Petition — Joyce Beverages, Inc. v. Joyce

Supreme Court brief1978

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Text

] ‘4 Supreme Court, U. S,

FILED

APR 28 1978

AEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No. i (or 1544

Joyce Beverages, Inc., Joun M. Joycor

and Wituiam J. CoLuier,

Petitioners,

vs.

Wu. J. Joyce, Beanice Ritzy Joyon, Mary Joyce

Hammond, Wiiuiam J. Joyor, Jr., Donormy Ann Joyon,

CatHertinge Joyce McManus, Paut McManus, Jr Joyce

KasseLMAN and Jupira Joycn Lana,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

Micwage. Lescu

Sura Goutp Curmenko & Casry

330 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10017

Attorneys for Joyce Beverages, Inc.,

John M. Joyce and William J. Collier

Of Counsel

Micuar. Lesou,

Sanrorp A. BE.

INDEX

PAGE

Ee mniisheaolaaeiaaaten 2

SI - caiiiisscttibacesiiienniiereenetinieemniamenapineapranesineaninstenhiententes 2

NS TI ciienniittnnisiinininaipemmmnmenmnnpe 2

Statutes and Rules Involved .................cccccsscsscsssscsssseeeees 2

I GE SG FD ccrnnsttsittiniitipaennninipstinensieeaininmnasnitine 3

Be ee Te etter iadeiediitinbinincniciamees 5

B. Delaware Corporation LAW 2.0.0.0... 7

Reasons Why the Writ Should be Granted .................... pS :

A. The Majority’s Decision Below Flatly Coutra-

venes This Court’s Decision in 7'SC v. North-

way, Will Greatly Increase the Volume of

Meritless Securities Litigations in the Federal

Courts and (Unless Overturned) Will Trans-

form Proxy Statements into “Avalanche[s]

of Trivial Information” Thereby Subverting

the “Informed Decision-Making” the Seeur-

ities Laws Are Designed to Foster (426 U.S.

RSE ARREST ES 9

B. The Second Cireuit’s Decision ls in Conflict

With Decisions of the Third and Fifth Cireuits

and That Split of Authority Should Be

Resolved by This Court ..............cccccceccccsccssssseseeess 15

RR RR i Aaa CREE ENS LARD oe 17

il

PAGE

Appendix A

Judgment of Second Circuit (January 30, 1978)...... la

Appendix B

Second Circuit Opinion (January 30, 1978) .............. 2a

Appendix C

U.S. District Court Opinion (April 28, 1977) ............ 12a

Appendix D

Complaint (without exhibits) .........0cccccccccceceeseeeeeene 17a

Appendix E

Securities Exéhange Act of 1934, §10(b) coco. 26a

Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 ............ 26a

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6).... 27a

Table of Authorities

Cases:

Ash v. LFE Corp., 525 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1975) 0.0.0... 8, 15

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723

(1975), reh. denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975) occ. 11

Ernst & Ernst vy. Hochfelder, 425 U.S, 185 (1976), rek.

dented, 425 U.S. 986 (1976) ............cccccccccsssecesscsseececercee 11

Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 Supp. 240 (D.

Neb. 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir, 1973) ........ 8, 15

Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 480 U.S. 1

SENT cchcicssnnseiasticdibiasiaaibinatdianaihenealbdeniianinbiamelah titel taas trate 11

Santa Ie Industries, Inc. v. Green, Inc., 430 U.S. 462

= sieineacimeccniiaisipiaapeaaataaaiaatanaianitatis ll

iii

PAGE

TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438

eee 2, 9-11, 12-14

Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir, 1974) ............ 8, 15

Statutes and Rules:

Securities and Exchange Commission Rules, 17 C.F.R.

§ 200, et seq.:

Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10D-5 oo... cceeecseeeeneeneees 3

Rule 144, 17 C.P.R. § 280.144 0. cccccccccccceeeeenes 4,5, 6,7,9

een 2

Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a,

G0 BOBS ecncsncmsiieccisennmimnmnmeinmemnmnaenntia 1,2

See. 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 789 (b) once ceecccccceceeeeesenees 2, 3, 10, 13

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

TEED THIET cceustinnindesienbenmenenmssetbiedieenniniidunetidinngsl 1,3,9

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No.

SEI Se

Joyce Beverages, Inc., Jonn M. Joyce

and Witu1am J. CoLiier,

Petitioners,

vs.

Wruiam J. Joyce, Bernicr Rmey Joycr, Mary Joyce

Hammonp, Wriuiam J. Joyce, Jr., Dorornay Ann Joyce,

CaTHERINE Joyck McManus, Paut McManus, Jmu Joyce

KasseLMAN and Juprra Joyce Lana,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

In this action brought under the Securities Exchange Act

of 1934 (the “1934 Act”), petitioners Joyee Beverages, Inc.

(“JBI”), John M. Joyce and William J. Collier request that

a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

(Hays and Friendly, J.J.; Oakes, J., dissenting) reversing

in part the order of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (Judge Milton Pollack) dis-

missing the complaint herein upon petitioners’ motion pur-

snant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Proeedure.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals has not been reported

at this time (2a).' Judge Pollack’s memorandum decision

and order, dated April 28, 1977, dismissing the complaint

herein is reported at 430 F.Supp. 676 (12a).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit was entered January 30, 1978 (1la).2 This Court’s

jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Second Cireuit’s decision holding that

the misrepresentations and omissions alleged in the com-

plaint herein are actionable under the 1934 Act, contravenes

the decision of this Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. North-

way, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), will greatly increase the

volume of meritless securities litigation in the federal

courts and will transform proxy statements into “ava-

lanche[s] of trivial information” (id. at 448)?

2. Whether the Second Cirenit’s decision creates a con-

flict with decisions of the Third and Fifth Cirenits which

must be resolved by this Court?

STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15. U.S.C.

§ 78j(b) (26a).

1. Numbers in parentheses followed by “a” refer to pages in the

Appendix, infra, to this Petition. References herein to “JA” refer

to the separate one volume Joint Appendix in the Court of Appeals,

which has been filed together with this petition with the Clerk of

this Court.

2. Petitioners’ application to the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit for a two-day enlargement of the time to file a petition for

rehearing and suggestion for rehearing in banc was denied.

3

Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17

C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (26a).

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6) (27a).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The complaint herein, filed on December 29, 1976, is pur-

portedly based upon a transaction (the “Exchange”) con-

summated on April 30, 1973, pursuant to which four

“Seven-Up” bottling companies (collectively, the “operat-

ing companies”) were consolidated through an exchange of

the shares of those operating companies for shares in

defendant JBI. Each shareholder of the operating com-

panies was sent (1) a letter of acceptance containing the

offer (“Letter”) (2) an Agreement and Plan of Reorgani-

zation (“Agreement”) and (3) an Information Statement.

Copies of these were annexed to the complaint.

Plaintiffs are members of the same family as the prin-

cipal defendant, John M. Joyce. Prior to the Exchange,

plaintiffs owned various percentages of the outstanding

shares of the operating companies and, after the Exchange,

owned 37% of the stock of JBI. There is no claim that the

amount of JBI stock received by plaintiffs was insufficient

or unfairly calculated.

Plaintiff William J. Joyce was Chairman of the Board

of two of the operating companies and is presently a

director and the largest single stockholder of JBI.

Defendant John M. Joyce, was formerly Chairman of the

Board of one of the operating companies and presently is

Chairman of the Board of JBI. The other individual

defendant is William J. Collier, a director of each of the

operating companies and a director and General Counsel

of JBL.

Plaintiffs’ complaint (17a) asserts three counts, all of

which are alleged to be based upon Scction 10(b) of the

1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.

