Petition — St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Griffith

Supreme Court brief1978

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Text

- Bupreme Court, U

FILED

APR 10 1978

—_ PRODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

TERM, 1978

“ee eee eenenenene

No. Te" 1 434

ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY,

Petitioner,

Vv

JAMES T. GRIFFITH,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District

DONALD E. ENGLE

GERALD D. MORRIS

906 Olive Street—Suite 1023

St. Louis, Missouri 63101

(314) 241-7800

Counsel for Petitioner, St. Louis-

San Francisco Railway Company

April 4, 1978

St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 812 Olive Street 63101 314-231-4477

fe ad

_

INDEX

Page

GR ed cccee sees bsdakestveresdietserss 1

ED - whoa 00 nue Sale dea dba aeeeeak epee 2

PIT TO LTTE TTT LETTER CLIO 2

Statutory Provision Involved ................0050005 2

I cic tncundcdacdvecessucenceen 3

Reason for Granting the Writ ................0.0055 11

I 4 4 ane Wa Cio b bs cence k heb 04a sc teant ea wns 11

1. The Question Presented Is Important Because Pe-

titioner and All Railroad Defendants in Federal Em-

ployer’s Liability Act Cases in the State of Missouri

Are Being Deprived of Substantive Rights Granted

Under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act by Ar-

bitrary Rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri and

by the Opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals in

We EE See vis a5 0 Cea 0406 1658 Cb 8d d cokes 11

2. M.A.I. 24.01 Is an Inadequate Instruction Unfairly

Discriminating Against Petitioner and Other Rail-

road Defendants in the State of Missouri, Depriving

Them of Substantive Rights Under the Federal Em-

ployer’s Liability Act, Solely and Only Because They

Are Federal Employer’s Liability Act Defendants .. 12

3. The Question Here Presented Is One Touching Pe-

titioner’s Substantive Rights Under the Federal Em-

ployer’s Liability Act and Is Not Merely a Matter

of State Procedural Law ........... ccc cceees 15

Ce es ee teh ele tceues 17

Appendix “A”—Opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals

—St. Louis District of November 8, 1977 .......... A-1

Appendix “B”—Order of the Supreme Court of Missouri

of January 9, 1978 Denying Petitioner’s Application to

Transfer This Cause to the Missouri Supreme Court A-7

Appendix “C”——Order of the Missouri Court of Appeals

—St. Louis District of December 16, 1977 Denying

Petitioner’s Alternative Motion for a Rehearing or to

Transfer to the Supreme Court .................. A-8

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Dugas v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., U.S.C.A. Sth

Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 821; Certiorari denied 414 U.S.

Me cinnawdsnnennnebseddan ha eledice's¢es 16

Hite v. Western Maryland Railway, U.S.C.A. 4th Cir.,

Ss EE nob nven's ny cee dieds eenuct 14

Johnson v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., Mo., 1960, 334

> SP ne aa 14

Lavender v. Kurn, 1946, 327 U.S. 645 ............... 13

Ricketts v. Kansas City Stock Yards, Mo., 1972, 484 S.W.

RRR er ot nak. 5 13, 14

Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 1957, 352 U.S.500... 14

Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Padgett, 1915, 236 U.S. 668 15

Searcy v. Neal, MA-KC, 509 $.W.2d 755 ............ 14

Terminal Railroad Ass’n. of St. Louis v. Fitzjohn, 1948,

Wein Gee Gan GP HE GUD cd occcdcvecccces 14

Tiller v. Atlantic Coastline R. Co., 1943, 318 U.S.54.... 13

Urie v. Thompson, 1949, 337 U.S. 163 ............... 11

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1)

United States Statutes

AB UIDEA. OSE cocci decd e Bice vvseavecccccccees 2

Missouri Supreme Court Rules of

Civil Procedure

Rule 70.02 (formerly 70.01) Missouri Rules of Court, 9th

Edition, 1978 ........eeee cece e rere eeeees 2, 8, 11, 12

Rule 70.03 (formerly 70.02) Missouri Rules of Court, 9th

Edition, 1978 ........:.eeecee cee ee eter eeeecee 6

Missouri Approved Jury Instructions

M.A.I. No. 24.01 ...... 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Sat i TERM, 1978

ie dn cucdoesxs

ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY,

) Petitioner,

v

JAMES T. GRIFFITH,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District

Petitioner, the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company,

respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari be issued to review

the judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals entered in this

proceeding on November 8, 1977 which became the final judg-

ment in this cause by order of the Supreme Court of Missouw

dated January 9, 1978, by which order that Court refused to

transfer this cause from the Missouri Court of Appeals.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals, which appears

as Appendix “A”, attached hereto, is reported at 559 S.W.2d

278, (MA-SL, 1977). A copy of the order of the Missouri

Supreme Court denying Petitioner’s application to transfer this

cause from the Missouri Court of Appeals to that Court is

attached hereto and marked Appendix “B”.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals was entered

on November 8, 1977. It became the final judgment in this case

on January 9, 1478 when the Missouri Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s application to transfer this cause from the Missouri

Court of Appeals to the Missouri Supreme Court. This Petition

is filed within ninety days of January 9, 1978. This Court’s

jurisdiction is invoked under 28 USC § 1257(3).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Missouri Supreme Court Rule 70.02, which mandates the use

of only one and the same designated jury instruction (M.A.1.

