Petition — Keefer v. California

iN THE Lomi

CHAEL RODAK, jp, cme

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Oc by “B78.

No. 8

WARREN DALE KEEFER,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTLORARI

RICHARD H, LEVIN

9911 W. Pico Boulevard

Suite 800

Los Angeles, California

90035

Attorney for Petitioner

<

SUBJECT INDEX | rv

Page

Summary of Charges on Whicn TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Petitioner Was Convicted 3 CASES Page

Question Presented 4 Bitter v. United States, 389

Petitioner's Contention Was U.S. ERR RS

a in the 4 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S, 524,.,...18

Argument 6 Henderson v. Dutton, 397 F. 2d 375,,.17

I In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345,,...,22,26

Revocation of Petitioner's Mastrian Vv. Hedman, 326 F. 2d 708,..17

"Own Recognizance" Status

and the Setting of Excessive on v. Brown, 184 Cal. App. 2d 20.29

Bail Without Notice Immed- P Ce ae ee ee ,

iately re wed to Trial, Con-

ee ee oe ~ People v. Gilliam, 41 Cal. App. :

the a os and d Dia aimed es tema seadneeseeeeuer

Fourteenth Amendments,

United States Constitution. 6 People v. Norman, 252 Cal. App.

ff res rere

Conclusion st | People v. Spencer, 66 Cal. 2d 158.,.31

vuceeneeee v. Circuit Court, 324

F. a 0 ee eee hee oe

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.

ES ee Te Pe |

Savarese v, State Farm Ins, Co.,

7 ee; eee

Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1..........17,18,

20,22,

26

iii.

Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp.

Dist butane cbdde o0nkbnsnsbeeseesoee

United States v. Allison, 414

BF. 26 GOT cc cccccccccccccseccvece 24,25,

26

United States v. Leathers, 412

B. 26 L6G. ccccccvccccccccccccvese 22

United States v. Motlow, 10 F.

2d Dich ebbes ceeds neweee oeessoenn

United States v. Stroud, 474 F.

2d a rn *eereenereee#ee#e#e##e 28

White v. Wilson, 399 F. 2d 596...... 17

STATUTES

California Penal Code §484..........3

California Penal Code §487,1..... seae

California Penal Code §1318......... 19

California Penal Code §1318.6....... 7,8,19

United States Code, §1257(3)........ 2

TEXTS

A Study of the Administration of

Bail in New York City, 106 U.

id Mis Gh Wa obeseede océe cekas 27

iv.

Compelling Appearance in Court;

Administration of Bail in

Philadelphia, 102 U. Pa. L. ;

Rev. 1031...... ec eccececccecooces 27

Preventive Detention Before Trial,

79 Harv. L. Rev. 1489. ..cccccvees 18

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE

ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRA-

TION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUS-

TICE, Report Te idneecscodeboesuet

Witkin, California Evidence (2d Ed.)

pp. 1053-1054 oeveee seneueneess neuen

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1977

WARREN DALE KEEFER,

Petitioner,

vs,

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

1

The judgment of conviction imposed

upon Petitioner by the Superior Court of

the State of California for the County of

Santa Barbara was affirmed in a Mimeo Op-

inion of the California Court of Appeal,

Second Appellate District, Division Three.

The Opinion of the Court of Appeal is

voluminous and, accordingly, is separately

presented.

2

Judgement of conviction was impose

by the Santa Barbara County Superior

Court on November 3, 1975. The Court of

Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction

on August 24, 1977, and denied a Petition

for Rehearing on September 22, 1977. The

California Supreme Court denied a hearing

on November 17, 1977. The Court of Appeal

issued its Remittitur on November 30, 1977.

3

Jurisdiction over this case is con-

ferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. §1257(3).

Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by

the highest Court of the State of Califor-

nia required to hear Petitioner's appeal,

and the Supreme Court of the State of Cal-

ifornia, which had discretionary power

to hear Petitioner's appeal, refused to

grant a hearing.