4

Count I of the complaint sets forth the preceding facts

and alleges:

1. That defendant John M. Joyce and his family,

defendant William J. Collier and Sidney P. Mudd (a)

control JBI, (b) own or have owned not less than 47.56%

of JBI’s outstanding common stock, (c) have never

occupied fewer than a majority of the seats on JBI’s Board

of Directors, and (d) have at all times acted in concert in

voting their shares (5 at 19a); and

2. That plaintiff William J. Joyce “relied upon the

judgment” of John M. Joyce and William J. Collier “in all

matters of consequence dealing with the affairs of JBI,”

and that William J. Collier served as the personal attorney

for William J. Joyce until approximately June 1, 1976

(76 at 20a).

Count I then alleges that the Information Statement was

misleading in that it contained three misstatements or

omissions of material fact. The first was an alleged omis-

sion to state the purported purpose of the Exchange

(710(a) at 21a). Both courts below held that this alleged

omission did not state a claim and hence it is not before this

Court.’ The remaining two alleged omissions or misstate-

ments—relating to Securities and Exchange Commission

Rule 144 (17 CFR § 230.144) and the corporation law of the

States of Illinois and Delaware—are discussed below.

Count LI repeats Count I and adds that defendants John

M. Joyce and William J. Collier were primarily responsible

for the Exchange and for the Information Statement and

that they knew or had reason to know that the Information

3. Plaintiffs alleged that the weakest of the operating companies

was the one located in New York and that the primary purpose of the

Exchange was to infuse capital into the New York operations

through loans out of funds generated by the other operating com-

panies ({[{]7-9 at 20a-2la). The Second Circuit agreed with the Dis-

_ Court that these allegations failed to state an actionable claim

(8a).

5

Statement contained untrue statements and omissions of

material fact (24a). Count III adds to Counts I and I

the allegation that defendants John M. Joyce and William

J. Collier caused the distribution of the untrue statements

of material fact and omissions with intent to defraud the

plaintiffs (25a).

Based on the above allegations, plaintiffs demand rescis-

sion of the Plan of Exchange and damages in an unspe-

cified amount (25a-26a).

Nowhere have plaintiffs attacked the fairness of the Ex-

change and thus allege no financial injury. The present

action was commenced three years and eight months after

completion of the Exchange (25a) and is one of a number

of lawsuits filed by plaintiffs against defendants in various

jurisdiction in a far-ranging intra-family dispute having no

real relationship to the federal securities laws.‘

A. Rule 144

The first of the two allegations as to misleading state-

ments upheld by the majority of the Second Circuit was an

alleged omission to advise the plaintiffs that Rule 144 would

not be “available as an exemption from the registration

requirements of the Securities Act of 1933” if JBI did not

make available certain information required under Rule

15¢2-11 of the Securities Exchange Act (10(b) at 21a-22a).

Notwithstanding the foregoing allegations, the Informa-

tion Statement, which -ppears as Exhibit B to the com-

plaint (JA35), states with respect to Rule 44:

4. This Court may take judicial notice of the following other

actions now pending between the two branches of the Joyce family:

Jill Kasselman v. Joyce Beverages, Inc., et al. (U.S.D.C. N. Dist.

Ill.) (76-C-4417); William Joyce, Jr. v. Joyce Beverages, Inc., et ano

(U.S.D.C: N. Dist. Ill.) (76-C-4328) wherein a counterclaim has

been interposed by defendants; and William J. Joyce, jr. v. James T.

Norris, et ano (Circ. Ct. Will Co. [Ill.] 12th Dist.) (76-G-3374L).

All of the foregoing actions were commenced in 1976, the same year

that the present action was commenced. The last-cited action, a libel

action, was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice and with costs

against William J. Joyce, Jr., one of the respondents in this case.

6

“Shares of common stock of Joyce [JBI] received

by stockholders of the Companies pursuant to the

Plan must be held indefinitely unless they are sub-

sequently registered under the Act or an exemption

from such registration is available. Rule 144 under

the Act permits resale of shares so restricted to be

nade in limited quantities after the shares have been

beneficially owned for two years in accordance with

the terms and conditions of that Rule. Stockholders

should consult their investment advisors for detailed

information as to the operation and availability of

Rule 144.” (JA56)

In addition, the following facts relating to Rule 144 were

disclosed in the Agreement (annexed to the Complaint as

Exhibit A; JA13-28) and the letter (contained in Exhibit B

annexed to the Complaint; JA29-32) which was required

to be signed by every shareholder who wished to exchange

his stock for JBI stock as provided by the Agreement:

(a) Both the Agreement and the Letter stated that “any

routine sales of securities made in reliance on Rule 144

promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission

ander the Act can be made only in limited amounts in

accordance with the terms and conditions of that rule and

that, in the case of securities to which that rule is not ap-

plicable registration under the Act or the availability of

another exemption therefrom will be required.” (JA30,

JA21)

(b) Both the Agreement and the Letter provided that all

shares of JBI would bear a legend that they “have not been

registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended,

and none of such shares can be sold, transferred or other-

wise disposed of in the absence of an effective registration

statement under such Act or an opinion of counsel satis-

factory to the issuer that registration under such Act is

not required for such sale, transfer or other disposition.”

(JA24, JA31)

7

(ec) Both the Agreement and the Letter provided that

each of the stockholders represented that he was “acquiring

all of the shares of [JBI] pursuant to the Plan for invest-

ment for the personal account of such Stockholder and not

with a view to the distribution on resale of any such shares.”

(JA20, JA30)

(d) Both the Agreement and the Letter provided that

resale of the JBI shares was prohibited unless, prior to

such resale, the stockholder (1) gave written notice to JBI

of his intention to sell shares, and (2) included with the

notice a copy of a bona fide third party offer to purchase

the shares. It was further provided that the foregoing

operated as an offer to sell the shares to JBI on the same

terms as the third party offer and that such offer to JBI

remained open for 60 days (JA21-22, JA30).

Referriag only to the Information Statement and ignor-

ing the above-cited portions of the Agreement and Letter,

the majority of the Court below held that the complaint

stated a claim of an alleged misleading statement (8a).

We respectfully submit that when the above-cited state-

ments are read together with the Information Statement,

there was no basis for the majority’s decision (applying

an incorrect standard of law) that a “reasonable share-

holder” (a) “could” have attached importance to a Rule

144 exemption, or (b) “could” have believed that Rule 144

would be avaiizble to him.

B. Delaware Corporation Law

The remaining allegations of omissions or misleading

statements are the alleged failure te disclose that rights

appurtenant to the stock of the operating companies under

Illinois law, would materially differ in the following four

respects from rights appurtenant to the stock of JBI under

8

Delaware law: (1) the number of shares required to

approve certain corporate actions, (2) the manner of filling

vacancies in corporate boards of directors, (3) the rights

of dissenting shareholders, and (4) the rights of indemni-

fication of officers and directors ({10(¢) at 22a).

The complaint is devoid of any allegation which indi-

cates how the alleged hypothetical differences between

Illinois and Delaware Corporation Law are related to the

facts of this case in any way, nor does the complaint allege

or suggest that any action was pianned or subsequently

occurred which would be affected by any such alleged

difference.

In particular, there was no allegation of a sale or other

disposition of assets which required a vote such as that

referred to in Paragraph 10(¢)(1) of the complaint, or an

appraisal procedure such as referred to in Paragraph

10(e)(3) of the complaint. Nor was there any allegation

of a vacancy on the Board of Directors or of an event mak-

ing the indemnification provisions of Delaware Corpora-

tion Law applicable, which might conceivably make the

allegations of Paragraphs 10(¢)(2) and 10(c)(4) of the

complaint relevant. Thus, the alleged differences between

Illinois and Delaware Corporation Law were-—for aught

that was set forth in the ecomplaint—unrelated to any facts

alleged in this case.

Judge Pollack, based on a careful analysis of the com-

plaint and decisions from three different cireuits—Ash v.

