Petition — St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Griffith
Supreme Court brief1978
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- Bupreme Court, U
FILED
APR 10 1978
—_ PRODAK, JR., CLERK
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
TERM, 1978
“ee eee eenenenene
No. Te" 1 434
ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Vv
JAMES T. GRIFFITH,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District
DONALD E. ENGLE
GERALD D. MORRIS
906 Olive Street—Suite 1023
St. Louis, Missouri 63101
(314) 241-7800
Counsel for Petitioner, St. Louis-
San Francisco Railway Company
April 4, 1978
St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 812 Olive Street 63101 314-231-4477
fe ad
_
INDEX
Page
GR ed cccee sees bsdakestveresdietserss 1
ED - whoa 00 nue Sale dea dba aeeeeak epee 2
PIT TO LTTE TTT LETTER CLIO 2
Statutory Provision Involved ................0050005 2
I cic tncundcdacdvecessucenceen 3
Reason for Granting the Writ ................0.0055 11
I 4 4 ane Wa Cio b bs cence k heb 04a sc teant ea wns 11
1. The Question Presented Is Important Because Pe-
titioner and All Railroad Defendants in Federal Em-
ployer’s Liability Act Cases in the State of Missouri
Are Being Deprived of Substantive Rights Granted
Under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act by Ar-
bitrary Rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri and
by the Opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals in
We EE See vis a5 0 Cea 0406 1658 Cb 8d d cokes 11
2. M.A.I. 24.01 Is an Inadequate Instruction Unfairly
Discriminating Against Petitioner and Other Rail-
road Defendants in the State of Missouri, Depriving
Them of Substantive Rights Under the Federal Em-
ployer’s Liability Act, Solely and Only Because They
Are Federal Employer’s Liability Act Defendants .. 12
3. The Question Here Presented Is One Touching Pe-
titioner’s Substantive Rights Under the Federal Em-
ployer’s Liability Act and Is Not Merely a Matter
of State Procedural Law ........... ccc cceees 15
Ce es ee teh ele tceues 17
Appendix “A”—Opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals
—St. Louis District of November 8, 1977 .......... A-1
Appendix “B”—Order of the Supreme Court of Missouri
of January 9, 1978 Denying Petitioner’s Application to
Transfer This Cause to the Missouri Supreme Court A-7
Appendix “C”——Order of the Missouri Court of Appeals
—St. Louis District of December 16, 1977 Denying
Petitioner’s Alternative Motion for a Rehearing or to
Transfer to the Supreme Court .................. A-8
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Dugas v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., U.S.C.A. Sth
Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 821; Certiorari denied 414 U.S.
Me cinnawdsnnennnebseddan ha eledice's¢es 16
Hite v. Western Maryland Railway, U.S.C.A. 4th Cir.,
Ss EE nob nven's ny cee dieds eenuct 14
Johnson v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., Mo., 1960, 334
> SP ne aa 14
Lavender v. Kurn, 1946, 327 U.S. 645 ............... 13
Ricketts v. Kansas City Stock Yards, Mo., 1972, 484 S.W.
RRR er ot nak. 5 13, 14
Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 1957, 352 U.S.500... 14
Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Padgett, 1915, 236 U.S. 668 15
Searcy v. Neal, MA-KC, 509 $.W.2d 755 ............ 14
Terminal Railroad Ass’n. of St. Louis v. Fitzjohn, 1948,
Wein Gee Gan GP HE GUD cd occcdcvecccces 14
Tiller v. Atlantic Coastline R. Co., 1943, 318 U.S.54.... 13
Urie v. Thompson, 1949, 337 U.S. 163 ............... 11
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1)
United States Statutes
AB UIDEA. OSE cocci decd e Bice vvseavecccccccees 2
Missouri Supreme Court Rules of
Civil Procedure
Rule 70.02 (formerly 70.01) Missouri Rules of Court, 9th
Edition, 1978 ........eeee cece e rere eeeees 2, 8, 11, 12
Rule 70.03 (formerly 70.02) Missouri Rules of Court, 9th
Edition, 1978 ........:.eeecee cee ee eter eeeecee 6
Missouri Approved Jury Instructions
M.A.I. No. 24.01 ...... 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Sat i TERM, 1978
ie dn cucdoesxs
ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY,
) Petitioner,
v
JAMES T. GRIFFITH,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District
Petitioner, the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company,
respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari be issued to review
the judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals entered in this
proceeding on November 8, 1977 which became the final judg-
ment in this cause by order of the Supreme Court of Missouw
dated January 9, 1978, by which order that Court refused to
transfer this cause from the Missouri Court of Appeals.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals, which appears
as Appendix “A”, attached hereto, is reported at 559 S.W.2d
278, (MA-SL, 1977). A copy of the order of the Missouri
Supreme Court denying Petitioner’s application to transfer this
cause from the Missouri Court of Appeals to that Court is
attached hereto and marked Appendix “B”.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals was entered
on November 8, 1977. It became the final judgment in this case
on January 9, 1478 when the Missouri Supreme Court denied
Petitioner’s application to transfer this cause from the Missouri
Court of Appeals to the Missouri Supreme Court. This Petition
is filed within ninety days of January 9, 1978. This Court’s
jurisdiction is invoked under 28 USC § 1257(3).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 70.02, which mandates the use
of only one and the same designated jury instruction (M.A.1.
