Appendix — Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles
Supreme Court brief1979
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| — Supreme Coug, U.
FILED
} AUG 21 1978
APPENDIX
MICHABL RODAK, JR., CLERK
—
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1977
No. 77-1378
JAPAN LIne, LTD., ef al.,
Appellants,
vs.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et ai.,
Appellees.
On Appeal From the Supreme Court of the
State of California.
Filed March 28, 1978.
Jurisdiction Postponed June 12, 1978.
APPENDIX
Page
Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries ......
sidelines llieietihiaiteainteatintimnigmaienpcesmamtatate App. p. 1
A ESN a 3
Certificate of Assignment or Transfer, Dated May
13, 1971.
Complaint. Recovery of Taxes ............ sepeniinenetiatuies 9
Certificate of Assignment or Transfer, Dated Febru-
ary 1, 1972.
Complaint for Recovery of Taxes ........ 7h 15
Certificate of Assignmeat or Transfer, Dated Febru-
ary 14, 1973.
oe 21
Agreed Statement in Lieu of Clerk's and Reporter's
Ee 26
Agreed Statement in Lieu of Clerk’s and Reporter's
Transcripts ..........cccccceecceesseessvessseeen ‘Mae 28
ST iiiaiiiiaetaadiindietenentiniinenhsiniascovececeesesceveces 39
EE ee 41
Opinion of the Court of Appeal .....0.....0...00.0ccee. 43
Opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Cali-
EEE ey Te 52
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1977
No. 77-1378
JAPAN Line, LTD.., ef ai.,
Appellants,
vs.
COUNTY OF Los ANGELES, et ai.,
Appellees.
On Appeal From the Supreme Court of the
State of California.
APPENDIX
ss
Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries.
May 18, 1971—Plaintiffs’ Complaint for recovery
of taxes for fiscal year 1970-71 filed in the California
Superior Court, Los Angeles County (Case No. SOC
25617).
June 14, 1971—Defendants’ Answer to said Complaint
(Case No. SOC 25617) filed.
February 2, 1972—Plaintiffs’ Complaint for recovery
of taxes for fiscal year 1971-72 filed in the Cali-
fornia Superior Court, Los Angeles County (Case
No. SOC 27593).
April 5, 1972—-Defendants’ Answer to said Complaint
(Case No. SOC 27593) filed.
February 15, 1973—Plaintiffs’ Complaint for recovery
of taxes for fiscal year 1972-73 filed in the Cali-
fornia Superior Court, Los Angeles County (Case
No. SOC 30557).
March 23, 1973—Defendants’ Answer to said Com-
plaint (Case No. SOC 30557) filed.
October 10, 1973—Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate
the above three actions heard and granted by the
Superior Court.
March 14, 1974—Intended Decision in favor of plain-
tiffs filed following trial in the Superior Court.
October 15, 1974—Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs
by the Superior Court.
December 12, 1974—Notice of Appeal filed by defend-
ants in the Superior Court.
September 17, 1975—Agreed Statement in Lieu of
Clerk’s and Reporter’s Transcripts filed by plaintiffs
=
and defendants in the California Court of Appeal,
Second Appellate District, (hereafter, Court of Ap-
peal).
December 22, 1975—Defendants’ Opening Brief filed
in the Court of Appeal.
March 19, 1976—Plaintiffs’ Brief filed in the Court
of Appeal.
May 17, 1976—Defendants’ Reply Brief filed in the
Court of Appeal.
July 16, 1976—Plaintiffs’ Supp'emental Brief filed in
the Court of Appeal.
July 30, 1976—Defendants’ Supplemental Brief filed
in the Court of Appeal.
August 27, 1976—Opinion of the Court of Appeal
filed, reversing the decision of the Superior Court
and entering judgment in favor of defendants.
September 13, 1976—Plaintiffs’ Petition for Rehearing
filed in the Court of Appeal.
September 22, 1976—Plaintiffs’ Petition for Rehearing
denied by the Court of Appeal.
October 6, 1976—Plaintiffs’ Petition for Hearing filed
in the California Supreme Court.
October 27, 1976—Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’
Petition for Hearing filed in the California Supreme
Court.
November 24, 1976—Plaintiffs’ Petition for Hearing
granted by the California Supreme Court.
November 18, 1977—Opinion of the California Su-
preme Court filed, affirming the decision of the
Court of Appeal.
=——
December 9, 1977—Plaintiffs’ Petition for Rehearing
filed in the California Supreme Court.
December 28, 1977—Plaintiffs’ Petition for Rehearing
denied by, and Order Modifying Opinion filed in,
the California Supreme Court.
February 28, 1978—Notice of Appeal by plaintiffs
to the United States Supreme Court filed in the
California Supreme Court.
Complaint.
Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of Los Angeles.
JAPAN LINE, LTD.; KAWASAKI KISEN KAISHA,
LTD.; MITSUI O.S.K. LINES, LTD; NIPPON YUSEN
KAISHA; SHOWA SHIPPING CO., LTD.; YAMA-
SHITA-SHINNIHON STEAMSHIP CO., LTD., foreign
corporations, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF LOS AN-
GELES AND CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendants.
NO. SOC 25617.
Original Filed: May 8, 1971.
Plaintiffs allege:
I
Plaintiffs are and at all times hereinafter mentioned
were, Corporations duly organized and existing under
the laws of Japan engaged primarily in the operation
of steamships and containerships in the carriage of
cargo in foreign commerce.
II
Defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES is, and
at all times hereinafter mentioned was, a politica! sub-
division of the State of California.
—_
Il
Defendant CITY OF LOS ANGELES is, and at
all times hereinafter mentioned was, a municipal corpo-
ration and political subdivision of the State of Caii-
fornia. At all times mentioned herein, defendant COUN-
TY OF LOS ANGELES acted in part for defendant
CITY OF LOS ANGELES in levying and collecting
the taxes which are the subject matter of this complaint.
IV
On March 1, 1970, at 12:01 a.m., plaintiffs were
the owners and lessees of certain cargo containers
located in the City of Los Angeles. Said containers
are an integral part of the movement of goods in
foreign commerce by plantiffs’ vessels, which are regis-
tered under the laws of Japan, where each of plaintiffs
has its corporate and commercial domicile and the
home port of its vessels and containers. At all times
when said containers are physically present in the City
of Los Angeles, they are so located only for short
periods of time sufficient for the delivery and loading
of the international cargo shipments contained therein.
Vv
The Assessor of the County of Los Angeles assessed
against the subject cargo containers, and the Tax Collec-
tor of the County of Los Angeles levied taxes thereon
as follows:
Plaintiff-Taxpayer Appraisal Assessment Tax Levied
Japan Line $ 765,000 $191,250 $20,512.32
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha 1,250,100 312,525 33,519.55
Mitsui O.S.K. Line 1,251,000 312,750 33,543.68
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 1,389,000 347,250 37,243.95
Showa Shipping Co. 595,000 148,750 15,954.03
Yamashita-Shinnihon 824,000 206,000 22,094.32
Between December 28, 1970 and March 2, 1971,
plaintiffs herein paid, under written protest, the amount
a
of tax respectively levied against each of them. The
grounds of the protest were set out in an exhibit
accompanying the payment of the tax, which grounds
are set forth in Exhibit “A” attached hereto and in-
corporated herein.
VI
At 12:01 a.m., on March 1, 1970, none of the
cargo containers physically present within the City of
Los Angeles had acquired taxable situs in the County
or City of Los Angeles. The subject containers were
and are constantly committed to and engaged in the
process of importation to and exportation from the
United States and are integral to the transportation
of goods aboard plaintiffs’ vessels exclusively in foreign
commerce. As instrumentalities of foreign commerce,
and due to their integral participation and exclusive
use in foreign commerce and foreign movements of
cargo, the containers were subject to taxation exclusive-
ly in Japan. Therefore, the said taxes were unlawfully
levied and collected in that the subject containers were
exempt from taxation by United States Constitution
Article I Sections 8, 9 and 10, Amendment V and
Amendment XIV; the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation between the United States and Japan
(especially Article XI and XVII) and, pursuant to
the most-favored-nation provisions of that Treaty, (Ar-
ticle VI Section 4 and Article XI Section 3) under
treaties with other nations; California Constitution Arrti-
cle 13 Sections 1 and 4; and Revenue and Taxation
Code Section 201. The levying and collecting of the
subject taxes subjected plaintiffs and the containers
to double taxation, as between California and Japan,
in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code Section
102. As movable property without a “normal place
endins
of return” between movements, the containers have
situs exclusively at plaintiffs’ principal place of business,
Japan. (See, e.g., 18 California Administrative Code
205).
Vil
The subject taxes were unlawfully levied and col-
lected in that the assessment upon which the taxes
were based was not made “on discovery” of the presence
of the subject containers as required by Revenue and
Taxation Code Section 531.
Vill
No refund of said taxes, or any part thereof, has
been made to plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against
defendants in the respective amounts of taxes levied
and paid as set forth in Paragraph V of this Complaint,
together with interest thereon from the date of payment
at the maximum rate of interest, which rate is no
less than 842% per annum from the date of payment,
for costs of suit, and for such other and further relief
as may be just and proper.
Dated: April 30, 1971.
GRAHAM & JAMES
FRANCIS L. TETREAULT
REED M. WILLIAMS
DONALD H. READ
By /s/ Reed M. Williams
REED M. WILLIAMS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
= =
EXHIBIT A
1) The subject containers as “movable property”
have not acquired situs in Los Angeles County under
the standards of Rule 205 of the California Administra-
tive Code, Title 18; and, pursuant to that Rule, have
situs Only at the principal place of business of the
taxpayer, Japan.
2) The subject containers are integral to taxpayer's
movement of cargo in foreign commerce.
a) They are instrumentalities of foreign com-
merce and are taxable only in taxpayer’s domicile,
Japan, under the “home port” doctrine and under
the “commerce clause” of the United States Con-
stitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; Article
XIII, Section 1, of the California Constitution;
and Revenue and Taxation Code, Section 201,
and the due process clauses of the United States
Constitution Amendments V and XIV.
b) The containers are constantly engaged in
the process of importation to and exportation from
the United States, and, as such, are exempt from
taxation under the “import-export” and “com-
merce” clauses [Article 1, §§10 and 8(3)] of
the United States Constitution and under Article
XIII, Section 1, of the California Constitution,
and under Revenue and Taxation Code, Section
201, and the due process clauses, Amendments
V and XIV to the United States Constitution.