LFE Corp., 525 F.2d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 1975); Vohs v. Dick-

son, 495 F.2d 607, 625 (5th Cir. 1974); Nanfito v. Tekseed

Hybrid Co., 341 F.Supp. 240, 243, 245, (D.Neb. 1972), aff'd,

473 F.2d 537 (Sth Cir. 1973)—coneluded that there was

nothing misleading whatsoever and dismissed the complaint.

On review, a divided Second Circuit affirmed Judge Pol-

lack’s dismissal of the complaint as a matter of law with

respect to the first allegedly misleading statement, but

9

reversed the District Court with respect to the second and

third statements. The majority opinion noted that these

two statements raised “substantial issues”.

Applying a standard repudiated by this Court’s North-

way decision, the Second Cireuit held that the Information

Statement’s reference to Rule 144 “could have misled the

reasonable shareholder” into thinking that the Rule was

available to him (Sa, emphasis added). Likewise, the Court

opined that the reference to the distinction between Dela-

ware and Illinois law, “could have misled” the reasonable

shareholder into thinking that his legal rights were other-

wise identical (id., emphasis added). The “difficult question

of materiality”, Judge Hays concluded, “should not ordi-

narily be disposed of on a Rule 12(b) (6) motion (9a).”

Judge Oakes, dissenting in part, voted to affirm Judge

Pollack with respect to all three statements as a matter of

law (9a-lla).

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED

A. The Majority’s Decision Below Flatly Contra-

venes This Court’s Decision in TSC v. North-

way, Will Greatly Increase the Volume of

Meritless Securities Litigations in the Federal

Courts and (Unless Overturned) Will Trans-

form Proxy Statements Into “Avalanche[s] of

Trivial Information” Thereby Subverting the

“Informed Decision-Making” the Securities

Laws Are Designed To Foster (426 U.S. at

448-9).

In the recent case of TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,

Inc.. 426 U.S. 488 (1976), this Court was called upon to

define the standard of materiality required under the 1934

Act. Tt held that an omitted fact is material only if there

is a “substantial likelihood that under all the circumstances,

10

the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in

the deliberations of a reasonable shareholder” (emphasis

added). In so holding, the Court rejected a standard of

materiality grounded on “a fact which a reasonable share-

holder might consider important”.

This Court’s rationale for adopting a limited notion of

materiality was clearly stated as follows (426 U.S, at 448-9) :

“We are aware... that the disclosure policy embodied

in the proxy regulations is not without limit. See

id., at 384. Some information is of such dubious sig-

nificance that insistence on its disclosure may accom-

plish more harm than good. The potential liability

for a Rule 14a-9 violation can be great indeed, and

if the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low,

not only may the corporation and its management be

subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or

misstatements, but also management’s fear of expos-

ing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply

to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial

information—a result that is hardly conducive to

informed decisionmaking.”

In contravention of this cautionary principle, the major-

ity’s decision in the Second Circuit herein virtually pre-

cludes the dismissal of any complaint purportedly brought

under Seetion 10(b) of the 1954 Aet which alleges the

conclusion that there have been misstatements or omissions

of material facts, no matter how remote the likelihood that

the shareholder was actually misled.

The Second Cireuit’s decision states the bald conclusion

that the alleged misleading statements and omissions “raise

substantial issues” (but nowhere articulates what those

hypothetical substantial issues may be) and then holds

broadly that “the diffieult question of materiality should not

11

ordinarily be disposed of on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion”

(9a).

The majority’s decision in effect, signals to a prospective

litigant that the mere allegation of misstatements or omis-

sions of facts, however trivial, will guarantee him the right

to extensive pre-trial procedures and eventual trial, This

cannot fail to stimulate a flood of litigation of marginal and

frivolous claims which will be measured more by their

potential settlement value than by their merit. Such a

result will directly undercut the policies limiting the un-

bridled expansion of litigation under the federal securities

laws enunciated by this Court in its recent decisions in

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S, 723, 747-

748 (1975), reh. denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975); Ernst & Ernst

v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), reh. denied, 425 U.S.

986 (1976); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S.

L (1977); and Santa I’e Industries, Inc. v. Green, 480 U.S.

462 (1977).

Moreover, unless overturned, the majority’s decision will

engender a very real fear among business managements of

exposing themselves to substantial liability and unwar-

ranted legal expenses and will result in precisely the “ava-

lanche of trivial information” which this Court sought to

stem in Northway and which can only subvert the “informed

decisionmaking” which this Court noted the securities laws

are designed to foster (426 U.S. at 449).

Paradoxically, the significance of the Second Cireuit’s de-

cision below and the importance of its review by this Court,

derive from the very triviality of the allegations of mis-

statements and omissions on which plaintiffs’ purported

claim is based. If the federal securities laws can be freely

invoked as a tactical device in an intra-family corporate

squabble by merely hypothetical allegations of non-diselo-

sure, the federal policy of informed disclosure in stock-

holders’ affairs and transactions will be destroyed.

12

-

Not only does the practical result of the majority's de-

cision below contravene the principles of Northway, but it

appears that the Court below (although professing to apply

a uniform standard of materiality) applied a different and

lesser standard of materiality expressly rejected by this

Court in Northway. Thus, the Second Circuit’s majority

decision correctly stated that the issue was whether the al-

legedly undisclosed facts, “had they been disclosed, would

have been considered by the reasonable shareholder to have

significally altered the ‘total mix’ of information made

available” (Sa). However, when it came to apply the stan-

dard, the majority of the Court below sustained the action-

ability of plaintiffs’ claims of misstatements and omissions

on the suggestion that they merely “could” have misled

plaintiffs under some conceivable set of facts (9a). No-

where does the Second Circuit suggest how these alleged

misstatements and omissions would have assumed actual

significance in the deliberations of the reasonable share-

holder.

This Court’s Northway decision made crystal clear its

rejection of a materiality standard foeusing on facts which

a reasonable stockholder “might” consider important as a

formulation “too suggestive of mere possibility, however

unlikely” (426 U.S. at 449). It stated:

“The general standard of materiality that we think

best comports with the policies of Rule 14a-9 is as fol-

lows: An omitted fact is material if there is a sub-

stantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder

would consider it important in deciding how to vote.

This standard is fully consistent with Mills’ general

description of materiality as a requirement that ‘the

defect have a significant propensity to affect the vot-

ing process.’ It does not require proof of a substan-

tial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact

13

would have caused the reasonable investor to change

his vote. What the standard does contemplate is a

showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all

the circumstances, the omitted fact wows nave as-

sumed actual significance in the deliberations of the

reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must

be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the

omitted fact would have been viewed by the reason-

able investor as having significantly altered the ‘total

mix’ of information made available.” (426 U.S. at

449; emphasis added)

Yet the opinion of the majority below, with respect to

both allegations of Section LO(b) violations applied the

broader standard of materiality flatly rejected by this

Court in Northway. The Second Cireuit stated (9a) :

“The statement about the potential availability of

Rule 144 could have misled the reasonable share-

holder into thinking that it was, in fact, available

to him. Similarly, the diseussion of the loss of pre-

emptive rights and the discontinuance of cumulative

voting as a result of the changeover to Delaware law,

could have misled him into thinking that the change-

over did not otherwise affect his rights.” (emphasis

added)

It is possible that the Second Cireuit’s decision stems

from a misreading of this Court’s admonition in Northway

that the determination of materiality “requires delicate

assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’

would draw from a given set of facts and the significance

of those inferences to him, and those assessments are

pecularly ones for the trier of fact” (426 U.S. at 450, quoted

by the Second Cireuit at 8a). However, this Court also

made clear that the foregoing comments were directed to a

case where the complaint clearly stated an actionable claim

and the only question was whether summary judgment

14

against defendant was appropriate. Thus, this Court

stated (426 U.S, at 450):

“Only if the established omissions are ‘so obviously

important to an investor, that reasonable minds can-

not differ on the question of materiality’ is the ulti-

mate issue of materiality appropriately resolved ‘as

a matter of law’ by summary judgment.”

