of Appeal]

waived this obvious impropriety in the taxpayers’

appellate procedure and asked for and obtained from

the parties supplemented briefs on the new matter.

— =

DISCUSSION

1. The Home-port Doctrine

The taxpayers concede that in the field of interstate

commerce the home-port doctrine has been superseded

by the apportionment doctrine, but they argue that

it is still extant in the area of foreign commerce where

apportionment cannot be substituted except perhaps

by treaty or other agreement. [|] [They urge that]

in Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of

Los Angeles [1961] 56 Cal.2d 11, 15, 17, 33, 36-

37 (hereafter SAS), [this court! applied the home-

port doctrine to foreign owned, based, registered and

taxed airplanes flying exclusively in foreign commerce

and using Los Angeles quite infrequently as their soie

United States terminus and thereby struck down the

apportioned property taxes upon such planes which

appellants had imposed.

[] [However, in Sea-Land we specifically addressed

this very contention (12 Cal.3d at pp. 784-786), name-

ly that the home-port doctrine retained vitality with

respect to foreign commerce as distinguished from inter-

state commerce pursuant to our decision in SAS, and

clearly rejected it. First, we concluded that “we are

not inhibited by SAS from concluding that the home-

port doctrine does not shield the property of a taxpayer

from a fairly apportioned ad valorem tax levied by

a nondomiciliary jurisdiction with which the taxpayer

has sufficient contacts, even if the taxpayer is engaged

in foreign commerce. . . . The principles of apportioned

taxation enunciated in Pullman, Ott and Braniff are

to be applied to instrumentalities so engaged.” (Jd.

at p. 786.) Second, we specifically adopted the reason-

ing of Justice Traynor in his dissent in SAS to the

= =

effect that the threat of double taxation from foreign

taxing authorities has no role in commerce clause con-

siderations of multiple burdens, since burdens in inter-

national commerce are not attributable to discrimination

by the taxing state and are matters for international

agreement. (/d. at p. 788.)

The only asserted distinction between the case at

bench and Sea-Land is that the cargo shipping con-

tainers in Sea-Land were owned by a United States

corporation whereas the containers herein are owned

by foreign corporations. The taxpayers have failed to

cite any authority which would support a conclusion

that instrumentalities of commerce used in foreign com-

merce are subject to differeat constitutional protection

depending upon whether they are owned by foreign

or domestic corporations. Existing authority supports

the opposite conclusion. For example in Canadian Pac.

Ry. Co. v. King Co. (1916) 90 Wash. 38, the Washing-

ton Supreme Court rejected the home-port doctrine

and applied to a Canadian railway corporation the

apportionment rule applied by the United States Su-

preme Court to the rolling stock of a domestic railway

corporation used in foreign commerce in Pullman’s

Car Co. v. Pennsylvania (1891) 141 U.S. 18, 23.

Sea-Land is fully dispositive of the commerce clause

and federal exclusivity issues raised in the case at

bench. |

2. The Tonnage Duty Prohibition

Article I, section 10, clause 3 of the United States

Constitution prohibits the imposition by states [] of

tonnage duties. The taxpayers contend that this prohibi-

tion invalidates the local property taxes at issue since

they in practical effect are tonnage duties upon the

Cargo containers.

~~ =

We disagree. In the recent case of Michelin Tire

Corp. v. Wages (1976) 423 U.S. 276, the United

States Supreme Court held that the assessment by Geor-

gia of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax

against imported tires was not within the constitutional

prohibition against the laying of any impost or duty

on imports. In support of this holding the court pointed

out that imposts and duties “are essentially taxes on

the commercial privilege of bringing goods into a coun-

try,” while nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes

of the kind before us are taxes by which a state

apportions the costs of its general services among the

beneficiaries thereof (Michelin, supra, .at pp. 286-287)

and that the words “imposts” and “duties,” as used

in 1787, clearly meant only “exactions upon imported

goods as imports.” (Italics added.) (/d. at pp. 290-

291, 283.)* []

[The taxpayers contend that the Michelin holding

that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax was

not an “impost” or “duty” is not determinative of

the case at bench because the cargo containers herein

were in import-export transit. They urge that the court

in Michelin specifically stressed that the goods in that

case were no longer in import transit. (See 423 U.S.

at pp. 286, 302.) The contention is of no avail to

taxpayers.

