Petition — Joyce Beverages, Inc. v. Joyce
Supreme Court brief1978
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Text
] ‘4 Supreme Court, U. S,
FILED
APR 28 1978
AEL RODAK, JR., CLERK
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1977
No. i (or 1544
Joyce Beverages, Inc., Joun M. Joycor
and Wituiam J. CoLuier,
Petitioners,
vs.
Wu. J. Joyce, Beanice Ritzy Joyon, Mary Joyce
Hammond, Wiiuiam J. Joyor, Jr., Donormy Ann Joyon,
CatHertinge Joyce McManus, Paut McManus, Jr Joyce
KasseLMAN and Jupira Joycn Lana,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
Micwage. Lescu
Sura Goutp Curmenko & Casry
330 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Attorneys for Joyce Beverages, Inc.,
John M. Joyce and William J. Collier
Of Counsel
Micuar. Lesou,
Sanrorp A. BE.
INDEX
PAGE
Ee mniisheaolaaeiaaaten 2
SI - caiiiisscttibacesiiienniiereenetinieemniamenapineapranesineaninstenhiententes 2
NS TI ciienniittnnisiinininaipemmmnmenmnnpe 2
Statutes and Rules Involved .................cccccsscsscsssscsssseeeees 2
I GE SG FD ccrnnsttsittiniitipaennninipstinensieeaininmnasnitine 3
Be ee Te etter iadeiediitinbinincniciamees 5
B. Delaware Corporation LAW 2.0.0.0... 7
Reasons Why the Writ Should be Granted .................... pS :
A. The Majority’s Decision Below Flatly Coutra-
venes This Court’s Decision in 7'SC v. North-
way, Will Greatly Increase the Volume of
Meritless Securities Litigations in the Federal
Courts and (Unless Overturned) Will Trans-
form Proxy Statements into “Avalanche[s]
of Trivial Information” Thereby Subverting
the “Informed Decision-Making” the Seeur-
ities Laws Are Designed to Foster (426 U.S.
RSE ARREST ES 9
B. The Second Cireuit’s Decision ls in Conflict
With Decisions of the Third and Fifth Cireuits
and That Split of Authority Should Be
Resolved by This Court ..............cccccceccccsccssssseseeess 15
RR RR i Aaa CREE ENS LARD oe 17
il
PAGE
Appendix A
Judgment of Second Circuit (January 30, 1978)...... la
Appendix B
Second Circuit Opinion (January 30, 1978) .............. 2a
Appendix C
U.S. District Court Opinion (April 28, 1977) ............ 12a
Appendix D
Complaint (without exhibits) .........0cccccccccceceeseeeeeene 17a
Appendix E
Securities Exéhange Act of 1934, §10(b) coco. 26a
Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 ............ 26a
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6).... 27a
Table of Authorities
Cases:
Ash v. LFE Corp., 525 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1975) 0.0.0... 8, 15
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975), reh. denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975) occ. 11
Ernst & Ernst vy. Hochfelder, 425 U.S, 185 (1976), rek.
dented, 425 U.S. 986 (1976) ............cccccccccsssecesscsseececercee 11
Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 Supp. 240 (D.
Neb. 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir, 1973) ........ 8, 15
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 480 U.S. 1
SENT cchcicssnnseiasticdibiasiaaibinatdianaihenealbdeniianinbiamelah titel taas trate 11
Santa Ie Industries, Inc. v. Green, Inc., 430 U.S. 462
= sieineacimeccniiaisipiaapeaaataaaiaatanaianitatis ll
iii
PAGE
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438
eee 2, 9-11, 12-14
Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir, 1974) ............ 8, 15
Statutes and Rules:
Securities and Exchange Commission Rules, 17 C.F.R.
§ 200, et seq.:
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10D-5 oo... cceeecseeeeneeneees 3
Rule 144, 17 C.P.R. § 280.144 0. cccccccccccceeeeenes 4,5, 6,7,9
een 2
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a,
G0 BOBS ecncsncmsiieccisennmimnmnmeinmemnmnaenntia 1,2
See. 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 789 (b) once ceecccccceceeeeesenees 2, 3, 10, 13
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
TEED THIET cceustinnindesienbenmenenmssetbiedieenniniidunetidinngsl 1,3,9
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1977
No.
SEI Se
Joyce Beverages, Inc., Jonn M. Joyce
and Witu1am J. CoLiier,
Petitioners,
vs.
Wruiam J. Joyce, Bernicr Rmey Joycr, Mary Joyce
Hammonp, Wriuiam J. Joyce, Jr., Dorornay Ann Joyce,
CaTHERINE Joyck McManus, Paut McManus, Jmu Joyce
KasseLMAN and Juprra Joyce Lana,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
In this action brought under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the “1934 Act”), petitioners Joyee Beverages, Inc.
(“JBI”), John M. Joyce and William J. Collier request that
a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(Hays and Friendly, J.J.; Oakes, J., dissenting) reversing
in part the order of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Judge Milton Pollack) dis-
missing the complaint herein upon petitioners’ motion pur-
snant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Proeedure.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals has not been reported
at this time (2a).' Judge Pollack’s memorandum decision
and order, dated April 28, 1977, dismissing the complaint
herein is reported at 430 F.Supp. 676 (12a).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit was entered January 30, 1978 (1la).2 This Court’s
jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Second Cireuit’s decision holding that
the misrepresentations and omissions alleged in the com-
plaint herein are actionable under the 1934 Act, contravenes
the decision of this Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. North-
way, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), will greatly increase the
volume of meritless securities litigation in the federal
courts and will transform proxy statements into “ava-
lanche[s] of trivial information” (id. at 448)?
2. Whether the Second Cirenit’s decision creates a con-
flict with decisions of the Third and Fifth Cirenits which
must be resolved by this Court?
STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15. U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (26a).
1. Numbers in parentheses followed by “a” refer to pages in the
Appendix, infra, to this Petition. References herein to “JA” refer
to the separate one volume Joint Appendix in the Court of Appeals,
which has been filed together with this petition with the Clerk of
this Court.
2. Petitioners’ application to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit for a two-day enlargement of the time to file a petition for
rehearing and suggestion for rehearing in banc was denied.
3
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (26a).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6) (27a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The complaint herein, filed on December 29, 1976, is pur-
portedly based upon a transaction (the “Exchange”) con-
summated on April 30, 1973, pursuant to which four
“Seven-Up” bottling companies (collectively, the “operat-
ing companies”) were consolidated through an exchange of
the shares of those operating companies for shares in
defendant JBI. Each shareholder of the operating com-
panies was sent (1) a letter of acceptance containing the
offer (“Letter”) (2) an Agreement and Plan of Reorgani-
zation (“Agreement”) and (3) an Information Statement.
Copies of these were annexed to the complaint.
Plaintiffs are members of the same family as the prin-
cipal defendant, John M. Joyce. Prior to the Exchange,
plaintiffs owned various percentages of the outstanding
shares of the operating companies and, after the Exchange,
owned 37% of the stock of JBI. There is no claim that the
amount of JBI stock received by plaintiffs was insufficient
or unfairly calculated.
Plaintiff William J. Joyce was Chairman of the Board
of two of the operating companies and is presently a
director and the largest single stockholder of JBI.
Defendant John M. Joyce, was formerly Chairman of the
Board of one of the operating companies and presently is
Chairman of the Board of JBI. The other individual
defendant is William J. Collier, a director of each of the
operating companies and a director and General Counsel
of JBL.
Plaintiffs’ complaint (17a) asserts three counts, all of
which are alleged to be based upon Scction 10(b) of the
1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.