24.01), for all Federal Employer’s Liability Act cases tried in

the State Courts of Missouri, fails to provide the jury with proper

and sufficient instructions to permit them to apply the law as

set forth in the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, as construed

by Federal decisional law and such rule deprives the parties to

a fair trial.

STATUTORY PROVISION

45 U.S.C.A. § 51.

LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS BY RAILROAD, IN

INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMERCE, FOR IN-

JURIES TO EMPLOYEES FROM NEGLIGENCE;

DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEES.

Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in com-

merce between any of the several States or Territories, or between

any of the States and Territories, or between the District of

Columbia and any of the States or Territories, or between the

District of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any

foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to any

person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in

such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to

his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving

widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none,

then of such employee’s parents; and, if none, then of the next

of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death

resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the

officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of

any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars,

engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats,

wharves, or other equipment.

Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such

employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign com-

merce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially,

affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes

of this chapter, be considered as being employed by such car-

rier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the

bneefits of this chapter.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Respondent in this case, Plaintiff below, is a carman

(i.e. a car repairer), for the Petitioner railroad, Defendant be-

low. On April 26, 1971, Respondent while performing his du-

— va

ties as carman for Petitioner in its Springfield, Missouri car

shops, was in the process of disassembling, cleaning, and reas-

sembling air brake piston assemblies for railroad cars. During

the process of reassembly a part of the brake assembly slipped

out of a machine used in the reassembly process and struck Re-

spondent, causing serious injuries to his left eye.

The Respondent pleaded his case under the theory of Res

Ipsa Loquitur in the following language:

“On or about the 26th day of April, 1971, plaintiff, while

employed by the defendant in the defendant’s Centralized

Air Brake Shop in Springfield, Missouri, was required, in

the performance of his duties, to reassemble a brake piston

and while so engaged was required to utilize a metal re-

assembly rack and in the course of utilizing said rack and

appurtenances was violently and unexpectedly struck by

the head of a brake piston projected therefrom, thereby

causing plaintiff to sustain the hereinafter described serious

and permanent bodily injuries and damages.

Plaintiff states that at the time of the above occurrence,

the above rack, appurtenances and equipment were under

the exclusive management and control of defendant, its

agents and employees, and the above occurrence was such

as does not ordinarily happen in the absence of negligence

and in the exercise of due care, and defendant, its agents

and employees possess superior knowledge or means of in-

formation as to the cause thereof, said information and

knowledge not being readily accessible to plaintiff.” (R 1, 2)

He submitted his case to the jury on Instruction No. 2 (R 330).

Instruction No. 2 is the exact wording and form of Missouri

Approved Instruction No. 24.01. Respondent’s Instruction No.

2 reads as follows:

“Your verdict must be for the plaintiff if you believe:

—

First, defendant failed to provide reasonably safe condi-

tions for work, and

Second, defendant was thereby negligent, and

Third, such negligence directly resulted in whole or in

part in injury to plaintiff.” (R 330)

Pages 237 and 238 of the Missouri Approved Jury Instruc-

tions, which contains Instruction 24.01 and the “Notes on Use”

pertaining to it read as follows:

“24.01 Verdict Directing—F.E.L.A.—Failure to Provide

Safe Place to Work

Your verdict must be for the plaintiff if you believe:

First, defendant was a common carrier by railroad

engaged in interstate commerce, and

Second, plaintiff was an employee of defendant and

a part of his employment in some way closely

and substantially affected such commerce, and

Third, defendant failed to provide

reasonably safe conditions for work, or

reasonably safe appliances, or

reasonably safe methods of work, or

reasonably adequate help, and

Fourth, defendant in any one or more of the respects

submitted in paragraph Third was negligent, and

Fifth, such negligence directly resulted in whole or

in part in ajury to plaintiff (death of name).

Alternate Third, defendant’s employee (characterize

negligent conduct; i.e., failed to keep a lookout,

etc.)

Alternate Fourth, defendant’s employee was negligent.

af Ss P

—_ we

Notes on Use

1. Describe the political divisions between which the

commerce occurs.

2. Paragraphs First and Second will seldom be in issue.

Omit those paragraphs if the matters are not in issue.

3. These theories of negligence concern conditions of

which the defendant had constructive knowledge.

In the event plaintiff submits some act of negligence,

constructive knowledge of which is not chargeable to the

railroad, there shall be submitted in addition a paragraph

providing ‘defendant knew or by using ordinary care should

have known of such condition, and that such condition was

reasonably likely to cause substantial harm.’ This para-

graph should be inserted between existing paragraphs, Third

and Fourth, and the paragraphs should be renumbered ac-

cordingly.”

