Petition — Maurice Proctor v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary

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—-

In TILE RCI Vici

suntals COUNT OF THs WIITLD STATO DEC 17 1977

OCTOU:R Tint, 1977 OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, US.

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MAURICE Ce PAQCTUx

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WATLDEN, 1A YLAND Pols.

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PsPitIOy FOR A wart OF CurtoRrrs tO

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; ab } inueice Ce Procter Pro SGe

Movember 26, LOTT an % hae

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paltiiuors, barylam 21202

INDrm

OPINION BELOW

JURISDICTION

QUESTIONS PRESLUTSDs

1. That Potitioner's guilty plea was unconstitutional

beeuuse he ves not fully ennraised by tae trial

court or nig counsel against conpulsory seli-ine-

crininatione

,. That Petitioner's Trial Counsel was incometent and

did not provide hin witha genulns roprosent2tion vio-

Lated his “LPthy, sister azul “ouryecnta ezondaonts to

equel protection ani due procesbe

3. That Potitioner's hane was illerally searchod by &

Fazally Sovestive Search Varrant the Prosecution ene

gaged in lelLicious liisconducte

he ‘That Petitioner was denied faix and complete Evidone

tiary Hearing in the Court below and tne State Courthe

STATESINT OF CASES

REASONS FOR GiailinG Ti WRIT

le Public Intorest

2, Whether Constitutional safeguards have substantielly

been erodode

CONCLUSIOS

MOTION AND APFITAVIT Dl SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCDLD

ON WRIT OF CUNTIONARI Di FOMMA PAUPLALS

(iI)

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12, 13, Lby ly Uy 17s 2s

19, 20, 22, 22

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In Tits

SUPREME COURT OF THs UNITZD STATIS

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

WO.

MAURICE C. PROCTOR PETITIONR,

ViRSUS

WARDEN, MARYLAND PSNTTAUTIARY RESPOUDANT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 10 THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

THe PETITIONR, MAURICS C. PeuctuR, RUSPMOTFULLY PRALS DUT

WRIT OF CERTIORARI 15504 TO REVIwW Tile JUDGLM:NT AUD OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR Tis YOUNTH CIRCUIT ENTARED IN TiS PROCLSUI.G

ON AUGUST 12, 1977 AND RENLARING LNDANG, WOVEMBER 2, 197Te

a»

(III)

OPINION BuLOW

THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF TALS IS UNREPORTED I SLIP OPINION WO. 76<0

(Fourth Circuit, 1977) AND THE ORDER DRIYING REARING APPEARS IN TilS APP)DID

THORETO. THE OPINION OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF MAHYLAND APPEARS, IN TiDt APPIO:DIX

THERETO.

JURISDICTION

TUE JUDGMENT OF THB COURT OF APPEALS FOR TH FOURTH CIRCUIT WAS EWEUD AUGUST

1, 1977. A PEPITION FOR RAZARLIG ENBANG WAS FILED AND SUBSEQMENILY DINIED HOVRER

2, 1977» THIS PETITION FOR CHRTIONART WAS FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF TiiiT DATE. TiS

COURT'S JURISRICTION Is MVOKED UNDIR 26 U.S.C. SECTION 125k (1).

TISTIONS PRESENTED

1. That Petitioner's cuilty ples wes unconstitutional because he was not fully

anpraised by the triel court or his counsel of his right against commulsory

evlf-incrininatione

2. That Petiticner's Trial Counsel wes incompetent and cid not provide hin with

gemine representation violated his fifth, sixth an@ fourteanth anencncnts

to omusl protection and due processe

3- That Petitioner's home wus 4Ucrally searched by A Fatally Defective Search

warrant the Prosecution Snraged in jiclicious Hisconducte

he THat Petitioner was denied a fair end complete bvidentiary Hearing in the

Court below and the State Courtse

qv)

REASON FOR GRANTING PSTITILN POR A WRIT OF CiRTIORARI

The Petitioner respectfully moves this Honorable Court for a Petition for \rit

of Cortiorari pursuant to Rule 53 of the Supreme Court of The U. S. Procedure, Petieg

tioner contends inter alias thet there exists substantial question of law regarding

controlling ' Jurisdiction ' in Petitioner's litiga’'ion before the federal courts.

Moreover, Petitioner stresses that he initiated Habeas Corpus Proceedings in the United

States District Court for the District of Maryland on September 16, 1975 pursuant to

Mtle 28 U.S.C. Section 221 thru 2254 contesting the unconstitutionality of his une

lawful confinement in custody of the Respondent against his will in restraint of his

liberty in violation of the laws of the United States and Maryland, Petitioner's pevtie

tion was filed according to and with the Habeas Corpus Act, Article 2 United States

Constitution, Contrary to the Court's finding below which based its determination on

the Civil Rights Act Statue, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which deals exclusively with Civil

Rights violation in the nature and scope of torts, damages, etc, Petitioner notes,

particularly, that he has never, at anytime invoked the Civil Rights Jurisdiction te

contest this case at bar or to confer upon this court nor the court below authority

to hear and determine his case according to that statutory provisions, considering

the court's liberalistic interpretation of his Pro Se petition or application shod

not have been sonstrued to be otherwise than ae cet forth. Seer Haines V. Kerner, Lid;

Usd. 519 (1972)+ Tho Civil Rights Act provision doss not prescribe remedies or relicf

for Petitioners seeking ' custody relief * » See Presiser V. Rodriguez, 93 Se Cte 1627,

36 L. Ede 439 (1974) Thore the United States Supreme Court Saids

®..seclut we need not in this case explore the appropriats limits of Habeas Core

pus as an alternative remedy to a proper action wider Section 1983. fhat question is

not before use What is involved here is the extent to which section 1963 is @ porise

sible alternative to the traditional remedy of Habeas Corpus. Upon that question, we

hold today that where a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or sturation of his

-le

ale

phyvical impr isonnent and relief he secks 4s a determination that ho 4s entitled vo

immediate or more speedy release from that impriscmment, his sole federal remedy is a

Wit, of llabeas Corpus, according, we reversed the judgement before use"