4
Count I of the complaint sets forth the preceding facts
and alleges:
1. That defendant John M. Joyce and his family,
defendant William J. Collier and Sidney P. Mudd (a)
control JBI, (b) own or have owned not less than 47.56%
of JBI’s outstanding common stock, (c) have never
occupied fewer than a majority of the seats on JBI’s Board
of Directors, and (d) have at all times acted in concert in
voting their shares (5 at 19a); and
2. That plaintiff William J. Joyce “relied upon the
judgment” of John M. Joyce and William J. Collier “in all
matters of consequence dealing with the affairs of JBI,”
and that William J. Collier served as the personal attorney
for William J. Joyce until approximately June 1, 1976
(76 at 20a).
Count I then alleges that the Information Statement was
misleading in that it contained three misstatements or
omissions of material fact. The first was an alleged omis-
sion to state the purported purpose of the Exchange
(710(a) at 21a). Both courts below held that this alleged
omission did not state a claim and hence it is not before this
Court.’ The remaining two alleged omissions or misstate-
ments—relating to Securities and Exchange Commission
Rule 144 (17 CFR § 230.144) and the corporation law of the
States of Illinois and Delaware—are discussed below.
Count LI repeats Count I and adds that defendants John
M. Joyce and William J. Collier were primarily responsible
for the Exchange and for the Information Statement and
that they knew or had reason to know that the Information
3. Plaintiffs alleged that the weakest of the operating companies
was the one located in New York and that the primary purpose of the
Exchange was to infuse capital into the New York operations
through loans out of funds generated by the other operating com-
panies ({[{]7-9 at 20a-2la). The Second Circuit agreed with the Dis-
_ Court that these allegations failed to state an actionable claim
(8a).
5
Statement contained untrue statements and omissions of
material fact (24a). Count III adds to Counts I and I
the allegation that defendants John M. Joyce and William
J. Collier caused the distribution of the untrue statements
of material fact and omissions with intent to defraud the
plaintiffs (25a).
Based on the above allegations, plaintiffs demand rescis-
sion of the Plan of Exchange and damages in an unspe-
cified amount (25a-26a).
Nowhere have plaintiffs attacked the fairness of the Ex-
change and thus allege no financial injury. The present
action was commenced three years and eight months after
completion of the Exchange (25a) and is one of a number
of lawsuits filed by plaintiffs against defendants in various
jurisdiction in a far-ranging intra-family dispute having no
real relationship to the federal securities laws.‘
A. Rule 144
The first of the two allegations as to misleading state-
ments upheld by the majority of the Second Circuit was an
alleged omission to advise the plaintiffs that Rule 144 would
not be “available as an exemption from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933” if JBI did not
make available certain information required under Rule
15¢2-11 of the Securities Exchange Act (10(b) at 21a-22a).
Notwithstanding the foregoing allegations, the Informa-
tion Statement, which -ppears as Exhibit B to the com-
plaint (JA35), states with respect to Rule 44:
4. This Court may take judicial notice of the following other
actions now pending between the two branches of the Joyce family:
Jill Kasselman v. Joyce Beverages, Inc., et al. (U.S.D.C. N. Dist.
Ill.) (76-C-4417); William Joyce, Jr. v. Joyce Beverages, Inc., et ano
(U.S.D.C: N. Dist. Ill.) (76-C-4328) wherein a counterclaim has
been interposed by defendants; and William J. Joyce, jr. v. James T.
Norris, et ano (Circ. Ct. Will Co. [Ill.] 12th Dist.) (76-G-3374L).
All of the foregoing actions were commenced in 1976, the same year
that the present action was commenced. The last-cited action, a libel
action, was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice and with costs
against William J. Joyce, Jr., one of the respondents in this case.
6
“Shares of common stock of Joyce [JBI] received
by stockholders of the Companies pursuant to the
Plan must be held indefinitely unless they are sub-
sequently registered under the Act or an exemption
from such registration is available. Rule 144 under
the Act permits resale of shares so restricted to be
nade in limited quantities after the shares have been
beneficially owned for two years in accordance with
the terms and conditions of that Rule. Stockholders
should consult their investment advisors for detailed
information as to the operation and availability of
Rule 144.” (JA56)
In addition, the following facts relating to Rule 144 were
disclosed in the Agreement (annexed to the Complaint as
Exhibit A; JA13-28) and the letter (contained in Exhibit B
annexed to the Complaint; JA29-32) which was required
to be signed by every shareholder who wished to exchange
his stock for JBI stock as provided by the Agreement:
(a) Both the Agreement and the Letter stated that “any
routine sales of securities made in reliance on Rule 144
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
ander the Act can be made only in limited amounts in
accordance with the terms and conditions of that rule and
that, in the case of securities to which that rule is not ap-
plicable registration under the Act or the availability of
another exemption therefrom will be required.” (JA30,
JA21)
(b) Both the Agreement and the Letter provided that all
shares of JBI would bear a legend that they “have not been
registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended,
and none of such shares can be sold, transferred or other-
wise disposed of in the absence of an effective registration
statement under such Act or an opinion of counsel satis-
factory to the issuer that registration under such Act is
not required for such sale, transfer or other disposition.”
(JA24, JA31)
7
(ec) Both the Agreement and the Letter provided that
each of the stockholders represented that he was “acquiring
all of the shares of [JBI] pursuant to the Plan for invest-
ment for the personal account of such Stockholder and not
with a view to the distribution on resale of any such shares.”
(JA20, JA30)
(d) Both the Agreement and the Letter provided that
resale of the JBI shares was prohibited unless, prior to
such resale, the stockholder (1) gave written notice to JBI
of his intention to sell shares, and (2) included with the
notice a copy of a bona fide third party offer to purchase
the shares. It was further provided that the foregoing
operated as an offer to sell the shares to JBI on the same
terms as the third party offer and that such offer to JBI
remained open for 60 days (JA21-22, JA30).
Referriag only to the Information Statement and ignor-
ing the above-cited portions of the Agreement and Letter,
the majority of the Court below held that the complaint
stated a claim of an alleged misleading statement (8a).
We respectfully submit that when the above-cited state-
ments are read together with the Information Statement,
there was no basis for the majority’s decision (applying
an incorrect standard of law) that a “reasonable share-
holder” (a) “could” have attached importance to a Rule
144 exemption, or (b) “could” have believed that Rule 144
would be avaiizble to him.
B. Delaware Corporation Law
The remaining allegations of omissions or misleading
statements are the alleged failure te disclose that rights
appurtenant to the stock of the operating companies under
Illinois law, would materially differ in the following four
respects from rights appurtenant to the stock of JBI under
8
Delaware law: (1) the number of shares required to
approve certain corporate actions, (2) the manner of filling
vacancies in corporate boards of directors, (3) the rights
of dissenting shareholders, and (4) the rights of indemni-
fication of officers and directors ({10(¢) at 22a).
The complaint is devoid of any allegation which indi-
cates how the alleged hypothetical differences between
Illinois and Delaware Corporation Law are related to the
facts of this case in any way, nor does the complaint allege
or suggest that any action was pianned or subsequently
occurred which would be affected by any such alleged
difference.
In particular, there was no allegation of a sale or other
disposition of assets which required a vote such as that
referred to in Paragraph 10(¢)(1) of the complaint, or an
appraisal procedure such as referred to in Paragraph
10(e)(3) of the complaint. Nor was there any allegation
of a vacancy on the Board of Directors or of an event mak-
ing the indemnification provisions of Delaware Corpora-
tion Law applicable, which might conceivably make the
allegations of Paragraphs 10(¢)(2) and 10(c)(4) of the
complaint relevant. Thus, the alleged differences between
Illinois and Delaware Corporation Law were-—for aught
that was set forth in the ecomplaint—unrelated to any facts
alleged in this case.