SUMMARY OF CHARGES ON WHICH

PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED

4

Petitioner was convicted of four

counts of Grant Theft by False Pretenses

in violation of California Penal Code §§

484 (Theft defined) and 487.1 (Grand

theft defined). Two of the counts (Counts

I and II) were based upon statements alle-

gedly made by Petitioner to lending insti-

tutions while acting as agent for purcha-

sers in real property transactions, to

facilitate loans sought by said purchasers.

The remaining counts (Counts V and VI)

were based upon statements allegedly made

by Petitioner, acting as agent for parties

involved in real property transactions, to

facilitate the sale of trust deeds.

ahe

QUESTION PRESENTED

I

Five days prior to triai, without no-

“own

tice to Petitioner, Petitioner's

recognizance" release status was revoked

and bail of $500,000.00 was tmpeced. Peti-

tioner, unable to post bail, remained in

custody during trial. The question pre- |

sented by this Petition is whether said

action constituted the imposition of ex-

cessive bail in violation of the Eighth

Amendment and/or deprived Petitioner of

effective representation by counsel in

violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

PETITIONER'S CONTENTION WAS PROPERLY

RAISED IN THE STATE COURTS

5

The contention that revocation of

Petitioner's "“cwn recognizance" status and

aSe

imposition of excessive bail violated

Petitioner's Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights was advanced during trial

pursuant to a motion for reduction of bail

[(C.T.715-721], on appeal [App. Op. Br.75-

79; App. Rep. Br.28-30; Pet. Rehearing 14-

15], and in a Petition for Hearing denied

by the California Supreme Court. [Pet.

Hearing 40-45]

The Court of Appeal held that Peti-

tioner had "not shown that the mere fact

he was in custody during trial adversely

affected the outcome of the case."' [Mimeo

Op.95]

=

ARGUMENT

I

REVOCATION OF PETITIONER'S “OWN

RECOGNIZANCE" STATUS AND THE SET-

TING Cr EXCESSIVE BAIL, WITHOUT

NOTICE, IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO

TRIAL, CONTRAVENED FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS ACCORDED TO PETITIONER

BY THE SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOUR-

TEENTH AMENDMENTS, UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION.

The indictment herein was filed on

June 26, 1975. Petitioner was arraigned

on June 27, 1975, and was released on his

own recognizance pending a hearing on his

application to be released on his own

recognizance. [C.T.9] On July 8, 1975,

Petitioner's application to be released

on his own recognizance was granted. [C.T.

569]

afe

On October 1, 1975, the day on which

a trial date was to be set, the People

moved for an order revoking Petitioner's

"own recognizance” status and setting

bail pursuant to California Penal Code

§1318.6.- [C.T.673-703] The People al-

leged that facts had come to the People's -

attention indicating that Petitioner had

engaged in other criminal activities be-

fore and after his indictment "which facts

1 California Penal Code §1318.6 provides

that:

"After a defendant has been

released pursuant to this

article [own recognizance],

the court in which the charge

is pending may, in its dis-

cretion, require that the

defendant either give bail

in an amount specified by

it or other security as else-

where provided in this chap-

ter. The court may order that

the defendant be committed

to actual custody unless he

gives such bail or gives such

other security,"

ae

represent a change in circumstances which

substantially increase the risk of the

said defendant's failure to appear and

attend upon further proceedings in court

in this matter." [C.T.673] The People's

motion specifically alleged:

"From the facts at hand, it

appears that the defendant has

fraudulently obtained, or has

attempted to obtain by fraud,

amounts of money ranging from

$50,000 to in excess of $200,000

within the past few months, and

that it may be his intention to

flee this jurisdiction with

whatever money he has obtained

or may yet obtain before a

judgment is rendered in the

criminal charges now pending

against him in this court."

a9

[C.T.678 (Emphasis added) ]

The Court granted said motion, fixed bail

at $500,000.00, and remanded Petitioner to

the custody of the Santa Barbara County

Sheriff. Trial of the matter was set for

October 6, 1975. [C.T.704]

On October 10, 1975, during the

course of trial, Petitioner moved for a

reduction in the amount of bail. [C.T.715-

721] The declaration of Petitioner's

trial counsel in support of said motion

stated:

"Tt is respectfully urged that

bail should be substantially

reduced for the following rea-

sons:

"1, Defendant voluntarily

appeared at his arraignment

and for booking by the County

Sheriff.

