Petition — Keyes v. District of Columbia

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FILED

[ Supreme Court. U.S 1

o€C 121977 =

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcroBeR TERM, 1977

No. 77-850.

ArTHUR H. Kryes, Jr. and Luctnte Keyes,

on behalf of themselves and others

similarly situated,

Petitioners,

Vv.

THe Disrrict oF CotuMBiA, A Municipal Corporation

and WaLrer FE. WASHINGTON, and KENNETH Back,

Respondents,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

GILBERT HAHN, JR.

lith Floor

1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C, 20036

Attorneys for Petitioners

Mary KATHLEEN HITE

DeNNIS OAKES

Maynarp H. Dixon

Wornr, BLock, SCHORR and Soits-COHEN

1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W,

Washington, D.C, 20036

Of Counsel

Press of Byaon S, ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.

INDE X

Opinions Below . ...+-++-+e+-s+ee e

JurieGictiow « © e eo ec eee eo ewe le

Questions Presented ....++-+-+e+ se.

U. S. Constitutional Provision

Involved .. ++ +-++e-e¢eeee @ @

Statement of the Case ....+ + « «

Reasons for Granting the Writ .....

Conclusion . . «6 « «© « «© «© © © © © © e

Appendix

Opinion of the Court of Appeals dated

July 23, 1976 . . . . . . * . . . .

Opinion and Order of the Superior

Court dated April 23, 1974 ... .

Opinion and Order of the Superior

Court dated August 6, 1974 ... .

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

in District of Columbia v. Green,

dated October 9, 1973... sees

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

in District of Columbia v. Burling-

ton dated January 29, 1976 ... .

Order of the Court of Appeals of

Pebruary 27, 1976 .« « «e«eeree

Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

i

Page

13

18

A-74

A-90

A-145

Page

District of Columbia v. Burling-

ton dated June 13, 1977... ~=aA-147

Petitioners' "Motion to the Court En

Banc to Withdraw the Mandate of

s Court In Order to Prevent In-

justice and Grant Hearing En Banc

in Nu. &790 Because of District

of Columbia v. Burlington Decid-

ed June 13, 1977 . —— re , = « A-164

Order of the Court of Appeals

dated September 13, 1977

a A-194

Petitioners' "Motion to Withdraw

and Stay Mandate Pending Applica-_

tion to the Supreme Court of the

United States for a Writ of

Certiorari"

. A-196

Order of the Court of Appeals

dated October 11, 1977 ., “_ A-202

ii

A ee ee -

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases:

ee

Bare sed of Columbia, 370 eee * | se.86

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co.

—sET US. 673 (1930 ;

Vv. Hill, U. . ) . . . . . 16,1

pistes of Columbia vV. Berenter, 460" : i

ict of Columbia v. Burlington,

ee 7986 (D.C.App.January 29, 1976) 5.38,

. . . . . ’

(Vacated) ..++-+ s+ e+e » Pe ree

District of Columbia y+ Burlington, | 29517

District of Columbia v. Green, _ ough ue

2d (1973) . . . . . . 10,17

4009

Key v. Dole, 46 U.S.L.Week

U.S. November i. Beets &¢ « 6 © 6 8.8 13

Mayes v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S.

(1971) . . 7 . . . . . . . -

» » 15,16

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) + ’

o ec o £9,868

sOe Bae

Sta tos8) City of Baxtey, a 7 : Toes eae

Sullivan v. Little Huntse Park, os ns

Inc., 396 U. . . 7 . . . . . ’

Wright v. State of Georgia, 373 U.S.

iii

Bee CROGD). «6 454°u a ee 16,18

. . . . . ’

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions:

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-

ment sé © 6 4 Se 5

28 U.S.C. §1257(3) ... 2 eee 4

Title I, D.C. Code §1501 et seq. ... 6

iv

Seti oe

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

“

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

NO.

ARTHUR H. KEYES and LUCILLE KEYES,

On behalf of themselves and others

similarly situated,

Petitioners,

Vv.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a Municipal

Corporation and WALTER E. WASHINGTON,

and KENNETH BACK,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

Arthur H. Keyes, et al., petitioners,

appellees below, respectfully pray that a writ

of certiorari issue to review the judgment of

t.

-2-

the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

entered on September 13, 1977 in District of

Columbia, et al. v. Arthur H. Keyes, et al.,

No. 8790

OPINIONS BELOW

The first Opinion of the Court of Ap-

peals in the instant case is reported at

362 A.2d 729 (1976) and is reprinted in the

Appendix, infra, p. A-l. The subsequent per

curiam order of the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals in the instant case is not

yet reported and is reprinted in the Appendix,

infra, p. A-194.

The Opinions of the Superior Court of

the District of Columbia, Tax Division, in the

instant case, are unreported and are reprint-

ed in the Appendix, infra, p. A-16 and p. A-60

The Opinion of the District of Columbia Court

of Appeals in the case of District of Columbia

v. Burlington, is reported at 375 A.24 1052

(1977) and is reprinted in the Appendix, infra

p. A-147.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the District of Colum-

bia Court of Appeals was initially entered on

July 23, 1976. Petitioners' Petition for Re-

hearing or Rehearing En Banc was timely filed

on September 16, 1976, and was denied by the

Court of Appeals on November 26, 1976. On

December 27, 1976 the Court of Appeals filed

an order granting a stay of mandate for the

period of time permitted by law for the fil-

ing of a petition for a writ of certiorari.

Petitioners' writ of certiorari was timely

filed on February 23, 1977, and was denied

by this Court on April 18, 1977 (97 Sup.Ct.

1651).

On July 7, 1977 Petitioners filed a

motion with the District of Columbia Court

of Appeals to withdraw its mandate and to

grant a hearing en banc. (Appendix, infra,

p. A-164) Petitioners' motion was denied by

-4-

the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

en banc on September 13, 1977 (Appendix,

infra, p. A-194).

On September 22, 1977 petitioners

moved the District of Columbia Court of Ap-

peals to withdraw and Stay its mandate pend-

ing application to this Court for a writ of

certiorari. Petitioners' Motion was denied,

per curiam, on October 11, 1977. (Appendix,

infra, p. A-202).

On October 27, 1977 petitioners moved

this Court for leave to file a petition

for writ of mandamus to require the recall

of the mandate prior to the expiration date

of the present term of the Court of Appeals,

which motion is pending before the Court at

the time of the filing of this Petition.

The jurisdiction of this Court is in-

voked under 28 U.S.c. §1257(3).

-5-

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did an "ex parte" proceeding take

place where the petitioners and respondents

were advised during the proceedings in the

instant case by the highest court in the

District of Columbia that a "certain deci-

sion" was the law of the jurisdiction and

when the appellate court, during the pro-

ceedings, later vacated that "certain deci-

sion" notifying respondents but not the

petitioners?

2. Did the highest court of the Dis-

trict of Columbia deny petitioners their

constitutional right to a hearing on their

constitutional claim when the appellate

court held an ex parte proceeding?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides in part:

No person shall. . .be deprived

of life, liberty or property, with-

out due process of law...

-6-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Prior to fiscal year 1973 all the 96,000

single-family residential properties in the

District of Columbia were assessed for real

estate tax purposes in the same way. The fair

market value of the property was reduced to

a fixed percentage known as the "level of

assessment". Prior to fiscal year 1973 the

"level of assessment" was 55 percent of fair

market value for all Single-family proper-

ties. (App. pp. A-2, A-77.)

In preparing the assessments for fiscal

year 1973, the responsible officials of the

District of Columbia charged with the adminis-

tration of the tax laws, acting secretly and

without notice to the public as required by

the District of Columbia Administrative Proce-

dures Act, Title 1 D.C. Code §1501 et seq.,

raised the level of assessment for eee

mately 34,000 of the 96,000 homeowners in the

city from 55 to 60 percent (App. pp. A-63/65)

-7-

The tax for fiscal year 1973, based upon

these secret and unrevealed unequal assess~-

ments was levied and collected from the

taxpayers in question. (App. PP- A-63/65.)

In preparing the assessments for the

following year 1974, the same officials of

the District raised the level of assessment

for an additional 44,000 of the 96,000 home-

owners from 55 to 60 percent. However, be-

fore the taxes were levied and collected for

fiscal year 1974, the discriminatory assess~-

ments were “reluctantly made public” by the

District of Columbia officials in June, 1973,

during the trial of an action brought to en-

join the fiscal year 1974 taxes and entitled

Green v. District of Columbia. Accordingly,

the Superior Court of the District of Colum-

bia enjoined the levy and collection of

these taxes for fiscal year 1974 as unconsti-

tutional as denying equal protection as read

into the Fifth Amendment. The District of

Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed. Dis-

trict of Columbia v. Green, 310 A.2d 348

(1973). (App. p. A-74.)

The instant case (Keyes) was thereupon

filed as a class action to recover the un-

constitutional tax levied and paid by the

34,000 homeowners for fiscal year 1973, at

a time prior to the revelation of the deceit

of the District officials. The trial court

ordered a refund of the unconstitutional

tax collected. (App. pp. A-69/73.) The

trial court ignored the defense of the Dis-

trict that taxpayers had failed to take

timely administrative appeals, and directed

refund of the unconstitutional taxes.

On appeal, the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals acknowledged the taxes to

have been unconstitutionally levied and

collected, but nevertheless reversed.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari was

taken to this Court in the October Term,

-9-

1976 and the Writ was denied April 18, 1977.

The mandate of the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals issued on April 26, 1977.

Following the denial of the Writ of

Certiorari by this Court and following the

issuance of mandate by the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals a most bizarre

set of circumstances came to light on June

13, 1977 that raised the Constitutional

issue that brings petitioners back to this

Court with a second petition for Writ of

Certiorari.

District of Columbia v. Burlington,

375 A.2da 1052 (hereinafter referred to as

"Burlington II") (Appendix, infra, p. A-

147) was decided June 13, 1977. In that

opinion, the Court, en banc, said:

On April 23, 1976, we grant-

ed appellee's petition for hear-

ing en banc and vacated the January

29 (1976) decision. [at p. 1053]

(The January 29, 1976 decision of Dis-

-10-

trict of Columbia v. Burlington, unreported

Slip opinion D.C. App. 1976, is hereinafter

referred to as "Burlington I".) (Appendix,

infra, p. A-90.)

The Keyes case was argued in the Court

of Appeals on December 5, 1974. Following

briefing and argument, the three judge panel,

On February 27, 1976, issued an Order (Appen-

dix, infra, p. A-145) asking the parties to

submit memoranda addressing the following

extraneous question not covered in the briefs

of either party:

Bearing in mind (a) that this

court’ in District of Columbia v.

Green (310 A.2d 848 (1973)) speci-

fFically approved the trial court's

finding that an injunctive remedy

was available in that case due to

the "exceptional and extraordinary"

circumstances there presented. (at

853) and (b) that this court re-

cently reiterated that proposition

in District of Columbia v. Burlina-

ton Apartment House Company =fn The

Burlington Hotel, D.C.App. A.

No. 6, January 29, 1976) [Bur=

lington I] at pages 4-5 of the slip

opinion, are the appellees in this

case barred from the relief sought

“hens

-ll-

by reason of their failure to pur-

Sue their statutory remedies in

Se Se inate ae

ere in addressing them-

selves to the question, the parties

should discuss rict of Columbia

v. Berente 15 .S. : ,

F.2d se 71972) . (Emphasis supplied.)

Comments on this question of the neces-

sity of an appeal to the Board of Equaliza-

tion and Review in tax refund cases were filed

by counsel for the District of Columbia on

March 15, 1976 and by counsel for the Keyes

taxpayers on March 24, 1976.

One month after the March 24, 1976 fil-

ing by the Keyes taxpayers, the Court of Ap-

peals vacated Burlington I on April 23, 1976,

telling the District of Columbia but not the

Keyes taxpayers. Keyes was decided four

months later on July 23, 1976.

It is undisputed that taxpayers, peti-

tioners here, were never notified and never

knew that Burlington I had been vacated on

April 23, 1976 until June 13, 1977, but that

the District of Columbia, et al., respondents

v

'

-12-

here, were notified and did know of that

vacation.

Upon learning that the above had occur-

red, petitioners immediately filed a motion,

with the District of Columbia Court of Ap-

peals to withdraw its mandate and to grant

a hearing en banc, (Appendix, infra, p.

A-164) which was denied by the Court of

Appeals en banc on September 13, 1977.

(Appendix, infra, p. A-194.),

On September 22, 1977 petitioners

moved the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals to withdraw the mandate of April

26, 1977 on the procedural grounds that

relief would be denied with the ending o1

the 1977 term of the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals on December 31, 1977 if

petitioners ultimately prevail on the

merits.

The Court of Appeals denied this mo-

tion October 11, 1977, after which peti-

-13-

tioners moved this Court on October 27,

1977 for leave to file Petition for Writ

of Mandamus to require recall of the man-

date before December 31, 1977 so that re-

lief might not be denied if petitioners

ultimately prevail on the merits. At the

time of filing of this petition for Writ

of Certiorari, the October 27, 1977 motion

for leave to file Petition for Writ of

Mandamus is pending.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case arises in a narrowly defined

area of concern which affects the fairness

of hearings in the 50 highest state Appel-

late Courts and the Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia. cf. Key v.

Doyle, 46 U.S.L.Week 4009 (U.S. November

14, 1977).

The District of Columbia Court of Ap-

peals, in this case, acted to deny peti-

tioners a "hearing". The denial of that

-14-

"hearing" prevented petitioners from ever

having a hearing on the merits on their

claim to have been unconstitutionally de-

prived of their property.

The petitioners were denied a "hearing"

because the District cf Columbia Court of

Appeals held an "ex parte" proceeding from

which petitioners were excluded.

The "ex parte" proceeding took place in

the following way (more fully described at

Appendix, infra, p. A-166 to A-169 and A-177

to A-179 and the Statement of the Case,

supra). Following argument on the merits

of Keyes before the panel that heard the

case, the panel on February 27, 1976 addres-

sed the parties, in such a way as to re-

quire the parties to respond, assuming that

Burlington I (Appendix, infra, p. A-90) was

"the law cf the District of Columbia". On

April 23, 1976 (one month after the parties

responded) Burlington I was vacated. Respon-

ee —

-15-

dents were informed of this, but petitioners

were not. Keyes was decided four months later

on July 23, 1976 on the Burlington I principle

of failure to pursue statutory remedies.

Holding an "ex parte" hearing or pro-

ceeding in a highest state court or in the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals is a

violation of "due process" of either the

Fourteenth or the Fifth Amendments respec-

tively because no fair hearing has been held.

This Court has a well-defined "thres-

hold" test for the failure to give a "fair

hearing" in the highest appellate court.

Cases along that threshold where the highest

state appellate court has failed to give a

“fair hearing" on the merits are, for example:

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) and

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971)

("novel procedural requirements" to thwart

hearing); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,

Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (arbitrary appli-

-16-

cation of rule to prevent hearing); Barr v.

City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964), (in-

consistent application of rule to prevent

hearing); Wright v. State of Georgia, 373

U.S. 284 (1963) and Staub v. City of Bax-

ley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958), (arbitrary appli-

cation of rule to prevent hearing).

Compare NAACP v. Alabama, et seg. with

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v.

Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).

The facts in Keyes clearly fall well

within the "threshold". An "ex parte" pro-

ceeding took place. Therefore, there was

no "fair hearing” on petitioners' constitu-

tional claims.

The Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments re-

quire that the proceedings before the appel-

late court once instituted be fair and even

handed. This court, from NAACP, supra, to

Mayer, supra, has set as the minimum standard

-17-

for the final state appellate proceeding

that there be a “fair hearing".

As the result of the denial of a

hearing, the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals never heard petitioners' constitu-

tional claim on the merits. That constitu-

tional claim was to enforce petitioners'

federal right under the constitution to re-

cover property. That property was taken

under an admittedly unconstitutional and

discriminatory tax. Green, supra. cf.

Brinkerhoff, supra.

Burlington II (Appendix, infra, p.

A-147), which was later decided, reversed

Burlington I. Burlington II would have

permitted recovery of the unconstitutional

and discriminatory tax.

The "ex parte” proceeding denied peti-

tioners the right ever to argue their claim

of an unconstitutional exaction.

-18-

Moreover, the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals has no published rule with

respect to when or how or to whom it

announces the vacation of opinions. In

this instance, the court must be said to have

operated with either a "novel rule”, the

arbitrary application of a non-rule, or the

arbitrary action of the court where there was

no rule at all. The effect, in any event, was

to create an "ex parte" proceeding and deny

petitioners a "hearing". Mayer v. City of

Chicago, supra; Sullivan v. Little Hunting

Park, Inc., supra; Barr v. City of Columbia,

Supra; Wright v. State of Georgia, supra;

NAACP v. Alabama, supra; Staub v. City of

Baxley, supra.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of review by this Court,

the istrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

will have successfully denrived Petitioners

-19-

of due process of law.

