Petition — Keyes v. District of Columbia
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FILED
[ Supreme Court. U.S 1
o€C 121977 =
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcroBeR TERM, 1977
No. 77-850.
ArTHUR H. Kryes, Jr. and Luctnte Keyes,
on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated,
Petitioners,
Vv.
THe Disrrict oF CotuMBiA, A Municipal Corporation
and WaLrer FE. WASHINGTON, and KENNETH Back,
Respondents,
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
GILBERT HAHN, JR.
lith Floor
1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C, 20036
Attorneys for Petitioners
Mary KATHLEEN HITE
DeNNIS OAKES
Maynarp H. Dixon
Wornr, BLock, SCHORR and Soits-COHEN
1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W,
Washington, D.C, 20036
Of Counsel
Press of Byaon S, ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.
INDE X
Opinions Below . ...+-++-+e+-s+ee e
JurieGictiow « © e eo ec eee eo ewe le
Questions Presented ....++-+-+e+ se.
U. S. Constitutional Provision
Involved .. ++ +-++e-e¢eeee @ @
Statement of the Case ....+ + « «
Reasons for Granting the Writ .....
Conclusion . . «6 « «© « «© «© © © © © © e
Appendix
Opinion of the Court of Appeals dated
July 23, 1976 . . . . . . * . . . .
Opinion and Order of the Superior
Court dated April 23, 1974 ... .
Opinion and Order of the Superior
Court dated August 6, 1974 ... .
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
in District of Columbia v. Green,
dated October 9, 1973... sees
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
in District of Columbia v. Burling-
ton dated January 29, 1976 ... .
Order of the Court of Appeals of
Pebruary 27, 1976 .« « «e«eeree
Opinion of the Court of Appeals in
i
Page
13
18
A-74
A-90
A-145
Page
District of Columbia v. Burling-
ton dated June 13, 1977... ~=aA-147
Petitioners' "Motion to the Court En
Banc to Withdraw the Mandate of
s Court In Order to Prevent In-
justice and Grant Hearing En Banc
in Nu. &790 Because of District
of Columbia v. Burlington Decid-
ed June 13, 1977 . —— re , = « A-164
Order of the Court of Appeals
dated September 13, 1977
a A-194
Petitioners' "Motion to Withdraw
and Stay Mandate Pending Applica-_
tion to the Supreme Court of the
United States for a Writ of
Certiorari"
. A-196
Order of the Court of Appeals
dated October 11, 1977 ., “_ A-202
ii
A ee ee -
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases:
ee
Bare sed of Columbia, 370 eee * | se.86
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co.
—sET US. 673 (1930 ;
Vv. Hill, U. . ) . . . . . 16,1
pistes of Columbia vV. Berenter, 460" : i
ict of Columbia v. Burlington,
ee 7986 (D.C.App.January 29, 1976) 5.38,
. . . . . ’
(Vacated) ..++-+ s+ e+e » Pe ree
District of Columbia y+ Burlington, | 29517
District of Columbia v. Green, _ ough ue
2d (1973) . . . . . . 10,17
4009
Key v. Dole, 46 U.S.L.Week
U.S. November i. Beets &¢ « 6 © 6 8.8 13
Mayes v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S.
(1971) . . 7 . . . . . . . -
» » 15,16
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) + ’
o ec o £9,868
sOe Bae
Sta tos8) City of Baxtey, a 7 : Toes eae
Sullivan v. Little Huntse Park, os ns
Inc., 396 U. . . 7 . . . . . ’
Wright v. State of Georgia, 373 U.S.
iii
Bee CROGD). «6 454°u a ee 16,18
. . . . . ’
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions:
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment sé © 6 4 Se 5
28 U.S.C. §1257(3) ... 2 eee 4
Title I, D.C. Code §1501 et seq. ... 6
iv
Seti oe
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
“
OCTOBER TERM, 1977
NO.
ARTHUR H. KEYES and LUCILLE KEYES,
On behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated,
Petitioners,
Vv.
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a Municipal
Corporation and WALTER E. WASHINGTON,
and KENNETH BACK,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
Arthur H. Keyes, et al., petitioners,
appellees below, respectfully pray that a writ
of certiorari issue to review the judgment of
t.
-2-
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
entered on September 13, 1977 in District of
Columbia, et al. v. Arthur H. Keyes, et al.,
No. 8790
OPINIONS BELOW
The first Opinion of the Court of Ap-
peals in the instant case is reported at
362 A.2d 729 (1976) and is reprinted in the
Appendix, infra, p. A-l. The subsequent per
curiam order of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in the instant case is not
yet reported and is reprinted in the Appendix,
infra, p. A-194.
The Opinions of the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia, Tax Division, in the
instant case, are unreported and are reprint-
ed in the Appendix, infra, p. A-16 and p. A-60
The Opinion of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals in the case of District of Columbia
v. Burlington, is reported at 375 A.24 1052
(1977) and is reprinted in the Appendix, infra
p. A-147.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals was initially entered on
July 23, 1976. Petitioners' Petition for Re-
hearing or Rehearing En Banc was timely filed
on September 16, 1976, and was denied by the
Court of Appeals on November 26, 1976. On
December 27, 1976 the Court of Appeals filed
an order granting a stay of mandate for the
period of time permitted by law for the fil-
ing of a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Petitioners' writ of certiorari was timely
filed on February 23, 1977, and was denied
by this Court on April 18, 1977 (97 Sup.Ct.
1651).
On July 7, 1977 Petitioners filed a
motion with the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals to withdraw its mandate and to
grant a hearing en banc. (Appendix, infra,
p. A-164) Petitioners' motion was denied by
-4-
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
en banc on September 13, 1977 (Appendix,
infra, p. A-194).
On September 22, 1977 petitioners
moved the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals to withdraw and Stay its mandate pend-
ing application to this Court for a writ of
certiorari. Petitioners' Motion was denied,
per curiam, on October 11, 1977. (Appendix,
infra, p. A-202).
On October 27, 1977 petitioners moved
this Court for leave to file a petition
for writ of mandamus to require the recall
of the mandate prior to the expiration date
of the present term of the Court of Appeals,
which motion is pending before the Court at
the time of the filing of this Petition.
The jurisdiction of this Court is in-
voked under 28 U.S.c. §1257(3).
-5-
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did an "ex parte" proceeding take
place where the petitioners and respondents
were advised during the proceedings in the
instant case by the highest court in the
District of Columbia that a "certain deci-
sion" was the law of the jurisdiction and
when the appellate court, during the pro-
ceedings, later vacated that "certain deci-
sion" notifying respondents but not the
petitioners?
2. Did the highest court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia deny petitioners their
constitutional right to a hearing on their
constitutional claim when the appellate
court held an ex parte proceeding?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in part:
No person shall. . .be deprived
of life, liberty or property, with-
out due process of law...
-6-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Prior to fiscal year 1973 all the 96,000
single-family residential properties in the
District of Columbia were assessed for real
estate tax purposes in the same way. The fair
market value of the property was reduced to
a fixed percentage known as the "level of
assessment". Prior to fiscal year 1973 the
"level of assessment" was 55 percent of fair
market value for all Single-family proper-
ties. (App. pp. A-2, A-77.)
In preparing the assessments for fiscal
year 1973, the responsible officials of the
District of Columbia charged with the adminis-
tration of the tax laws, acting secretly and
without notice to the public as required by
the District of Columbia Administrative Proce-
dures Act, Title 1 D.C. Code §1501 et seq.,
raised the level of assessment for eee
mately 34,000 of the 96,000 homeowners in the
city from 55 to 60 percent (App. pp. A-63/65)
-7-
The tax for fiscal year 1973, based upon
these secret and unrevealed unequal assess~-
ments was levied and collected from the
taxpayers in question. (App. PP- A-63/65.)
In preparing the assessments for the
following year 1974, the same officials of
the District raised the level of assessment
for an additional 44,000 of the 96,000 home-
owners from 55 to 60 percent. However, be-
fore the taxes were levied and collected for
fiscal year 1974, the discriminatory assess~-
ments were “reluctantly made public” by the
District of Columbia officials in June, 1973,
during the trial of an action brought to en-
join the fiscal year 1974 taxes and entitled
Green v. District of Columbia. Accordingly,
the Superior Court of the District of Colum-
bia enjoined the levy and collection of
these taxes for fiscal year 1974 as unconsti-
tutional as denying equal protection as read
into the Fifth Amendment. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed. Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Green, 310 A.2d 348
(1973). (App. p. A-74.)
The instant case (Keyes) was thereupon
filed as a class action to recover the un-
constitutional tax levied and paid by the
34,000 homeowners for fiscal year 1973, at
a time prior to the revelation of the deceit
of the District officials. The trial court
ordered a refund of the unconstitutional
tax collected. (App. pp. A-69/73.) The
trial court ignored the defense of the Dis-
trict that taxpayers had failed to take
timely administrative appeals, and directed
refund of the unconstitutional taxes.
On appeal, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals acknowledged the taxes to
have been unconstitutionally levied and
collected, but nevertheless reversed.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari was
taken to this Court in the October Term,
-9-
1976 and the Writ was denied April 18, 1977.
The mandate of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals issued on April 26, 1977.
Following the denial of the Writ of
Certiorari by this Court and following the
issuance of mandate by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals a most bizarre
set of circumstances came to light on June
13, 1977 that raised the Constitutional
issue that brings petitioners back to this
Court with a second petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
District of Columbia v. Burlington,
375 A.2da 1052 (hereinafter referred to as
"Burlington II") (Appendix, infra, p. A-
147) was decided June 13, 1977. In that
opinion, the Court, en banc, said:
On April 23, 1976, we grant-
ed appellee's petition for hear-
ing en banc and vacated the January
29 (1976) decision. [at p. 1053]
(The January 29, 1976 decision of Dis-
-10-
trict of Columbia v. Burlington, unreported
Slip opinion D.C. App. 1976, is hereinafter
referred to as "Burlington I".) (Appendix,
infra, p. A-90.)
The Keyes case was argued in the Court
of Appeals on December 5, 1974. Following
briefing and argument, the three judge panel,
On February 27, 1976, issued an Order (Appen-
dix, infra, p. A-145) asking the parties to
submit memoranda addressing the following
extraneous question not covered in the briefs
of either party:
Bearing in mind (a) that this
court’ in District of Columbia v.
Green (310 A.2d 848 (1973)) speci-
fFically approved the trial court's
finding that an injunctive remedy
was available in that case due to
the "exceptional and extraordinary"
circumstances there presented. (at
853) and (b) that this court re-
cently reiterated that proposition
in District of Columbia v. Burlina-
ton Apartment House Company =fn The
Burlington Hotel, D.C.App. A.
No. 6, January 29, 1976) [Bur=
lington I] at pages 4-5 of the slip
opinion, are the appellees in this
case barred from the relief sought
“hens
-ll-
by reason of their failure to pur-
Sue their statutory remedies in
Se Se inate ae
ere in addressing them-
selves to the question, the parties
should discuss rict of Columbia
v. Berente 15 .S. : ,
F.2d se 71972) . (Emphasis supplied.)
Comments on this question of the neces-
sity of an appeal to the Board of Equaliza-
tion and Review in tax refund cases were filed
by counsel for the District of Columbia on
March 15, 1976 and by counsel for the Keyes
taxpayers on March 24, 1976.
One month after the March 24, 1976 fil-
ing by the Keyes taxpayers, the Court of Ap-
peals vacated Burlington I on April 23, 1976,
telling the District of Columbia but not the
Keyes taxpayers. Keyes was decided four
months later on July 23, 1976.
It is undisputed that taxpayers, peti-
tioners here, were never notified and never
knew that Burlington I had been vacated on
April 23, 1976 until June 13, 1977, but that
the District of Columbia, et al., respondents
v
'
-12-
here, were notified and did know of that
vacation.
Upon learning that the above had occur-
red, petitioners immediately filed a motion,
with the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals to withdraw its mandate and to grant
a hearing en banc, (Appendix, infra, p.
A-164) which was denied by the Court of
Appeals en banc on September 13, 1977.
(Appendix, infra, p. A-194.),
On September 22, 1977 petitioners
moved the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals to withdraw the mandate of April
26, 1977 on the procedural grounds that
relief would be denied with the ending o1
the 1977 term of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals on December 31, 1977 if
petitioners ultimately prevail on the
merits.
The Court of Appeals denied this mo-
tion October 11, 1977, after which peti-
-13-
tioners moved this Court on October 27,
1977 for leave to file Petition for Writ
of Mandamus to require recall of the man-
date before December 31, 1977 so that re-
lief might not be denied if petitioners
ultimately prevail on the merits. At the
time of filing of this petition for Writ
of Certiorari, the October 27, 1977 motion
for leave to file Petition for Writ of
Mandamus is pending.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
This case arises in a narrowly defined
area of concern which affects the fairness
of hearings in the 50 highest state Appel-
late Courts and the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. cf. Key v.
Doyle, 46 U.S.L.Week 4009 (U.S. November
14, 1977).
The District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals, in this case, acted to deny peti-
tioners a "hearing". The denial of that
-14-
"hearing" prevented petitioners from ever
having a hearing on the merits on their
claim to have been unconstitutionally de-
prived of their property.
The petitioners were denied a "hearing"
because the District cf Columbia Court of
Appeals held an "ex parte" proceeding from
which petitioners were excluded.
The "ex parte" proceeding took place in
the following way (more fully described at
Appendix, infra, p. A-166 to A-169 and A-177
to A-179 and the Statement of the Case,
supra). Following argument on the merits
of Keyes before the panel that heard the
case, the panel on February 27, 1976 addres-
sed the parties, in such a way as to re-
quire the parties to respond, assuming that
Burlington I (Appendix, infra, p. A-90) was
"the law cf the District of Columbia". On
April 23, 1976 (one month after the parties
responded) Burlington I was vacated. Respon-
ee —
-15-
dents were informed of this, but petitioners
were not. Keyes was decided four months later
on July 23, 1976 on the Burlington I principle
of failure to pursue statutory remedies.
Holding an "ex parte" hearing or pro-
ceeding in a highest state court or in the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals is a
violation of "due process" of either the
Fourteenth or the Fifth Amendments respec-
tively because no fair hearing has been held.
This Court has a well-defined "thres-
hold" test for the failure to give a "fair
hearing" in the highest appellate court.
Cases along that threshold where the highest
state appellate court has failed to give a
“fair hearing" on the merits are, for example:
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) and
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971)
("novel procedural requirements" to thwart
hearing); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (arbitrary appli-
-16-
cation of rule to prevent hearing); Barr v.
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964), (in-
consistent application of rule to prevent
hearing); Wright v. State of Georgia, 373
U.S. 284 (1963) and Staub v. City of Bax-
ley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958), (arbitrary appli-
cation of rule to prevent hearing).
Compare NAACP v. Alabama, et seg. with
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v.
Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
The facts in Keyes clearly fall well
within the "threshold". An "ex parte" pro-
ceeding took place. Therefore, there was
no "fair hearing” on petitioners' constitu-
tional claims.
The Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments re-
quire that the proceedings before the appel-
late court once instituted be fair and even
handed. This court, from NAACP, supra, to
Mayer, supra, has set as the minimum standard
-17-
for the final state appellate proceeding
that there be a “fair hearing".
As the result of the denial of a
hearing, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals never heard petitioners' constitu-
tional claim on the merits. That constitu-
tional claim was to enforce petitioners'
federal right under the constitution to re-
cover property. That property was taken
under an admittedly unconstitutional and
discriminatory tax. Green, supra. cf.
Brinkerhoff, supra.
Burlington II (Appendix, infra, p.
A-147), which was later decided, reversed
Burlington I. Burlington II would have
permitted recovery of the unconstitutional
and discriminatory tax.
The "ex parte” proceeding denied peti-
tioners the right ever to argue their claim
of an unconstitutional exaction.
-18-
Moreover, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals has no published rule with
respect to when or how or to whom it
announces the vacation of opinions. In
this instance, the court must be said to have
operated with either a "novel rule”, the
arbitrary application of a non-rule, or the
arbitrary action of the court where there was
no rule at all. The effect, in any event, was
to create an "ex parte" proceeding and deny
petitioners a "hearing". Mayer v. City of
Chicago, supra; Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., supra; Barr v. City of Columbia,
Supra; Wright v. State of Georgia, supra;
NAACP v. Alabama, supra; Staub v. City of
Baxley, supra.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of review by this Court,
the istrict of Columbia Court of Appeals
will have successfully denrived Petitioners
-19-
of due process of law.
Petitioners respectfully urge that the
writ of certiorari issue and that after hear-
ing this Court remand to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals for a hearing on
the unheard constitutional issue before
either the full bench of that Court or a
different panel of that Court.
Respectfully submitted.
.
Gilbert Hahn, Jr., Esq.