Here, the question is not whether summary judgment

foreclosing a defendant from the opportunity to present

mitigating factors to the trier of facet is appropriate.

Rather, it is whether the standards of materiality set forth

by this Court in Northway must also be applied at the

pleading stage. It appears that this Court’s admonition

concerning the “delicate assessments” that must be made

by a trier of fact was read by the majority below as a fore-

closing pre-trial dismissal of substantially all claims based

on alleged misstatements or omissions, no matter how

trivial the claims or how remote the likelihood that the

shareholder was actually mislead. We submit that this

Court never intended such a result and that the lower

court’s misapprehension runs directly contrary to the

explicit rejection in Northway of a standard of liability

that would cause “an avalanche of trivial information”.

Because of the significant concentration of actions under

the securities laws within the Second Cireuit and the

influence of the Second Circuit in this area in other juris-

dictions, it is particularly important that this Court take

affirmative action to signal that the Second Cireuit’s dis-

regard of the Northway standard will not be ignored. No

benefit can be derived from allowing this issue to percolate

in the lower courts.

15

B. The Second Circuit’s Decision Is in Conflict

With Decisions of the Third and Fifth Cir-

cuits and That Split of Authority Should Be

Resolved by This Court.

One reads the Second Cireuit’s decision in vain for any

mention of the three cases cited by the District Court in

support of its decision that plaintiffs’ complaint should be

dismissed: Ash v. LFE Corp., supra; Vohs vy. Dickson,

supra; Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Corp., supra.

In those eases, the courts held alleged misrepresentations

or omissions virtually identical to those alleged here to be

nonactionable. In Ash, a unanimous panel of the Third

Cireuit noted that (525 F.2d at 220):

“No ease has been called to our attention requiring

disclosure of speculative issues of state corporation

law in a proxy solicitation.”

And in Vohs, a unanimous Fifth Court panel held (495

F.2d at 625):

“Rule 10b-5 cannot be construed to require a pro-

spective seller of securities to give his prospective

buyers legal advice on technical matters arising

under the federal securities laws.”

Also, see Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Corp.. supra, at 243,

245, aff'd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973).

In this ease, however, the Second Cireuit held that once

plaintiffs alleged that defendants mentioned the existence

of Rule 144 and certain differing rights of shareholders

pursuant to Delaware and Illinois law, they opened a Pan-

dora’s Box—the issue of “materiality’—-which the Court

believed could not be closed prior to a jury trial.

16

Since this decision invites the perception that, by merely

alleging a misleading statement or omission under the

securities laws, a plaintiff can compel a corporation to

defend a lawsuit on its merits, corporate managers are

likely to interpret the Second Cireuit’s decision as requiring

them to provide shareholders with a fullblown exigesis of

every issue of law which may conceivably bear upon the

interests of shareholders. The resulting torrent of infor-

mation will only interfere with intelligent decisionmaking.

Since the concentration of the securities industry in New

York City makes the Districts of the Second Circuit at least

a potential venue in a great many types of actions under

the federal securities laws, the nationwide impact of the

Second Cireuit’s opinion must not be discounted.

The lack of a uniformly recognized test of disclosure with

respect to legal matters conflicts with the federally man-

dated duty of regulated corporations to provide information

to shareholders on a nationwide basis. This Court’s enun-

ciation of a uniform standard would eliminate the current

posture of conflict among the Circuits in which the deter-

mination of whether the statements of a national corpora-

tion are actionable because of material misstatement and

omissions may depend on the choice of forum.

Finally, it is very important that this ease be heard at its

present stage. If this case is tried on its merits, defendants

are convinced that they will succeed. Therefore, the ques-

tion of whether the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint are

sufficient even to state a claim will never he presented to

this Court. However, the damage the Second Cirenit’s

decision is likely to cause will continne unabated. If

corporate managers believe that an allegation of a material

misrepresentation or omission is sufficient that the issue be

tried, they will continue to “bury” their shareholders

17

with utterly useless verbiage—an unfortunate result

which is incompatible with informed decisionmaking. In

short, to allow this issue to percolate further in the lower

Courts would only harm the investing public without pro-

moting any significant policy of judicial administration.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant

this petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Micwaet Lescu

Suea Goutp Cuimenko & Casey

330 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10017

Attorneys for Joyce Beverages, Inc.,

John M. Joyce and William J. Collier

Of Counsel

MicuaeL Lescu,

Sanrorp A. Bet.

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Cireuit, held at the United States Court-

house in the City of New York, on the thirtieth day of

January one thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight.

United States Court of Appeals Filed Jan 30 1978. A.

Daniel Fusaro, Clerk, Second Circuit.

AP PENDIX Present: Hon. Henry J. Frrmenpity, Hon. Paut R. Hays,

Hon. James L. Oakes, Circuit Judges,

77-7262

ae

Wituum J. Joyce, Bernice Ritzy Joyce, Mary Joyce

HammMonp, WituiAM J. Joyce, Jr., Dornorny Ann Joyce,

CATHERINE Joyce McManus, Paut McManus, Jitt Joycr

KXASSELMAN and JupirH Lange,

Plaintiff s-Appellants,

v.

Joyce Beveraces, Inc., Jonn M. Joyce and WituiaMm J.

COLLIER,

Defendants-A ppellees.

or

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of

record from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby

ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the order of said Dis-

trict Court be and it hereby is reversed and the action be

and it hereby is remanded to said District Court for further

proceedings in accordance with the opinion of this court

with costs to be taxed against the appellees.

A. Damien Fvusaro, Clerk

' By

| Deputy Clerk

Om

2a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE Seconp Circuit

—EE ee

No. 255—September Term, 1977.

(Argued November 2, 1977 Decided January 30, 1978.)

Docket No. 77-7262

EE

Wii J. Joyce, Bernice Rizzy Joyce, Mary Joyce Ham-

MOND, WituiAM J. Joyce, JR., Dororay Ann Joyce,

CaTHERINE Joyce McManus, Paut McManus, Jitu

Joyce KasseLMan and Jupitu Joyce Lane,

Plaintiff s-Appellants,

—against—

Joyce Beverages, Inc., Joun M. Joyce and

WituiaM J. Couier,

Defendants-A ppellees.

——En ee

Before:

Frienpty Hays and Oakes,

Circuit Judges.

_—_—_———EnE ee

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York, the Honorable

Milton Pollack, Judge, dismissing plaintiffs’ claims under

§ 10(b) of the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.

§78j}(b) (1971), for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and

3a

for failure to plead with particularity the circumstances

constituting a fraud as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

Reversed and remanded.

—_——aeeel eee

Donatp E. Eean, Chieago, Ill. (Katten, Muchin,

Gitles, Zavis, Pearl & Galler, Chicago, IIl., Lee

Ann Watson, on the brief; Chadbourne, Parke,

Whiteside & Wolff, New York, N. Y., of coun-

sel), for Plaintiff s-Appellants.

MicuaEL Lescn, New York, N. Y. (Shea Gould

Climenko & Casey, New York, N. Y., Lillian 8S.

Weigert, New York, N. Y., of counsel), for

Defendants-Appellees.

ec

Hays, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-appellants appeal the dismissal of their com-

plaint in an action brought under §10(b) of the Securities

and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1971), and

Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1977).

The complaint alleged that an “Information Statement”

that accompanied a proposed exchange of stock contained

various material omissions and misrepresentations. The

defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted and for failure to

plead with particularity the circumstances constituting the

fraud. The district court granted the motion. Joyce v.

Joyce Beverages, Inc., 430 F.Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

We find that the complaint sufficiently complies with the

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), and therefore proceed

to a consideration of the other alleged deficiencies.

4a

The plaintiffs are William J. Joyee and the members of

his immediate family: his wife, children, and son-in-law.