The Petitioner further quotes from the rationale of the Supreme Court in cafee

guarding the rights of the accused who has suffored constitutional deprivationse ib

said in Pay V Wola, 372 U.S. 391 at LOL "se. Ite root principal is that in a civilized

society government must always be eccountable to the judiciary for a man's inpriscrsent 5

If the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of

lov, the individual is entitled to his immediate release." (aophasis Supplied) Petitioner

argues from the posture that if the court below had reviowed his " application for leave

to appeal * in the light and under the Civil Rights Act jurisdiction and prodicated its

finding and conclusion, then 4t follows that Petitioner has been substantially denicJ

a fair and complete bvidentiary Hearing in the District Court appellate rovicw, thoroe

fore, an iMmbanc Review Hoaring was & Judicia& Mecessity for the proper and orderly

adwinistration of Justice and Due Processe The Practice complained of hus departed from

the principles of Equal Protection and ive Process, as to call to exercise this Court's

powers of suparvisione

STATINSIT OF CASS

On September 16, 1975, The Petitioner, Maurice Ce Proctor, in Propor Persons filed

4n the United States District Court for the District of Marylend a Petition For & Wit

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 22),1 thru 2254. He sought reliof om sove

eral grounds of constitutional magnitudes To wits

1. That his guilty plea was ynoonstitutional because he was not fully appreise

by the trial court or his counsel of his right against compulsory selfeincriminatione

That he did not freely, voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional rights

intentionallye

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2, That Petitioner's trial Counsel was incompetent and did not provide hin with

genuine representation violated his fifth, sixth and fourtecnth amendments to equal

protection snd due procecse That counsel failure is in the following ani

a. To properly investigate and prepare defense of case

be To file necessary pretrial and postrial motions, ©.£e

epeedy trial, suppression, dismissal and appeale

3, That Petitioner's home was illegally searched by @ fatally defective search

warrsnt end the vrosecution engaged in malicious misconducte

he That Petition was denied a fair and complete evidentiary hearing in the court

below and the state courts.

The Listrict Court Issued an * Order to Show Cause “ on September 18th, 1975 te

be issued on or before October 31, 1975, The Appellee filed a Motion for Extension of

Tine on October 26, 1975. Motion was granted October 29, 1975 to include extensicn to

Yovenber 15, 1975 Petitioner filed on October 31, 1975 Motion For Mandamus to Compel

Obedience to Mandate in the United States District Court of Maryland and Motion for

Sumary Judgenent in opposition to Respondent's Motion. On July 2, 1976 the District

filed a Memorandum and Order denying relief as prayed by the Appellant, tut found that

appellant issue regarding incompetent counsel denied him of effective assistance of

eounrel and did not represent his best interest. However, the cour did not afford ape

pellant opportunity to prove this contention and findings

Petitioner entered a notice of appeal to this court on August 2, 19762 Ga Deore

ber 21, 1976 Petitioner's Motion for ixtention of time to obtain records, documents

and transcripts pertinent to the itcaes raised in tie Light of not utilizing the cise

covery rules below. Notion was unofficially granted, in that, Petitioner was not noe

tified whether the court granted hia Notion or denied ite However, On Agust ll, 1977»

This Court Decided Petitioner's Appeal ani affirmed the ruling below. 1t is noteworthy

to point-out this affirmacy was predicated on A Civil Nicht's Statue Title )” oe

aje

«he

g 1903 snd not the liabeas Corpus provisions, which invalidates this court holdings i:

gatd relies 4s currecte Petitioner again Motioned this court for additional extengion

of time, because hoe was unable to secure the record, documents, and transcripts necose

sary to effectuate an effective appeal. Ths Motion for extension of time was franved,

but no mention of the Motion for appointment of counsel or request for production of

documents to Rule 10, 12 of Fed. R. App. Procedure. See (Exhibit) i

STATQLIT OF FACTS

The Petitioner was convicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City of the State

of Maryland on September 16, 1973 in a Plea Bargain, to count (2) one in Crininal Ine

dictnent # 6909 -11/703 count (1) one Criminal Indictment # 6510011/70 involving vice

lations of Narcotic Laws of Marylands to count (1) of Criminal Indictment # 66L.811/ 72

the wlawful possession of a handgun, the sentences of twenty (20) years and 5 youre

to be served concurrently. Appeal therefrom was not noted or entered.

On January 5, 1975, Petitioner intitiated his first post conviction petition pire

guant to Article 27, Section 645 A@d of Maryland Annotated Codes, and LX 10 esqe of

Maryland Rules of Procedures. Un March 12, 1975, Patiticner moved to supplicment post

couviction to includes Exhibit (¢)

1. Illegal search and seigure

2. Inadequecy of counsel

3. illegal sentence

be Prosecution misponduct

Incomplete evidentiary hearing was conducted on June 6, 1975 waere co.nsel was

appointed to reprsent him. The hearing court liznited its findings and revicw to cu.y

the contentions raised on the original post conviction petition and denied relief sow ht

thereafter, Petitioner was advised by appointed counsel to enter on his own behalf o

notice for leave for application for an sppeal. July Sth, 1975 Application was denied

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by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Potitioner filed 6 Writ of Uabeas Corpus

in the United States District Court for the District of iuryland contending thst his

confinement me in violation of the “aws of the United Strtes inter alia., relief

preyed was ceniod July 2,5 1976~ Potitioner noted this Appeal which was reviewed and

affirmed August 1, 1977s Potitioner is now oceling Rehearing Inbano und wishes to

note that he is ond has been proceeding in both the federal courts and state courts

without tic necessary cocuments or vocores and transcripts to effectively have ressone

ablo eccess 10 the court, to appraise this court of the grave constitutional viclee

tions hereine

ARGU TIT

I, That Petitioner's guilty plea was unconstitutional because he was not fully

eppraised by the triel court or his counsel of his right against compulsuy seif~ine

criminatione

The Petitioner directs this court to the United States Supreme Court's line of

cases rocarding plea bargain and guilty please The Court has cet standards amd cuiice

lines by wich pleas are to be negotiated bye Sees Santoballo Ve lea York, L04 UsS-