24.01), for all Federal Employer’s Liability Act cases tried in
the State Courts of Missouri, fails to provide the jury with proper
and sufficient instructions to permit them to apply the law as
set forth in the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, as construed
by Federal decisional law and such rule deprives the parties to
a fair trial.
STATUTORY PROVISION
45 U.S.C.A. § 51.
LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS BY RAILROAD, IN
INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMERCE, FOR IN-
JURIES TO EMPLOYEES FROM NEGLIGENCE;
DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEES.
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in com-
merce between any of the several States or Territories, or between
any of the States and Territories, or between the District of
Columbia and any of the States or Territories, or between the
District of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any
foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in
such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to
his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving
widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none,
then of such employee’s parents; and, if none, then of the next
of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death
resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the
officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of
any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars,
engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats,
wharves, or other equipment.
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such
employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign com-
merce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially,
affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes
of this chapter, be considered as being employed by such car-
rier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the
bneefits of this chapter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Respondent in this case, Plaintiff below, is a carman
(i.e. a car repairer), for the Petitioner railroad, Defendant be-
low. On April 26, 1971, Respondent while performing his du-
— va
ties as carman for Petitioner in its Springfield, Missouri car
shops, was in the process of disassembling, cleaning, and reas-
sembling air brake piston assemblies for railroad cars. During
the process of reassembly a part of the brake assembly slipped
out of a machine used in the reassembly process and struck Re-
spondent, causing serious injuries to his left eye.
The Respondent pleaded his case under the theory of Res
Ipsa Loquitur in the following language:
“On or about the 26th day of April, 1971, plaintiff, while
employed by the defendant in the defendant’s Centralized
Air Brake Shop in Springfield, Missouri, was required, in
the performance of his duties, to reassemble a brake piston
and while so engaged was required to utilize a metal re-
assembly rack and in the course of utilizing said rack and
appurtenances was violently and unexpectedly struck by
the head of a brake piston projected therefrom, thereby
causing plaintiff to sustain the hereinafter described serious
and permanent bodily injuries and damages.
Plaintiff states that at the time of the above occurrence,
the above rack, appurtenances and equipment were under
the exclusive management and control of defendant, its
agents and employees, and the above occurrence was such
as does not ordinarily happen in the absence of negligence
and in the exercise of due care, and defendant, its agents
and employees possess superior knowledge or means of in-
formation as to the cause thereof, said information and
knowledge not being readily accessible to plaintiff.” (R 1, 2)
He submitted his case to the jury on Instruction No. 2 (R 330).
Instruction No. 2 is the exact wording and form of Missouri
Approved Instruction No. 24.01. Respondent’s Instruction No.
2 reads as follows:
“Your verdict must be for the plaintiff if you believe:
—
First, defendant failed to provide reasonably safe condi-
tions for work, and
Second, defendant was thereby negligent, and
Third, such negligence directly resulted in whole or in
part in injury to plaintiff.” (R 330)
Pages 237 and 238 of the Missouri Approved Jury Instruc-
tions, which contains Instruction 24.01 and the “Notes on Use”
pertaining to it read as follows:
“24.01 Verdict Directing—F.E.L.A.—Failure to Provide
Safe Place to Work
Your verdict must be for the plaintiff if you believe:
First, defendant was a common carrier by railroad
engaged in interstate commerce, and
Second, plaintiff was an employee of defendant and
a part of his employment in some way closely
and substantially affected such commerce, and
Third, defendant failed to provide
reasonably safe conditions for work, or
reasonably safe appliances, or
reasonably safe methods of work, or
reasonably adequate help, and
Fourth, defendant in any one or more of the respects
submitted in paragraph Third was negligent, and
Fifth, such negligence directly resulted in whole or
in part in ajury to plaintiff (death of name).
Alternate Third, defendant’s employee (characterize
negligent conduct; i.e., failed to keep a lookout,
etc.)
Alternate Fourth, defendant’s employee was negligent.
af Ss P
—_ we
Notes on Use
1. Describe the political divisions between which the
commerce occurs.
2. Paragraphs First and Second will seldom be in issue.
Omit those paragraphs if the matters are not in issue.
3. These theories of negligence concern conditions of
which the defendant had constructive knowledge.
In the event plaintiff submits some act of negligence,
constructive knowledge of which is not chargeable to the
railroad, there shall be submitted in addition a paragraph
providing ‘defendant knew or by using ordinary care should
have known of such condition, and that such condition was
reasonably likely to cause substantial harm.’ This para-
graph should be inserted between existing paragraphs, Third
and Fourth, and the paragraphs should be renumbered ac-
cordingly.”