Wolf, Block, Schorr and
Solis-Cohen
llth Floor
1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Attorneys for Petitioners
APPENDIX
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 8790
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a Municipal Corporation,
and
WALTER E. WASHINGTON, and KENNETH BACK,
APPELLANTS,
Vv.
ARTHUR H. KEYES, JR., and LUCILLE KFYEs,
On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
APPELLEES.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia
(Argued December 5, 1974 * Decided July 23, 1976)
Louis P, Robbins, Principal Assistant Corporation
Counsel, with whom C. Francis Murphy, Corporation
Counsel at the time the brief was filed, Henry E. Wixon
and Richard L. Aguglia, Assistant Corporation Cownsel,
were on the brief, for appellants.
Gilbert Hahn, Jr., with whom Jack C. Sando was on
the brief, for appellees.
Before KELLY and GALLAGHER, Associate Judges, and
Pair, Associate Judge, Retired.
* At the court’s request, supplemental! post-argument mem-
oranda were submitted by the parties in March 1976.
A=2
GALLAGHER, Associate Judge: This is an appeal
from the Tax Division of the Superior Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. The appellees, Arthur H. Keyes, Jr.
and Lucille Keyes, filed suit, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, against the District of Colum-
bia, Mayor Walter E. Washington, and the Director of
the Department of Finance and Revenue, Kenneth Back,
appellants, for partial refunds of taxes paid in fiscal year
1973 on all single-family residential properties in the
District of Columbia which were assessed at 60% of
estimated market value. The tria! court held that the
appellees are entitled to the relief sought. We reverse.
During calendar year 1971, the level of assessment '
on approximately one-third of the single-family residen-
tial properties * in the District of Columbia was raised
from 55% to 60% of estimated market value for fiscal
year 1973.° This change in the level of assessment was
part of a plan by the Department of Finance and Reve-
nue of the District of Columbia to achieve a phased in-
crease in the debasement factor (level of assessement)
for all single-family residential properties in the District
‘ The level of assessment is also known as the “debasement
factor” or “multiplier.” This element in the tax computation
is the percentage of estimated market value upon which the
tax is levied. The assessed value or assessment for an individ-
ual piece of real property is obtained by multiplying the esti-
mated market value of the property by the level of assess-
ment, Thus, a dwelling valued at $100,000 is assessed at
$55,000 if a 55° debasement factor is applied and at $60,000
if a 60% debasement factor is applied.
? It is estimated that this suit involves approximately 34,000
properties.
: joer yg 4 of oe property are made an a calendar
year basis for the subsequent fiscal year. Fiscal year 1973
from July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1973. 4 on
A=3
of Columbia. Appellants seek to have their refunds meas-
ured by the difference between their actual tax bills
which they paid for fiscal year 1973 (for which a 60%
debasement factor was applied) and the lower tax bills
which they would have received if a 55% debasement
factor had been applied, plus 6% interest per annum.
In May 1973, an earlier class action was brought by
several single-family residential property taxpayers to
enjoin the District of Columbia from using unequal levels
of assessment in taxing single-family residential proper-
ties for fiscal year 1974. This court, in District of Co-
lumbia v. Green, D.C.App., 310 A.2d 848 (1973) (here-
inafter Green), affirmed the trial court and hela that
the District of Columbia’s “stairstep” approach to achieve
an increased debasement factor for all single-family resi-
dential properties was unconstitutional as it resulted in
different debasement factors being applied to the same
class of property in the same year.‘ Injunctive relief
was granted for fiscal year 1974, and the “stairstep”
plan was prohibited.
The present suit was brought as an uncertified * class
action to recover that portion of fiscal year 1973 residen-
‘ District of Columbia v. Green, supra at 855. Yet not all
inequalities in the assessment of property taxes are necessarily
unconstitutional. To illustrate, it has occurred frequently that
taxpayers pay different tax bills on property of identical
values due to the inability of the assessors to value all prop-
erty every year. This particular type of lack of equalization
between taxpayers has been held “permissible because caused
by logistical problems which may be temporarily beyond the
power of the city to correct.” District of Columbia v. Green,
supra at 856. We there concluded, in effect, that this logistical
factor was not reasonably established.
* The trial judge held that certification as a class action
and notice to members of the class were unnecessary because
A-4
tial property taxes paid which was attributable to the
increase of 5% in the level of assessment.’ The District
of Columbia appeals the decision of the trial court grant-
ing refunds to the taxpayers on the grounds that (1)
under traditional principles of equity and tax reform
litigation only prospective relief should have been granted;
(2) refunds should not have been granted without proof
that appellees bore a substantially disproportionate share
of the real property tax burden; (3) the trial judge
erred in not permitting the District of Columbia to prove
that appellees did not bear a substantially dispropor-
tionate share of the real property tax burden; and (4)
the trial court erred in permitting appellees to proceed
as a class for refunds without certification and individual
notice. We hold that appellees are not entitled to refunds
either under the statutes of this jurisdiction or by virtue
of equitable principles.
The trial court held, insofar as pertinent here, (1)
that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel the legal
and factual issues as they relate to the conduct of appel-
lants are controlled by the result in Green, and (2) that
the rules applicable to the Tax Division omitted any mention
of class action procedures. We note that effective September
8, 1975, Super. Ct. Civ. R. 28, 23-I and 23-II were incor-
porated by reference into the Tax Division rules, and pur-
ported class action tax suits are now subject to the same
criteria with respect to prerequisites, maintainability, and
notice as other civil suits. See Super. Ct. Tax R. 3.
* Notices of tax assessments for fiscal year 1973 were sent
out during the period from November 1, 1971 to March 1,
1972. April 2, 1972 was the last day to appeal to the Board
of Equalization and Review for any tax assessment for fiscal
year 1973. In September 1972 the first installment on prop-
erty taxes for fiscal year 1973 was due, with the second and
final installment due during the month of March 1973.
A-5
under principles of equity it would be inappropriate to
deny refunds in this case. We believe that, even if the
first holding were assumed to be correct, the second is
not.
Preliminarily, we observe that this suit was brought
in equity and was decided solely on equitable grounds. No
statutory remedy was sought or granted and one of the
premises of appellees’ approach to this litigation is that
their potential legal remedies, if any, were inadequate.
The rationale of the trial court is essentially that because
appellees were held to be entitled to injunctive relief in
Green, they are ipso facto entitled to tax refunds in this
case.
Recovery of taxes illegally or erroneously assessed and
voluntarily paid was not permitted at commen law and
is a matter within the purview of the legislative branch.
Therefore, refunds of taxes so assessed and paid will not
be made absent an authorizing statute. District of
Columbia v. McFall, 88 U.S.App. D.C. 217, 188 F.2d 991
(1951); Lindner v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App.,
82 A.2d 540 (1943)." Under the statutory procedure
’ See also, e.g., Snyderman v. Isaacs, 31 Ill. 2d 192, 201
N.E.2d 106 (1964); People ex rel. City of Highland Park v.
McKibbin, 380 Ill. 447, 44 N.E.2d 449 (1942), cert. denied,
318 U.S. 778 (1943); People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer, 371
Ill. 367, 21 N.E.2d 318, appeal dismissed sub nom., Illinois
ex rel, Eitel v. Toman, 308 U.S. 505 (1939); Drummond v.
Maine Employment Security Comm'n, 157 Me. 404, 173 A.2d
353 (1961); Baltimore County v. Churchill, Ltd., 271 Md. 1,
313 A.2d 829, appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902 (1974) ; Comp-
troller of the Treasury v. Campanella, 265 Md. 478, 290 A.2d
475 (1972); Wasena Housing Corp. v. Levay, 188 Md. 383,
52 A2d 908 (1947); Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. v.
Board of Finance and Revenue, 409 Pa. 180, 185 A.2d 542
(1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 958 (1963) ; Calvert Distillers
Corp. v. Board of Finance and Revenue, 376 Pa. 476, 103
A.2d 668 (1954).
A-6
applicable to this case, the recovery of refunds through
appeal to the Superior Court requires, as a first step, a
complaint to the Board of Equalization and Review.’
Subject matter jurisdiction of the Superior Court does
not attach until that prerequisite has been satisfied,’ and
a refund based on a final determination of the Superior
Court presupposes that the taxpayer has complied with
the procedure mandated by the legislature. If “ag-
grieved” for any reason, the taxpayer must appeal
within the permitted time to the Board of Equalization
and Review. D.C. Code 1973, § 47-709. This was not
done in this case. The taxpayers failed to follow their
administrative remedies for fiscal year 1973.
* D.C, Code 1973, § 47-709 reads in pertinent part:
Any person aggrieved by any assessment, equalization
or valuation made may within six months after October
1 of the year in which such assessment, equalization, or
valuation is made, appeal from such assessment, equali-
zation, or valuation in the same manner and to the same
extent as provided in sections 47-2403 and 47-2404; Pro-
vided, however, That such person shall have first made
his complaint to the Board of Equalization and Review
respecting such assessment as herein provided... .
This language is also codified in D.C. Code 1973, § 47-2405.
The relevant portions of these code provisions were repealed
effective June 30, 1975, and the above requirement is now
found in D.C, Code 1975 Supp., § 47-646 (i).
D.C, Code 1973, § 47-2407 reads:
Any sum finally determined by the Superior Court to
have been erroneously paid by or collected from the tax-
payer shall be refunded by the District to the taxpayer
from its annual appropriation for refunding erro
neousl
paid taxes in said District. . :
* Payment in full of the tax due is also jurisdictional, See,
e.g., George Hyman Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia,
D.C.App., 315 A.2d 175 (1974); District of Columbia v.
Berenter, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 466 F.2d 367 (1972).
A-7
Appellees contend that the administrative remedies
could not have been pursued by any of the taxpayers for
fiscal year 1973 because of prior concealment of the
“stair-step” plan by District officials. In Green, how-
ever, we noted that three petitioners “ascertained the
existence of, and raised as an issue, the increased level
of assessment of their properties” before the Board of
Equalization and Review for fiscal year 1974. District
of Columbia v. Green, supra at 851. These taxpayers not
only pursued their administrative remedies but in the
process also discovered the now prohibited practice of
applying ditferent debasement factors to similarly situ-
ated taxpayers. Consequently, we cannot assume, as the
trial court did in the case now before us, that a timely
administrative challenge to the 1973 taxes for the pur-
pose of obtaining refunds was unavailable or would have
been fruitless. The 1973 taxpayers were just as aware
as the 1974 taxpayers that their tax bills had been
increased.
In Green, we agreed with the trial court that the cir-
cumstances there were extraordinary and, further, that
it would be inequitable to allow those who had bypassed
the Board to proceed immediately with the action for
injunction while requiring those who had gone to the
Board to wait until tne expiration of the statutory period
before proceeding. Our conclusion was: “The evidence
of record supports the findings of the trial court and, as
a consequence, it was not error to entertain the [com-
plaint] for injunction.” District of Columbia v. Green,
supra at 853. Thus, we specifically limited our analysis
to the context of the relief sought.*° That is to say, we
1° Tumulty v. District of Columbia, 69 U.S.App.D.C. 390,
102 F.2d 254 (1989) was cited in Green for the proposition
that when an assessment is void, resort to equity may be had
A-3
held only that the circumstances before the court were
so extraordinary as to warrant a prohibitive writ re-
straining the practice for fiscal year 1974 and subsequent
years. Appellees argue that we should extend this hold-
ing to the instant refund case for the prior fiscal year of
1973. We disagree and hold that equitable intervention
is not justified in this case."
Moreover, even assuming it were appropriate to apply
the principles of equity to the facts before us, we do not
without following statutory remedies. District of Columbia
v. Green, supra at 853. Tumulty, however, involved the ques-
tion of whether an invalid District of Columbia tax claim.
filed in a receivership proceeding, could be attacked in that
proceeding by parties with other claims against the company
in receivership. The United States Court of Appeals held
that equity would permit such a collateral attack on the tax
claim. Hence, the relief sought and granted in Tumulty was
preventive in nature (because it precluded assertion of the
invalid tax claim) and therefore analogous to the injunctive
relief sought and granted in Green, but not applicable to the
refunds sought here.
‘* We note that the fiscal year 1974 taxpayers who resorted
to the Board of Equalization and Review and raised the issue
of unequal debasement factors found the Board unresponsive
to their arguments. Hence, in Green, where only injunctive
relief was sought, we stated that a taxpayer in that case had
“no meaningful ability to challenge his assessment at al!”
because the Board declined to inquire into the non-judg-
mental aspects of the assessment process. District of Colum-
bia v. Green, supra at 856. This was one of the extraordinary
circumstances upon which the grant of injunctive relief in
Green was based. However, the fact that an administrative
body may wrongly perceive the nature or scope of its powers
or responsibilities in a given instance is not a justification for
bypassing that body in all instances when it is an essential
element in a procedure of purely statutory origin. In fact, it
would be a rare instance when taxpayers would not bypass
the Board at great peril.
nn hn nilalall
- ee ES ee Rm.
A-9
ieve that appellees would be entitled to refunds. Re-
pial of pp context involved, the distinguish-
ing feature of equity jurisdiction is “.. . the power of
the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to
the necessities of the particular case.” Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). Thus, it is charac-
teristic of a court of equity that it must take a compre-
hensive view of the issues before it; and as a result its
extraordinary remedies are to be meted out with care.
Where the public interest is involved,
ourts of ity may, and frequently do, go
— Section hath to give and withhold relief
in furtherance of the public interest than they
are accustomed to go when only private inter-
ests are involved. Pennsylvania v. Williams,
294 U.S. 176, 185; Central Kentucky Gas Co. v.
Railroad Commission, 290 U.S. 264, 270-273;
Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Co., 289
U.S. 334, 338; Beasley v. Texas & Pacific Ry.
Co., 191 U.S. 492, 497; Joy v. St. Louis, [138
U.S. 1,] 47; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Marshall,
136 U.S. 398, 405-406; Conger v. New York,
W. S. & B. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 29, 32, 33; 23
N. E. 983. [Virginian Ry. v. System Federation
40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937) (emphasis added).
See also United States v. First National City
Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965) and cases cited
therein at 383.]
is principle was applied in Blair v. Freeman, 125
Us sede. "007, 370 F.2d 229 (1966) which involved
a marketing regulation of the Secretary of Agriculture
who authorized premium payments to dairy farmers in
certain locations. The payments were made from a
settlement fund or equalization pool intended to appor-
tion among producers the benefits and burdens of varia-
A-10
tions in the fluid milk market. One side effect of the
Secretary’s order was to reduce statutorily mandated
uniferm minimum prices received by other farmers not
in the specified geographical areas; and this adversely
affected group sought a declaratory judgment and an
injunction restraining enforcement of the regulation.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and the United
States Court of Appeals reversed and granted declara-
tory and injunctive relief but excluded the possibility of
refunds * for the following reason:
Appellants have invoked the aid of equity in
seeking a declaration of their rights and the
prevention of further interference with them.
We are concerned lest a declaration of invalidity
in the context of such an action be deemed to
require refund of moneys illegally paid and re-
ceived under an invalid order. A court of
equity may tailor its relief with a critical and
balanced view of the ramifications of its deci-
sion, including in the overall public interest a
consideration of the interests of those not before
the court. (125 U.S.App.D.C. at 217, 370 F.2d
at 239 (footnote omitted) .}
In treating the refund issue, the court considered a
variety of factors including the complexity of the re-
coupment and refund process, the large sums of money
and large number of farmers involved, the long delay in
filing suit, the difficulty in determining if the plaintiffs
* The court recognized that litigation as to refunds was
imminent because the appellants’ interest in the settlement
fund was sufficient to confer standing for such a suit and
because the appellants had sought an order requiring an es-
crow pendente lite. 125 U.S.App.D.C. at 217 n.39, 370 F.2d
at 239 n.39.
A-1l1
had received offsetting advantages from other aspects of
the equalization system, and the fact that the court was
convinced that under all of the circumstances “the pro-
ducers benefited are ~ot necessarily to be held to ac-
count for an ultra vires action taken by the Secretary
in what he conceived to be the public interest.” 125
U.S.App.D.C. at 217, 370 F.2d at 239 (footnote omitted).
We do not mean to say that these considerations are
dispositive of the issue before us, or even that all are
relevant to the case at hand. Rather, we recite them
because they demonstrate the mode of analysis which
should be applied by a court of equity in cases such
as this.
Prospective application of judicial decisions is a prac-
tice often followed, particularly where retrospective
operation of a decision would create economic hardship
which would outweigh the beneficial effect of retro-
activity.**
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Cochise County, 95 Ariz.
395, 377 P.2d 770 (1963) (en banc) it was held that
while real property taxes based on discriminatory assess-
ments had been illegally collected from a taxpayer rail-
road, only prospective injunctive relief would be
granted * because “(t]he refund which appellant seeks
1 This doctrine is sometimes applied when a decision over-
rules prior law or regulation. See, ¢.g., Safarik v. Udall, 113
U.S.App.D.C. 68, 304 F.2d 944, cert. denied, 371 US. 901
(1962) ; Arizona State Taz Comm'n v. Ensign, 75 Ariz. 376,
257 P.2d 392 (1953); State v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384
P.2d 833 (1963).