2575 Brody Ve United States, 377 USe T[2, TSly 7523 AcTelie Standards relating te

Pleas of Guilty 1-3 (approved dreft 1953) or ALI Mode). Code of prewarraipment proe

cedure secticn 250.0 comontary (1975). The Court has held repeatedly in recent yours

thet a quiliy pleas is a lawful trial where standards are adhered to and where feasible,

the court has encourrged and condoned its practice. Its most recent opinion expounding

on this rationale is Blackledge Ve Allison, Slip Opinion No. T5-1L93, docidad Nay 2,

1977 at pece 7 (II) The Court Saids oo.itmtevor might bo the pituation in en ideal

world, the fact is thet the guilty pleas and the often concormitant plea barzcin are

important coppononts of this country's crimincl justice syate, properly edninio reds

whey can bonetit all concerned. The defendant uncertainties of a trial he pais &

speedy Cisposition of his case, the onance to acimovledco his quilis, cmd & pre met

Se

he

start in realizing whatever potential there may be rehabilitation. Judjcs and prose=

cutors camsexve vital and scarce resources. The public ie protected from the risks

posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are ot large on beil while awiting

completion of criminal proceedings Wr ccccee” Although noting that in colleteraliy ate

tacking a plea of guilty a prisoner ' nay not ordinarily repudiate * statemenvs made

to the sentencing Judge wham the plea was entered, tie court observed that m2 prosed=

ural device for the taling of Guilty pleas is so perfect in desirn and cxarcise os

warrant a pox’ se rendering it Uniformly Invulrerable to subscgurnt chilicn76e" The

Allison Court further noted that inspite of the defcndant's in court declaration of

his: predicated on the advise of counsel, he also wis advised to conceal any plea bare

gain from the trial court and that his denial of any promises had been cade might nave

Leon a courtroom * RITUAL MORE SuAN TIAN RAL '3 The Court relicd upon the folloving

nuthorities te substantiate their holdings United States V Notartiyy, 433 Fe 22 291, 533

( CA 1)5 walters V Merris, L460 7. 24 983 (cA 4) United States V wWillinns, 457 Tre 2a

9403 P7919 Note 13 (CA4)s Bryan V United States, 192 Fe 24 775, 7000751 (GA 5) ioody

¥ United States, LOT Fe 2d 259, 3620363, und ne 2 CA 7)3 Fountsine V United Staves

Ill US. 213, Machibroda V. United States, 363 U.S. 27. The Potiticnar's contvenvica

contention based apon the foregoing authorities cupra, as cited by the Suprens court

to the affect that a Guilty Plea, per se, is not so insurmounteble or formiceble as

rot to be collaterally attacked where the nlea is 4nvalide In Menna Ve State of Now

York, Siip Opinions Noe 75-501, decided November 1/, 1975 the court said at page 3,

Ne Zeccee “either Tollett V Senderson, ll U.S. 253, Nor our easlicr cases on which

it relied, eee Brady Ve United States, 397 Use 742, and Mdfenn Ve Richardson, 377

UeSe 7595 stand for the proposition that counseled guilty pleas inevitably WAIVE oll

antecedant constitutional violations. If thay did so hold, the New York Court cf Ap=

peals might be correcte However’, in Tollett we emphasized that incrediant of v:is line

of cason, ide, at 266. The Point of these cases is Uist « counseled plea of cuilty is

an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where volunta:y and intellicmt, it

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to validly renoves the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, fectual

guilt is o oufficient besis for the State's imposition of punishment. A Quilvy plea,

thorsfore, simply renders irrcbevant those constitutional violations not logically ine

consistent with the valid establishwent of factual guilt is validly establisned, lice,

however, tho cleim is that the state may not convict potitioner no matter how validly

his fcctual guilt is established. The Cullty Plea, therefore, docs not bar tne claine®

The PetLiioner invokes the came rationale eployed in the Nenna and Allison Court and

thoir corpanion cases, where inspite of what may appear to be cverwhelming evidence

acainst him, ho has satisfactory demonstrated at the Post Conviction Proceeding that

his Guilty Plea was involuntary given and his Attorney was incompetent, tims, his con=

wiction cannot stands The court below relied exclusively on tue Post Conriction and

crinl Transeripts to make its determination as ‘to Appellant voluntariness to his guilty

plea, in its extensive Merorendum md Opirton the Court attempts to or is dcliberately

amicuous wieloar or vague in so far 6s Genonstrating that the trial court and counsel

had full appraised the Petitioner of his right arainst compulsory self-incrinination

and thot no unZevoreble inference would be made if he elected to stand trial with a

jurye

At pace & thru 5 the District Court quotes colloque at trial court which is as

follewinss

Wy, Howard (defense counsel): Yor the record, Your Honor, I h=ve had extene

sive converzations with my clicnt revarding these indictments and I heave aivised lin

of all of kis richta as to a jury trial ami a plea of not suiltye I have advised hin

that on a cuilty plea and a statement of facts is giving up hisricht te a confrontation

of witnesses in order to cross examine theme I have also advised him that he is sivin:

up his richt to produce witnesses and other defense motions he would have us vo the cusin

of custody in -his cases

For the Record, Mave I stated it correctly, Hre Porctor?

“rhe Defendants Yebe

mo, Mowerds And, you agree to waive all those rirhts?

Wee CQUNTs Before the Court cun accept the plea of guilty, it mst be chown

that the plea is voluntary und not throuch my threacvs or incisenenes tna

wich the understanding of tha nature of vhe plea and the possivie conco

cronces of the sleade I want to be sure that he is doing 1t conscicusly and

he is waiving and civing up his rights guaranteed to hin by sie Joryiic ond

the Federal lave

=7o

tad

® Do you rant to tell him about the consequences of tho pica?

t Mo. Howards For the Xcord, a plea of puilty would loeavo nothing for

the Court except to hear thw siatement of facts and irmose the se:1vence

end the wecirun is twentyeZive years on the first tio indictments «nd

the third indictment cm be a three year scntence and @ thousand coilor

fine " (ire 3-5)

Petitioner points out furthor where the court below stated in sunpors of ite finiin:,

4% saids " « » « e Although the colloouy botween petitioner and tha judce ws virturiirs

nenee-i.stent (emphasis supplicd), the record indicates that petitioner had boon acvised

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of his richtse by his attormcye"®