A judgment for Respondent for $150,000.00, on a jury ver-
dict, was entered for Respondent by the trial Court on February
25, 1976.
Under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 70.03 objections to jury
instructions are not required at the time of trial. Specific ob-
jections are required in the motion for a new trial unless made
at trial. Rule 70.03 reads as follows:
“70.03 Objections to Instructions
Counsel need not object to any instruction to be given
at the request of any other party or by the court on its own
motion or to the refusal of any instructions requested by
such party. Specific objections to instructions shall be
required in motions for new trial unless made at trial. The
making of objections during trial shall not preclude making
additional objections to the same or other instructions in
=~
the motion for new trial. No general objection to instruc-
tions is required. (Amended May 20, 1964, effective Jan.
1, 1965. Amended Jan. 19, 1973, effective Sept. 1, 1973.
Renumbered from Rule 70.62 April 7, 1977, effective Dec.
1, 1977).”
On March 9, 1976, within the fifteen days permitted by Su-
preme Court Rule, Petitioner filed its motion for a new trial (R
368), and raised specific objections to Instruction No. 2 (R 368,
370, 371). Those specific objections were that the instruction
constituted a roving commission to the jury permitting the jury
to find Petitioner negligent without specifying to the jury what
conditions were claimed by Respondent to be negligent (R 370,
371). Petitioner also raised the specific objection that the in-
struction because of its vagueness, permitted the jury to disbe-
lieve the personal testimony of Respondent and his witnesses and
still find for Respondent even though they might believe the ac-
cident did not happen as he claimed (R 371).
On June 4, 1976, the trial Court overruled Petitioner’s motion
for a new trial (R 373). Petitioner took a timely appeal to the
Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, which Court has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this matter by Article V,
Section 3 of the Missouri Constitution. That Court rendered
the opinion which is attached hereto and marked Appendix
“A”.
Petitioner briefed and argued at length before the Court its
specific objections that Instruction No 2 (and therefore, also,
M.A.I. 24.01) was a roving commission not specifying the con-
ditions that Respondent claimed were not reasonably safe and
that the instruction was so vague that it did not even conform to
Respondent’s pleaded theory of Res Ipsa Loquitur.
In response to those arguments, as can be seen in Appendix
“A”, the Missouri Court of Appeals disposes of all issues per-
taining to Instruction No. 2 by simply saying that it is in accord-
ance with the language of M.A.I. 24.01 and that M.A.I. 24.01 is
the Federal Employer’s Liability Act verdict directing instruc-
tion to be used in Missouri by authority of Supreme Court Rule
70.02 and that the Court of Appeals doesn’t have power to
change that rule (See page 2 of the Opinion).
Petitioner filed its timely motion for a rehearing or, in the
alternative, to transfer this cause to the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri in the Missouri Court of Appeals. The Court denied Pe-
titioner’s motions on December 16, 1977. A copy of the order
of the Court is attached hereto and marked Exhibit “C”. There-
after, on December 31, 1977, Petitioner filed in the Missouri Su-
preme Court its timely application to transfer this cause from the
Missouri Court of Appeals. Petitioner’s application to transfer
was denied by the Missouri Supreme Court on January 9, 1978.
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 70.02 reads as follows:
“70.02 Instructions to Juries
(a) Written Instructions—Giving or Refusing. After a
jury has been sworn to try a case but before opening state-
ments the court must read to the jury Missouri Approved
Instruction No. 2.01 which will be marked and given to the
jury along with the other instructions at the close of the
case but will not be reread by the court. Before the case
is submitted the court shall call a conference of counsel to
consider instructions. Any party may, before the case is
submitted, request the court to instruct the jury in writing
on the law applicable to the issues. The court may give
instructions On its own motion. All instructions shall be
submitted in writing and shall be given or refused by the
court according to the law and the evidence in the case. All
instructions shall be simple, brief, impartial, free from
argument, and shall not submit to the jury or require find-
ings of detailed evidentiary facts. All instructions sh.” be
» fread by the court.
—
(b) Missouri Approved Instructions Exclude Others.
Whenever Missouri Approved Instructions contains an in-
struction applicable in a particular case which the appro-
priate party requests or the court decides to submit, such
instruction shall be given to the exclusion of any other on
the same subject.
(c) Violation of Rule—Effect. The giving of an instruc-
tion in violation of the provisions of this Rule shall consti-
tute error, its prejudicial effect to be judicially determined.
However, the use of an approved instruction or following
notes on use before the effective date shall not be presumed
to be error.
(d) Marking—Use of and Filing. Each instruction shall
be submitted with an original and one copy for the court
and one copy for each party. Each copy shall indicate
whether it was prepared at the court’s direction or by which
party it was tendered and shall contain a notation as fol-
lows:
‘MAI No. ——’ or ‘MAI No. —— modified’ or ‘Not
in MAP
as the case may be. Original instructions which are refused
shall be so marked by the court and filed with the clerk.