-10-

"2, Following his release on

his own recognizance the defendant

has made all required court appear-

ances and additional court appear-

ances not required of him by the

court,

"3, The defendant's prior record

consists of only one misdemeanor

conviction and would not suggest

any motivation for the defendant

to flee the Court's jurisdiction.

"4, The defendant has cooperated

throughout these proceedings with

his counsel,

"5, The defendant's present

custodial status, particularly in

a trial requiring close coopera-

tion between the defendant and his

counsel because of the number of

documentary exhibits involved, makes

elle

the preparation cf the defendant's

defense prejudicially difficult.

Interview facilities at the County

Jail where the defendant is in-

carcerated are very poor and pro-

hibit the exchange of documents

between the defendant and his coun-

sel. Moreover, the conduct of

the trial severely limits the

time available to defendant to

meet with his attorney in light

of defendant's custodial status.

"6. The alleged crimes involved

are not crimes of violence and do

not suggest danger to any persons,

should the defendant's bail be

reduced and should he be able to

make bail,

"7, The bail presently set is

such as to totally preclude any

o12-

practical possibility of the de-

fendant meeting the bail, defen-

dant's finances being severely

limited and he counting on help

from his family to meet whatever

bail may be set.

"8. The defendant has been the

primary person caring for his elder-

ly mother, having resided with her

for some time, in order to care

for her. Defendant's mother has

been hospitalized during the last

number of days and may still be

hospitalized, Moreover, defendant's

elderly father was hospitalized

within the past several days for

surgery, but in the course of

such surgery suffered a stroke

and as a result thereof is pre-

sently understood to be in intensive

— {=

care in. the Los Robles Hospital,

Thousand Oaks, California,"

[C.T,718-719]

On October 13, 1975, the sixth day of

Petitioner's trial, the Court heard argu-

ment by counsel on Petitioner's motion

to reduce the amount of bail, [C.T.722;

R.T.751-757] Petitioner's counsel noted

that Petitioner resided in Westlake, [Cal-

ifornia] and that Petitioner had conduct-

ed business in the area for many years.

[R.T.752] Counsel then reiterated the

effect of Petitioner's custodial status

upon preparation of Petitioner's defense:

". , .[A]s your Honor can readily

see from what has gone on before

us now in approximately a week of

trial, this is an extremely com-

plicated matter. It involved

four counts, and I don't know

elie

how many transactions for each

count. I can assure the Court

that it's very, very difficult,

without considerable help from

one's client, to put these trans-

actions together. I can see that

that would not be a reason for

releasing a defendant where

there are substantial reasons

suggesting a risk or danger or

what have you; but it seems to

me that. where the risk or danger

of the defendant fleeing is as

minimal as I see it to be here,

the Court should consider the

right of the defendant to be

afforded every opportunity for

the most expansive contact with

his counsel." [R.T.754]

214

Petitioner's motion for reduction of

bail was denied. [C.T.22; R.T.757] Peti-

tioner was remanded to custody in lieu of

bail, and Petitioner's counsel did not

thereafter confer with Petitioner at the

County jail. [R.T.2557]

On December 16, 1975, Petitioner's

application for probation was denied and

Petitioner was sentenced to state prison

on each of the four counts, the sentences

to run concurrently. [C.T.927] On the same

day Petitioner filed Notice of Appeal [C.

T.932] and moved for an order setting bail

on appeal. The trial court declined to

rule on said motion, but granted Petition-

er's request for a stay of execution of

the sentences to December 29, 1975 to

permit counsel to file appropriate written

motions. [R.T.2579-2580]

On December 31, 1975, Petitioner filed

-16-

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus dated

December 29, 1975, in the California Court

of Appeal, Second Appellate District. [2d

Crim. No. 28000] Said Petition was denied

on January 7, 1976 without prejudice to

Petitioner's right to apply to the trial

court for an order granting bail on appeal.