¢ Unlike the situation here, the practices complained of in
Southern Pacific, supra, had existed openly for many years
ith perfunctory protests from the affected taxpayer.
We ~~ believe, however, that the factual difference is a
A-12
together with other similar claims threatens the financial
solvency of many taxing units of the state... .”** 95
Ariz. at ——, 377 P.2d at 778. Significantly, the court
so held despite the fact that the taxpayer relied upon a
statutory provision which allowed for refund of illegally
collected taxes. On this point, the court said:
The State’s grace does not extend to its own
destruction. Clearly this was not within the
contemplation of the legislature in the enact-
ment of the refunding statute. [95 Ariz. at
——, 377 P.2d at 778. ]
In their presentations both here and in the trial court,
appellees have stressed that the District’s treatment of
this matter, although perhaps well intentioned, was not
characterized either by candor or adherence to principles
of good fiscal management, but this does not justify the
granting of refunds. However erroneous such practices
have been found to be, they cannot, consistently with the
objects of equity jurisprudence, be viewed in isolation
significant one. Although the Arizona Supreme Court was
critical of the inaction on the part of the railroad in the face
of long-standing discriminatory assessment, the refunds sought
were for only one-half of one fiscal year (rather than for the
entire period of discrimination) and the decision not to grant
refunds was based on that demand, which “together with
= similar claims” posed a threat to governmental sta-
ility.
** Although refunds were not at issue, much the same con-
siderations were taken into account by the three-judge dis-
trict court in Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615 (M.D.
Ala. 1971). In that case, Alabama's ad valorem property tax
program was held discriminatory and unconstitutional but
expressing concern about the fiscal impact of its decision, the
court allowed the Commissioner of Revenue up to one year
a the date of its opinion to equalize assessments. Jd. at
D-13
or without regard to the practical consequences which
the requested retrospective relief would have. This court
is confronted with the task of attempting to reconcile
competing claims to equity, these being the financial in-
terest of the assumedly wronged appellees on the one
hand, and the financial interest of the District of Colum-
bia as it relates to all of the people whom it serves, on
the other hand."
Appellees represent to this court that an average of
$41 per taxpayer is at stake here and that the aggregate
refunds sought in this particular litigation would amount
to from $1.1 million to $1.6 million.’ Appellees state
that the total refund amount would be insignificant in
light of the District’s budget of approximately $1 billion,
and that the District has recently foregone greater sums
by voluntarily reducing the debasement factor applied to
commercial property from 65% to 55%.
We do not agree. The sums at issue here are not in-
significant by any realistic standard, whether absolute
or relative; and this decision may be considered to have
precedential effect in future class action iax refund cases.
The funds collected for fiscal year 1973 have already
been disbursed for governmental purposes which have
benefited all of the citizens of the District of Columbia
and the refunds sought here would have to be financed
‘* Another implication of appellees’ arguments has been
that they seek by means of this suit to serve a general in-
terest in good government by encouraging fairness and open-
ness on the part of officials of the District. We believe, how-
ever, that this interest has been vindicated by the result in
Green.
** Appellees’ estimates below were an average refund of
approximately $50 per taxpayer, with some as little as $10 or
less and a total of $1.5 to $1.75 million.
A-14
through increased taxes or decreased services. It has
been stated in a somewhat similar situation, that
[aJs government is dependent on taxation for
its maintenance, the local subdivision that levied
the illegal or unconstitutional tax would have
to tax the taxpayers to raise the necessary
money to return to them the illegal or unconsti-
tutional tax collected. In other words, the tax-
payers would have to be paid the illegal tax,
paid by them, out of their own pockets. Such
a ceremony would be idle and vain. [Dupre v.
City of Opelousas, 161 La. 272, ——, 108 So.
479, 481 (1926).]
Thus, not only did the taxpayers not pursue the statu-
tory procedures, but under these particular circumstances
the adverse impact of refunds on the entire citizenry of
the District outweighs the economic interest of the prop-
erty owners who paid the taxes at issue."*
: Appellees in this case have come to the courts seeking
equity but equity has already been done by the first
Green case, supra, where a mandatory injunction was
affirmed despite this jurisdiction’s anti-tax injunction
statute. D.C. Code 1973, § 47-2410. After a balancing
** The second opinion of this court in District of Columbia
v. Green, D.C.App., 348 A.2d 305 (1975) is not to the con-
trary. Our decision there was simply an implementation of
the first Green case (310 A.2d 848 (1973)) and it did not
run to tax refunds for a prior fiscal year.
v4 D.C. Code 1973, § 47-2410: “No suit shall be filed to
enjoin the assessment or collection by the District of Colum-
bia or any of its officers, agents, or employees of any tax.”
Injunctive relief notwithstanding the existence of an anti-
tax injunction statute is not entirely unprecedented, but it
may be granted only in the most exceptional and stringent
circumstances. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974) :
A-15
of all interests in this case, we conclude that the public
interest would be disserved by a grant of the refunds
sought. In Green, we went as far as equity requires us
to go and so we will not go further here.
While application of the principles of equity occasion-
ally may be appropriate in tax litigation (¢.g., Green)
it would hardly aid the financial stability of this city if
this court were to relax the statutory requirements of
our Code as they relate to tax litigation and superimpose
equity jurisprudence on these statutory requirements.
This should be done only in a rare case ‘e.g., Green).
Otherwise. financial instability would be promoted. Tax
statutes are necessarily formalistic and often technical.
It is essential that we adhere to their technicalities, even
if at times a seeming hardship results to the taxpayer.
See, e.g., George Hyman Construction Co. v. District of
Columbia, D.C.App., 315 A.2d 175, 178 (1974). Among
other things, fiseal considerations require that this be
done. Where class action tax refunds for fiscal years in
the past are at issue, the relief sought would not ema-
nate from some inexhaustible treasury. The reality is
that the funds could only be supplied by an additional
tax on innocent taxpayers,” or the reduction of services,
in an already financially beleaguered city. Only in ex-
traordinary circumstances, not here present, should the
equity relief sought be afforded.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is
Reversed with instructions
to dismiss the complaint.
Enochs v. Williams Packing and Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1
(1962).
20 This would include taxpayers in the class here secking
relief.
A-16
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TAX DIVISION
ARTHUR H. KEYES, JR., et al.,
Petitioners :
Vv. NO. 2214
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, :
et al., :
Respondents
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court pursuant
to the action denominated as Taxpayers'
Suit for Refund of Tax for Fiscal Year
1973 Illegally Assessed which, in essence,
seeks refunds for approximately 34,000
persons owning single-family residential
property in the District of Columbia (in-
cluding residential garages and vacant
land zoned for single family residential
use).
It is alleged that these 34,000 persons
were taxed, and paid their taxes, for
Fiscal Year 1973 at a level of assessment
A-17
(debasement factor) of 60 percent of esti-
mated market value and that these tax-
payers should be assessed for taxation at
the same level of assessment (debasement
factor) of 55 percent of estimated market
vdlue as were assessed some 62,378 other
owners of single-family residential pro-
perty in the District of Columbia for the
same Fiscal Year 1973.
The Petitioners aver that fixing a level
of assessment for real property is rule-
making within the meaning of the District
of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act
and that failure to give notice to the
District of Columbia single-family resi-
dential property owners that the level
of assessment of their properties was in
the process of change, deprived the tax-
payers of the due process afforded by the
D.C.A.P.A. and invalidated the increased
taxes assessed at 60% of estimated market
A-18
value.
It is also contended that the inten-
tional and arbitrary actions of Respon-
dents in applying unequal levels of
assessment (55% and 60%) to estimated
market value within the same class of
Single-family residential properties is
violative of the Fifth Amendment rights
under the Constitution of the United
States of the Petitioners and others
Similarly situated to them.
As a result of the above, the Peti-
tioners request refunds which are to be
measured by the difference between the
tax bill rendered and voaid for Fiscal
Year 1973 at a level of assessment of
60% of estimated market value and the
tax bill as it should have been assess-
ed for Fiscal Year 1973 at a level of
assessment (debasement factor) of 55% of
estimated market value, volus interest at
6% per annum.
A-19
The Respondents have answered that the
petition fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted and that this
Court is without jurisdiction to hear and
determine this matter; they also deny the
tax bills for Fiscal Year 1973 were in
any way illegally rendered, deny Petition-
ers can maintain this action as a class
action for themselves and all others claim-
ed to be similarly situated and deny they
have violated the D.C.A.P.A. or that the
taxpayers have been deprived of the due
process required by the D.C.A.P.A. They
do:
",..admit that all taxpayers were
not assessed at the same level of
assessment (debasement factor) for
Fiscal Year 1973..."1/
At the same time the taxpayers’ suit
was filed and Respondents answered, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals had
17 Answer of Respondents, Par. 6.
A-20
yet to hear argument and render decision,
on an expedited basis, in Green, et al
v. District of Columbia, et al., D.C.App.,
319 A.2d 848 (1973). Accordingly, ina
motion to place the instant case upon the
reserve calendar pending the Green deci-
sion, Respondents referred to Petitioners'
contention that the present case involves
the same Respondents and similar Peti-
tioners and a claim of res judicata for
facts and questions of law decided June
29, 1973 in Green, and said that "[w]hen
a decision is rendered by the appellate
court, this case may be governed by that
decision."
Thereafter, Respondents moved to ex-
tend the time in which to file their
response to Petitioners’ Motion to Sub-
mit Case Without Trial until 30 days
after final decision was reached in
Green, supra.
A-21
"...According to Petitioners,
the final decision on that appeal
would be res judicata of the pre-
sent case for both facts and ques-
tions of law. Thus, in accor-
dance with Petitioners' premise,
until that case is finally decided
it would be undesirable for this
Court to require an answer to
Petitioners' Motion..."
After the appellate decision in Green,
although specifically stating they had no
objection to the Green trial record becom-
ing part of this Keyes trial proceedings,
the Respondents formally opposed Petition-
ers' Motion to Submit Case Without Trial
because:
"Respondents herein wish to
proffer to this Court the testi-
mony of witnesses to fully pre-
sent the assessment system used
by the District for purpose of
real property taxation for Fis-
cal Year 1973."2/
"While the District of Columbia
presented explanations in a trial
27 Par. 2 Of Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion
to Submit Case Without Trial.
A-22
before this Court in Clarzell
Green, et al. v. District of
Columbia, et al, D.C. Tax Court
Case 2213, District of Columbia
Court of Appeals 7539, it was
limited in its amplification of
the tax assessment methods be-
cause the hearing was conducted
as an expedited proceeding."3/
Also, Respondents contended that, ab-
sent certain unspecified procedures to
be followed by Petitioners in order that
the matter be handled as a class action,
those procedures entered in a case before
another Judge of this Court could be fol-
lowed in this one.
The Respondents claimed that it did not
admit facts averred by the Petitioners
nor did they stipulate to any facts.
In consideration of the above on Novem-
ber 21, 1973 this Court denied Peti-
tioners' Motion to Submit Case Without
Trial and set the trial date, alterations
of which have resulted for several rea-
sons.
3/ Par.3 of Opposition to Petitioners' Motion to
Submit Case Without Trial.
A-23
Subsequently, for the convenience of
the litigations and also in light of the
Court's other and continuing judicial
atsanteia it was agreed between
counsel and the Court that there would
first be a determination of the Peti-
tioners' plea of res judicata or colla-
teral estoppel by judgment, and Respon-
dents' Opposition to same, prior to the
commencement of testimony, if any, in
this cause. If the Court agreed with
Petitioners' contentions, a hearing with
accompanying testimony and documentation
would become unnecessary. If the Court
agreed with Respondents' position, the
hearing would be scheduled to completion
with temporary suspension of the Court's
other responsibilities.
Accordingly, Petitioners filed their
47 Felony II assignment through January 1974;
~ Arraignment Court for February 1974;
Misdemeanor Trials for March 1974;
Preliminary Hearings for April 1974.
A-24
Motion for Judgment on the grounds of
collateral estoppel by judgment or res
judicata and Memoranda of Law in support
thereof. The Respondents have filed
their Opposition in the nature of a Mem-
Orandum and oral argument was heard on
the 5th of March 1974.
The Court agrees with the Petitioners,
as expressed in their oral argument, that
the principle of collateral estoppel, not
the principle of res judicata, is appli-
cable here. Lawlor v. National Screen
Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 75 S.Ct. 865,
99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955), relied on by both
parties, well defines the effect of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.
"The basic distinction,” said
Chief Justice Warren, "between the
doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppei, as those
terms are used in this case, has
frequently been emphasized. Thus,
under the doctrine of res judi-
cata, a judgment ‘on the merits'
in a prior suit involving the same
parties or their privies bars a
A-25
second suit based on the same
cause of action. Under the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel, on
the other hand, such a judgment
precludes relitigation of issues
actually litigated and determined
in the prior suit, regardless of
whether it was based on the same
cause of action as the second suit."
See, also, Tutt v. Doby, 459 F.2d 1195
(1972), 148 U.S.App.D.c. 171.
In the classic case of Cromwell v.
County of Sac, >/ illustrating the dis-
tinction between the direct effect of a
judgment as res judicata and its colla-
teral effect, Justice Field stated:
",,..where the second action be-
tween the same parties is upon
a different claim or demand,
the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel only
as to those matters in issue or
points controverted, upon the
determination of which the find-
ing or verdict was rendered,
In all cases, therefore, where
it is sought to apply the estop-
pel of a judgment rendered upon
one cause of action to matters
arising in a suit upon a dif-
ferent cause of action, the in-
5/ 94 U.S. 351, 352-353, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1877).
A-26
quiry must always be as to the
point or question actually liti-
gated and determined in the origi-
nal action, not what might have been
thus litigated and determined. Only
upon such matters is the judgment
conclusive in another action."
The principle of collateral estoppel em-
braces matters both of fact and law, and
it is clear that one must look to the plead-
ings forming the issues and must examine
the record for a determination cf the ques-
tions essential to the decision of the
earlier litigation:
1. Whether the issue sought to be
concluded is the same as that
involved in the prior action?
2. Was the issue litigated in the
prior action?
3. Was the issue judicially deter-
mined in the prior action?
4. Whether the judgment in the prior
action was dependent upon the de-
termination made of the issue?6/
67 Cf. United Shoe MachineryCorp. v. United
States, U.S.451,459, S.Ct. 363, 66 L.Ed.
708 (1922). If the parties could have reasonably
foreseen the conclusive effect of their action,
eminent authority holds the principle of colla-
teral estoppel properly applicable. Moore's Fed.
Prac.Vol.1B,§0.444; Tutt v. Boby, supra, at p.1200.
ow oe ot
2 ee le et 00 elit bs nena aiclliee be chal Ralgpipen tes AB >
ee ee ed
+ ato om
A-27
If the above questions are affirmative-
ly answered, the issue is concluded under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Or, to put it another way: the essence
of collateral estoppel by judgment is
that some fact or question in dispute has
been judicially and finally determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction between
the same parties or their privies. If
the second action involved a different
claim, different demand or different
cause, the judgment in the first suit
operates as a collateral estoppel only
as to those matters which were in issue
Or controverted and upon the determina-
tion of which the original judgment
necessarily depended.
As noted, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is operative where the second
action is between the same persons who
were parties to the first action.
"A judgment for the plaintiff
A-28
in the first action may have
the effect of enabling him to
recover in the second action
without proving the facts con-
stituting his cause of action,
provided that those facts were
litigated and determined in the
prior action; but the defendant
is not precluded from defending
the second action on grounds not
litigated and determined in the
first action."7/
These rules are also applicable
",..to periodic taxes, such as
successive income taxes or pro-
perty taxes. If in an action be-
tween the taxing authority and
the taxpayer an issue of fact is
litigated and determined by a
judgment with reference to the
tax on one year, the determina-
tion is conclusive if the same
issue is raised between the tax-
ing authority and the taxpayer
with reference to the tax of a
subsequent year."8/
The doctrine of estoppel by judgment
has long been applied in the Federal
77 Restatement of Judgments (1942) 68a, at
p. 295.
8/ Restatement of Judgments (1942) §68c, at
p. 299.
PO ee
A-29
Courts in the tax field. The case of
Com'r. v. Sunnen,= (concerning federal
income tax consequences of intra-family
assignments of income) held that a prior
income tax judgment is res judicata only
in
"...a subsequent proceeding in-
volving the same claim and the
same tax year",
and confined the doctrine of collateral
estoppel to
",...-Situations where the matter
raised in the second suit is
identical in all respects with
that decided in the first pro-
ceeding and where the control-
ling facts and applicable legal
rules remain unchanged."10/
With application of the doctrine of res
judicata it has been repeatedly held that
the parties are concluded in a suit for
one year's tax as to the right or question
adjudicated by a former judgment respect-
97 333 U.S. 591, 68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898
71948).