Petitioners respectfully urge that the

writ of certiorari issue and that after hear-

ing this Court remand to the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals for a hearing on

the unheard constitutional issue before

either the full bench of that Court or a

different panel of that Court.

Respectfully submitted.

.

Gilbert Hahn, Jr., Esq.

Wolf, Block, Schorr and

Solis-Cohen

llth Floor

1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

Attorneys for Petitioners

APPENDIX

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 8790

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a Municipal Corporation,

and

WALTER E. WASHINGTON, and KENNETH BACK,

APPELLANTS,

Vv.

ARTHUR H. KEYES, JR., and LUCILLE KFYEs,

On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,

APPELLEES.

Appeal from the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia

(Argued December 5, 1974 * Decided July 23, 1976)

Louis P, Robbins, Principal Assistant Corporation

Counsel, with whom C. Francis Murphy, Corporation

Counsel at the time the brief was filed, Henry E. Wixon

and Richard L. Aguglia, Assistant Corporation Cownsel,

were on the brief, for appellants.

Gilbert Hahn, Jr., with whom Jack C. Sando was on

the brief, for appellees.

Before KELLY and GALLAGHER, Associate Judges, and

Pair, Associate Judge, Retired.

* At the court’s request, supplemental! post-argument mem-

oranda were submitted by the parties in March 1976.

A=2

GALLAGHER, Associate Judge: This is an appeal

from the Tax Division of the Superior Court of the Dis-

trict of Columbia. The appellees, Arthur H. Keyes, Jr.

and Lucille Keyes, filed suit, on behalf of themselves and

others similarly situated, against the District of Colum-

bia, Mayor Walter E. Washington, and the Director of

the Department of Finance and Revenue, Kenneth Back,

appellants, for partial refunds of taxes paid in fiscal year

1973 on all single-family residential properties in the

District of Columbia which were assessed at 60% of

estimated market value. The tria! court held that the

appellees are entitled to the relief sought. We reverse.

During calendar year 1971, the level of assessment '

on approximately one-third of the single-family residen-

tial properties * in the District of Columbia was raised

from 55% to 60% of estimated market value for fiscal

year 1973.° This change in the level of assessment was

part of a plan by the Department of Finance and Reve-

nue of the District of Columbia to achieve a phased in-

crease in the debasement factor (level of assessement)

for all single-family residential properties in the District

‘ The level of assessment is also known as the “debasement

factor” or “multiplier.” This element in the tax computation

is the percentage of estimated market value upon which the

tax is levied. The assessed value or assessment for an individ-

ual piece of real property is obtained by multiplying the esti-

mated market value of the property by the level of assess-

ment, Thus, a dwelling valued at $100,000 is assessed at

$55,000 if a 55° debasement factor is applied and at $60,000

if a 60% debasement factor is applied.

? It is estimated that this suit involves approximately 34,000

properties.

: joer yg 4 of oe property are made an a calendar

year basis for the subsequent fiscal year. Fiscal year 1973

from July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1973. 4 on

A=3

of Columbia. Appellants seek to have their refunds meas-

ured by the difference between their actual tax bills

which they paid for fiscal year 1973 (for which a 60%

debasement factor was applied) and the lower tax bills

which they would have received if a 55% debasement

factor had been applied, plus 6% interest per annum.

In May 1973, an earlier class action was brought by

several single-family residential property taxpayers to

enjoin the District of Columbia from using unequal levels

of assessment in taxing single-family residential proper-

ties for fiscal year 1974. This court, in District of Co-

lumbia v. Green, D.C.App., 310 A.2d 848 (1973) (here-

inafter Green), affirmed the trial court and hela that

the District of Columbia’s “stairstep” approach to achieve

an increased debasement factor for all single-family resi-

dential properties was unconstitutional as it resulted in

different debasement factors being applied to the same

class of property in the same year.‘ Injunctive relief

was granted for fiscal year 1974, and the “stairstep”

plan was prohibited.

The present suit was brought as an uncertified * class

action to recover that portion of fiscal year 1973 residen-

‘ District of Columbia v. Green, supra at 855. Yet not all

inequalities in the assessment of property taxes are necessarily

unconstitutional. To illustrate, it has occurred frequently that

taxpayers pay different tax bills on property of identical

values due to the inability of the assessors to value all prop-

erty every year. This particular type of lack of equalization

between taxpayers has been held “permissible because caused

by logistical problems which may be temporarily beyond the

power of the city to correct.” District of Columbia v. Green,

supra at 856. We there concluded, in effect, that this logistical

factor was not reasonably established.

* The trial judge held that certification as a class action

and notice to members of the class were unnecessary because

A-4

tial property taxes paid which was attributable to the

increase of 5% in the level of assessment.’ The District

of Columbia appeals the decision of the trial court grant-

ing refunds to the taxpayers on the grounds that (1)

under traditional principles of equity and tax reform

litigation only prospective relief should have been granted;

(2) refunds should not have been granted without proof

that appellees bore a substantially disproportionate share

of the real property tax burden; (3) the trial judge

erred in not permitting the District of Columbia to prove

that appellees did not bear a substantially dispropor-

tionate share of the real property tax burden; and (4)

the trial court erred in permitting appellees to proceed

as a class for refunds without certification and individual

notice. We hold that appellees are not entitled to refunds

either under the statutes of this jurisdiction or by virtue

of equitable principles.

The trial court held, insofar as pertinent here, (1)

that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel the legal

and factual issues as they relate to the conduct of appel-

lants are controlled by the result in Green, and (2) that

the rules applicable to the Tax Division omitted any mention

of class action procedures. We note that effective September

8, 1975, Super. Ct. Civ. R. 28, 23-I and 23-II were incor-

porated by reference into the Tax Division rules, and pur-

ported class action tax suits are now subject to the same

criteria with respect to prerequisites, maintainability, and

notice as other civil suits. See Super. Ct. Tax R. 3.

* Notices of tax assessments for fiscal year 1973 were sent

out during the period from November 1, 1971 to March 1,

1972. April 2, 1972 was the last day to appeal to the Board

of Equalization and Review for any tax assessment for fiscal

year 1973. In September 1972 the first installment on prop-

erty taxes for fiscal year 1973 was due, with the second and

final installment due during the month of March 1973.

A-5

under principles of equity it would be inappropriate to

deny refunds in this case. We believe that, even if the

first holding were assumed to be correct, the second is

not.

Preliminarily, we observe that this suit was brought

in equity and was decided solely on equitable grounds. No

statutory remedy was sought or granted and one of the

premises of appellees’ approach to this litigation is that

their potential legal remedies, if any, were inadequate.

The rationale of the trial court is essentially that because

appellees were held to be entitled to injunctive relief in

Green, they are ipso facto entitled to tax refunds in this

case.

Recovery of taxes illegally or erroneously assessed and

voluntarily paid was not permitted at commen law and

is a matter within the purview of the legislative branch.

Therefore, refunds of taxes so assessed and paid will not

be made absent an authorizing statute. District of

Columbia v. McFall, 88 U.S.App. D.C. 217, 188 F.2d 991

(1951); Lindner v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App.,

82 A.2d 540 (1943)." Under the statutory procedure

’ See also, e.g., Snyderman v. Isaacs, 31 Ill. 2d 192, 201

N.E.2d 106 (1964); People ex rel. City of Highland Park v.

McKibbin, 380 Ill. 447, 44 N.E.2d 449 (1942), cert. denied,

318 U.S. 778 (1943); People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer, 371

Ill. 367, 21 N.E.2d 318, appeal dismissed sub nom., Illinois

ex rel, Eitel v. Toman, 308 U.S. 505 (1939); Drummond v.

Maine Employment Security Comm'n, 157 Me. 404, 173 A.2d

353 (1961); Baltimore County v. Churchill, Ltd., 271 Md. 1,

313 A.2d 829, appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902 (1974) ; Comp-

troller of the Treasury v. Campanella, 265 Md. 478, 290 A.2d

475 (1972); Wasena Housing Corp. v. Levay, 188 Md. 383,

52 A2d 908 (1947); Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. v.

Board of Finance and Revenue, 409 Pa. 180, 185 A.2d 542

(1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 958 (1963) ; Calvert Distillers

Corp. v. Board of Finance and Revenue, 376 Pa. 476, 103

A.2d 668 (1954).

A-6

applicable to this case, the recovery of refunds through

appeal to the Superior Court requires, as a first step, a

complaint to the Board of Equalization and Review.’

Subject matter jurisdiction of the Superior Court does

not attach until that prerequisite has been satisfied,’ and

a refund based on a final determination of the Superior

Court presupposes that the taxpayer has complied with

the procedure mandated by the legislature. If “ag-

grieved” for any reason, the taxpayer must appeal

within the permitted time to the Board of Equalization

and Review. D.C. Code 1973, § 47-709. This was not

done in this case. The taxpayers failed to follow their

administrative remedies for fiscal year 1973.

* D.C, Code 1973, § 47-709 reads in pertinent part:

Any person aggrieved by any assessment, equalization

or valuation made may within six months after October

1 of the year in which such assessment, equalization, or

valuation is made, appeal from such assessment, equali-

zation, or valuation in the same manner and to the same

extent as provided in sections 47-2403 and 47-2404; Pro-

vided, however, That such person shall have first made

his complaint to the Board of Equalization and Review

respecting such assessment as herein provided... .

This language is also codified in D.C. Code 1973, § 47-2405.

The relevant portions of these code provisions were repealed

effective June 30, 1975, and the above requirement is now

found in D.C, Code 1975 Supp., § 47-646 (i).

D.C, Code 1973, § 47-2407 reads:

Any sum finally determined by the Superior Court to

have been erroneously paid by or collected from the tax-

payer shall be refunded by the District to the taxpayer

from its annual appropriation for refunding erro

neousl

paid taxes in said District. . :

* Payment in full of the tax due is also jurisdictional, See,

e.g., George Hyman Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia,

D.C.App., 315 A.2d 175 (1974); District of Columbia v.

Berenter, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 466 F.2d 367 (1972).

A-7

Appellees contend that the administrative remedies

could not have been pursued by any of the taxpayers for

fiscal year 1973 because of prior concealment of the

“stair-step” plan by District officials. In Green, how-

ever, we noted that three petitioners “ascertained the

existence of, and raised as an issue, the increased level

of assessment of their properties” before the Board of

Equalization and Review for fiscal year 1974. District

of Columbia v. Green, supra at 851. These taxpayers not

only pursued their administrative remedies but in the

process also discovered the now prohibited practice of

applying ditferent debasement factors to similarly situ-

ated taxpayers. Consequently, we cannot assume, as the

trial court did in the case now before us, that a timely

administrative challenge to the 1973 taxes for the pur-

pose of obtaining refunds was unavailable or would have

been fruitless. The 1973 taxpayers were just as aware

as the 1974 taxpayers that their tax bills had been

increased.

In Green, we agreed with the trial court that the cir-

cumstances there were extraordinary and, further, that

it would be inequitable to allow those who had bypassed

the Board to proceed immediately with the action for

injunction while requiring those who had gone to the

Board to wait until tne expiration of the statutory period

before proceeding. Our conclusion was: “The evidence

of record supports the findings of the trial court and, as

a consequence, it was not error to entertain the [com-

plaint] for injunction.” District of Columbia v. Green,

supra at 853. Thus, we specifically limited our analysis

to the context of the relief sought.*° That is to say, we

1° Tumulty v. District of Columbia, 69 U.S.App.D.C. 390,

102 F.2d 254 (1989) was cited in Green for the proposition

that when an assessment is void, resort to equity may be had

A-3

held only that the circumstances before the court were

so extraordinary as to warrant a prohibitive writ re-

straining the practice for fiscal year 1974 and subsequent

years. Appellees argue that we should extend this hold-

ing to the instant refund case for the prior fiscal year of

1973. We disagree and hold that equitable intervention

is not justified in this case."

Moreover, even assuming it were appropriate to apply

the principles of equity to the facts before us, we do not

without following statutory remedies. District of Columbia

v. Green, supra at 853. Tumulty, however, involved the ques-

tion of whether an invalid District of Columbia tax claim.

filed in a receivership proceeding, could be attacked in that

proceeding by parties with other claims against the company

in receivership. The United States Court of Appeals held

that equity would permit such a collateral attack on the tax

claim. Hence, the relief sought and granted in Tumulty was

preventive in nature (because it precluded assertion of the

invalid tax claim) and therefore analogous to the injunctive

relief sought and granted in Green, but not applicable to the

refunds sought here.

‘* We note that the fiscal year 1974 taxpayers who resorted

to the Board of Equalization and Review and raised the issue

of unequal debasement factors found the Board unresponsive

to their arguments. Hence, in Green, where only injunctive

relief was sought, we stated that a taxpayer in that case had

“no meaningful ability to challenge his assessment at al!”

because the Board declined to inquire into the non-judg-

mental aspects of the assessment process. District of Colum-

bia v. Green, supra at 856. This was one of the extraordinary

circumstances upon which the grant of injunctive relief in

Green was based. However, the fact that an administrative

body may wrongly perceive the nature or scope of its powers

or responsibilities in a given instance is not a justification for

bypassing that body in all instances when it is an essential

element in a procedure of purely statutory origin. In fact, it

would be a rare instance when taxpayers would not bypass

the Board at great peril.

nn hn nilalall

- ee ES ee Rm.

A-9

ieve that appellees would be entitled to refunds. Re-

pial of pp context involved, the distinguish-

ing feature of equity jurisdiction is “.. . the power of

the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to

the necessities of the particular case.” Hecht Co. v.

Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). Thus, it is charac-

teristic of a court of equity that it must take a compre-

hensive view of the issues before it; and as a result its

extraordinary remedies are to be meted out with care.

Where the public interest is involved,

ourts of ity may, and frequently do, go

— Section hath to give and withhold relief

in furtherance of the public interest than they

are accustomed to go when only private inter-

ests are involved. Pennsylvania v. Williams,

294 U.S. 176, 185; Central Kentucky Gas Co. v.

Railroad Commission, 290 U.S. 264, 270-273;

Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Co., 289

U.S. 334, 338; Beasley v. Texas & Pacific Ry.

Co., 191 U.S. 492, 497; Joy v. St. Louis, [138

U.S. 1,] 47; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Marshall,

136 U.S. 398, 405-406; Conger v. New York,

W. S. & B. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 29, 32, 33; 23

N. E. 983. [Virginian Ry. v. System Federation

40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937) (emphasis added).

See also United States v. First National City

Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965) and cases cited

therein at 383.]

is principle was applied in Blair v. Freeman, 125

Us sede. "007, 370 F.2d 229 (1966) which involved

a marketing regulation of the Secretary of Agriculture

who authorized premium payments to dairy farmers in

certain locations. The payments were made from a

settlement fund or equalization pool intended to appor-

tion among producers the benefits and burdens of varia-

A-10

tions in the fluid milk market. One side effect of the

Secretary’s order was to reduce statutorily mandated

uniferm minimum prices received by other farmers not

in the specified geographical areas; and this adversely

affected group sought a declaratory judgment and an

injunction restraining enforcement of the regulation.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and the United

States Court of Appeals reversed and granted declara-

tory and injunctive relief but excluded the possibility of

refunds * for the following reason:

Appellants have invoked the aid of equity in

seeking a declaration of their rights and the

prevention of further interference with them.

We are concerned lest a declaration of invalidity

in the context of such an action be deemed to

require refund of moneys illegally paid and re-

ceived under an invalid order. A court of

equity may tailor its relief with a critical and

balanced view of the ramifications of its deci-

sion, including in the overall public interest a

consideration of the interests of those not before

the court. (125 U.S.App.D.C. at 217, 370 F.2d

at 239 (footnote omitted) .}

In treating the refund issue, the court considered a

variety of factors including the complexity of the re-

coupment and refund process, the large sums of money

and large number of farmers involved, the long delay in

filing suit, the difficulty in determining if the plaintiffs

* The court recognized that litigation as to refunds was

imminent because the appellants’ interest in the settlement

fund was sufficient to confer standing for such a suit and

because the appellants had sought an order requiring an es-

crow pendente lite. 125 U.S.App.D.C. at 217 n.39, 370 F.2d

at 239 n.39.

A-1l1

had received offsetting advantages from other aspects of

the equalization system, and the fact that the court was

convinced that under all of the circumstances “the pro-

ducers benefited are ~ot necessarily to be held to ac-

count for an ultra vires action taken by the Secretary

in what he conceived to be the public interest.” 125

U.S.App.D.C. at 217, 370 F.2d at 239 (footnote omitted).

We do not mean to say that these considerations are

dispositive of the issue before us, or even that all are

relevant to the case at hand. Rather, we recite them

because they demonstrate the mode of analysis which

should be applied by a court of equity in cases such

as this.

Prospective application of judicial decisions is a prac-

tice often followed, particularly where retrospective

operation of a decision would create economic hardship

which would outweigh the beneficial effect of retro-

activity.**

In Southern Pacific Co. v. Cochise County, 95 Ariz.