3) The containers are integral parts of the vessels
which transport the cargo and as such are exempt
under Article XIII, Section 4, of the California Con-
stitution, and Section 201 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code.
—
4) These containers are exempt from taxation under
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the United States and Japan and, pursuant
to the most-favored-nation provision of that treaty,
under treaties with other nations.
5) The presence of the% containers in Los Angeles
County was well known to the general public and
the Assessor during the regular assessment period in
1969 and the escaped assessment is, therefore, void
as not made “on discovery” as required by Revenue
and Taxation Code Section 531.
DECLARATION
State of California, County of Los Angeles—ss.
I, the undersigned, say:
I am a member of the firm of GRAHAM &
JAMES, attorneys for the Plaintiffs herein; said Plain-
tiffs are corporations, all of whose officers are absent
from the County of Los Angeles, California, where
Said attorneys have their offices, and that I make
this verification for and on behalf of said party for
that reason; the foregoing document is true of my
own knowledge, except as to the matters which are
therein stated on information or belief, and as to those
matters I believe it to be true.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing
is true and correct.
Executed on April 30, 1970 at Long Beach, Calli-
fornia.
/s/ Reed M. Williams
REED M. WILLIAMS
ee
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culm
Complaint.
Recovery of Taxes.
Superior Court of the Siate of California, for the
County of Los Angeles.
Japan Line Ltd.; Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.; Kwasaki
Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.; Nippon Yusen Kaisha; Showa Ship-
ping Co., Ltd.; Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co.,
Ltd., foreign corporations, Plaintiffs, v. County of Los
Angeles and City of Los Angeles, Defendants. No.
SOC 27593.
Original Filed: Feb. 2, 1972.
Plaintiffs allege;
I
Plaintiffs are and at all times hereinafter mentioned
were, corporations duly organized and existing under
the laws of Japan engaged primarily in the operation
of steamships and containerships in the carriage of
cargo in foreign commerce.
II
Defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES is, and
at all times hereinafter mentioned was, a political subdi-
vision of the State of California.
Ill
Defendant CITY OF LOS ANGELES is, and at
all times hereinafter mentioned was, a municipal cor-
poration and political subdivision of the State of Cali-
fornia. At all times mentioned herein, defendant COUN-
TY OF LOS ANGELES acted in part for defendant
CITY OF LOS ANGELES in levying and collecting
the taxes which are the subject matter of this complaint.
=
IV
On March 1, 1971, at 10:01 A.M., plaintiffs were
the owners and lessees of certain cargo containers
located in the City of Los Angeles. Said containers
are an integral part of the movement of goods in
foreign commerce by plaintiff's vessels, which are regis-
tered under the laws of Japan, where each of plaintiffs
has its corporate and commercial domicile and the
home port of its vessels and containers. At all times
when said containers are physically present in the City
of Los Angeles, they are so located only for short
periods of time sufficient for the delivery and loading
of the international cargo shipments contained therein.
Vv
The Assessor of the County of Los Angeles assessed
against the subject cargo containers, and the Tax Col-
lector of the County of Los Angeles levied taxes thereon
as follows:
Plaintiff-Taxpayer Appraisal Assessment Tax Levied
Japan Line $ 885,500 $221,375 $26,617.46
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha 977,720 244,430 29,389.52
Mitsui O.S.K. Line 1,228,860 307,215 36,938.60
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 1,213,400 303,350 36,473.89
Showa Shipping Co. 553,200 138,300 16,628.77
Yamashita-Shinnihon 835,400 208,850 25,111.49
Between August 14, 1971, and August 31, 1971, plain-
tiffs herein paid, under written protest, the amount
of tax respectively levied against each of them. The
grounds of the protest were set out in an exhibit
accompanying the payment of the tax, which grounds
are set forth in Exhibit “A” attached hereto and in-
corporated herein.
VI
At 12:01 A.M., on March 1, 1971, none of the
cargo containers physically present within the City of
ae ne ne
wt Wee. ee
a
Los Angeles had acquired taxable situs in the County
or City of Los Angeles. The subject containers were
and are constantly committed to and engaged in the
process of importation to and exportation from the
United States and are integral to the transportation
of goods aboard plaintiff's vessels exclusively in foreign
commerce. As instrumentalities of foreign commerce,
and due to their integral participation and exclusive
use in foreign commerce and foreign movements of
cargo, the containers were subject to taxation exclu-
sively in Japan. Therefore, the said taxes were unlawful-
ly levied and collected in that the subject containers
were exempt from taxation by United States Constitu-
tion Article I Sections 8, 9 and 10, Amendment V
and Amendment XIV; the Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation between the United States and
Japan (especially Article XI and XVII) and, pursuant
to the most-favored-nation provisions of that Treaty,
(Article VI Section 4 and Article XI Section 3) under
treaties with other nations; California Constitution Ar-
ticle 13 Sections 1 and 4; and Revenue and Taxation
Code Section 201. The levying and collecting of the
subject taxes subjected plaintiffs and the containers
to double taxation, as between California and Japan,
in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code Section
102. As movable property without a “normal place
of return” between movements, the containers have
situs exclusively at plaintiff's principal place of business,
Japan. (See, e.g., 18 California Administrative Code
205.)
Vil
The subject taxes were unlawfully levied and col-
lected in that the assessment upon which the taxes
were based was not made “on discovery” of the presence
——
of the subject containers as required by Revenue and
Taxation Code Section 531.
Vill
No’ refund of said taxes, or any part thereof, has
been made to plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against
defendants in the respective amounts of taxes levied
and paid as set forth in Paragraph V of this Com-
plaint, together with interest thereon from the date
of payment at the maximum rate of interest, which
rate is no less than 82% per annum from the date
of payment, for costs of suit, and for such other and
further relief as may be just and proper.
DATED: February 1, 1972
GRAHAM & JAMES
By /s/ Reed M. Williams
Reed M. Williams
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DECLARATION
State of California, County of Los Angeles—-ss.
I, the undersigned, say:
I am a member of the firm of GRAHAM & JAMES,
attorneys for the Plaintiffs herein; said Plaintiffs are
corporations, all of whose officers are absent from
the County of Los Angeles, California, where said
attorneys have their offices, and that I make this verifica-
tion for and on behalf of said party for that reason;
the foregoing document is true of my own knowledge,
except as to the matters which are therein stated on
information or belief, and as to those matters I believe
it to be true.
==
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing
is true and correct.
Executed on February 1, 1972, at Long Beach,
California.
/s/ Reed M. Williams
REED M. WILLIAMS
EXHIBIT A
1) The subject containers as “movable property”
have not acquired situs in Los Angeles County under
the standards of Rule 205 of the California Administra-
tive Code, Title 18; and, pursuant to that Rule, have
situs only at the principal place of business of the
taxpayer, Japan.
2) The subject containers are integral to taxpayer's
movement of cargo in foreign commerce.
a) They are instrumentalities of foreign com-
merce and are taxable only in taxpayer’s domicile,
Japan, under the “home port” doctrine and under
the “commerce clause” of the United States Con-
stitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; Article
XIII, Section 1, of the~California Constitution:
and Revenue and Taxation Code, Section 201,
and the due process clauses of the United States
Constitution Amendments V and XIV.
b) The containers are constantly engaged in
the process of importation to and exportation from
the United States, and, as such, are exempt from
taxation under the “import-export” and “com-
merce” clauses (Article I, Sections 10 and 8(3)
of the United States Constitution and under Article
XIII, Section 1, of the California Constitution,
and under Revenue and Taxation Code, Section
201, and the due process clauses, Amendments
V and XIV to the United States Constitution.
—v
3) The containers are integral parts of the vessels
which transport the cargo and as such are exempt
under Artic! XIII, Section 4, of the California Con-
stitution, and Section 201 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code.
4) These containers are exempt from taxation under
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the United States and Japan and, pursuant
to the most-favored-nation provision of that treaty,
under treaties with other nations.
5) The presence of these containers in Los Angeles
County was well known to the general public and
the Assessor during the regular assessment period in
1971 and the escaped assessment is, therefore, void
as not made “on discovery” as required by Revenue
and Taxation Code Section 531.
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Complaint for Recovery of Taxes.
Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of Los Angeles.
Japan Line Ltd.; Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.; Kawasaki
Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.; Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line; Showa
Shipping Co., Ltd.; Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co.
Ltd., foreign corporations; Lilly Shipping Agencies, a
corporation, Plaintiffs, vs. County of Los Angeles and
City of Los Angeles, Defendants. No. SOC 30557.
Original Filed: Feb. 15, 1973.
Plaintiffs allege:
J
Plaintiffs are and at all times hereinafter mentioned
were, corporations duly organized and existing under
the laws of Japan or elsewhere, and excepting LILLY
SHIPPING AGENCIES (hereafter “LILLY”) were en-
gaged primarily in the operation of steamships and
containerships in the carriage of cargo in foreign com-
merce. LILLY was and is the agent of and for YAMA-
SHITA-SHINNIHON STEAMSHIP CO., Ltd.
II
Defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES is, and
at all times hereinafter mentioned was, 4 political sub-
division of the State of California.
Il
Defendant CITY OF LOS ANGELES is, and at
all times hereinafter mentioned was, a municipal corpo-
ration and political subdivision of the State of Califor-
nia. At all times mentioned herein, defendant COUNTY
OF LOS ANGELES acted in part for defendant CITY
OF LOS ANGELES in levying and collecting the taxes
which are the subject matter of this Complaint.
= =
IV
On March 1, 1972, at 12:01 A.M., plaintiffs were
the owners and lessees of certain cargo containers lo-
cated in the City of Los Angeles. Said containers
are an integral part of the movement of goods in
foreign commerce by Japanese plaintiff's vessels, which
are registered under the laws of Japan, where each
of Japanese plaintiffs has its corporate and commercial
domicile and the home port of its vessels and containers.
At all times when said containers are physically present
in the City of Los Angeles, they are so located only
for short periods of time sufficient for the delivery
and loading of the international cargo shipments con-
tained therein.