A judgment for Respondent for $150,000.00, on a jury ver-

dict, was entered for Respondent by the trial Court on February

25, 1976.

Under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 70.03 objections to jury

instructions are not required at the time of trial. Specific ob-

jections are required in the motion for a new trial unless made

at trial. Rule 70.03 reads as follows:

“70.03 Objections to Instructions

Counsel need not object to any instruction to be given

at the request of any other party or by the court on its own

motion or to the refusal of any instructions requested by

such party. Specific objections to instructions shall be

required in motions for new trial unless made at trial. The

making of objections during trial shall not preclude making

additional objections to the same or other instructions in

=~

the motion for new trial. No general objection to instruc-

tions is required. (Amended May 20, 1964, effective Jan.

1, 1965. Amended Jan. 19, 1973, effective Sept. 1, 1973.

Renumbered from Rule 70.62 April 7, 1977, effective Dec.

1, 1977).”

On March 9, 1976, within the fifteen days permitted by Su-

preme Court Rule, Petitioner filed its motion for a new trial (R

368), and raised specific objections to Instruction No. 2 (R 368,

370, 371). Those specific objections were that the instruction

constituted a roving commission to the jury permitting the jury

to find Petitioner negligent without specifying to the jury what

conditions were claimed by Respondent to be negligent (R 370,

371). Petitioner also raised the specific objection that the in-

struction because of its vagueness, permitted the jury to disbe-

lieve the personal testimony of Respondent and his witnesses and

still find for Respondent even though they might believe the ac-

cident did not happen as he claimed (R 371).

On June 4, 1976, the trial Court overruled Petitioner’s motion

for a new trial (R 373). Petitioner took a timely appeal to the

Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, which Court has

exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this matter by Article V,

Section 3 of the Missouri Constitution. That Court rendered

the opinion which is attached hereto and marked Appendix

“A”.

Petitioner briefed and argued at length before the Court its

specific objections that Instruction No 2 (and therefore, also,

M.A.I. 24.01) was a roving commission not specifying the con-

ditions that Respondent claimed were not reasonably safe and

that the instruction was so vague that it did not even conform to

Respondent’s pleaded theory of Res Ipsa Loquitur.

In response to those arguments, as can be seen in Appendix

“A”, the Missouri Court of Appeals disposes of all issues per-

taining to Instruction No. 2 by simply saying that it is in accord-

ance with the language of M.A.I. 24.01 and that M.A.I. 24.01 is

the Federal Employer’s Liability Act verdict directing instruc-

tion to be used in Missouri by authority of Supreme Court Rule

70.02 and that the Court of Appeals doesn’t have power to

change that rule (See page 2 of the Opinion).

Petitioner filed its timely motion for a rehearing or, in the

alternative, to transfer this cause to the Supreme Court of Mis-

souri in the Missouri Court of Appeals. The Court denied Pe-

titioner’s motions on December 16, 1977. A copy of the order

of the Court is attached hereto and marked Exhibit “C”. There-

after, on December 31, 1977, Petitioner filed in the Missouri Su-

preme Court its timely application to transfer this cause from the

Missouri Court of Appeals. Petitioner’s application to transfer

was denied by the Missouri Supreme Court on January 9, 1978.

Missouri Supreme Court Rule 70.02 reads as follows:

“70.02 Instructions to Juries

(a) Written Instructions—Giving or Refusing. After a

jury has been sworn to try a case but before opening state-

ments the court must read to the jury Missouri Approved

Instruction No. 2.01 which will be marked and given to the

jury along with the other instructions at the close of the

case but will not be reread by the court. Before the case

is submitted the court shall call a conference of counsel to

consider instructions. Any party may, before the case is

submitted, request the court to instruct the jury in writing

on the law applicable to the issues. The court may give

instructions On its own motion. All instructions shall be

submitted in writing and shall be given or refused by the

court according to the law and the evidence in the case. All

instructions shall be simple, brief, impartial, free from

argument, and shall not submit to the jury or require find-

ings of detailed evidentiary facts. All instructions sh.” be

» fread by the court.

—

(b) Missouri Approved Instructions Exclude Others.

Whenever Missouri Approved Instructions contains an in-

struction applicable in a particular case which the appro-

priate party requests or the court decides to submit, such

instruction shall be given to the exclusion of any other on

the same subject.

(c) Violation of Rule—Effect. The giving of an instruc-

tion in violation of the provisions of this Rule shall consti-

tute error, its prejudicial effect to be judicially determined.

However, the use of an approved instruction or following

notes on use before the effective date shall not be presumed

to be error.

(d) Marking—Use of and Filing. Each instruction shall

be submitted with an original and one copy for the court

and one copy for each party. Each copy shall indicate

whether it was prepared at the court’s direction or by which

party it was tendered and shall contain a notation as fol-

lows:

‘MAI No. ——’ or ‘MAI No. —— modified’ or ‘Not

in MAP

as the case may be. Original instructions which are refused

shall be so marked by the court and filed with the clerk.