Potitioner contends that she record is silent as to the court or the counsel Eye

praising hin of his constitutional right to his sixth easendment und fifth oncndecnt

righta of sclf{f-insrimination contrary to the cictate and etandard established by boy=

kins. The Trizl Court, Post Convicuion Court and tho Federal Court had a nwxiavury coty

to resclve any end al constitutional questions of law before entoring its decrees

HMoresvex, the Petitioner invites the court to consider also whet tho Suprew Cours said

in Hendervon Ve Morgan, 462 UsSe 637 0 7 eooce “A ples ray be involuntary citaer beccuse

the accused doce not understand the nature of the constitutional protection thet he is

waivint, Sece Gefe Johnson Ve Zerbst,y Dh UsSe 153, LékeLS53 or because he has such on

incorplevwe understanding of the chergee That his ples comnot stand as an intellicent

admission of cuilte Without sdequate notice of the nature of the charge ariinst him or

proof that he in fect underrtood the charge the ploa :cannot be voluntary in this latter

senses Suith Ve O'Grady, 312 UsSe 3290" at pe 2 « » o” Plainly, & defendant cammot ine

telliccntly reach that conclusion if he ces not kmow the elements of the crine to which

he is ploading and therefore does not know what the state has to proves snd his icnorent

decision to plead guilty under such circuastances is not & reliable indication that he

is in foct guilty ¥ Likewlse appellant contends that the olenenis of the crine end the

intent were necesanry elements of the offense in which he was -wt appraised nor did tue

state or the aypclles prove that the Appellant " walrod his constitutional rights vole

untary or intelligently, cince it becames the states’ burdem of proof to chow that ape

Se

De

pellent intcllicently, relinquished known richtse See Johnson ¥. Zerost, Supra, Far

the Host part in the State of Maryland the case law controlling guilty pless are sub-

stantially the sane as emunciated in the Supreme Court's case laws and citations, Of

WiLLiass Ve State, 10 Mae Appe 5703 McCall V. State, 9 Nde Appe 1913 Im lish Ve Stave,

299 A 2a liks Davis Ve State, Supra, McCarthy Ve State; PeCePeCe 2573, 8/2/7136 In tice

Carthy Ve State, Supra, The Post Conviction Judge recogmized the dilanmma attatched to

congtrueing the situation whether an accused infact understood his constitutional rights

very cuccinily and uniquely peraphased the question at pe 5-6 whon it calds seeee" 1

don't think there is any question over the fact that Mzte McCarthy is en intelligent

persone Juci:e O'Donnell sensed that, and I co too in thir proceedings but that dossn't

answer the quostion, unfortunately, it io L7AT IS IT THAT OF WS TO EZ eM LUEIGE

AbOUT? I cucss that is on exicmrd way of putting it but I guess that is really wit

1% comes down weenie that the record before Judge O'Dommall, and the record made

in this court doesn't affiraatively establish that the defendant was fully evpraised

of the rermdfications of hie richt to protection against sclfpincriminations nor du2a

4% show that he witeratood those ricute end Imowlinly vaived then™, in that cased, leie

The McCarthy, she Judge reversed the conviction, bottom on the lnglish case, cited suprée

The Petitionar's case is identical insofar es circumstances end eituation end not as

to the type of offenses In the inglish Case, Om March 30, 1971, in the Criminal Court

of Baltimore, Michard English pleaded guilty to the 1st count of the indicurent pree

penting that on November 28, 1970 that he wilewfully distributed heroin, Iiic ples vas

scceptod and he was sentenced to 5 years. ile annealed (emphasis added) and clained

thet the nloa was not freely, voluntarily and intelligently madee The case wont besore

the court of special Appeals of Meryland, where the record disclosed that both the

court ond defense counsel made extensive inouiries of Inglish to determine the volune

tary nature of his, plea. Their inquire was comprehensive oxce>t for whe riplt againss

compubsoryeselfeincrimination. The record did not show, explicitly that he Lnvellizently

understood and waived that right. the Court of Special Appeals said in reversin; cy lish

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see” Unices tho record affimatively chose that he, tho defencant understood this

priviledge and waived 4t in the constitutional sence, acceptance of his puilty plea

4s not cffoctivets English Ve Stas Supr@e

Aplea of cuilty must be nade with the probable consequences in mind, including:

the maximum sentence the Gofendant can resolve if convicted. Marvel Ve Unitod States,

300 UsSe 262 (1962)- If a plea is not Inalngly made, it camot be accepted by 4 trial

court or used to convict a cofendante Such & conviction is obtained in violniton of ihe

guarantees of due process %0 which an eccused is entitled, md is therefore Woide lice

Carthy, supray Boykin, cupras Machivroda V- United States, 263 UeSe 37, 93 (1902)$

Herman Ye Clatiy, 350 UsSe 116, 120-121 (1956)5 Cf. Vialey Ve Johnson, 315 UeSe 90,

10, (1942), the United States Supreme Court noted the importance of the guilty plea

tn erininel trial practice and its meaning for defendantst eee " A plea of pullty cite

fers in purpose and affect fron & mere odaissionoor an extrajudicial confessions 4t is

itself a conmvictione Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusivce Hore is not reanlrods

the court has nothing to do but give judceuent and sentences Oat of just consideration

for persons accused of crimt, courts are careful thet a ples of guilt shall not be

secepted unless mado voluntarily after proper advice and with £12 understendin, of

the consequences » Ide at 223 (omphasie edied)". the doctrine identified in Kercheval

wan ertioulated in Doykins Ve AlabamB, Cupra, the Court deceribod due process requisites

associated with the guilty plea. It hold that afi offer of & guilty plea iy an encused

cennmot automatically be treated as a knowing and voluntary waiver of rightse A trial

court first must be convinced thet 4 defendant both understands tho sismificance of &

guilty plea and intends to waive his richts before 1t accepts a please von vhouha

defendant is — by competent counsel, a trial judge still may not accept the

plea unless he has determined that it is both knowing and voluntarye Morooves, Petiidenar

contends that loykin did not establish now substantive law. It created no nev riyhts

to be enjoyed by criminal defendant and no new test of waives to be ayplicd whore &

guilty plea is used to support @ convictions It morely established that tas absence o-

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any indication in the record that a cuilty plea was kmowing and voluntary is rovernible

errors There the principal concern of the court in Boykin was the sane due process ise

suc first identified in Kercheval waich heldeee" What is at stake for wn accused fucing

death or irprisonnent derands the utmost solicitudes of which courts are capable in ome

vassinz the matier with the accused, to make sure he has 6 full understanding of wast

the plea connotes and of its consequencese Doykins, Supra *.