In Mareh of 1973, they owned a large block of the stock

of four companies (“Operating Companies”) engaged in the

business of bottling Seven-Up and other soft drinks. The

defendants are Jolin M. Joyvee, William J. Collier, and

Jovee Beverages, Inc. (“JBI”). John M. Joyee was the

Chairman of the Board of the New York Operating Com-

pany. Tle is now the Chairman of the Board of JBI.

William J. Collier, who formerly served as the personal

attorney of William J. Joyee, is a divector of JBI and also

serves as its General Counsel. As General Counsel, he was

responsible for the legal matters relating to the preparation

of the documents used in the instant transaction. JBI is a

Delaware corporation that was formed to serve as a hold-

ing company for the four Operating Companies. The com-

plaint alleges that John M. Joyee and William J. Collier,

together with John M. Joyee’s immediate family and

another, own and at all relevant times have owned not

less than 47.56% of the outstanding stock of JBI, that they

have controlled a majority of the board of directors of

JBI, and that they have acted in concert so that they

hold a controlling interest in the company.

A plan was developed to reorganize and consolidate the

four Operating Companies through the device of a holding

company. As noted above, J BI was formed for this purpose.

Pursuant to this plan, JBI proposed to the stockholders of

the Operating Companies that they exchange their stock

for shares of JBI. The offer was made by mail. The pack-

age sent to each shareholder included a letter containing

the offer, an Agreement and Plan of Reorganization setting

out the terms of the exchange, and an “Information State-

ment.” The Information Statement was a lengthy, wide-

5a

ranging disclosure document akin to the form of proxy

statement outlined in Schedule A, Item 14, which is re-

quired when §14 of the Securities Exchange Act is appli-

cable. In response to this offer, plaintiffs exchanged their

shares in the Operating Companies for JBI stock. Accord-

ing to the complaint, they now hold 37% of the outstanding

stock of JBL.

All of the companies involved in this case have at all

times been privately held. The four Operating Companies

were incorporated in Lilinois; JBI is a Delaware corpora-

tion. It is not disputed that the New York Operating Com-

pany was the weakest of the four. Nor is it disputed that

this fact was adequately disclosed.

I

The complaint charges that there were three materially

inisleading statements in the Information Statement:

1. The first section of the statement delineated the rea-

sons for the proposed consolidation. Essentially, it stressed

the operating economies that would result from the con-

solidation of the four companies. It also stressed that the

consolidation would produce a financially stronger entity

that would be in a better position to obtain financing,

The plaintiffs allege that the real purpose of the con-

solidation was to benefit defendants’ New York company,

which, as everybody knew, was the weakest financially.

They allege that the plan was to have JBI float loans to

the New York company out of the funds generated by the

other Operating Companies, “all to the detriment of the

Operating Companies other than New York.”

2. The Information Statement contained a section explain-

ing that the exchanged JBI shares could not be resold since

fa

they had not been and would not be registered. /nter alia,

it advised that Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1977), would

allow resale if its terms were met, and that the stockholders

should consult their investment advisors about the avail-

ability of Rule 144. Plaintiffs claim that this statement

was misleading in that it implied that a Rule 144 exemption

might be available when defendants knew that was not so.

3. As noted above, the Operating Companies were IIli-

nois corporations; JBI is incorporated in Delaware. The

Information Statement described certain changes in stock

rights effected by this changeover: the loss of pre-emptive

rights ' and the discontinuance of cumulative voting.’ Plain-

tiffs claim that by listing some but not all of the changes,

defendants misled them. Specifically, they claim that de-

fendants should have included the fact that: several types

of stockholder approval votes could be effected by simple

majorities instead of two third votes as under Tllinois law ;’

1. The Illinois Business Corporation Act. /ll.Ann.Stat. ch. 32

§ 157.24 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1977), recognizes the stockholders’ com-

mon law pre-emptive right, see Elward v. Peabody Coal Co., 9 Il.

App. 234, 132 N.E. 2d 549 (1956), to share pro-rata in any new

issue of corporate stock so that their interest in the corporation will

not be diluted. Delaware does not recognize such a right. See Del.

Code tit. 8 §§ 157, 161 (1975).

2. The Illinois act makes cumulative voting mandatory, //l.Ann.

Stat. ch. 32 § 157.28 (Smith-Hurd 1954); under the Delaware Acct it

is permissive. Del.Code tit. 8 § 214 (1975). If cumulative voting is

not provided for in the certificate of incorporation, each shareholder

is only entitled to one vote for each share that he holds. /d. § 212.

3. Under Delaware law, the certfiicate of incorporation may be

amended by a majority vote of the stockholders. Del.Code tit. 8

§ 242(c)(1) (1975). Under Illinois law, a two thirds vote is re-

quired. Jl. Ann.Stat. ch, 32 § 157.33(c) (Smith-Hurd. Supp. 1977).

The same is true with regard to approval votes for mergers and con-

solidations, compare Del.Code tit. 8 §251(c) (Supp. 1976) with

Jil. Ann.Stot. ch. 32 § 157.64 (Smith-Hurd 1954), and for dissolutions

or sales, leases, exct ‘ges, mortgages, or pledges of all or substanti-

ally all of the assets of the corporation. Compare Del.Code tit. 8

7a

vacancies on the Board of Directors could be filled by the

vote of the remaining directors instead of the stockhoiders ;'

certain appraisal rights would be lost;’ and, under Dela-

ware law, JBI’s officers and directors would have broader

rights of indemnification.

The district court held that, as a matter of law, none of

these alleged misrepresentations or omissions was material.

It understood the first claim to allege that the weakness of

the New York company, and the fact that it stood to benefit

by obtaining loans, was not adequately disclosed. The

court held that it was not fraudulent to fail to say that the

weakest company would benefit from the consolidation. It

did not find anything misleading about the Rule 144 state-

ment. With regard to the changes in stockholders’ rights

resulting from the change in states of incorporation, it held

that the defendants’ duty to disclose was discharged by the

disclosure of the changeover and the inclusion of the names

of the states involved. 430 F. Supp. at 678.

4, (a) (1975) with Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 32 § 157.76(c) (Smith-Hurd

1954).

These differences are of practical import in the instant case. The

vm pe ye alleges that, together, the plaintiffs owned more than one

third of the stock of each Operating Company. This gave them an

effective veto of any p merger, dissolution, or amendment of

the charter. They lost this power when they exchanged their stock

for stock in JBI, a Delaware corporation,

4. Del.Code tit. 8 §§ 142(e), 223(a) (1975). Compare Ill.Ann.

Stat. ch. 32 § 157.36 (Smith-Hurd 1954),

5. In the event of a sale or exchange of substantially all of the

assets of a corporation, the Illinois act provides for appraisal rights

for the dissenting shareholders, //l.Ann.Stat. ch. 32 § 197.73 (Smith-

Hurd, Supp. 1977). The same is true in the event of a merger or

consolidation. /d. § 157.70 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1977). The Dela-

ware act provides for appraisal only in the event of a me or con-

solidation. Del.Code tit. 8 § 262 ( Supp. 1976), not in the event of

sale or exchange.

Sa

While we agree with the district court’s conclusions as to

the first claim, we cannot go along with its views as to the

materiality of the second and third claims.

On this motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

plaintiffs’ allegations must be accepted as true and must be

read in the manner most favorable to them, This is espe-

cially true when dealing with questions of materiality

which, since they are “mixed questions of law and fact,”

require

delicate assessments of the inferences a “reasonable

shareholder” would draw froma given set of facts and

the significance of those inferences to him, and these

assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact.

TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450

(1976).° The issue on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether

the plaintiffs can prove any set of facts that, had they been

disclosed, would have been considered by the reasonable

shareholder to have “significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of

information made available.” Jd. at 449.

We cannot say that this is not the case with respect to

the second and third claims here.

The statements about the availability of Rule 144 and the

omissions regarding Delaware law raise substantial issues.