Vv
The Assessor of the County of Los Angeles assessed
against the subject cargo containers, and the Tax Collec-
tor of the County of Los Angeles levied taxes thereon
as follows:
Plaintiff-Taxpayer Appraisal Assessment Tax Levied
Japan Line, Ltd. $1,696,900 $424,225 $54,297.83
Kawasaki Kisen 1,768,280 442,070 56,581.86
Kaisha, Ltd.
Mitsui O.S.K. 1,342,200 335,550 42,948.05
Lines, Ltd.
Nippon Yusen 1,173,920 293,480 37,563.38
Kaisha Line
Showa Shipping Co., Ltd. 564,340 141,085 18,057.89
Yamashita-Shinnihon 731,040 182,760 23,392.00
Steamship Co., Ltd. &
Lilly Shipping Agencies
Between June 19, 1972, and August 31, 1972, plaintiffs
herein, excepting YAMASHITA - SHINNIHON
STEAMSHIP CO., LTD., paid, under written protest,
the amount of tax respectively levied against each of
them. The grounds of the protest were set out in
an exhibit accompanying the payment of the tax, which
= =
grounds are set forth in Exhibit “A” attached hereto
and incorporated herein. On or about June 19, 1972
LILLY, as agent for and on behalf of YAMASHITA-
SHINNIHON STEAMSHIP CO., LTD. paid the
amount of tax levied against YAMASHITA-SHINNI-
HON STEAMSHIP CO., LTD. and thereafter, on or
about February 5, 1973 LILLY and YAMASHITA-
SHINNIHON STEAMSHIP CO., LTD. duly filed claim
for refund (which has been denied) the grounds for
which are likewise set forth in Exhibit “A” attached
hereto and incorporated herein.
VI
At 12:01 A.M., on March 1, 1972, none of the
cargo containers physically present within the City of
Los Angeles had acquired taxable situs in the County
or City of Los Angeles. The subject containers were
and are constantly committed to and engaged in the
process of importation to and exportation from the
United States and are integral to the transportation
of goods aboard Japanese plaintiff's vessels exclusively
in foreign commerce. As instrumentalities of foreign
commerce, and due to their integral participation and
exclusive use in foreign commerce and foreign move-
ments of cargo, the containers were subject to taxation
exclusively in Japan. Therefore, the said taxes were
unlawfully levied and collected in that the subject con-
tainers were exempt from taxation by United States
Constitution Article I, Sections 8, 9 and 10, Amend-
ment V and Amendment XIV; the Treaty of Friendsuuip,
Commerce and Navigation between the United States
and Japan (especially Article XI and XVII) and, pur-
suant to the most-favored-nation provisions of that
Treaty, (Article VI, Section 4 and Article XI, Section
3) under treaties with other nations; California Consti-
anbfies
tution Article 13, Sections | and 4; and Revenue
and Taxation Code Section 201. The levying and col-
lecting of the subject taxes subjected plaintiffs and
the containers to double taxation, as between California
and Japan, in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code
Section 102. As movable property without a “normal
place of return” between movements, the containers
have situs exclusively at Japanese plaintiff's principal
place of business, Japan. (See, e.g., 18 California Ad-
ministrative Code 205. )
Vil
No refund of said taxes, or any part thereof, has
been made to plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against
defendants in the respective amounts of taxes levied
and paid as set forth in Paragraph V of this Complaint,
together with interest thereon from the date of payment
at the maximum rate of interest, which rate is no
less than 842% per annum from the date of payment,
for costs of suit, and for such other and further relief
as may be just and proper.
DATED: February 14, 1973
GRAHAM & JAMES
By /s/ Reed M. Williams
Reed M. Williams
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DECLARATION
State of California, County of Los Angeles—ss.
I, the undersigned, say:
I am a member of the firm of GRAHAM & JAMES,
attorneys for the Plaintiffs herein; said Plaintiffs are
niin
corporations, all of whose officers are absent from the
County of Los Angeles, California, where said attorneys
have their officers, and that I make this verification
for and on behalf of said party for that reason; the
foregoing Complaint For Recovery of Taxes is true
of my own knowledge, except as to the matters which
are therein stated on information or belief, and as
to those matters I believe them to be true.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing
is true and correct.
Executed on February 14, 1973, at Los Angeles,
California.
/s/ Reed M. Williams
REED M. WILLIAMS
EXHIBIT “A”
1) The subject containers as “movable property”
have not acquired situs in Los Angeles County under
the standards of Rule 205 of the California Administra-
tive Code, Title 18; and, pursuant to that Rule. have
situs only at the principal place of business of the
taxpayer, Japan.
2) The subject containers are integral to taxpayer's
movement of cargo in foreign commerce.
a) They are instrumentalities of foreign com-
merce and are taxable only in taxpayer's domicile,
Japan, under the “home port” doctrine and under
the “commerce clause” of the United States Consti-
tution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; Article XIII,
Section 1, of the California Constitution; and Reve-
nue and Taxation Code, Section 201, and the
due process clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion Amendments V and XIV.
aii
b) The containers are constantly engaged in
the process of importation to and exporation from
the United States, and, as such, are exempt from
taxation under the “import-export” and “com-
merce” clauses (Article I, Sections 10 and 8
(3)) of he United States Constitution and under
Article XIII, Section 1, of the California Constitu-
tion, and under Revenue and Taxation Code, Sec-
tion 201, and the due process clauses, Amendments
V and XIV to the United States Constitution.
3) The containers are integral parts of the vessels
which transport the cargo and as such are exempt
under Article XIII, Section 4, of the California Consti-
tution, and Section 201 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code.
4) These containers are exempt from taxation under
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the United States and Japan and, pursuant
to the most-favored-nation provision of that treaty,
under treaties with other nations.
—
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| _
| Intended Decision.
Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of Los Angeles.
Japan Line, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. County of
Los Angeles, et ai., Defendants. No. SO C 25617. (Con-
solidated for all purposes with: SO C 27593, and SO C
30557.)
Japan Line, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. County of
Los Angeles, et al., Defendants. No. SO C 27593.
Japan Line, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. County of
Los Angeles, et al., Defendants. No. SO C 30557.
The Court has before it three cases which were
consolidated. They all have identical facts and parties,
except that the periods in which an ad velorum tax
was levied are different, to wit:
Case No. SO C 25617—March 2, 1972
Case No. SO C 27593—August 31, 1971
Case No. SO C 30557—August 31, 1972
Briefly, Los Angeles County has levied a property
tax on cargo containers used by the five Japanese
shipping lines who are parties plaintiff, based on the
average number of containers constantly in Los
Angcles County. These containers are owned and con-
trolled by Japanese based concerns and only come
into this country for the purpose of bringing in cargoes
or shipping them out in foreign commerce. There is
no interstate or intrastate use. The taxes were paid
for the periods indicated under protest and this suit
to recover followed.
ee one
Another case identical in nature has been previously
tried by this Court and decided for the plaintiff (SO
C 23482). This decision was not appealed, but since
=_— =
that time the Court of Appeal has decided Sea-Land
vs. Alameda County, (District 1, Div. 2) 36 C.A.(2)
825, and the defendant contends that that decision
is controlling and at least calls for a reconsideration
of the whole question.
The parties have stipulated to the facts and to the
taxes paid each year, which exhibit is incorporated
into this Intended Decision and made a part hereof
as Exhibit A.
In SO C 23482, the Court found that the cargo
containers were instrumentalities of foreign commerce
and were a part of the ship. The Sea-Land case has
taken the position that they are only instrumentalities
of commerce to the extent that they provide a means
for transferring cargo from one form of transportation
to another (at page 832). This would belie the idea
that they are an extension of the ship. The distinction
makes no difference and as “instrumentalities of foreign
commerce” they are still afforded the benefits of the
“Home Port” rule.
Sea-Land was concerned with a domestic corporation
(New Jersey) engaged in both foreign, inter and intra-
state commerce and here lies the difference. There
was no consideration of the “Home Port” rule as that
was not involved; nor was any thought given to foreign
treaties so well discussed in Scandinavian Airlines vs.
County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal.(2) 11, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 899.
This Court is of the opinion that nothing has changed
since the last decision on this matter, and therefore,
adopts that part of the previous decision relating to
Federal law, Home Port rule, and treaties. It is as
follows:
ee eee ee +
or
=— =
Our Supreme Court in the Scandinavian Airlines
system case made it clear that “Foreign Commerce”
is a federal matter exclusively. It further stated that
if the tax is repugnant to the treaty it cannot stand.
Two treaties were considered here: The “General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade” and the “Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United
States and Japan”.
In the previous decision by this Court it was
remarked in the Intended Decision that the Court didn’t
think the “Most Favored Nation” rule was applicable
and that it based its ruling on the Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United
States and Japan (1953), and the particular Article
XI therein which provides that parties engaged in trade
within the territory of the other party shall not be
subject to the payment of taxes, fees or charges imposed
upon or applied to income, capital, transactions, activ-
ties or any other object more burdensome than those
borne by nationals of the host country.
A tax levied on the containers by Los Angeles
County would violate this section, because it was stipu-
lated that plaintiffs pay a tax in Japan. There is no
way to prorate the same, as we do in interstate com-
merce. The Japanese would be paying a double tax,
while a domestic company would, by reason of prora-
tion, be paying only one tax.
In addition to this, the Court now feels “The Most
Favored Nation Rule” is likewise applicable, because
we are favoring our nationals (by reason of only one
total tax) as against our foreign parties.
It is also to be noted that U.S. companies pay
no tax on containers in Japan (by stipulation). To
aff «
allow the tax levy would result in unequal treatment
of our foreign parties.
To consider proration of taxes with foreign entitites
is not practical. There is no tribunal that can adjudicate
these rights unless it be the International Court and
to invoke its services jurisdiction must be consented
to by all parties. For this reason, our Federal Courts
have consistently held that vessels which are instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce and engaged in foreign
commerce can be taxed in their home port only.
Whether we consider the containers as a part of
the ship or not, they do have a home port (Japan).
They are engaged exclusively in foreign commerce and
they are taxed in their home port so it presents no
problem to extend to them the benefits of the “Home
Port” rule.