10/ Com'r. v. Sunnen, supra, 333 U.S. 591,
599-600.
A-30
ing the tax of an earlier year. City of
New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U.S.
371, 17 S.Ct. 905, 42 L.Ed. 202:
"It follows, then, that the mere
fact that the demand in this
case is for a tax for one year,
and the demands in the adjudged
cases were for taxes for other
years, does not prevent the
operation of the thing adjudged,
if, in thé prior cases the ques-
tion of exemption was neces-
Sarily presented and determined
upon identically the same facts
upon which the right of exemp-
tion is now claimed." (at p. 398)
Compare, also, among others, Tait v.
Western Maryland Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 620, 53
S.Ct. 706, 77 L.Ed. 1405; Deposit Bank v.
Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 24 S.ct. 154, 48
L.Ed. 276.
By application of collateral estoppel
both the government and the taxpayer are
relieved of "redundant litigation of the
identical question of the statute's appli-
cation to the taxpayer's status. °-~
A Tait v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., supra, at
A-31
Collateral estoppel attempts to pre-
clude the repeated controversy of mat-
ters once judicially determined, aiming
for judicial finality. It is considered
"...a reasonable measure calcu-
lated to save individuals and
courts from the waste and burden
of relitigating old issues."12/
Compare the applicability of collateral
estoppel to criminal proceedings as an
integral part of the protection against
double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Once an issue
of ultimate fact has been determined by
valid and final judgment, that issue can-
not again be litigated between the same
parties in any future law suit, Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25
L.Ed.2a 469; Harris v. Washington, 404
U.S. 55, 92 S.Ct. 183, 30° L.Ed.2d 212
(1971).
127 Tillman v. National City Bank of New York
(Oca 2d, 1941) 118 F.2d 631, 634, cert. den.
(1941), 314 U.S. 650, 62 S.Ct. 96, 86 L.Ed. 521.
A-32
Even when the precise question for de-
termination in a second action (automo-
bile operator-host's negligence versus
his passenger) has not been litigated in
a technical sense, where the factual and
legal issues in che two actions (passen-
ger v. host and motorist; other motorist
v. host) are
",..SO interrelated that the re-
sult in General Sessions [deny-
ing recovery to the host against
the other motorist on the ground
that both parties were negligent]
is properly dispositive of the
subsequent action for contribu-
tions." Beegntheart v. McKay, 420
F.2d 242, 136 U.S.App.D.c. 400
(1969):
",...-The critical question in the
application of collateral estop-
pel is whether the parties have
had a full opportunity to liti-
gate the issue on which they are
estopped...Here, estoppel is in-
voked as against the person who
initiated the action in General
Sessions as plaintiff. There is
every reason to believe he exert-
ed his full energies to obtain
recovery, and sought to avoid any
determination of negligence on
his part..." (fn. 4)
A-33
In its dual function of protecting the
public interest in sound judicial adminis-
tration and protecting litigants against
needless, oft-times oppressive, court
action, collateral estoppel attains the
end result desired: final, but just, de-
termination of every suit.
Respondent's contentions that they now
wish to "fully" present the District's
assessment system, although they "present-
ed explanations" in the Green trial echoes
the refrain sounded by appellant in Tait
v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., supra.
Tait's appellant argued that the Circuit
Court of Appeals:
",..-might well have reached a
different result on the merits,
if the former case had been
more fully and accurately pre-
sented."
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding:
",..the very right now contest-
ed arising out of the same facts
appearing in this record, was
adjudged in the prior proceeding
A-34—
...-The [appellant] may not es-
cape the affect of the earlier
judgment as an estoppel by show-
ing an inadvertent or erroneous
concession as to the material-
ity, bearing or significance of
the facts, provided, as is the
case here, the facts and the
questions presented on those
facts were before the court when
it rendered its judgment..."
It has been held by the Maryland Court
of Appeals that where it was determined
that the taxpayer (a military preparatory
school) was entitled to a tax exemption
for the year 1950 for certain land by rea-
son of its use for educational purposes,
the doctrine of estoppel by judgment was
applicable to a claim for a tax on the
same properties against the same parties
for another tax year (1954). State Tax
Commission for Maryland v. Bullis School,
Inc., 218 Md. 558, 147 A.2d 849 (1959).
In the Bullis case appellee had made a
proper showing to establish a tax exemp-
tion for the year 1950 which necessi-
tated a finding that.the property's use
—
—
ee hte RP me ON MR A Ce Gla os
ee ee ee er ee ee ae
ne REE Ge. wk ere ee wots 6 le 8 ok
ee ee
A-35
was for educational purposes entitling
an exemption under the appropriate Mary-
land statutes. Since the original case
there was
"...no material change in the
law, the parties and the proper-
ty are the same as in the pre-
sent case, and the only testi-
mony taken...showed that the use
of the property for the taxable
year 1954 was the same as in
1950."
Since the Maryland appellate court could
find no questions to be determined in the
second action that were not fully liti-
gated in the original case, it affirmed,
with costs, holding that the doctrine of
estoppel by judgment was properly applied
by the court helow.
Determination in the case of Green, et
al. v. District of Columbia, et al., D.C.
App., 310 A.2d 848 (1973), was made after
numerous pretrial motions and rulings,
substantial discovery (primarily by de-
positicas and computer runs), a full hear-
A-36
ing lasting five days, extending over
approximately 1,000 pages of transcript,
detailed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law rendered in a 60 page
Opinion and order , +2/ and terminating
in a comprehensive 16 page Court of
Appeals oftisusaee,” which, as does the
trial court's Opinion and Order, dis-
cusses at length the history of real pro-
perty tax assessment in the District of
Columbia. Findings and conclusions are
made both in the trial and appellate
courts concerning not only Fiscal Year
1974 (the Green case enjoined Respon-
dents from unsyually assessing a certain
class of taxpayers for Fiscal Year 1974)
but also concerning Fiscal Year 1973.
13/ Wash. L. -, Vol. 101, No. 172, p. 1737;
No. 173, p. 1749; No. 174, p. 1761 (1973).
14/ Green, et al. v. District of Columbia, et
al., D.C.App. 310 A.2d 848 (1973).
ee ee
Pe tae ot &
ey ee ee ee
Pree a tatiana Bn tie eee Neth! AE nih Be ih Silile in Meant ahha: Leta DP Wt nie the. aly OG PAAR Apt L ONS nin, Peat an SS AAO APP 0 Hd Ahm
A-37
The Keyes suit claims refunds for Fiscal
Year 1973 based on precisely the same
substantive issues that confronted the
Green trial court:
1. Whether the level of assessment
used to determine the assessed
value of single-family residen-
tial real properties in the Dis-
trict of Columbia was increased
from 55 percent of estimated
market value to 60 percent of
estimated market value in viola-
tion of the "rule-making" pro-
visions of the District of
Columbia Administrative Proce-
dure act?
2. Whether failure of the taxpay-
ers to timely avail themselves
of, and exhaust, administrative
remedies precludes the [refund]
relief now sought?
3. Whether the relief sought for
petitioners should be granted
for the benefit of all owners
of single-family residential
real property in the District
of Columbia?
4. Whether unequal levels of
assessment (55 to 60 percent of
estimated market value) were
used for single-family residen-
tial properties in the same tax
year in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States?
ee a
A-38
As they originally did in the Green
case, Respondents contend in the Keyes
case that the petition fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted;
that this Court is without jurisdiction;
that the tax bills rendered for Fiscal
Year 1973 were in no way illegally ren-
dered; that this matter is not maintain-
able as a class action. The Respondents
further deny that they have violated the
District of Columbia Administrative Pro-
cedure Act or that the taxpayers have
been deprived of the due process required
by that Act.
It must be noted that when Respondents'
Answer to Keyes was filed the Green deci-
sion still pended. Subsequently, three
months after the Green decision, Respon-
dents filed their Opposition to Motion
for Judgment on the Grounds of Collateral
Estoppel by Judgment or Res Judicata and
on March 5, 1974 presented oral argument
© ae thei Ay, eh DA 66 ree PED! ate. tine en | Aims &
Pe Py ee ee
A-39
as to this matter. In both their written
and oral argument, after the Green deci-
sion, Respondents concede that a class
action might be appropriate but only if
done in some unspecified manner:
"We have a class action. Fine.
We're not contesting that this
may very properly be. We're
saying if we have a class
action, let's do it properly.
And let's do it, since we're do-
ing it with refunds, let's do
it in a way...that that will
close the question once and for
all." (transcript of proceedings,
Mar. 5, 1974, p. 13,14)
It is difficult, however, to comprehend
Respondent's position, which slips and
slides, dependent on whether it was formu-
lated in pleadings before the Green deci-
sion or in written/oral argument after
the Green decision. To wit:
Respondents are not objecting to Peti-
tioner's attempt to have this case tried
as a class action--
"...{but] failure to have this
case properly certified as a
-4
" , — ; A-41 15/
class action may work to the detri- Even though the Court of Appeals
ment of respondents should they
prevail .." (p. 6, Respondent's
Opposit on to Motion for Judgment
on the srounds of Collateral Es- ; family residential class"
toppel by Judgment or Res Judicata). ;
—
refers over and again to the "single-
(p. 854),
"same class of property (residential
Yet, in the very same paragraph, Respon-
taxpayers),” (p.855), "same class" (p.
dents state that "in no way [do they] waive
855), “one class of real property";
any objections that they may make at such
"single family residential property
ae a ee ee reer ee bo ee!
time as a proper motion to certify this
; , , and other classes of real property";
case as a class action is filed with the
"one class of single-family residen-
court."
els ins ies ed nb en
; eae tial property owners", "single class
In an incredible position, the Respon-
of residential property owners" (p.
dents contend, three months after the
a 857), Respondents are "not certain
appellate decision in Green, that:
that all single family residential
"Respondents note that they
are not certain that all sin-
gle family residential property
represents a class in a refund
suit and suggest that certain
questions such as whether each
Single family residential pro-
perty is in fact solely occu-
pied by the owner, or is rental
property represents a class in a re-
fund suit", and, in effect, would re-
quire some 34,000 separate hearings
to determine answers to the questions
lel lit Nihon AA trae te AAA eal AR es AB AB
property, or, although occupied they pose above.
by the owner has income pro-
ducing units therein, may well | Nowhere now, as to defenses, as to new
have to be addressed by the
Court at such time as a proper
motion is filed." 15/7 Green, et al. v. District of Columbia, et
al., supra.
ee ee
A-42
questions of fact, do Respondents claim
that the merits of the matter would en-
title them to prevail on the fiscal year
assessment and taxes. In effect, all
they say is that new sales assessment
ratio studies concerning Fiscal Year
1973 have been performed since the Green
trial. They say further, through their
attorney, that:
"The District of Columbia has
no intention of attempting...
to have the District rehash the
facts that were proven in the
previous case...the District was
not and did not see fit to put
on testimony in depth and detail
with regard to a claim for re-
fund...[the Green case was an in-
junction suit concerning Fiscal
Year 1974]...finding that this
was an impermissible...level of
assessment, with regard to cer-
tain householders,...this does
not ipso facto give rise to a
refund...there is an entirely
different body of law that is in-
volved..."
And, later, continuing the same argument
in generalities:
"I will state...that under the
facts as already established and
BRR AAAS Bee Cate ee mmm Cath et) be LEO RON
el tly hele a tle le A pallial CaN tas + 6
ak ee ae
ss L6 oe) Set ia Olle .
A-43
under the additional facts that
the District of Columbia wishes
to put before the court with re-
gard to Fiscal Year 1973 that
under the overwhelming majority
law in the United States of
America, the petitioners are
not entitled to a refund of
taxes for Fiscal Year 1973,
whether they be brought in in-
dividual cases or whether they
be brought in the form of a
class action." (transcript of
oral argument, Mar. 5, 1974,
at pp. 21-22)
Let us, therefore, look to see what
Respondents have conceded by virtue of
their prior pleadings or briefs, and
what has been decided by the Court in
Green, et al. v. District of Columbia,
et al., which may permit or preclude
the use of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
Respondent's trial brief, filed in
the Green case, on June 23, 1973, is
clear:
"In calendar year 1971, the
level of assessment was raised
from 55% to 60% on approxi-
mately one-third of single
family residentia] properties
A-44
for FY 1973;..." (p. 31)
In the trial court's Opinion and Order
in the Green case it stated as follows:
"In fiscal year 1973 there were
37,290 changes of all kinds in
the assessments in the District
of Columbia of which approxi-
mately 34,193 (99.61%) were at-
tributable to changes in single
family residential property
levels of assessment.
"In fiscal year 1974 there were
45,364 changes of all kinds in
the assessments in the District
of Columbia, of which approxi-
mately 40,056 (88.3%) were at-
tributable to changes in single
family residential property
levels of assessment." (Trial
court's Opinion and Order)
Wash. L. Rep., Vol. 101, No.
173, at p. 1749.
The taxpayer received and paid his tax
bill on real property in the same manner
in Fiscal Year 1973 as he was required to
do for Fiscal Year 1974. (See Opinion
and Order in Green detailing these steps,
Wash. L. Rep., Vol. 101, No. 173, at p.
1749.)
The Court of Appeals expostulated in
tote. ets WU Bee el
PON 6 Ment teh ee dene Dd At Mid ees pe EP DEN | dod me *
Pasa to.
ye ee. ee
A-45
detail the way an individual real pro-
perty owner's tax liability was formu-
lated. Upon receipt of a tax bill there
were appeal procedures for an unhappy
taxpayer, first by complaint to the
Board of Equalization and Review and,
subsequently, by appeal to the Tax Divi-
sion of the Superior Court.
",..in a planned cyclical re-
assessment program, conceived
and orally implemented by the
Director of Finance and Revenue,
the level of assessment for
approximately 33,000 single-
family residential properties
was changed from 55% to 60% for
Fiscal Year 1973, and, in pre-
paring the tax rolls for Fiscal
Year 1974, an additional 44,485
Single-family properties were
debased at 60%..."
The Green case further developed that
the public disclosure of the heretofore
secretive unequal assessment raises came
in June 1973, "far too late to afford the
customary relief to approximately 77,485
Single-family residential real property
taxpayers who are being assessed at 60%
A-46
For example,
"Arthur Keyes, Jr., testified
that he did not know the market
value of his property ($77,600
remained the same when he re-
ceived his notice of increase
of assessment from $42,682 to
$46,560 in calendar year 1971
effective fiscal year 1973).
He was also neither aware nor
advised that the entire in-
crease came about as the re-
sult of a change in the level
of assessment from 55% to 60%."
(Order and Opinion, Wash. L.
Rep., Vol. 101, No. 172, at
p. 1741)
It is now settled that the fixing of a
level of assessment for real property is
rulemaking within the meaning of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Administrative Procedure
Act, and it was undisputed in Green that
no rules governing the method of assess-
ment of real property have been published.
Interpretation or explanation of the
words "full and true value" contained in
§47-713 of the Code was a rule within the
A-47
meaning of the District of Columbia Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and its formu-
lation was rulemaking. Accordingly, for
a number of years the meaning of "full
and true value" of single-family residen-
tial properties had been 55% of estimated
market value (i.e., 55% debasement factor).
This was an unpublished rule. The Court
of Appeals, in Greefi, has held that a
change in the debasement factor is rule-
making within the meaning of the District
of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act,
which must be published with an opportun-
ity for a public hearing.
The District
",...chose to apply different
debasement factors to the same
class of property in the same
year and, in so doing, denied
the [taxpayers] equal protec-
tion of the laws by discrimi-
nating among residential tax-
payers.”
It is clear that in Keyes, as in Green,
even if the taxpayer had known about the
A-48
disparity of the level of assessment,
he would have had no chance to success-
fully challenge his assessment, since
the increased debasement factor (55% to
60%) was arbitrarily determined and in-
flexible. It was not a subjective art,
such as is appraisal.
"The lack of equalization [be-
tween taxpayers owning identi-
cally valued properties with dif-
ferent assessments] [was] caused
by an intentional and arbitrary
application of two different
debasement factors to identical
properties."
",..evidence before the trial
court demonstrated the assess-
ments in years where the ‘stair
steps’ were being used caused
assessment increase that went
above and beyond the increases
that would have been caused by
property appreciation alone.
This should be no surprise,
for any raise in the debasement
factor must raise the assess-
ment. ...the facts of this case
have highlighted the importance
to the taxpayer of an accurate-
ly stated fair market value; it
is the only element in the tax
formula to which he can meaning-
fully object. If real increases
in his property assessment are
disguised in the form of a
we =
A-49
higher debasement factor, he
is totally remediless within
the normal avenues for seeking
redress."