Original instructions which are to be given shall be con-
secutively numbered and all shall be given as instructions
of the court. Except where otherwise provided in Missouri
Approved Instructions, they shall be given in such order
as the court shall deem advisable. All instructions shall be
carried by the jury to their room and returned and filed at
the conclusion of their deliberations. All instructions re-
fused and all instructions given, including a record of who
tendered them and the ‘MAI’ notation, shall be kept as a
part of the record in the case.
(e) Guide for the Form of Instructions Where MAI Not
Used. Where an MAI must be modified to fairly submit the
—_
issues in a particular case, or where there is no applicable
MAI so that an instruction not in MAI must be given, then
such modifications or such instructions shall be simple,
brief, impartial, free from argument, and shall not submit
to the jury or require findings of detailed evidentiary facts.
(f) Instruction Directing Verdict—Converse Instruction.
Instructions may be given, authorizing a verdict for a de-
fendant, upon finding the converse of any essential fact or
el: nent essential to a verdict for plaintiff. The request of a
converse instruction shall not be deemed to waive any
objection to the instruction conversed.
(Amended May 20, 1964, effective Jan. 1, 1965; amended
Jan. 19, 1973, effective Sept. 1, 1973. Renumbered from
Rule 70.01 and amended April 7, 1977, effective Dec. 1,
1977).”
= yo
REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Writ of Certiorari herein sought should be granted be-
cause the Supreme Court of Missouri by its Rule 70.02 and
by its action in permitting the Opinion of the Missouri Court of
Appeals herein to become law has dictated that M.A.I. 24.01
is the only verdict directing instruction to be used in any Federal
Employer’s Liability Act case in Missouri. In so doing, it has
burdened Petitioner and all other Federal Employer’s Liability
Act defendants in this State with an unfair discriminatory in-
struction which denies all such defendants their substantial right,
accorded under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act., to have
a jury fairly decide whether they are guilty of the negligence
charged against them.
ARGUMENT
1. The Question Presented Is an Important Federal Question
Because Petitioner and All Railroad Defendants in Federal Em-
ployer’s Liability Act Cases in the State of Missouri Are Being
Deprived of Substantive Rights Granted Under the Federal Em-
ployer’s Liability Act by Rule of the Supreme Court of Missouri
and by the Opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals in this Case.
The most basic question in any cause brought under the Fed-
eral Employer’s Liability Act is whether or not the defendant
railroad is negligent in the respects claimed by the plaintiff.
What constitutes negligence under the statute is a Federal ques-
tion, not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions
of negligence applicable under State laws. Federal decisional
law applying the concept governs, Urie v. Thompson, 1949, 337
U.S. 163. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the rail-
road was negligent in those respects and the jury must so find
before the railroad is liable. In Missouri, the issue of negligence
—_—
is submitted to the jury through the use of a form jury instruction,
M.A.I. 24.01, required by the Missouri Supreme Court under
its Rule 70.02.
By imposing the use of M.A.I. 24.01 as the plaintiff's ver-
dict directing instruction in all Federal Employer’s Liability Act
cases in Missouri, the Supreme Court of Missouri has deprived
Petitioner and all other Federal Employer’s Liability Act defend-
ants in Missouri of their right to have the jury decide whether or
not they are negligent in the respects claimed by plaintiff. In-
stead the jury is required to be given a general charge which
gives them no aid whatsoever in determining what the specific
issues of negligence are in a given case or how to resolve those
issues. They are given only the legal conclusions set out in
M.A.I. 24.01 and no factual question is submitted for their
resolution. They are never required to resolve a factual ques-
tion. They are always merely permitted to agree or disagree
with the legal conclusions set out in M.A.I. 24.01. Whether or
not the railroad is negligent because of specific conduct or for
permitting specific circumstances is not decided. Hence Peti-
tioner submits that the Missouri courts are denying its right
to jury adjudication of the question of its negligence under the
Federal Employer’s Liability Act. This is an important issue
because it affects the rights of all Federal Employer's Liability
Act defendants in all cases brought under the Act in Missouri.
2. M.A.L. 24.01 Is an Inadequate Instruction Unfairly Dis-
criminating Against Petitioner and Other Railroad Defendants
in the State of Missouri, Depriving Them of Substantive Rights
Under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, Solely and Only Be-
cause They Are Federal Employer's Liability Act Defendants.
M.A.I. form instructions were adopted in the State of Mis-
souri in 1965. By Supreme Court Rule 70.02, that Court de-
creed that the form instruction in the M.A.I. book, if applicable
to the case, must be used to the exclusion of all other instruc-
—_—
am §3
tions. M.A.I. 24.01, with one very minor exception pertaining
to the Fourth paragraph thereof, has been unchanged since the
day it was published. Now, with the instant decision, the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals has taken the ultimate step of requiring
M.A.I. 24.01 to be used in all Federal Employer’s Liability Act
cases no matter what the proof or theories may be. They can
do that because M.A.I. 24.01 is so vague and general it includes
all possible legal theories and requires no factual hypothesis.