The cargo containers are not being taxed while in

transit. Rather they are being taxed on an apportioned

In Sea-Land, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 789, [] [we} expressly

rejected the contention that the similar cargo containers therein

involved were exempted from local property taxation by the

[] [import-export] clause of the United States Constitution.

1} IT }he protection against local taxation afforded by that

clause extended only to goods and commodities in the import-

export stream and not to the containers which were merely

a means of transport suitable for repeated use.

_ =

basis for their continuous presence in the state. Some

containers are continuously present in the state through-

out the year, even though not necessarily the same

containers. The continuous presence of these containers,

as well as any instrumentality of commerce, involves

the constant use of many services provided by the

state and, here, the county; e.g., harbor facilities, roads,

bridges, water supply, as well as fire and police protec-

tion. The Supreme Court has held that states may

impose a property tax on these moving instrumentalities

of commerce on an apportioned basis in order to meet

the expenses of services within the taxing jurisdiction.

(Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama (1935) 296 U.S.

261, 265-266; Cox v. Lott (1870) 79 U.S. 204, 213;

Pullman’s Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra, 141 U.S.

18.) In Sea-Land we affirmed the apportionment for-

mula used in the case at bench to determine the contin-

uous presence of the cargo containers there involved.

It is the continuous presence within the jurisdiction

drawing upon the service of that jurisdiction to a signifi-

cant degree which permits reimbursement through non-

discriminatory property taxation as opposed to the fleet-

ing presence of imported goods in transit which may

possibly be exempted from such taxation by Michelin.

If Michelin is inapplicable to resolution of the issues

herein as taxpayers contend, then the traditional ton-

nage clause analysis applies, viz., while the tonnage

clause prohibits states from taxing access to their terri-

tories, it does not prohibit states from making charges

for services rendered and enjoyed by those instrumen-

talities of foreign or insterstate commerce within their

jurisdiction. (Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, supra,

296 U.S. 261, 265-266; Cox v. Lott, supra, 79 US.

204, 213.) The court in Michelin pointed out that

=

nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes are taxes

by which the state apportions the costs of services,

such as police and fire protection. (423 U.S. at p.

287.) Even under traditional tonnage clause analysis

this property tax would be valid.

Thus plaintiffs’ further insistent assertion that the

tax liability is created by entry into the taxing jurisdic-

tion must fall and with it the contention that the

tax herein is a tonnage duty levied upon the entry

of the containers into the jurisdiction. |

3. The Treaty Question

The taxpayers contend that the local taxation at

issue violates certain treaty obligations of the United

States and is therefore invalid under the supremacy

clause of the United States Constitution (art. VI, cl.

2). (SAS, supra, 56 Cal.2d 11, 37.) In support of

this contention they point out first, that the afore-

mentioned 1953 treaty between the United States and

Japan (4 U.S.T. 2063) contains most favored nation

provisions with respect to the ownership and possession

of movable property and taxes. (Art. IX, § 2; art.

XI, § 3; art. XXII, § 2; 4 U.S.T. 2071, 2072, 2079.)

They then note that in the just-mentioned SAS case

|] [we] held that the terms of the previously mentioned

1939 convention between the United States and Sweden

respecting double taxation (54 Stat. 1759) prevented

appellants herein from generally taxing Swedish-owned

property, including particularly airplanes (56 Cal.2d

at p. 39) and, therefore, the Japanese-owned containers

before us are likewise exempt from taxation by appel-

lants pursuant to the just mentioned most favored na-

tion provisions of the 1953 treaty between the United

States and Japan. [| [This court in SAS] based its

—

holding largely on the provisions of article XIII, subdivi-

sion 2 of the Swedish convention (54 Stat. 1766),

applying generally apparently to movable property, but

the taxpayers argue that their containers are also exempt

from local property taxation by appellants under the

provisions of the aforementioned Swedish convention

(arts. IV and XIII, subd. (1)(b); 54 Stat. 1761,

1766) exempting instrumentalities of foreign commerce

(i.e., ships and airplanes). Finally, the taxpayers argue

that by reason of the modification made in the Swedish

convention by the aforementioned 1964 supplementary

convention thereto (15 U.S.T. 1825) the local property

taxation of appellants at issue is precluded by the

provision in the convention prohibiting nonreciprocal

taxation.*

We reject the foregoing argument totally. We do

not think that either the holding of the SAS case

or the supplementary convention (which came into

existence after the SAS decision) invalidates appellants’