Petitioner so moved the trial court and on

January 28, 1976, the Superior Court set

bail on appeal in the amount of $250,000.00.

On or about February 12, 1976, Peti-

tioner filed a second Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the California Court

of Appeal, Second Appellate District. [2d

Crim. No. 28159] On February 20, 1976,

the Court of Appeal set Petitioner's bail

on appeal at $50,000.00. Petitioner was

thereafter released on the bail set by the

Court of Appeal pending resolution of his

appeal,

-l7-

The Eighth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides the "[e]x-

cessive bail shall not be required.” Pur-

Suant to the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, United States Cons-

titution, the States, as well as the

federal government, are prohibited from

subjecting criminal defendants to excessive

bail. Henderson v. Dutton (5th Cir. 1968)

397 F.2d 375, 377 fn. 3; Mastrian v.

Hedman (8th Cir. 1964) 326 F. 2d 708, 711,

cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965; Pilkinton v.

Circuit Court (8th Cir. 1963) 324 F. 2d 45,

46: see Robinson v. California (1962) 370

U.S. 660, 666; Stack v. Boyle (1951) 342

U.S. 1; White v. Wilson (9th Cir. 1968)

399 F. 2d 596, 598.

Although the question of whether the

Eighth Amendment impliedly quarantees a

right to bail has not been definitively

-18-

resolved,” it is clear that where a

statutory right to bail exists, bail in

an ensunt greater than that necessary to

assure appearance is excessive. Stack v.

Boyle (1951) 342 U.S. 1, 5; Carlson v.

Landon (1952) 342 U.S. 524,544-546.

Article 1, Section 12 of the Calif-

Ornia Constitution provides that "[e]x-

cessive bail may not be required,” and

provides, inter alia, an absolute right

to bail “except for capital crimes.”

California Penal Code Section 1271

implements the foregoing Constitutional

imperative by providing that "[iJf the

charge is for any [offense other than a

capital offense], he may be admitted to

“see Carlson v. Landon (1952) 342, U.S.

524,; United States v. Motlow (7th Cir.

1926) 10 F. 2d 657; Trimble v. Stone

(D.D.C. 1960) 187 F. Supp. 483, 484; Note

Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 Harv.

L. Rev. 1489, 1494.

-19-

bail before conviction, as a matter of

right."

Where a California criminal defendant

has been released on his own recognizance

(see California Penal Code Section 1318),

". . . the court in which the

charge is pending may require that

the defendant either give bail in

an amount specified by it or other

security as elsewhere provided in

this chapter upon a finding, made

in open court that the defendant

has failed to appear or has vio-

lated any condition of the order

releasing him on his own recogni-

zance, or that there has been a

change of circumstances which

increases the risk of failure to

appear, or that additional facts

have been presented which were not

shown at the time of the original

order releasing the defendant on

his own recognizance. The court

may order that the defendant be

committed to actual custody unless

he give such bail or gives such

other security." (P.C. §1318.6)

Applicable considerations in determin-

ing the amount of bail are: (1) The

seriousness of the offense charged; (2)

the previous criminal record of the

-20-

defendant, and (3) the probability of his

appearing at trial. California Penal

Code Section 1275. Although fixing the

amount of bail rests with the discretion

of the trial court, the exercise of that

discretion must be overturned where the

facts demonstrate that said discretion

has been abused. Stack v. Boyle (1951)

342 U.S. 1, 6; see People v. Norman (1967)

252 Cal App. 2d 381.

Petitioner respectfully submits that

the Superior Court set excessive bail so

as to violate Petitioner's Constitutional

right that excessive baii not be set and,

moreover, so as to effectively deprive

Petitioner of his Constitutional right to

adequate representation of counsel. Bitter

v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 15; see

People v. Brown (1960) 184 Cal. App. 2d

588.

-2l-

In the instant case, Petitioner's

prior criminal record clearly did not

justify $500,000.00 bail. Petitioner's

trial counsel represented that it consis-

ted of one misdemeanor conviction [C.T.

718), and the People presented no contrary

evidence.