Original instructions which are to be given shall be con-

secutively numbered and all shall be given as instructions

of the court. Except where otherwise provided in Missouri

Approved Instructions, they shall be given in such order

as the court shall deem advisable. All instructions shall be

carried by the jury to their room and returned and filed at

the conclusion of their deliberations. All instructions re-

fused and all instructions given, including a record of who

tendered them and the ‘MAI’ notation, shall be kept as a

part of the record in the case.

(e) Guide for the Form of Instructions Where MAI Not

Used. Where an MAI must be modified to fairly submit the

—_

issues in a particular case, or where there is no applicable

MAI so that an instruction not in MAI must be given, then

such modifications or such instructions shall be simple,

brief, impartial, free from argument, and shall not submit

to the jury or require findings of detailed evidentiary facts.

(f) Instruction Directing Verdict—Converse Instruction.

Instructions may be given, authorizing a verdict for a de-

fendant, upon finding the converse of any essential fact or

el: nent essential to a verdict for plaintiff. The request of a

converse instruction shall not be deemed to waive any

objection to the instruction conversed.

(Amended May 20, 1964, effective Jan. 1, 1965; amended

Jan. 19, 1973, effective Sept. 1, 1973. Renumbered from

Rule 70.01 and amended April 7, 1977, effective Dec. 1,

1977).”

= yo

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Writ of Certiorari herein sought should be granted be-

cause the Supreme Court of Missouri by its Rule 70.02 and

by its action in permitting the Opinion of the Missouri Court of

Appeals herein to become law has dictated that M.A.I. 24.01

is the only verdict directing instruction to be used in any Federal

Employer’s Liability Act case in Missouri. In so doing, it has

burdened Petitioner and all other Federal Employer’s Liability

Act defendants in this State with an unfair discriminatory in-

struction which denies all such defendants their substantial right,

accorded under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act., to have

a jury fairly decide whether they are guilty of the negligence

charged against them.

ARGUMENT

1. The Question Presented Is an Important Federal Question

Because Petitioner and All Railroad Defendants in Federal Em-

ployer’s Liability Act Cases in the State of Missouri Are Being

Deprived of Substantive Rights Granted Under the Federal Em-

ployer’s Liability Act by Rule of the Supreme Court of Missouri

and by the Opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals in this Case.

The most basic question in any cause brought under the Fed-

eral Employer’s Liability Act is whether or not the defendant

railroad is negligent in the respects claimed by the plaintiff.

What constitutes negligence under the statute is a Federal ques-

tion, not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions

of negligence applicable under State laws. Federal decisional

law applying the concept governs, Urie v. Thompson, 1949, 337

U.S. 163. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the rail-

road was negligent in those respects and the jury must so find

before the railroad is liable. In Missouri, the issue of negligence

—_—

is submitted to the jury through the use of a form jury instruction,

M.A.I. 24.01, required by the Missouri Supreme Court under

its Rule 70.02.

By imposing the use of M.A.I. 24.01 as the plaintiff's ver-

dict directing instruction in all Federal Employer’s Liability Act

cases in Missouri, the Supreme Court of Missouri has deprived

Petitioner and all other Federal Employer’s Liability Act defend-

ants in Missouri of their right to have the jury decide whether or

not they are negligent in the respects claimed by plaintiff. In-

stead the jury is required to be given a general charge which

gives them no aid whatsoever in determining what the specific

issues of negligence are in a given case or how to resolve those

issues. They are given only the legal conclusions set out in

M.A.I. 24.01 and no factual question is submitted for their

resolution. They are never required to resolve a factual ques-

tion. They are always merely permitted to agree or disagree

with the legal conclusions set out in M.A.I. 24.01. Whether or

not the railroad is negligent because of specific conduct or for

permitting specific circumstances is not decided. Hence Peti-

tioner submits that the Missouri courts are denying its right

to jury adjudication of the question of its negligence under the

Federal Employer’s Liability Act. This is an important issue

because it affects the rights of all Federal Employer's Liability

Act defendants in all cases brought under the Act in Missouri.

2. M.A.L. 24.01 Is an Inadequate Instruction Unfairly Dis-

criminating Against Petitioner and Other Railroad Defendants

in the State of Missouri, Depriving Them of Substantive Rights

Under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, Solely and Only Be-

cause They Are Federal Employer's Liability Act Defendants.

M.A.I. form instructions were adopted in the State of Mis-

souri in 1965. By Supreme Court Rule 70.02, that Court de-

creed that the form instruction in the M.A.I. book, if applicable

to the case, must be used to the exclusion of all other instruc-

—_—

am §3

tions. M.A.I. 24.01, with one very minor exception pertaining

to the Fourth paragraph thereof, has been unchanged since the

day it was published. Now, with the instant decision, the Mis-

souri Court of Appeals has taken the ultimate step of requiring

M.A.I. 24.01 to be used in all Federal Employer’s Liability Act

cases no matter what the proof or theories may be. They can

do that because M.A.I. 24.01 is so vague and general it includes

all possible legal theories and requires no factual hypothesis.

What justification have the Missouri courts given for foisting

this incredible instruction on all Federal Employer's Liability

Act defendants in all Federal Employer's Liability Act cases?