Judge Pollack, based on a careful analysis of the com-
plaint and decisions from three different cireuits—Ash v.
LFE Corp., 525 F.2d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 1975); Vohs v. Dick-
son, 495 F.2d 607, 625 (5th Cir. 1974); Nanfito v. Tekseed
Hybrid Co., 341 F.Supp. 240, 243, 245, (D.Neb. 1972), aff'd,
473 F.2d 537 (Sth Cir. 1973)—coneluded that there was
nothing misleading whatsoever and dismissed the complaint.
On review, a divided Second Circuit affirmed Judge Pol-
lack’s dismissal of the complaint as a matter of law with
respect to the first allegedly misleading statement, but
9
reversed the District Court with respect to the second and
third statements. The majority opinion noted that these
two statements raised “substantial issues”.
Applying a standard repudiated by this Court’s North-
way decision, the Second Cireuit held that the Information
Statement’s reference to Rule 144 “could have misled the
reasonable shareholder” into thinking that the Rule was
available to him (Sa, emphasis added). Likewise, the Court
opined that the reference to the distinction between Dela-
ware and Illinois law, “could have misled” the reasonable
shareholder into thinking that his legal rights were other-
wise identical (id., emphasis added). The “difficult question
of materiality”, Judge Hays concluded, “should not ordi-
narily be disposed of on a Rule 12(b) (6) motion (9a).”
Judge Oakes, dissenting in part, voted to affirm Judge
Pollack with respect to all three statements as a matter of
law (9a-lla).
REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED
A. The Majority’s Decision Below Flatly Contra-
venes This Court’s Decision in TSC v. North-
way, Will Greatly Increase the Volume of
Meritless Securities Litigations in the Federal
Courts and (Unless Overturned) Will Trans-
form Proxy Statements Into “Avalanche[s] of
Trivial Information” Thereby Subverting the
“Informed Decision-Making” the Securities
Laws Are Designed To Foster (426 U.S. at
448-9).
In the recent case of TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc.. 426 U.S. 488 (1976), this Court was called upon to
define the standard of materiality required under the 1934
Act. Tt held that an omitted fact is material only if there
is a “substantial likelihood that under all the circumstances,
10
the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in
the deliberations of a reasonable shareholder” (emphasis
added). In so holding, the Court rejected a standard of
materiality grounded on “a fact which a reasonable share-
holder might consider important”.
This Court’s rationale for adopting a limited notion of
materiality was clearly stated as follows (426 U.S, at 448-9) :
“We are aware... that the disclosure policy embodied
in the proxy regulations is not without limit. See
id., at 384. Some information is of such dubious sig-
nificance that insistence on its disclosure may accom-
plish more harm than good. The potential liability
for a Rule 14a-9 violation can be great indeed, and
if the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low,
not only may the corporation and its management be
subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or
misstatements, but also management’s fear of expos-
ing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply
to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial
information—a result that is hardly conducive to
informed decisionmaking.”
In contravention of this cautionary principle, the major-
ity’s decision in the Second Circuit herein virtually pre-
cludes the dismissal of any complaint purportedly brought
under Seetion 10(b) of the 1954 Aet which alleges the
conclusion that there have been misstatements or omissions
of material facts, no matter how remote the likelihood that
the shareholder was actually misled.
The Second Cireuit’s decision states the bald conclusion
that the alleged misleading statements and omissions “raise
substantial issues” (but nowhere articulates what those
hypothetical substantial issues may be) and then holds
broadly that “the diffieult question of materiality should not
11
ordinarily be disposed of on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion”
(9a).
The majority’s decision in effect, signals to a prospective
litigant that the mere allegation of misstatements or omis-
sions of facts, however trivial, will guarantee him the right
to extensive pre-trial procedures and eventual trial, This
cannot fail to stimulate a flood of litigation of marginal and
frivolous claims which will be measured more by their
potential settlement value than by their merit. Such a
result will directly undercut the policies limiting the un-
bridled expansion of litigation under the federal securities
laws enunciated by this Court in its recent decisions in
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S, 723, 747-
748 (1975), reh. denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), reh. denied, 425 U.S.
986 (1976); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S.
L (1977); and Santa I’e Industries, Inc. v. Green, 480 U.S.
462 (1977).
Moreover, unless overturned, the majority’s decision will
engender a very real fear among business managements of
exposing themselves to substantial liability and unwar-
ranted legal expenses and will result in precisely the “ava-
lanche of trivial information” which this Court sought to
stem in Northway and which can only subvert the “informed
decisionmaking” which this Court noted the securities laws
are designed to foster (426 U.S. at 449).
Paradoxically, the significance of the Second Cireuit’s de-
cision below and the importance of its review by this Court,
derive from the very triviality of the allegations of mis-
statements and omissions on which plaintiffs’ purported
claim is based. If the federal securities laws can be freely
invoked as a tactical device in an intra-family corporate
squabble by merely hypothetical allegations of non-diselo-
sure, the federal policy of informed disclosure in stock-
holders’ affairs and transactions will be destroyed.
12
-
Not only does the practical result of the majority's de-
cision below contravene the principles of Northway, but it
appears that the Court below (although professing to apply
a uniform standard of materiality) applied a different and
lesser standard of materiality expressly rejected by this
Court in Northway. Thus, the Second Circuit’s majority
decision correctly stated that the issue was whether the al-
legedly undisclosed facts, “had they been disclosed, would
have been considered by the reasonable shareholder to have
significally altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available” (Sa). However, when it came to apply the stan-
dard, the majority of the Court below sustained the action-
ability of plaintiffs’ claims of misstatements and omissions
on the suggestion that they merely “could” have misled
plaintiffs under some conceivable set of facts (9a). No-
where does the Second Circuit suggest how these alleged
misstatements and omissions would have assumed actual
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable share-
holder.
This Court’s Northway decision made crystal clear its
rejection of a materiality standard foeusing on facts which
a reasonable stockholder “might” consider important as a
formulation “too suggestive of mere possibility, however
unlikely” (426 U.S. at 449). It stated:
“The general standard of materiality that we think
best comports with the policies of Rule 14a-9 is as fol-
lows: An omitted fact is material if there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.
This standard is fully consistent with Mills’ general
description of materiality as a requirement that ‘the
defect have a significant propensity to affect the vot-
ing process.’ It does not require proof of a substan-
tial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact
13
would have caused the reasonable investor to change
his vote. What the standard does contemplate is a
showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all
the circumstances, the omitted fact wows nave as-
sumed actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must
be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reason-
able investor as having significantly altered the ‘total
mix’ of information made available.” (426 U.S. at
449; emphasis added)
Yet the opinion of the majority below, with respect to
both allegations of Section LO(b) violations applied the
broader standard of materiality flatly rejected by this
Court in Northway. The Second Cireuit stated (9a) :
“The statement about the potential availability of
Rule 144 could have misled the reasonable share-
holder into thinking that it was, in fact, available
to him. Similarly, the diseussion of the loss of pre-
emptive rights and the discontinuance of cumulative
voting as a result of the changeover to Delaware law,
could have misled him into thinking that the change-
over did not otherwise affect his rights.” (emphasis
added)
It is possible that the Second Cireuit’s decision stems
from a misreading of this Court’s admonition in Northway
that the determination of materiality “requires delicate
assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’
would draw from a given set of facts and the significance
of those inferences to him, and those assessments are
pecularly ones for the trier of fact” (426 U.S. at 450, quoted
by the Second Cireuit at 8a). However, this Court also
made clear that the foregoing comments were directed to a
case where the complaint clearly stated an actionable claim
and the only question was whether summary judgment
14
against defendant was appropriate. Thus, this Court
stated (426 U.S, at 450):
“Only if the established omissions are ‘so obviously
important to an investor, that reasonable minds can-
not differ on the question of materiality’ is the ulti-
mate issue of materiality appropriately resolved ‘as
a matter of law’ by summary judgment.”