Finally, The Petitioner contends from the overall perspective that the most in=

portant consequonces of which an accused must be aware before his guilty piea ia ace

ceptcad by a taial court is his right againsy self~incrinination and the length of tins

he nay de ceprived of his liberty or the maximum sentence he can receive for his offense

4¢ convluted. Moreover, argues that because he was @ first offender in the State of

Mesylmd , he wae in fact promised a term of 10 yoars instead of twenty (20) that his

expectation from his counsel's advise, that the court would only immose 10 yoars. In

sadley V~ ileeDourall, 392 Fe 2d 155 (ith Chre) Corte Denied, 393 U-5S- 67 (1968),

This Court voided a prisoner's guilty ploa entered in 1936 because “No OnesCourt or

Counsel « ascertained that balloy Understood the consequences of his plea # In the

Collateral proceedings brought by Railey in State Court in vhich he challenged the

voluwitariness of his plea, his trial counstl testified that prior to the entry of Lhe

plea he had ccploined to Bailey in State proceeding that the guilty plea meant 3 lites

sentence vould be imposed md the covernmor mifpht not follow the pardon or parole secon

naviation of tho State Officlelse Trial counsel further testified that Bailey might net

have understood the consequences or the import of the warnings Bailoy clained that he

untorsteod the consequehees of his plea even though trial counsel had expleined thom

to hltte Ide At 15le suprae Tho Bailey doctrine should apply to the instsnt casey, in

tut, the petitioner not only contends that he lacked an understanding of the conse=

quences for entering 4 guilty plea, but also that no attempt to eplain full tose

consefaences was ever undertaken by the court of his counsel, particularly to hile cb=

polute right to remain silente The Menorancum and Order of vie District Court, relird

exolualvely on the state's finding therefore, was precluded from naking a fair asrece=

«lle

#l2<

ment of petitioner's claims. Petitioner pointsout in support of whe Dailey “octrins, t's

Third Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals also adopted s ofgxilar views of the

sone rationale in eo far as ostablishing guidelines and standards and proper function

of the trial court in accepting 6 defendant's pullty pleas * “rial Courts have 2 duly

to do more than simply lista to an articulation or & yerbalisation of & plea of guilty

by a ceferdiants they have @ duty to insure that the defendant undorstands the congequonces

of his atte 0k Fe 2d Tole" Appellant contends that the duty to inowre that he uniere

stood tic direct consequences of his guilty plea was wholly abdicated by the ur el court

in vaich he was coavicted and sentencede Under the rule first adopted in tis circult

in Bailcy Ve NasDougall, supra, the burden of proof as to & defendant's Knowledge and

underetunciy of the consequences of his guilty plea is on the otatee Sees aloo Salta

Je Cons aS (ath Chr) 1970 Ware Ve Coxy 32h Fe Suppe 568 EeDs Veo 1072) Tinite oxo 8

Paboas Corpus, petitioner allozes that his plee was involuntary, the burcern onifte to

the etate to demonstrate thet the plea was properly accepted by whe trial court cad is

not Lrvlide In Ware Ve Cox, The Federal Court found, after reviewing a reovrd produced

in State Hebeas proceedings, that tho petitioner's syunsel did not inZorm him of the

possible length of sentence if ho wae convicted. That failure was held reversible error

as the State of Virginta, had not danonstrated either’s

1. Yhat the Petitioner in fact loww the consequences of his pica or

2. That it wos likely he had obtained information from mother source

before pleading guiltye

In the thstant cave neither of the above haa becn denonstrated, thorce

fore, 1% Zollows that & reversal would sppear mandatory oF the very least a remand

to the District Court for further hearing determine Petitioner's Clainse

ARcWIn:S IL

That Petitioner's Triel Counsel was incompetent and dia not provide him

with goulns representation violated his fifth, sixth, md fourieenth sanenducnts Ww

@l2-

“13

equal protection and due processe

The Petitioner contends that although counsel wis employed ty him to represent his

best interests, in so far es the instant case at bar, his duties and responsibilities

were no preater or no less than the ceneral functions of my othor counsels! or members

of the logal profession. That the Sixth Anendaent of the United Staves Constitution an=

sures every accused defendamt the right to gemuine effectiveness 6f assistance of coun-

pele Thot hirdd attorneys sre duty bound by the sane Standards of competency 6S court

eppointed attorneyBe

Most recently this court reestablished competency standards in }arzallo Ve Mary

Land, 9/2/77 CrL 2545, relying upon Vctarm Ve Richardson, 397 UsSe 719 (1970) Coles

Ve Peyton, 309 Fe 2d 22 (uth Cire 1965) UsSe Ve Decoster, 37 24 197, (CA 1 973)

UsSe ¥ rster 539 F 2d 663, (CA 8 1976) Holding the Normal Commetency Test, which is

first determined whether the defense counsel's representation yvithin the renge of come

potence domanded of attorneys in criminal cases. There in the Narsullo Cow't, ihe Court

caidt eee " An Attorney's conduct by comparison with the competence gencrelly four Lu

tho profeesion", and " requires an objective assosament of counsel's acequacy ® althouch

the court cid not stress or assured "errorless" representation but it arpheeiszed that

a criminal defendant ageinst " flayrant " ersor that results from "Nerlect! or Imnore

ence" rather than from informed professional deliberation. The Marzullo Standard 1s cone

trolling th the fourth (4th) cireuit and the instant case, tho applicability of ive

holding is overwhelmingly compelling First, and forancst reasons ares counsel], for the

petitioner through neglect or ignorance or both fail to properly prepare, investizate

or to file necessary pre-trial motions and postetrial motions, in addition, te improp=

erly advicing the petitioner to plead guilty, 98 well a3 not edviging hin that he had

the récht srainst eclfe-incrimination or that no unfavorable inferencss will be rade if

ho elocts to heave a trial by @ jury in the ebsence of the trial court failures

Petitioner argues thet the records should reflect (See Datilbit (A) ) that potitioner