The statement about the potential availability of Rule 144

could have misled the reasonable shareholder into thinking

6. TSC Industries dealt with the standard of materiality under

§ 14(a) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1971). However, it is

generally agreed that the same standard applies under § 10(b). See

Goldberg v. Meridor, No. 77-7146 at 5820-21 (2nd Cir. Sept. 8, 1977).

This seems correct as a matter of statutory interpretation since the

statutes are in pari materia. As a matter of policy, the 7SC standard

is particularly appropriate in this case since it involves an Information

Statement much akin to a proxy statement in a merger vote.

ee

9a

that it was, in fact, available to him. Similarly, the diseus-

sion of the loss of pre-emptive rights and the discontinuance

of cumulative voting as a result of the changeover to

Delaware law, could have misled him into thinking that the

changeover did not otherwise affect his rights.

ITT

Of course, we intimate no views on the merits of this

case, It may develop that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate to

the trier of fact that the reasonable shareholder would

have been misled. It may develop, once discovery has

begun, that the plaintiffs actually knew or could not have

cared less about the very facts that they claim were mis-

represented. We stress only that the difficult question of

materiality should not ordinarily be disposed of on a Rule

12(b)(6) motion.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceed-

ings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Oakes, Circuit Judge (dissenting) :

I most respectfully dissent.

I agree with Judge Pollack below that none of the

asserted omissions or representations is _ sufficiently

material to avoid dismissal. T shall deal seriatim with the

three statements alleged to be misleading.

First, the representation that a purpose of the consolida-

tion was to permit financing to be obtained more easily and

at lower cost is not a representation that the stronger

companies’ excess funds would not be used to strengthen

the financial position of the New York Operating Company.

Any consolidation implies to a reasonable stockholder, it

10a

seems to me, that there will be intereorporate loans, quite

likely from the stronger to the weaker entities of the con-

solidation. Excessive lending, charging an unreasonably

low rate of interest or imperiling the stronger corporation’s

capital may give rise to a state cause of action for waste

of assets or for mismanagement. However, as the majority

and I agree, the omission tu state that there will be such

lending does not rise to the level of a 10b-5 claim.

Second, the reference to Rule 144, surely a boilerplate

provision in the Information Statement, presents a some-

what closer question, but the statement issued did say that

the shares of JBI “must be held indefinitely unless they are

subsequently registered under the Act or an exemption

from such registration is available.” That was true, and it

was followed by another true statement that Rule 144 per-

mits resale of restricted shares in limited quantities after

a holding period of two years “in accordance with the terms

and conditions of that Rule.” To my mind this language

would put a reasonable shareholder on notice that unless

“that Rule” were subsequently complied with,' he would

have to hold them “indefinitely.”

1, Compliance with Rule 144 is no simple matter. Under the

rule, a seller of restricted securities will not be deemed a Section

2(11), 15 U.S.C. §77b(11), underwriter, if inter alia, in addition

to holding the securities for the requisite period. 17 C.F.R.

§ 230.144(d), and to complying with the a le limitation on the

amount of securities which may be sold, id. § 230.144(e), the issuer

has made available adequate current pgm information with respect

to itself. The issuer may satisfy the information requirement in

either of two ways. It must have securities registered under either

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or the Securities Act of 1933,

— making itself subject to the reporting requirements of Sec-

tions 13 and 15(d) —— of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m,

780, or it must have made publicly available the information required

by Rule 15c2-11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11(a)(4) (1977). See 17

FR, § 230.144(c)(1), (2) (1977).

Oe OR ce a ee ED ot Se ee

lla

Finally, the reference to Delaware as the state of JBI’s

incorporation and to two Delaware corporate law provisions

particularly burdensome on these minority stockholders—

relating to lack of preemptive rights and unavailability of

cumulative voting—was factually accurate. Such a refer-

ence should have alerted even the most unsophisticated

stockholder to the possibility that Delaware law had addi-

tional, perhaps more esoteric traps for the unwary which,

to avert, might well require advice of counsel. But I should

have thought that it has long been a matter of common

knowledge to the business world generally that Delaware’s

corporation law quite generally favors management and

controlling interests, and disfavors minority stockholders.

To my knowledge, the SEC has not yet required merger

information or proxy statements to bear a sticker warning

against the laws of Delaware. More to the point, perhaps,

no allegation in the complaint indicates that any of the

Delaware laws not mentioned in the Information Statement

here have in some way been utilized by the controlling

interests adversely to those of appellants.

[ suspect that the proof may show that appellants

received poor legal advice when they went into the ex-

change of stock. This might give them a state cause of

action for negligence or other breach of fiduciary duty if,

since allegedly their attorney benefited from the trans-

action, indeed, appellants have suffered loss. But I agree

with Judge Pollack that the Information Statement does

not give rise to a cause of action under federal securities

law, and accordingly would affirm.

12a

APPENDIX C

UNITES STATES DISTRICT COURT

SouTHERN District oF New York

76 CIV. 5846(MP)

a

Wuuam J. Joyce, Bernice Rmaey Joyce, Mary Joyce

Hammonp, Wituiam J. Joyce, Jr., Dororny Ann Joyce,

CATHERINE Joyce McManus, Paut McManvs, JILt Joyce

KassELMAN and JupitH Joyce LANG,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

Joyce Beveraces, Inc., Jonn M. Joyce and Wim J.

COLLIER,

Defendants.

eS

DECISION

Milton Pollack, District Judge.

Defendants move, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6)

and 9(b) for a dismissal of the complaint for failure to

state a sufficient claim for relief and failure to plead with

particularity any circumstances constituting fraud.

On April 30, 1973 plaintiffs exchanged their common

stock in four “Seven-Up” bottling companies (“Operating

Companies”) incorporated in the State of Illinois for

shares in Joyee Beverages, Inc. (“JBI”) incorporated in

the State of Delaware, pursuant to an Agreement and Plan

of Reorganization.' The offer for the exchange was made

1. This suit was filed three years and eight months after the

exchange in which plaintiffs participated fully. Plaintiff William J.

Joyce became and is a director and largest stockholder of JBI.

~ Ate Ae note

13a

by mail, and was accompanied by a document labeled

“Information Statement”. Having been annexed to the

complaint, that may be considered hereon. Wright &

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1357 at 604.

Plaintiffs seek rescission of the exchange and damages

on the ground that the offer omitted and misstated material

facts with intent to defraud the plaintiffs in violation of

section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and

Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

Material omissions charged

1. That: the Information Statement failed to say that

the New York Seven-Up Bottling Co., one of the four oper-

ating Companies was financially weaker than the other

three ; that the Chairman of the Board of Directors, defend-

ant John Joyce, and the General Counsel of JBI, defendant

William Collier, who also was a director of JBI and of the

Operating Companies, intended by the Plan to facilitate

JBI loans to the New York company out of funds generated

by the other Operating Companies.

2. That: the Information Statement suggested to the

plaintiffs that Rule 144 of the General Rules and Regula-

tions under the Securities Act of 1933 would be available

to plaintiffs to market their JBi stock and such suggestion

was incorrect because (a) JBI is not a registered company

under the 1934 Act, and (b) JBI does not make public the

information required by Rule 15C2-11 of the 1934 Act.

3. That: the Information Statement failed to disclose

material differences between the rights of stockholders in

Delaware and Illinois corporations in respect to (a) the

percentage of votes required for approval of major cor-

porate actions, (b) the manner of filling vacancies on the

Board, (c) appraisal rights in connection with sale of cor-

l4a

porate assets, and (d) rights of indemnification of directors

and officers for their corporate acts.

None of the asserted omissions or representations is suf-

ficient to warrant entertaining this litigation.

The recitation in the Statement of the purpose of the

Plan was, to reorganize the [Operating] Companies under

common ownership in order to achieve economies in ad-

ministration and permit greater strength and flexibility in-

cluding the purpose to permit financing to be obtained more

easily and at lower costs from the consolidated strength

of the assets of the four Companies.