The plaintiffs have conceded that certain generator
sets were included in the taxes levied and that the
tax on those was legal. The Court has, therefore,
deducted stipulated amounts from the “Schedule of
Payments” to reflect the true amounts in issue in this
case.
Judgment will be for plaintiffs against defendants
in amounts indicated in Exhibit A, plus interest at
7% per annum on the amounts indicated on Exhibit
A under the particular plaintiff's name from the date
of payment so indicated, excluding from such sums
the portion thereof that was paid on generator sets.
Plaintiff will prepare judgment.
Dated: March 14, 1974.
HAMPTON HUTTON
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
SCHEDULE OF PAYMENT DATES
Y-S Line
NYK a
M-O Line
Payment J Line K Line
Date of
Tax Year
$ 37,243.95 $ 15.954.03 $ 22,094.22
$ 20,512.32 $ 33,519.55 $ 33,543.68
3-2-71
70-71
f
a
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$ 70,597.71
$
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$
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1,181.32
$ 69,416.39
1,106.18
$
$ 2,175.08
$111,255.25
1,874.49
794.76
$
LESS
$110,175.04
$117,616.44
$100,632.85
=—
Agreed Statement in Lieu of Clerk’s and
Reporter’s Transcripts.
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California,
Second Appellate District.
Japan Line, Ltd.; Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.;
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.; Nippon Yusen Kaisha; Showa
Shipping Co., Ltd.; Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship
Co., Ltd.; foreign corporations, Plaintiffs and Respond-
ents, vs. County of Los Angeles and City of Los
Angeles, Defendants and Appellants. Nos. SO C-25617,
SO C-27593, SO C-30557.
Original Filed July 21, 1975.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Los Angeles Coun-
ty, Honorable Hampton Hutton, Judge.
Appearances:
GRAHAM and JAMES, 100 Oceangate, Suite 515,
Long Beach, California 90802, Area Code (213)
435-4435, Counsel for Respondents.
JOHN H. LARSON, County Counsel, JAMES DEX-
TER CLARK, Deputy County Counsel, 648 Hall of
Administration, Los Angeles, California 90012, Area
Code (213) 974-1889, Counsel for Appellants.
— =
AGREED STATEMENT IN LIEU
OF
CLERK’S AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS
28
Agreed Statement in Lieu of Clerk’s and Reporter’s
Transcripts.
Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of Los Angeles.
Japan Line, Ltd.; Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.;
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.; Nippon Yusen Kaisha;
Showa Shipping Co., Ltd.; Yamashita-Shinnihon Steam-
ship Co., Ltd.; foreign corporations, Plaintiffs and Re-
spondents, vs. County of Los Angeles and City of
Los Angeles, Defendants and Appellants. Nos. SO C-
25617, SO C-27593, SO C-30557.
Appellants herein submit and file with the Clerk,
the Agreed Statement in Lieu of Clerk’s and Reporter's
Transcripts signed by the parties herein under California
Rules of Court, Rule 6.
I
A copy of the Judgment is attached hereto.
Il
A copy of the Notice of Appeal is attached hereto
and was filed on December 12, 1974.
Ill
The nature of the controversy is whether cargo ship-
ping containers, owned by Respondents, Japanese dom-
iciliaries, and subject to and in fact taxed in Japan,
and used exclusively for the transportation of cargo
for hire in foreign commerce, may be taxed by Appel-
lants, County and City, on an ad valorem basis.
IV
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, South District, entered
—29—
on Plaintiffs’ (Respondents herein) Complaints on Oc-
tober 15, 1974, in the amount of $559,736.66, plus
interest as provided by Revenue and Taxation Code
$5141, and against Defendants (Appellants herein).
Original jurisdiction was vested in the Superior Court
by California Constitution Article IV, Section V. On
December 12, 1974, within sixty (60) days of entry
of judgment, notice of appeal was filed by Appellants.
A copy of said notice is attached hereto. Jurisdiction
is conferred on this Court by California Constitution
Article VI, 4b, (10 and 11).
Vv
The questions involved herein arose as the result
of a levy of personal property tax on the Respondents’
cargo shipping containers. The Appellants answered
the Complaints, denying that the tax was unlawful.
All three cases involved herein, covering a period of
three years, were consolidated for all purposes. The
Superior Court held that the tax was unlawful. Respond-
ents paid the taxes under protest on the grounds set
forth in their letter of protest which is attached hereto
as Exhibit “A” and made a part hereof as if fully
set forth herein. Complaints for recovery of taxes based
on the same grounds were filed by Respondents.
VI
The facts which are stipulated on appeal are as
follows:
1. There were present in Los Angeles County
on lien dates 1970, 1971 and 1972 an unspecified
number of cargo shipping containers owned and con-
trolled by Plaintiffs and having the market values as
set forth in the Findings of Fact.
— Ss
2. Said containers were not concealed and their
presence was open and obvious. Taxes on said cargo
shipping containers were timely paid, under protest,
as set forth in the Findings of Fact.
3. Said amounts are the correct amounts of the
tax, assuming that all containers present on the lien
date were subject to tax based on their total fair
market values.
4. Said amounts of taxes were paid by Plaintiffs
within six months prior to the commencement of the
actions herein.
5. Said containers are used exclusively for the trans-
portation of cargo for hire in foreign commerce.
6. Said containers are never used for intrastate or
interstate transportation of cargo except as continuations
of international voyages.
7. The interstate or intrastate movement of empty
containers are solely for the purpose of picking up
cargo to be carried in foreign commerce, or returning
the containers to ports (principally Los Angeles), all
containers thereafter moving by Plaintiffs’ vessels to
foreign countries.
8. All of the loaded containers physically present
within Los Angeles County on the lien dates were
loaded with cargo either inbound from or outbound
to foreign ports.
9. All empty containers physically present within
Los Angeles County on the lien dates were awaiting
loading of cargo to be carried on Plaintiffs’ vessels
in foreign commerce, or carriage to other ports (prin-
cipally in Japan) by Plaintiffs’ vessels.
10. No container has a usual place of return in
California or the United States between uses.
— =
11. Each container is in constant transit save for
repair time and time awaiting new cargo.
12. None of the containers present in Los Angeles
County on lien dates 1970, 1971 or 1972 had been
in California for as much as six months during the
twelve months immediately preceding said lien dates.
13. The average stay of any of the containers in
California at any one time is less than three weeks.
14. No container is permanently situated in Cali-
fornia or scheduled, on departure from Los Angeles,
to return to Los Angeles or any other place in California
or the United States.
15. Plaintiffs are incorporated under the laws of
Japan, and have their principal places of business and
commercial domiciles in Japan.
16. All of Plaintiffs’ vessels, on which the subject
containers are carried, have their home port in and
are registered in Japan, and are used exclusively in
foreign commerce.
17. None of Plaintiffs’ vessels on which the subject
containers are carried is registered in the United States.
18. All of Plaintiffs’ vessels on which the subject
containers are carried are specifically designed and
constructed to accommodate the subject containers, and
carry only cargo in such containers.
19. In general, all containers carried by Plaintiffs’
vessels as aforesaid, including the subject containers,
upon arriving from Japan are discharged from said
vessels in the Port of Los Angeles and either (1)
transported by truck or rail to the ultimate inland
destination of the imported cargo contained therein,
or (2) unloaded in Los Angeles Harbor.
=)
(a) Those containers transported to such inland
destinations are unloaded at such destinations and
are then either (1) reloaded with export cargo
at an inland location and transported to one of
Plaintiffs’ vessels by truck or rail for export, or
(2) returned empty by truck or rail to Los Angeles
Harbor for export or for reloading for export,
all containers thereafter moving by said vessels
to Japan.
20. The inland (outside Los Angeles Harbor) desti-
nations and origins of cargo carried in said containers
include locations in other states, as well as in California.
21. An outbound container may leave the United
States through any port, and need not leave through
the port through which it entered the United States.
22. All containers of Plaintiffs are subject to prop-
erty tax and are, in fact, taxed in Japan.
23. Plaintiffs have not received a refund of said
taxes.
24. Said taxes were paid to and received by Defend-
ants as set forth in the Findings of Fact.
25. During all periods referred to in Plaintiffs’ com-
plaints, cargo shipping containers owned or corirolled
by steamship companies domiciled in the United States,
which containers from time to time were located in
Japan while engaged in receiving and delivering cargo
and awaiting shipment by vessel, were not subject
to property taxation in Japan, and were not taxed
in Japan.
26. The number of containers physically present
in Los Angeles County on the lien dates 1970, 1971
and 1972 is fairly representative of the number of
containers present in Los Angeles County on other
dates throughout the tax year.
Vil
The Court rendered Findings of Fact and conclusions
of law, which are as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On the first day of March 1970, 1971 and
1972, there were present in the City of Los Angeles
and the County of Los Angeles certain cargo shipping
containers owned and controlled by Plaintiffs, the fair
market values and assessed values being as follows:
Fair Market Values
Plaintiff 1970 1971 1972
Japan Line, Ltd. $ 765,000 $ 885,550 $1,696,900
Kawasaki Kisen
Kaisha, Ltd 1,250,100 977,720 1,768,280
Mitsui O.S.K.
Lines, Ltd 1,251,000 1,228,860 1,342,200
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 1,389,000 1,213,400 1,173,920
Showa Shipping Co. 595,000 553,200 564,340
Yamashita-Shinnihon
Steamship Co. 824,000 835,400 731,040
Assessed Values
Japan Line, Ltd. $191,250 $221,375 $424,225
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. 312,525 244,430 442,070
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. 312,750 307,215 335,550
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 347,250 303,350 293,480
Showa Shipping Co. 148,750 138,300 141,085
Yamashita-Shinnihon
Steamship Co. 206,000 208,850 182,760
eniiiius
2. Defendants assessed and levied taxes as follows
against Plaintiffs with respect to said containers. The
amounts of said taxes are properly calculated as follows:
Plaintiff 1970 1971 1972
Japan Line, Ltd. $20,512.32 $25,822.70 $54,297.83
Kawasaki Kisen
Kaisha, Ltd. 33,519.55 27,515.03 56,581.86
Mitsui O.S.K.