Their reasoning is as astounding as the instruction. It is set out

in the case of Ricketts v. Kansas City Stock Yards, Mo., 1972,

484 S.W.2d 216. No other justification has been attempted.

The only explanation voiced in the Ricketts case is that Federal

Employer’s Liability Act defendants are liable if they are guilty

of only “slight negligence”, I.c. 221. That it is to say, the rail-

roads are liable under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act if

they failed to exercise “great care”, I.c. 221. Logically, it would

seem that resolution of specific factual questions is equally im-

portant whether the issue be one of “ordinary care” or “great

”

care .

Further, the Missouri courts’ view of Federal Employer's

Liability Act negligence, as expressed in Ricketts, is wrong. The

standard applicable to Federal Employer's Liability Act negli-

gence is the same standard applied in other negligence cases,

namely, the failure to exercise the degree of care that an ordi-

narily careful and prudent person would use under the same

or similar circumstances. This Court made that abundantly

clear in the case of Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 1943,

318 U.S. 54, 63 S.Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed 610. It is true that the

amount of evidence required to make a submissible jury case is

small in Federal Employer’s Liability Act cases, Lavender v.

Kurn, 1946, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916. It is

also true that any causal connection whatsoever between the

—— ee

railroad’s negligence and plaintiff's injuries will suffice to support

a plaintiff's verdict, Rogers v. Mo. Pac. PR. Co., 1957, 352 US.

500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493. But the standard of care is

the same in Federal Employer’s Liability Act and non-Federal

Employer’s Liability Act cases. Hence, even the rationalization

of Missouri courts for the propriety of M.A.I. 24.01 is without

merit. There is simply no justification for the Missouri courts’

discrimination in their instruction practice between Federal

Employer’s Liability Act and non-Federal Employer’s Liability

Act cases.

In this connection it must be noted that prior to 1965, before

the imposition of form instructions by the Missouri Supreme

Court, narrative jury instructions were used, much like the prac-

tice in Federal District Courts today. In the narrative instruc-

tions in Federal Employer’s Liability Act cases the Missouri

courts required the jury to decide specific factual issues. Those

instructions did not permit the vague general terms of M.A.I.

24.01. In fact clear-cut preciseness was required. This is

plainly demonstrated by the case of Johnson v. Missouri-Kansas-

Texas Railroad Company, Mo., 1960, 334 S.W.2d 41, Lc. 46-

47, a case by the same Missouri Judge who wrote Ricketts, supra.

Likewise, the Federal District Courts submit specific factual is-

sues in their jury instructions. Illustrative cases are Hite v. West-

ern Maryland Railway, U.S.C.A., 4th Cir., 1954, 217 F.2d

781, Le. 782: Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis v. Fitzjohn,

U.S.C.A., 8th Cir., 1948, 165 F.2d 473, Lc. 480.

It must be kept in mind that the Missouri Supreme Court has

expressly declared that M.A.I. 24.01 is a vague roving commis-

sion inadequately defining the jury issues to be decided and

has decided that it is an illegal instruction in any except Federal

Employer's Liability Act cases, Ricketts v. Kansas City Stock

Yards, Mo., 1972, supra. That line of reasoning has been fol-

lowed by the Missouri Court of Appeals on at least one other

occasion in the case of Searcy v. Neal, MA-KC, 1974, 509 S.W.

— =

2d 755, where M.A.I. 24.01 was again found to be an unfit sub-

mission for any except Federal Employer’s Liability Act cases.

There is no reason in law or logic requiring the discrimination

practiced by the Missouri Supreme Court in its imposition of

M.A.I. 24.01 in Federal Employer’s Liability Act cases. Ap-

parently its action is based on its misconception of the law as to

the standard of care imposed by the Federal Employer’s Lia-

bility Act. This Court must rectify the situation if Federal Em-

ployer’s Liability Act defendants are to get fair trials in Mis-

souri. This Court has in the past reviewed State Court cases be-

cause of potential instructional error, Seaboard Air Line Railway

v. Padgett, 1915, 236 U.S. 668, 35 S.Ct. 481, 59 L.Ed. 777.

Petitioner respectfully requests the Court to do so in this cause.

3. The Question Presented Here Is One Touching Petition-

er’s Substantive Rights Under the Federal Employer's Liability

Act and Is Not Merely a Matter of State Procedural Law.

Questions touching the form and wording of jury instructions

in State Court civil cases ordinarily do not merit the attention

of this Court. However, the question in this case arises out of

the arbitrary action of the Missouri Supreme Court in applying

different instruction standards in Federal Employer’s Liability

Act cases as opposed to any other civil jury case in the State.

The question here goes far beyond mere points of procedure or

semantics and strikes at the heart of Petitioner's rights under

the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, namely, the right to have

a jury decision on the question of its negligence. Vague, gen-

eral, roving commissions to juries are suitable in Federal Em-

ployer’s Liability Act cases in Missouri, say the Missouri courts,

but they are illegal in all other civil cases. Further, say the

Missouri courts, this vague general instruction must be used to

the exclusion of any other in all Federal Employer's Liability

Act cases. Nowhere have those courts imposed such an arbi-

trary, inflexible, and punishing burden except in Federal Em-

ployer’s Liability Act cases.