Since there was no representation in the Information

Statement that the four Operating Companies had the

identical financial strength, (indeed the financial data set

out specifically indicated the contrary), it can hardly be

claimed that it was fraudulent to fail to mention the obvious

that the companies were of unequal strength and that the

weakest would benefit from a consolidation with the other

three.

The statement issued concerning Rule 144 which is as

follows does not omit material fact nor does it contain

material misstatement:

Shares of common stock of Joyce (JBI) received

by stockholders of the Companies pursuant to the

Plan must be held indefinitely unless they are subse-

quently registered under the Act or an exemption

from such registration is available. Rule 144 under

the Act permits resale of shares so restricted to be

made in limited quantities after the shares have been

beneficially owned for two years in accordance with

the terms and conditions of that Rule. Stockholders

should consult their investment advisors for detailed

information as to the operation and availability of

Rule 144.

lda

The corporate rights of stockholders provided for in

statutes of the states of incorporation are adequately de-

scribed by reference to the identity of the states involved.

Where the names of the states of incorporation are set

forth the reader is charged with constructive notice of the

relevant statutes. The omissiou of a comparison thereof

in an exchange offer is not an omission of matter on which

a 10b-5 claim may be mounted for a recovery.

There is no duty to render legal advice to the reader of

an exchange offer; an omission of legal advice is not fraud-

ulent. Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 625 (5th Cir. 1974).

In Vohs v. Dickson, swpra, an employee sold his unregis-

tered stock in his corporate employer to a fellow employee.

The purchasing employee claimed that the seller had vio-

lated 10b-5 by not advising her that the stock must be

purchased with a non-distributive intent in order to escape

the federal registration requirements upon a subsequent

resale.

The Court rejected this claim, stating:

Federal law makes it fraudulent to misrepresent or

omit material facts in respect to a sale of securities.

The important point ... is that whether or not

plaintiffs had to take the stock with non-distribu-

tive intent is not a matter of fact—imnaterial or other-

wise; it is a matter of law. Rule 10b-5 canot be con-

strued to require a prospective seller of securities

to give his prospective buyers legal advice on tech-

nical matters arising under the federal securities law.

If the buyer is aware of the material facts— [unreg-

istered stock]—he should be as aware of the legal

consequences of those facts as his seller. Id. at 625.

(Emphasis supplied)

l6a

Cf. Ash v. LFE Corp., 525 F.2d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 1975).

“No case has been called to our attention requiring disclo-

sure of speculative issues of state corporation law in a

proxy solicitation.” See also, Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid

Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 248, 245, (D. Neb. 1972), aff’d, 473

F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973).

The complaint is dismissed for insufficiency in the re-

spects claimed in the notice of motion.

SO ORDERED.

Mitton Poiiack

April 28, 1977

tte ee eee

U.S. District Judge

ER A A lh

17a

APPENDIX D

COMPLAINT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SoutHerN District or New York

ae

Witutiam J. Joyce, Bernice Ritey Joyce, Mary Joyce

Hammonp, WitutaAm J. Joyce, Jr., Dornorny Any Joyce,

CaTHEnINE Joyce McManus, Pavt McManus, Jitit Joycr

KasseLMAN and Jupitx Joyce Lana,

Plaintiffs,

—against—

Joyce Brveraces, Inc., Jounw M, Joycr, and

WriuiamM J. Cotirmr,

Defendants.

i

Plaintiffs for their complaint herein allege:

1. This action arises under Section 10(b) of the Secu-

rities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) and Rule

10b-5 of the General Rules and Regulations thereunder.

This Court has jurisdiction under Section 27 of that Act

(15 U.S.C. § 78aa).

COUNT TI

2. On March 26, 1973, plaintiffs were owners of shares

of stock in Chicago Seven-Up Bottling Co. (“Chicago”),

Illinois Seven-Up Bottling Co. (“Illinois”), Madison Seven-

Up Bottling Co. (“Madison”), and New York Seven-Up

18a

Bottling Co. (“New York”) (hereinafter collectively

referred to as “Operating Companies”) as follows:

Chicago Illinois Madison New York

William J. Joyee ................ 5492 5492 2000 5492

Bernice Riley Joyce .......... 267 267 40 267

Mary Joyce Hammond ...... 380 380 80 380

William J. Joyce, Jr. ........ 522 522 102 522

Dorothy Ann Joyee .......... 92 92 0 92

Catherine Joyce McManus 423 423 80 425

Paul McManus .................... 92 92 0 92

Jill Joyce Kasselman ........ 393 393 80 393

Judith Jovee Lang ............ 425 423 80 423

3. Plaintiffs are presently owners of approximately

37% of the total issued and outstanding shares of the

common stock of defendant Joyce Beverages, Inc. (“JBT’”).

The number of shares of JBI common stock owned by each

plaintiff is as follows:

Stockholder No. of Shares

Gg OE a 263,039

Bernice Riley Jovee ....................-...------- 12,136

Mary Joyee Hammond ............................ 18,075

I 25,283

ae 4,641

Catherine Joyce McManus .................... 20,518

Sn SEED i scadiciniesiieriidicheesuctintiiannabiiiaiits 4,641

Jill Joyee Kasselman .............................. 18,232

Judith Joyce Lang ..............................-.. 20,518

SOIT shiniwvsciseritiinianiieaitecdianaetinins 387,083

4. All or nearly all of plaintiffs’ presently-owned shares

of JBI were acquired on or about April 30, 1973, pursuant

to an Agreement and Plan of Reorganization (“the Plan”)

o ———

19a

dated April 1, 1973, a copy of which is attached hereto and

incorporated herein as Exhibit A. Pursuant to the Plan,

each shareholder of an Operating Company was offered by

JBI the right to exchange his shares in said corporation

for the number of shares of JBI as set forth in Paragraph

3 of the Plan. The aforesaid offer was made by letter

dated March 26, 1973, which was transmitted by United

States mail to each shareholder of the Operating Com-

panies with a document labeled “Information Statement”.

A copy of the Information Statement and the transmittal

letter is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit

B. The shares owned by plaintiffs, as set forth in para-

graph 2 hereof, were exchanged for the number of shares

of JBI set forth opposite each plaintiff’s name in para-

graph 3 hereof, in accordance with the provisions of the

Plan.

». JBI is controlled by defendant John M. Joyee, his

wife, his descendants and their spouses, acting in concert

with defendant William J. Collier, General Counsel of JBI,

and Sidney P. Mudd, President of JBI. Such persons are

hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Controlling

Persons”. John M. Joyce is Chairman of the Board of

JBI, and as such is responsible for the supervision and

direction of all of the business and affairs of JBI. William

J. Collier is the General Counsel and a Director of JBI

and each Operating Company, and as such was responsible

for all legal matters relating to the preparation of the

Plan and the Information Statement. The Controlling

Persons own, or have at all times relevant hereto owned,

in the aggregate not less than 47.56% of the outstanding

shares of common stock of JBI and each Operating Com-

pany. The Controlling Persons at all times relevant hereto

have occupied not less than a majority of the seats on the

Board of Directors of JBI. The Controlling Persons have

20a

at all times relevant hereto acied in concert with respect

to the voting of their shares of JBI, and casting their votes

at directors’ meetings, and in the conduct of their duties as

officers of JBI and the Operating Companies.

6. Plaintiff William J. Joyce is and at all times relevant

hereto has been a director of JBI, largest single stock-

holder of JBI, and Chairman of the Board of Tllinois and

Madison. However, at all times relevant hereto he has not

been actively involved in the day-to-day affairs of JBI and

the Operating Companies. In all matters of consequence

dealing with the affairs of JBI, he has until the summer

of 1976 relied on the judgment of John M. Joyce and

William J. Collier. Until approximately June 1, 1976,

William J. Collier served as the personal attorney of

William J. Joyee. The remaining plaintiffs are all mem-

bers of the immediate family (spouse, children and a son-

in-law) of William J. Jeyee.