Likewise, the extraordinary amount of

bail was not justified by the seriousness

of the charged offenses. Perusal of the

facts set forth by the California Court

of Appeal [Mim. Op. 3-60] demonstrates

that although the charged offenses were

felonies, they did not entail violence,

but were rather highly technical crimes

against property. Moreover, the serious-

ness of the offense charged is relevant

only to the likelihood that a defendant

will make required court appearances:

“{t]Jhe purpose of bail is not to punish

@-22@

the defendant nor to protect the public

safety, but to assure his presence in

Court. . . Peovle v. Gilliam (1974) 41 Cal.

App. 3d 181, 191; see U.S. v. Leathers

(D.C. Cir. 1969) 412 F. 2d 169; In re

Underwood (1973) 9 Cal. 3d 345.

There remains only one possible proper

justification for $500,000.00 bail - that

it was required to assure Petitioner's

presence at trial. Stackv. Boyle, supra;

In re Underwood, supra. The People argued

that because Petitioner allegedly was

committing other crimes while released on

his own recognizance, the risk that he

would fail to appear at trial was substan-

tially increased. [C.T. 673-674] Plainly,

this is a non-seguitur.

The only arguable inference is that

Petitioner was allegedly committing

fraudulent acts in order to obtain money.

It cannot reasonably be further inferred

-23-

that Petitioner would use any monies so

obtained to flee the jurisdiction. Indeed,

the opposite inference is equally likely:

If Petitioner found that he could readily

defraud persons in California, there would

be no reason for him to go elsewhere. It

is also equally likely that Petitioner

would utilize any monies so obtained to

pay his and his family's living expenses

and/or his undoubtedly substantial attorneys

fees. As was said in Savarese v. State

Farm Ins. Co. (1957) 150 Cal. App. 2d 518,

520:

"Of course, the building

of inference upon inference may

often result in a progressive

weakening of a logical sequence,

and lead to an ultimate conclusion

which is untenable on the basis of

the facts proven. Where an

ultimate inference is thus remote

from the evidence, it should be

a pe mcf See also, Witkin,

alifornia Evidence (2nd Ed. .

1053-1054. | ines

wage

"_»

-24-

The extraordinary amount of the bail

imposed - $500,000.00 - lends further

support to Petitioner's position: There

was simply no evidence that such an amount

was necessary to dissuade Petitioner from

leaving the jurisdiction. Even the People's

obviously inflated estimate was only that

Petitioner "[had] fraudulently obtained,

or [had] attempted to obtain by fraud,

amounts of money ranging from $50,000 to

in excess of $200,000..." {[C.T. 678]

A fortiori, the amount of bail necessary

to dissuade Petitioner from leaving the

jurisdiction would certainly have been no

more than $200,000.00.

"It is also significant that, after

conviction, when the probability of flight

was presumably at its maximum "(United

States v. Allison (9th Cir. 1969) 414 F.

2a 407, 414), the Superior Court set bail

-25-

On appeal in the amount of $250,000.00,

and the Court of Appeal thereafter reduced

the amount of bail on appeal to $50,000.00.

[p. 16, supra) "There is nothing to in-

dicate why this less drastic action would

not have sufficed during trial. [Citiation

omitted)" United States v. Allison, supra,

414 F. 2d at 414.

Moreover, the facts available to the

Court demonstrated a likelihood that

Petitioner would appear at trial. peti-

tioner had been arraigned on June 27, 1975,

had been in court on several occasions

thereafter, both when required to be and

when not so required, and had hired an

attorney, presumably paid him, and cooper-

ated with him. [C.T. 718] By October 1,

1976, over three months had elapsed since

the arraignment and it was a scant five

days before trial was to commence. This

=26-

conduct surely does not suggest an intention

not to appear at trial.

The conclusion is inescapable that the

Court set bail at $500,000.00 in order to

keep Petitioner in jail and prevent him

from committing crimes such as those

alleged at length by the People. ([C.T.