nondiscriminatory ad valorem taxation of these con-

tainers. The SAS holding on its facts prohibits only

local taxation of foreign owned, based and registered

airplanes. (56 Cal.2d at p. 42.) It does not apply

to cargo containers as such. The taxpayers seek to

extend this holding nevertheless and the relevant treaty

*The supplementary convention, among other things, replaced

paragraph 7 of its protocol (54 Stat. 1777) with a new paragraph

7, reading as follows:

“7. The citizens of one of the contracting States shall not,

while resident in the other State, be subject therein to other

or more burdensome taxes than are citizens of that other State

residing in its territory. The term ‘citizens’ as used in this

paragraph, includes also all legal persons, partnerships, and

associations created or organized under the laws in force in

the respective contracting State. In this paragraph the word

‘taxes’ means taxes of every kind or description, whether Fed-

eral[,] State, or municipal.” {15 U.S.T. 1831-1832.)

—

prohibitions as well by describing both the airplanes

involved in the SAS case and the containers involved

here as instrumentalities of commerce. This generic

description of ships and airplanes does not appear,

in the relevant provisions of the 1939 convention be-

tween Sweden and the United States. || In any event,

so far as the convention with Sweden is concerned,

[] [as] Justice Traynor pointed out in his dissent

in the SAS case that, properly interpreted, this treaty

does not apply to local property taxation at all. (56

Cal.2d at pp. 47-48.)

The same thing, however, cannot be said with respect

to the supplementary convention thereto. But in advising

ratification by the United States of this convention,

the United States Senate did so on the basis of a

report from its Foreign Relations Committee, which

stated that the replacement paragraph in its protocol

(which we quoted in fm. 4) merely restated “for the

sake of clarity” the requirement of its predecessor para-

graph of nondiscriminatory tax treatment as between

citizens and non-citizens (Tax Conventions and Proto-

cols with Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and

Japan, Rep. of the Sen. Foreign Relations Com., Ex.

Rep. No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. at p. 65 (1964)).°

Admittedly the taxation at issue in this case does not

violate this requirement.

5In determining the effect of an international agreement

as domestic law, a court of the United States is to some

extent required to take into account domestic sources in the

formation of an international agreement such as committee

reports indicative of the meaning that the United States Senate

has attached to an international agreement in cases where the

nent, aS a matter of international law, requires the assent

of the Senate (Rest. 2d Foreign Relations Law of the United

States (1965) § 151, com. (b)(i), pp. 462-463; compare

Traynor, J., dissent, SAS, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 48).

— =

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed.

(]

Manuel, J.

We concur:

Bird, C. J.

Tobriner, J.

Mosk, J.

Clark, J.

Richardson, J.

*Jefferson, J.

*Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Coun-

cil.

———

Order Modifying Opinion.

In the Supreme Court of the State of California.

Japan Line, Ltd., et al, Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v. County of Los Angeles et al., Defendants and Appel-

lants, L.A. 30703 Super Ct. Nos. SO C-25617, SO C-

27593, SO C-30557. Filed Dec. 28, 1977.

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on Novem-

ber 18, 1977, and reported in the Official Reports

(20 Cal.3d 180) be modified in the following particu-

lars:

1. On page 187, line 7 of the second full paragraph,

the words “the county” are changed to the words “local

entities” so the sentence reads:

The continuous presence of these containers,

as well as any instrumentality of commerce, in-

volves the constant use of many facilities provided

by the state and here, local entities; e.g., harbor

facilities, roads, bridges, water supply, as well

as fire and police protection.

Clerk’s Office, Supreme Court, 4250 State Building,

San Francisco, California 94102.

Dec. 28, 1977

I have this day filed Order Rehearing Denied In

re: L.A. No. 30703 Japan Line, Ltd. vs. County of

Los Angeles

Respectfully,

G. E. Bishel

Clerk

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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