Here, the question is not whether summary judgment
foreclosing a defendant from the opportunity to present
mitigating factors to the trier of facet is appropriate.
Rather, it is whether the standards of materiality set forth
by this Court in Northway must also be applied at the
pleading stage. It appears that this Court’s admonition
concerning the “delicate assessments” that must be made
by a trier of fact was read by the majority below as a fore-
closing pre-trial dismissal of substantially all claims based
on alleged misstatements or omissions, no matter how
trivial the claims or how remote the likelihood that the
shareholder was actually mislead. We submit that this
Court never intended such a result and that the lower
court’s misapprehension runs directly contrary to the
explicit rejection in Northway of a standard of liability
that would cause “an avalanche of trivial information”.
Because of the significant concentration of actions under
the securities laws within the Second Cireuit and the
influence of the Second Circuit in this area in other juris-
dictions, it is particularly important that this Court take
affirmative action to signal that the Second Cireuit’s dis-
regard of the Northway standard will not be ignored. No
benefit can be derived from allowing this issue to percolate
in the lower courts.
15
B. The Second Circuit’s Decision Is in Conflict
With Decisions of the Third and Fifth Cir-
cuits and That Split of Authority Should Be
Resolved by This Court.
One reads the Second Cireuit’s decision in vain for any
mention of the three cases cited by the District Court in
support of its decision that plaintiffs’ complaint should be
dismissed: Ash v. LFE Corp., supra; Vohs vy. Dickson,
supra; Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Corp., supra.
In those eases, the courts held alleged misrepresentations
or omissions virtually identical to those alleged here to be
nonactionable. In Ash, a unanimous panel of the Third
Cireuit noted that (525 F.2d at 220):
“No ease has been called to our attention requiring
disclosure of speculative issues of state corporation
law in a proxy solicitation.”
And in Vohs, a unanimous Fifth Court panel held (495
F.2d at 625):
“Rule 10b-5 cannot be construed to require a pro-
spective seller of securities to give his prospective
buyers legal advice on technical matters arising
under the federal securities laws.”
Also, see Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Corp.. supra, at 243,
245, aff'd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973).
In this ease, however, the Second Cireuit held that once
plaintiffs alleged that defendants mentioned the existence
of Rule 144 and certain differing rights of shareholders
pursuant to Delaware and Illinois law, they opened a Pan-
dora’s Box—the issue of “materiality’—-which the Court
believed could not be closed prior to a jury trial.
16
Since this decision invites the perception that, by merely
alleging a misleading statement or omission under the
securities laws, a plaintiff can compel a corporation to
defend a lawsuit on its merits, corporate managers are
likely to interpret the Second Cireuit’s decision as requiring
them to provide shareholders with a fullblown exigesis of
every issue of law which may conceivably bear upon the
interests of shareholders. The resulting torrent of infor-
mation will only interfere with intelligent decisionmaking.
Since the concentration of the securities industry in New
York City makes the Districts of the Second Circuit at least
a potential venue in a great many types of actions under
the federal securities laws, the nationwide impact of the
Second Cireuit’s opinion must not be discounted.
The lack of a uniformly recognized test of disclosure with
respect to legal matters conflicts with the federally man-
dated duty of regulated corporations to provide information
to shareholders on a nationwide basis. This Court’s enun-
ciation of a uniform standard would eliminate the current
posture of conflict among the Circuits in which the deter-
mination of whether the statements of a national corpora-
tion are actionable because of material misstatement and
omissions may depend on the choice of forum.
Finally, it is very important that this ease be heard at its
present stage. If this case is tried on its merits, defendants
are convinced that they will succeed. Therefore, the ques-
tion of whether the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint are
sufficient even to state a claim will never he presented to
this Court. However, the damage the Second Cirenit’s
decision is likely to cause will continne unabated. If
corporate managers believe that an allegation of a material
misrepresentation or omission is sufficient that the issue be
tried, they will continue to “bury” their shareholders
17
with utterly useless verbiage—an unfortunate result
which is incompatible with informed decisionmaking. In
short, to allow this issue to percolate further in the lower
Courts would only harm the investing public without pro-
moting any significant policy of judicial administration.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant
this petition for a writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
Micwaet Lescu
Suea Goutp Cuimenko & Casey
330 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Attorneys for Joyce Beverages, Inc.,
John M. Joyce and William J. Collier
Of Counsel
MicuaeL Lescu,
Sanrorp A. Bet.
la
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Cireuit, held at the United States Court-
house in the City of New York, on the thirtieth day of
January one thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight.
United States Court of Appeals Filed Jan 30 1978. A.
Daniel Fusaro, Clerk, Second Circuit.
AP PENDIX Present: Hon. Henry J. Frrmenpity, Hon. Paut R. Hays,
Hon. James L. Oakes, Circuit Judges,
77-7262
ae
Wituum J. Joyce, Bernice Ritzy Joyce, Mary Joyce
HammMonp, WituiAM J. Joyce, Jr., Dornorny Ann Joyce,
CATHERINE Joyce McManus, Paut McManus, Jitt Joycr
KXASSELMAN and JupirH Lange,
Plaintiff s-Appellants,
v.
Joyce Beveraces, Inc., Jonn M. Joyce and WituiaMm J.
COLLIER,
Defendants-A ppellees.
or
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of
record from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the order of said Dis-
trict Court be and it hereby is reversed and the action be
and it hereby is remanded to said District Court for further
proceedings in accordance with the opinion of this court
with costs to be taxed against the appellees.
A. Damien Fvusaro, Clerk
' By
| Deputy Clerk
Om
2a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE Seconp Circuit
—EE ee
No. 255—September Term, 1977.
(Argued November 2, 1977 Decided January 30, 1978.)
Docket No. 77-7262
EE
Wii J. Joyce, Bernice Rizzy Joyce, Mary Joyce Ham-
MOND, WituiAM J. Joyce, JR., Dororay Ann Joyce,
CaTHERINE Joyce McManus, Paut McManus, Jitu
Joyce KasseLMan and Jupitu Joyce Lane,
Plaintiff s-Appellants,
—against—
Joyce Beverages, Inc., Joun M. Joyce and
WituiaM J. Couier,
Defendants-A ppellees.
——En ee
Before:
Frienpty Hays and Oakes,
Circuit Judges.
_—_—_———EnE ee
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, the Honorable
Milton Pollack, Judge, dismissing plaintiffs’ claims under
§ 10(b) of the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§78j}(b) (1971), for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and
3a
for failure to plead with particularity the circumstances
constituting a fraud as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Reversed and remanded.
—_——aeeel eee
Donatp E. Eean, Chieago, Ill. (Katten, Muchin,
Gitles, Zavis, Pearl & Galler, Chicago, IIl., Lee
Ann Watson, on the brief; Chadbourne, Parke,
Whiteside & Wolff, New York, N. Y., of coun-
sel), for Plaintiff s-Appellants.
MicuaEL Lescn, New York, N. Y. (Shea Gould
Climenko & Casey, New York, N. Y., Lillian 8S.
Weigert, New York, N. Y., of counsel), for
Defendants-Appellees.
ec
Hays, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-appellants appeal the dismissal of their com-
plaint in an action brought under §10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1971), and
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1977).
The complaint alleged that an “Information Statement”
that accompanied a proposed exchange of stock contained
various material omissions and misrepresentations. The
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted and for failure to
plead with particularity the circumstances constituting the
fraud. The district court granted the motion. Joyce v.
Joyce Beverages, Inc., 430 F.Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
We find that the complaint sufficiently complies with the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), and therefore proceed
to a consideration of the other alleged deficiencies.