673-703] Such purpose was not only

incompatible with the theory that crimes

should be deterred by the threat of sub-

sequent punishment rather than by prior

confinement, but was clearly violative of

the Eighth Amendment. Stack v. Boyle

(1951) 342 U.S. 1; In re Underwood (1973)

9 Cal. 3d 345.

An important purpose of the Bail

Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and stat-

utes enacted pursuant thereto, is that of

permitting “the unhampered preparation

of a defense, . .. “Stack v. Boyle (1951)

o%Je

342 U.S. 1, 4. Detention prior to and/or

during trial seriously impedes the ability

of a defendant to prepare his case.> Thus,

in, Bitter v. United States (1967) 389 U.S.

15, the United States Supreme Court sum-

marily reversed the judgment of conviction,

holding that the order of the trial judge

remanding the defendant to custody for the

duration of his trial after defendant was

tardy in returning to court "constituted

an unwarranted burden upon defendant and his

counsel in the conduct of the case." Bitter

v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. at 17.

The Court did not inquire whether prejudice

resulted from the improper commitment order.

3see U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE

ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FED-

ERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT 70-71; Note,

a Study of the Administration of Bail in

New York City, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 693, 725;

Note, Compelling Appearance in Court:

Administration of Bail in Philadelphia,

102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031, 1

-28-

In the instant case, the record

demonstrates that Petitioner's defense

was severely prejudiced by the imposition

of exorbitant bail. Cf. United States

v. Stroud (9th Cir. 1973) 474 F. 2d 737,

cert. denied 412 U.S. 930; United States

v. Allison (9th Cir. 1969) 414 F. 24 407.

In this case involving scores of witnesses

and hundreds of exhibits, close consulta-

tion between Petitioner and counsel was

obviously essential. It was the expecta-

tion of Petitioner and his trial counsel,

as would be the normal practice in a

complex case, that they would meet each

evening after trial to review the evidence

and organize the defense. [R.T. 2455] When

a mere five days before trial, without

warning, this expectation was thwarted,

the lines of communication between

Petitioner and his attorney were severed.

-29-

[C.T. 719; R.T. 2456-2457] As a result,

Petitioner was deprived of effective

representation of counsel.

Incongruously, the Court of Appeal

disposed of the foregoing contention in one

sentence: "Appellant has not shown that

the mere fact he was in custody during

trial adversely affected the outcome of the

case. (People v. Brown, 184 Cal. App. 2d

588, 596.)" [Mim. Op. 95]

Petitioner respectfully submits that

the substantial constitutional issues

advanced herein are deserving of consider-

ation beyond that accorded by the Court of

Appeal.

The case relied upon by the Court of

Appeal, People v. Brown, supra, contains

only two sentences on the subject and no

discussion of the particular circumstances

wherein Brown may have been prejudiced by

-30-

his incarceration awaiting trial. More-

over, Brown did not seek a bail reduction

and the amount of his bail does not appear

in the record. Furthermore, Brown

involved a relatively simple marijuana

case rather than the complex multi-exhibit

litigation here. It is quite clear in the

instant case that Petitioner was prejudiced.

His trial attorney so stated under oath.

{C.T. 719} Common sense compels the con-

clusion that prejudice occurred.

In addition, the Court's notion that

Petitioner had to show that the excessive

bail “adversely affected the outcome of

the case” was faulty. People v. Brown,

supra at 596. This is, once again, plainly

a constitutional issue. Petitioner's right

not to be the subject of excessive bail

requirements is explicitly protected by

both state and federal constitutions.

@32-

o%le , :

, of Appeal ordering it to vacate its

Therefore, Petitioner need not show Opinion and reverse the judgment of con-

“probable prejudice” he need only show 2 il

viction.

“possible prejudice." See People v.

Spencer (1967) 66 Cal. 2d 158.

Even more basically, this case Respectfully submitted,

demonstrates a flagrant abuse of the

constitutional bail provisions. The Court's RICHARD H. LEVIN

Ae Attorney for Petitioner

approach leaves Petitioner, and others

Similarly situated, without any effective

remedy where this ancient constitutional .

right is abused. "Excessive bail may not

be required" says our Constitution. Here

excessive bail was obviously required.

This Court should not sanction this

constitutional abuse.

CONCLUSION

A Writ of Certiorari should be

issued, directed to the California Court