"...the District cannot now be
heard to say in this appeal
that in attempting to cure the
one allegedly discriminatory
method of assessment between
single-family residential pro-
perty and other classes of other
real property it can in the
process deliberately discrimi-
nate between members within the
one class of single-family resi-
dential property owners..."16/
The Opinion and Order discussed (Wash.
L. Rep., Vol. 101, No. 173, p. 1753) the
above oral directive to change the level
of assessment for single-family residen-
tial real properties from 55% to 60% "for
all those properties reviewed commencing
in calendar year 1971 (for fiscal year
1973) and for calendar year 1972 (for
fiscal year 1974)." (Emphasis supplied.)
It was admitted in Green that the Finance
167 Green, et al. v. District of Columbia, et
al., Supra, at pp. 856, 857.
A-50
Director's "policy goal" of 65% was
never put into written form and when he
ordered the Fiscal Year 1973 level of
assessment (debasement factor) he did not
publish this change or give public notice
or other written notice to the taxpayers.
"As a result of this, and be-
ginning in calendar year 1971
(notices were mailed out to
taxpayers between November l,
1971 and March 1. 1972. but the
assessors' work was accomplish-
ed in calendar year 1971 (for
fiscal year 1973)) the bills
sent out in September 1972 to
approximately 34,000 (or to
1/3 of these taxpayers, Res-
pondents contend) of the 96,378
Single family residential pro-
perties had their level of
assessment changed from 55% to
60% of estimated market value.
"In calendar year 1972, for
fiscal year 1974, approximately
40,000 more (or to approxi-
mately 1/2 of these taxpayers,
Respondents contend) single
family residential properties
had their level of assessment
changed from 55% to 60% of
estimated market value.
"Presently, 18,893 single
family residential properties
remain at the 55% level of
assessment.
A-51 .
"The assessment increases in both
fiscal years 1973 and 1974 for
single family residential proper-
ties were represented to the
public as increases in property
value. But, in fact, the change
of assessment in fiscal year 1973
were due, in over 90% of the
cases, solely to a rise in the
level of assessment. in fiscal
year 1974 about 50% of the rise
was due to increases in property
value and about 50% to rises in
the level of assessment from 55%
to 60%.
"Using data derived during testi-
money and, in particular, from
the Respondents' own figures and
projectionsl7/ the following in-
formation was obtained for fiscal
years 1973 and 1974
"Total increased $203,794,400
assessment single
family residences
fiscal year 1972-1974
"Increased assess- $113,713,800
ment single family
residences fiscal year
1972 - 1974 due to
increase from 55% to
60% in the level of
assessment ("debase-
ment factor")
z7/ ‘Testimony of John E. Rackham, using the
acords of D.C. Department of Finance and
Revenue.
A-52 18/
"Increased assess- $ 96,080,600—
ment single family
residences fiscal year
1972 - 1974 due to
increase in market
value (estimated market
value)
"This exhibit demonstrates that,
as a result of these acts of the
District of Columbia in raising
the level of assessment (debase-
ment factor) for two years for
part of the single family resi-
dential properties from 55% to
60%, the assessment of that class
of property was increased by
$113,713,800 out of a total
assessment increase in the same
two year period of $209,794,400.
The substantial nature of the
effect of this change in the level
of assessment over this two year
period is evident." (Emphasis sup-
plied)
During the trial, in the Green case, the
Respondents admitted that in calendar year
1971 (for Fiscal Year 1973), as well as
for calendar year 1972 (for Fiscal Year
1974) all changes in assessments were com-
puted at a level of assessment at only
60%, except for minor administrative error.
18/ This was Petitioners' Exhibit 43 in the
Green case.
A-53
Accordingly,
"(t]he net result of these in-
tentional acts was that in fis-
cal year 1973 the level of
assessment was raised for
approximately one-third of the
taxpayers of this category--
"class" of 96,378 single
family residential properties
(excluding garages). (see
Wash. L. Rep., Vol. 101, No.
174, p. 1764, for Opinion and
Order)
An assessor-witness testified that "poor"
neighborhoods were assessed in Fiscal Year
1973, and when the estimated market
value was reduced for the Fiscal Year 1973,
then the level of assessment was raised
from 55% to 60%.
It was pointed out in Green, that in
Fiscal Year 1973 whole neighborhoods were
assessed from 55% to 60% level of assess-
ment, even those with less than 20% of
changes in the estimated market value.
Old City and Kalorama were illustrative.
As Assessor Beal testified in the
Green trial: He accomplished assessing
A-54
approximately 2,000 single family resi-
dential properties there for the Fiscal
Year 1973. There were a "lot of de-
creases" [in estimated market value] and
a "majority of increases". Probably
"all" of the 2,000 properties assessed
in Fiscal Year 1973 were chanced; "I do
not think any did not go to 60%. However,
some may have kept the same estimated
market value.” Whether the estimated
market value was reduced or increased
made no difference: the level of assess-
ment would still be 60%. (Wash. L. Rep.,
Vol. 101, No. 174, p. 1765).
Therefore, it was found that those tax-
payers who by-passed the Board of Equali-
zation and Review could not have known
of the changed level of assessment until
June 1973 and were, accordingly, denied
viable access to the statutory adminis-
trative procedure within the permissible
time. In any event, under the extraordi-
A-55
nary circumstances of the case, there
was, in reality, no effective administra-
tive remedy and any appeal thereto would
have been useless. "The evidence of
record supports the finding of the trial
soust.<.°ae
"When the assessment is void,
the taxpayer must resort to
equity for relief, without fol-
lowing statutory remedies...",
citing Tumulty v. District of
Columbia, 69 App.D.C. 390, 399-
400, 102 F.2d 254, 263-64 (1939).
How could the taxpayers in Keyes com-
plain timely to the Board of Equalization
and Review of an increase in their Fiscal
Year 1973 real property tax assessment
(from 55% to 60%) when they were clearly
unaware of any raise in the level of
assessment, and when they were unaware of
two levels of assessment existing for the
same class of single-family residential
properties. Just as in Green, they were
19/ Green, et al. v. District of Columbia, et
al., supra, at p. 853.
A-56
effectively denied an adequate adminis-
trative and legal remedy.
Respondents contend this Court is with-
out jurisdiction to entertain the present
action. The Court completely disagrees
and cites Green for authority. It would
be unbelievable to have jurisdiction to
enjoin an invalid, void, unconstitutional,
arbitrary, invidious tax assessment for
one fiscal year (1974); yet require de-
tailed, duplicative testimony, at sub-
stantial waste of campayer'e’ additional
monies to pay for the presentation of
testimony, covering identical matters,
for Respondents suggested 34,000 indivi-
dual hearings, to consider whether or
not the issues previously presented in
Green for Fiscal Year 1974 are the same
issues germane to a determination of
Keyes for Fiscal Year 1973.
As the trial court said in Green,
"Should the Court adopt Res-
A-57
pondents’ argument it would,
in effect, add yet another di-
mension of inequity to a situa-
tion already surrounded by un-
fairness, secrecy and lack of
candor. It would be tantamount
to telling a taxpayer that he
must pay thousands of dollars
and that he must yield days,
weeks and months of his effort
to develop testimony and docu-
mentation at his individual
high expense to reap, in return,
a few dollars in the majority
of cases (and hundreds or more
of dollars in other cases) just
to have the right to present
constitutional argument and to
exhibit that which is already
before this Court. Would not
this attitude in and of itself
be a coercive device on the
taxpayers to not pursue their
due remedies because of finan-
cial and time inability?”
The Court has gone into great detail
[and has avoided the temptation to cite
substantive and further examples] to
illustrate the multiple reasons the
Court finds that the principle of col-
lateral estoppel is significantly appro-
priate to the Keyes case. Accordingly,
there shall be no testimony taken in the
Keyes tax case.
A-58
Respondents pray the opportunity to
plead the law applicable to refunds in
general and to this case in particular.
Petitioners had earlier requested the
Court fix a time for filing briefs and
for oral argument. Both requests were
made prior to the written and oral argu-
ment concerning the applicability of
collateral estoppel, which necessarily
embraced--at least in part--the law
pertaining to refunds. Nevertheless,
fairness dictates that the parties have
the full opportunity, if they stiil so
desire, to develop in writing their res-
pective positions concerning applicable
law before a final determination of this
case. [There shall be no further oral
argument thereon. ]
Accordingly, if the parties, or any of
them, wish to file written briefs (op-
tional as far as the Court is concerned)
they may do so, as follows:
A-59
Petitioners to file written brief, if
any, on or before May 6, 1974; Respon-
dents to file written brief, if any, on
or before May 16, 1974, following which
the matter shall stand submitted.
/s/ Joyce Hens Green
Joyce Hens Green
Judge
April 25, 1974
Copies to counsel of record.
—— he ele 7.)
A-60
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TAX DIVISION
ARTHUR H. KEYES, JR., et Gh e
Petitioners
Vv. : NO.2214
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
et al.,
Respondents
OPINION AND ORDER
For fullest comprehension and compli-
ance this matter must be considered in
context with the Court's detailed
Opinion and Order of April 25, 19742/
holding the principle of collateral es-
toppel significantly appropriate to the
instant case as a result of Green, et
al. v. District of Columbia, et al.,
D.C. App., 310 A.2d 848 (1973).
Counsel had requested the opportunity
to file written briefs which have since
17 Wash. L. Rep., Vol. 102, No. 99, p.1029,
11974).
A-61 .
been filed and considered.
There are questions of law or fact com-
mon to the members of this class of tax-
payers, including equal protection under
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States and the statutes of
the District of Columbia, which predomi-
nate over any que~tions affecting only
individual members, and a class action
would be superior to other available
methods for fair and efficient adminis-
tration of the controversy. Members of
the class on behalf of whom petitioners
sue are so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable. The claims
of petitioners are typical of and appli-
cable to the claims of all members of
the class and petitioners have fairly
and adequately represented and protect-
ed the interests of all members of the
class. Prosecution of separate actions
by members of the class would create a
A-62
risk of inconsistency or varying adjudi-
cations with respect to individual members
of the class which would, as a practical
matter, be dispositive of the interests
of the other members of the class not
parties to the adjudications.
Nevertheless, Petitioners action does
not require certification as a class
action and notice to its members. Sepa-
rate rules have been adopted by the Board
of Judges for civil actions and for tax
actions, and the Tax Division has neither
adopted nor incorporated by reference the
Civil Division class action Rule 23 or
any other rule pertaining to class ac-
tions.
The facts in this case, as in Green,
supra, are so exceptional and extraordi-
nary as to merit extraordinary and excep-
tional relief that justice compels under
the inherent and general equity powers
of the Court. Accordingly, this cause is
A-63-
determined as a taxpayers’ suit in equity
in the nature of an uncertified class
action brought on behalf of the indivi-
dual petitioners and all others similar-
ly situatea.*
Petitioners and the approximate 34,000
other similarly situated owners of single
family residential properties in the Dis-
trict of Columbia were taxed, and paid
their taxes, for Fiscal Year 1973 at a
level of assessment (debasement factor)
of 60 percent of estimated market value.
27. Cr vV. Zubrinskie, 101 U.S. 601, 25 L.
Bd. 80). Yokley, Municipal Corporations:
"It is an essential element of a tax-
payer's suit that the suit be brought
in behalf of a plaintiff and other citi-
zens and taxpayers.
"A taxpayer's suit is necessarily a
class action. It must be brought not by
individuals, but by individuals, for
themselves and for all of the citizens
similarly situated." Vol. 4, Sec. 602,
p.36.
A-64
Petitioners seek in the form of refunds
the difference between what was actually
paid by these taxpayers and what should
have been paid had a level of assessment
of 55 percent of estimated market value
been used, plus interest at 6 percent per
annum computed from the date payment was
made until the date of refund.
In applicable substance, Green held
that the increases in property tax assess-
ment from 55 percent to 60 percent of
estimated market value were invalid be-
cause they were based on an arbitrary, in-
tentional, and discriminatory change by
Respondents in the level of assessment
(debasement factor) applied to petition-
ers and some 34,009 other taxpayers for
Fiscal Year 1973 and not applied for the
same Fiscal Year 1973 to approximately
62,378 other owners of single family resi-
dential real property in the District of
Columbia. Green further held that the
A-65
changes were nullified by their creation
in violation and disregard of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Administrative Proce-
dure Act. The taxpayers had ". . .no
meaningful ability to challenge his
assessment at a11"2’ when the District
choose to apply different debasement fac-
tors to the same class of property in
the same year because the taxpayer was
not aware that he was being treated dif-
ferently from his neighbor and that he
was being denied equal protection of the
laws. He was therefore effectively
denied his administrative remedy and his
timely complaint to court.
Put succinctly, as did the Court of
Appeals in Green:
"., . .irrespective of whether the
District may constitutionally dif-
ferentiate in the level of assess-
ment applied to residential real
3/ Green, supra, at p. 856.
a
eV” eee ee ee
a ee ee a ee
A-€5
property as opposed to commercial
real property,. . .it clearly may
not do so within the single class
of residential property owners."
at p.857.
Accordingly, Green ordered the level of
assessment for Fiscal Year 1974 reduced
to 55 percent of estimated market value
(by enjoining any other percentage level
of assessment) until and unless a level
of assessment was established after full
compliance with the District of Columbia
Administrative Procedure Act and further
provided that only equal le: els of
assessment were to be used.
In summary ,-/ the Court finds that the
same factors exist here as in Green: the
taxpayers were deprived of due process
and there has been discrimination among
the citizens of the same class of single
family residential properties. Some
taxpayers have been assessed at 60 per-
47 For fuller expostulation, see the Opinion
_ and Order of April 25, 1974, Wash. L. Rep.,
Vol. 102, No. 93, p. 1029, (1974).
A-67
cent of estimated market value, and paid
their taxes accordingly, while others
in the same class were assessed and paid
their taxes at 55 percent of estimated
market value. This is clearly in vicla-
tion of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States as it applies to the
Petitioners individually and to those
similarly situated. >/
It is frequently stated that a taxpayer
must pay his just share for the just and
orderly functioning of his Government.
It is never proclaimed thet a taxpayer
should pay his unjust, inequitable, dis-
proportionate share. If he does--and
errors can occur--then the (Federal)
Government upon review refunds the ex-
cess, with interest. It is manifest that
the municipal government should do no
less. “Monies illegally exacted from a
57 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
A-68 '
citizen taxpayer by its Government must
be promptly refunded. To hold otherwise
would be unconscionable."
The Court concludes that the Petition-
ers and the approximate 34,000 others
Similarly situated are, upon computation
of the appropriate sums, entitled to
prompt refunds of the amounts overpaid,
with corresponding interest, in considera-
tion of the above invalid assessment and
then collection of taxes not rightfully
due and owing. The Court further con-
cludes that Respondents, by access to the
District of Columbia's data sources, tax
rolls, finance department, and computers,
are in an unique position to exactly as-
certain and yield the information neces-
sary from which the full and fair refund
. can be made.
A decision concerning counsel fees and
costs will be rendered upon the final
determination of the amounts to be refund-
oe A-69
ed to each citizen.
Having determined the issues in this
matter, the Court is withholding entry of
the amount of refunds due to each member
of the class of single family residential
real property owners whose property was
incorrectly and illegally assessed at a
level of assessment (debasement factor)
in excess of 55 percent of estimated mar-
ket value, to allow the parties, pursuant
to Superior Court Tax Rule 15, to submit
computations of the amounts due to each
person pursuant to the findings and con-
clusions entered in this case.
It is therefore, this 6th day of August,
1974:
ORDERED:
(1) the [sic] the Respondents submit
to Petitioners by August 27, 1974 computa-
tions of the amounts due, in accordance
with the findings entered in this case,
to each owner of single family residen-
A-70 .,
tial real property whose property was
assessed in Fiscal Year 1973 at a level
of assessment (debasement factor) in
excess of 55 percent of estimated market
value. These computations shall include
the names and addresses of each person
entitled to a refund, each property for
which a refund is due, the amount of
taxes which were paid, the amount of
taxes which should have been paid, and
the basis on which this calculation was
made (e.g. estimated market value), and
the refund due.
(2) That the Petitioners shall examine
the computations prepared by the Respon-
dents and notify both the Court and Res-
pondents by no later than September 17,
1974 as to whether they are in agreement
with the computations of the Respondent
as to the amounts of refunds due.
(3) That the Respondents shall make
such information available to Petitioners
A-71_
as will enable them to fully and aae-
quately review the computations made by
Respondents;
(4) That if the parties are in agree-
ment as to the amount of the refund due
to be entered as the decision pursuant
to the findings and conclusions made by
the Court, the Respondents shall file,
within three (3) days after being noti-
fied by Petitioners that they are in
agreement, with the Deputy Clerk for the
Tax Division an original and 2 copies
of a computation showing the amount of
the refund due, together with a state-
ment to the effect that there is no dis-
agreement and that the figures shown are
in accordance with the findings and con-
clusions of the Court. A decision will
then be entered accordingly.