Lines, Ltd. 33,543.68 34,763.52 42,948.05
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 37,243.95 35,367.71 37,563.38
Showa Shipping Co. 15,954.03 16,628.77 18,057.89
Yamashita-Shinnihon
Steamship Co. 22,094.22 23,930.17 23,392.00
3. Plaintiffs timely paid said taxes, under protest,
as follows:
Tax Year Date of Payment
1970-1971 March 2, 1971
1971-1972 August 31, 1971
1972-1973 August 31, 1972
4. Plaintiffs’ suits for refund of said taxes were
filed within six months from the date of payment
of said taxes.
5. No refund of said taxes has been made.
6. Plaintiffs are incorporated under the laws of
Japan, and have their principal places of business and
commercial domiciles in Japan.
7. All of Plaintiffs’ vessels, on which the said con-
.tainers are carried, have their home port in and are
registered in Japan, and are used exclusively in
foreign commerce.
8. All of Plaintiffs’ vessels on which the said con-
tainers are carried are specifically designed and con-
structed to accommodate the said containers, and carry
cargo only in said containers.
&
=_ =
9. Said containers have their home port in Japan,
and are used constantly and exclusively for the trans-
portation of cargo for hire in foreign commerce.
10. No container has a usual place of return in
California or the United States between uses.
11. Each container is in constant transit save for
repair time, and time awaiting the loading of cargo.
12. None of the containers present in Los Angeles
County on the first day of March 1970, 1971, or
1972 had been in California for as much as six months
during the twelve months immediately preceding said
dates.
13. The average stay of any of the containers in
California at any one time is less than three weeks.
14. All containers of Plaintiffs are subject to prop-
erty tax, and are, in fact, taxed in Japan.
15. During all periods referred to in Plaintiffs’ com-
plaints, those cargo shipping containers owned or con-
trolled by steamship companies domiciled in the United
States, and which from time to time were located
in Japan while engaged in receiving and delivering
cargo (being transported in foreign commerce) and
awaiting shipment by vessel, were not subject to prop-
erty taxation in Japan, and were not taxed in Japan.
16. The number of containers physically present
in Los Angeles County on the lien dates 1970, 1971
and 1972 is fairly representative of the number of
containers present in Los Angeles County on other
dates throughout the tax year.
17. Any movements, or periods of non-movement
of any of said containers while in the United States
(whether said containers are empty or filled with car-
==
go), are incidental to and inseparable from the use
of said containers in the transportation of cargo in
foreign commerce, any such movements or periods of
non-movement being essential to and solely for the
efficiency and economic utilization of the containers
as instrumentalities of foreign commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Said containers, as utilized by Plaintiffs at all
times relevant hereto, are instrumentalities of foreign
commerce.
2. That said containers are exempt from taxation
by Defendants.
3. That Defendants unlawfully collected those taxes
from Plaintiffs as set forth in Findings of Fact No.
2.
4. That Plaintiffs are entitled to a refund of said
taxes.
5. That Plaintiffs have judgment against Defendants
for the following sums:
Plaintiff Sum
Japan Line, Ltd. $100,632.85
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. 117,616.44
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. 111,255.25
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 110,175.04
Showa Shipping Co. 50,640.69
Yamashita-Shinnihon
Steamship Co. 69,416.39
together with interest pursuant to California Revenue
and Taxation Code $5141 computed from the dates
and on the amounts of payment as follows, until entry
of judgment:
—_— =
Plaintiff Mar.2,°71 Aug. 31,°71 Aug. 31,°71
Japan Line, Ltd. $20,512.32 $25,822.70 $54,297.83
Kawasaki Kisen
Kaisha, Ltd. 33,519.55 27,515.03 56,581.86
Mitsui O.S.K.
Lines, Ltd. 33,543.68 34,763.52 42,948.05
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 37,243.95 33,367.71 37,563.38
Showa-Shipping Co. 15,9°4.93 16,628.77 18,057.89
Yamashita-Shinnihon
Steamship Co. 22,094.22 22,930.17 23,392.00
together with costs of suit herein.
GRAHAM & JAMES
By /s/ Reed Williams
Reed Williams
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
JOHN H. LARSON
County Counsel
By /s/ James Dexter Clark
James Dexter Clark
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
EXHIBIT A
1) The subject containers as “movable property”
have not acquired situs in Los Angeles County under
the standards of Rule 205 of the California Adminis-
trative Code, Title 18; and, pursuant to that Rule,
have situs only at the principal place of business of
the taxpayer, Japan.
2) The subject containers are integral to taxpayer's
movement of cargo in foreign commerce.
a) They are instrumentalities of foreign com-
merce and are taxable only in taxpayer's domicile,
Japan, under the “home port” doctrine and under
—
the “commerce clause” of the United States Consti-
tution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; Article
XIII, Section 1, of the California Constitution;
and Revenue and Taxation Code, Section 201,
and the due process clauses of the United States
Constitution Amendments V and XIV.
b) The containers are constantly engaged in
the process of importation to and exportation from
the United States, and, as such, are exempt from
taxation under the “import-export” and “com-
merce” clauses (Article I, Sections 10 and 8 (3)
of the United States Constitution, and under Ar-
ticle XIIi, Section 1, of the California Constitution,
and under Revenue and Taxation Code, Section
201, and the due process clauses, Amendments V
and XIV to the United States Constitution.
3) The containers are integral parts of the vessels
which transport the cargo and as such are exempt
under Article XIII, Section 4, of the California Con-
stitution, and Section 201 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code.
4) These containers are exempt from taxation under
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the United States and Japan and, pursuant
to the most-favored-nation provision of that treaty, un-
der treaties with other nations.
5) The presence of these containers in Los Angeles
County was well known to the general public and
the Assessor during the regular assessment period in
1971 and the escaped assessment is, therefore, void
as not made “on discovery” as required by Revneue
and Taxation Code Section 531.
oiliion
Judgment.
Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of Los Angeles.
Japan Line, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs, v. County of
Los Angeles and City of Los Angeles, Defendants.
No. SO C 25617, SO C 27593, SO C 30557.
The above entitled causes came on regularly for
trial on February 14, 1974. GRAHAM & JAMES
and Reed M. Williams appeared as attorneys for plain-
tiffs. John H. Larson, County Counsel, and James
Dexter Clark, Deputy County Counsel, appeared as at-
torneys for defendants. A jury trial having been waived,
and the Court having heard the testimony and having
heard and considered the evidence and the matters
admitted by the parties, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises and having filed its findings
of fact and conclusions of law, and having directed
that judgment be entered in accordance therewith, now
therefore by reason of the law and findings aforesaid,
and good cause appearing:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that plaintiffs have judgment against defendants in the
following principal amounts, together with interest
thereon, pursuant to California Revenue and Taxation
Code §5141 from the dates specified hereafter to the
date of entry of judgment;
JAPAN LINE, LTD.
Principal $100,632.85
Interest
($4,482.10 ($20,512.32 from 3-2-71)
($3,877.50 ($25,822.70 from 8-31-71)
($8,153.27 ($54,297.83 from 8-31-72)
$ 16,512.87
TOTAL $117,145.72
wd
eniitins
KAWASAKI KISEN KAISHA, LTD.
Principal $117,616.44
Interest
($7,324.27 ($33,519.55 from 3-2-71)
($4,131.61 ($27,515.03 from 8-31-71)
($8,496.25 ($56,581.86 from 8-31-72)
$ 19,952.13
TOTAL $137,568.57
MITSUI O.S.K. LINES, LTD.
Principal $111,255.25
Interest
($7,329.55 ($33,543.68 from 3-2-71)
($5,220.03 ($34,763.52 from 8-31-71)
($6,449.02 ($42,948.05 from 8-31-72)
$ 18,998.60
TOTAL $130,253.85
NIPPON YUSEN KAISHA
Principal $110,175.04
Interest
($8,138.09 ($37,243.95 from 3-2-71)
($5,310.76 ($35,367.71 from 8-31-71)
($5,640.45 ($37,563.38 from 8-31-72)
$ 19,089.30
TOTAL $129,264.34
SHOWA SHIPPING CO., LTD.
Principal $ 50,640.69
Interest
($3,486.08 ($15,954.03 from 3-2-71)
($2,496.95 ($16,628.77 from 8-31-71)
($2,711.54 ($18,057.89 from 8-31-72)
$ 8,694.57
TOTAL $ 59,335.26
YAMASHITA SHINNIHON STEAMSHIP CO., LTD.
Principal $ 69,416.39
Interest
($4,827.76 ($22, 094.22 from 3-2-71)
($3,593.31 ($23,930.17 from 8-31-71)
($3,512.50 ($23,392.00 from 8-31-72)
$ 11,933.57
TOTAL $ 81,349.96
together with costs of suit herein taxed in the amount
Dated: Oct. 15, 1974.
HAMPTON HUTTON
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
—_—
Notice of Appeal.
Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of Los Angeles.
Japan Line, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. County of
Los Angeles and City of Los Angeles, Defendants.
Nos.: SO C 25617, SO C 27593, SO C 30557.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the COUNTY
OF LOS ANGELES and CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
defendants, hereby appeal to the Court of Appeal of
the State of California, Second District, Division ........
from the Judgment rendered on October 15, 1974,
and entered in Minute Book, Volume SO 225, Page
085, on October 15, 1974, in favor of Japan Line,
Ltd., Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines,
Ltd., Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Showa Shipping Co., Ltd.,
and Yamashita Shinnihon Steamship Co., Ltd., plain-
tiffs.
DATED: December 12, 1974.
JOHN H. LARSON
County Counsel
By /s/ James Dexter Clark
JAMES DEXTER CLARK
Deputy County Counsel
Attorneys for Defendants
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL
State of California, County of Los Angeles
Doris Ross states: | am and at all times herein
mentioned have been a citizen of the United States
and a resident of the County of Los Angeles, over
the age of eighteen years and not a party to nor
interested in the within action; that my business ad-
dress is 648 Hall of Administration, City of Los An-
geles, County of Los Angeles, State of California;
anGies
That on the 12th day of December, 1974, I served
the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL upon Plaintiff's
Attorneys by depositing a copy thereof, enclosed in
a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid,
in a United States mail box in Los Angeles, California,
addressed as follows: Reed Williams, Esq., Graham
& James, 100 Oceangate, Long Beach, CA 90802
and that the person on whom said service was made
has his office at a place where there is a delivery
service by United States mail, and that there is a
regular communication by mail between the place of
mailing and the place so addressed.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing
is true and correct.