What justification have the Missouri courts given for foisting
this incredible instruction on all Federal Employer's Liability
Act defendants in all Federal Employer's Liability Act cases?
Their reasoning is as astounding as the instruction. It is set out
in the case of Ricketts v. Kansas City Stock Yards, Mo., 1972,
484 S.W.2d 216. No other justification has been attempted.
The only explanation voiced in the Ricketts case is that Federal
Employer’s Liability Act defendants are liable if they are guilty
of only “slight negligence”, I.c. 221. That it is to say, the rail-
roads are liable under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act if
they failed to exercise “great care”, I.c. 221. Logically, it would
seem that resolution of specific factual questions is equally im-
portant whether the issue be one of “ordinary care” or “great
”
care .
Further, the Missouri courts’ view of Federal Employer's
Liability Act negligence, as expressed in Ricketts, is wrong. The
standard applicable to Federal Employer's Liability Act negli-
gence is the same standard applied in other negligence cases,
namely, the failure to exercise the degree of care that an ordi-
narily careful and prudent person would use under the same
or similar circumstances. This Court made that abundantly
clear in the case of Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 1943,
318 U.S. 54, 63 S.Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed 610. It is true that the
amount of evidence required to make a submissible jury case is
small in Federal Employer’s Liability Act cases, Lavender v.
Kurn, 1946, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916. It is
also true that any causal connection whatsoever between the
—— ee
railroad’s negligence and plaintiff's injuries will suffice to support
a plaintiff's verdict, Rogers v. Mo. Pac. PR. Co., 1957, 352 US.
500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493. But the standard of care is
the same in Federal Employer’s Liability Act and non-Federal
Employer’s Liability Act cases. Hence, even the rationalization
of Missouri courts for the propriety of M.A.I. 24.01 is without
merit. There is simply no justification for the Missouri courts’
discrimination in their instruction practice between Federal
Employer’s Liability Act and non-Federal Employer’s Liability
Act cases.
In this connection it must be noted that prior to 1965, before
the imposition of form instructions by the Missouri Supreme
Court, narrative jury instructions were used, much like the prac-
tice in Federal District Courts today. In the narrative instruc-
tions in Federal Employer’s Liability Act cases the Missouri
courts required the jury to decide specific factual issues. Those
instructions did not permit the vague general terms of M.A.I.
24.01. In fact clear-cut preciseness was required. This is
plainly demonstrated by the case of Johnson v. Missouri-Kansas-
Texas Railroad Company, Mo., 1960, 334 S.W.2d 41, Lc. 46-
47, a case by the same Missouri Judge who wrote Ricketts, supra.
Likewise, the Federal District Courts submit specific factual is-
sues in their jury instructions. Illustrative cases are Hite v. West-
ern Maryland Railway, U.S.C.A., 4th Cir., 1954, 217 F.2d
781, Le. 782: Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis v. Fitzjohn,
U.S.C.A., 8th Cir., 1948, 165 F.2d 473, Lc. 480.
It must be kept in mind that the Missouri Supreme Court has
expressly declared that M.A.I. 24.01 is a vague roving commis-
sion inadequately defining the jury issues to be decided and
has decided that it is an illegal instruction in any except Federal
Employer's Liability Act cases, Ricketts v. Kansas City Stock
Yards, Mo., 1972, supra. That line of reasoning has been fol-
lowed by the Missouri Court of Appeals on at least one other
occasion in the case of Searcy v. Neal, MA-KC, 1974, 509 S.W.
— =
2d 755, where M.A.I. 24.01 was again found to be an unfit sub-
mission for any except Federal Employer’s Liability Act cases.
There is no reason in law or logic requiring the discrimination
practiced by the Missouri Supreme Court in its imposition of
M.A.I. 24.01 in Federal Employer’s Liability Act cases. Ap-
parently its action is based on its misconception of the law as to
the standard of care imposed by the Federal Employer’s Lia-
bility Act. This Court must rectify the situation if Federal Em-
ployer’s Liability Act defendants are to get fair trials in Mis-
souri. This Court has in the past reviewed State Court cases be-
cause of potential instructional error, Seaboard Air Line Railway
v. Padgett, 1915, 236 U.S. 668, 35 S.Ct. 481, 59 L.Ed. 777.
Petitioner respectfully requests the Court to do so in this cause.
3. The Question Presented Here Is One Touching Petition-
er’s Substantive Rights Under the Federal Employer's Liability
Act and Is Not Merely a Matter of State Procedural Law.
Questions touching the form and wording of jury instructions
in State Court civil cases ordinarily do not merit the attention
of this Court. However, the question in this case arises out of
the arbitrary action of the Missouri Supreme Court in applying
different instruction standards in Federal Employer’s Liability
Act cases as opposed to any other civil jury case in the State.