(5) That if, however, the parties are
not in agreement as to the amount of the
~~ 9 ———
Se,
ne ee ae ee ee 7
A-72
refund due, they shall notify the Court
of the basis of their disagreement by no
later than September 20, 1974. Pursuant
to the procedure set forth in Superior
Court Tax Rule 15 (b) to be followed in
the absence of agreement, either party
may file with the Deputy Clerx for the
Tax Division a computation of the amounts
of refunds believed by such party to be
in accordance with the findings and con-
clusions of the Court and shall serve a
copy of those computations on the oppos-
ing party. The matter will then be
scheduled by the Court for argument. If
the opposite party fails to file an ob-
jection accompanied by an alternative
computation at least 5 days prior to the
date of such argument or any continuance
thereof, the Court may determine to enter
decision in accordance with the computa-
tion already submitted.
(6) That if computations are submitted
A-73
by the parties which differ as to the
amount to be entered as the decision,
the parties shall be afforded an oppor-
tunity to be heard in argument thereon
on the date fixed, and the Court shall
determine the amount of refund due and
enter its decision accordingly. Pursuant
to Superior Court Tax Rule 15(c), any
argument shall be confined to the con-
sideration of the correct computation of
the amount of refunds due resulting from
the findings and conclusions theretofore
made, and no argument shall be heard upon
or consideration given to any new issues
or to the issues or matters already dis-
posed of by such findings and conclusions.
The hearing shall not be regarded as
affording an opportunity for rehearing or
reconsideration.
ce Hens Green
Judge
/s/ Joyce Hens Green
oy
Copies to Counsel
i il re
=
A-74
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 7539
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A Municipal Corporation,
and
WALTER E. WASHINGTON,
and
KENNETH BACK, APPELLANTS,
Vv.
CLARZELL GREEN, ET AL., APPELLEES.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia
(Argued September 7, 1973 Decided October 9, 1973)
Louis P, Robbins, Assistant Corporation Counsel, with
whom C. Francis Murphy, Corporation Counsel, and
Henry E. Wixon, Robert E. McCally, Richard W. Barton,
David P. Sutton, Kenneth A. Pels and Richard L. Agu-
glia, Assistant Corporation Counsels, were on the brief,
for appellants.
Gilbert Hahn, Jr., with whom Jack C. Sando was on
the brief, for appellees. Philip W. Amram, Daniel G.
Grove and Steven L. Engelberg also entered appearances
for appellees.
A-75
Before Reilly, Chief Judge, and Kelly and Nebeker,
Associate Judges.
KELLY, Associate Judge: This appeal is from an order
entered in the Superior Court, Tax Division, enjoining
appellants from using, for purposes of taxation of single-
family residential properties within the District of Co-
lumbia, unequal levels of assessment of estimated market
value in determining the assessment, valuation or equali-
zation of such properties, and from assessing such prop-
erties at a level of assessment other than 55% of esti-
mated market value unless and until an equal level of
assessment is established by the District after full com-
pliance with the provisions of the District of Columbia
Administrative Procedure Act (DCAPA).' The issues
outlined by appellants for review are (1) whether the
trial court erred in holding temporarily unequal single-
family property levels of assessment (debasement fac-
tors)? of 55% and 60% to be unconstitutionally discrim-
inatory when such temporary inequality resulted from a
city-wide cyclical reassessment work program designed
to ultimately equalize all single-family property assess-
ments with the multi-family ard commercial properties
debased at 65%; (2) whether the trial court’s holding
compels an unconstitutional discrimination against multi-
family and commercial properties and 20% of the single-
family properties in the District of Columbia; (3) wheth-
er the development of a cyclical assessment program
designed to bring certain properties into compliance with
constitutional and statutory mandates for equalization is
“rulemaking” within the meaning of the DCAPA, and
(4) whether the failure of some appellees to exhaust
‘D.C. Code 1972 Supp., § 1-1501 et seq.
? The terms “level of assessment” and ‘“‘debasement factor”
are used interchangeably throughout this opinion.
—_ - oT. ee ee
ee ae
a
A-76
their administrative remedies and of others to pursue
their statutory legal remedies precluded the trial court
from granting injunctive relief. Appellees are in sub-
stantial agreement with the issues appellants present for
review, demurring only to the suggestion that any ques-
tion of a constitutionally prohibited discrimination
against owners of properties in categories other than
single-family properties is embraced within or even rele-
vant to this appeal.
I
In brief explanation of the essential background to
this appeal, there are three components of the mathe-
matical process used to determine the dollar amount of
tax due the District from an individual owner of real
property each year; namely, the market value of the
property, the debasement factor ‘level of assessment)
to be applied to that value to determine the assessment
(assessed value), and the tax rate. Market value (also
referred to as estimated market value) is the fair mar-
ket value of a particular property as determined from
time to time by District assessors. The debasement fac-
tor is the percentage of market value upon which the tax
will be levied. The tax rate is expressed in terms of dol-
lars per hundred and is currently $3.32 per each $100 of
an individual property’s assessed value.
The assessment for an individual taxpayer is de-
termined by multiplying the market value of the prop-
erty by the debasement factor or level of assessment.’
The tax rate applied to the assessed value of the prop-
erty is set by the City Council after notice published in
the District of Columbia Register and, like the level of
*Example: A house valued at $100,000 with a debase-
ment factor of 60% is assessed at $60,000 and taxed at the
rate of $3.32 per $100 of assessed value—$1,992.00.
A-77
assessment, is fixed. The third component of the above
equation, market value, is a variable with each individual
property having a unique estimated’ value. Upon receipt
of a tax bill, an aggrieved taxpayer may complain of an
alleged unfair assessment to the Board of Equalization
and Review (Board)* and, beyond that, appeal to the
Tax Division of the Superior Court.’
For several years immediately prior to calendar year
1969, if not before, all single-family residential prop-
erties in this city had a debasement factor of 55% and
all multi-family residential, commercial and industrial
real property was assessed at 65% of estimated market
value. Thereafter, in a planned cyclical reassessment
program, conceived and orally implemented by the Di-
rector of Finance and Revenue, the level of assessment
for approximately 33,000 single-family residential prop-
erties was changed from 55% to 609% for fiscal year
1973, and, in preparing the tax rolls for fiscal year 1974,
an additional 44,485 single-family properties were de-
based at 60%." The level of assessment of nearly 19,000
single-family residential properties remained at 55%.
Of the 44,485 taxpayers who at the end of 1972 re-
ceived notices of assessments for fiscal year 1974, only
1,044 appealed, three of whom somehow ascertained the
existence of, and raised as an issue, the increased level
of assessment of their properties. Of the eleven named
petitioners below (appellees), five unsuccessfully com-
plained to the Board of Equalization and Review of
alleged unfair assessments; six did not so complain. This
*D.C. Code 1972 Supp., § 47-709; § 47-2405.
> D.C. Code 1972 Supp., § 11-1202.
* Assessment is done on a calendar year basis for the fol-
lowing fiscal year.
4-78
class action was brought by petitioners on behalf of them-
selves and others so situated to enjoin the respondents
(appellants) from applying the 60% debasement factor
against their properties unless and until the same level
of assessment was applied to all single-family residential
properties within the District after compliance by the
District with the pertinent provisions of the DCAPA.
After a lengthy trial the court granted appellees the
relief sought, accompanying its order with a compre-
hensive and learned memorandum opinion with which
we are in full accord.’
The critical factors upon which we focus in our de-
cision are (1) that the District’s cyclical reassessment
program was undertaken in a manner which resulted in
unequal levels of assessment within a single class of
assessed property, and (2) that no notice was given to
District of Columbia single-family residential property
owners that the level of assessment of their properties
was in the process of change.
II
Relying upon D.C. Code 1967, § 47-709, appeilants
challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court to determine
the claims of the six appellees who failed to complain
of their increased assessments to the Board, alleging a
failure to exhaust their administrative remedies; * assert
*WasuH. L. REP., Vol. 101, No. 172, p. 1737; No. 173, p.
1749; No. 174, p. 1761 (1973).
~ D.C. Code 1972 Supp., § 47-709:
The valuation of the real property made and equalized
as aforesaid shall be completed not later than the first
Monday of May annually. The valuation of said real
property made and equalized as aforesaid shall be ap-
proved by the Commissioners not later than July 1, an-
4-79
that the appellees who did complain to the Board are
barred from suit by language in D.C. Code 1972 Supp.,
$$ 47-2403—2405specifying that the court may not en-
tertain a taxpayer’s petition until after October 1, and
after payment of the tax in full, and claim that the
trial court erred in issuing an injunction in the face of
D.C. Code 1967, § 47-2410 which provides that
No suit shall be filed to enjoin the assessment
or collection by the District of Columbia or any
of its officers, agents, or employees of any tax.
These jurisdictional points are not pressed with vigor
here, each of the parties preferring a decision on the
merits. Consequently, we simply point out that appellants’
latter argument would be readily accepted except that
the trial court found the facts of this case to be so ex-
ceptional and extraordinary as to merit equitable relief
and, as the Court said in Miller v. Standard Nut Marga-
rine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932):
nually, and when approved by the Commissioners shall
constitute the basis of taxation for the next succeeding
year and until another valuation is made according to
law, except as hereinafter provided. Any person ag-
grieved by any assessment, equalization or valuation
made may within six months after October 1 of the year
in which such assessment, equalization, or valuation is
made, appeal from such assessment, equalization, or val-
uation in the same manner and to the same extent as
provided in sections 47-2403 and 47-2404: Provided,
however, That such person shall have first made his com-
plaint to the Board of Equalization and Review respect-
ing such assessment as herein provided, except that, in
case of increase of valuation of real property over that
for the immediately preceding year, where no notice in
writing of such increase of valuation is given the tax-
payer prior to March 1 of the particular year, no such
complaint shall be required for appeal.
oe. “othhe.6 bw +
A-80
‘'W]here complainant shows that in addition to
the illegality of an exaction in the guise of a tax
there exist special and extraordinary circum-
stances sufficient to bring the case within some
acknowledged head of equity jurisprudence, a
suit may be maintained to enjoin the collector.
[Citations omitted. ] °
Additionally, the trial court found that since the six
named petitioners (appellees) who bypassed the Board
could not have known of the changed level of assessment
until it was reluctantly made public in this lawsuit in
June of 1973, they were unable to pursue the ad-
ministrative remedy created by statute prior to cutoff
date of April 1, 1973." It also found, in effect, that
under the extraordinary circumstances of this case, out-
lined at length in its memorandum opinion and not re-
peated here, the petitioners who did not appeal to the
Board were in reality afforded no effective administrative
remedy. Moreover, the court saw no reason to require
the parties who in good faith sought administrative re-
view to wait until October 1 to apply for relief, after
payment of tax, when those bypassing the useless ad-
ministrative procedure were permitted to proceed, stating
that to a@tept such an argument “would, in effect, add
yet another dimension of inequity to a situation already
surrounded by unfairness, secrecy and lack of candor.” "' |
The evidence of record supports the findings of the
» See also Allen v. Regents of University System of Georgie,
304 U.S. 439 (1938).
In its words: “The court is not persuaded by this argu-
ment and cannot believe that Congress intended that the
statute be subverted to include deceit of the populace, by
either unintentional oral and written misinformation (at best)
or by deliberate misstatement (or deliberate omission) of
oral and written information (at worst).” R. at 666.
"= R. at 667.
A-?1
trial court and, as a consequence, it was not error to
entertain the petition for injunction. As the Circuit
Court said in Tumulty v. District of Columbia, 69 App.
D.C. 390, 399-400, 102 F.2d 254, 263-64 (1939):
We think it clear that all administrative rem-
edies in matters of taxation must be exhausted
before resort can be had to court action. Nelson
v. First Nat. Bank, 8 Cir., 42 F.2d 30, but
think it equally clear that when the assessment
is void, the taxpayer may resort to equity for
relief, without following statutory remedies... .
[Emphasis supplied. ]
III
Appellees successfully contended in the trial court that
the fixing of a level of assessment for real property
is rulemaking within the meaning of the District of
Columbia Administrative Procedure Act.’* They con-
ceded there, and concede here, that prior to the effective
date of the DCAPA appellants had a right to make
a rule setting the level of assessment at 55% of market
value for residential property in the District and 65%
of market value for commercial property without notice
to or opportunity by the public to be heard. Conceded
also is appellants’ right at any time to change the level
of assessment of residential property to a higher per-
centage of market value if it is done in compliance with
the pertinent provisions of the DCAPA.
Appellants argue that the Constitution and the per-
1% D.C. Code 1972 Supp., § 1-1507(c). The DCAPA, effective
October 21, 1969, required that all administrative rules then
in effect be published in the District of Columbia Register by
October 21, 1970. It is undisputed that no rules governing
the method of assessment of real property have been published.
Pa 4 |
A-92
tinent statutory provision ‘’ governing assessment of rea!
property compel the same level of assessment be applied
to all real property in the District of Columbia; con-
sequently, any change in the level of assessment for
single-family residential property in the process of ac-
complishing equalization in assessment does not constitute
a rule within the meaning of the DCAPA.
D.C. Code 1972 Supp., § 1-1502(6) and ‘7! defines
the terms “rule” and “rulemaking” as:
(6) the term “rule’’ means the whole or any
part of any Commissioner’s ,Council’s, or agency
statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, in-
terpret, or prescribe law or policy or to de-
scribe the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of the Commissioner, Council, or
of any agency;
(7) the term “rulemaking’’ means Commis-
sioner’s, Council’s, or agency process for the
formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule:
The trial court found, correctly we think, that the
interpretation or implementation of the words “full and
true value” contained in $ 47-713 of the Code was a rule
within the meaning of § 1-1502(6) and its formulation
was rulemaking within the definition of § 1-1502(7).
The meaning of “full and true value” of single-family
residential properties had for a number of years been
55° of estimated market value. This 55° debasement
factor, albeit unpublished, was, under the Code defini-
** D.C. Code 1967, § 47-713, provides in pertinent part:
All real estate in the District of Columbia subject to
taxation, including improvements thereon, shall be listed
and assessed at not less than the full and true value
thereof in lawful money.
A-83
tion, a rule. Both the tax rate and the debasement factor
are fixed values in the assessment equation. The setting
of the tax rate by the City Council is admittedly a rule
which must be published, with an opportunity for a
public hearing provided for by the DCAPA. Setting or
changing the debasement factor affects the final tax bill
in exactly the same manner as does the setting of the
rate, and to allow the debasement factor to be secretly
established or changed would completely frustrate the
purpose of being able to review the tax rate later when
it is set each year.
Appellants argue that since they are constitutionally
required to achieve equalization of the level of assessment
of all real property, commercial and residential, a change
of the debasement factor is not rulemaking within the
meaning of the DCAPA. Should this constitutional re-
quirement exist, however, it does not compel the con-
clusion that the District may not be required to ac-
complish its goal by constitutionai means or that the
necessary changes of levels of assessment in the process
are not rules and rulemaking as defined in the DCAPA.
This court has held that a Commissioner’s Order di-
recting the Department of Human Resources to set the
level of public assistance payments at 759 of the public
assistance standards to be a rule, stating that “Com-
missioner’s Order No. 70-265, whether we consider it an
implementing directive, as Corporation Counsel char-
acterizes it, or prescribing policy, is a ‘rule’ as defined
by the D.C. APA... .” [Footnote omitted.) Junghans
v. Department of Human Resources, D.C.App., 289 A.2d
17, 23 (1972). A like holding is required here.
IV
Appellants contend that the tax policy of the District
has always been to uniformly apply a 65% debasement
~
pve AAT POT eet, * he hee ae ee ee ee ay ee ee eee ae ee
asa dle of
A-94
factor to all real property in the District of Columbia,
both residential and commercial. This “policy”, however,
has never been articulated to the general public and was
apparently unknown to some assessors. The facts are
that until 1969 the District compiled and used a real
estate assessment manual designed to achieve a debase-
ment of 65% of value, there being no identifiable market
value at that time to debase. Sales ratio studies under-
taken in 1968 revealed, however, that some single-family
residential properties were actually debased as low as
40%, although the desired 65° factor for multi-family
and commercial properties was substantially achieved.
As a result, the District developed a reassessment pro-
gram to equalize single-family residential properties with
other real property at a 65° levél of assessment. In an
effort to accomplish a common debasement factor while
maintaining relative equalization within the single-family
residential class a “stair-step’’ approach was decided upon
as the means to attain the desired result over a period
of time, an approach necessitated both by budgetary and
manpower considerations. The debasement factor of all
single-family residential properties was first raised to
55°, the next planned step being to raise the level of
assessment to 60% and the final goal being to elevate
the debasement factor of all such properties to 65°.