Los Angeles, California. Dated: December 12, 1974.
/s/ Doris Ross
—_—
Opinion of the Court of Appeal.
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California,
Second Appellate District, Division Three.
Japan Lines, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v. County of Los Angeles and City of Los Angeles,
Defendants and Appellants. 2d Civ. No. 47134. Sup.
Ct. Nos. SOC 25617, SOC 27593, SOC 30557.
Filed: Aug. 27, 1976.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County. Hampton Hutton, Judge. Re-
versed.
John H. Larson, County Counsel, James Dexter
Clark, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and
Appellants.
Graham & James, and Reed M. Wiiliams, for Plain-
tiffs and Respondents.
The sole question presented by this appeal upon
an agreed statement from a tax refund judgment is
whether appellants, the County and City of Los An-
geles, may impose an apportioned ad valorem tax upon
cargo shipping containers, taxed in Japan, used here
essentially exclusively in foreign commerce and owned
and controlled by Japanese taxpayers. These taxpayers
are six shipping lines incorporated under the laws of
Japan which have their principal places of business
and commercial domiciles there.
FACTS
The facts as stipulated between the parties disclose
that the containers at issue are in constant transit
save for repair time and time awaiting new cargo.
They are only intermittently physically present within
auiiitives
the jurisdictions of appellants for an average stay of
less than three weeks. They are used exclusively for
the transportation of cargo for hire in foreign commerce.
They are either full or empty. The full containers
are loaded with cargo inbound from or outbound to
foreign ports. The empty containers are moved intra-
state within California and interstate from California
solely to pick up cargo to be carried in foreign com-
merce or to return the containers themselves to ports
(principally Los Angeles) for placement aboard the
taxpayers’ outbound vessels. The containers are never
used for either intrastate or interstate transportation
of cargo except in continuation of international voyages.
The Taxpayers’ Contentions
Since the judgment under appeal was rendered, our
Supreme Court decided unanimously in the case of
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. County of Alameda, 12 Cal.3d
772, 775-776, that a California county may tax such
containers, under circumstances of use essentially identi-
cal to those before us, where the containers were used
mainly in foreign commerce’ but were owned by a
shipping company incorporated and commercially domi-
ciled within this country.
The taxpayers contend that the Sea-Land decision
is not dispositive of this case because, there, Sea-Land
conceded that its containers were subject to local tax-
ation within the United States. Its position was that
such taxation must be done exclusively at the home
port of its vessels. (Sea-Land, supra, at 781, 786.)
1The interstate commerce therein involved was via interna-
tional waters between California and the east coast of the
United States. (Sea-Land, supra, at 776.) The court made
no distinction between the containers used in foreign commerce
and those used in intercoastal commerce.
—
Here, the home ports of the taxpayers’ vessels, which
are specifically designed to carry the containers at
issue, are in Japan. The taxpayers’ vessels are likewise
registered there rather than in the United States.
The initial position of the taxpayers on this appeal
was that under both the home-port doctrine and the
most favored nation provisions of the 1953 Treaty
between the United States and Japan their containers
are not subject to taxation by any jurisdiction except
Japan.* In this connection, we note that the containers
of the taxpayers are subject to property taxation in
Japan and have actually been so taxed there. Similar
containers, similarly used in Japan but owned and
controlled by steamship companies domiciled in the
United States, have not been so taxed there.
At oral argument counsel for the taxpayers advanced
a new ground and an additional factual basis for their
position that their containers, notwithstanding the con-
tinuous use of the containers in the United States
within appellants’ jurisdictions, are not subject to prop-
erty taxation by any government except that of Japan.
They there argued that the property taxes at issue
constitute indirect tonnage duties prohibited by article
I, section 10, clause 3 of the United States Constitution
and, in support of oc of their initial contentions that
*The taxpayers do not now claim though that their cargo
containers have not acquired a taxable situs within California.
In any event, the following wen used by our Supreme
Court in Sea-Land, supra, 12 Cal.3d at 778, would appear
to be entirely apposite: “While no specific container may be
in the county for a substantial period of time, Sea-Land’s
containers are physically present in the county on every day
of the year. Such habitual presence of containers creates
a taxable situs, even though the identical containers are not
there every day and even —— none of the containers is
continuously within the county.” (Citations omitted. )
—
these taxes are also prohibited by applicable treaties,
called our attention for the first time to the existence
of the Supplementary Convention of 1964 (15 U.S.T.
1824) to the 1939 Convention between Sweden and
the United States on double taxation. (54 Stat. 1759.)
We could disregard this new matter without any
consideration thereof because, without any showing of
justification therefor, it was presented after the normal
briefing process had been concluded. (See Lotts v.
Board of Park Commrs., 13 Cal.App.2d 625, 636;
Sinclair v. Aquarius Electronics, Inc., 42 Cal.App.3d
216, 229.) But in the interest of being as fully informed
as reasonably possible on the fundamental tax issue
presented, we waived this obvious impropriety in the
taxpayers’ appellate procedure and asked for and ob-
tained from the parties supplemental briefs on the new
matter.
DISCUSSION
1. The Home-Port Doctiine
The taxpayers concede that in the field of inter-
state commerce the home-port doctrine has been super-
seded by the apportionment doctrine, but they argue
that it is still extant in the area of foreign commerce
where apportionment cannot be substituted except per-
haps by treaty or other agreement. Our Supreme Court
in Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of
Los Angeles, 56 Cal.2d 11, 15, 17, 33, 36-37 (here-
after SAS), applied the home-port doctrine to foreign
owned, based, registered and taxed airplanes flying
exclusively in foreign commerce and using Los Angeles
quite infrequently as their sole United States terminus
and thereby struck down the apportioned property taxes
upon such planes which appellants had imposed.
_ =
In Sea-Land, though, our Supreme Court criticized
the home-port doctrine at length (12 Cal.3d at 781-
788) and labeled it “anachronistic.” (Jd. at 787.)
It unanimously adopted the view of the minority in
SAS that the possibility of international double taxation
of instrumentalities of foreign commerce, which these
containers admittedly are, was no reason to limit the
local power to tax them upon a nondiscriminatory
apportioned basis provided they had (as they did)
a taxable situs here. (/d. at 786, 787-788. )
2. The Tonnage Duty Prohibition
Article I, section 10, clause 3 of the United States
Constitution prohibits the imposition by states (and
presumably their subdivisions) of tonnage duties. The
taxpayers contend that this prohibition invalidates the
local property taxes at issue since they in practical
effect are tonnage duties upon the cargo containers.
We disagree. In the recent case of Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages (1976) .... U.S. ...., .... [46 L.Ed.2d
495, 500], the United States Supreme Court held that
the assessment by Georgia of a nondiscriminatory ad
valorem property tax against imported tires was not
within the constitutional prohibition against the laying
of any impost or duty on imports. In support of this
holding the court pointed out that imposts and duties
“are essentially taxes on the commercial privilege of
bringing goods into a country,” while nondiscriminatory
ad valorem property taxes of the kind before us are
taxes by which a state apportions the costs of its
general services among the beneficiaries thereof (Miche-
lin, supra, at 504) and that the words “imposts” and
“duties”, as used in 1787, clearly meant only “exactions
upon imported goods as imports.” (Emphasis added. )
—48—
(Id. at 506, 502.) This being so, the taxes at issue
may not be regarded as tonnage duties prohibited by
article I, section 10, clause 3 of the United States
Constitution.*
3. The Treaty Question
The taxpayers contend that the local taxation at
issue violates certain treaty obligations of the United
States and is therefore invalid under the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution (art. VI, cl.
2). (SAS, supra, 56 Cal.2d 11, 37.) In support of
this contention they point out first, that the afore-
mentioned 1953 Treaty between the United States and
Japan (4 U.S.T. 2063) contains most favored nation
provisions with respect to the ownership and possession
of movable property and taxes. (Art. IX, § 2; art. XI,
§ 3; art. XXII, § 2; 4 U.S.T. 2071, 2072, 2079.)
They then note that in the just-mentioned SAS case
our Supreme Court held that the terms of the previously
mentioned 1939 Convention between the United States
and Sweden respecting double taxation (54 Stat. 1759)
prevented appellants herein from generally taxing Swed-
ish-owned property, including particularly airplanes (56
Cal.2d at 39) and, therefore, the Japanese-owned con-
tainers before us are likewise exempt from taxation
by appellants pursuant to the just-mentioned most fav-
ored nation provisions of the 1953 Treaty between the
United States and Japan. The SAS court based its
8In Sea-Land, supra, 12 Cal.3d at 789, our Supreme Court
expressly rejected the contention that the similar cargo containers
therein involved were exempted from local property taxation
by the immediately preceding clause of the United States Consti-
tution. According to that ision the protection against local
taxation afforded by that clause extended only to goods and
commodities in the import-export stream and not to the con-
tainers which were merely a means of transport suitable for
repeated use.
—49—
holding largely on the provisions of article XIII, subdivi-
sion 2 of the Swedish Convention (54 Stat. 1766),
applying generally apparently to movable property, but
the taxpayers argue that their containers are also
exempt from local property taxation by appellants under
other provisions of the aforementioned Swedish Conven-
tion (arts. 1V and XIII, subd. (1)(b) (54 Stat. 1761,
1766)) exempting instrumentalities of foreign com-
merce (i.¢., ships and airplanes). Finally, the taxpayers
argue that by reason of the modification made in
the Swedish Convention by the aforementioned 1964
Supplementary Convention thereto (15 U.S.T. 1825)
the local property taxation of appellants at issue is
precluded by the provision in the convention prohibiting
nonreciprocal taxation.*
We reject the foregoing argument totally. We do
not think that either the holding of the SAS case or
the Supplementary Convention (which came into ex-
istence after the SAS decision) invalidates appellants’
nondiscriminatory ad valorem taxation of these con-
tainers. The SAS holding on its facts prohibits only
local taxation of foreign owned, based and registered
airplanes. (56 Cal.2d at 42.) It does not apply to
cargo containers as such. The taxpayers seek to extend
this holding nevertheless and the relevant treaty prohibi-
*The Supplementary Convention, among other things, replaced
a 7 of its protocol (54 Stat. 1777) with a new para-
graph 7, reading as follows:
“7. The citizens of one of the contracting States shall not,
while resident in the other State, be subject therein to other
or more burdensome taxes than are citizens of that other State
residing in its territory. The term ‘citizens’ as used in this
paragraph, includes also all legal persons, partnerships, and
associations created or organized under the laws in force in
the respective contracting State. In this paragraph the word
‘taxes’ means taxes of every kind or description, whether
Federal|,] State, or municipal.” (15 U.S.T. 1831-1832.)