4a
The plaintiffs are William J. Joyee and the members of
his immediate family: his wife, children, and son-in-law.
In Mareh of 1973, they owned a large block of the stock
of four companies (“Operating Companies”) engaged in the
business of bottling Seven-Up and other soft drinks. The
defendants are Jolin M. Joyvee, William J. Collier, and
Jovee Beverages, Inc. (“JBI”). John M. Joyee was the
Chairman of the Board of the New York Operating Com-
pany. Tle is now the Chairman of the Board of JBI.
William J. Collier, who formerly served as the personal
attorney of William J. Joyee, is a divector of JBI and also
serves as its General Counsel. As General Counsel, he was
responsible for the legal matters relating to the preparation
of the documents used in the instant transaction. JBI is a
Delaware corporation that was formed to serve as a hold-
ing company for the four Operating Companies. The com-
plaint alleges that John M. Joyee and William J. Collier,
together with John M. Joyee’s immediate family and
another, own and at all relevant times have owned not
less than 47.56% of the outstanding stock of JBI, that they
have controlled a majority of the board of directors of
JBI, and that they have acted in concert so that they
hold a controlling interest in the company.
A plan was developed to reorganize and consolidate the
four Operating Companies through the device of a holding
company. As noted above, J BI was formed for this purpose.
Pursuant to this plan, JBI proposed to the stockholders of
the Operating Companies that they exchange their stock
for shares of JBI. The offer was made by mail. The pack-
age sent to each shareholder included a letter containing
the offer, an Agreement and Plan of Reorganization setting
out the terms of the exchange, and an “Information State-
ment.” The Information Statement was a lengthy, wide-
5a
ranging disclosure document akin to the form of proxy
statement outlined in Schedule A, Item 14, which is re-
quired when §14 of the Securities Exchange Act is appli-
cable. In response to this offer, plaintiffs exchanged their
shares in the Operating Companies for JBI stock. Accord-
ing to the complaint, they now hold 37% of the outstanding
stock of JBL.
All of the companies involved in this case have at all
times been privately held. The four Operating Companies
were incorporated in Lilinois; JBI is a Delaware corpora-
tion. It is not disputed that the New York Operating Com-
pany was the weakest of the four. Nor is it disputed that
this fact was adequately disclosed.
I
The complaint charges that there were three materially
inisleading statements in the Information Statement:
1. The first section of the statement delineated the rea-
sons for the proposed consolidation. Essentially, it stressed
the operating economies that would result from the con-
solidation of the four companies. It also stressed that the
consolidation would produce a financially stronger entity
that would be in a better position to obtain financing,
The plaintiffs allege that the real purpose of the con-
solidation was to benefit defendants’ New York company,
which, as everybody knew, was the weakest financially.
They allege that the plan was to have JBI float loans to
the New York company out of the funds generated by the
other Operating Companies, “all to the detriment of the
Operating Companies other than New York.”
2. The Information Statement contained a section explain-
ing that the exchanged JBI shares could not be resold since
fa
they had not been and would not be registered. /nter alia,
it advised that Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1977), would
allow resale if its terms were met, and that the stockholders
should consult their investment advisors about the avail-
ability of Rule 144. Plaintiffs claim that this statement
was misleading in that it implied that a Rule 144 exemption
might be available when defendants knew that was not so.
3. As noted above, the Operating Companies were IIli-
nois corporations; JBI is incorporated in Delaware. The
Information Statement described certain changes in stock
rights effected by this changeover: the loss of pre-emptive
rights ' and the discontinuance of cumulative voting.’ Plain-
tiffs claim that by listing some but not all of the changes,
defendants misled them. Specifically, they claim that de-
fendants should have included the fact that: several types
of stockholder approval votes could be effected by simple
majorities instead of two third votes as under Tllinois law ;’
1. The Illinois Business Corporation Act. /ll.Ann.Stat. ch. 32
§ 157.24 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1977), recognizes the stockholders’ com-
mon law pre-emptive right, see Elward v. Peabody Coal Co., 9 Il.
App. 234, 132 N.E. 2d 549 (1956), to share pro-rata in any new
issue of corporate stock so that their interest in the corporation will
not be diluted. Delaware does not recognize such a right. See Del.
Code tit. 8 §§ 157, 161 (1975).
2. The Illinois act makes cumulative voting mandatory, //l.Ann.
Stat. ch. 32 § 157.28 (Smith-Hurd 1954); under the Delaware Acct it
is permissive. Del.Code tit. 8 § 214 (1975). If cumulative voting is
not provided for in the certificate of incorporation, each shareholder
is only entitled to one vote for each share that he holds. /d. § 212.
3. Under Delaware law, the certfiicate of incorporation may be
amended by a majority vote of the stockholders. Del.Code tit. 8
§ 242(c)(1) (1975). Under Illinois law, a two thirds vote is re-
quired. Jl. Ann.Stat. ch, 32 § 157.33(c) (Smith-Hurd. Supp. 1977).
The same is true with regard to approval votes for mergers and con-
solidations, compare Del.Code tit. 8 §251(c) (Supp. 1976) with
Jil. Ann.Stot. ch. 32 § 157.64 (Smith-Hurd 1954), and for dissolutions
or sales, leases, exct ‘ges, mortgages, or pledges of all or substanti-
ally all of the assets of the corporation. Compare Del.Code tit. 8
7a
vacancies on the Board of Directors could be filled by the
vote of the remaining directors instead of the stockhoiders ;'
certain appraisal rights would be lost;’ and, under Dela-
ware law, JBI’s officers and directors would have broader
rights of indemnification.
The district court held that, as a matter of law, none of
these alleged misrepresentations or omissions was material.
It understood the first claim to allege that the weakness of
the New York company, and the fact that it stood to benefit
by obtaining loans, was not adequately disclosed. The
court held that it was not fraudulent to fail to say that the
weakest company would benefit from the consolidation. It
did not find anything misleading about the Rule 144 state-
ment. With regard to the changes in stockholders’ rights
resulting from the change in states of incorporation, it held
that the defendants’ duty to disclose was discharged by the
disclosure of the changeover and the inclusion of the names
of the states involved. 430 F. Supp. at 678.
4, (a) (1975) with Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 32 § 157.76(c) (Smith-Hurd
1954).
These differences are of practical import in the instant case. The
vm pe ye alleges that, together, the plaintiffs owned more than one
third of the stock of each Operating Company. This gave them an
effective veto of any p merger, dissolution, or amendment of
the charter. They lost this power when they exchanged their stock
for stock in JBI, a Delaware corporation,
4. Del.Code tit. 8 §§ 142(e), 223(a) (1975). Compare Ill.Ann.
Stat. ch. 32 § 157.36 (Smith-Hurd 1954),
5. In the event of a sale or exchange of substantially all of the
assets of a corporation, the Illinois act provides for appraisal rights
for the dissenting shareholders, //l.Ann.Stat. ch. 32 § 197.73 (Smith-
Hurd, Supp. 1977). The same is true in the event of a merger or
consolidation. /d. § 157.70 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1977). The Dela-
ware act provides for appraisal only in the event of a me or con-
solidation. Del.Code tit. 8 § 262 ( Supp. 1976), not in the event of
sale or exchange.
Sa
While we agree with the district court’s conclusions as to
the first claim, we cannot go along with its views as to the
materiality of the second and third claims.
On this motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
plaintiffs’ allegations must be accepted as true and must be
read in the manner most favorable to them, This is espe-
cially true when dealing with questions of materiality
which, since they are “mixed questions of law and fact,”
require
delicate assessments of the inferences a “reasonable
shareholder” would draw froma given set of facts and
the significance of those inferences to him, and these
assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact.