395, 377 P.2d 770 (1963) (en banc) it was held that

while real property taxes based on discriminatory assess-

ments had been illegally collected from a taxpayer rail-

road, only prospective injunctive relief would be

granted * because “(t]he refund which appellant seeks

1 This doctrine is sometimes applied when a decision over-

rules prior law or regulation. See, ¢.g., Safarik v. Udall, 113

U.S.App.D.C. 68, 304 F.2d 944, cert. denied, 371 US. 901

(1962) ; Arizona State Taz Comm'n v. Ensign, 75 Ariz. 376,

257 P.2d 392 (1953); State v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384

P.2d 833 (1963).

¢ Unlike the situation here, the practices complained of in

Southern Pacific, supra, had existed openly for many years

ith perfunctory protests from the affected taxpayer.

We ~~ believe, however, that the factual difference is a

A-12

together with other similar claims threatens the financial

solvency of many taxing units of the state... .”** 95

Ariz. at ——, 377 P.2d at 778. Significantly, the court

so held despite the fact that the taxpayer relied upon a

statutory provision which allowed for refund of illegally

collected taxes. On this point, the court said:

The State’s grace does not extend to its own

destruction. Clearly this was not within the

contemplation of the legislature in the enact-

ment of the refunding statute. [95 Ariz. at

——, 377 P.2d at 778. ]

In their presentations both here and in the trial court,

appellees have stressed that the District’s treatment of

this matter, although perhaps well intentioned, was not

characterized either by candor or adherence to principles

of good fiscal management, but this does not justify the

granting of refunds. However erroneous such practices

have been found to be, they cannot, consistently with the

objects of equity jurisprudence, be viewed in isolation

significant one. Although the Arizona Supreme Court was

critical of the inaction on the part of the railroad in the face

of long-standing discriminatory assessment, the refunds sought

were for only one-half of one fiscal year (rather than for the

entire period of discrimination) and the decision not to grant

refunds was based on that demand, which “together with

= similar claims” posed a threat to governmental sta-

ility.

** Although refunds were not at issue, much the same con-

siderations were taken into account by the three-judge dis-

trict court in Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615 (M.D.

Ala. 1971). In that case, Alabama's ad valorem property tax

program was held discriminatory and unconstitutional but

expressing concern about the fiscal impact of its decision, the

court allowed the Commissioner of Revenue up to one year

a the date of its opinion to equalize assessments. Jd. at

D-13

or without regard to the practical consequences which

the requested retrospective relief would have. This court

is confronted with the task of attempting to reconcile

competing claims to equity, these being the financial in-

terest of the assumedly wronged appellees on the one

hand, and the financial interest of the District of Colum-

bia as it relates to all of the people whom it serves, on

the other hand."

Appellees represent to this court that an average of

$41 per taxpayer is at stake here and that the aggregate

refunds sought in this particular litigation would amount

to from $1.1 million to $1.6 million.’ Appellees state

that the total refund amount would be insignificant in

light of the District’s budget of approximately $1 billion,

and that the District has recently foregone greater sums

by voluntarily reducing the debasement factor applied to

commercial property from 65% to 55%.

We do not agree. The sums at issue here are not in-

significant by any realistic standard, whether absolute

or relative; and this decision may be considered to have

precedential effect in future class action iax refund cases.

The funds collected for fiscal year 1973 have already

been disbursed for governmental purposes which have

benefited all of the citizens of the District of Columbia

and the refunds sought here would have to be financed

‘* Another implication of appellees’ arguments has been

that they seek by means of this suit to serve a general in-

terest in good government by encouraging fairness and open-

ness on the part of officials of the District. We believe, how-

ever, that this interest has been vindicated by the result in

Green.

** Appellees’ estimates below were an average refund of

approximately $50 per taxpayer, with some as little as $10 or

less and a total of $1.5 to $1.75 million.

A-14

through increased taxes or decreased services. It has

been stated in a somewhat similar situation, that

[aJs government is dependent on taxation for

its maintenance, the local subdivision that levied

the illegal or unconstitutional tax would have

to tax the taxpayers to raise the necessary

money to return to them the illegal or unconsti-

tutional tax collected. In other words, the tax-

payers would have to be paid the illegal tax,

paid by them, out of their own pockets. Such

a ceremony would be idle and vain. [Dupre v.

City of Opelousas, 161 La. 272, ——, 108 So.

479, 481 (1926).]

Thus, not only did the taxpayers not pursue the statu-

tory procedures, but under these particular circumstances

the adverse impact of refunds on the entire citizenry of

the District outweighs the economic interest of the prop-

erty owners who paid the taxes at issue."*

: Appellees in this case have come to the courts seeking

equity but equity has already been done by the first

Green case, supra, where a mandatory injunction was

affirmed despite this jurisdiction’s anti-tax injunction

statute. D.C. Code 1973, § 47-2410. After a balancing

** The second opinion of this court in District of Columbia

v. Green, D.C.App., 348 A.2d 305 (1975) is not to the con-

trary. Our decision there was simply an implementation of

the first Green case (310 A.2d 848 (1973)) and it did not

run to tax refunds for a prior fiscal year.

v4 D.C. Code 1973, § 47-2410: “No suit shall be filed to

enjoin the assessment or collection by the District of Colum-

bia or any of its officers, agents, or employees of any tax.”

Injunctive relief notwithstanding the existence of an anti-

tax injunction statute is not entirely unprecedented, but it

may be granted only in the most exceptional and stringent

circumstances. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974) :

A-15

of all interests in this case, we conclude that the public

interest would be disserved by a grant of the refunds

sought. In Green, we went as far as equity requires us

to go and so we will not go further here.

While application of the principles of equity occasion-

ally may be appropriate in tax litigation (¢.g., Green)

it would hardly aid the financial stability of this city if

this court were to relax the statutory requirements of

our Code as they relate to tax litigation and superimpose

equity jurisprudence on these statutory requirements.

This should be done only in a rare case ‘e.g., Green).

Otherwise. financial instability would be promoted. Tax

statutes are necessarily formalistic and often technical.

It is essential that we adhere to their technicalities, even

if at times a seeming hardship results to the taxpayer.

See, e.g., George Hyman Construction Co. v. District of

Columbia, D.C.App., 315 A.2d 175, 178 (1974). Among

other things, fiseal considerations require that this be

done. Where class action tax refunds for fiscal years in

the past are at issue, the relief sought would not ema-

nate from some inexhaustible treasury. The reality is

that the funds could only be supplied by an additional

tax on innocent taxpayers,” or the reduction of services,

in an already financially beleaguered city. Only in ex-

traordinary circumstances, not here present, should the

equity relief sought be afforded.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is

Reversed with instructions

to dismiss the complaint.

Enochs v. Williams Packing and Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1

(1962).

20 This would include taxpayers in the class here secking

relief.

A-16

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TAX DIVISION

ARTHUR H. KEYES, JR., et al.,

Petitioners :

Vv. NO. 2214

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, :

et al., :

Respondents

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant

to the action denominated as Taxpayers'

Suit for Refund of Tax for Fiscal Year

1973 Illegally Assessed which, in essence,

seeks refunds for approximately 34,000

persons owning single-family residential

property in the District of Columbia (in-

cluding residential garages and vacant

land zoned for single family residential

use).

It is alleged that these 34,000 persons

were taxed, and paid their taxes, for

Fiscal Year 1973 at a level of assessment

A-17

(debasement factor) of 60 percent of esti-

mated market value and that these tax-

payers should be assessed for taxation at

the same level of assessment (debasement

factor) of 55 percent of estimated market

vdlue as were assessed some 62,378 other

owners of single-family residential pro-

perty in the District of Columbia for the

same Fiscal Year 1973.

The Petitioners aver that fixing a level

of assessment for real property is rule-

making within the meaning of the District

of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act

and that failure to give notice to the

District of Columbia single-family resi-

dential property owners that the level

of assessment of their properties was in

the process of change, deprived the tax-

payers of the due process afforded by the

D.C.A.P.A. and invalidated the increased

taxes assessed at 60% of estimated market

A-18

value.

It is also contended that the inten-

tional and arbitrary actions of Respon-

dents in applying unequal levels of

assessment (55% and 60%) to estimated

market value within the same class of

Single-family residential properties is

violative of the Fifth Amendment rights

under the Constitution of the United

States of the Petitioners and others

Similarly situated to them.

As a result of the above, the Peti-

tioners request refunds which are to be

measured by the difference between the

tax bill rendered and voaid for Fiscal

Year 1973 at a level of assessment of

60% of estimated market value and the

tax bill as it should have been assess-

ed for Fiscal Year 1973 at a level of

assessment (debasement factor) of 55% of

estimated market value, volus interest at

6% per annum.

A-19

The Respondents have answered that the

petition fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted and that this

Court is without jurisdiction to hear and

determine this matter; they also deny the

tax bills for Fiscal Year 1973 were in

any way illegally rendered, deny Petition-

ers can maintain this action as a class

action for themselves and all others claim-

ed to be similarly situated and deny they

have violated the D.C.A.P.A. or that the

taxpayers have been deprived of the due

process required by the D.C.A.P.A. They

do:

",..admit that all taxpayers were

not assessed at the same level of

assessment (debasement factor) for

Fiscal Year 1973..."1/

At the same time the taxpayers’ suit

was filed and Respondents answered, the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals had

17 Answer of Respondents, Par. 6.

A-20

yet to hear argument and render decision,

on an expedited basis, in Green, et al

v. District of Columbia, et al., D.C.App.,

319 A.2d 848 (1973). Accordingly, ina

motion to place the instant case upon the

reserve calendar pending the Green deci-

sion, Respondents referred to Petitioners'

contention that the present case involves

the same Respondents and similar Peti-

tioners and a claim of res judicata for

facts and questions of law decided June

29, 1973 in Green, and said that "[w]hen

a decision is rendered by the appellate

court, this case may be governed by that

decision."

Thereafter, Respondents moved to ex-

tend the time in which to file their

response to Petitioners’ Motion to Sub-

mit Case Without Trial until 30 days

after final decision was reached in

Green, supra.

A-21

"...According to Petitioners,

the final decision on that appeal

would be res judicata of the pre-

sent case for both facts and ques-

tions of law. Thus, in accor-

dance with Petitioners' premise,

until that case is finally decided

it would be undesirable for this

Court to require an answer to

Petitioners' Motion..."

After the appellate decision in Green,

although specifically stating they had no

objection to the Green trial record becom-

ing part of this Keyes trial proceedings,

the Respondents formally opposed Petition-

ers' Motion to Submit Case Without Trial

because:

"Respondents herein wish to

proffer to this Court the testi-

mony of witnesses to fully pre-

sent the assessment system used

by the District for purpose of

real property taxation for Fis-

cal Year 1973."2/

"While the District of Columbia

presented explanations in a trial

27 Par. 2 Of Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion

to Submit Case Without Trial.

A-22

before this Court in Clarzell

Green, et al. v. District of

Columbia, et al, D.C. Tax Court

Case 2213, District of Columbia

Court of Appeals 7539, it was

limited in its amplification of

the tax assessment methods be-

cause the hearing was conducted

as an expedited proceeding."3/

Also, Respondents contended that, ab-

sent certain unspecified procedures to

be followed by Petitioners in order that

the matter be handled as a class action,

those procedures entered in a case before

another Judge of this Court could be fol-

lowed in this one.

The Respondents claimed that it did not

admit facts averred by the Petitioners

nor did they stipulate to any facts.

In consideration of the above on Novem-

ber 21, 1973 this Court denied Peti-

tioners' Motion to Submit Case Without

Trial and set the trial date, alterations

of which have resulted for several rea-

sons.

3/ Par.3 of Opposition to Petitioners' Motion to

Submit Case Without Trial.

A-23

Subsequently, for the convenience of

the litigations and also in light of the

Court's other and continuing judicial

atsanteia it was agreed between

counsel and the Court that there would

first be a determination of the Peti-

tioners' plea of res judicata or colla-

teral estoppel by judgment, and Respon-

dents' Opposition to same, prior to the

commencement of testimony, if any, in

this cause. If the Court agreed with

Petitioners' contentions, a hearing with

accompanying testimony and documentation

would become unnecessary. If the Court

agreed with Respondents' position, the

hearing would be scheduled to completion

with temporary suspension of the Court's

other responsibilities.

Accordingly, Petitioners filed their

47 Felony II assignment through January 1974;

~ Arraignment Court for February 1974;

Misdemeanor Trials for March 1974;

Preliminary Hearings for April 1974.

A-24

Motion for Judgment on the grounds of

collateral estoppel by judgment or res

judicata and Memoranda of Law in support

thereof. The Respondents have filed

their Opposition in the nature of a Mem-

Orandum and oral argument was heard on

the 5th of March 1974.

The Court agrees with the Petitioners,

as expressed in their oral argument, that

the principle of collateral estoppel, not

the principle of res judicata, is appli-

cable here. Lawlor v. National Screen

Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 75 S.Ct. 865,

99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955), relied on by both

parties, well defines the effect of the

doctrine of collateral estoppel.

"The basic distinction,” said

Chief Justice Warren, "between the

doctrines of res judicata and

collateral estoppei, as those

terms are used in this case, has

frequently been emphasized. Thus,

under the doctrine of res judi-

cata, a judgment ‘on the merits'

in a prior suit involving the same

parties or their privies bars a

A-25

second suit based on the same

cause of action. Under the doc-

trine of collateral estoppel, on

the other hand, such a judgment

precludes relitigation of issues

actually litigated and determined

in the prior suit, regardless of

whether it was based on the same

cause of action as the second suit."

See, also, Tutt v. Doby, 459 F.2d 1195

(1972), 148 U.S.App.D.c. 171.

In the classic case of Cromwell v.

County of Sac, >/ illustrating the dis-

tinction between the direct effect of a

judgment as res judicata and its colla-

teral effect, Justice Field stated:

",,..where the second action be-

tween the same parties is upon

a different claim or demand,

the judgment in the prior action

operates as an estoppel only

as to those matters in issue or

points controverted, upon the

determination of which the find-

ing or verdict was rendered,

In all cases, therefore, where

it is sought to apply the estop-

pel of a judgment rendered upon

one cause of action to matters

arising in a suit upon a dif-

ferent cause of action, the in-

5/ 94 U.S. 351, 352-353, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1877).

A-26

quiry must always be as to the

point or question actually liti-

gated and determined in the origi-

nal action, not what might have been

thus litigated and determined. Only

upon such matters is the judgment

conclusive in another action."

The principle of collateral estoppel em-

braces matters both of fact and law, and

it is clear that one must look to the plead-

ings forming the issues and must examine

the record for a determination cf the ques-

tions essential to the decision of the

earlier litigation:

1. Whether the issue sought to be

concluded is the same as that

involved in the prior action?

2. Was the issue litigated in the

prior action?

3. Was the issue judicially deter-

mined in the prior action?

4. Whether the judgment in the prior

action was dependent upon the de-

termination made of the issue?6/

67 Cf. United Shoe MachineryCorp. v. United

States, U.S.451,459, S.Ct. 363, 66 L.Ed.

708 (1922). If the parties could have reasonably

foreseen the conclusive effect of their action,

eminent authority holds the principle of colla-

teral estoppel properly applicable. Moore's Fed.

Prac.Vol.1B,§0.444; Tutt v. Boby, supra, at p.1200.

ow oe ot

2 ee le et 00 elit bs nena aiclliee be chal Ralgpipen tes AB >

ee ee ed

+ ato om

A-27

If the above questions are affirmative-

ly answered, the issue is concluded under

the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Or, to put it another way: the essence

of collateral estoppel by judgment is

that some fact or question in dispute has

been judicially and finally determined by

a court of competent jurisdiction between

the same parties or their privies. If

the second action involved a different

claim, different demand or different

cause, the judgment in the first suit

operates as a collateral estoppel only

as to those matters which were in issue

Or controverted and upon the determina-

tion of which the original judgment

necessarily depended.

As noted, the doctrine of collateral

estoppel is operative where the second

action is between the same persons who

were parties to the first action.

"A judgment for the plaintiff

A-28

in the first action may have

the effect of enabling him to

recover in the second action

without proving the facts con-

stituting his cause of action,

provided that those facts were

litigated and determined in the

prior action; but the defendant

is not precluded from defending

the second action on grounds not

litigated and determined in the

first action."7/

These rules are also applicable

",..to periodic taxes, such as

successive income taxes or pro-

perty taxes. If in an action be-

tween the taxing authority and

the taxpayer an issue of fact is

litigated and determined by a

judgment with reference to the

tax on one year, the determina-

tion is conclusive if the same

issue is raised between the tax-

ing authority and the taxpayer

with reference to the tax of a

subsequent year."8/

The doctrine of estoppel by judgment

has long been applied in the Federal

77 Restatement of Judgments (1942) 68a, at

p. 295.

8/ Restatement of Judgments (1942) §68c, at

p. 299.