—_=

The practical effect of the actions taken by the Missouri

courts to deny Federal Employer’s Liability Act defendants,

and only Federal Employer's Liability Act defendants, a fair

trial. First, M.A.I. 24.01 must be used no matter what issues

have been raised by the pleadings. In the instant case, for ex-

ample, Respondent’s sole pleaded theory was the Doctrine of

Res Ipsa Loquitur, which his proof supported. Instruction No.

2 (M.A.I. 24.01), which the trial court must by law give, did

not submit the pleaded and proven issues. Dugas v. Kansas

City So. Ry., 1973, 473 F.2d 821, certiorari denied 414 U.S.

823, 94 S.Ct. 124, 38 L.Ed. 56. Instead it submitted only the

legal conclusion of whether Petitioner proved “reasonably safe

conditions for work”. It did not submit the question of exclu-

sive control by Petitioner of the machinc or even whether the

occurrence happened because of Petitioner’s negligence. So,

also, in those cases where particular conditions for work, par-

ticular appliances, or particular methods of work are pleaded

issues, Petitioner and other Federal Employer’s Liability Act

defendants are placed in an impossible situation by the vague

terms of M.A.I. 24.01. In most cases, as in the instant case,

accidents involving railroad workers involve innumerable con-

ditions and strange pieces of equipment most of which are

completely unfamiliar to the average juror. Thus, as in this

case, adroit and capable Federal Employer’s Liability Act plain-

tiffs’ counsel are able to paint a picture of liability involving

all of the various circumstances, some of which may be un-

pleasant, which happen to surround the occurrence, whether

they are legitimate issues of negligence or not. The vague con-

clusions submitted in the instruction make it impossible for

Federal Employer’s Liability Act defense counsel to focus the

attention of the jury on the true factual issues involved. They

are not able to confine the case to the issues. Instead the jury

is permitted, even invited, to sift through all of the circumstances

to find some small detail which they believe “is not a reason-

ably safe condition”. Thus, the “shotgun” approach to the issue

of negligence required by M.A.I. 24.01 presents an impossible

——’

= =

situation from the defense viewpoint. In that way, the gener-

ality of M.A.I. 24.01, in a real and substantial sense, deprives

Petitioner in the instant case, and all other Federal Employer's

Liability Act defendants in Missouri, of a fair trial on the mer-

its of those cases brought against them under the Federal Em-

ployer’s Liability Act.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reason, this Petition for a Writ of Certio-

rari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

DONALD E. ENGLE

GERALD D. MORRIS

By DONALD E. ENGLE

906 Olive Street—Suite 1023

St. Louis, Missouri 63101

(314) 241-7800

Counsel for Petitioner, St. Louis-

San Francisco Railway Company

April 4, 1978

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that three true copies of the foregoing Peti-

tion for Writ of Certiorari and Appendices “A,” “B” and “C”

were hand delivered to the Office of C. Marshall Friedman,

Attorney for Respondent, 818 Olive Street, St. Louis, Missouri,

by the undersigned this th day of April, 1978.

GERALD D. MORRIS

APPENDIX

—

APPENDIX “A”

In the Missouri Court of Appeals

St. Louis District ,

Division Three

James T. Griffith, )

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

q Cause No. 38,255.

St. Louis-San Francisco Railway

Company,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis

Hon. Clyde S. Cahill, Jr.

Opinion Filed November 8, 1977

Plaintiff-respondent was injured while working as an employee

for defendant-appellant, St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Com-

pany. Plaintiff sued defendant under the Federal Employers’

Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51, and received a $150,000 jury

verdict. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court

erred: (1) in giving plaintiff's verdict directing instruction; (2) in

refusing defendant’s converse instruction; (3) in refusing to

admit an exhibit of a recorded recollection of a defense witness;

(4) in failing to grant a new trial after an alleged prejudicial

statement made by plaintiff's counsel in closing argument; (5)

in failing to grant a new trial or remittitur by reason of an al-

leged grossly excessive verdict. We find no error and affirm the

judgment.

Plaintiff was employed by defendant in Springfield, Missouri.

At the time of his injury, plaintiff was assembling rebuilt air

— <

brake pistons which were put together under air pressure. As

plaintiff was in the process of assembling an air brake piston,

a portion of the piston slipped forward and struck plaintiff on

the left eyebrow and nose, injuring plaintiffs eye. As a result of

the injury, plaintiff suffered permanent impairment and distor-

tion of vision. The jury award was $150,000.

1. Defendant first attacks plaintiff's verdict directing instruc-

tion which is based on M.A.I. 24.01 and was submitted as fol-

lows:

“Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:

First, defendant failed to provide reasonably safe condi-

tions for work, and

Second, defendant was thereby negligent, and

Third, such negligence directly resulted in whole or in

part in injury to plaintiff.”