The question here goes far beyond mere points of procedure or
semantics and strikes at the heart of Petitioner's rights under
the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, namely, the right to have
a jury decision on the question of its negligence. Vague, gen-
eral, roving commissions to juries are suitable in Federal Em-
ployer’s Liability Act cases in Missouri, say the Missouri courts,
but they are illegal in all other civil cases. Further, say the
Missouri courts, this vague general instruction must be used to
the exclusion of any other in all Federal Employer's Liability
Act cases. Nowhere have those courts imposed such an arbi-
trary, inflexible, and punishing burden except in Federal Em-
ployer’s Liability Act cases.
—_=
The practical effect of the actions taken by the Missouri
courts to deny Federal Employer’s Liability Act defendants,
and only Federal Employer's Liability Act defendants, a fair
trial. First, M.A.I. 24.01 must be used no matter what issues
have been raised by the pleadings. In the instant case, for ex-
ample, Respondent’s sole pleaded theory was the Doctrine of
Res Ipsa Loquitur, which his proof supported. Instruction No.
2 (M.A.I. 24.01), which the trial court must by law give, did
not submit the pleaded and proven issues. Dugas v. Kansas
City So. Ry., 1973, 473 F.2d 821, certiorari denied 414 U.S.
823, 94 S.Ct. 124, 38 L.Ed. 56. Instead it submitted only the
legal conclusion of whether Petitioner proved “reasonably safe
conditions for work”. It did not submit the question of exclu-
sive control by Petitioner of the machinc or even whether the
occurrence happened because of Petitioner’s negligence. So,
also, in those cases where particular conditions for work, par-
ticular appliances, or particular methods of work are pleaded
issues, Petitioner and other Federal Employer’s Liability Act
defendants are placed in an impossible situation by the vague
terms of M.A.I. 24.01. In most cases, as in the instant case,
accidents involving railroad workers involve innumerable con-
ditions and strange pieces of equipment most of which are
completely unfamiliar to the average juror. Thus, as in this
case, adroit and capable Federal Employer’s Liability Act plain-
tiffs’ counsel are able to paint a picture of liability involving
all of the various circumstances, some of which may be un-
pleasant, which happen to surround the occurrence, whether
they are legitimate issues of negligence or not. The vague con-
clusions submitted in the instruction make it impossible for
Federal Employer’s Liability Act defense counsel to focus the
attention of the jury on the true factual issues involved. They
are not able to confine the case to the issues. Instead the jury
is permitted, even invited, to sift through all of the circumstances
to find some small detail which they believe “is not a reason-
ably safe condition”. Thus, the “shotgun” approach to the issue
of negligence required by M.A.I. 24.01 presents an impossible
——’
= =
situation from the defense viewpoint. In that way, the gener-
ality of M.A.I. 24.01, in a real and substantial sense, deprives
Petitioner in the instant case, and all other Federal Employer's
Liability Act defendants in Missouri, of a fair trial on the mer-
its of those cases brought against them under the Federal Em-
ployer’s Liability Act.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reason, this Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
DONALD E. ENGLE
GERALD D. MORRIS
By DONALD E. ENGLE
906 Olive Street—Suite 1023
St. Louis, Missouri 63101
(314) 241-7800
Counsel for Petitioner, St. Louis-
San Francisco Railway Company
April 4, 1978
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that three true copies of the foregoing Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari and Appendices “A,” “B” and “C”
were hand delivered to the Office of C. Marshall Friedman,
Attorney for Respondent, 818 Olive Street, St. Louis, Missouri,
by the undersigned this th day of April, 1978.
GERALD D. MORRIS
APPENDIX
—
APPENDIX “A”
In the Missouri Court of Appeals
St. Louis District ,
Division Three
James T. Griffith, )
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
q Cause No. 38,255.
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway
Company,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis
Hon. Clyde S. Cahill, Jr.
Opinion Filed November 8, 1977
Plaintiff-respondent was injured while working as an employee
for defendant-appellant, St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Com-
pany. Plaintiff sued defendant under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51, and received a $150,000 jury
verdict. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court
erred: (1) in giving plaintiff's verdict directing instruction; (2) in
refusing defendant’s converse instruction; (3) in refusing to
admit an exhibit of a recorded recollection of a defense witness;
(4) in failing to grant a new trial after an alleged prejudicial
statement made by plaintiff's counsel in closing argument; (5)
in failing to grant a new trial or remittitur by reason of an al-
leged grossly excessive verdict. We find no error and affirm the
judgment.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant in Springfield, Missouri.
At the time of his injury, plaintiff was assembling rebuilt air
— <
brake pistons which were put together under air pressure. As
plaintiff was in the process of assembling an air brake piston,
a portion of the piston slipped forward and struck plaintiff on
the left eyebrow and nose, injuring plaintiffs eye. As a result of
the injury, plaintiff suffered permanent impairment and distor-
tion of vision. The jury award was $150,000.
1. Defendant first attacks plaintiff's verdict directing instruc-
tion which is based on M.A.I. 24.01 and was submitted as fol-
lows:
“Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, defendant failed to provide reasonably safe condi-
tions for work, and
Second, defendant was thereby negligent, and
Third, such negligence directly resulted in whole or in
part in injury to plaintiff.”