PO ee

A-29

Courts in the tax field. The case of

Com'r. v. Sunnen,= (concerning federal

income tax consequences of intra-family

assignments of income) held that a prior

income tax judgment is res judicata only

in

"...a subsequent proceeding in-

volving the same claim and the

same tax year",

and confined the doctrine of collateral

estoppel to

",...-Situations where the matter

raised in the second suit is

identical in all respects with

that decided in the first pro-

ceeding and where the control-

ling facts and applicable legal

rules remain unchanged."10/

With application of the doctrine of res

judicata it has been repeatedly held that

the parties are concluded in a suit for

one year's tax as to the right or question

adjudicated by a former judgment respect-

97 333 U.S. 591, 68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898

71948).

10/ Com'r. v. Sunnen, supra, 333 U.S. 591,

599-600.

A-30

ing the tax of an earlier year. City of

New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U.S.

371, 17 S.Ct. 905, 42 L.Ed. 202:

"It follows, then, that the mere

fact that the demand in this

case is for a tax for one year,

and the demands in the adjudged

cases were for taxes for other

years, does not prevent the

operation of the thing adjudged,

if, in thé prior cases the ques-

tion of exemption was neces-

Sarily presented and determined

upon identically the same facts

upon which the right of exemp-

tion is now claimed." (at p. 398)

Compare, also, among others, Tait v.

Western Maryland Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 620, 53

S.Ct. 706, 77 L.Ed. 1405; Deposit Bank v.

Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 24 S.ct. 154, 48

L.Ed. 276.

By application of collateral estoppel

both the government and the taxpayer are

relieved of "redundant litigation of the

identical question of the statute's appli-

cation to the taxpayer's status. °-~

A Tait v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., supra, at

A-31

Collateral estoppel attempts to pre-

clude the repeated controversy of mat-

ters once judicially determined, aiming

for judicial finality. It is considered

"...a reasonable measure calcu-

lated to save individuals and

courts from the waste and burden

of relitigating old issues."12/

Compare the applicability of collateral

estoppel to criminal proceedings as an

integral part of the protection against

double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments. Once an issue

of ultimate fact has been determined by

valid and final judgment, that issue can-

not again be litigated between the same

parties in any future law suit, Ashe v.

Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25

L.Ed.2a 469; Harris v. Washington, 404

U.S. 55, 92 S.Ct. 183, 30° L.Ed.2d 212

(1971).

127 Tillman v. National City Bank of New York

(Oca 2d, 1941) 118 F.2d 631, 634, cert. den.

(1941), 314 U.S. 650, 62 S.Ct. 96, 86 L.Ed. 521.

A-32

Even when the precise question for de-

termination in a second action (automo-

bile operator-host's negligence versus

his passenger) has not been litigated in

a technical sense, where the factual and

legal issues in che two actions (passen-

ger v. host and motorist; other motorist

v. host) are

",..SO interrelated that the re-

sult in General Sessions [deny-

ing recovery to the host against

the other motorist on the ground

that both parties were negligent]

is properly dispositive of the

subsequent action for contribu-

tions." Beegntheart v. McKay, 420

F.2d 242, 136 U.S.App.D.c. 400

(1969):

",...-The critical question in the

application of collateral estop-

pel is whether the parties have

had a full opportunity to liti-

gate the issue on which they are

estopped...Here, estoppel is in-

voked as against the person who

initiated the action in General

Sessions as plaintiff. There is

every reason to believe he exert-

ed his full energies to obtain

recovery, and sought to avoid any

determination of negligence on

his part..." (fn. 4)

A-33

In its dual function of protecting the

public interest in sound judicial adminis-

tration and protecting litigants against

needless, oft-times oppressive, court

action, collateral estoppel attains the

end result desired: final, but just, de-

termination of every suit.

Respondent's contentions that they now

wish to "fully" present the District's

assessment system, although they "present-

ed explanations" in the Green trial echoes

the refrain sounded by appellant in Tait

v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., supra.

Tait's appellant argued that the Circuit

Court of Appeals:

",..-might well have reached a

different result on the merits,

if the former case had been

more fully and accurately pre-

sented."

The Supreme Court disagreed, holding:

",..the very right now contest-

ed arising out of the same facts

appearing in this record, was

adjudged in the prior proceeding

A-34—

...-The [appellant] may not es-

cape the affect of the earlier

judgment as an estoppel by show-

ing an inadvertent or erroneous

concession as to the material-

ity, bearing or significance of

the facts, provided, as is the

case here, the facts and the

questions presented on those

facts were before the court when

it rendered its judgment..."

It has been held by the Maryland Court

of Appeals that where it was determined

that the taxpayer (a military preparatory

school) was entitled to a tax exemption

for the year 1950 for certain land by rea-

son of its use for educational purposes,

the doctrine of estoppel by judgment was

applicable to a claim for a tax on the

same properties against the same parties

for another tax year (1954). State Tax

Commission for Maryland v. Bullis School,

Inc., 218 Md. 558, 147 A.2d 849 (1959).

In the Bullis case appellee had made a

proper showing to establish a tax exemp-

tion for the year 1950 which necessi-

tated a finding that.the property's use

—

—

ee hte RP me ON MR A Ce Gla os

ee ee ee er ee ee ae

ne REE Ge. wk ere ee wots 6 le 8 ok

ee ee

A-35

was for educational purposes entitling

an exemption under the appropriate Mary-

land statutes. Since the original case

there was

"...no material change in the

law, the parties and the proper-

ty are the same as in the pre-

sent case, and the only testi-

mony taken...showed that the use

of the property for the taxable

year 1954 was the same as in

1950."

Since the Maryland appellate court could

find no questions to be determined in the

second action that were not fully liti-

gated in the original case, it affirmed,

with costs, holding that the doctrine of

estoppel by judgment was properly applied

by the court helow.

Determination in the case of Green, et

al. v. District of Columbia, et al., D.C.

App., 310 A.2d 848 (1973), was made after

numerous pretrial motions and rulings,

substantial discovery (primarily by de-

positicas and computer runs), a full hear-

A-36

ing lasting five days, extending over

approximately 1,000 pages of transcript,

detailed findings of fact and conclu-

sions of law rendered in a 60 page

Opinion and order , +2/ and terminating

in a comprehensive 16 page Court of

Appeals oftisusaee,” which, as does the

trial court's Opinion and Order, dis-

cusses at length the history of real pro-

perty tax assessment in the District of

Columbia. Findings and conclusions are

made both in the trial and appellate

courts concerning not only Fiscal Year

1974 (the Green case enjoined Respon-

dents from unsyually assessing a certain

class of taxpayers for Fiscal Year 1974)

but also concerning Fiscal Year 1973.

13/ Wash. L. -, Vol. 101, No. 172, p. 1737;

No. 173, p. 1749; No. 174, p. 1761 (1973).

14/ Green, et al. v. District of Columbia, et

al., D.C.App. 310 A.2d 848 (1973).

ee ee

Pe tae ot &

ey ee ee ee

Pree a tatiana Bn tie eee Neth! AE nih Be ih Silile in Meant ahha: Leta DP Wt nie the. aly OG PAAR Apt L ONS nin, Peat an SS AAO APP 0 Hd Ahm

A-37

The Keyes suit claims refunds for Fiscal

Year 1973 based on precisely the same

substantive issues that confronted the

Green trial court:

1. Whether the level of assessment

used to determine the assessed

value of single-family residen-

tial real properties in the Dis-

trict of Columbia was increased

from 55 percent of estimated

market value to 60 percent of

estimated market value in viola-

tion of the "rule-making" pro-

visions of the District of

Columbia Administrative Proce-

dure act?

2. Whether failure of the taxpay-

ers to timely avail themselves

of, and exhaust, administrative

remedies precludes the [refund]

relief now sought?

3. Whether the relief sought for

petitioners should be granted

for the benefit of all owners

of single-family residential

real property in the District

of Columbia?

4. Whether unequal levels of

assessment (55 to 60 percent of

estimated market value) were

used for single-family residen-

tial properties in the same tax

year in violation of the Fifth

Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States?

ee a

A-38

As they originally did in the Green

case, Respondents contend in the Keyes

case that the petition fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted;

that this Court is without jurisdiction;

that the tax bills rendered for Fiscal

Year 1973 were in no way illegally ren-

dered; that this matter is not maintain-

able as a class action. The Respondents

further deny that they have violated the

District of Columbia Administrative Pro-

cedure Act or that the taxpayers have

been deprived of the due process required

by that Act.

It must be noted that when Respondents'

Answer to Keyes was filed the Green deci-

sion still pended. Subsequently, three

months after the Green decision, Respon-

dents filed their Opposition to Motion

for Judgment on the Grounds of Collateral

Estoppel by Judgment or Res Judicata and

on March 5, 1974 presented oral argument

© ae thei Ay, eh DA 66 ree PED! ate. tine en | Aims &

Pe Py ee ee

A-39

as to this matter. In both their written

and oral argument, after the Green deci-

sion, Respondents concede that a class

action might be appropriate but only if

done in some unspecified manner:

"We have a class action. Fine.

We're not contesting that this

may very properly be. We're

saying if we have a class

action, let's do it properly.

And let's do it, since we're do-

ing it with refunds, let's do

it in a way...that that will

close the question once and for

all." (transcript of proceedings,

Mar. 5, 1974, p. 13,14)

It is difficult, however, to comprehend

Respondent's position, which slips and

slides, dependent on whether it was formu-

lated in pleadings before the Green deci-

sion or in written/oral argument after

the Green decision. To wit:

Respondents are not objecting to Peti-

tioner's attempt to have this case tried

as a class action--

"...{but] failure to have this

case properly certified as a

-4

" , — ; A-41 15/

class action may work to the detri- Even though the Court of Appeals

ment of respondents should they

prevail .." (p. 6, Respondent's

Opposit on to Motion for Judgment

on the srounds of Collateral Es- ; family residential class"

toppel by Judgment or Res Judicata). ;

—

refers over and again to the "single-

(p. 854),

"same class of property (residential

Yet, in the very same paragraph, Respon-

taxpayers),” (p.855), "same class" (p.

dents state that "in no way [do they] waive

855), “one class of real property";

any objections that they may make at such

"single family residential property

ae a ee ee reer ee bo ee!

time as a proper motion to certify this

; , , and other classes of real property";

case as a class action is filed with the

"one class of single-family residen-

court."

els ins ies ed nb en

; eae tial property owners", "single class

In an incredible position, the Respon-

of residential property owners" (p.

dents contend, three months after the

a 857), Respondents are "not certain

appellate decision in Green, that:

that all single family residential

"Respondents note that they

are not certain that all sin-

gle family residential property

represents a class in a refund

suit and suggest that certain

questions such as whether each

Single family residential pro-

perty is in fact solely occu-

pied by the owner, or is rental

property represents a class in a re-

fund suit", and, in effect, would re-

quire some 34,000 separate hearings

to determine answers to the questions

lel lit Nihon AA trae te AAA eal AR es AB AB

property, or, although occupied they pose above.

by the owner has income pro-

ducing units therein, may well | Nowhere now, as to defenses, as to new

have to be addressed by the

Court at such time as a proper

motion is filed." 15/7 Green, et al. v. District of Columbia, et

al., supra.

ee ee

A-42

questions of fact, do Respondents claim

that the merits of the matter would en-

title them to prevail on the fiscal year

assessment and taxes. In effect, all

they say is that new sales assessment

ratio studies concerning Fiscal Year

1973 have been performed since the Green

trial. They say further, through their

attorney, that:

"The District of Columbia has

no intention of attempting...

to have the District rehash the

facts that were proven in the

previous case...the District was

not and did not see fit to put

on testimony in depth and detail

with regard to a claim for re-

fund...[the Green case was an in-

junction suit concerning Fiscal

Year 1974]...finding that this

was an impermissible...level of

assessment, with regard to cer-

tain householders,...this does

not ipso facto give rise to a

refund...there is an entirely

different body of law that is in-

volved..."

And, later, continuing the same argument

in generalities:

"I will state...that under the

facts as already established and

BRR AAAS Bee Cate ee mmm Cath et) be LEO RON

el tly hele a tle le A pallial CaN tas + 6

ak ee ae

ss L6 oe) Set ia Olle .

A-43

under the additional facts that

the District of Columbia wishes

to put before the court with re-

gard to Fiscal Year 1973 that

under the overwhelming majority

law in the United States of

America, the petitioners are

not entitled to a refund of

taxes for Fiscal Year 1973,

whether they be brought in in-

dividual cases or whether they

be brought in the form of a

class action." (transcript of

oral argument, Mar. 5, 1974,

at pp. 21-22)

Let us, therefore, look to see what

Respondents have conceded by virtue of

their prior pleadings or briefs, and

what has been decided by the Court in

Green, et al. v. District of Columbia,

et al., which may permit or preclude

the use of the doctrine of collateral

estoppel.

Respondent's trial brief, filed in

the Green case, on June 23, 1973, is

clear:

"In calendar year 1971, the

level of assessment was raised

from 55% to 60% on approxi-

mately one-third of single

family residentia] properties

A-44

for FY 1973;..." (p. 31)

In the trial court's Opinion and Order

in the Green case it stated as follows:

"In fiscal year 1973 there were

37,290 changes of all kinds in

the assessments in the District

of Columbia of which approxi-

mately 34,193 (99.61%) were at-

tributable to changes in single

family residential property

levels of assessment.

"In fiscal year 1974 there were

45,364 changes of all kinds in

the assessments in the District

of Columbia, of which approxi-

mately 40,056 (88.3%) were at-

tributable to changes in single

family residential property

levels of assessment." (Trial

court's Opinion and Order)

Wash. L. Rep., Vol. 101, No.

173, at p. 1749.

The taxpayer received and paid his tax

bill on real property in the same manner

in Fiscal Year 1973 as he was required to

do for Fiscal Year 1974. (See Opinion

and Order in Green detailing these steps,

Wash. L. Rep., Vol. 101, No. 173, at p.

1749.)

The Court of Appeals expostulated in

tote. ets WU Bee el

PON 6 Ment teh ee dene Dd At Mid ees pe EP DEN | dod me *

Pasa to.

ye ee. ee

A-45

detail the way an individual real pro-

perty owner's tax liability was formu-

lated. Upon receipt of a tax bill there

were appeal procedures for an unhappy

taxpayer, first by complaint to the

Board of Equalization and Review and,

subsequently, by appeal to the Tax Divi-

sion of the Superior Court.

",..in a planned cyclical re-

assessment program, conceived

and orally implemented by the

Director of Finance and Revenue,

the level of assessment for

approximately 33,000 single-

family residential properties

was changed from 55% to 60% for

Fiscal Year 1973, and, in pre-

paring the tax rolls for Fiscal

Year 1974, an additional 44,485

Single-family properties were

debased at 60%..."

The Green case further developed that

the public disclosure of the heretofore

secretive unequal assessment raises came

in June 1973, "far too late to afford the

customary relief to approximately 77,485

Single-family residential real property

taxpayers who are being assessed at 60%

A-46

For example,

"Arthur Keyes, Jr., testified

that he did not know the market

value of his property ($77,600

remained the same when he re-

ceived his notice of increase

of assessment from $42,682 to

$46,560 in calendar year 1971

effective fiscal year 1973).

He was also neither aware nor

advised that the entire in-

crease came about as the re-

sult of a change in the level

of assessment from 55% to 60%."

(Order and Opinion, Wash. L.

Rep., Vol. 101, No. 172, at

p. 1741)

It is now settled that the fixing of a

level of assessment for real property is

rulemaking within the meaning of the Dis-

trict of Columbia Administrative Procedure

Act, and it was undisputed in Green that

no rules governing the method of assess-

ment of real property have been published.

Interpretation or explanation of the

words "full and true value" contained in

§47-713 of the Code was a rule within the

A-47

meaning of the District of Columbia Ad-

ministrative Procedure Act and its formu-

lation was rulemaking. Accordingly, for

a number of years the meaning of "full

and true value" of single-family residen-

tial properties had been 55% of estimated

market value (i.e., 55% debasement factor).

This was an unpublished rule. The Court

of Appeals, in Greefi, has held that a

change in the debasement factor is rule-

making within the meaning of the District

of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act,

which must be published with an opportun-

ity for a public hearing.

The District

",...chose to apply different

debasement factors to the same

class of property in the same

year and, in so doing, denied

the [taxpayers] equal protec-

tion of the laws by discrimi-

nating among residential tax-

payers.”

It is clear that in Keyes, as in Green,

even if the taxpayer had known about the

A-48

disparity of the level of assessment,

he would have had no chance to success-

fully challenge his assessment, since

the increased debasement factor (55% to

60%) was arbitrarily determined and in-

flexible. It was not a subjective art,

such as is appraisal.

"The lack of equalization [be-

tween taxpayers owning identi-

cally valued properties with dif-

ferent assessments] [was] caused

by an intentional and arbitrary

application of two different

debasement factors to identical

properties."

",..evidence before the trial

court demonstrated the assess-

ments in years where the ‘stair

steps’ were being used caused

assessment increase that went

above and beyond the increases

that would have been caused by

property appreciation alone.

This should be no surprise,

for any raise in the debasement

factor must raise the assess-

ment. ...the facts of this case

have highlighted the importance

to the taxpayer of an accurate-

ly stated fair market value; it

is the only element in the tax

formula to which he can meaning-

fully object. If real increases

in his property assessment are

disguised in the form of a

we =

A-49

higher debasement factor, he

is totally remediless within

the normal avenues for seeking

redress."