Although defendant did not object to the foregoing instruction

at trial, on appeal, it contends that the verdict director permits

an improper roving commission for the jury. Defendant’s allega-

tion of error is without merit. The contested instruction has

been specifically adopted by our Supreme Court for use in

F.E.L.A. cases. See M.A.I. 24.01. As such, its use is manda-

tory to the exclusion of all others. Rule 70.01(b); Brown v. St.

Louis Public Service Co., 421 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. banc 1967).

In. Ricketts v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. of Maine, 484

S.W.2d 216 (Mo. banc 1972), regarding an instruction con-

gruent in every respect to plaintiff's verdict director here,' it was

said, l.c. 221:

1 Defendant claims that the word “thereby” added to

second of the verdict director and which does not appear in M.A.I.

24.01 renders the instruction fatally defective. The word ‘

EE SD SEES SD Se GEN Se ee ee eee

re.

—_*

“This instruction’s wording in what it submitted follows

M.A.I. 24.01 which is designed for submission of F.E.L.A.

cases.”

Defendant’s request that we abjure Supreme Court rules and,

incidentally, Ricketts, is futile. We do not have power to do so.

We are bound by the Supreme Court’s rules and its decisions.

Pitts v. Malcolm Bliss Mental Health Center, 521 S.W.2d 501

(Mo. App. 1975); Ritter v. Lindberg Acoustics, Inc., 501 S.W.

2d 207 (Mo. App. 1973). Plaintiff's verdict director is valid,

and we are not persuaded to step beyond the bounds of the

strictures of our appellate review.

2. Defendant submitted the following purported converse in-

struction to plaintiff's verdict director:

“Your verdict must be ior the defendant if you do not

believe the nonpressure head slipped out of the reassembly

rack while the nonpressure head was under air pressure”.

The trial court refused the instruction, which defendant com-

plains was error. We find no error. A converse must be in sub-

Stantially the same language as that used in the verdict di-

rector it converses. Oventrop v. Bi-State Development Agency,

521 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. App. 1975); Snyder v. Chicago, Rock

Island & Pacific Co., 521 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. App. 1973). De-

fendant’s ostensible converse does not comport with this pre-

cept. There was no error in refusing defendant’s converse.

3. Defendant argues that it was error for the trial court to

refuse to allow one of its witnesses, Loren Tate, to refresh

his memory from a written statement he had made shortly

after the accident and in refusing to admit the statement into

evidence. Mr. Tate was plaintiff's foreman on the date of the ac-

cident. He testified as to the condition of the air brake pro-

cedures subsequently taken by defendant to prevent further

occurrences of the particular accident experienced by plaintiff.

—_ oa

Defendant sought to introduce into evidence a written report

prepared by Mr. Tate after the accident stating the corrective

measures taken by defendant to avert similar happenings. The

alleged purpose of the written statement was to refresh Mr.

Tate’s recollection as to what had happened on the date of the

accident. The fact is that Mr. Tate had already testified clearly

and unhesitatingly regarding everything that was contained in

the proffered statement. As stated in Watson v. Meredith De-

velopment Co., 410 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. App. 1966):

“Generally speaking, the question of whether » witness

may be allowed to refresh his recollection is a matter re-

posing in the sound discretion of the trial court, reviewable

only for abuse. (citations omitted) However, . . . a sound

discretion would ordinarily dictate that a witness should

not be asked to refresh his recollection unless it is first

established that he has no present recollection and that he

needs the aid of a memorandum in order to recall the

facts to his mind or otherwise establish them.”

From the record, it is clear that Mr. Tate needed nothing to

refresh his recollection for the substance of his testimony. There

was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to re-

ceive the written statement in evidence, Furthermore, where a

witness has not been impeached, prior consisient out of court

statements, written or oral, are not admissible to bolster his in

court testimony. The out of court statement is hearsay and is

not admissible under any exception to the hearsay rules.

4. During his closing argument, plaintiff's counsel made a

statement conveying the impression that defendant would “get

rid of” plaintiff after the case was over. Defendant’s counsel

objected to the comment, and the objection was sustained. No

further relief was requested. Defendant, in its brief states that

“[{i]t may be argued that the trial court sustained defendant's

objection to the argument and that defendant got the relief it

requested.” We agree. Defendant did get all the relief it re-

ees oD

—

quested and is not now in position to complain. State v. Ruther-

ford, 554 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. App. 1977); Burian v. Dickens,

527 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. App. 1975). We find no abuse of dis-

cretion in the trial court’s failure sua sponte to declare a mis-

trial nor does any basis exist, as defendant contends, to reverse

and remand merely because the statement was made late in the

trial during closing argument, which, according to defendant,

would make a request for a mistrial futile.

5. Finally, defendant suggests the the jury verdict of

$150,000 was overly munificent and demonstrated bias and

prejudice. In the alternative, defendant argues that we should

order a remittitur.