Thus, the level of assessment on over 33,000 single-family
residential properties was raised to 60% in fiscal 1973,
and an additional 44,485, those at issue in this case, had
been entered on the tax rolls for fiscal 1974 at 60.
Approximately 19,000 properties remain debased at 55%-.
The District of Columbia has no rule dividing real
property into various classes for the purpose of taxation.
The only requirement of these ad valorem taxes is that
they be administered in a fashion that results in equali-
4-85
zation of the tax burden on all property owners.‘ The
amount of a property owner’s tax bill must be related as
nearly as possible to the value of his property as com-
pared to the value of the property of others. The ratio
of his property’s value to the total value of property in
the District should parallel the amount of tax he pays
compared to total taxes paid by all property owners.
Equalization depends directly on a fair and critical
assessment of each piece of real property in the District.
As expert witnesses for the District testified, assessment
is an art which requires an experienced eye. It is there-
fore important, if taxes are to be equalized, that indi-
vidual assessments be done thoroughly. Appellants have
stressed that they have been unable, due to fiscal and
manpower shortages, to effectuate an adequate assess-
ment of all property in the District each year, and this
is understandable. Under such circumstances a cyclical
assessment program may be permissible, provided any in-
equalities resulting therefrom are of an accidental and
temporary character. See, e.g., Sunday Lake Iron Co. v.
Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918); Johnson » County of
Ramsey, 290 Minn. 307, 187 N.W.2d 675 (1971); Car-
konen v. Williams, 76 Wash.2d 617, 458 P.2d 280 (1969)
(en banod; Skinner v. New Mexico State Tax Commis-
sion, 66 N.M. 221, 345 P.2d 750 (1959). Indeed, appel-
lees agree that if the District had engaged in a cyclical
program of adjusting the fair market value of properties
in the city one group at a time, this case would not have
arisen. But the District did not follow this course. In-
stead, as the record shows, it chose to apply different de-
basement factors to the same class of property in the
* Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S, 522, 526 (1959);
Hillsborough T P v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946); Colgate
v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 428 (19385); Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Johnson, 214 F. 180 (8th Cir. 1914), aff’d, 289 U.S. 234
(1915).
A-86
same year and, in so doing, denied the appellees equal
protection of the laws by discriminating among residen-
tial taxpayers.”
In the case of Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp.
615, 621-22 (M.D. Ala. 1971), the court declared uncon-
stitutional under Alabama's ad valorem property tax sys-
tem the application of two different levels of assessment
to the same class of property, stating that “. . . while
the Fourteenth Amendment does not require precise equal-
ity or uniformity in taxation, or prohibit inequality in
taxation which results from mere mistake or error in
judgment of tax officials, it does ‘secure every person
within the state’s jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express
terms of a statute or by its improper execution through
duly constituted agents.’ .. .” {Footnotes omitted.)
The justification the District offers for the admitted
intentional disparity of debasement factor applied to tax-
payers within the same class is that the “stair-step” ap-
proach was the only way to bring all properties to tae
uniform level of assessment of 65° without seriously
frustrating the only long-range goal of the tax system—
equalization. The trial court did not accept the logic of
this conclusion, nor can we.
The only variable in the tax equation for real property
is the estimated fair market value. As the District ad-
mits, when the real estate market and other factors cause
the fair market value to fluctuate, nearly constant reas-
sessment is necessary, though not always feasible. If
actual fair market value is determined by the amount
realized in an arm’s length sale of property, a compari-
s Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), reads the Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection clause into the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment to apply it to the District of
Columbia.
A-97
son between the latest assessed value and this sales value
constitutes the assessment/sales ratio. The disparity be-
tween the two values is expressed by a dispersion co-
efficient. The higher the coefficient, the greater the dif-
ference between the last assessed fair market value and
the fair market value indicated by sale. Various factors
may account for such a difference, but in any event the
Board of Assessors is interested in minimizing the co-
efficient of dispersion.
The assessment,sales ratio may well vary in different
parts of the District, and even within the same block.
This disparity inevitably produces the undesirable result
of placing unequal] tax burdens on persons owning prop-
erty with the same fair market value. For example, if
two different taxpayers own property identical in fair
market value but one property is currently assessed at
a higher value than the other due to the inability of the
assessors to vague all property every year, taxpayers own-
ing property of identical values pay different tax bills.
As another example, if the property of each of these tax-
payers is currently assessed at the same market value
but as part of a “stair-step” approach to reach a uniform
65° debasement value one level of assessment rises to
60% while the other remains at 55%, the taxpayers
owning property worth the same amount in the taxable
year have different tax bills.
In neither of the above examples has the goal of equali-
zation been reached. Yet the two situations are distin-
guishable in important ways. In the first situation the
lack of equalization between taxpayers is undesirable
but permissible because caused by logistical problems
which may be temporarily beyond the power of the city
to correct. In the second case the lack of equalization is
‘aused by an intentional and arbitrary application of two
Te ee eT
A-83
different debasement factors to identical properties."* . The
aggrieved taxpayer in the first example may complain to
the Board of Equalization and Review if he feels that
his assessment is too high and, since the assessment of
fair market value is admittedly a rather subjective art,
by requesting reconsideration of his valuation, he may be
successful in lowering his assessment. The facts of the
instant case show that in the second example the ag-
grieved taxpayer has no meaningful ability to challenge
his assessment at all. No judgment would be made in
his case as the new debasement factor was arbitrarily
determined as was its applicability to certain real prop-
erty.
Estimated market value, being the only variable in
the equation determining the amount of tax owed, would
appear to be the factor to be periodically adjusted to
reflect changes in property values which the District
recognizes occur for many different reasons that are
difficult to forecast. If the District desires, or feels com-
pelled, to apply an equal debasement factor across the
board to all real property within the District, however,
the proper course would be to formulate such a rule and
publish it in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by the DCAPA. An immediate raise to 65°¢ might well
be politically unpleasant, as the District clearly recog-
nized but, if the need to raise the level of ass.ssment
to 65° is as compelled as the District contends, this
result is unavoidable. Moreover, it is just as unavoid-
able using the “stair-step” approach although perhaps
not as visible. In fact, evidence before the trial court
demonstrated the assessments in years where the “stair
The District argues that one of its exhibits in evidence
demonstrates that in reality the differential in levels of assess-
ment resulted in greater equalization than before, but appellees
disagree and the trial court did not so find, nor was it required
to do so.
A-89
steps’’ were being used caused assessment increases that
went above and beyond the increases that would have
been caused by property appreciation alone. This should
be no surprise, for any raise in the debasement factor
must raise the assessment. The fair market value can-
not be held below its true level while the debasement
factor is inched towards 65% simply to keep taxes the
same, at least if the concept of fair market value is to
have any clear and understandable meaning. And as
already mentioned, the facts of this case have highlighted
the importance to the taxpayer of an accurately stated
fair market value; it is the only element in the tax
formula to which he can meaningfully object. If real
increases in his property assessment are disguised in the
form of a higher debasement factor, he is totally remedi-
less within the normal avenues for seeking redress.
Finally, appellants complaint that the trial court’s order
“eonvert|s) a relatively equalized tax roll into a patently
discriminating tax roll.” '' The trial court determined
that the assessments at issue were void because of a
differential in levels of assessment within one class of
real property, and the District cannot now be heard to
say in this appeal that in attempting to cure one allegedly
discriminatory method of assessment between single-
family residential property and other classes of real
property it can in the process deliberately discriminate
between members within the one class of single-family
residential property owners. Therefore, irrespective of
whether the District may constitutionally differentiate in
the level of assessment applied to residential real property
as opposed to commercial real property, a question which
we need not and do not here decide, it clearly may not
do so within the single class of residential property
owners.
A firmed.
** Appellants’ brief at 12.
A-90
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
NO. 7986
District of Columbia, Appellant,
Vv.
Burlington Apartment House Company
T/A The Burlington Hotel, Appellee
Appeal from the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia
(Arqued January 22, 1975 Decided January 29, 1976)
Melvin J. Washington, Assistant Corporation
Counsel, with whom C. Francis Murphy, Cor-
poration Counsel, and Henry E. Wixon, Assis-
tant Corporation Counsel, were on the
brief, for appellant.
Christopher Sanger for appellee.
Before KELLY, GALLAGHER and HARRIS, Asso-
ciate Judges.
Opinion for the court by Associate Judge
KELLY.
Opinion by Associate Judge HARRIS concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part at p.
16.
KELLY, Associate Judge: The District of
Columbia here appeals from an order of the
trial court's Tax Divison reducing from
A-91
$84.61 to $67.00 per square foot the real
property tax assessment on Lot 97, Square
214, for the fiscal years 1973 and 1974.
The land in question is improved by a
structure known as The Burlington Hotel,
which is owned and operated by appellee.
The hotel was built between the years
1905 and 1910, is seven stories high, and
fronts on Vermont Avenue, N. W., just
south of Thomas Circle.?
The parcel of
land contains 42,408 square feet.
The District initially assessed Lot
97 at $92.30 per square foot for fiscal
2
year 1973, but on appeal to the District
I The District states in its brief that the
value of the improvements on the land is in-
significant and we do not include it hore, ex-
cept insofar as it is contained in the find-
ings of the trial court.
2 This represents a market value of $3,914,584.60
and a value on the tax rolls of $2,544,480.00,
the latter being an assessment at 65% of market
value.
A-92
of Columbia Board of Equalization and Re-
view, the assessment was adjusted to
$84.61 per square foot.> After the real
property tax derived from this assessment
was paid, appellee filed a petition with
the Tax Division of the Superior Court
seeking to further reduce the assessment
rate; first to $60.00 and later, by amend-
ment during trial, to $64.00 per square
foot. The court ultimately valuea* the
property at $67.00 per square foot for
both fiscal year 1973 and fiscal year 1974
and ordered that the District refund to
3 This represents a market value of $3,588,369.20
and a value on the tax rolls of $2,332,440.00.
4 Market value is that price which a willing
seller would be willing to accept and a will-
ing buyer would be willing to pay for the pro-
perty, assuming that both are knowledgeable of
all the present or potential elements of value
involved and that neither is under duress or
obligation to act. Reservation Eleven Asso-
ciates v. District of Columbia, 136 U.S.App.D.C.
311, 313, 420 F.2d 153, 155 (1969).
A-93
appellee a tax overpayment of $15,308.72,
with interest, within ten days of its
order. We affirm the trial court's deci-
sion relating to fiscal year 1973 and re-
verse as to fiscal year 1974.
I
Preliminarily, citing George Hyman Con-
struction Co. v. District of Columbia, D.C.App.,
315 A.2d 175, 177 (1974) and District of
Columbia v. Berenter, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 203
466 F.2d 367, 374 (1972), the District con-
tends that the Tax Division was without
jurisdiction to enter an order with regard
to fiscal year 1974 taxes since appellee
had failed to utilize the requisite statu-
tory procedures to contest that year's |
assessment. It stresses the fact that appel-
lee's petition in the Tax Division did not
include a refund request for fiscal year
1974 and that it was never amended to do so.
A-94
Two arguments are advanced by appellee
in support of the trial court's property
assessment for fiscal year 1974: first,
that the District had not "reassessed" or
"“revaluated" the property for that year,
but had merely adopted the Board's equa-
lized figure for fiscal year 1973; and
second, that once the value of the proper-
ty was finally equalized by the Tax Divi-
sion, this valuation was effective until
a new valuation of the property was made
according to law.
The statutory scheme for relief from
allegedly inaccurate fiscal year assess-
ments is found in D.C. Code 1973, §§ 47-709,
5 . :
47-2403 and 47-2404, and the administrative
5 The timetable for establishment, notice and
appeal of real estate assessments was substan-
tually revised by the District of Columbia Real
Tax Revision Act of 1974, P.L. 93-407,
§§401-29, 88 Stat. 1036 (effective July l,
1975) and regulations promulgated thereunder.
Regulation 74-35, 21 D.C. Register 1309-27
(effective Dec. 12, 1974).
A-95
remedies outlined there must be exhausted
before a taxpayer may pursue court action. °®
Sections 47-709 and 47-2403 provide that
where the assessment for the following fis-
cal year is received before March lst, or
after March lst but without an increase in
valuation, a complaint must be made to the
Board of Equalization and Review which sits
from January 1 through April 1 for that
particular purpose (D.C. Code 1973, § 47-708)
If such complaint is made and adversely de-
cided the taxpayer may, after all canes’ tor
the entire fiscal year are paid, appeal to
the Superior Court after October 1 and for
the six months following. Where, however,
there is an increase in valuation and notice
6 An exception existed where the assessment was
void. District of Columbia v. Green, D.C.App.,
310 A.2d 848, 852-53 (1973).
A-96
in writing is received after March lst, a
complaint to the Board is unnecessary. An
appeal can then be taken to the Superior
Court, after all taxes for the fiscal year
have been paid, beginning October 1 and
for six months following.
In the instant case, notice of the
fiscal year 1974 assessment of $2,332,440.00
was received by appellee sometime after
March 27, 1973, and was identical in amount
to the Board's equalized assessment for
fiscal year 1973. Thus, with regard to its
1974 tax, appellee would have had to com-
plain of the assessment to the Board and,
if unsuccessful, pay the tax and appeal to
Superior Court for the latter to have juris-
diction over its fiscal year 1974 taxes.
As appellee did none of these things, the
court had no authority to affects its taxes
A-97
for that fiscal year.’
II
The District also contends that it
could not be required, as the trial court
directed, to refund to appellee its fis-
cal year 1973 real property tax overpay-
ment within ten days of the court's order.
It asserts that the time and manner of re-
funding taxes erroneously paid are con-
trolled by the provisions of D.C. Code 1973,
?
7 We note in passing that different tax years
have long been regarded in the law as separate
entities, Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591,
598 (1948); Keokuk & W.R. Co. v. Missouri, 152
U.S. 301, 314-16 (1894), as have assessments also,
City of East Orange v. Township of Livingston, 103
N.J.Super. 109, 246 A.2d 722 (1968); People v.
Haring, 286 App.Div. 676, 146 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1955).
In District of Columbia v. Green, supra at 852, we
stated that in "exceptional and extraordinary"
circumstances (deliberate discrimination between
members of one class of property owners), equit-
able relief could be sought to enjoin the assess-
ment of a tax. However, the facts of this case
are such that resort to equitable relief is in-
appropriate. Appellee had an adequate remedy at
law to contest his 1974 assessment but failed to
invoke the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.
We thus disagree with the dissent's assertion
that our ruling curtails the Superior Court's
equity jurisdiction in tax cases.
A-98
§§ 47-1016 and 47-2407, the latter sec-
tion providing for the refund of sums
"finally determined" to have been erron-
eously paid. Finality is spelled out in
some detail in § 47-2404 which states, in
general, that a Superior Court order in
a civil tax matter which is appealed to
this court becomes final only when the
time for any other review or appeal has
expired or when 30 days have elapsed
after certain dispositions, such as an
affirmance by the Supreme Court or the
rendering of an opinion by the Superior
Court in accordance with the mandate of
either the Supreme Court or this court.
Accordingly, since the order here in ques-
tion will not be final until thee@ppeal
process is completed, the trial court's
direction that the District refund the
contested overpayment within ten days was
an invalid attempt to confer finality on
A-99
its order in a manner which conflicts with
the statute and, in addition, which in-
fringes upon the right of the parties to
appeal. °
IIl
Numerous claims of error regarding the
court's ultimate fiscal year 1973 assessment
are advanced by the District, the one most
pressing here being the exclusion at trial
of a prior offer by appellee to sell the pro-
perty. From the deposition of appellee's
president it appears that in the Spring of
1972 he had authorized a real estate agent
to sell the property for $70.00 per square
foot and that during subsequent negotia-
tions he asked $75.00 per square foot for
the property with the furniture and
§ D.C. App.R4 Ii(a) (1); D.C. Code 1973, § 11-721
(a)-(c).
A-100
fixtures included.” However, these nego-
tiations never resulted in the grant of an
option to purchase the property. The Dis-
trict nevertheless claims that the asking
prices set by the owner for purposes of
sale should have been allowed in evidence
as admissions against interest and as pro-
bative of fair market value.
There is some authority which holds
that in actions to which the owner of pro-
perty is a party, his offers to sell the
property may be introduced as admissions
by the opposing party, provided they are
10
not too remote in time, and one juris-
3 Other efforts to sell the property in 1973
sought to be introduced are not relevant to the
issue of market value for fiscal year 1973 which
had to be determined as of July 1, 1972.
10 United States v. Certain Land in Baltimore
County, Maryland, 209 F.Supp. 50, 56 (D.Md. 1962);
Durika v. School District of Derry Township, 415
Pa. 480, 203 A.2d 474 (1964) (Cohen, J., dissent-
ing); cf. Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United
States, 261 U.S. 581, 589 (1923).
&
‘A-101
diction has held that offers by a land-
owner to sell his property are among the
factors to be considered in assessing
the property for purposes of taxation.