"...the District cannot now be

heard to say in this appeal

that in attempting to cure the

one allegedly discriminatory

method of assessment between

single-family residential pro-

perty and other classes of other

real property it can in the

process deliberately discrimi-

nate between members within the

one class of single-family resi-

dential property owners..."16/

The Opinion and Order discussed (Wash.

L. Rep., Vol. 101, No. 173, p. 1753) the

above oral directive to change the level

of assessment for single-family residen-

tial real properties from 55% to 60% "for

all those properties reviewed commencing

in calendar year 1971 (for fiscal year

1973) and for calendar year 1972 (for

fiscal year 1974)." (Emphasis supplied.)

It was admitted in Green that the Finance

167 Green, et al. v. District of Columbia, et

al., Supra, at pp. 856, 857.

A-50

Director's "policy goal" of 65% was

never put into written form and when he

ordered the Fiscal Year 1973 level of

assessment (debasement factor) he did not

publish this change or give public notice

or other written notice to the taxpayers.

"As a result of this, and be-

ginning in calendar year 1971

(notices were mailed out to

taxpayers between November l,

1971 and March 1. 1972. but the

assessors' work was accomplish-

ed in calendar year 1971 (for

fiscal year 1973)) the bills

sent out in September 1972 to

approximately 34,000 (or to

1/3 of these taxpayers, Res-

pondents contend) of the 96,378

Single family residential pro-

perties had their level of

assessment changed from 55% to

60% of estimated market value.

"In calendar year 1972, for

fiscal year 1974, approximately

40,000 more (or to approxi-

mately 1/2 of these taxpayers,

Respondents contend) single

family residential properties

had their level of assessment

changed from 55% to 60% of

estimated market value.

"Presently, 18,893 single

family residential properties

remain at the 55% level of

assessment.

A-51 .

"The assessment increases in both

fiscal years 1973 and 1974 for

single family residential proper-

ties were represented to the

public as increases in property

value. But, in fact, the change

of assessment in fiscal year 1973

were due, in over 90% of the

cases, solely to a rise in the

level of assessment. in fiscal

year 1974 about 50% of the rise

was due to increases in property

value and about 50% to rises in

the level of assessment from 55%

to 60%.

"Using data derived during testi-

money and, in particular, from

the Respondents' own figures and

projectionsl7/ the following in-

formation was obtained for fiscal

years 1973 and 1974

"Total increased $203,794,400

assessment single

family residences

fiscal year 1972-1974

"Increased assess- $113,713,800

ment single family

residences fiscal year

1972 - 1974 due to

increase from 55% to

60% in the level of

assessment ("debase-

ment factor")

z7/ ‘Testimony of John E. Rackham, using the

acords of D.C. Department of Finance and

Revenue.

A-52 18/

"Increased assess- $ 96,080,600—

ment single family

residences fiscal year

1972 - 1974 due to

increase in market

value (estimated market

value)

"This exhibit demonstrates that,

as a result of these acts of the

District of Columbia in raising

the level of assessment (debase-

ment factor) for two years for

part of the single family resi-

dential properties from 55% to

60%, the assessment of that class

of property was increased by

$113,713,800 out of a total

assessment increase in the same

two year period of $209,794,400.

The substantial nature of the

effect of this change in the level

of assessment over this two year

period is evident." (Emphasis sup-

plied)

During the trial, in the Green case, the

Respondents admitted that in calendar year

1971 (for Fiscal Year 1973), as well as

for calendar year 1972 (for Fiscal Year

1974) all changes in assessments were com-

puted at a level of assessment at only

60%, except for minor administrative error.

18/ This was Petitioners' Exhibit 43 in the

Green case.

A-53

Accordingly,

"(t]he net result of these in-

tentional acts was that in fis-

cal year 1973 the level of

assessment was raised for

approximately one-third of the

taxpayers of this category--

"class" of 96,378 single

family residential properties

(excluding garages). (see

Wash. L. Rep., Vol. 101, No.

174, p. 1764, for Opinion and

Order)

An assessor-witness testified that "poor"

neighborhoods were assessed in Fiscal Year

1973, and when the estimated market

value was reduced for the Fiscal Year 1973,

then the level of assessment was raised

from 55% to 60%.

It was pointed out in Green, that in

Fiscal Year 1973 whole neighborhoods were

assessed from 55% to 60% level of assess-

ment, even those with less than 20% of

changes in the estimated market value.

Old City and Kalorama were illustrative.

As Assessor Beal testified in the

Green trial: He accomplished assessing

A-54

approximately 2,000 single family resi-

dential properties there for the Fiscal

Year 1973. There were a "lot of de-

creases" [in estimated market value] and

a "majority of increases". Probably

"all" of the 2,000 properties assessed

in Fiscal Year 1973 were chanced; "I do

not think any did not go to 60%. However,

some may have kept the same estimated

market value.” Whether the estimated

market value was reduced or increased

made no difference: the level of assess-

ment would still be 60%. (Wash. L. Rep.,

Vol. 101, No. 174, p. 1765).

Therefore, it was found that those tax-

payers who by-passed the Board of Equali-

zation and Review could not have known

of the changed level of assessment until

June 1973 and were, accordingly, denied

viable access to the statutory adminis-

trative procedure within the permissible

time. In any event, under the extraordi-

A-55

nary circumstances of the case, there

was, in reality, no effective administra-

tive remedy and any appeal thereto would

have been useless. "The evidence of

record supports the finding of the trial

soust.<.°ae

"When the assessment is void,

the taxpayer must resort to

equity for relief, without fol-

lowing statutory remedies...",

citing Tumulty v. District of

Columbia, 69 App.D.C. 390, 399-

400, 102 F.2d 254, 263-64 (1939).

How could the taxpayers in Keyes com-

plain timely to the Board of Equalization

and Review of an increase in their Fiscal

Year 1973 real property tax assessment

(from 55% to 60%) when they were clearly

unaware of any raise in the level of

assessment, and when they were unaware of

two levels of assessment existing for the

same class of single-family residential

properties. Just as in Green, they were

19/ Green, et al. v. District of Columbia, et

al., supra, at p. 853.

A-56

effectively denied an adequate adminis-

trative and legal remedy.

Respondents contend this Court is with-

out jurisdiction to entertain the present

action. The Court completely disagrees

and cites Green for authority. It would

be unbelievable to have jurisdiction to

enjoin an invalid, void, unconstitutional,

arbitrary, invidious tax assessment for

one fiscal year (1974); yet require de-

tailed, duplicative testimony, at sub-

stantial waste of campayer'e’ additional

monies to pay for the presentation of

testimony, covering identical matters,

for Respondents suggested 34,000 indivi-

dual hearings, to consider whether or

not the issues previously presented in

Green for Fiscal Year 1974 are the same

issues germane to a determination of

Keyes for Fiscal Year 1973.

As the trial court said in Green,

"Should the Court adopt Res-

A-57

pondents’ argument it would,

in effect, add yet another di-

mension of inequity to a situa-

tion already surrounded by un-

fairness, secrecy and lack of

candor. It would be tantamount

to telling a taxpayer that he

must pay thousands of dollars

and that he must yield days,

weeks and months of his effort

to develop testimony and docu-

mentation at his individual

high expense to reap, in return,

a few dollars in the majority

of cases (and hundreds or more

of dollars in other cases) just

to have the right to present

constitutional argument and to

exhibit that which is already

before this Court. Would not

this attitude in and of itself

be a coercive device on the

taxpayers to not pursue their

due remedies because of finan-

cial and time inability?”

The Court has gone into great detail

[and has avoided the temptation to cite

substantive and further examples] to

illustrate the multiple reasons the

Court finds that the principle of col-

lateral estoppel is significantly appro-

priate to the Keyes case. Accordingly,

there shall be no testimony taken in the

Keyes tax case.

A-58

Respondents pray the opportunity to

plead the law applicable to refunds in

general and to this case in particular.

Petitioners had earlier requested the

Court fix a time for filing briefs and

for oral argument. Both requests were

made prior to the written and oral argu-

ment concerning the applicability of

collateral estoppel, which necessarily

embraced--at least in part--the law

pertaining to refunds. Nevertheless,

fairness dictates that the parties have

the full opportunity, if they stiil so

desire, to develop in writing their res-

pective positions concerning applicable

law before a final determination of this

case. [There shall be no further oral

argument thereon. ]

Accordingly, if the parties, or any of

them, wish to file written briefs (op-

tional as far as the Court is concerned)

they may do so, as follows:

A-59

Petitioners to file written brief, if

any, on or before May 6, 1974; Respon-

dents to file written brief, if any, on

or before May 16, 1974, following which

the matter shall stand submitted.

/s/ Joyce Hens Green

Joyce Hens Green

Judge

April 25, 1974

Copies to counsel of record.

—— he ele 7.)

A-60

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TAX DIVISION

ARTHUR H. KEYES, JR., et Gh e

Petitioners

Vv. : NO.2214

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

et al.,

Respondents

OPINION AND ORDER

For fullest comprehension and compli-

ance this matter must be considered in

context with the Court's detailed

Opinion and Order of April 25, 19742/

holding the principle of collateral es-

toppel significantly appropriate to the

instant case as a result of Green, et

al. v. District of Columbia, et al.,

D.C. App., 310 A.2d 848 (1973).

Counsel had requested the opportunity

to file written briefs which have since

17 Wash. L. Rep., Vol. 102, No. 99, p.1029,

11974).

A-61 .

been filed and considered.

There are questions of law or fact com-

mon to the members of this class of tax-

payers, including equal protection under

the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States and the statutes of

the District of Columbia, which predomi-

nate over any que~tions affecting only

individual members, and a class action

would be superior to other available

methods for fair and efficient adminis-

tration of the controversy. Members of

the class on behalf of whom petitioners

sue are so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable. The claims

of petitioners are typical of and appli-

cable to the claims of all members of

the class and petitioners have fairly

and adequately represented and protect-

ed the interests of all members of the

class. Prosecution of separate actions

by members of the class would create a

A-62

risk of inconsistency or varying adjudi-

cations with respect to individual members

of the class which would, as a practical

matter, be dispositive of the interests

of the other members of the class not

parties to the adjudications.

Nevertheless, Petitioners action does

not require certification as a class

action and notice to its members. Sepa-

rate rules have been adopted by the Board

of Judges for civil actions and for tax

actions, and the Tax Division has neither

adopted nor incorporated by reference the

Civil Division class action Rule 23 or

any other rule pertaining to class ac-

tions.

The facts in this case, as in Green,

supra, are so exceptional and extraordi-

nary as to merit extraordinary and excep-

tional relief that justice compels under

the inherent and general equity powers

of the Court. Accordingly, this cause is

A-63-

determined as a taxpayers’ suit in equity

in the nature of an uncertified class

action brought on behalf of the indivi-

dual petitioners and all others similar-

ly situatea.*

Petitioners and the approximate 34,000

other similarly situated owners of single

family residential properties in the Dis-

trict of Columbia were taxed, and paid

their taxes, for Fiscal Year 1973 at a

level of assessment (debasement factor)

of 60 percent of estimated market value.

27. Cr vV. Zubrinskie, 101 U.S. 601, 25 L.

Bd. 80). Yokley, Municipal Corporations:

"It is an essential element of a tax-

payer's suit that the suit be brought

in behalf of a plaintiff and other citi-

zens and taxpayers.

"A taxpayer's suit is necessarily a

class action. It must be brought not by

individuals, but by individuals, for

themselves and for all of the citizens

similarly situated." Vol. 4, Sec. 602,

p.36.

A-64

Petitioners seek in the form of refunds

the difference between what was actually

paid by these taxpayers and what should

have been paid had a level of assessment

of 55 percent of estimated market value

been used, plus interest at 6 percent per

annum computed from the date payment was

made until the date of refund.

In applicable substance, Green held

that the increases in property tax assess-

ment from 55 percent to 60 percent of

estimated market value were invalid be-

cause they were based on an arbitrary, in-

tentional, and discriminatory change by

Respondents in the level of assessment

(debasement factor) applied to petition-

ers and some 34,009 other taxpayers for

Fiscal Year 1973 and not applied for the

same Fiscal Year 1973 to approximately

62,378 other owners of single family resi-

dential real property in the District of

Columbia. Green further held that the

A-65

changes were nullified by their creation

in violation and disregard of the Dis-

trict of Columbia Administrative Proce-

dure Act. The taxpayers had ". . .no

meaningful ability to challenge his

assessment at a11"2’ when the District

choose to apply different debasement fac-

tors to the same class of property in

the same year because the taxpayer was

not aware that he was being treated dif-

ferently from his neighbor and that he

was being denied equal protection of the

laws. He was therefore effectively

denied his administrative remedy and his

timely complaint to court.

Put succinctly, as did the Court of

Appeals in Green:

"., . .irrespective of whether the

District may constitutionally dif-

ferentiate in the level of assess-

ment applied to residential real

3/ Green, supra, at p. 856.

a

eV” eee ee ee

a ee ee a ee

A-€5

property as opposed to commercial

real property,. . .it clearly may

not do so within the single class

of residential property owners."

at p.857.

Accordingly, Green ordered the level of

assessment for Fiscal Year 1974 reduced

to 55 percent of estimated market value

(by enjoining any other percentage level

of assessment) until and unless a level

of assessment was established after full

compliance with the District of Columbia

Administrative Procedure Act and further

provided that only equal le: els of

assessment were to be used.

In summary ,-/ the Court finds that the

same factors exist here as in Green: the

taxpayers were deprived of due process

and there has been discrimination among

the citizens of the same class of single

family residential properties. Some

taxpayers have been assessed at 60 per-

47 For fuller expostulation, see the Opinion

_ and Order of April 25, 1974, Wash. L. Rep.,

Vol. 102, No. 93, p. 1029, (1974).

A-67

cent of estimated market value, and paid

their taxes accordingly, while others

in the same class were assessed and paid

their taxes at 55 percent of estimated

market value. This is clearly in vicla-

tion of the due process clause of the

Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States as it applies to the

Petitioners individually and to those

similarly situated. >/

It is frequently stated that a taxpayer

must pay his just share for the just and

orderly functioning of his Government.

It is never proclaimed thet a taxpayer

should pay his unjust, inequitable, dis-

proportionate share. If he does--and

errors can occur--then the (Federal)

Government upon review refunds the ex-

cess, with interest. It is manifest that

the municipal government should do no

less. “Monies illegally exacted from a

57 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

A-68 '

citizen taxpayer by its Government must

be promptly refunded. To hold otherwise

would be unconscionable."

The Court concludes that the Petition-

ers and the approximate 34,000 others

Similarly situated are, upon computation

of the appropriate sums, entitled to

prompt refunds of the amounts overpaid,

with corresponding interest, in considera-

tion of the above invalid assessment and

then collection of taxes not rightfully

due and owing. The Court further con-

cludes that Respondents, by access to the

District of Columbia's data sources, tax

rolls, finance department, and computers,

are in an unique position to exactly as-

certain and yield the information neces-

sary from which the full and fair refund

. can be made.

A decision concerning counsel fees and

costs will be rendered upon the final

determination of the amounts to be refund-

oe A-69

ed to each citizen.

Having determined the issues in this

matter, the Court is withholding entry of

the amount of refunds due to each member

of the class of single family residential

real property owners whose property was

incorrectly and illegally assessed at a

level of assessment (debasement factor)

in excess of 55 percent of estimated mar-

ket value, to allow the parties, pursuant

to Superior Court Tax Rule 15, to submit

computations of the amounts due to each

person pursuant to the findings and con-

clusions entered in this case.

It is therefore, this 6th day of August,

1974:

ORDERED:

(1) the [sic] the Respondents submit

to Petitioners by August 27, 1974 computa-

tions of the amounts due, in accordance

with the findings entered in this case,

to each owner of single family residen-

A-70 .,

tial real property whose property was

assessed in Fiscal Year 1973 at a level

of assessment (debasement factor) in

excess of 55 percent of estimated market

value. These computations shall include

the names and addresses of each person

entitled to a refund, each property for

which a refund is due, the amount of

taxes which were paid, the amount of

taxes which should have been paid, and

the basis on which this calculation was

made (e.g. estimated market value), and

the refund due.

(2) That the Petitioners shall examine

the computations prepared by the Respon-

dents and notify both the Court and Res-

pondents by no later than September 17,

1974 as to whether they are in agreement

with the computations of the Respondent

as to the amounts of refunds due.

(3) That the Respondents shall make

such information available to Petitioners

A-71_

as will enable them to fully and aae-

quately review the computations made by

Respondents;

(4) That if the parties are in agree-

ment as to the amount of the refund due

to be entered as the decision pursuant

to the findings and conclusions made by

the Court, the Respondents shall file,

within three (3) days after being noti-

fied by Petitioners that they are in

agreement, with the Deputy Clerk for the

Tax Division an original and 2 copies

of a computation showing the amount of

the refund due, together with a state-

ment to the effect that there is no dis-

agreement and that the figures shown are

in accordance with the findings and con-

clusions of the Court. A decision will

then be entered accordingly.