The evidence disclosed that as a result of being struck in the

eye and eyebrow by a portion of the air brake piston on which

he was working, plaintiff suffered serious and permanent injury

to his eye. There was competent medical testimony that plain-

tiff's vision would be permanently distorted, not correctable by

the use of eye glasses; that his vision was impaired. There was

also medical testimony that by reason of the injury sustained the

possibility exists that plaintiff's visual problems could be aggra-

vated; that complications such as glaucoma and retinal detach-

ment could ultimately occur with loss of sight of the injured eye.

Defendant does not challenge the fact that the plaintiff was in-

jured or that permanent visual distortion did occur as a result

of the injury. The jury is vested with broad discretion in affixing

the amount of the award as is the trial judge in determining

whether to order a remittitur. Blond v. Overesch, 527 S.W.2d

663 (Mo. App. 1975). Gixing consideration to the nature and

extent of plaintiff's injuries, their permanence, the plaintiff's age

—38 at the time of the injury—consideration of economic

factors, awards in other cases and the jury’s superior position to

appraise the injury, we cannot say that the jury award was exces-

sive or that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order

a remittitur. Bedwell v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac.

—_” on

R.R. Co., 509 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1974); McDowell v. South-

western Bell Tel. Co., 546 S.W.2d 160 (Mo. App. 1976); Strake

v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 539 S.W.2d 715 (Mo. App.

1976); Woodford v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., 518

S.W.2d 712 (Mo. App. 1974). Under the circumstances of this

case, we do not believe that the fact that the record fails to dis-

close plaintiff lost work time from his injury is a significant factor

for reducing the verdict.

Judgment affirmed.

/s/ GEORGE F, GUNN, JR.

GEORGE F. GUNN, JR.,

Presiding Judge

Harry L. C. Weier, Judge, Concurs.

John J. Kelly, Judge, Concurs.

a i an

APPENDIX “B”

No. 60534

In the Supreme Court of Missouri

St. Louis District No. 38255

September Session 1977

James T. Griffith,

Plaintiff-Respondent

vs. Transfer

St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company,

Defendant-Appellant

Now at this day, on consideration of defendant-appellant’s

application to transfer the above entitled cause from the St.

Louis District Court of Appeals, it is ordered that said applica-

tion be, and the same is hereby denied.

State of Missouri—SCt.

1, Thomas F. Simon, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State

of Missouri, certify that the foregoing is a full, true and complete

transcript of the judgment of said Supreme Court, entered of

record at the September Session thereof, 1977, and on the 9th

day of January, 1978, in the above entitled cause.

Given under my hand and seal of said Court, at the City of

Jefferson City, this 9th day of January, 1978.

THOMAS F. SIMON, Clerk

By JANICE B. HANSON, D. C.

—* =

APPENDIX “C”

MEMORANDUM

To: Attorneys of Record

From: Robert D. St. Vrain, Clerk

Missouri Court of Appeals

St. Louis District

Re: Motions for Rehearing or Transfer (Rulings)

Date: December 16, 1977

The following motions for rehearing and for transfer to the Su-

preme Court have been ruled on by the Court.

On November 14, 1977, Appellant’s motion for rehearing was

stricken as scurrilous. Appellant’s motion to transfer denied in

the following case:

1. No. 37854 State v. Joe S. Hegwood

On December 16, 1977, Appellant’s motion for rehearing or for

transfer to Court En Banc or transfer to Supreme Court denied.

Judge Reinhard not participating in the following case:

1. No. 38477 James G. Bridges v. Olandrea S. Bridges

On December 16, 1977, Respondent’s motion for rehearing

granted. Cause reset on Wednesday, February 8, 1978, at 2

p.m. in the following case:

1. No. 38320 State v. Danny Lansford

The following motions for rehearing and/or transfer have all

been denied as of today, December 16, 1977:

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

. No.

No.

No.

No.

No.

a

36772 Charlene Sue Faulkner v. James Robert

Faulkner

36891 Gary Henderson v. Milton S. Yust

. 37036 State v. Paul Albert Wood, Jr.

. 37507 Floyd P. Keller, Sr. v. Winifred Laura

Porchey, et al.

. 37761 State v. John C. Daly

. 37879 David Francois v. Lillian M. Jones, Extx,

etc., et al.

. 37926 Maralyn Milner v. Texas Discount Gas

Co.

. 38070 State v. Terry Woodfin

. 38085 George R. McFarland. et al. v. Louis A.

Bra‘dy, et ux.

. 38255 James T. Griffith v. St. Louis-San Fran-

cisco RR Co.

38301

38222 State ex rel. State Highway Commission

of Missouri v. Public Water Supply

District No. 2 of Jefferson County,

Missouri

. 38346 State v. David Hampton

. 38452 In re: Adoption of E.N., et al. v. E.M.N.

38453 H.N. v. E.M.(N)W.

38573 State v. Local Junior Joiner

38655 Earnest Franklin v. State

— A-i0 —

16. No. 38674 William J. Vorbeck v. Theodore McNeal,

et al., etc.

17. No. 38807 State v. John Payton

18. No. 39250 James Turner, Jr. v. State

RSV/Id

ce: Judges

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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