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wis mrrooted in the month of November 1970 for narcotics violaticns for selling nare

cotics to undercover agent or cadet of the Baltimore County Police Dopartment, he

was subsequently indicted January ©, 1971 in Criminal Indictment Number 6009211/70

from his initial arrest end subsequent trial appellant's counsel only filed one (1)

Motion and that being one of Discovery-and-lnspectione However, during this period

fron January ©, 1971 to september 18, 1973 the day of his entering a guilty plea, a

total of 32 month under &ndictment pending trial, a pre-trial motion of Sxecdy Trint

would have precluded him from going to trial because of the length of delays TOrecver,

tho appellant has been informed that tho State's eyowltness the Esdate.ent waa cn

tour of duty in the Viet lan Conflict during this 32 month poriod of time md was wie

available to testify at trial. Moreover, the question whether the counsel had used

tactical stratecy in waiting until the witnoss returned from this tour of catye Tho ape

pellant cannot conslusively say. However, it did in facts, projudice appellant and mrce

oluied him from the opportunity to have a fair end speedy trial end substentially dc~

prived hin of his constitutional rights under the fifty ond fourteenth Aneniments ss

4s epplicable to the State. The Petitioner argues that the total circumstances of the

various factors involved in the instant case and the psychological affects of tho straia

and stress which he suffered during this period of uncertainties was one of tho ™ 4or

factors that caused him to surrender to a guilty plede Notwithstanding the fact tiat

he had no obligation to expedite or bring himsel? to speedyetrial. The Supreme Court

reoomnised the adverse affects 4n which a prolonged trial incurs, in Strunk V,. United

States, 412 U.S. 43h at 4,39 it saids " The spoody trial guarantee recognizes that @

prolonged delay may subject an accused to an emotional stress that can be presumed to

result in the ordinary porson from uncertaintios in the prospect of facing public trisl

or of receiving a senteco longer than, or consucutive to, the one he is presently ecrve

ing secee uncertainties that a prompt trial removes". (erphasis supplied) Uther pre=

trial wotions as Bill of particulars, Suppression and for digminsal wore eoually in-

portant in that, they wore necessary integral part of petitioner's trial f£orecioved

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him from an actual trinl. The failure of counsel to properly investigate and prepare

investigate and prepare the defense for the petitioner is clearly ineffectiveness of

counsel. Moreover, the record does not reflect that petitioner sought or obtained

postponenents or continuences during the same period of tine, therefore, it carnot be

said thot petitioner contributed to this length of delays Here again the petiticner

takes the liberty to quote from the United States Supreme Court where they hold that

pretrial proceedings are 48 vital to the defendant in a criminal trial, as the trial

4tcelf. In Brewer V. William, Slip Opinion, Noe7e1263 at pages 9-10, the court oaids

wee " This right guaranteed by the S4xth and Fourteenth Amendments, is 4indispensable

to the fair administration of our adversary system of Criminal Justice, Its yitel

neod at the protrial stage has perhaps nowhere been more succinctly explained than in

Me, Justice Sutherland's memorable works for the court hy years ago in Powell V Alne

bama, 287 U.S. LS at 57 eee ° (D)uring perhaps the most critical period of the proe

ceedings against these defendants, that ie to say, from the time of their erreicment

ntil the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough coing investiration

and preparation were vitally ixportant, the defendant did not have the aid of consol

4n any real sense, although they were as vuch entitled to such aid of counsel during

that period as at the trial itself ' sHHneHHeHeeee Thore has occassionally been a

aifforence of opinion within the Court as to the preiphsral scope of thio constitutionaL

right. Sees Kirby V. Illinois, 06 U.S. 6825 Coleman V, Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 but its

basic contours, which are 4dentioal in State and Federel contexts, Gideon V. Vaiusri¢ht,

372 U.S. 3353 Argersinger V. Hanlin, 07 U.S. 25, are too woll established to require

extensive elaboration here, Wiatever, else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by

the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Asendments means at least that a pereon is entitled

to the help of a lawyer at or after tho time that judicial proceeding 8 have been inie

tiated against hin wenaeueene? Whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hoarint,

{ndictment, information, or arraingment *.coce” Furthermore, Counsel. failure, to advise

iG

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petitioner that he had the rijht to Appoal his Guilty Plea, the record will show that

no appeal was noted, It is argued thet post-trial motions are equally important, 45

the pre-trial motions, The failure of counsel to psrform crucial and vital functions,

fatally deprived Appellant of competent representation under the Normal Corpetency Tost

adopted by this court, since it is established that counsel is obligated to establish

that ell available defsnoss are raised. Sees U.S. Ve Dennett, LO9 F. 2d C58 (2d Cire

1969)» UsS. Ve Achy 413 U.S. 3005 U.S- Ve Decoster, Supra, at ne 22 that coury ssid

the following: +e.” Coles V. Peyton, 389 Fe 2 d 22h) eveee Counsel for an indigent

defendant should be appointed promptly counsel should be afforded a reasonable oppore

tunity to prepare, to defend an accused. Counsel mst confer with his client without

undue delay and as dften as necessary, to advise him of his rights and to elicit mite

ters of defense or to ascertain that potential defense unavailable. Counsel must cone

duct appropriate investigations both factual and legal, to determine if mtters of

defense can be developed and to allow himself enough tine for reflection and prepers=

tion for trial. Sees State V. Harper, 57 Wis 2d Sh3, 205 Ne We 2d 2 (1973)" Also Sees

Beasley V. United States, L491 F. 2d 687 (197) The Court of Appeals for the sixth Cire

cuit held that the defendant had boen afforded * Incompetent and ineffective Ronresone=

tation ", it held that before and during trial, the District Court denied Defoncant's

motion to vacate the sentence and judgement on the ground that his Attorney's periorme

ance had rendered the trial as a ® @arce and a mockery, shocking to the court". The

Appeal Court reversed the district court's holding and joined the fifth and District

of Columbia Circuits in abandoning the * Farce and Mockery " test as @ standard for

testing Sixth Améndment claims of ineffective Counsel. Tracing the origin of the Farce

and Mockery standard from a view, since rejected, that the Sixth Amendment cuarantced

no more than the formal appointment of competent counsel, the court concluded.s..eit

maid t eee ® We hold that the assistance of counsel required under the sixth ancndnent

4s counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.