(5) That if, however, the parties are

not in agreement as to the amount of the

~~ 9 ———

Se,

ne ee ae ee ee 7

A-72

refund due, they shall notify the Court

of the basis of their disagreement by no

later than September 20, 1974. Pursuant

to the procedure set forth in Superior

Court Tax Rule 15 (b) to be followed in

the absence of agreement, either party

may file with the Deputy Clerx for the

Tax Division a computation of the amounts

of refunds believed by such party to be

in accordance with the findings and con-

clusions of the Court and shall serve a

copy of those computations on the oppos-

ing party. The matter will then be

scheduled by the Court for argument. If

the opposite party fails to file an ob-

jection accompanied by an alternative

computation at least 5 days prior to the

date of such argument or any continuance

thereof, the Court may determine to enter

decision in accordance with the computa-

tion already submitted.

(6) That if computations are submitted

A-73

by the parties which differ as to the

amount to be entered as the decision,

the parties shall be afforded an oppor-

tunity to be heard in argument thereon

on the date fixed, and the Court shall

determine the amount of refund due and

enter its decision accordingly. Pursuant

to Superior Court Tax Rule 15(c), any

argument shall be confined to the con-

sideration of the correct computation of

the amount of refunds due resulting from

the findings and conclusions theretofore

made, and no argument shall be heard upon

or consideration given to any new issues

or to the issues or matters already dis-

posed of by such findings and conclusions.

The hearing shall not be regarded as

affording an opportunity for rehearing or

reconsideration.

ce Hens Green

Judge

/s/ Joyce Hens Green

oy

Copies to Counsel

i il re

=

A-74

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 7539

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A Municipal Corporation,

and

WALTER E. WASHINGTON,

and

KENNETH BACK, APPELLANTS,

Vv.

CLARZELL GREEN, ET AL., APPELLEES.

Appeal from the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia

(Argued September 7, 1973 Decided October 9, 1973)

Louis P, Robbins, Assistant Corporation Counsel, with

whom C. Francis Murphy, Corporation Counsel, and

Henry E. Wixon, Robert E. McCally, Richard W. Barton,

David P. Sutton, Kenneth A. Pels and Richard L. Agu-

glia, Assistant Corporation Counsels, were on the brief,

for appellants.

Gilbert Hahn, Jr., with whom Jack C. Sando was on

the brief, for appellees. Philip W. Amram, Daniel G.

Grove and Steven L. Engelberg also entered appearances

for appellees.

A-75

Before Reilly, Chief Judge, and Kelly and Nebeker,

Associate Judges.

KELLY, Associate Judge: This appeal is from an order

entered in the Superior Court, Tax Division, enjoining

appellants from using, for purposes of taxation of single-

family residential properties within the District of Co-

lumbia, unequal levels of assessment of estimated market

value in determining the assessment, valuation or equali-

zation of such properties, and from assessing such prop-

erties at a level of assessment other than 55% of esti-

mated market value unless and until an equal level of

assessment is established by the District after full com-

pliance with the provisions of the District of Columbia

Administrative Procedure Act (DCAPA).' The issues

outlined by appellants for review are (1) whether the

trial court erred in holding temporarily unequal single-

family property levels of assessment (debasement fac-

tors)? of 55% and 60% to be unconstitutionally discrim-

inatory when such temporary inequality resulted from a

city-wide cyclical reassessment work program designed

to ultimately equalize all single-family property assess-

ments with the multi-family ard commercial properties

debased at 65%; (2) whether the trial court’s holding

compels an unconstitutional discrimination against multi-

family and commercial properties and 20% of the single-

family properties in the District of Columbia; (3) wheth-

er the development of a cyclical assessment program

designed to bring certain properties into compliance with

constitutional and statutory mandates for equalization is

“rulemaking” within the meaning of the DCAPA, and

(4) whether the failure of some appellees to exhaust

‘D.C. Code 1972 Supp., § 1-1501 et seq.

? The terms “level of assessment” and ‘“‘debasement factor”

are used interchangeably throughout this opinion.

—_ - oT. ee ee

ee ae

a

A-76

their administrative remedies and of others to pursue

their statutory legal remedies precluded the trial court

from granting injunctive relief. Appellees are in sub-

stantial agreement with the issues appellants present for

review, demurring only to the suggestion that any ques-

tion of a constitutionally prohibited discrimination

against owners of properties in categories other than

single-family properties is embraced within or even rele-

vant to this appeal.

I

In brief explanation of the essential background to

this appeal, there are three components of the mathe-

matical process used to determine the dollar amount of

tax due the District from an individual owner of real

property each year; namely, the market value of the

property, the debasement factor ‘level of assessment)

to be applied to that value to determine the assessment

(assessed value), and the tax rate. Market value (also

referred to as estimated market value) is the fair mar-

ket value of a particular property as determined from

time to time by District assessors. The debasement fac-

tor is the percentage of market value upon which the tax

will be levied. The tax rate is expressed in terms of dol-

lars per hundred and is currently $3.32 per each $100 of

an individual property’s assessed value.

The assessment for an individual taxpayer is de-

termined by multiplying the market value of the prop-

erty by the debasement factor or level of assessment.’

The tax rate applied to the assessed value of the prop-

erty is set by the City Council after notice published in

the District of Columbia Register and, like the level of

*Example: A house valued at $100,000 with a debase-

ment factor of 60% is assessed at $60,000 and taxed at the

rate of $3.32 per $100 of assessed value—$1,992.00.

A-77

assessment, is fixed. The third component of the above

equation, market value, is a variable with each individual

property having a unique estimated’ value. Upon receipt

of a tax bill, an aggrieved taxpayer may complain of an

alleged unfair assessment to the Board of Equalization

and Review (Board)* and, beyond that, appeal to the

Tax Division of the Superior Court.’

For several years immediately prior to calendar year

1969, if not before, all single-family residential prop-

erties in this city had a debasement factor of 55% and

all multi-family residential, commercial and industrial

real property was assessed at 65% of estimated market

value. Thereafter, in a planned cyclical reassessment

program, conceived and orally implemented by the Di-

rector of Finance and Revenue, the level of assessment

for approximately 33,000 single-family residential prop-

erties was changed from 55% to 609% for fiscal year

1973, and, in preparing the tax rolls for fiscal year 1974,

an additional 44,485 single-family properties were de-

based at 60%." The level of assessment of nearly 19,000

single-family residential properties remained at 55%.

Of the 44,485 taxpayers who at the end of 1972 re-

ceived notices of assessments for fiscal year 1974, only

1,044 appealed, three of whom somehow ascertained the

existence of, and raised as an issue, the increased level

of assessment of their properties. Of the eleven named

petitioners below (appellees), five unsuccessfully com-

plained to the Board of Equalization and Review of

alleged unfair assessments; six did not so complain. This

*D.C. Code 1972 Supp., § 47-709; § 47-2405.

> D.C. Code 1972 Supp., § 11-1202.

* Assessment is done on a calendar year basis for the fol-

lowing fiscal year.

4-78

class action was brought by petitioners on behalf of them-

selves and others so situated to enjoin the respondents

(appellants) from applying the 60% debasement factor

against their properties unless and until the same level

of assessment was applied to all single-family residential

properties within the District after compliance by the

District with the pertinent provisions of the DCAPA.

After a lengthy trial the court granted appellees the

relief sought, accompanying its order with a compre-

hensive and learned memorandum opinion with which

we are in full accord.’

The critical factors upon which we focus in our de-

cision are (1) that the District’s cyclical reassessment

program was undertaken in a manner which resulted in

unequal levels of assessment within a single class of

assessed property, and (2) that no notice was given to

District of Columbia single-family residential property

owners that the level of assessment of their properties

was in the process of change.

II

Relying upon D.C. Code 1967, § 47-709, appeilants

challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court to determine

the claims of the six appellees who failed to complain

of their increased assessments to the Board, alleging a

failure to exhaust their administrative remedies; * assert

*WasuH. L. REP., Vol. 101, No. 172, p. 1737; No. 173, p.

1749; No. 174, p. 1761 (1973).

~ D.C. Code 1972 Supp., § 47-709:

The valuation of the real property made and equalized

as aforesaid shall be completed not later than the first

Monday of May annually. The valuation of said real

property made and equalized as aforesaid shall be ap-

proved by the Commissioners not later than July 1, an-

4-79

that the appellees who did complain to the Board are

barred from suit by language in D.C. Code 1972 Supp.,

$$ 47-2403—2405specifying that the court may not en-

tertain a taxpayer’s petition until after October 1, and

after payment of the tax in full, and claim that the

trial court erred in issuing an injunction in the face of

D.C. Code 1967, § 47-2410 which provides that

No suit shall be filed to enjoin the assessment

or collection by the District of Columbia or any

of its officers, agents, or employees of any tax.

These jurisdictional points are not pressed with vigor

here, each of the parties preferring a decision on the

merits. Consequently, we simply point out that appellants’

latter argument would be readily accepted except that

the trial court found the facts of this case to be so ex-

ceptional and extraordinary as to merit equitable relief

and, as the Court said in Miller v. Standard Nut Marga-

rine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932):

nually, and when approved by the Commissioners shall

constitute the basis of taxation for the next succeeding

year and until another valuation is made according to

law, except as hereinafter provided. Any person ag-

grieved by any assessment, equalization or valuation

made may within six months after October 1 of the year

in which such assessment, equalization, or valuation is

made, appeal from such assessment, equalization, or val-

uation in the same manner and to the same extent as

provided in sections 47-2403 and 47-2404: Provided,

however, That such person shall have first made his com-

plaint to the Board of Equalization and Review respect-

ing such assessment as herein provided, except that, in

case of increase of valuation of real property over that

for the immediately preceding year, where no notice in

writing of such increase of valuation is given the tax-

payer prior to March 1 of the particular year, no such

complaint shall be required for appeal.

oe. “othhe.6 bw +

A-80

‘'W]here complainant shows that in addition to

the illegality of an exaction in the guise of a tax

there exist special and extraordinary circum-

stances sufficient to bring the case within some

acknowledged head of equity jurisprudence, a

suit may be maintained to enjoin the collector.

[Citations omitted. ] °

Additionally, the trial court found that since the six

named petitioners (appellees) who bypassed the Board

could not have known of the changed level of assessment

until it was reluctantly made public in this lawsuit in

June of 1973, they were unable to pursue the ad-

ministrative remedy created by statute prior to cutoff

date of April 1, 1973." It also found, in effect, that

under the extraordinary circumstances of this case, out-

lined at length in its memorandum opinion and not re-

peated here, the petitioners who did not appeal to the

Board were in reality afforded no effective administrative

remedy. Moreover, the court saw no reason to require

the parties who in good faith sought administrative re-

view to wait until October 1 to apply for relief, after

payment of tax, when those bypassing the useless ad-

ministrative procedure were permitted to proceed, stating

that to a@tept such an argument “would, in effect, add

yet another dimension of inequity to a situation already

surrounded by unfairness, secrecy and lack of candor.” "' |

The evidence of record supports the findings of the

» See also Allen v. Regents of University System of Georgie,

304 U.S. 439 (1938).

In its words: “The court is not persuaded by this argu-

ment and cannot believe that Congress intended that the

statute be subverted to include deceit of the populace, by

either unintentional oral and written misinformation (at best)

or by deliberate misstatement (or deliberate omission) of

oral and written information (at worst).” R. at 666.

"= R. at 667.

A-?1

trial court and, as a consequence, it was not error to

entertain the petition for injunction. As the Circuit

Court said in Tumulty v. District of Columbia, 69 App.

D.C. 390, 399-400, 102 F.2d 254, 263-64 (1939):

We think it clear that all administrative rem-

edies in matters of taxation must be exhausted

before resort can be had to court action. Nelson

v. First Nat. Bank, 8 Cir., 42 F.2d 30, but

think it equally clear that when the assessment

is void, the taxpayer may resort to equity for

relief, without following statutory remedies... .

[Emphasis supplied. ]

III

Appellees successfully contended in the trial court that

the fixing of a level of assessment for real property

is rulemaking within the meaning of the District of

Columbia Administrative Procedure Act.’* They con-

ceded there, and concede here, that prior to the effective

date of the DCAPA appellants had a right to make

a rule setting the level of assessment at 55% of market

value for residential property in the District and 65%

of market value for commercial property without notice

to or opportunity by the public to be heard. Conceded

also is appellants’ right at any time to change the level

of assessment of residential property to a higher per-

centage of market value if it is done in compliance with

the pertinent provisions of the DCAPA.

Appellants argue that the Constitution and the per-

1% D.C. Code 1972 Supp., § 1-1507(c). The DCAPA, effective

October 21, 1969, required that all administrative rules then

in effect be published in the District of Columbia Register by

October 21, 1970. It is undisputed that no rules governing

the method of assessment of real property have been published.

Pa 4 |

A-92

tinent statutory provision ‘’ governing assessment of rea!

property compel the same level of assessment be applied

to all real property in the District of Columbia; con-

sequently, any change in the level of assessment for

single-family residential property in the process of ac-

complishing equalization in assessment does not constitute

a rule within the meaning of the DCAPA.

D.C. Code 1972 Supp., § 1-1502(6) and ‘7! defines

the terms “rule” and “rulemaking” as:

(6) the term “rule’’ means the whole or any

part of any Commissioner’s ,Council’s, or agency

statement of general or particular applicability

and future effect designed to implement, in-

terpret, or prescribe law or policy or to de-

scribe the organization, procedure, or practice

requirements of the Commissioner, Council, or

of any agency;

(7) the term “rulemaking’’ means Commis-

sioner’s, Council’s, or agency process for the

formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule:

The trial court found, correctly we think, that the

interpretation or implementation of the words “full and

true value” contained in $ 47-713 of the Code was a rule

within the meaning of § 1-1502(6) and its formulation

was rulemaking within the definition of § 1-1502(7).

The meaning of “full and true value” of single-family

residential properties had for a number of years been

55° of estimated market value. This 55° debasement

factor, albeit unpublished, was, under the Code defini-

** D.C. Code 1967, § 47-713, provides in pertinent part:

All real estate in the District of Columbia subject to

taxation, including improvements thereon, shall be listed

and assessed at not less than the full and true value

thereof in lawful money.

A-83

tion, a rule. Both the tax rate and the debasement factor

are fixed values in the assessment equation. The setting

of the tax rate by the City Council is admittedly a rule

which must be published, with an opportunity for a

public hearing provided for by the DCAPA. Setting or

changing the debasement factor affects the final tax bill

in exactly the same manner as does the setting of the

rate, and to allow the debasement factor to be secretly

established or changed would completely frustrate the

purpose of being able to review the tax rate later when

it is set each year.

Appellants argue that since they are constitutionally

required to achieve equalization of the level of assessment

of all real property, commercial and residential, a change

of the debasement factor is not rulemaking within the

meaning of the DCAPA. Should this constitutional re-

quirement exist, however, it does not compel the con-

clusion that the District may not be required to ac-

complish its goal by constitutionai means or that the

necessary changes of levels of assessment in the process

are not rules and rulemaking as defined in the DCAPA.

This court has held that a Commissioner’s Order di-

recting the Department of Human Resources to set the

level of public assistance payments at 759 of the public

assistance standards to be a rule, stating that “Com-

missioner’s Order No. 70-265, whether we consider it an

implementing directive, as Corporation Counsel char-

acterizes it, or prescribing policy, is a ‘rule’ as defined

by the D.C. APA... .” [Footnote omitted.) Junghans

v. Department of Human Resources, D.C.App., 289 A.2d

17, 23 (1972). A like holding is required here.

IV

Appellants contend that the tax policy of the District

has always been to uniformly apply a 65% debasement

~

pve AAT POT eet, * he hee ae ee ee ee ay ee ee eee ae ee

asa dle of

A-94

factor to all real property in the District of Columbia,

both residential and commercial. This “policy”, however,

has never been articulated to the general public and was

apparently unknown to some assessors. The facts are

that until 1969 the District compiled and used a real

estate assessment manual designed to achieve a debase-

ment of 65% of value, there being no identifiable market

value at that time to debase. Sales ratio studies under-

taken in 1968 revealed, however, that some single-family

residential properties were actually debased as low as

40%, although the desired 65° factor for multi-family

and commercial properties was substantially achieved.

As a result, the District developed a reassessment pro-

gram to equalize single-family residential properties with

other real property at a 65° levél of assessment. In an

effort to accomplish a common debasement factor while

maintaining relative equalization within the single-family

residential class a “stair-step’’ approach was decided upon

as the means to attain the desired result over a period

of time, an approach necessitated both by budgetary and

manpower considerations. The debasement factor of all

single-family residential properties was first raised to

55°, the next planned step being to raise the level of

assessment to 60% and the final goal being to elevate

the debasement factor of all such properties to 65°.