We do not understand that Cloud v. Veeder,
41 Ala.App. 558, 140 So.2d 292 (1962),
cited by appellee, holds to the contrary.
In Cloud, a property owner, suing for
damages for fraud in its sale to him,
testified to the price at which he was
subsequently offering the house for sale.
Similarly, in United States v. Smith, 355 F.
2d 807, 810-11 (5th Cir. 1966), evidence
of options was introduced on behalf of a
landowner-condemnee (which, in addition,
Il Alstores Realty, Inc. v. State, 286 Minn.
343, 176 N.W.2d 112 (1970); Schleiff v. County
of Freeborn, 231 Minn. 389, 43 N.W.2d 265 (1950);
State v. Russell-Miller Milling Co., 182 Minn.
543, 235 N.W. 22 (1931) (cited by that court
as In re Delinquent Real Estate Taxes, Waseca
County) .
A-102
concerned other properties). In both cases
the testimony was held to be self-serving
and therefore inadmissible.
Appellee asserts, however, and we
agree, that even if the court's evidentiary
ruling was error, the error was harmless
in view of other testimony given at trial.
For example, the District presented the
court with data on nine sales in the sur-
rounding area through an expert witness
and his prepared appraisal report.
These sales ranged in value from $67.00
to $147.00 per square foot, and the wit-
ness testified that in his opinion the
market value of the property was $84.00
12 This testimony is discussed in greater de-
tail infra.
A-103
per square foot. Thus, there was credible
testimony on which the court could have
based a finding that the value of the pro-
perty exceeded the owner's asking price of
$75.00 per square foot had it been so
persuaded. }3
IV
The District's next contention with
regard to the fiscal year 1973 assessment
is that the court's valuation of the pro-
perty is against the weight of the evidence.
In particular, the District argues that
appellee's appraisal report was not proba-
tive because its expert witness (1) did not
inquire into the circumstances of the sales
13 We are in agreement with the trial court's
observation that an unacted upon offer to sell is
not highly probative of value in the context of
an assessment proceeding.
A-104
on which his opinion was based and (2)
used in his report sales which were not
comparable because they were of properties
which were smaller and less accessible
than the subject property. It also attacks
the testimony of appellee's other expert
witness on the ground that he did not in-
quire into the circumstances of the sales
upon which his opinion was based. Lastly,
the District complains that the court's
valuation of the property was less than
that given the property by appellee and its
experts.
Notwithstanding the District's insis-
tence that to have this assessment reduced
14 Several other claims of error by the District
of this tenor have been considered and found to
be without merit.
A-105
appellee must show that the qprtespent's
assessment of the property resulted from
fraud, illegality or, at the very least,
that it was arbitrary and inequitable,
our standard of review of purportedly
erroneous property assessments is whether
the property has been assessed in accor-
dance with the statute, i.e., at "the full
and true value thereof in lawful money”.
D.C. Code 1973, § 47-713. And the findings
of the Tax Division must be accepted unless
they are clearly erroneous. District of Colum
bia v. Neyman, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 193,196, 417
F.2d 1140, 1143 (1969); Super.Ct.Civ. R.52(a) 2°
15 The District relies upon District of Columbia v.
Capital Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc., D.C.Mun.App.
106 A.2d 695 (1954) (Hood, J., concurring). That
case does not apply to proceedings in the Tax Divi-
sion, however. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Oo. v. District
of Columbia, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 73, 76 n.3, 337 F.2d
109, 112 n.3 (1964).
16 "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm convictim that a mistake has been conmmit-
ted." United States v. United States Gypsum Company,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); cf. 4 K. Davis, Administra-
tive Law §29.02 at 121-22 (1958).
A-106
In general, real property is valued for
tax purposes according to its highest and
best use rather than according to its actual
17 And once the
use at the time of valuation.
highest and best use has been established, or
is assumed, the tax appraiser may use any one
or all of several different methods for esti-
mating value. ’ Many factors are relevant to
the appraisal of real property, including loca-
tion, size, use, neighborhood, and special
‘17 Wagner v. Commissioner of Taxation, 258 Minn.
330, 104 N.W.2d 26 (1960); National Folding Box
Co. v. City of New Haven, 146 Conn. 578, 153 A.2d
420 (1959). Condemnation cases such as State v.
Hedwig, Inc., 133 So.2d 180, 182 (La.App. 1961),
overruled on other grounds, State, Dept. of High-
ways v. Terrace Land Co., 298 S.2d 859, 862 (La.
1974), are also relevant here as market value
is determined in the same way in both condemna-
tion and assessment proceedings. Sorokach v.
Trusewich, 35 N.J.Super. 86, 113 A.2d 194 (1955).
18 Weil v. Supervisors of Assessments of Washing-
ton Co., 266 Md. 238, 292 A.2d 68 (1972); Fitz-
simmons v. McCorkle, 59 Del. 94, 214 A.2d 334
(1965).
A-107
ae 19
utility of property. Reference to sales
of similar properties is sometimes refer-
20 and some-
red to as a method of valuation
times such sales are considered as one of
the factors contributing to the determina-
21 Additionally, whether or not the
tion.
sales used by a party to establish value
are comparable to the subject property is
a factual issue which the trial judge has
discretion to determine .2* Where sales are
not comparable they are irrelevant to the
19 J.H. Becker, Inc. v. Township of Marlboro,
82 N.J.Super. 519, 198 A.2d 463 (1964); Traylor
v. City of Allentown, 378 Pa. 489, 106 A.2d 577
(1954); Schleiff v. County of Freeborn, supra
note 11, 43 N.W.2d at 268.
20 E.g., Lerner Shops of Connecticut, Inc. v.
Town of Waterbury, 151 Conn. 79, 193 A.2d 472
(1963).
21 See cases cited supra note 19.
22 Leeaye, Inc. v. District of Columbia Re-
development Land Agency, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 316,
296 F.2d 438 (1961).
A-108
proceeding and hence inadmissible 2 but
sales may be comparable where properties
are used or could be used for the same pur-
pose but do not occupy adjacent tracts.”
Appellee called three witnesses at
trial. Mr. Hudson Moses, its president,
testified that in his opinion the value
of the corporate property was influenced
by its proximity to the 14th Street neigh-
borhood, the location of bars, peep shows,
pornographic bookstores, strip joints, and
23 District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency
v. 61 Parcels of Land, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 368,
235 F.2d 864, 865 (1956). See also State, By and
Its Road Commission v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d
295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972).
24 United States v. American Pumice Company, 404
F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1968) [condemnation, pumice
claim ]; Weil v. Supervisors of Assessments of
Washington Co., supra note 18 fassessment, gasoline
service station] ; Traylor v. City of Allentown,
supra note 19 [fassessment, hotel and apartment
property] ; cf. District of Columbia v. Lot 813
in Square 568, 232 F.Supp. 714, 718 (D.D.C. 1964),
aff'd sub nom. Rubenstein v. District of Columbia,
120 U.S.App.D.C. 352, 346 F.2d 833 (1965) (Fahy,
J., dissenting).
A-109
prostitution. Mr. William Calomiris, a real
estate broker who had previously been enaaaed
to lease or sell the property, testified that
an office building with a lease to the govern-
ment would be the highest and best use of the
property. He said that he would not consider
any other use as feasible, and particularly
not a motel, since a relatively new hotel in
the area was doing very poorly. In his
opinion, based on comparable sales in the
area, the property was worth $64.00 per square
foot.
Mr. Calomiris regarded the property as
part of a neighborhood stretching from Ver-
mont Avenue, east to 13th Street, and south
from Thomas Circle to about K Street, N. W.
The ten sales on which he based his deter-
mination of market value were, for the most
part, located within these boundaries and
ranged from $36.00 to $69.00 per square foot.
Sales of properties cited by Mr. Calomiris
A-110
as being on the same block as the subject
property were two on Thomas Circle, which
sold for $60.70 and $46.00 per square
foot in 1972, and 1104-06 Vermont Avenue,
N.W., just south of the Burlington Hotel,
which sold for $64.00 per square foot in
1967. Mr. Calomiris thought that 15th
and M Streets, N. W., was an entirely. dif-
ferent area from 14th Street and Thomas
Circle, and that while 15th Street marked
the point at which the downtown commer-
cial district began to improve, 14th
Street had been unable to attract desir-
able tenants.
Appellee's third witness was Mr.
Anthony Reynolds, a professional real es-
tate appraiser, who testified that the
highest and best use of the property was
a new single structure office building
with a single tenant such as the (U.S.)
Government Services Administration. He
A-111
described GSA's requirements at that time
as being a minimum of 300,000 square feet
of floor area. Mr. Reynolds testified that .
there had been no successful privately
occupied new building east of 15th Street
Since 1965 (and perhaps since World War
II), and that that area was regarded as
a different market from the area west
of 15th Street. Mr. Reynolds considered
four sales in the same block as the sub-
ject property to be comparable. These
parcels all fronted on Thomas Circle, with
one being adjacent to Lot 97, and were
sold for $69.20, $67.95, $60.70, and $46.59
per square foot during June, July and August
of 1972. He viewed these parcels as being
assembled for a building site.
Mr. Reynolds also considered sites in
other portions of downtown Washington that
were comparable in size to appellee's pro-
perty and had been developed for GSA use.
A-112
In his opinion these sites were comparable
because they had the same highest use and
because the rent for the new office space
leased by the government was virtually the
same, irrespective of location. The four
sites included one bought for new construc-
tion to be Leseed by the government in
May 1972, one purchased by the District
of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency in
1971, one that had been acquired by the
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company
in 1970, and one acquired by GSA for reno-
vation in 1971. Prices paid for the sites,
adjusted to account for the difference in
building area permitted by zoning, were
$57.40, $56.90, $70.60, and $60.70 per
square foot.
Mr. Robert K. Briden, a real estate
appraiser for the District of Columbia De-
partment of Finance and Revenue, was the
District's expert witness. His opinion
A-113
was that the highest and best use of the
property was its subdivision and develop-
ment as two new office buildings and a
motel, each occupying a lot of about
15,000 square feet. His feeling was that
such use would be in keeping with new
development nearby on 15th Street, parti-
cularly since the area of Vermont Avenue
above K Street was being revitalized. In
setting his valuation of the property, Mr.
Briden conSidered nine comparable sales.
Of these, he relied primarily on three: a
sale in 1965 of property in the same block,
but fronting on L Street, for $91.38 per
square foot; a sale in 1966 of a triangular
site directly across from the Burlington
for $74.72 per square foot; and a sale in
19°67 of property at the southwest corner
of 15th and M Streets for $104.72 per
square foot. He testified that his method
of valuing the subject property was to take
each of the actual sales, add a percentage
A-114 A-115
increase for appreciation to July 1, 1972, Based on the foregoing testimony and
then make a percentage adjustment for dif- the appraisal reports submitted by both par-
ferences in location, corner location, ties the trial judge concluded that the
size, zoning, floor area ratio, commercial highest and best use of the subject property
“usefulness, and alley (attiuimen was the development of a single office build-
Mr. Briden stated that he did not rely ing for rental to one large organization
on the sales of properties to the north such as the GSA or the telephone company.
of the Burlington, fronting on Thomas He found two sets of sales relevant to the
Circle, because they were so much smaller question of fair market value: the four 1972
and because one, in his opinion, was not a sales in the same block of properties on
true land sale. He thought that develop- Thomas Circle and the four sales of land as
ment on Vermont Avenue was being influenced a site for the GSA or a similar tenant which
by the new construction on 15th Street and were contained in appellee's appraisal re-
believed that Vermont Avenue was not a good port. The trial judge further found that
location for GSA because none of the build- the market value of the property on July l,
ings along 15th Street were currently occu- 1972 was $67.00 per square foot. In our
pied by GSA. judgment, all of these findings are support-
25 In terms of location, a site mom Vermont Avenue ed by the evidence and are not clearly erron-
was worth 25 per cent less than a mid-block site
on L Street, N. W., and 35 per cent less than a eous.
mid-block site on 15th Street, N. W., in the witness'
calculations. As to the District's specific objec-
tions to the findings of the court, the
A-116
sales used by appellee to support its esti-
mated valuation were competent evidence so
long as they did not result from foreclo-
sure or legal compulsion. District of Colum
bia Redevelopment Land Agency v. 61 Parcels of
Land, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 3€7, 368, 235 F.2d 864,
865 (1956); Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d
391, 397 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
772 (1944). The motivations and circum-
stances of the sales go.to the weight of
the evidence offered and not to its admis-
sibility. District of Columbia Redevelopment
Land Agency v. 61 Parcels of Land, supra at 369,
235 F.2d at 866.
Whether or not the sales used to
compute valution were comparable to the
subject property was, as stated earlier,
a matter for the trial judge to determine.
Here, there was a broad range of testimony
concerning sales of different land par-
cels to aid the trial judge in resolving
A-117
the issue of market value. In reaching
this resolution it was reasonable for
the trial judge to consider four parcels
on the same block as the subject pro-
perty, all sold within a month or two
of the appraisal date, as probative.
He was aware that the parcels were smal-
ler than Lot 97, but he was also aware
that they were most probably being assem-
bled to make a larger building site and
that contrary to the subject property
they enjoyed a prominent location on
Thomas Circle. We conclude, therefore,
that the court's finding of compara-
bility of sales has sound support in the
evidence.
The District's claim that the value
which the court assigned to the property
was less than the value testified to by
appellee's own experts is likewise with-
out significance. The property was valued
A-118 A-119
at $64.00 per square foot by one and assessment for fiscal year 1973, and in
$67.20 by the other, and the court all other respects is affirmed.
arrived at an ultimate valuation of So Ordered.
$67.00 per square foot. In any event,
the opinions of the expert witnesses
are simply evidence to aid the trier of
fact in reaching a decision and are not
conclusive. Cohn v. City and Town of Hartford,
130 Conn. 699, 37 A.2d 237 (1944).
V
Both parties agree that the trial
court made a slight arithmetical error
in its determination of Lot 97's total
debased assessed value due to the inad-
vertent inclusion of a small adjacent
parcel owned by appellee. The property's
final debased assessment value for fiscal
year 1973 should be $1,846,868.40 and not
$1,871,334.79. Accordingly, the order
appealed from is reversed as to fiscal
26 See D.C. Code 1973, §47-2404(a).
year 1974, reduced as to the total debased
-
A-120
HARRIS, Associate Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part: While I con-
cur in Parts II, III, IV, and V of the
majority opinion, I am unable to agree
with the conclusion expressed in Part I.
In my judgment, the result reached on that
issue is contrary to the language and in-
tend of the statutory scheme, and wrongly
circumscribes the normal discretionary
authority of the trial court in disregard
of both the Rules of Civil Procedure and
traditional equitable and constitutional
principles. I therefore respectfully dis-
sent from that aspect of the majority
opinion which inflicts upon appellee a
valuation for 1974 (and subsequent years)
which we unanimously recognize to be ex-
cessive.
I
In February 1972, the District issued
a notice of assessment for fiscal year 1973
A-121
for the Burlington Hotel property. Appel-
lee appealed the Assessor's evaluation to
the District of Columbia Board of Equali-
zation and Review. D.C. Code 1973, §§47-
708 and 47-709. Following a hearing the
Board issued an order establishing a some-
what reduced fair market value for taxa-
tion purposes. Appellee then paid the
tax and filed a timely petition contest-
ing the Board's order in the Superior
Court. Id., § 47-2403.
The trial court agreed with appel-
lee's contention that the 1973 valuation
was arbitrarily high. It arrived at a re-
duced valuation as legal and correct. We
properly affirm that decision. In com-
pliance with the Code and in justice to
the taxpayer, the trial court not only or-
dered the assessment for 1973 lowered, but
also decreed "that the aforesaid reduced
assessment. . .shall constitute the full
A-122
and lawful assessment. . .pursuant to Dis-
trict of Columbia Code § 47-709, for all
succeeding years until another valuation
is made according to law".
On some date after March 27, 1973
(otherwise unspecified in the record),
the District notified appellee of the
assessment on the Burlington Hotel pro-
perty for fiscal year 1974. The figure
thus conveyed was not based upon a re-
assessment or new valuation. Rather, the
District merely used the fiscal 1973
figure, which then was being disputed in
the Superior Court.
The District argues, and the majority
agrees, that the District now may employ
an admittedly incorrect valuation in the
fiscal 1974 assessment, and that we may
not sustain the continued use of the lower
valuation which both the trial court and
we have held to be proper. Thus, the
A-123
majority tells appellee, you have won the
battle but lost the war. The majority
arrives at this anomaly by the following
rather facile syllogism, which apparently
leads it to conclude that the trial court
was powerless to extend the diminished
taxation based beyond fiscal 1973:
In the instant case, notice of
the fiscal year 1974 assessment
. « e-was received by appellee
sometime after March 27, 1973,
and was identical in amount to
the Board's equal
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