Although defendant did not object to the foregoing instruction
at trial, on appeal, it contends that the verdict director permits
an improper roving commission for the jury. Defendant’s allega-
tion of error is without merit. The contested instruction has
been specifically adopted by our Supreme Court for use in
F.E.L.A. cases. See M.A.I. 24.01. As such, its use is manda-
tory to the exclusion of all others. Rule 70.01(b); Brown v. St.
Louis Public Service Co., 421 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. banc 1967).
In. Ricketts v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. of Maine, 484
S.W.2d 216 (Mo. banc 1972), regarding an instruction con-
gruent in every respect to plaintiff's verdict director here,' it was
said, l.c. 221:
1 Defendant claims that the word “thereby” added to
second of the verdict director and which does not appear in M.A.I.
24.01 renders the instruction fatally defective. The word ‘
EE SD SEES SD Se GEN Se ee ee eee
re.
—_*
“This instruction’s wording in what it submitted follows
M.A.I. 24.01 which is designed for submission of F.E.L.A.
cases.”
Defendant’s request that we abjure Supreme Court rules and,
incidentally, Ricketts, is futile. We do not have power to do so.
We are bound by the Supreme Court’s rules and its decisions.
Pitts v. Malcolm Bliss Mental Health Center, 521 S.W.2d 501
(Mo. App. 1975); Ritter v. Lindberg Acoustics, Inc., 501 S.W.
2d 207 (Mo. App. 1973). Plaintiff's verdict director is valid,
and we are not persuaded to step beyond the bounds of the
strictures of our appellate review.
2. Defendant submitted the following purported converse in-
struction to plaintiff's verdict director:
“Your verdict must be ior the defendant if you do not
believe the nonpressure head slipped out of the reassembly
rack while the nonpressure head was under air pressure”.
The trial court refused the instruction, which defendant com-
plains was error. We find no error. A converse must be in sub-
Stantially the same language as that used in the verdict di-
rector it converses. Oventrop v. Bi-State Development Agency,
521 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. App. 1975); Snyder v. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Co., 521 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. App. 1973). De-
fendant’s ostensible converse does not comport with this pre-
cept. There was no error in refusing defendant’s converse.
3. Defendant argues that it was error for the trial court to
refuse to allow one of its witnesses, Loren Tate, to refresh
his memory from a written statement he had made shortly
after the accident and in refusing to admit the statement into
evidence. Mr. Tate was plaintiff's foreman on the date of the ac-
cident. He testified as to the condition of the air brake pro-
cedures subsequently taken by defendant to prevent further
occurrences of the particular accident experienced by plaintiff.
—_ oa
Defendant sought to introduce into evidence a written report
prepared by Mr. Tate after the accident stating the corrective
measures taken by defendant to avert similar happenings. The
alleged purpose of the written statement was to refresh Mr.
Tate’s recollection as to what had happened on the date of the
accident. The fact is that Mr. Tate had already testified clearly
and unhesitatingly regarding everything that was contained in
the proffered statement. As stated in Watson v. Meredith De-
velopment Co., 410 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. App. 1966):
“Generally speaking, the question of whether » witness
may be allowed to refresh his recollection is a matter re-
posing in the sound discretion of the trial court, reviewable
only for abuse. (citations omitted) However, . . . a sound
discretion would ordinarily dictate that a witness should
not be asked to refresh his recollection unless it is first
established that he has no present recollection and that he
needs the aid of a memorandum in order to recall the
facts to his mind or otherwise establish them.”
From the record, it is clear that Mr. Tate needed nothing to
refresh his recollection for the substance of his testimony. There
was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to re-
ceive the written statement in evidence, Furthermore, where a
witness has not been impeached, prior consisient out of court
statements, written or oral, are not admissible to bolster his in
court testimony. The out of court statement is hearsay and is
not admissible under any exception to the hearsay rules.
4. During his closing argument, plaintiff's counsel made a
statement conveying the impression that defendant would “get
rid of” plaintiff after the case was over. Defendant’s counsel
objected to the comment, and the objection was sustained. No
further relief was requested. Defendant, in its brief states that
“[{i]t may be argued that the trial court sustained defendant's
objection to the argument and that defendant got the relief it
requested.” We agree. Defendant did get all the relief it re-
ees oD
—
quested and is not now in position to complain. State v. Ruther-
ford, 554 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. App. 1977); Burian v. Dickens,
527 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. App. 1975). We find no abuse of dis-
cretion in the trial court’s failure sua sponte to declare a mis-
trial nor does any basis exist, as defendant contends, to reverse
and remand merely because the statement was made late in the
trial during closing argument, which, according to defendant,
would make a request for a mistrial futile.
5. Finally, defendant suggests the the jury verdict of
$150,000 was overly munificent and demonstrated bias and
prejudice. In the alternative, defendant argues that we should
order a remittitur.