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450
(1976).° The issue on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether
the plaintiffs can prove any set of facts that, had they been
disclosed, would have been considered by the reasonable
shareholder to have “significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information made available.” Jd. at 449.
We cannot say that this is not the case with respect to
the second and third claims here.
The statements about the availability of Rule 144 and the
omissions regarding Delaware law raise substantial issues.
The statement about the potential availability of Rule 144
could have misled the reasonable shareholder into thinking
6. TSC Industries dealt with the standard of materiality under
§ 14(a) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1971). However, it is
generally agreed that the same standard applies under § 10(b). See
Goldberg v. Meridor, No. 77-7146 at 5820-21 (2nd Cir. Sept. 8, 1977).
This seems correct as a matter of statutory interpretation since the
statutes are in pari materia. As a matter of policy, the 7SC standard
is particularly appropriate in this case since it involves an Information
Statement much akin to a proxy statement in a merger vote.
ee
9a
that it was, in fact, available to him. Similarly, the diseus-
sion of the loss of pre-emptive rights and the discontinuance
of cumulative voting as a result of the changeover to
Delaware law, could have misled him into thinking that the
changeover did not otherwise affect his rights.
ITT
Of course, we intimate no views on the merits of this
case, It may develop that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate to
the trier of fact that the reasonable shareholder would
have been misled. It may develop, once discovery has
begun, that the plaintiffs actually knew or could not have
cared less about the very facts that they claim were mis-
represented. We stress only that the difficult question of
materiality should not ordinarily be disposed of on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Oakes, Circuit Judge (dissenting) :
I most respectfully dissent.
I agree with Judge Pollack below that none of the
asserted omissions or representations is _ sufficiently
material to avoid dismissal. T shall deal seriatim with the
three statements alleged to be misleading.
First, the representation that a purpose of the consolida-
tion was to permit financing to be obtained more easily and
at lower cost is not a representation that the stronger
companies’ excess funds would not be used to strengthen
the financial position of the New York Operating Company.
Any consolidation implies to a reasonable stockholder, it
10a
seems to me, that there will be intereorporate loans, quite
likely from the stronger to the weaker entities of the con-
solidation. Excessive lending, charging an unreasonably
low rate of interest or imperiling the stronger corporation’s
capital may give rise to a state cause of action for waste
of assets or for mismanagement. However, as the majority
and I agree, the omission tu state that there will be such
lending does not rise to the level of a 10b-5 claim.
Second, the reference to Rule 144, surely a boilerplate
provision in the Information Statement, presents a some-
what closer question, but the statement issued did say that
the shares of JBI “must be held indefinitely unless they are
subsequently registered under the Act or an exemption
from such registration is available.” That was true, and it
was followed by another true statement that Rule 144 per-
mits resale of restricted shares in limited quantities after
a holding period of two years “in accordance with the terms
and conditions of that Rule.” To my mind this language
would put a reasonable shareholder on notice that unless
“that Rule” were subsequently complied with,' he would
have to hold them “indefinitely.”
1, Compliance with Rule 144 is no simple matter. Under the
rule, a seller of restricted securities will not be deemed a Section
2(11), 15 U.S.C. §77b(11), underwriter, if inter alia, in addition
to holding the securities for the requisite period. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144(d), and to complying with the a le limitation on the
amount of securities which may be sold, id. § 230.144(e), the issuer
has made available adequate current pgm information with respect
to itself. The issuer may satisfy the information requirement in
either of two ways. It must have securities registered under either
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or the Securities Act of 1933,
— making itself subject to the reporting requirements of Sec-
tions 13 and 15(d) —— of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m,
780, or it must have made publicly available the information required
by Rule 15c2-11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11(a)(4) (1977). See 17
FR, § 230.144(c)(1), (2) (1977).
Oe OR ce a ee ED ot Se ee
lla
Finally, the reference to Delaware as the state of JBI’s
incorporation and to two Delaware corporate law provisions
particularly burdensome on these minority stockholders—
relating to lack of preemptive rights and unavailability of
cumulative voting—was factually accurate. Such a refer-
ence should have alerted even the most unsophisticated
stockholder to the possibility that Delaware law had addi-
tional, perhaps more esoteric traps for the unwary which,
to avert, might well require advice of counsel. But I should
have thought that it has long been a matter of common
knowledge to the business world generally that Delaware’s
corporation law quite generally favors management and
controlling interests, and disfavors minority stockholders.
To my knowledge, the SEC has not yet required merger
information or proxy statements to bear a sticker warning
against the laws of Delaware. More to the point, perhaps,
no allegation in the complaint indicates that any of the
Delaware laws not mentioned in the Information Statement
here have in some way been utilized by the controlling
interests adversely to those of appellants.
[ suspect that the proof may show that appellants
received poor legal advice when they went into the ex-
change of stock. This might give them a state cause of
action for negligence or other breach of fiduciary duty if,
since allegedly their attorney benefited from the trans-
action, indeed, appellants have suffered loss. But I agree
with Judge Pollack that the Information Statement does
not give rise to a cause of action under federal securities
law, and accordingly would affirm.
12a
APPENDIX C
UNITES STATES DISTRICT COURT
SouTHERN District oF New York
76 CIV. 5846(MP)
a
Wuuam J. Joyce, Bernice Rmaey Joyce, Mary Joyce
Hammonp, Wituiam J. Joyce, Jr., Dororny Ann Joyce,
CATHERINE Joyce McManus, Paut McManvs, JILt Joyce
KassELMAN and JupitH Joyce LANG,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
Joyce Beveraces, Inc., Jonn M. Joyce and Wim J.
COLLIER,
Defendants.
eS
DECISION
Milton Pollack, District Judge.
Defendants move, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6)
and 9(b) for a dismissal of the complaint for failure to
state a sufficient claim for relief and failure to plead with
particularity any circumstances constituting fraud.
On April 30, 1973 plaintiffs exchanged their common
stock in four “Seven-Up” bottling companies (“Operating
Companies”) incorporated in the State of Illinois for
shares in Joyee Beverages, Inc. (“JBI”) incorporated in
the State of Delaware, pursuant to an Agreement and Plan
of Reorganization.' The offer for the exchange was made
1. This suit was filed three years and eight months after the
exchange in which plaintiffs participated fully. Plaintiff William J.
Joyce became and is a director and largest stockholder of JBI.
~ Ate Ae note
13a
by mail, and was accompanied by a document labeled
“Information Statement”. Having been annexed to the
complaint, that may be considered hereon. Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1357 at 604.
Plaintiffs seek rescission of the exchange and damages
on the ground that the offer omitted and misstated material
facts with intent to defraud the plaintiffs in violation of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.
Material omissions charged
1. That: the Information Statement failed to say that
the New York Seven-Up Bottling Co., one of the four oper-
ating Companies was financially weaker than the other
three ; that the Chairman of the Board of Directors, defend-
ant John Joyce, and the General Counsel of JBI, defendant
William Collier, who also was a director of JBI and of the
Operating Companies, intended by the Plan to facilitate
JBI loans to the New York company out of funds generated
by the other Operating Companies.
2. That: the Information Statement suggested to the
plaintiffs that Rule 144 of the General Rules and Regula-
tions under the Securities Act of 1933 would be available
to plaintiffs to market their JBi stock and such suggestion
was incorrect because (a) JBI is not a registered company
under the 1934 Act, and (b) JBI does not make public the
information required by Rule 15C2-11 of the 1934 Act.
3. That: the Information Statement failed to disclose
material differences between the rights of stockholders in
Delaware and Illinois corporations in respect to (a) the
percentage of votes required for approval of major cor-
porate actions, (b) the manner of filling vacancies on the
Board, (c) appraisal rights in connection with sale of cor-
l4a
porate assets, and (d) rights of indemnification of directors
and officers for their corporate acts.