Thus, the level of assessment on over 33,000 single-family

residential properties was raised to 60% in fiscal 1973,

and an additional 44,485, those at issue in this case, had

been entered on the tax rolls for fiscal 1974 at 60.

Approximately 19,000 properties remain debased at 55%-.

The District of Columbia has no rule dividing real

property into various classes for the purpose of taxation.

The only requirement of these ad valorem taxes is that

they be administered in a fashion that results in equali-

4-85

zation of the tax burden on all property owners.‘ The

amount of a property owner’s tax bill must be related as

nearly as possible to the value of his property as com-

pared to the value of the property of others. The ratio

of his property’s value to the total value of property in

the District should parallel the amount of tax he pays

compared to total taxes paid by all property owners.

Equalization depends directly on a fair and critical

assessment of each piece of real property in the District.

As expert witnesses for the District testified, assessment

is an art which requires an experienced eye. It is there-

fore important, if taxes are to be equalized, that indi-

vidual assessments be done thoroughly. Appellants have

stressed that they have been unable, due to fiscal and

manpower shortages, to effectuate an adequate assess-

ment of all property in the District each year, and this

is understandable. Under such circumstances a cyclical

assessment program may be permissible, provided any in-

equalities resulting therefrom are of an accidental and

temporary character. See, e.g., Sunday Lake Iron Co. v.

Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918); Johnson » County of

Ramsey, 290 Minn. 307, 187 N.W.2d 675 (1971); Car-

konen v. Williams, 76 Wash.2d 617, 458 P.2d 280 (1969)

(en banod; Skinner v. New Mexico State Tax Commis-

sion, 66 N.M. 221, 345 P.2d 750 (1959). Indeed, appel-

lees agree that if the District had engaged in a cyclical

program of adjusting the fair market value of properties

in the city one group at a time, this case would not have

arisen. But the District did not follow this course. In-

stead, as the record shows, it chose to apply different de-

basement factors to the same class of property in the

* Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S, 522, 526 (1959);

Hillsborough T P v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946); Colgate

v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 428 (19385); Wells Fargo & Co. v.

Johnson, 214 F. 180 (8th Cir. 1914), aff’d, 289 U.S. 234

(1915).

A-86

same year and, in so doing, denied the appellees equal

protection of the laws by discriminating among residen-

tial taxpayers.”

In the case of Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp.

615, 621-22 (M.D. Ala. 1971), the court declared uncon-

stitutional under Alabama's ad valorem property tax sys-

tem the application of two different levels of assessment

to the same class of property, stating that “. . . while

the Fourteenth Amendment does not require precise equal-

ity or uniformity in taxation, or prohibit inequality in

taxation which results from mere mistake or error in

judgment of tax officials, it does ‘secure every person

within the state’s jurisdiction against intentional and

arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express

terms of a statute or by its improper execution through

duly constituted agents.’ .. .” {Footnotes omitted.)

The justification the District offers for the admitted

intentional disparity of debasement factor applied to tax-

payers within the same class is that the “stair-step” ap-

proach was the only way to bring all properties to tae

uniform level of assessment of 65° without seriously

frustrating the only long-range goal of the tax system—

equalization. The trial court did not accept the logic of

this conclusion, nor can we.

The only variable in the tax equation for real property

is the estimated fair market value. As the District ad-

mits, when the real estate market and other factors cause

the fair market value to fluctuate, nearly constant reas-

sessment is necessary, though not always feasible. If

actual fair market value is determined by the amount

realized in an arm’s length sale of property, a compari-

s Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), reads the Four-

teenth Amendment equal protection clause into the due process

clause of the Fifth Amendment to apply it to the District of

Columbia.

A-97

son between the latest assessed value and this sales value

constitutes the assessment/sales ratio. The disparity be-

tween the two values is expressed by a dispersion co-

efficient. The higher the coefficient, the greater the dif-

ference between the last assessed fair market value and

the fair market value indicated by sale. Various factors

may account for such a difference, but in any event the

Board of Assessors is interested in minimizing the co-

efficient of dispersion.

The assessment,sales ratio may well vary in different

parts of the District, and even within the same block.

This disparity inevitably produces the undesirable result

of placing unequal] tax burdens on persons owning prop-

erty with the same fair market value. For example, if

two different taxpayers own property identical in fair

market value but one property is currently assessed at

a higher value than the other due to the inability of the

assessors to vague all property every year, taxpayers own-

ing property of identical values pay different tax bills.

As another example, if the property of each of these tax-

payers is currently assessed at the same market value

but as part of a “stair-step” approach to reach a uniform

65° debasement value one level of assessment rises to

60% while the other remains at 55%, the taxpayers

owning property worth the same amount in the taxable

year have different tax bills.

In neither of the above examples has the goal of equali-

zation been reached. Yet the two situations are distin-

guishable in important ways. In the first situation the

lack of equalization between taxpayers is undesirable

but permissible because caused by logistical problems

which may be temporarily beyond the power of the city

to correct. In the second case the lack of equalization is

‘aused by an intentional and arbitrary application of two

Te ee eT

A-83

different debasement factors to identical properties."* . The

aggrieved taxpayer in the first example may complain to

the Board of Equalization and Review if he feels that

his assessment is too high and, since the assessment of

fair market value is admittedly a rather subjective art,

by requesting reconsideration of his valuation, he may be

successful in lowering his assessment. The facts of the

instant case show that in the second example the ag-

grieved taxpayer has no meaningful ability to challenge

his assessment at all. No judgment would be made in

his case as the new debasement factor was arbitrarily

determined as was its applicability to certain real prop-

erty.

Estimated market value, being the only variable in

the equation determining the amount of tax owed, would

appear to be the factor to be periodically adjusted to

reflect changes in property values which the District

recognizes occur for many different reasons that are

difficult to forecast. If the District desires, or feels com-

pelled, to apply an equal debasement factor across the

board to all real property within the District, however,

the proper course would be to formulate such a rule and

publish it in accordance with the procedure prescribed

by the DCAPA. An immediate raise to 65°¢ might well

be politically unpleasant, as the District clearly recog-

nized but, if the need to raise the level of ass.ssment

to 65° is as compelled as the District contends, this

result is unavoidable. Moreover, it is just as unavoid-

able using the “stair-step” approach although perhaps

not as visible. In fact, evidence before the trial court

demonstrated the assessments in years where the “stair

The District argues that one of its exhibits in evidence

demonstrates that in reality the differential in levels of assess-

ment resulted in greater equalization than before, but appellees

disagree and the trial court did not so find, nor was it required

to do so.

A-89

steps’’ were being used caused assessment increases that

went above and beyond the increases that would have

been caused by property appreciation alone. This should

be no surprise, for any raise in the debasement factor

must raise the assessment. The fair market value can-

not be held below its true level while the debasement

factor is inched towards 65% simply to keep taxes the

same, at least if the concept of fair market value is to

have any clear and understandable meaning. And as

already mentioned, the facts of this case have highlighted

the importance to the taxpayer of an accurately stated

fair market value; it is the only element in the tax

formula to which he can meaningfully object. If real

increases in his property assessment are disguised in the

form of a higher debasement factor, he is totally remedi-

less within the normal avenues for seeking redress.

Finally, appellants complaint that the trial court’s order

“eonvert|s) a relatively equalized tax roll into a patently

discriminating tax roll.” '' The trial court determined

that the assessments at issue were void because of a

differential in levels of assessment within one class of

real property, and the District cannot now be heard to

say in this appeal that in attempting to cure one allegedly

discriminatory method of assessment between single-

family residential property and other classes of real

property it can in the process deliberately discriminate

between members within the one class of single-family

residential property owners. Therefore, irrespective of

whether the District may constitutionally differentiate in

the level of assessment applied to residential real property

as opposed to commercial real property, a question which

we need not and do not here decide, it clearly may not

do so within the single class of residential property

owners.

A firmed.

** Appellants’ brief at 12.

A-90

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

NO. 7986

District of Columbia, Appellant,

Vv.

Burlington Apartment House Company

T/A The Burlington Hotel, Appellee

Appeal from the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia

(Arqued January 22, 1975 Decided January 29, 1976)

Melvin J. Washington, Assistant Corporation

Counsel, with whom C. Francis Murphy, Cor-

poration Counsel, and Henry E. Wixon, Assis-

tant Corporation Counsel, were on the

brief, for appellant.

Christopher Sanger for appellee.

Before KELLY, GALLAGHER and HARRIS, Asso-

ciate Judges.

Opinion for the court by Associate Judge

KELLY.

Opinion by Associate Judge HARRIS concur-

ring in part and dissenting in part at p.

16.

KELLY, Associate Judge: The District of

Columbia here appeals from an order of the

trial court's Tax Divison reducing from

A-91

$84.61 to $67.00 per square foot the real

property tax assessment on Lot 97, Square

214, for the fiscal years 1973 and 1974.

The land in question is improved by a

structure known as The Burlington Hotel,

which is owned and operated by appellee.

The hotel was built between the years

1905 and 1910, is seven stories high, and

fronts on Vermont Avenue, N. W., just

south of Thomas Circle.?

The parcel of

land contains 42,408 square feet.

The District initially assessed Lot

97 at $92.30 per square foot for fiscal

2

year 1973, but on appeal to the District

I The District states in its brief that the

value of the improvements on the land is in-

significant and we do not include it hore, ex-

cept insofar as it is contained in the find-

ings of the trial court.

2 This represents a market value of $3,914,584.60

and a value on the tax rolls of $2,544,480.00,

the latter being an assessment at 65% of market

value.

A-92

of Columbia Board of Equalization and Re-

view, the assessment was adjusted to

$84.61 per square foot.> After the real

property tax derived from this assessment

was paid, appellee filed a petition with

the Tax Division of the Superior Court

seeking to further reduce the assessment

rate; first to $60.00 and later, by amend-

ment during trial, to $64.00 per square

foot. The court ultimately valuea* the

property at $67.00 per square foot for

both fiscal year 1973 and fiscal year 1974

and ordered that the District refund to

3 This represents a market value of $3,588,369.20

and a value on the tax rolls of $2,332,440.00.

4 Market value is that price which a willing

seller would be willing to accept and a will-

ing buyer would be willing to pay for the pro-

perty, assuming that both are knowledgeable of

all the present or potential elements of value

involved and that neither is under duress or

obligation to act. Reservation Eleven Asso-

ciates v. District of Columbia, 136 U.S.App.D.C.

311, 313, 420 F.2d 153, 155 (1969).

A-93

appellee a tax overpayment of $15,308.72,

with interest, within ten days of its

order. We affirm the trial court's deci-

sion relating to fiscal year 1973 and re-

verse as to fiscal year 1974.

I

Preliminarily, citing George Hyman Con-

struction Co. v. District of Columbia, D.C.App.,

315 A.2d 175, 177 (1974) and District of

Columbia v. Berenter, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 203

466 F.2d 367, 374 (1972), the District con-

tends that the Tax Division was without

jurisdiction to enter an order with regard

to fiscal year 1974 taxes since appellee

had failed to utilize the requisite statu-

tory procedures to contest that year's |

assessment. It stresses the fact that appel-

lee's petition in the Tax Division did not

include a refund request for fiscal year

1974 and that it was never amended to do so.

A-94

Two arguments are advanced by appellee

in support of the trial court's property

assessment for fiscal year 1974: first,

that the District had not "reassessed" or

"“revaluated" the property for that year,

but had merely adopted the Board's equa-

lized figure for fiscal year 1973; and

second, that once the value of the proper-

ty was finally equalized by the Tax Divi-

sion, this valuation was effective until

a new valuation of the property was made

according to law.

The statutory scheme for relief from

allegedly inaccurate fiscal year assess-

ments is found in D.C. Code 1973, §§ 47-709,

5 . :

47-2403 and 47-2404, and the administrative

5 The timetable for establishment, notice and

appeal of real estate assessments was substan-

tually revised by the District of Columbia Real

Tax Revision Act of 1974, P.L. 93-407,

§§401-29, 88 Stat. 1036 (effective July l,

1975) and regulations promulgated thereunder.

Regulation 74-35, 21 D.C. Register 1309-27

(effective Dec. 12, 1974).

A-95

remedies outlined there must be exhausted

before a taxpayer may pursue court action. °®

Sections 47-709 and 47-2403 provide that

where the assessment for the following fis-

cal year is received before March lst, or

after March lst but without an increase in

valuation, a complaint must be made to the

Board of Equalization and Review which sits

from January 1 through April 1 for that

particular purpose (D.C. Code 1973, § 47-708)

If such complaint is made and adversely de-

cided the taxpayer may, after all canes’ tor

the entire fiscal year are paid, appeal to

the Superior Court after October 1 and for

the six months following. Where, however,

there is an increase in valuation and notice

6 An exception existed where the assessment was

void. District of Columbia v. Green, D.C.App.,

310 A.2d 848, 852-53 (1973).

A-96

in writing is received after March lst, a

complaint to the Board is unnecessary. An

appeal can then be taken to the Superior

Court, after all taxes for the fiscal year

have been paid, beginning October 1 and

for six months following.

In the instant case, notice of the

fiscal year 1974 assessment of $2,332,440.00

was received by appellee sometime after

March 27, 1973, and was identical in amount

to the Board's equalized assessment for

fiscal year 1973. Thus, with regard to its

1974 tax, appellee would have had to com-

plain of the assessment to the Board and,

if unsuccessful, pay the tax and appeal to

Superior Court for the latter to have juris-

diction over its fiscal year 1974 taxes.

As appellee did none of these things, the

court had no authority to affects its taxes

A-97

for that fiscal year.’

II

The District also contends that it

could not be required, as the trial court

directed, to refund to appellee its fis-

cal year 1973 real property tax overpay-

ment within ten days of the court's order.

It asserts that the time and manner of re-

funding taxes erroneously paid are con-

trolled by the provisions of D.C. Code 1973,

?

7 We note in passing that different tax years

have long been regarded in the law as separate

entities, Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591,

598 (1948); Keokuk & W.R. Co. v. Missouri, 152

U.S. 301, 314-16 (1894), as have assessments also,

City of East Orange v. Township of Livingston, 103

N.J.Super. 109, 246 A.2d 722 (1968); People v.

Haring, 286 App.Div. 676, 146 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1955).

In District of Columbia v. Green, supra at 852, we

stated that in "exceptional and extraordinary"

circumstances (deliberate discrimination between

members of one class of property owners), equit-

able relief could be sought to enjoin the assess-

ment of a tax. However, the facts of this case

are such that resort to equitable relief is in-

appropriate. Appellee had an adequate remedy at

law to contest his 1974 assessment but failed to

invoke the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.

We thus disagree with the dissent's assertion

that our ruling curtails the Superior Court's

equity jurisdiction in tax cases.

A-98

§§ 47-1016 and 47-2407, the latter sec-

tion providing for the refund of sums

"finally determined" to have been erron-

eously paid. Finality is spelled out in

some detail in § 47-2404 which states, in

general, that a Superior Court order in

a civil tax matter which is appealed to

this court becomes final only when the

time for any other review or appeal has

expired or when 30 days have elapsed

after certain dispositions, such as an

affirmance by the Supreme Court or the

rendering of an opinion by the Superior

Court in accordance with the mandate of

either the Supreme Court or this court.

Accordingly, since the order here in ques-

tion will not be final until thee@ppeal

process is completed, the trial court's

direction that the District refund the

contested overpayment within ten days was

an invalid attempt to confer finality on

A-99

its order in a manner which conflicts with

the statute and, in addition, which in-

fringes upon the right of the parties to

appeal. °

IIl

Numerous claims of error regarding the

court's ultimate fiscal year 1973 assessment

are advanced by the District, the one most

pressing here being the exclusion at trial

of a prior offer by appellee to sell the pro-

perty. From the deposition of appellee's

president it appears that in the Spring of

1972 he had authorized a real estate agent

to sell the property for $70.00 per square

foot and that during subsequent negotia-

tions he asked $75.00 per square foot for

the property with the furniture and

§ D.C. App.R4 Ii(a) (1); D.C. Code 1973, § 11-721

(a)-(c).

A-100

fixtures included.” However, these nego-

tiations never resulted in the grant of an

option to purchase the property. The Dis-

trict nevertheless claims that the asking

prices set by the owner for purposes of

sale should have been allowed in evidence

as admissions against interest and as pro-

bative of fair market value.

There is some authority which holds

that in actions to which the owner of pro-

perty is a party, his offers to sell the

property may be introduced as admissions

by the opposing party, provided they are

10

not too remote in time, and one juris-

3 Other efforts to sell the property in 1973

sought to be introduced are not relevant to the

issue of market value for fiscal year 1973 which

had to be determined as of July 1, 1972.

10 United States v. Certain Land in Baltimore

County, Maryland, 209 F.Supp. 50, 56 (D.Md. 1962);

Durika v. School District of Derry Township, 415

Pa. 480, 203 A.2d 474 (1964) (Cohen, J., dissent-

ing); cf. Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United

States, 261 U.S. 581, 589 (1923).

&

‘A-101

diction has held that offers by a land-

owner to sell his property are among the

factors to be considered in assessing

the property for purposes of taxation.