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alfe

It is a violation of this standard for defense counsel to deprive a criminal defendant

of a substantial defense by his own ineffectiveness or incompetence". See: also Foote

notes 15, 21, 22 #rerican Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,

Standards relating to the Defense function (app. Draft 1972). It is further contended

by the Petitioner that due to the nature of his arrest in 1970 regarding narcotic vice

lation, tnat the prosecution lacked probable cause to have errested him, first because

the informant/agent=cadet, or infromant did not file an affidavit and warrant to arrest

him and secondly, there exists a substantial question as to the reliability of the s0-

called informant, The Petitioner did not sell drugs to the alleged cadet-agent, there-

fore, there is a reasonable inference as to why the prosecution demanded a sveedy trial

for fear of police misconduct. The counsel for the pstitioner in his defense prepara-

tion should have been able to determine these facte inter alia, nonetheless, his faiie

ure to act over the 32 month period of iime to dispose of the instant case ettests to

his incempetencye

ARGUMENT IIT

That Petitioner's home was 4llegally searched by A Fatally Defective Search

Warrant the Prosecution mgaged in Melicious Misconduct.

The Petitioner contends that another major factor which induced and coerced his guiit

plea was tho 4nnumerious drug charges which the police department of PAltirore City

was framing him wits, their constant harassing and intimidating his family, in thoir

efforts to remove the Petitioner from the commmnity or the "Streets". The Record will

reflect (See: Exhibit (A) ) the various times the rrosecution or the police department

had attempted to have appeJlant's bond revoked or increased, or fraudulently concock

situations which provides them with an opportamity to arrest him. Moreover, cace in

point, On July 23, 2h, and 25, 1973 respectively. The local laitinore Police Depart-

ment, the Narcotics Unit, raided the Petitioner's home on successive days and nipnts

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-1h-

without proper warrants and affidavits to search his premises, That because of Petie

ticner's wife's refusal to admit the police in her home without proper authoriz2tioa

and documents, the police in retaliation, secured (enly) arrest wrrant for nor, prede

$cated on on unsupported testimony of an alleged anonymous informant, Clainins that snes

was maintaining house of commen nuisance, illegal manuracturing, distributing, storage

ing and concealing & narcotic drug in violation of Varyland's Lew Article 27, Section

26 (2) (5) The prosecutor subsequently lodged criminal information Sees Leiivits

(3 & C) against ths Petitioner and his wife for manufacturing and distributing are

cotics. The warrants are devoid of dates, time, place, or affidavit, nor specizicaticn

as to the tine of these transactions, particulariy as they pertain to pov tdoner'*s w2i'@e

The Petitioner arjues that his hired attorney ghould nave diligently debunk this dlabol-

geal ccheme in which the prosecution had designed in order to 4nduce and coures poti#

tioner to plead guilty on the then (3) throes years-old narcotic chargs(s)e Forces

Exhibit(d) the police purported that they had information of Petitioner's 4llicit ote

tivities, however, lock probable causa to arrest or search his hone, however, in isile

4ng to gain laxful consent cf the appellant's wife to conduct an exploratory S°2TC1l,

they use other unlawful means to gain entry to his hows. The Fourth end Foursveentin Ancande

ments requires a consent not coerced by explicit or implicit means by 4mplied threat

or covert force. For no matter how subtly the coercion were applied, the resubtin? “cone

sent” would be no mere than & pretext for the unjustified police intrusion avainst weisch

the fourth Amendnuent is directed in the words of a classic admonition in Poyd Ve Vaiicd

States, 126 U.S. 616 at 635." eee It may be that it 4s the obnoxious thins ia its mide

est and least repulsive forms but 4llegitinate and mneonstitational practices get thoir

first footing in that way, nanely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from Jee

gal modes of procedures. Ynis can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constiq

tutional provisions for the security of person end property should be liberally cone

s wed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, ani leads

to gradvcl cepreciation of the right as if it consisted more in sound than in substencue

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It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the viticen,

and against any stealthy encroaciments thereon".

The Petitioner invokes the rationale used in berger Ve United States, 295 UeSe

78 (1935) where the Suprene Court seidt " The United States Attorney is the ropresene

tative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose oblisse

ticn to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and

whose interest, therefore, in 8 criminal prosecution is not thet 4t shall win a cas6,

but that justice shall be done. As such, he is ina peculiar and very definite sense

the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or

4rnocer.a9 suffer, ile may prosecute witd earnesiness and vigoreindeed, he should do 30.

Dut, woile he my strike hard blows, ho is not at liborty to strike foul onese It is

ts mich his duty to refrain from inproper methods calculated to produce @ urengiul ccne

viction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about ¢@ just one. Salah lala

It ts feir to say that ths average jury, in a greater cr lezs degree hes confidcnce Eisd

these obligations, which so plainly rest upon the prosecuting ettorncy will be faithitule

ly observed. Consequentiy, improper suggestions, insinuations and especially, aasertee

ticas of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused “hen they

should propsrly carry none sece”s Although criminal informetion was dismissed arainst

petitioner's wild, 4t vas done as a part of the plea bargein and not because of the

prosucutionts desire to insure justicee

ARGUIIT IV

That Petitioner was Denied a Fair and Complete Lvidentiary

lie wring in the Court Relow and The State Courtse

44tioner contends that 68 & Pro Se litigant hs should have been given 4 full cppeore

tunity to present evidence in support of his claims, perticularly, in the light tat

«19

200

he was summarily denied an evidentiary hearing bolow, pecondly, his Motions filed in

opposition te Hotions of ths State for extension of tine and summary judgement ghould

have been granted in the light of the fact, that petitioner was not provided sccess to

tho records, documents or transcripts or other discoverable itens of the state in which

to feirly contesting his conviction. That the court below abused its discretion in 6xe

tending time to the appellee, in that, no excoptional circumstances was shown te ware

rant said extension of time, the cniy reasons given was for the need to cbtiin tne

post conviction tranecript which the appellant did not receive a copy 48 proviced bY