None of the asserted omissions or representations is suf-
ficient to warrant entertaining this litigation.
The recitation in the Statement of the purpose of the
Plan was, to reorganize the [Operating] Companies under
common ownership in order to achieve economies in ad-
ministration and permit greater strength and flexibility in-
cluding the purpose to permit financing to be obtained more
easily and at lower costs from the consolidated strength
of the assets of the four Companies.
Since there was no representation in the Information
Statement that the four Operating Companies had the
identical financial strength, (indeed the financial data set
out specifically indicated the contrary), it can hardly be
claimed that it was fraudulent to fail to mention the obvious
that the companies were of unequal strength and that the
weakest would benefit from a consolidation with the other
three.
The statement issued concerning Rule 144 which is as
follows does not omit material fact nor does it contain
material misstatement:
Shares of common stock of Joyce (JBI) received
by stockholders of the Companies pursuant to the
Plan must be held indefinitely unless they are subse-
quently registered under the Act or an exemption
from such registration is available. Rule 144 under
the Act permits resale of shares so restricted to be
made in limited quantities after the shares have been
beneficially owned for two years in accordance with
the terms and conditions of that Rule. Stockholders
should consult their investment advisors for detailed
information as to the operation and availability of
Rule 144.
lda
The corporate rights of stockholders provided for in
statutes of the states of incorporation are adequately de-
scribed by reference to the identity of the states involved.
Where the names of the states of incorporation are set
forth the reader is charged with constructive notice of the
relevant statutes. The omissiou of a comparison thereof
in an exchange offer is not an omission of matter on which
a 10b-5 claim may be mounted for a recovery.
There is no duty to render legal advice to the reader of
an exchange offer; an omission of legal advice is not fraud-
ulent. Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 625 (5th Cir. 1974).
In Vohs v. Dickson, swpra, an employee sold his unregis-
tered stock in his corporate employer to a fellow employee.
The purchasing employee claimed that the seller had vio-
lated 10b-5 by not advising her that the stock must be
purchased with a non-distributive intent in order to escape
the federal registration requirements upon a subsequent
resale.
The Court rejected this claim, stating:
Federal law makes it fraudulent to misrepresent or
omit material facts in respect to a sale of securities.
The important point ... is that whether or not
plaintiffs had to take the stock with non-distribu-
tive intent is not a matter of fact—imnaterial or other-
wise; it is a matter of law. Rule 10b-5 canot be con-
strued to require a prospective seller of securities
to give his prospective buyers legal advice on tech-
nical matters arising under the federal securities law.
If the buyer is aware of the material facts— [unreg-
istered stock]—he should be as aware of the legal
consequences of those facts as his seller. Id. at 625.
(Emphasis supplied)
l6a
Cf. Ash v. LFE Corp., 525 F.2d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 1975).
“No case has been called to our attention requiring disclo-
sure of speculative issues of state corporation law in a
proxy solicitation.” See also, Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid
Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 248, 245, (D. Neb. 1972), aff’d, 473
F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973).
The complaint is dismissed for insufficiency in the re-
spects claimed in the notice of motion.
SO ORDERED.
Mitton Poiiack
April 28, 1977
tte ee eee
U.S. District Judge
ER A A lh
17a
APPENDIX D
COMPLAINT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SoutHerN District or New York
ae
Witutiam J. Joyce, Bernice Ritey Joyce, Mary Joyce
Hammonp, WitutaAm J. Joyce, Jr., Dornorny Any Joyce,
CaTHEnINE Joyce McManus, Pavt McManus, Jitit Joycr
KasseLMAN and Jupitx Joyce Lana,
Plaintiffs,
—against—
Joyce Brveraces, Inc., Jounw M, Joycr, and
WriuiamM J. Cotirmr,
Defendants.
i
Plaintiffs for their complaint herein allege:
1. This action arises under Section 10(b) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) and Rule
10b-5 of the General Rules and Regulations thereunder.
This Court has jurisdiction under Section 27 of that Act
(15 U.S.C. § 78aa).
COUNT TI
2. On March 26, 1973, plaintiffs were owners of shares
of stock in Chicago Seven-Up Bottling Co. (“Chicago”),
Illinois Seven-Up Bottling Co. (“Illinois”), Madison Seven-
Up Bottling Co. (“Madison”), and New York Seven-Up
18a
Bottling Co. (“New York”) (hereinafter collectively
referred to as “Operating Companies”) as follows:
Chicago Illinois Madison New York
William J. Joyee ................ 5492 5492 2000 5492
Bernice Riley Joyce .......... 267 267 40 267
Mary Joyce Hammond ...... 380 380 80 380
William J. Joyce, Jr. ........ 522 522 102 522
Dorothy Ann Joyee .......... 92 92 0 92
Catherine Joyce McManus 423 423 80 425
Paul McManus .................... 92 92 0 92
Jill Joyce Kasselman ........ 393 393 80 393
Judith Jovee Lang ............ 425 423 80 423
3. Plaintiffs are presently owners of approximately
37% of the total issued and outstanding shares of the
common stock of defendant Joyce Beverages, Inc. (“JBT’”).
The number of shares of JBI common stock owned by each
plaintiff is as follows:
Stockholder No. of Shares
Gg OE a 263,039
Bernice Riley Jovee ....................-...------- 12,136
Mary Joyee Hammond ............................ 18,075
I 25,283
ae 4,641
Catherine Joyce McManus .................... 20,518
Sn SEED i scadiciniesiieriidicheesuctintiiannabiiiaiits 4,641
Jill Joyee Kasselman .............................. 18,232
Judith Joyce Lang ..............................-.. 20,518
SOIT shiniwvsciseritiinianiieaitecdianaetinins 387,083
4. All or nearly all of plaintiffs’ presently-owned shares
of JBI were acquired on or about April 30, 1973, pursuant
to an Agreement and Plan of Reorganization (“the Plan”)
o ———
19a
dated April 1, 1973, a copy of which is attached hereto and
incorporated herein as Exhibit A. Pursuant to the Plan,
each shareholder of an Operating Company was offered by
JBI the right to exchange his shares in said corporation
for the number of shares of JBI as set forth in Paragraph
3 of the Plan. The aforesaid offer was made by letter
dated March 26, 1973, which was transmitted by United
States mail to each shareholder of the Operating Com-
panies with a document labeled “Information Statement”.
A copy of the Information Statement and the transmittal
letter is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit
B. The shares owned by plaintiffs, as set forth in para-
graph 2 hereof, were exchanged for the number of shares
of JBI set forth opposite each plaintiff’s name in para-
graph 3 hereof, in accordance with the provisions of the
Plan.
». JBI is controlled by defendant John M. Joyee, his
wife, his descendants and their spouses, acting in concert
with defendant William J. Collier, General Counsel of JBI,
and Sidney P. Mudd, President of JBI. Such persons are
hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Controlling
Persons”. John M. Joyce is Chairman of the Board of
JBI, and as such is responsible for the supervision and
direction of all of the business and affairs of JBI. William
J. Collier is the General Counsel and a Director of JBI
and each Operating Company, and as such was responsible
for all legal matters relating to the preparation of the
Plan and the Information Statement. The Controlling
Persons own, or have at all times relevant hereto owned,
in the aggregate not less than 47.56% of the outstanding
shares of common stock of JBI and each Operating Com-
pany. The Controlling Persons at all times relevant hereto
have occupied not less than a majority of the seats on the
Board of Directors of JBI. The Controlling Persons have
20a
at all times relevant hereto acied in concert with respect
to the voting of their shares of JBI, and casting their votes
at directors’ meetings, and in the conduct of their duties as
officers of JBI and the Operating Companies.