7. During the period prior to the consummation of the

Plan, New York was financially weaker than the other

Operating Companies, as evidenced by the following:

(a) New York operated on the smallest profit

margins in relations to sales;

(b) New York had the least favorable ratio of

total assets to total liabilities;

(c) New York had the least favorable ratio of

current assets to current liabilities; and

(d) New York had the largest percentage of its

total assets as fixed assets as opposed to current

assets.

As a result of the foregoing, and other factors relating to

New York’s business, New York’s need for capital and

wee eho tere 6 = ~

2la

financial support was the greatest among all of the Operat-

ing Companies.

8. As residents of the New York area, John M. Joyce

and William J. Collier, both of whom were and are Con-

trolling Persons, had a particular stake in the maintenance

and expansion of New York at the expense of the other

Operating Companies, and said individuals sought to

enhance their individual positions within the corporate

scheme by maintaining the overall corporate headquarters

of all the Operating Companies in the State of New York.

9. Because of the considerations set forth in paragraphs

7 and 8, a primary purpose of John M. Joyce and William

J. Collier in causing the Plan to be effected was to facilitate

the infusion of outside capital into New York by loans

from JBI to New York out of funds generated from the

Operating Companies other than New York, all to the detri-

ment of the Operating Companies other than New York.

10. The Information Statement is misleading in that it

contains the following untrue statements of material facts

or omissions of material facts necessary in order to make

the statements made therein not misleading:

(a) On pages 1, 2 and 3, the Information State-

ment purports to state the purposes of the Plan. No

disclosure is made as to the purpose alleged in para-

graph 9 of this complaint.

(b) On page 19 of the Information Statement, it

is stated that:

Rule 144 under the [Securities] Act [of 1933]

permits resale of shares so restricted to be made

in limited quantities after the shares have been

beneficially owned for two years in accordance

with the terms and conditions of that Rule.

22a

In fact, Rule 144 is not available and was not at the time

of that statement available as an exemption from the regis-

tration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 for com-

panies not registered under the Securities Exchange Act of

1934 or companies which do not make public certain infor-

mation required by Rule 15C2-11 of that Act. JBI is not

and was not then so registered and, upon information and

belief, JBI did not then and does not now intend to make

such information publicly available. To the extent that

plaintiffs had not exchanged their shares of the Operating

Companies that they had acquired prior to June 15, 1972

for shares of JBI, the plaintiffs would have been entitled

to sell their shares entirely free of the restrictions of Rule

144.

(c) Pages 20 and 21 of the Information Statement pur-

port to describe the newly-issued capital stock of JBI

offered under the Plan and to explain the differences

between the stock of the Operating Companies which had

all been organized under the laws of Illinois, and the stock

of JBI which was organized under the laws of Delaware.

No disclosure was made of the following material differ-

ences in the rights appurtenant to the stock of the Operat-

ing Companies and the rights appurtenant to the stock of

JBI:

(1) As to all of the Operating Companies, a favor-

able vote of holders of two-thirds of the outstanding

shares was required to approve a merger or consoli-

dation, amendment of the Articles of Incorporation,

dissolution or sale, lease, exchange, mortgage or

pledge of all or substantially all the assets. Plaintiffs

owned, in the aggregate, in excess of one-third of

the outstanding shares of each Operating Company

and thus, acting collectively, would have held an

effective veto power over any such action. Inas-

ee eee

soins

nae a a

ee ee re ee es See ee ne ee eee

23a

much as the Certificate of Incorporation of JBI and

Delaware law permit any such action to be taken by

a favorable vote of only a simple majority of the

outstanding stock (and in some cases, without the

approval of stockholders at all), the Plan has seri-

ously affected the position of plaintiffs and reduced

their influence in the corporate affairs of JBI.

(2) Any vacanies in the Boards of Directors of

the Operating Companies can only be filled by a vote

of the shareholders, but JBI can fill such vacanies by

a vote of the remaining directors.

(3) Dissenting stockholders have no appraisal

rights in connection with the sale, lease or exchange

of substantially all the assets of JBI, but they had

such rights as shareholders of the Operating Com-

panies.

(4) Under Delaware law far broader rights of

indemnification of JBI’s officers and directors are

permitted than existed for the officers and directors

of the Operating Companies.

11. JBI knew or had reason to know that the Informa-

tion Statement contained the untrue statements of material

fact and omissions of material fact set forth in paragraph

10 hereof.

12. The conduct of JBI in connection with the Plan vio-

lated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.

13. As a consequence of the violations complained of

herein, plaintiffs were induced to exchange their shares of

the Operating Companies for the offered shares of JBI,

and have suffered substantial monetary loss thereby in an

amount not yet determinable.

24a

14. The Controlling Persons approved and approve of

the content of the Plan and Information Statement, and

consequently any demands by plaintiffs on JBI for relief

from the wrongs complained of herein would be futile.

COUNT II

15. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations con-

tained in paragraphs 2 through 14 of this complaint.

16. Defendants John M. Joyce and William J. Collier

were primarily responsible for the Plan and the prepara-

tion of the Information Statement.

17. John M. Joyce and William J. Collier know or had

reason to know that the Information Statement contained

untrue statements of material fact and omissions of mate-

rial fact as set forth in paragraph 10 hereof.

COUNT III

18. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations con-

tained in paragraphs 2 through 14 and in paragraphs 16

and 17 of this complaint.

19. John M. Joyce and William J. Collier caused the

distribution of the untrue statements of material fact and

omissions of material fact set forth in paragraph 10

hereof, with intent to defraud the plaintiffs.

Waererorr, plaintiffs demand judgment against defend-

ants:

(1) in the amount of al! damage suffered by the plain-

tiffs as a result of the conduct hereinabove described;

ee Seren ae ee

25a

(2) permitting plaintiffs to rescind the exchange of their

shares in the Operating Companies in return for all shares

of Joyce Beverages, Inc. received by them; and

(3) for such other and further relief as to the Court may

appear proper, together with the costs and disbursements

of this action.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, plaintiffs demand a trial by jury in this action.

December 28, 1976

Kattren, Mucutin, Gites, Zavis,

Peart & GALLER

55 East Monroe Street

Suite 4100

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 346-7400

CHADBOURNE, Parkr, WRHITESIDE

& WoLrr

By Cuester HinsHaw

A Member of the Firm

30 Rockefeller Plaza

New York, New York 10020

(212) 541-5800

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

26a

APPENDIX E

Securities Exchange Act of 1934,

§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)

§ 78}. Manreu.ative anp Deceptive Devices

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,

by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate

commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national

securities exchange—

* = bal

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the pur-

chase or sale of any security registered on a national

securities exchange or any security not so registered,

any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance

in contravention of such rules and regulations as the

Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-

priate in the public interest or for the protection

of investors.

Securities and Exchange Commission,

Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5

§ 240.10b-5. Employment oF MANIPULATIVE AND DECEPTIVE

Devices

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,

by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate

commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national

securities exchange—

(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to

defraud.

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material

fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in

order to make the statements made, in the light of

the circumstances under which they were made, not

misleading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of

business which operates or would operate as a fraud

or deceit upon any person,

ean

27a

in connection with the purchase or sale of any

security.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Rule 12(b) (6)

Rule 12.

DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS—WHEN AND HOW

PRESENTED—BY PLEADING OR MOTION—MOTION

FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

a ® e

(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a

claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counter-

claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted

in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except

that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader

be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the sub-

ject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3)

improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffici-

ency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join a party

under Rule 19. A motion making any of these defenses

shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is per-

mitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined

with one or more other defenses or objections in a respon-

sive pleading or motion. If a pleading sets forth a claim

for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve

a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any de-

fense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion

asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure

of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and

not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one

for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule

56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to

present all material made pertinent to such a motion by

Rule 56.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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