—s50—
tions as well as describing both the airplanes involved
in the SAS case and the containers involved here as
instrumentalities of commerce. This generic description
of ships and airplanes does not appear, in the relevant
provisions of the 1939 Convention between Sweden
and the United States. Furthermore, the SAS court
did not view the airplanes there involved as instrumen-
talities of commerce, but instead as instrumentalities of
communication, whose activities in this country were
confined to the port of entry. (See 56 Cal.2d at 33.)
In any event, so far as the convention with Sweden
is concerned, then Justice Traynor pointed out in his
dissent in the SAS case that, properly interpreted, this
treaty does not apply to local property taxation at
all. (56 Cal.2d at 47-48.)
The same thing, however, cannot be said with respect
to the Supplementary Convention thereto. But in advis-
ing ratification by the United States of this convention,
the United States Senate did so on the basis of a
report from its Foreign Relations Committee, which
stated that the replacement paragraph in its protocol
(which we quoted in footnote 4) merely restated “for
the sake of clarity” the requirement of its predecessor
paragraph of nondiscriminatory tax treatment as be-
tween citizens and noncitizens (Tax Conventions and
Protocols with Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden
and Japan, Report of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Ex. Report No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
1964, p. 65).° Admittedly, the taxation at issue in
this case does not violate this requirement.
‘In determining the effect of an international agreement
as domestic law, a court of the United States is to some
extent required to take iniv account domestic sources in the
formation of an international agreement such as committee
reports indicative of the meaning that the United States Senate
—
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
Cobey, J.
We concur:
ALLPORT, Acting P.J.
POTTER, J.
has attached to an international agreement in cases where the
pes, as a matter of internal law, requires the assent
the Senate (Rest. 2d, Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (1965) § 151, com. (b)(i) pp. 462-463, compare Tray-
nor, J., dissent, SAS, supra, 56 Cal.2d at 48).
—_— =
Opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of California.
In the Supreme Court of the State of California.
Japan Line, Ltd., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v. County of Los Angeles et al., Defendants and Ap-
pellants. Super. Ct. Nos. SO C-25617, CO C-27593,
SO C-30557.
In this action for recovery of ad valorem personal
property taxes paid under protest, defendants City of
Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles appeal from
a judgment entered after a nonjury trial in favor of
plaintiffs and against defendants for the recovery of
said taxes together with interest and costs. After de-
cision by the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate Dis-
trict, Division Three, reversing the judgment, we granted
a hearing in this court for the purpose of giving further
consideration to the issues raised. Having made a
thorough examination of the cause, we have concluded
that the opinion of the Court of Appeal prepared
by Justice Cobey and concurred in by Acting Presiding
Justice Allport and Justice Potter correctly treats and
disposes of the issues involved and we adopt such
opinion as and for the opinion of this court. That
opinion (with appropriate additions and deletions) is
as follows:*
*Brackets together, in this manner {] without enclosing ma-
terial, are used to indicate deletions from the opinion of the
Court of Appeal; brackets enclosing material (other than editor’s
parallel citations) are, unless otherwise indicated, used to denote
insertions or additions by this court. We thus avoid the exten-
sion of quotation marks within quotation marks, which would
be incident to the use of such conventional punctuation, and
at the same time accurately indicate the matter quoted. In
so doing, we adhere to a method of adoption employed by
us in the past. (See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western
Financial Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 311, fn. 2, and cases
there cited.)
— =
The sole question presented by this appeal upon
an agreed statement from a tax refund judgment is
whether appellants, the County of Los Angeles and
the City of Los Angeles, may impose an apportioned
ad valorem tax upon cargo shipping containers, taxed
in Japan, used here essentially exclusively in foreign
commerce and owned and controlled by Japanese tax-
payers. These taxpayers are six shipping lines incor-
porated under the laws of Japan which have their
principal places of business and commercial domiciles
there.
FACTS
The facts as stipulated between the parties disclose
that the ‘containers at issue are in constant transit
save for repair time and time awaiting new cargo.
They are only intermittently physically present within
the jurisdictions of appellants for an average stay of
less than three weeks. They are used exclusively for
the transportation of cargo for hire in foreign com-
merce. They are either full or empty. The full con-
tainers are loaded with cargo inbound from or outbound
to foreign ports. The empty containers are moved intra-
state within California and interstate from California
solely to pick up cargo to be carried in foreign com-
merce or to return the containers themselves to ports
(principally Los Angeles) for placement aboard the
taxpayers’ outbound vessels. The containers are never
used for either intrastate or interstate transportation
of cargo except in continuation of international voyages.
The Taxpayers’ Contentions
Since the judgment under appeal was rendered, | |
[this court] decided unanimously in the case of Sea-
Land Serv’-s, Inc. v. County of Alameda [1974] 12
—_— se
Cal.3d 772, 775-776, that a California county may
tax such containers, under circumstances of use essen-
tially identical to those before us, where the containers
were used mainly in foreign commerce’ but were owned
by a shipping company incorporated and commercially
domiciled within this country.
The taxpayers contend that the Sea-Land decision
is not dispositive of this case because, there, Sea-Land
conceded that its containers were subject to local taxa-
tion within the United States. Its position was that
such taxation must be done exclusively at the home
port of its vessels. (Sea-Land, supra, at pp. 781, 786.)
Here, the home ports of the taxpayers’ vessels, which
are specifically designed to carry the containers at
issue, are in Japan. The taxpayers’ vessels are likewise
registered there rather than in the United States.
The initial position of the taxpayers on this appeal
was that under both the home-port doctrine and the
most favored nation provisions of the 1953 treaty be-
tween the United States and Japan their containers
are not subject to taxation by any jurisdiction except
Japan.” In this connection, we note that the containers
1The interstate commerce therein involved was via interna-
tional waters between California and the East Coast of the
United States. (Sea-Land, supra, at p. 776.) [|] [This] court
made no distinction between the containers in foreign
commerce and those used in intercoastal commerce.
2The taxpayers do not now claim though that their ——
containers have not acquired a taxable situs within California.
In any event, the following language [| in Sea-Land, supra,
12 Cal.3d at p. 778, would appear to be entirely apposite:
“While no specific container may be in the county for a
substantial period of time, Sea-Land’s containers are physically
present in the county on every day of the year. Such habitual
presence of containers creates a taxable situs, even though
the identical containers are not there every day and even
none of the containers is continuously within the county.” (Cita-
tions omitted).
— =
of the taxpayers are subject to property taxation in
Japan and have actually been so taxed there. Similar
containers, similarly used in Japan but owned and
controlled by steamship companies domiciled in the
United States, have not been so taxed there.
At oral argument [before the Court of Appeal }
counsel for the taxpayers advanced a new ground and
an additional factual basis for their position that their
containers, notwithstanding the continuous use of the
containers in the United States within appellants’ juris-
dictions, are not subject to property taxation by any
government except that of Japan. They there argued
that the property taxes at issue constitute indirect ton-
nage duties prohibited by article I, section 10, clause
3 of the United States Constitution and, in support
of one of their initial contentions that these taxes
are also prohibited by applicable treaties, called our
attention for the first time to the existence of the
supplementary convention of 1964 (15 U.S.T. 1824)
to the 1939 convention between Sweden and the United
States on double taxa‘’on. (54 Stat. 1759.)
We could disregard this new matter without any
consideration thereof because, without any showing of
justification therefor, it was presented after the normal
briefing process had been concluded. (See Lotts v.
Board of Park Commrs. [1936] 13 Cal.App.2d 625,
636; Sinclair v. Aquarius Electronics, Inc. [1974] 42
Cal.App.3d 216, 229.) But in the interest of being
as fully informed as reasonably possible on the funda-
mental tax issue presented, [| [the Court of Appeal]
waived this obvious impropriety in the taxpayers’
appellate procedure and asked for and obtained from
the parties supplemented briefs on the new matter.
— =
DISCUSSION
1. The Home-port Doctrine
The taxpayers concede that in the field of interstate
commerce the home-port doctrine has been superseded
by the apportionment doctrine, but they argue that
it is still extant in the area of foreign commerce where
apportionment cannot be substituted except perhaps
by treaty or other agreement. [|] [They urge that]
in Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of
Los Angeles [1961] 56 Cal.2d 11, 15, 17, 33, 36-
37 (hereafter SAS), [this court! applied the home-
port doctrine to foreign owned, based, registered and
taxed airplanes flying exclusively in foreign commerce
and using Los Angeles quite infrequently as their soie
United States terminus and thereby struck down the
apportioned property taxes upon such planes which
appellants had imposed.
[] [However, in Sea-Land we specifically addressed
this very contention (12 Cal.3d at pp. 784-786), name-
ly that the home-port doctrine retained vitality with
respect to foreign commerce as distinguished from inter-
state commerce pursuant to our decision in SAS, and
clearly rejected it. First, we concluded that “we are
not inhibited by SAS from concluding that the home-
port doctrine does not shield the property of a taxpayer
from a fairly apportioned ad valorem tax levied by
a nondomiciliary jurisdiction with which the taxpayer
has sufficient contacts, even if the taxpayer is engaged
in foreign commerce. . . . The principles of apportioned
taxation enunciated in Pullman, Ott and Braniff are
to be applied to instrumentalities so engaged.” (Jd.
at p. 786.) Second, we specifically adopted the reason-
ing of Justice Traynor in his dissent in SAS to the
= =
effect that the threat of double taxation from foreign
taxing authorities has no role in commerce clause con-
siderations of multiple burdens, since burdens in inter-
national commerce are not attributable to discrimination
by the taxing state and are matters for international
agreement. (/d. at p. 788.)