The evidence disclosed that as a result of being struck in the
eye and eyebrow by a portion of the air brake piston on which
he was working, plaintiff suffered serious and permanent injury
to his eye. There was competent medical testimony that plain-
tiff's vision would be permanently distorted, not correctable by
the use of eye glasses; that his vision was impaired. There was
also medical testimony that by reason of the injury sustained the
possibility exists that plaintiff's visual problems could be aggra-
vated; that complications such as glaucoma and retinal detach-
ment could ultimately occur with loss of sight of the injured eye.
Defendant does not challenge the fact that the plaintiff was in-
jured or that permanent visual distortion did occur as a result
of the injury. The jury is vested with broad discretion in affixing
the amount of the award as is the trial judge in determining
whether to order a remittitur. Blond v. Overesch, 527 S.W.2d
663 (Mo. App. 1975). Gixing consideration to the nature and
extent of plaintiff's injuries, their permanence, the plaintiff's age
—38 at the time of the injury—consideration of economic
factors, awards in other cases and the jury’s superior position to
appraise the injury, we cannot say that the jury award was exces-
sive or that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order
a remittitur. Bedwell v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac.
—_” on
R.R. Co., 509 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1974); McDowell v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 546 S.W.2d 160 (Mo. App. 1976); Strake
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 539 S.W.2d 715 (Mo. App.
1976); Woodford v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., 518
S.W.2d 712 (Mo. App. 1974). Under the circumstances of this
case, we do not believe that the fact that the record fails to dis-
close plaintiff lost work time from his injury is a significant factor
for reducing the verdict.
Judgment affirmed.
/s/ GEORGE F, GUNN, JR.
GEORGE F. GUNN, JR.,
Presiding Judge
Harry L. C. Weier, Judge, Concurs.
John J. Kelly, Judge, Concurs.
a i an
APPENDIX “B”
No. 60534
In the Supreme Court of Missouri
St. Louis District No. 38255
September Session 1977
James T. Griffith,
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs. Transfer
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company,
Defendant-Appellant
Now at this day, on consideration of defendant-appellant’s
application to transfer the above entitled cause from the St.
Louis District Court of Appeals, it is ordered that said applica-
tion be, and the same is hereby denied.
State of Missouri—SCt.
1, Thomas F. Simon, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State
of Missouri, certify that the foregoing is a full, true and complete
transcript of the judgment of said Supreme Court, entered of
record at the September Session thereof, 1977, and on the 9th
day of January, 1978, in the above entitled cause.
Given under my hand and seal of said Court, at the City of
Jefferson City, this 9th day of January, 1978.
THOMAS F. SIMON, Clerk
By JANICE B. HANSON, D. C.
—* =
APPENDIX “C”
MEMORANDUM
To: Attorneys of Record
From: Robert D. St. Vrain, Clerk
Missouri Court of Appeals
St. Louis District
Re: Motions for Rehearing or Transfer (Rulings)
Date: December 16, 1977
The following motions for rehearing and for transfer to the Su-
preme Court have been ruled on by the Court.
On November 14, 1977, Appellant’s motion for rehearing was
stricken as scurrilous. Appellant’s motion to transfer denied in
the following case:
1. No. 37854 State v. Joe S. Hegwood
On December 16, 1977, Appellant’s motion for rehearing or for
transfer to Court En Banc or transfer to Supreme Court denied.
Judge Reinhard not participating in the following case:
1. No. 38477 James G. Bridges v. Olandrea S. Bridges
On December 16, 1977, Respondent’s motion for rehearing
granted. Cause reset on Wednesday, February 8, 1978, at 2
p.m. in the following case:
1. No. 38320 State v. Danny Lansford
The following motions for rehearing and/or transfer have all
been denied as of today, December 16, 1977:
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
. No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
a
36772 Charlene Sue Faulkner v. James Robert
Faulkner
36891 Gary Henderson v. Milton S. Yust
. 37036 State v. Paul Albert Wood, Jr.
. 37507 Floyd P. Keller, Sr. v. Winifred Laura
Porchey, et al.
. 37761 State v. John C. Daly
. 37879 David Francois v. Lillian M. Jones, Extx,
etc., et al.
. 37926 Maralyn Milner v. Texas Discount Gas
Co.
. 38070 State v. Terry Woodfin
. 38085 George R. McFarland. et al. v. Louis A.
Bra‘dy, et ux.
. 38255 James T. Griffith v. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco RR Co.
38301
38222 State ex rel. State Highway Commission
of Missouri v. Public Water Supply
District No. 2 of Jefferson County,
Missouri
. 38346 State v. David Hampton
. 38452 In re: Adoption of E.N., et al. v. E.M.N.
38453 H.N. v. E.M.(N)W.
38573 State v. Local Junior Joiner
38655 Earnest Franklin v. State
— A-i0 —
16. No. 38674 William J. Vorbeck v. Theodore McNeal,
et al., etc.
17. No. 38807 State v. John Payton
18. No. 39250 James Turner, Jr. v. State
RSV/Id
ce: Judges
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.