6. Plaintiff William J. Joyce is and at all times relevant
hereto has been a director of JBI, largest single stock-
holder of JBI, and Chairman of the Board of Tllinois and
Madison. However, at all times relevant hereto he has not
been actively involved in the day-to-day affairs of JBI and
the Operating Companies. In all matters of consequence
dealing with the affairs of JBI, he has until the summer
of 1976 relied on the judgment of John M. Joyce and
William J. Collier. Until approximately June 1, 1976,
William J. Collier served as the personal attorney of
William J. Joyee. The remaining plaintiffs are all mem-
bers of the immediate family (spouse, children and a son-
in-law) of William J. Jeyee.
7. During the period prior to the consummation of the
Plan, New York was financially weaker than the other
Operating Companies, as evidenced by the following:
(a) New York operated on the smallest profit
margins in relations to sales;
(b) New York had the least favorable ratio of
total assets to total liabilities;
(c) New York had the least favorable ratio of
current assets to current liabilities; and
(d) New York had the largest percentage of its
total assets as fixed assets as opposed to current
assets.
As a result of the foregoing, and other factors relating to
New York’s business, New York’s need for capital and
wee eho tere 6 = ~
2la
financial support was the greatest among all of the Operat-
ing Companies.
8. As residents of the New York area, John M. Joyce
and William J. Collier, both of whom were and are Con-
trolling Persons, had a particular stake in the maintenance
and expansion of New York at the expense of the other
Operating Companies, and said individuals sought to
enhance their individual positions within the corporate
scheme by maintaining the overall corporate headquarters
of all the Operating Companies in the State of New York.
9. Because of the considerations set forth in paragraphs
7 and 8, a primary purpose of John M. Joyce and William
J. Collier in causing the Plan to be effected was to facilitate
the infusion of outside capital into New York by loans
from JBI to New York out of funds generated from the
Operating Companies other than New York, all to the detri-
ment of the Operating Companies other than New York.
10. The Information Statement is misleading in that it
contains the following untrue statements of material facts
or omissions of material facts necessary in order to make
the statements made therein not misleading:
(a) On pages 1, 2 and 3, the Information State-
ment purports to state the purposes of the Plan. No
disclosure is made as to the purpose alleged in para-
graph 9 of this complaint.
(b) On page 19 of the Information Statement, it
is stated that:
Rule 144 under the [Securities] Act [of 1933]
permits resale of shares so restricted to be made
in limited quantities after the shares have been
beneficially owned for two years in accordance
with the terms and conditions of that Rule.
22a
In fact, Rule 144 is not available and was not at the time
of that statement available as an exemption from the regis-
tration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 for com-
panies not registered under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 or companies which do not make public certain infor-
mation required by Rule 15C2-11 of that Act. JBI is not
and was not then so registered and, upon information and
belief, JBI did not then and does not now intend to make
such information publicly available. To the extent that
plaintiffs had not exchanged their shares of the Operating
Companies that they had acquired prior to June 15, 1972
for shares of JBI, the plaintiffs would have been entitled
to sell their shares entirely free of the restrictions of Rule
144.
(c) Pages 20 and 21 of the Information Statement pur-
port to describe the newly-issued capital stock of JBI
offered under the Plan and to explain the differences
between the stock of the Operating Companies which had
all been organized under the laws of Illinois, and the stock
of JBI which was organized under the laws of Delaware.
No disclosure was made of the following material differ-
ences in the rights appurtenant to the stock of the Operat-
ing Companies and the rights appurtenant to the stock of
JBI:
(1) As to all of the Operating Companies, a favor-
able vote of holders of two-thirds of the outstanding
shares was required to approve a merger or consoli-
dation, amendment of the Articles of Incorporation,
dissolution or sale, lease, exchange, mortgage or
pledge of all or substantially all the assets. Plaintiffs
owned, in the aggregate, in excess of one-third of
the outstanding shares of each Operating Company
and thus, acting collectively, would have held an
effective veto power over any such action. Inas-
ee eee
soins
nae a a
ee ee re ee es See ee ne ee eee
23a
much as the Certificate of Incorporation of JBI and
Delaware law permit any such action to be taken by
a favorable vote of only a simple majority of the
outstanding stock (and in some cases, without the
approval of stockholders at all), the Plan has seri-
ously affected the position of plaintiffs and reduced
their influence in the corporate affairs of JBI.
(2) Any vacanies in the Boards of Directors of
the Operating Companies can only be filled by a vote
of the shareholders, but JBI can fill such vacanies by
a vote of the remaining directors.
(3) Dissenting stockholders have no appraisal
rights in connection with the sale, lease or exchange
of substantially all the assets of JBI, but they had
such rights as shareholders of the Operating Com-
panies.
(4) Under Delaware law far broader rights of
indemnification of JBI’s officers and directors are
permitted than existed for the officers and directors
of the Operating Companies.
11. JBI knew or had reason to know that the Informa-
tion Statement contained the untrue statements of material
fact and omissions of material fact set forth in paragraph
10 hereof.
12. The conduct of JBI in connection with the Plan vio-
lated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.
13. As a consequence of the violations complained of
herein, plaintiffs were induced to exchange their shares of
the Operating Companies for the offered shares of JBI,
and have suffered substantial monetary loss thereby in an
amount not yet determinable.
24a
14. The Controlling Persons approved and approve of
the content of the Plan and Information Statement, and
consequently any demands by plaintiffs on JBI for relief
from the wrongs complained of herein would be futile.
COUNT II
15. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations con-
tained in paragraphs 2 through 14 of this complaint.
16. Defendants John M. Joyce and William J. Collier
were primarily responsible for the Plan and the prepara-
tion of the Information Statement.
17. John M. Joyce and William J. Collier know or had
reason to know that the Information Statement contained
untrue statements of material fact and omissions of mate-
rial fact as set forth in paragraph 10 hereof.
COUNT III
18. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations con-
tained in paragraphs 2 through 14 and in paragraphs 16
and 17 of this complaint.
19. John M. Joyce and William J. Collier caused the
distribution of the untrue statements of material fact and
omissions of material fact set forth in paragraph 10
hereof, with intent to defraud the plaintiffs.
Waererorr, plaintiffs demand judgment against defend-
ants:
(1) in the amount of al! damage suffered by the plain-
tiffs as a result of the conduct hereinabove described;
ee Seren ae ee
25a
(2) permitting plaintiffs to rescind the exchange of their
shares in the Operating Companies in return for all shares
of Joyce Beverages, Inc. received by them; and
(3) for such other and further relief as to the Court may
appear proper, together with the costs and disbursements
of this action.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, plaintiffs demand a trial by jury in this action.
December 28, 1976
Kattren, Mucutin, Gites, Zavis,
Peart & GALLER
55 East Monroe Street
Suite 4100
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 346-7400
CHADBOURNE, Parkr, WRHITESIDE
& WoLrr
By Cuester HinsHaw
A Member of the Firm
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10020
(212) 541-5800
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
26a
APPENDIX E
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
§ 78}. Manreu.ative anp Deceptive Devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange—
* = bal
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
Securities and Exchange Commission,
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
§ 240.10b-5. Employment oF MANIPULATIVE AND DECEPTIVE
Devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange—
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person,
ean
27a
in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 12(b) (6)
Rule 12.
DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS—WHEN AND HOW
PRESENTED—BY PLEADING OR MOTION—MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
a ® e
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a
claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counter-
claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted
in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader
be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3)
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffici-
ency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join a party
under Rule 19. A motion making any of these defenses
shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is per-
mitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined
with one or more other defenses or objections in a respon-
sive pleading or motion. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve
a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any de-
fense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.