We do not understand that Cloud v. Veeder,

41 Ala.App. 558, 140 So.2d 292 (1962),

cited by appellee, holds to the contrary.

In Cloud, a property owner, suing for

damages for fraud in its sale to him,

testified to the price at which he was

subsequently offering the house for sale.

Similarly, in United States v. Smith, 355 F.

2d 807, 810-11 (5th Cir. 1966), evidence

of options was introduced on behalf of a

landowner-condemnee (which, in addition,

Il Alstores Realty, Inc. v. State, 286 Minn.

343, 176 N.W.2d 112 (1970); Schleiff v. County

of Freeborn, 231 Minn. 389, 43 N.W.2d 265 (1950);

State v. Russell-Miller Milling Co., 182 Minn.

543, 235 N.W. 22 (1931) (cited by that court

as In re Delinquent Real Estate Taxes, Waseca

County) .

A-102

concerned other properties). In both cases

the testimony was held to be self-serving

and therefore inadmissible.

Appellee asserts, however, and we

agree, that even if the court's evidentiary

ruling was error, the error was harmless

in view of other testimony given at trial.

For example, the District presented the

court with data on nine sales in the sur-

rounding area through an expert witness

and his prepared appraisal report.

These sales ranged in value from $67.00

to $147.00 per square foot, and the wit-

ness testified that in his opinion the

market value of the property was $84.00

12 This testimony is discussed in greater de-

tail infra.

A-103

per square foot. Thus, there was credible

testimony on which the court could have

based a finding that the value of the pro-

perty exceeded the owner's asking price of

$75.00 per square foot had it been so

persuaded. }3

IV

The District's next contention with

regard to the fiscal year 1973 assessment

is that the court's valuation of the pro-

perty is against the weight of the evidence.

In particular, the District argues that

appellee's appraisal report was not proba-

tive because its expert witness (1) did not

inquire into the circumstances of the sales

13 We are in agreement with the trial court's

observation that an unacted upon offer to sell is

not highly probative of value in the context of

an assessment proceeding.

A-104

on which his opinion was based and (2)

used in his report sales which were not

comparable because they were of properties

which were smaller and less accessible

than the subject property. It also attacks

the testimony of appellee's other expert

witness on the ground that he did not in-

quire into the circumstances of the sales

upon which his opinion was based. Lastly,

the District complains that the court's

valuation of the property was less than

that given the property by appellee and its

experts.

Notwithstanding the District's insis-

tence that to have this assessment reduced

14 Several other claims of error by the District

of this tenor have been considered and found to

be without merit.

A-105

appellee must show that the qprtespent's

assessment of the property resulted from

fraud, illegality or, at the very least,

that it was arbitrary and inequitable,

our standard of review of purportedly

erroneous property assessments is whether

the property has been assessed in accor-

dance with the statute, i.e., at "the full

and true value thereof in lawful money”.

D.C. Code 1973, § 47-713. And the findings

of the Tax Division must be accepted unless

they are clearly erroneous. District of Colum

bia v. Neyman, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 193,196, 417

F.2d 1140, 1143 (1969); Super.Ct.Civ. R.52(a) 2°

15 The District relies upon District of Columbia v.

Capital Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc., D.C.Mun.App.

106 A.2d 695 (1954) (Hood, J., concurring). That

case does not apply to proceedings in the Tax Divi-

sion, however. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Oo. v. District

of Columbia, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 73, 76 n.3, 337 F.2d

109, 112 n.3 (1964).

16 "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court

on the entire evidence is left with the definite

and firm convictim that a mistake has been conmmit-

ted." United States v. United States Gypsum Company,

333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); cf. 4 K. Davis, Administra-

tive Law §29.02 at 121-22 (1958).

A-106

In general, real property is valued for

tax purposes according to its highest and

best use rather than according to its actual

17 And once the

use at the time of valuation.

highest and best use has been established, or

is assumed, the tax appraiser may use any one

or all of several different methods for esti-

mating value. ’ Many factors are relevant to

the appraisal of real property, including loca-

tion, size, use, neighborhood, and special

‘17 Wagner v. Commissioner of Taxation, 258 Minn.

330, 104 N.W.2d 26 (1960); National Folding Box

Co. v. City of New Haven, 146 Conn. 578, 153 A.2d

420 (1959). Condemnation cases such as State v.

Hedwig, Inc., 133 So.2d 180, 182 (La.App. 1961),

overruled on other grounds, State, Dept. of High-

ways v. Terrace Land Co., 298 S.2d 859, 862 (La.

1974), are also relevant here as market value

is determined in the same way in both condemna-

tion and assessment proceedings. Sorokach v.

Trusewich, 35 N.J.Super. 86, 113 A.2d 194 (1955).

18 Weil v. Supervisors of Assessments of Washing-

ton Co., 266 Md. 238, 292 A.2d 68 (1972); Fitz-

simmons v. McCorkle, 59 Del. 94, 214 A.2d 334

(1965).

A-107

ae 19

utility of property. Reference to sales

of similar properties is sometimes refer-

20 and some-

red to as a method of valuation

times such sales are considered as one of

the factors contributing to the determina-

21 Additionally, whether or not the

tion.

sales used by a party to establish value

are comparable to the subject property is

a factual issue which the trial judge has

discretion to determine .2* Where sales are

not comparable they are irrelevant to the

19 J.H. Becker, Inc. v. Township of Marlboro,

82 N.J.Super. 519, 198 A.2d 463 (1964); Traylor

v. City of Allentown, 378 Pa. 489, 106 A.2d 577

(1954); Schleiff v. County of Freeborn, supra

note 11, 43 N.W.2d at 268.

20 E.g., Lerner Shops of Connecticut, Inc. v.

Town of Waterbury, 151 Conn. 79, 193 A.2d 472

(1963).

21 See cases cited supra note 19.

22 Leeaye, Inc. v. District of Columbia Re-

development Land Agency, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 316,

296 F.2d 438 (1961).

A-108

proceeding and hence inadmissible 2 but

sales may be comparable where properties

are used or could be used for the same pur-

pose but do not occupy adjacent tracts.”

Appellee called three witnesses at

trial. Mr. Hudson Moses, its president,

testified that in his opinion the value

of the corporate property was influenced

by its proximity to the 14th Street neigh-

borhood, the location of bars, peep shows,

pornographic bookstores, strip joints, and

23 District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency

v. 61 Parcels of Land, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 368,

235 F.2d 864, 865 (1956). See also State, By and

Its Road Commission v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d

295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972).

24 United States v. American Pumice Company, 404

F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1968) [condemnation, pumice

claim ]; Weil v. Supervisors of Assessments of

Washington Co., supra note 18 fassessment, gasoline

service station] ; Traylor v. City of Allentown,

supra note 19 [fassessment, hotel and apartment

property] ; cf. District of Columbia v. Lot 813

in Square 568, 232 F.Supp. 714, 718 (D.D.C. 1964),

aff'd sub nom. Rubenstein v. District of Columbia,

120 U.S.App.D.C. 352, 346 F.2d 833 (1965) (Fahy,

J., dissenting).

A-109

prostitution. Mr. William Calomiris, a real

estate broker who had previously been enaaaed

to lease or sell the property, testified that

an office building with a lease to the govern-

ment would be the highest and best use of the

property. He said that he would not consider

any other use as feasible, and particularly

not a motel, since a relatively new hotel in

the area was doing very poorly. In his

opinion, based on comparable sales in the

area, the property was worth $64.00 per square

foot.

Mr. Calomiris regarded the property as

part of a neighborhood stretching from Ver-

mont Avenue, east to 13th Street, and south

from Thomas Circle to about K Street, N. W.

The ten sales on which he based his deter-

mination of market value were, for the most

part, located within these boundaries and

ranged from $36.00 to $69.00 per square foot.

Sales of properties cited by Mr. Calomiris

A-110

as being on the same block as the subject

property were two on Thomas Circle, which

sold for $60.70 and $46.00 per square

foot in 1972, and 1104-06 Vermont Avenue,

N.W., just south of the Burlington Hotel,

which sold for $64.00 per square foot in

1967. Mr. Calomiris thought that 15th

and M Streets, N. W., was an entirely. dif-

ferent area from 14th Street and Thomas

Circle, and that while 15th Street marked

the point at which the downtown commer-

cial district began to improve, 14th

Street had been unable to attract desir-

able tenants.

Appellee's third witness was Mr.

Anthony Reynolds, a professional real es-

tate appraiser, who testified that the

highest and best use of the property was

a new single structure office building

with a single tenant such as the (U.S.)

Government Services Administration. He

A-111

described GSA's requirements at that time

as being a minimum of 300,000 square feet

of floor area. Mr. Reynolds testified that .

there had been no successful privately

occupied new building east of 15th Street

Since 1965 (and perhaps since World War

II), and that that area was regarded as

a different market from the area west

of 15th Street. Mr. Reynolds considered

four sales in the same block as the sub-

ject property to be comparable. These

parcels all fronted on Thomas Circle, with

one being adjacent to Lot 97, and were

sold for $69.20, $67.95, $60.70, and $46.59

per square foot during June, July and August

of 1972. He viewed these parcels as being

assembled for a building site.

Mr. Reynolds also considered sites in

other portions of downtown Washington that

were comparable in size to appellee's pro-

perty and had been developed for GSA use.

A-112

In his opinion these sites were comparable

because they had the same highest use and

because the rent for the new office space

leased by the government was virtually the

same, irrespective of location. The four

sites included one bought for new construc-

tion to be Leseed by the government in

May 1972, one purchased by the District

of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency in

1971, one that had been acquired by the

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

in 1970, and one acquired by GSA for reno-

vation in 1971. Prices paid for the sites,

adjusted to account for the difference in

building area permitted by zoning, were

$57.40, $56.90, $70.60, and $60.70 per

square foot.

Mr. Robert K. Briden, a real estate

appraiser for the District of Columbia De-

partment of Finance and Revenue, was the

District's expert witness. His opinion

A-113

was that the highest and best use of the

property was its subdivision and develop-

ment as two new office buildings and a

motel, each occupying a lot of about

15,000 square feet. His feeling was that

such use would be in keeping with new

development nearby on 15th Street, parti-

cularly since the area of Vermont Avenue

above K Street was being revitalized. In

setting his valuation of the property, Mr.

Briden conSidered nine comparable sales.

Of these, he relied primarily on three: a

sale in 1965 of property in the same block,

but fronting on L Street, for $91.38 per

square foot; a sale in 1966 of a triangular

site directly across from the Burlington

for $74.72 per square foot; and a sale in

19°67 of property at the southwest corner

of 15th and M Streets for $104.72 per

square foot. He testified that his method

of valuing the subject property was to take

each of the actual sales, add a percentage

A-114 A-115

increase for appreciation to July 1, 1972, Based on the foregoing testimony and

then make a percentage adjustment for dif- the appraisal reports submitted by both par-

ferences in location, corner location, ties the trial judge concluded that the

size, zoning, floor area ratio, commercial highest and best use of the subject property

“usefulness, and alley (attiuimen was the development of a single office build-

Mr. Briden stated that he did not rely ing for rental to one large organization

on the sales of properties to the north such as the GSA or the telephone company.

of the Burlington, fronting on Thomas He found two sets of sales relevant to the

Circle, because they were so much smaller question of fair market value: the four 1972

and because one, in his opinion, was not a sales in the same block of properties on

true land sale. He thought that develop- Thomas Circle and the four sales of land as

ment on Vermont Avenue was being influenced a site for the GSA or a similar tenant which

by the new construction on 15th Street and were contained in appellee's appraisal re-

believed that Vermont Avenue was not a good port. The trial judge further found that

location for GSA because none of the build- the market value of the property on July l,

ings along 15th Street were currently occu- 1972 was $67.00 per square foot. In our

pied by GSA. judgment, all of these findings are support-

25 In terms of location, a site mom Vermont Avenue ed by the evidence and are not clearly erron-

was worth 25 per cent less than a mid-block site

on L Street, N. W., and 35 per cent less than a eous.

mid-block site on 15th Street, N. W., in the witness'

calculations. As to the District's specific objec-

tions to the findings of the court, the

A-116

sales used by appellee to support its esti-

mated valuation were competent evidence so

long as they did not result from foreclo-

sure or legal compulsion. District of Colum

bia Redevelopment Land Agency v. 61 Parcels of

Land, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 3€7, 368, 235 F.2d 864,

865 (1956); Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d

391, 397 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.

772 (1944). The motivations and circum-

stances of the sales go.to the weight of

the evidence offered and not to its admis-

sibility. District of Columbia Redevelopment

Land Agency v. 61 Parcels of Land, supra at 369,

235 F.2d at 866.

Whether or not the sales used to

compute valution were comparable to the

subject property was, as stated earlier,

a matter for the trial judge to determine.

Here, there was a broad range of testimony

concerning sales of different land par-

cels to aid the trial judge in resolving

A-117

the issue of market value. In reaching

this resolution it was reasonable for

the trial judge to consider four parcels

on the same block as the subject pro-

perty, all sold within a month or two

of the appraisal date, as probative.

He was aware that the parcels were smal-

ler than Lot 97, but he was also aware

that they were most probably being assem-

bled to make a larger building site and

that contrary to the subject property

they enjoyed a prominent location on

Thomas Circle. We conclude, therefore,

that the court's finding of compara-

bility of sales has sound support in the

evidence.

The District's claim that the value

which the court assigned to the property

was less than the value testified to by

appellee's own experts is likewise with-

out significance. The property was valued

A-118 A-119

at $64.00 per square foot by one and assessment for fiscal year 1973, and in

$67.20 by the other, and the court all other respects is affirmed.

arrived at an ultimate valuation of So Ordered.

$67.00 per square foot. In any event,

the opinions of the expert witnesses

are simply evidence to aid the trier of

fact in reaching a decision and are not

conclusive. Cohn v. City and Town of Hartford,

130 Conn. 699, 37 A.2d 237 (1944).

V

Both parties agree that the trial

court made a slight arithmetical error

in its determination of Lot 97's total

debased assessed value due to the inad-

vertent inclusion of a small adjacent

parcel owned by appellee. The property's

final debased assessment value for fiscal

year 1973 should be $1,846,868.40 and not

$1,871,334.79. Accordingly, the order

appealed from is reversed as to fiscal

26 See D.C. Code 1973, §47-2404(a).

year 1974, reduced as to the total debased

-

A-120

HARRIS, Associate Judge, concurring in

part and dissenting in part: While I con-

cur in Parts II, III, IV, and V of the

majority opinion, I am unable to agree

with the conclusion expressed in Part I.

In my judgment, the result reached on that

issue is contrary to the language and in-

tend of the statutory scheme, and wrongly

circumscribes the normal discretionary

authority of the trial court in disregard

of both the Rules of Civil Procedure and

traditional equitable and constitutional

principles. I therefore respectfully dis-

sent from that aspect of the majority

opinion which inflicts upon appellee a

valuation for 1974 (and subsequent years)

which we unanimously recognize to be ex-

cessive.

I

In February 1972, the District issued

a notice of assessment for fiscal year 1973

A-121

for the Burlington Hotel property. Appel-

lee appealed the Assessor's evaluation to

the District of Columbia Board of Equali-

zation and Review. D.C. Code 1973, §§47-

708 and 47-709. Following a hearing the

Board issued an order establishing a some-

what reduced fair market value for taxa-

tion purposes. Appellee then paid the

tax and filed a timely petition contest-

ing the Board's order in the Superior

Court. Id., § 47-2403.

The trial court agreed with appel-

lee's contention that the 1973 valuation

was arbitrarily high. It arrived at a re-

duced valuation as legal and correct. We

properly affirm that decision. In com-

pliance with the Code and in justice to

the taxpayer, the trial court not only or-

dered the assessment for 1973 lowered, but

also decreed "that the aforesaid reduced

assessment. . .shall constitute the full

A-122

and lawful assessment. . .pursuant to Dis-

trict of Columbia Code § 47-709, for all

succeeding years until another valuation

is made according to law".

On some date after March 27, 1973

(otherwise unspecified in the record),

the District notified appellee of the

assessment on the Burlington Hotel pro-

perty for fiscal year 1974. The figure

thus conveyed was not based upon a re-

assessment or new valuation. Rather, the

District merely used the fiscal 1973

figure, which then was being disputed in

the Superior Court.

The District argues, and the majority

agrees, that the District now may employ

an admittedly incorrect valuation in the

fiscal 1974 assessment, and that we may

not sustain the continued use of the lower

valuation which both the trial court and

we have held to be proper. Thus, the

A-123

majority tells appellee, you have won the

battle but lost the war. The majority

arrives at this anomaly by the following

rather facile syllogism, which apparently

leads it to conclude that the trial court

was powerless to extend the diminished

taxation based beyond fiscal 1973:

In the instant case, notice of

the fiscal year 1974 assessment

. « e-was received by appellee

sometime after March 27, 1973,

and was identical in amount to

the Board's equal

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Petition — Keyes v. District of Columbia · 434 U.S. 1067 | Frix