Rule and 5 Foderal Byles of Civil Procecurée iiowever, The appellant points out tat

from all indications of the Motion for extension of tine that the Post Conviction irone

peript wae not transeribed at the tine he noted his application for appeal, then it san

be reasonbly inferred that he did not receive an adequate or couplets appeliate rsview

of the post conviction hearing, which in fact vould make the Court of Special Apnesis'

arbitrarious and eopricously denied without affording appellant 4 fair rovies on tae

constitutional questions and claims of law. See Exhibit (e) Furthermore, ie suprsne

Court in ita vast wisdom, held in Haines V. Kerner, hoy U.S. 519 (1972) a cace wrich

concerns Pro Se corplaintants, particularly proceedings under 2 U.S.C. Section 17235

reversed a disrissal of a civil ection stating? eoooe” (&)Liegstions guch ag those 330

gerted by petitioner, however, inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the ope

portunity to offer supporting evidences 1 cannot say with assurance that uxier the

allegations of the Pro Se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standsivs wean

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, 4t appears ° beyond doubt that plaintifé can

prove no set of fects in support of his claim wich would entitlod him to relie<*. 8%

520", In addition to the Sunrene Court's Doctrine regarding pro 6e litigants, this

court has held in Wooten “Ve Chook, 527 Fe 2d 976, (uth Cire) 1975 eceernat %29 general

rule is thateces" Pro Se petitions should be liberally construcdesss” Morcovers tnis

court takes ths position that its District Courts yust be especially solicitious of

Civil Rights Plaintiffs. Sest Canty V. City of Riclumnd, Virginia Police Department,

200

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303 Fe Suppe 139% EDe Vae 197. Affirmed, 526 F. 2a 587 (uth Cire) Cert Denied, 423

U.S. 1062 (1976) eeeThere the court saids eee” A civil Rights complaint should not

be dismissed unless it appears to @ certainty that the plaintiff would not te entitled

te relief under any leczal theory which might plausibly be sugsested by the facts ale

ledred “ id at 13990 ecoe ® This solicitude for civil rights plaintiff with counsel

must be heightened when a civil rights plaintiff appears Pro S€ceee (The District Court

must examine the Pro Se complaint to 56s whether the facts alleged, or the set of facts

which plaintiff might be able to prove, could very well provide a basis for recovery

under any of the Civil Rights actse..esacoordingly, The Court is considering the vefende

ent's Motion to dismiss will not pormit technical pleading requirements to defeat the

vindication of any conet&tutional rights which the plaintiff alleces, however inartfully,

to have bean infringed. “ id at 1399-1100. Notwithstanding the general holding of the

Supreme Court and This Court insofar, 35 recognizing Pro Se litigant's rights, Pct-=

stoncr further argues reasons why the court below should have at least provice him an

evidentiary hearing to determine the merits of his constitutional clains, that pro

vious state court findings concerning his guilty plea do not control this Court's roe

view of tho issues, nor the court belowe Petitioner acknowledges thot he has bocn afe

forded an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of his plea and incompetence of aot~

torney in state courte In Re Proctor Ve State of Maryland P.C.PeAs # 2793 in the Crine

4nal Court of Baltimore Citye Sees ixhibit (£). The finding end holding ws 5° Limited

and narrow as to not cven having to been conducted, for the most part it relied on the

trial transcripts, in cpposed to the hearing itself to make 4ts determination of the

constitutional questionse The State or the Respondant is ynable to chow that petitioner

voluntarily, knowlingly and 4ntelligently entered guilty plea or whether he waived his

constitutional right of gelfeincrimination or whether the counsel wae incampetente On

the basis of the tris] court's opinion glone, 1% cannot be determined what facta tinat

that court used to arrive at its finding. There 4o no clear factwal basis in the recort

{according to petitioner's limited record aad understanding ) of that proceeding which

21+

o22=

supports the conclusions thepein as announced by the Post Conviction snd Court liclowe

Yoreover, it is not epparent how tne Court applied centrolling constitutional stande

ards to arrive at the findings it made, the court's opinion, in effect, is no rore

than a bare conglusion of Jaw unsupported by pertincat factual findinZgse Seo: 25 Uede

| C. Section 2254 (4) (8). The Court delow should have provided the Petitioner with an

evidentiary Hearings In Townsorid Ve Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) The Suprems Court held

that in Habeas proceed‘ngs the federal courts camot accept state court findines on

questions of federal law where the basis for such findings is uncloartees” asconstrice

tion (of the record) is not possible if it is disposing of the claim. Under such cire

cumstances the state court found the law of the Yacts adversely to the petitioner's con»

tentions. Since the decision of the state trial of fact may rest upon an errer of lay

rather than an adverse determinatioa of the facts a hearing is compelled to ascertain

tue facts id at 31)".

Sirilarly, in Bailey VY. MacDougall, Supra, The Fourth Circuit reversed the finde

ing of the South Carolina Courts that the prisoner's plea had not been intelligontly

made, because it could find no factual basis for that corclusion. It looked beyme the

bald findings of the State Courts and thus followed the direction of the Court in Yowne

pend Ve Sain. (See 28 UeteC. Section 2254 (es) Both Towsain and Bailey stress that it

4s improper for the Federal Courts to Swrarily adopt the findings and conclusions of

state courts when tie constitutional guoxantee of liberty has been abridged. In both

cases, the finding of local and state courts were scrutinized, and something moro then

ba re couclusions of lew was demanded in their supports Sevs 28 U.S.C. Section 22 Cede

The court below bare findings here that petitioner's plea was voluntary, knowing aad

intallivently given differ little in this respect frm the findincessupply litile xore

than bald conclusions. Those findings alone do not warrant the dicissal of Petitioner's

petition without a Full and Thorough hearing on the merits of his cogplaint. It is pree

cisely these questions that the federal judge is comsanded to docice ®brow V, Allon,

a~

~230

BL U.S. L36

In Conclusion, it is the Petitioner's prayer for the foregoing reasons as

setforth herein, that tris Honorable Court ehould grant this Petition for Writ

of Certiorari and remand it to District Court for e Full and Complete plenary

Hearing or Reverse it back to the state court for a New Trial, or what this court

deems proper and juste

Respectfully Submitted,

TAaAUPICEe Ve rrucvor PFO See

95, Forrest Street

Baltinore, Maryland 21202

“230