The only asserted distinction between the case at
bench and Sea-Land is that the cargo shipping con-
tainers in Sea-Land were owned by a United States
corporation whereas the containers herein are owned
by foreign corporations. The taxpayers have failed to
cite any authority which would support a conclusion
that instrumentalities of commerce used in foreign com-
merce are subject to differeat constitutional protection
depending upon whether they are owned by foreign
or domestic corporations. Existing authority supports
the opposite conclusion. For example in Canadian Pac.
Ry. Co. v. King Co. (1916) 90 Wash. 38, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court rejected the home-port doctrine
and applied to a Canadian railway corporation the
apportionment rule applied by the United States Su-
preme Court to the rolling stock of a domestic railway
corporation used in foreign commerce in Pullman’s
Car Co. v. Pennsylvania (1891) 141 U.S. 18, 23.
Sea-Land is fully dispositive of the commerce clause
and federal exclusivity issues raised in the case at
bench. |
2. The Tonnage Duty Prohibition
Article I, section 10, clause 3 of the United States
Constitution prohibits the imposition by states [] of
tonnage duties. The taxpayers contend that this prohibi-
tion invalidates the local property taxes at issue since
they in practical effect are tonnage duties upon the
Cargo containers.
~~ =
We disagree. In the recent case of Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages (1976) 423 U.S. 276, the United
States Supreme Court held that the assessment by Geor-
gia of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax
against imported tires was not within the constitutional
prohibition against the laying of any impost or duty
on imports. In support of this holding the court pointed
out that imposts and duties “are essentially taxes on
the commercial privilege of bringing goods into a coun-
try,” while nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes
of the kind before us are taxes by which a state
apportions the costs of its general services among the
beneficiaries thereof (Michelin, supra, .at pp. 286-287)
and that the words “imposts” and “duties,” as used
in 1787, clearly meant only “exactions upon imported
goods as imports.” (Italics added.) (/d. at pp. 290-
291, 283.)* []
[The taxpayers contend that the Michelin holding
that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax was
not an “impost” or “duty” is not determinative of
the case at bench because the cargo containers herein
were in import-export transit. They urge that the court
in Michelin specifically stressed that the goods in that
case were no longer in import transit. (See 423 U.S.
at pp. 286, 302.) The contention is of no avail to
taxpayers.
The cargo containers are not being taxed while in
transit. Rather they are being taxed on an apportioned
In Sea-Land, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 789, [] [we} expressly
rejected the contention that the similar cargo containers therein
involved were exempted from local property taxation by the
[] [import-export] clause of the United States Constitution.
1} IT }he protection against local taxation afforded by that
clause extended only to goods and commodities in the import-
export stream and not to the containers which were merely
a means of transport suitable for repeated use.
_ =
basis for their continuous presence in the state. Some
containers are continuously present in the state through-
out the year, even though not necessarily the same
containers. The continuous presence of these containers,
as well as any instrumentality of commerce, involves
the constant use of many services provided by the
state and, here, the county; e.g., harbor facilities, roads,
bridges, water supply, as well as fire and police protec-
tion. The Supreme Court has held that states may
impose a property tax on these moving instrumentalities
of commerce on an apportioned basis in order to meet
the expenses of services within the taxing jurisdiction.
(Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama (1935) 296 U.S.
261, 265-266; Cox v. Lott (1870) 79 U.S. 204, 213;
Pullman’s Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra, 141 U.S.
18.) In Sea-Land we affirmed the apportionment for-
mula used in the case at bench to determine the contin-
uous presence of the cargo containers there involved.
It is the continuous presence within the jurisdiction
drawing upon the service of that jurisdiction to a signifi-
cant degree which permits reimbursement through non-
discriminatory property taxation as opposed to the fleet-
ing presence of imported goods in transit which may
possibly be exempted from such taxation by Michelin.
If Michelin is inapplicable to resolution of the issues
herein as taxpayers contend, then the traditional ton-
nage clause analysis applies, viz., while the tonnage
clause prohibits states from taxing access to their terri-
tories, it does not prohibit states from making charges
for services rendered and enjoyed by those instrumen-
talities of foreign or insterstate commerce within their
jurisdiction. (Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, supra,
296 U.S. 261, 265-266; Cox v. Lott, supra, 79 US.
204, 213.) The court in Michelin pointed out that
=
nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes are taxes
by which the state apportions the costs of services,
such as police and fire protection. (423 U.S. at p.
287.) Even under traditional tonnage clause analysis
this property tax would be valid.
Thus plaintiffs’ further insistent assertion that the
tax liability is created by entry into the taxing jurisdic-
tion must fall and with it the contention that the
tax herein is a tonnage duty levied upon the entry
of the containers into the jurisdiction. |
3. The Treaty Question
The taxpayers contend that the local taxation at
issue violates certain treaty obligations of the United
States and is therefore invalid under the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution (art. VI, cl.
2). (SAS, supra, 56 Cal.2d 11, 37.) In support of
this contention they point out first, that the afore-
mentioned 1953 treaty between the United States and
Japan (4 U.S.T. 2063) contains most favored nation
provisions with respect to the ownership and possession
of movable property and taxes. (Art. IX, § 2; art.
XI, § 3; art. XXII, § 2; 4 U.S.T. 2071, 2072, 2079.)
They then note that in the just-mentioned SAS case
|] [we] held that the terms of the previously mentioned
1939 convention between the United States and Sweden
respecting double taxation (54 Stat. 1759) prevented
appellants herein from generally taxing Swedish-owned
property, including particularly airplanes (56 Cal.2d
at p. 39) and, therefore, the Japanese-owned containers
before us are likewise exempt from taxation by appel-
lants pursuant to the just mentioned most favored na-
tion provisions of the 1953 treaty between the United
States and Japan. [| [This court in SAS] based its
—
holding largely on the provisions of article XIII, subdivi-
sion 2 of the Swedish convention (54 Stat. 1766),
applying generally apparently to movable property, but
the taxpayers argue that their containers are also exempt
from local property taxation by appellants under the
provisions of the aforementioned Swedish convention
(arts. IV and XIII, subd. (1)(b); 54 Stat. 1761,
1766) exempting instrumentalities of foreign commerce
(i.e., ships and airplanes). Finally, the taxpayers argue
that by reason of the modification made in the Swedish
convention by the aforementioned 1964 supplementary
convention thereto (15 U.S.T. 1825) the local property
taxation of appellants at issue is precluded by the
provision in the convention prohibiting nonreciprocal
taxation.*
We reject the foregoing argument totally. We do
not think that either the holding of the SAS case
or the supplementary convention (which came into
existence after the SAS decision) invalidates appellants’
nondiscriminatory ad valorem taxation of these con-
tainers. The SAS holding on its facts prohibits only
local taxation of foreign owned, based and registered
airplanes. (56 Cal.2d at p. 42.) It does not apply
to cargo containers as such. The taxpayers seek to
extend this holding nevertheless and the relevant treaty
*The supplementary convention, among other things, replaced
paragraph 7 of its protocol (54 Stat. 1777) with a new paragraph
7, reading as follows:
“7. The citizens of one of the contracting States shall not,
while resident in the other State, be subject therein to other
or more burdensome taxes than are citizens of that other State
residing in its territory. The term ‘citizens’ as used in this
paragraph, includes also all legal persons, partnerships, and
associations created or organized under the laws in force in
the respective contracting State. In this paragraph the word
‘taxes’ means taxes of every kind or description, whether Fed-
eral[,] State, or municipal.” {15 U.S.T. 1831-1832.)
—
prohibitions as well by describing both the airplanes
involved in the SAS case and the containers involved
here as instrumentalities of commerce. This generic
description of ships and airplanes does not appear,
in the relevant provisions of the 1939 convention be-
tween Sweden and the United States. || In any event,
so far as the convention with Sweden is concerned,
[] [as] Justice Traynor pointed out in his dissent
in the SAS case that, properly interpreted, this treaty
does not apply to local property taxation at all. (56
Cal.2d at pp. 47-48.)
The same thing, however, cannot be said with respect
to the supplementary convention thereto. But in advising
ratification by the United States of this convention,
the United States Senate did so on the basis of a
report from its Foreign Relations Committee, which
stated that the replacement paragraph in its protocol
(which we quoted in fm. 4) merely restated “for the
sake of clarity” the requirement of its predecessor para-
graph of nondiscriminatory tax treatment as between
citizens and non-citizens (Tax Conventions and Proto-
cols with Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and
Japan, Rep. of the Sen. Foreign Relations Com., Ex.
Rep. No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. at p. 65 (1964)).°
Admittedly the taxation at issue in this case does not
violate this requirement.
5In determining the effect of an international agreement
as domestic law, a court of the United States is to some
extent required to take into account domestic sources in the
formation of an international agreement such as committee
reports indicative of the meaning that the United States Senate
has attached to an international agreement in cases where the
nent, aS a matter of international law, requires the assent
of the Senate (Rest. 2d Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (1965) § 151, com. (b)(i), pp. 462-463; compare
Traynor, J., dissent, SAS, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 48).
— =
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
(]
Manuel, J.
We concur:
Bird, C. J.
Tobriner, J.
Mosk, J.
Clark, J.
Richardson, J.
*Jefferson, J.
*Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Coun-
cil.
———
Order Modifying Opinion.
In the Supreme Court of the State of California.
Japan Line, Ltd., et al, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v. County of Los Angeles et al., Defendants and Appel-
lants, L.A. 30703 Super Ct. Nos. SO C-25617, SO C-
27593, SO C-30557. Filed Dec. 28, 1977.
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on Novem-
ber 18, 1977, and reported in the Official Reports
(20 Cal.3d 180) be modified in the following particu-
lars:
1. On page 187, line 7 of the second full paragraph,
the words “the county” are changed to the words “local
entities” so the sentence reads:
The continuous presence of these containers,
as well as any instrumentality of commerce, in-
volves the constant use of many facilities provided
by the state and here, local entities; e.g., harbor
facilities, roads, bridges, water supply, as well
as fire and police protection.
Clerk’s Office, Supreme Court, 4250 State Building,
San Francisco, California 94102.
Dec. 28, 1977
I have this day filed Order Rehearing Denied In
re: L.A. No. 30703 Japan Line, Ltd. vs. County of
Los Angeles
Respectfully,
G. E. Bishel
Clerk
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.